[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 133 (Thursday, September 25, 2003)]
[House]
[Pages H8944-H8947]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
THE PRESIDENT'S WAR REQUEST AND AMERICA'S FUTURE COURSE
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bishop of Utah). Under the Speaker's
announced policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from North Carolina
(Mr. Price) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the
minority leader.
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, the President's request of
an $87 billion supplemental appropriation on top of $79 billion already
appropriated has prompted renewed debate over our military operations
in Iraq, our plans for the subsequent reconstruction of that country,
and our broader policy objectives in the Middle East.
We must take to a successful conclusion the securing of Iraq, the
rebuilding of the country's economy and infrastructure, and the
transition to an indigenous democratic government. We must provide our
forces in Iraq the resources they need to complete their mission and to
enhance their safety and security while they are performing their
mission. But the Bush administration must give a full accounting of how
we plan to reach these goals, how we are going to meet the costs, and
how we are to enlist the necessary international support.
This afternoon, Mr. Speaker, I want to specify certain key questions
and expectations that Members of Congress must bring to the
consideration of the President's request.
This request is considerably overdue. For far too long the Bush
administration refused to estimate the precise costs of the war as it
pushed for tax cuts upon tax cuts, mainly benefitting the wealthiest
Americans, and as it presided over a 2-year, $8 trillion fiscal
reversal, the largest in our country's history.
But now the bill is coming due, and that stubborn fact, in addition
to the critical situation on the ground in Iraq, has forced the
President's hand.
That is not to say he has totally come clean. The President's request
of $20 billion for reconstruction covers less than half of the
projected costs. And it is bound to increase if his optimistic estimate
as to oil revenues and contributions from allies do not materialize.
Nor are we ever likely to hear
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the President acknowledge that every dime of that $87 billion is
borrowed money, adding to what was already a record Federal deficit.
How much money is $87 billion? It is three times what we spend each
year on major disease research at the National Institutes of Health. It
is more than double our entire post-9/11 Homeland Security budget. It
amounts to $3.5 million each week throughout 2004 for each of the 435
congressional districts in our country; $3.5 million dollars each week
for each district. I will leave it to colleagues to calculate what this
could mean in terms of covering the uninsured or upgrading our schools
or improving roads and mass transit.
So the cost of our Iraqi intervention is immense and we are reminded
daily of the human cost as well. American fatalities since the
President declared the combat phase concluded now number 158, more than
the 139 incurred during active combat. Honest acknowledgment of these
costs is essential both to assessing our Nation's course thus far and
to charting our course ahead.
As it became more and more evident last winter that nothing was
likely to divert the President from the course he had chosen in Iraq,
I, like others, took to the House floor to raise questions that the
administration had not answered, questions which were basic to any
rationale for war:
``What accounting do we have of the costs and risks of military
invasion? How are we to secure and maintain the support and engagement
of our allies? Can Iraq be disarmed by means that do not divert us
from, or otherwise compromise, equally or more urgent anti-terrorist
and diplomatic objectives? Do we have a credible plan for rebuilding
and governing post-war Iraq? Have we secured the necessary
international cooperation ensure that this does not become a perceived
U.S. occupation?''
I must say in retrospect that those were legitimate and important
questions. In some areas, the administration had no answer or wrong
answers, and in others they refused to level with Congress and the
American people.
{time} 1600
On one of the few instances when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
addressed the war's costs, he echoed OMB Mitch Daniels with an estimate
of ``something under $50 billion.'' That was in January, and a few
weeks later his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, described Iraq as ``a country
that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.''
Such statements help us understand the fix we are in in Iraq and the
pressure the administration is now facing to give an honest accounting,
along with a credible plan, complete with cost and deployment
estimates, going forward.
The President's $87 billion supplemental appropriations request has
been accompanied by a return to the United Nations to seek the support,
for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq, of the allies the
administration once spurned. This appears to be, as Ron Brownstein of
the Los Angeles Times termed it, a case of ``reality trumping
ideology,'' based on the realization that under present policies the
President does not have the means to achieve his ends in Iraq. But it
does not yet amount to the mid-course correction that is called for.
The administration still has a long way to go in presenting to the
American people and to our prospective allies a credible plan for
securing and rebuilding Iraq. There is no time to spare, as the New
York Times editorialized on September 14, ``If Mr. Bush does not
demonstrate a clear and convincing strategy soon, he may face political
pressure to bring home American troops under conditions that would be
embarrassing for America and perilous for the Middle East.''
In the first place, Mr. Speaker, the President must provide a
straightforward account of how the $79 billion already appropriated has
been spent and what the newly requested $87 billion will buy.
Accountability for funds thus far expended; justification for the
present request; and an honest estimate of the costs yet to come.
Is the request consistent with our first priority of combatting
terrorism in Afghanistan and beyond? Is it based on realistic estimates
of funding from oil revenues and from allied contributions? Even if we
succeed in enlisting additional allies, that will only partially ease
our financial burden. Current plans, for example, are for Poland to
lead a multinational force of some 19 countries in the central-southern
region of Iraq. But of the estimated $240 million cost of the
operation, Poland is expected to pay no more than $40 million, with the
U.S. covering the rest.
It is critically important, I believe, to focus separately on the
portion of the President's of $87 billion request that is targeted to
Afghanistan: $11 billion for military operations and $800 million for
reconstruction. Those numbers pale in comparison to the Iraq request,
and they may not be sufficient. In crucial respects, our Afghan
operations offer a contrast to Iraq. Afghanistan was a war of
necessity. It was directly related to the 9/11 attacks. It was endorsed
and supported almost unanimously by the world community. The NATO
alliance has now assumed responsibility for ongoing operations there.
Yet the country is largely unsecured outside of Kabul and the top
leadership of both the Taliban and al Qaeda is still at large.
Our decision to deal with the Iraqi challenge through a massive
military invasion has arguably set back the broader war on terrorism,
allowing the Taliban and al Qaeda to regroup. There is no place in the
world where it is more important to position U.S. Special Forces than
in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region where Taliban and al Qaeda
forces are still operating. Our Special Forces must be fully supported,
and they must not be further diverted until their mission is concluded.
The Afghan reconstruction funding will partially address such
critical needs as road and school construction, irrigation projects,
and training a self-sustaining Afghan security force. This aid may also
help shore up some support for the embattled, pro-Western President of
Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai. However, decades of civil war have left the
nation without such basic needs as a modern electric power
infrastructure, urban sanitation systems, or an advanced medical
infrastructure. There is much left to do, and it will take a concerted
multinational effort to meet these needs.
The administration must also explain to Congress and the public how
the $87 billion, all of it deficit spending, far beyond the scale of
most emergency supplemental appropriations requests, is to be paid for.
In particular, is it either fair or fiscally prudent to leave in place,
much less to extend, massive tax cuts for those in the highest
brackets, tax cuts that have produced unprecedented annual deficits and
that mock the very idea of shared sacrifice?
Secondly, the administration must deal with the question of troop
strength. The supplemental appropriations request assumes American
troops will remain at present levels for at least another year. We in
North Carolina have particular reason to recognize the spectacular
performance of our men and women in uniform during the combat phase and
the valor and commitment they continue to display under trying
conditions. Tens of thousands of these troops have been deployed from
our State, including National Guard and Reserve units that have been
subject to repeated call-ups.
By the same token, however, North Carolinians have been especially
attentive to evidence of administration misjudgments as to the troop
levels that would be required in post-war Iraq, to extensions in the
tours of many units, and to the mismatch between what these troops have
been trained for and the security and reconstruction functions that
they are being called upon to perform.
Secretary Rumsfeld has offered dubious assurances, despite the
continuing level of violence, that no more troops are needed; but the
administration has not explained how even the present level of
deployment in Iraq can be sustained. Of the Army's 33 active duty
combat brigades, 16 are currently assigned to Iraq and five elsewhere
overseas. Almost all of the others are needed for rotation purposes,
mainly in Iraq, and for emergency standby related to North Korea. As of
last week, more than 128,000 Army Guard and Reserve members, or 23
percent of the force, were mobilized in support of operations overseas
and in the United States, many on yearlong tours, with thousands more
to be deployed or redeployed soon.
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Thirdly, what is the administration's plan for securing allied
participation and how much relief can this realistically afford
relative to American financial and personnel requirements? The tens of
thousands of additional troops and the billions of dollars of
additional funding that we need in Iraq, as well as our broader
antiterrorist and peacemaking endeavors in the Middle East, will
require intensive diplomatic repair work in the coming weeks. The
return of Secretary Powell and of the President to the United Nations
is a necessary first step toward the cooperative ties we must forge
with allies ranging from Germany and France to India and Turkey and
Egypt. At the same time, we must press ahead with the recruitment and
training of indigenous Iraqi police and security forces and the
transition to Iraqi self-rule.
Finally, we look to the President for a reaffirmation of America's
commitment to Middle East peacemaking. After almost 2\1/2\ years of
ill-advised disengagement from the quest for a fair and enduring
settlement between Israel and its neighbors, the President has
commendably joined with our ``Quartet'' partners, the European Union,
the United Nations and Russia, to announce the ``Road Map'' initiative
for mutual, step-by-step Israeli-Palestinian accommodations.
Recent weeks have not been auspicious for the Road Map initiative.
Hamas suicide bombers have conducted devastating attacks, killing and
maiming dozens of Israelis, many of them teenagers and children. The
Israeli government has stepped up its targeted assassination of Hamas
leaders and members and has tightened its chokehold on the occupied
territories.
In fact, the two sides seemed locked in a death grip. Violent deaths
since the collapse of the peace process number 858 among Israelis and
2,468 Palestinians. Who would not be moved by the story of two of the
victims of the September 9 Jerusalem bombing, Dr. David Applebaum and
his daughter Naava, out on an errand the night before what was to be
her happy wedding day? Such wrenching stories underscore again and
again the urgency of reaching a settlement that ensures security and
integrity for Israel and a viable state for the Palestinians. And in
the post-9/11 world, Middle East peacemaking has assumed an added
dimension. ``Suicide bombing is becoming so routine'' in Israel/
Palestine, Thomas Friedman recently wrote, ``that it risks becoming
embedded in contemporary culture. America must stop it. A credible
peace deal is no longer a U.S. luxury: it is essential to our own
homeland security. Otherwise, this suicide madness will spread, and it
will be Americans who will have to learn how to live with it.''
The simultaneous steps that the Road Map envisions are politically
difficult and vulnerable to sabotage. The Israeli government, reluctant
to challenge the settlers in any case, is doubly so when the likely
reward is another horrific bombing by Hamas, whose structure of terror
remains intact. As for the Palestinians, they feel they are being asked
to risk a civil war by taking on militant groups by force without
assurances that settlements will actually be removed from Palestinian
territory or statehood achieved. That is why American leadership is
absolutely essential, to help ensure that both sides in fact comply
with the road map and that the process is steadied against the
predictable attempts at sabotage by the enemies of peace.
If the process remains stalled and the violence continues, American
leaders may need to think outside the Road-Map ``box'' in terms of
putting a peace plan on the table proactively. What is not even
thinkable is for our government again to disengage and to let that
death grip tighten.
Mr. Speaker, we are at a critical juncture in the war on terrorism
and in our Nation's engagement in the Middle East. We must push ahead
with the reconstruction and democratization of Afghanistan and Iraq,
preventing either a return to tyranny or a collapse into violence that
would allow forces deadly to our country's vital interests to take
root.
That is what the supplemental appropriations requested by the
President must help underwrite, and that is why I expect that most of
us in this body are likely in due course to support something close to
the requested amount. But while Congress was willing to provide a blank
check in the past, it does not seem likely to do so now. We must have
an accounting of the administration's strategy going forward, its
timetables and objectives, its costs and personnel requirements, how
our allies will share in its obligation, and how past mistakes will be
corrected or avoided. The committees of the Congress must schedule
sufficient hearings to allow administration officials to make their
case and to allow Members to question them fully.
The need for mid-course correction raises serious issues, yet
unresolved, about the path to war that the President chose. We will no
doubt debate these questions for years to come, and we cannot allow
them to paralyze us now. But if we are to correct our course and go
forward successfully, we must confront the flawed premises and the
failed diplomacy that set the terms of the Iraqi invasion. In closing,
I want to underscore the importance of one of these pieces of
unfinished business, not merely to clear the air but also to clarify
what Congress and the American people must demand of this
administration or of any administration in the future. I am referring
to the intelligence and to the interpretations of intelligence on which
the decision to invade Iraq was based.
We are all aware, Mr. Speaker, of the perils of 20/20 hindsight. And
on some questions, most notably Iraq's possession of chemical and
biological weapons, even hindsight is still unclear. Iraq possessed and
used such weapons in the past. Yet after 5 months, no stockpiles have
been found. U.S. weapons inspector David Kay is soon expected to make
an interim report to Congress on the Iraqis weapons program. By all
reports, he will suggest that Saddam may have intended to produce
weapons when and if U.N. inspectors left Iraq. However, intent does not
constitute an imminent threat. While Mr. Kay has work left to do, he
has yet to uncover the threat that we expected.
Regarding Iraq's development of deployable nuclear weapons and the
tenuous linkage between al Qaeda and the Iraqi government, we are not
simply talking about 20/20 hindsight. We are talking about evidence
that Members of this body knew, or should have known, to be shaky as
early as the October congressional vote authorizing the use of force
and certainly in the winter months leading up to the invasion.
The President and administration officials continue to obfuscate the
Iraqi-al Qaeda link, which now may become a self-fulfilling prophecy as
Iraq becomes a magnet for terrorist operatives from around the region.
As for the claims by the President, the Vice President, and others that
Iraq was attempting to reconstitute its nuclear program, we have the
testimony of retired foreign service officer Joseph Wilson, who was
dispatched to Niger in early 2002 to investigate reported sales of
uranium ore to Iraq. ``Based on my experience with the administration
in the months leading up to the war,'' Wilson wrote, ``I have little
choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq's
nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat.''
{time} 1615
The House and Senate Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence are
currently conducting investigations which we are assured will focus not
only on the prewar performance of U.S. intelligence agencies but also
on how the White House used intelligence information to make the case
for war. These investigations must be thorough and objective, following
the facts wherever they lead. We commend these colleagues for the hard
work they have done thus far. They know we are counting on them for a
conscientious and comprehensive job. If this investigation takes a
partisan turn, or if there is any hint of pressure to protect the
administration, sentiment may well shift toward an inquiry by an
independent commission of the sort the gentleman from California (Mr.
Waxman) has proposed. We must never conclude, despite the undisputed
fact that Saddam Hussein was a blood-soaked tyrant, and that both the
Iraqis and the world are better off with him gone--we still must never
conclude that the credibility of the reasons that our government gave
to the American people
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and to our potential allies for going to war do not matter. These
reasons, which centered on the grave threat posed by Iraq's weapons
program, do matter. If they are found to have been based on fallacious
or manipulated evidence, the blow to our international credibility and
to the integrity of the discourse on which our democracy depends will
be profound.
Mr. Speaker, there will be many calls for national unity and resolve
as we consider the President's $87 billion request and contemplate the
long, hard road ahead. I will join in those calls, for the challenges
confronting our country transcend political divisions and the
differences we have had in the past. But the administration needs to
understand its end of the bargain, for in a democracy, where power is
shared between the executive and legislative branches of government,
critical decisions must not be taken in an atmosphere of deception or
political intimidation or stealth. Going forward, we must hold one
another accountable for the clear-eyed development of a strategy in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, planning carefully and
realistically, dealing truthfully with costs and risks, and working
cooperatively with allies who share our values and goals. This is the
mid-course correction, indeed the new beginning, that we need to signal
and to achieve as we consider the request the President has made of
this Congress and of the people we represent.
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