[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 133 (Thursday, September 25, 2003)]
[House]
[Pages H8944-H8947]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        THE PRESIDENT'S WAR REQUEST AND AMERICA'S FUTURE COURSE

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bishop of Utah). Under the Speaker's 
announced policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from North Carolina 
(Mr. Price) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the 
minority leader.
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, the President's request of 
an $87 billion supplemental appropriation on top of $79 billion already 
appropriated has prompted renewed debate over our military operations 
in Iraq, our plans for the subsequent reconstruction of that country, 
and our broader policy objectives in the Middle East.
  We must take to a successful conclusion the securing of Iraq, the 
rebuilding of the country's economy and infrastructure, and the 
transition to an indigenous democratic government. We must provide our 
forces in Iraq the resources they need to complete their mission and to 
enhance their safety and security while they are performing their 
mission. But the Bush administration must give a full accounting of how 
we plan to reach these goals, how we are going to meet the costs, and 
how we are to enlist the necessary international support.
  This afternoon, Mr. Speaker, I want to specify certain key questions 
and expectations that Members of Congress must bring to the 
consideration of the President's request.
  This request is considerably overdue. For far too long the Bush 
administration refused to estimate the precise costs of the war as it 
pushed for tax cuts upon tax cuts, mainly benefitting the wealthiest 
Americans, and as it presided over a 2-year, $8 trillion fiscal 
reversal, the largest in our country's history.
  But now the bill is coming due, and that stubborn fact, in addition 
to the critical situation on the ground in Iraq, has forced the 
President's hand.
  That is not to say he has totally come clean. The President's request 
of $20 billion for reconstruction covers less than half of the 
projected costs. And it is bound to increase if his optimistic estimate 
as to oil revenues and contributions from allies do not materialize. 
Nor are we ever likely to hear

[[Page H8945]]

the President acknowledge that every dime of that $87 billion is 
borrowed money, adding to what was already a record Federal deficit.
  How much money is $87 billion? It is three times what we spend each 
year on major disease research at the National Institutes of Health. It 
is more than double our entire post-9/11 Homeland Security budget. It 
amounts to $3.5 million each week throughout 2004 for each of the 435 
congressional districts in our country; $3.5 million dollars each week 
for each district. I will leave it to colleagues to calculate what this 
could mean in terms of covering the uninsured or upgrading our schools 
or improving roads and mass transit.
  So the cost of our Iraqi intervention is immense and we are reminded 
daily of the human cost as well. American fatalities since the 
President declared the combat phase concluded now number 158, more than 
the 139 incurred during active combat. Honest acknowledgment of these 
costs is essential both to assessing our Nation's course thus far and 
to charting our course ahead.
  As it became more and more evident last winter that nothing was 
likely to divert the President from the course he had chosen in Iraq, 
I, like others, took to the House floor to raise questions that the 
administration had not answered, questions which were basic to any 
rationale for war:
  ``What accounting do we have of the costs and risks of military 
invasion? How are we to secure and maintain the support and engagement 
of our allies? Can Iraq be disarmed by means that do not divert us 
from, or otherwise compromise, equally or more urgent anti-terrorist 
and diplomatic objectives? Do we have a credible plan for rebuilding 
and governing post-war Iraq? Have we secured the necessary 
international cooperation ensure that this does not become a perceived 
U.S. occupation?''
  I must say in retrospect that those were legitimate and important 
questions. In some areas, the administration had no answer or wrong 
answers, and in others they refused to level with Congress and the 
American people.

                              {time}  1600

  On one of the few instances when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
addressed the war's costs, he echoed OMB Mitch Daniels with an estimate 
of ``something under $50 billion.'' That was in January, and a few 
weeks later his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, described Iraq as ``a country 
that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.'' 
Such statements help us understand the fix we are in in Iraq and the 
pressure the administration is now facing to give an honest accounting, 
along with a credible plan, complete with cost and deployment 
estimates, going forward.
  The President's $87 billion supplemental appropriations request has 
been accompanied by a return to the United Nations to seek the support, 
for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq, of the allies the 
administration once spurned. This appears to be, as Ron Brownstein of 
the Los Angeles Times termed it, a case of ``reality trumping 
ideology,'' based on the realization that under present policies the 
President does not have the means to achieve his ends in Iraq. But it 
does not yet amount to the mid-course correction that is called for.
  The administration still has a long way to go in presenting to the 
American people and to our prospective allies a credible plan for 
securing and rebuilding Iraq. There is no time to spare, as the New 
York Times editorialized on September 14, ``If Mr. Bush does not 
demonstrate a clear and convincing strategy soon, he may face political 
pressure to bring home American troops under conditions that would be 
embarrassing for America and perilous for the Middle East.''
  In the first place, Mr. Speaker, the President must provide a 
straightforward account of how the $79 billion already appropriated has 
been spent and what the newly requested $87 billion will buy. 
Accountability for funds thus far expended; justification for the 
present request; and an honest estimate of the costs yet to come.
  Is the request consistent with our first priority of combatting 
terrorism in Afghanistan and beyond? Is it based on realistic estimates 
of funding from oil revenues and from allied contributions? Even if we 
succeed in enlisting additional allies, that will only partially ease 
our financial burden. Current plans, for example, are for Poland to 
lead a multinational force of some 19 countries in the central-southern 
region of Iraq. But of the estimated $240 million cost of the 
operation, Poland is expected to pay no more than $40 million, with the 
U.S. covering the rest.
  It is critically important, I believe, to focus separately on the 
portion of the President's of $87 billion request that is targeted to 
Afghanistan: $11 billion for military operations and $800 million for 
reconstruction. Those numbers pale in comparison to the Iraq request, 
and they may not be sufficient. In crucial respects, our Afghan 
operations offer a contrast to Iraq. Afghanistan was a war of 
necessity. It was directly related to the 9/11 attacks. It was endorsed 
and supported almost unanimously by the world community. The NATO 
alliance has now assumed responsibility for ongoing operations there. 
Yet the country is largely unsecured outside of Kabul and the top 
leadership of both the Taliban and al Qaeda is still at large.
  Our decision to deal with the Iraqi challenge through a massive 
military invasion has arguably set back the broader war on terrorism, 
allowing the Taliban and al Qaeda to regroup. There is no place in the 
world where it is more important to position U.S. Special Forces than 
in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region where Taliban and al Qaeda 
forces are still operating. Our Special Forces must be fully supported, 
and they must not be further diverted until their mission is concluded.
  The Afghan reconstruction funding will partially address such 
critical needs as road and school construction, irrigation projects, 
and training a self-sustaining Afghan security force. This aid may also 
help shore up some support for the embattled, pro-Western President of 
Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai. However, decades of civil war have left the 
nation without such basic needs as a modern electric power 
infrastructure, urban sanitation systems, or an advanced medical 
infrastructure. There is much left to do, and it will take a concerted 
multinational effort to meet these needs.
  The administration must also explain to Congress and the public how 
the $87 billion, all of it deficit spending, far beyond the scale of 
most emergency supplemental appropriations requests, is to be paid for. 
In particular, is it either fair or fiscally prudent to leave in place, 
much less to extend, massive tax cuts for those in the highest 
brackets, tax cuts that have produced unprecedented annual deficits and 
that mock the very idea of shared sacrifice?
  Secondly, the administration must deal with the question of troop 
strength. The supplemental appropriations request assumes American 
troops will remain at present levels for at least another year. We in 
North Carolina have particular reason to recognize the spectacular 
performance of our men and women in uniform during the combat phase and 
the valor and commitment they continue to display under trying 
conditions. Tens of thousands of these troops have been deployed from 
our State, including National Guard and Reserve units that have been 
subject to repeated call-ups.

  By the same token, however, North Carolinians have been especially 
attentive to evidence of administration misjudgments as to the troop 
levels that would be required in post-war Iraq, to extensions in the 
tours of many units, and to the mismatch between what these troops have 
been trained for and the security and reconstruction functions that 
they are being called upon to perform.
  Secretary Rumsfeld has offered dubious assurances, despite the 
continuing level of violence, that no more troops are needed; but the 
administration has not explained how even the present level of 
deployment in Iraq can be sustained. Of the Army's 33 active duty 
combat brigades, 16 are currently assigned to Iraq and five elsewhere 
overseas. Almost all of the others are needed for rotation purposes, 
mainly in Iraq, and for emergency standby related to North Korea. As of 
last week, more than 128,000 Army Guard and Reserve members, or 23 
percent of the force, were mobilized in support of operations overseas 
and in the United States, many on yearlong tours, with thousands more 
to be deployed or redeployed soon.

[[Page H8946]]

  Thirdly, what is the administration's plan for securing allied 
participation and how much relief can this realistically afford 
relative to American financial and personnel requirements? The tens of 
thousands of additional troops and the billions of dollars of 
additional funding that we need in Iraq, as well as our broader 
antiterrorist and peacemaking endeavors in the Middle East, will 
require intensive diplomatic repair work in the coming weeks. The 
return of Secretary Powell and of the President to the United Nations 
is a necessary first step toward the cooperative ties we must forge 
with allies ranging from Germany and France to India and Turkey and 
Egypt. At the same time, we must press ahead with the recruitment and 
training of indigenous Iraqi police and security forces and the 
transition to Iraqi self-rule.
  Finally, we look to the President for a reaffirmation of America's 
commitment to Middle East peacemaking. After almost 2\1/2\ years of 
ill-advised disengagement from the quest for a fair and enduring 
settlement between Israel and its neighbors, the President has 
commendably joined with our ``Quartet'' partners, the European Union, 
the United Nations and Russia, to announce the ``Road Map'' initiative 
for mutual, step-by-step Israeli-Palestinian accommodations.
  Recent weeks have not been auspicious for the Road Map initiative. 
Hamas suicide bombers have conducted devastating attacks, killing and 
maiming dozens of Israelis, many of them teenagers and children. The 
Israeli government has stepped up its targeted assassination of Hamas 
leaders and members and has tightened its chokehold on the occupied 
territories.
  In fact, the two sides seemed locked in a death grip. Violent deaths 
since the collapse of the peace process number 858 among Israelis and 
2,468 Palestinians. Who would not be moved by the story of two of the 
victims of the September 9 Jerusalem bombing, Dr. David Applebaum and 
his daughter Naava, out on an errand the night before what was to be 
her happy wedding day? Such wrenching stories underscore again and 
again the urgency of reaching a settlement that ensures security and 
integrity for Israel and a viable state for the Palestinians. And in 
the post-9/11 world, Middle East peacemaking has assumed an added 
dimension. ``Suicide bombing is becoming so routine'' in Israel/
Palestine, Thomas Friedman recently wrote, ``that it risks becoming 
embedded in contemporary culture. America must stop it. A credible 
peace deal is no longer a U.S. luxury: it is essential to our own 
homeland security. Otherwise, this suicide madness will spread, and it 
will be Americans who will have to learn how to live with it.''
  The simultaneous steps that the Road Map envisions are politically 
difficult and vulnerable to sabotage. The Israeli government, reluctant 
to challenge the settlers in any case, is doubly so when the likely 
reward is another horrific bombing by Hamas, whose structure of terror 
remains intact. As for the Palestinians, they feel they are being asked 
to risk a civil war by taking on militant groups by force without 
assurances that settlements will actually be removed from Palestinian 
territory or statehood achieved. That is why American leadership is 
absolutely essential, to help ensure that both sides in fact comply 
with the road map and that the process is steadied against the 
predictable attempts at sabotage by the enemies of peace.
  If the process remains stalled and the violence continues, American 
leaders may need to think outside the Road-Map ``box'' in terms of 
putting a peace plan on the table proactively. What is not even 
thinkable is for our government again to disengage and to let that 
death grip tighten.

  Mr. Speaker, we are at a critical juncture in the war on terrorism 
and in our Nation's engagement in the Middle East. We must push ahead 
with the reconstruction and democratization of Afghanistan and Iraq, 
preventing either a return to tyranny or a collapse into violence that 
would allow forces deadly to our country's vital interests to take 
root.
  That is what the supplemental appropriations requested by the 
President must help underwrite, and that is why I expect that most of 
us in this body are likely in due course to support something close to 
the requested amount. But while Congress was willing to provide a blank 
check in the past, it does not seem likely to do so now. We must have 
an accounting of the administration's strategy going forward, its 
timetables and objectives, its costs and personnel requirements, how 
our allies will share in its obligation, and how past mistakes will be 
corrected or avoided. The committees of the Congress must schedule 
sufficient hearings to allow administration officials to make their 
case and to allow Members to question them fully.
  The need for mid-course correction raises serious issues, yet 
unresolved, about the path to war that the President chose. We will no 
doubt debate these questions for years to come, and we cannot allow 
them to paralyze us now. But if we are to correct our course and go 
forward successfully, we must confront the flawed premises and the 
failed diplomacy that set the terms of the Iraqi invasion. In closing, 
I want to underscore the importance of one of these pieces of 
unfinished business, not merely to clear the air but also to clarify 
what Congress and the American people must demand of this 
administration or of any administration in the future. I am referring 
to the intelligence and to the interpretations of intelligence on which 
the decision to invade Iraq was based.
  We are all aware, Mr. Speaker, of the perils of 20/20 hindsight. And 
on some questions, most notably Iraq's possession of chemical and 
biological weapons, even hindsight is still unclear. Iraq possessed and 
used such weapons in the past. Yet after 5 months, no stockpiles have 
been found. U.S. weapons inspector David Kay is soon expected to make 
an interim report to Congress on the Iraqis weapons program. By all 
reports, he will suggest that Saddam may have intended to produce 
weapons when and if U.N. inspectors left Iraq. However, intent does not 
constitute an imminent threat. While Mr. Kay has work left to do, he 
has yet to uncover the threat that we expected.
  Regarding Iraq's development of deployable nuclear weapons and the 
tenuous linkage between al Qaeda and the Iraqi government, we are not 
simply talking about 20/20 hindsight. We are talking about evidence 
that Members of this body knew, or should have known, to be shaky as 
early as the October congressional vote authorizing the use of force 
and certainly in the winter months leading up to the invasion.
  The President and administration officials continue to obfuscate the 
Iraqi-al Qaeda link, which now may become a self-fulfilling prophecy as 
Iraq becomes a magnet for terrorist operatives from around the region. 
As for the claims by the President, the Vice President, and others that 
Iraq was attempting to reconstitute its nuclear program, we have the 
testimony of retired foreign service officer Joseph Wilson, who was 
dispatched to Niger in early 2002 to investigate reported sales of 
uranium ore to Iraq. ``Based on my experience with the administration 
in the months leading up to the war,'' Wilson wrote, ``I have little 
choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq's 
nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat.''

                              {time}  1615

  The House and Senate Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence are 
currently conducting investigations which we are assured will focus not 
only on the prewar performance of U.S. intelligence agencies but also 
on how the White House used intelligence information to make the case 
for war. These investigations must be thorough and objective, following 
the facts wherever they lead. We commend these colleagues for the hard 
work they have done thus far. They know we are counting on them for a 
conscientious and comprehensive job. If this investigation takes a 
partisan turn, or if there is any hint of pressure to protect the 
administration, sentiment may well shift toward an inquiry by an 
independent commission of the sort the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Waxman) has proposed. We must never conclude, despite the undisputed 
fact that Saddam Hussein was a blood-soaked tyrant, and that both the 
Iraqis and the world are better off with him gone--we still must never 
conclude that the credibility of the reasons that our government gave 
to the American people

[[Page H8947]]

and to our potential allies for going to war do not matter. These 
reasons, which centered on the grave threat posed by Iraq's weapons 
program, do matter. If they are found to have been based on fallacious 
or manipulated evidence, the blow to our international credibility and 
to the integrity of the discourse on which our democracy depends will 
be profound.
  Mr. Speaker, there will be many calls for national unity and resolve 
as we consider the President's $87 billion request and contemplate the 
long, hard road ahead. I will join in those calls, for the challenges 
confronting our country transcend political divisions and the 
differences we have had in the past. But the administration needs to 
understand its end of the bargain, for in a democracy, where power is 
shared between the executive and legislative branches of government, 
critical decisions must not be taken in an atmosphere of deception or 
political intimidation or stealth. Going forward, we must hold one 
another accountable for the clear-eyed development of a strategy in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, planning carefully and 
realistically, dealing truthfully with costs and risks, and working 
cooperatively with allies who share our values and goals. This is the 
mid-course correction, indeed the new beginning, that we need to signal 
and to achieve as we consider the request the President has made of 
this Congress and of the people we represent.

                          ____________________