[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 117 (Friday, August 1, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10892-S10896]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                LIBERIA

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise to address the Senate concerning my 
concern--I think there are others who feel similarly--about the crisis 
situation that is rapidly developing in Liberia and the decision 
framework that has confronted, is confronting, and will confront our 
Government.
  I carefully use the word ``Government'' because when men and women in 
the Armed Forces are sent into harm's way, there is a constitutional 
responsibility on the President as Commander in Chief and the principal 
architect of our foreign policy to make the decision to send them into 
harm's way. In no way in my 25 years in the Senate have I ever once 
questioned that constitutional authority. In fact, I will match my 
record--humble as it is--against any Member of this body with regard to 
participation in the war power debates, participation in the 
resolutions regarding the use of force, when we, as a body, are 
addressing our responsibilities with regard to the men and women of the 
Armed Forces.
  The President has a constitutional right. There is always debate, as 
reflected in the history of the War Powers Act, to what extent should 
he consult and, indeed, to what extent should he receive the specific 
concurrence of the Congress before exercising that very heavy 
responsibility.
  There are volumes written on this subject. But for simplicity, 
clarity, and brevity today, I simply say the Constitution gives that 
right to the President and should not be ever in question. To the 
extent that Congress has the opportunity, through consultation and 
through other actions working with the administration, I believe it is 
wise that Congress speak to this issue.
  About 4 weeks ago, I appeared on ``Meet the Press'' and somewhat 
indirectly referenced my concern about Liberia at that time. I 
expressed that the need to make a decision was coming down upon this 
Government, as indeed it has, and that it would be wise for the 
Congress to take a role. I cannot predict how this body would vote on 
it if it got to a vote. But I think the involvement of Congress when 
men and women go in harm's way is a very important responsibility as 
coequal branches of the Government, the executive and the legislative, 
and, indeed, an obligation.
  I have tried each day to spend some time on these issues. I read what 
I can from the press, which has been rather interesting and good 
coverage so far, and from other documents, official and otherwise.
  The complexity of this situation is really considerable. We do have 
these historical ties dating to the 1840s to this small country. At 
times, we have taken actions there. At times through the history of 
this country, we have sort of looked the other way. We have gone in 
before to try to quell disruption and violence, but I do not find a 
long history of strong involvement. We now have a despot who has been 
elected to the highest official post in that country, who has made 
representation that he will leave subject to certain contingencies. The 
President of the United States has indicated he wants to try and help 
the people subject, again, to the Liberian leader taking certain 
actions. This whole framework is quite unclear.

  The Secretary General of the United Nations visited here 2 weeks ago. 
I was privileged to sit in a small meeting hosted by the distinguished 
majority leader, at which time we expressed our views. He was quite 
concerned, as I am quite concerned--I think everybody is quite 
concerned who has followed this--about the extraordinary dimensions of 
human suffering, there is no dispute about that, human suffering as a 
consequence of the frightful public record of the current leader in 
Liberia, that leader who has indicated he is willing to leave.
  As I stand here addressing the Senate, on orders from the President, 
a very significant force, largely of marines, has progressed from the 
Horn of Africa around to the Mediterranean and is approaching, probably 
in the next 72 hours, a location somewhere off the coast of Liberia, 
where the ships will be positioned to await such further orders as the 
President may direct.
  Now, what of the role of the Congress? As chairman of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, I had hearings--at least a briefing--at my 
request on July 8. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs provided a very 
fine team of briefers where my committee, in S-407, heard their 
reports. A day or so ago, recognizing the Congress would soon be 
leaving for its August recess, I felt it wise to set a second briefing 
of the Armed Services Committee to which I invited really anyone in the 
Senate who wished to join, and also specifically a group of Senators, 
of which I am one, who soon will be embarking on a trip to the African 
continent. I was privileged to be included in that trip and expressed 
an interest to go primarily because of my concerns of national security 
in that region and the impending Liberian conflict. It had been my 
expectation that several of those Senators would have joined today had 
that briefing gone ahead.
  Yesterday afternoon, the Department of Defense, following the regular 
procedures we always follow, sent up the names of three briefers--2 
from the Joint Staff and one from OSD policy--and it all seemed to be 
ready to go this morning when quite unexpectedly we received word from 
the Department of Defense that the briefers would not come.
  I will not dwell further on that procedure. I will say in my 25 years 
in the Senate, it is most unusual to conduct our affairs in that way 
between the Senate and the Department of Defense. Indeed, I am not sure 
I know of a precedent of that type of abrupt cancellation, but I will 
put that to one side and press on. I did feel it would have been 
helpful, certainly, to this Senator and several others--I know one or 
two on the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday expressed to me their 
concerns of where could they get information. Both of those Senators 
were invited to attend this morning. One of them is on the Subcommittee 
on African Affairs and he expressed to me his concern and asked how 
best he could get involved in learning more.
  I will move on now to this question about the seriousness of this 
problem. This type of civil war, regrettably, has persisted in Liberia 
for many years. There are essentially three factions now. There is one 
faction to the sort of fragile, if almost inconsequential, government 
that is in place today with this despotic leader. Then there is a group 
to the south that refers to themselves as the Model, M-O-D-E-L. There 
is a group in the north that refers to themselves as the Lurd, L U-R-D. 
Both of them are a mixture of groups of Liberians and others from other 
areas. Both groups are now converging on the central part of the 
country, Monrovia, and we have witnessed this outbreak once again of 
civil war and the devastation being wrought on innocent civilians.

  So what to do about it? Again, I am not prepared to give a clear 
answer. I would presume the administration is proceeding and in due 
course will share this information, but it is likely one or more 
decisions will be made in the absence of the Congress in formal 
session, so that concerns me because I feel strongly that congressional 
involvement in this situation is very important. I go back to our 
obligation to the men and women in the Armed Forces.
  Once this military force--that is the force at sea--is on station, I 
anticipate that will increase the international pressure on our 
Government--and I continue to use the phrase ``government''--to become 
more actively involved and send these forces in. Again, under the 
Constitution, the President has every right to make that decision on 
his own initiative, with or without consultation with the Congress, and 
to proceed.
  In doing that, I call the attention of the Senate to the military 
doctrine that has evolved since Vietnam. It was my privilege to serve 
in the Department of Defense for over 5 years during the Vietnam 
conflict as Navy Secretary. That period of history is indelibly etched 
in my memory, a period of

[[Page S10893]]

history which reflected the Congress breaking away from successive 
administrations that were involved in that conflict, and the animosity 
in the Congress against the Department of Defense. I shared my burden 
of that animosity, along with three Secretaries of Defense whom I 
served with in that period. Two remain very dear friends and valued 
advisers to me to this day. The third has passed on.
  Out of that conflict, America began to examine the criteria by which 
this Nation should send men and women in uniform into harm's way--a 
very introspective, deep reflection on the tragic losses. My 
recollection is close to 50,000 men and women gave their lives in that 
conflict in Vietnam, and many more were wounded.
  So often in the evening hours of our duties in the Pentagon in those 
days, I would, as did the other service Secretaries, call families and 
attend funerals. I frequently met with groups regarding their deep 
concern about that conflict and their losses. I remember meeting with 
the wives of the prisoners of war on regular occasions. Then this 
country unfortunately, in many respects, turned its discontent on the 
men and women of the Armed Forces themselves. When they would return 
home from their tours of duty in Vietnam, indeed there were instances 
in commands in the European theater of breakdown in discipline and 
morale, because of the uncertainty surrounding that conflict, the 
enormity of the casualities that we would take.

  I mentioned the background because it was important America sit down 
and reflect on those criteria that Presidents--and indeed to the extent 
the Congress renders its approval--that Presidents and the Congress 
should follow.
  A brief summary of that doctrine would be that military action should 
be used only as a last resort and only if there is a clear risk to 
national security interests of the United States of America; and at 
times we take into consideration the security interests of our valued 
allies.
  So, is there a clear risk to national security by the intended target 
of our military action? What measure is the risk to the uniformed 
American? What measure is the risk to his or her life and limb?
  The force when used should be overwhelming and disproportionate to 
the force used by the enemy. There must be strong support for the 
campaign by the general American public and there must be a clear exit 
strategy from the conflict in which the military is engaged.
  I have generalized this but I ask unanimous consent to have printed 
in the Record following my statement a very important set of guidelines 
for the use of force that have been articulated through the years by 
our distinguished Secretary of State, Colin Powell--the so-called 
``Powell Doctrine.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. WARNER. I have fairly stated the basic precedents that I embrace 
wholeheartedly. The Members of the Senate, in general, embrace these 
precedents.
  Therefore, I pose rhetorically the question: As the decision process 
is made at this time, given the Congress will be out of town, that 
process will be made by the executive branch, the President of the 
United States, assuming, as he does, full accountability, will those 
criteria for the use of force be the guideline or are we somehow going 
to make a departure, and if so, what is that departure?
  I fully recognize the dimension of human suffering today and the 
potential for even greater human suffering tomorrow, perhaps the next 
day. But at the same time, I fully recognize to the best I have been 
able to assertain, and I have not been able to assertain it to my 
complete satisfaction, but there will be an element of risk. I have 
asked not one, not two, but half a dozen distinguished military 
officers--some active duty, some not--whether they share my concern 
that there will be a measure of risk should we send troops into 
Liberia.
  I made reference to this in hearings we have had in the Armed 
Services Committee in connection with the reappointment of the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers and of the Vice Chairman, 
General Pace.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an excerpt from 
renomination hearing.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 2.)
  Mr. WARNER. My concern is not just of today; it has been there for 
some significant period of time. This Senator has pressed the questions 
on that situation at every opportunity I have had to date.
  I will also reflect on the personal involvement I have had in 
addition to the period in Vietnam. When I first came to the Armed 
Services Committee, I worked under some of the greatest men I have ever 
known in the Senate: Scoop Jackson, John Stennis, Barry Goldwater, John 
Tower. I try, as best I can, in my duties as Senator today to draw on 
the wisdom they imparted to me in their teachings. Those men were 
historic in proportion to the Senate. I shall never achieve but a small 
fraction of their stature but, nevertheless, having the responsibility, 
I do my very best.
  I remember John Stennis asked me to work on a report for him of the 
effort we made to rescue the hostages illegally taken by the Government 
of Iran at the embassy. We all remember that challenge. The Pentagon 
prepared what I thought was a well thought through plan to rescue those 
hostages. It was the right thing to do. We put our military at great 
risk. It was a plan to use covert action and helicopters. I will not 
dwell on it because I did write that report for Senator Stennis. It is 
somewhere in the archives.
  The bottom line, a series of primarily mechanical failures, due to 
dust being taken into the intake systems, prevented the consummation of 
what I still to this day say could have been a successful operation. 
Certainly the heroics of the men involved who volunteered for that 
action were extraordinary.
  John Tower, when he was chairman, we went together, just the two of 
us, to Beirut shortly after the bombing of the marine barracks in 
Beirut, marines who were sent there for the best of purposes to try to 
alleviate the suffering. The tragic loss.
  Later, I was entrusted to work on the report for Somalia. My 
distinguished colleague, good friend, Carl Levin, and I went to 
Somalia. We worked on that report. It took us months to interview many 
individuals. How could we have experienced that tragic loss of men and 
women in our Armed Forces at the hands of savage attacks? That is a 
matter of record, the observations and conclusions Senator Levin and I 
put in that report.
  I don't want to take any more time of the Senate on what I personally 
have done. Many have done as much, if not more, in respective 
responsibilities, but I do draw on some experience.
  I am not hesitant to express my own concerns about some situations. 
If I were asked today, What should be done with respect to Liberia, I 
would simply say, I do not have the facts to make an informed 
decision. I hope in the executive branch there are those who do have 
sufficient facts to make an informed decision. Is this situation 
following the doctrine in our national security interests? I have even 
seen the word ``vital'' national security interests used. It has not 
been answered to my satisfaction.

  If we are going to make a departure from the doctrine, is that 
predicated on sound principles that equate, somehow, to violation of 
security interests? If so, should we state them? If so, should we 
explain to the people?
  I strongly believe, as I pointed out, that as we ask our men and 
women to take risks, we should, an as executive branch, as a 
legislative branch, have informed the American people, prepared the 
American--prepared them in a way to accept such losses as might occur. 
Has that been done? I fear, in my judgment, it has not been done.
  I have tried my best to respond to my constituents. I have been 
questioned about it a number of times. I do not have the facts to my 
satisfaction. But it is very clear throughout the history of that 
Vietnam experience, we should have, as I stated, gained the support of 
the general public, the support of the families of the men and women in 
the Armed Forces who must go in harm's way. That has not, to my 
satisfaction, been done.
  It is my hope that whatever decision process has to be made in the 
absence

[[Page S10894]]

of the Congress will be made and carefully thought through. If we are 
going to depart from this doctrine on the use of force, if there are 
geopolitical pressures, if there are domestic political pressures--
whatever it is, spell it out: What were the factors taken into 
consideration to make such decisions as may--and I underline may--be 
made by the executive branch when the Congress is gone, assuming that 
some decisions will be made--I don't predict in any way what they may 
be, but assuming some decisions are made. Maybe the decision is not to 
be involved.
  I do fervently hope the Congress becomes engaged when we return, that 
we consider whether we have a resolution--first at the request of the 
administration, with the concurrence of the Senate leadership, and 
perhaps maybe some consultation with the committee chairmen and ranking 
members who are involved in the oversight committees--mine, Foreign 
Relations, certainly the Subcommittee on Appropriations, and others. So 
we go through a process.
  I was privileged--I remember it so well--in 1991 to be asked by then 
the distinguished leader, Robert Dole, to prepare a resolution for the 
utilization by the President of force in the Persian Gulf in the 1991 
conflict. How well I remember that debate--3 days, 3 nights on this 
floor of the Senate and then the vote. And only by a margin of 5 votes 
did the Senate adopt a resolution in support of then the first 
President Bush to utilize force in that conflict.
  We had a larger vote with regard to the operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. We had some closer votes. I worked on these resolutions and so 
forth and decisionmaking by the Congress in the Balkan situation. I 
watched, carefully, all of those matters as they were addressed by this 
body.
  Now, as we look at this situation in Liberia, we have a background of 
an ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and an ongoing conflict in Iraq. 
This mighty Nation is mourning the losses of uniformed members of the 
Armed Forces every week for some weeks now, doing the best we can 
individually to comfort and share the grief of the families.
  Just this week, one Senator approached me: His State suffered a loss, 
and how could we facilitate the interment that this brave soldier 
deserved in Arlington in a timely way? Those steps are being taken. But 
a number of Senators have approached me, and I am glad to help as best 
I can with this situation back home in the context of the loss of the 
brave men and women of the Armed Forces.
  This decision regarding Liberia could superimpose on those losses 
another level. It could. The risk, it seems to us, to be there--some of 
us who looked at this issue. Are we prepared as a nation to accept 
another circumstance in another theater that poses the threat of more 
casualties? I come back, is the United States of America--its 
citizens--prepared?
  Our Armed Forces today, in my humble judgment, are stretched. We have 
seen some questioning the morale. I happen to think the morale is quite 
high. The recruiting, to the everlasting credit of the American spirit, 
is still strong; the retention is still strong. The All-Volunteer Force 
has exceeded every expectation we had.
  I was privileged to be part of the framework in the Pentagon, under 
the leadership of a distinguished Secretary of Defense by the name of 
Melvin Laird, and a successor Secretary by the name of Jim Schlesinger, 
to envision and create and establish the All-Volunteer Force. It 
worked, and worked well. But that has its breaking points. Like 
everything else in life, it has its breaking points. I am not 
suggesting we have reached that limit, but we should never take our eye 
off the fact of that framework, that concept that everyone in uniform 
today is there because he or she has raised their arm and pledged 
allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and obligated 
themselves to accept the risks of military service. They do so thinking 
that the President, whoever that President may be, and the Congress, 
whatever the composition may be, are standing guard, protecting them 
and their families, protecting them and following the doctrine on the 
use of force, which presumably they have some knowledge of before 
accepting these obligations, that doctrine that I have enunciated and 
others have enunciated.
  That is a heavy obligation upon us. We have to make certain that, as 
these conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are concluded and the goals 
that we stated are reached--goals which enable both of those nations to 
achieve a measure of democracy and freedom that they never have had, 
certainly not in the last 30 years--after that, those successive 
goals--and there is no doubt that we must be steadfast in our resolve 
to achieve them--we have to make certain our Armed Forces remain strong 
to meet the unexpected contingencies that arise around the world. Those 
contingencies that could challenge the vital security interests of this 
Nation. That means a strong, active, All-Volunteer Force, a strong 
Guard and Reserve.
  We have to take those steps now to ensure that they are in place as 
we complete our mission in Afghanistan and Iraq, and indeed in many 
ways where our troops are throughout the world. I think they are on the 
border of being overdeployed and overextended, and we have to keep a 
very watchful eye.
  Early this week, the Secretary of Defense came up to the Hill along 
with General Keane and went over a rotation policy which is going to 
correct--and I repeat in their words--that ``some mistakes were made'' 
of late with regard to our troops currently engaged in the Iraqi 
conflict. I commend the general. He recognized that some mistakes have 
been made. They are going to correct them.
  I think now our forces will have a much clearer understanding, and 
their families--and I repeat--and their families will have a clear 
understanding as to their obligation. But always keep in mind that 
there is a tomorrow and a tomorrow, and what we do today in many ways 
establishes the foundation of what we can and cannot do on a tomorrow.
  I wish our President Godspeed to make his decision. And I am hopeful 
that this body will engage itself when it returns from this recess.

                               Exhibit 2


                u.s. senate committee on armed services

       Sir/Madam: There will be a meeting of the Committee on 
     Armed Services, Room SR-325, the Caucus Room, Russell Senate 
     Office Building, Thursday, July 24, 2003-9:30 a.m.
       To consider the following nominations: General Richard B. 
     Myers, USAF, for reappointment as Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff and reappointment to the grade of general; 
     and General Peter Pace, USMC, for reappointment as Vice 
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and reappointment to 
     the grade of general.
       The nominees will be present.
                                  ____

       Chairman Warner. My last question would relate to Liberia 
     and the decision process now underway by which the President 
     is trying to make an assessment as to the force level and 
     composition that could be put in by the United States to 
     stabilize a very tragic situation in terms of human 
     suffering.
       But, on the other hand, in my judgment it is a situation 
     that poses great personal risk to forces such as our forces 
     that could be injected into that very fast-moving and 
     volatile situation there in Monrovia and the greater Liberia.
       General Myers. If you will permit me, Mr. Chairman, let me 
     just describe the situation that we currently have in 
     Liberia. It hasn't changed dramatically in the last 24 hours.
       But we have a situation where you have a leader who has got 
     to go who, as we know, is not a good leader, has not done 
     good things for Liberia or, for that matter, has not been--
     been a lot less than helpful to the countries in the region, 
     and so President Taylor must leave, and that part is being 
     worked.
       The other thing is that the two rebel groups, the two major 
     rebel groups, the LURD and the MODEL, it is unclear--in fact, 
     it's, I think the intelligence community would tell us that 
     it is probably not going to happen that you are going to get 
     political leadership out of these rebel groups, that they are 
     not a replacement for Taylor. So it is not clear who is going 
     to step forward in a political sense when the situation 
     settles down in Liberia, to take over the political 
     leadership.
       In the meantime, you have a humanitarian situation where 
     food, clean water, medical care is a problem. All the 
     nongovernmental organizations that were in there providing 
     those kinds of capabilities have left because of the 
     security situation. So it is a situation that is, as you 
     have described it, is not a pretty situation. It is not 
     going to give way to any instant fix. Whatever the fix is 
     going to be is going to have to be a long-term fix.
       Currently, we have the West African nations surrounding 
     that area, to include Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, others, are 
     looking to put a force in there to help stabilize the 
     situation in Liberia. They, of course, have asked for U.S. 
     support and what the administration is doing right now is 
     trying to determine what is going to be the character of that 
     support.

[[Page S10895]]

       As a military person, I am concerned, like you, that 
     whatever we do, that we have a very clear mission, we 
     understand the mission we are asked to do, that we have an 
     idea of when the mission is going to be over, in other words, 
     when can we come out of the mission, and that we have 
     sufficient force to deal with the security situation, that we 
     do not go in on a shoestring when we need adequate force.
       There are other things we can consider, but those are 
     probably the three main things.
       We have looked at options, all sorts of options. There has 
     been no decision made--taken on this. I think I will just 
     leave it there, I think. I think in the next few days we 
     will--
       Chairman Warner. I would also add, for myself, and I draw 
     that from statements made by our President in earlier days, 
     that there be a clear and identifiable strategic interest, 
     security interest, of this country. That to me remains 
     somewhat to be defined in this situation, should the decision 
     be made to go forward.
       Can I just draw by way of conclusion your remarks that you 
     concur, that in my judgment, this is not a risk-free 
     operation, if we were to undertake it?
       General Myers. Mr. Chairman, I don't think any operation 
     like this is risk-free. We have three, at least three warring 
     factions, the LURD, the MODEL, the two rebel groups, and the 
     government forces themselves. They are all armed. They are 
     not disciplined troops as we know them. There are a lot of 
     young people fighting in these groups. It is potentially a 
     dangerous situation.
       So when you go into it, you need to go into it knowing 
     that. It may be that we can go in terms of support for these 
     ECOWAS forces. And ECOWAS countries have come forward and 
     volunteered forces. They will need some equipping and some 
     training, some of the forces will, before they go in. So 
     it is a little longer-term issue and it is a matter of 
     months, probably not weeks, for some of those forces. Some 
     of them probably can get in there fairly quickly, but 
     small numbers.
       And then eventually I believe Kofi Annan up at the U.N. 
     said this will become a U.N. mission at some point. And that 
     all has to be blended into this.
       But I will go back to the larger issue. There is a 
     political situation there with the president of a country, a 
     `'democracy,'' and how they deal with President Taylor, where 
     he goes, what this interim government is also important to 
     our security situation. And that is a somewhat cloudy picture 
     today.
       Chairman Warner. General Pace, you had experience in your 
     previous command before becoming Vice Chairman, in terms of 
     Central and South America, do you have any views to add to 
     those of the Chairman, General Pace?
       General Pace. Sir, my experience in Somalia is a little 
     more akin to the potential experience in Liberia. And I would 
     echo what General Myers just said, that it is potentially a 
     very dangerous situation. And when we--if we are asked to do 
     something militarily, we need to make sure we do it with the 
     proper numbers of troops and that we be prepared for the 
     eventualities of having to take a military action.
       Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
       Senator Levin. Just on that Liberian issue, would you 
     recommend going in unless Taylor is either gone or on his way 
     out as we arrive?
       General Myers: So far, that has been one of the planning 
     assumptions that we made, that otherwise, you get into a 
     situation that General Pace knows only too well, and it would 
     define your mission, and the mission would be quite different 
     if Taylor were to remain there than if he were gone. And so 
     one of our planning assumptions is that he will leave, either 
     before or simultaneously with the troops entering, whether 
     they are ECOWAS troops or U.S., or U.S.-supported ECOWAS 
     troops.
                                  ____


                               Exhibit 1

   [The first public articulation of the ``Powell Doctrine,'' a most 
   influential mindset throughout the 1990s--and through the current 
                        administration, as well]

  Excerpts From Colin Powell, ``U.S. Forces: The Challenges Ahead,'' 
                      Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992

       To help with the complex issue of the use of ``violent'' 
     force, some have turned to a set of principles or a when-to-
     go-to-war doctrine. ``Follow these directions and you can't 
     go wrong.'' There is, however, no fixed set of rules for the 
     use of military force. To set one up is dangerous. First, it 
     destroys the ambiguity we might want to exist in our enemy's 
     mind regarding our intentions. Unless part of our strategy is 
     to destroy that ambiguity, it is usually helpful to keep it 
     intact. Second, having a fixed set of rules for how you will 
     go to war is like saying you are always going to use the 
     elevator in the event of fire in your apartment building. 
     Surely enough, when the fire comes the elevator will be 
     engulfed in flames or, worse, it will look good when you get 
     in it only to fill with smoke and flames and crash a few 
     minutes later. But do you stay in your apartment and burn to 
     death because your plans call for using the elevator to 
     escape and the elevator is untenable? No, you run to the 
     stairs, an outside fire escape or a window. In short, your 
     plans to escape should be governed by the circumstances of 
     the fire when it starts.
       When a ``fire'' starts that might require committing armed 
     forces, we need to evaluate the circumstances. Relevant 
     questions include: Is the political objective we seek to 
     achieve important, clearly defined and understood? Have all 
     other nonviolent policy means failed? Will military force 
     achieve the objective? At what cost? Have the gains and risks 
     been analyzed? How might the situation that we seek to alter, 
     once it is altered by force, develop further and what might 
     be the consequences?
       As an example of this logical process, we can examine the 
     assertions of those who have asked why President Bush did not 
     order our forces on to Baghdad after we had driven the Iraqi 
     army out of Kuwait. We must assume that the political 
     objective of such an order would have been capturing Saddam 
     Hussein. Even if Hussein had waited for us to enter Baghdad, 
     and even if we had been able to capture him, what purpose 
     would it have served? And would serving that purpose have 
     been worth the many more casualties that would have occurred? 
     Would it have been worth the inevitable follow-up: major 
     occupation forces in Iraq for years to come and a very 
     expensive and complex American proconsulship in Baghdad? 
     Fortunately for America, reasonable people at the time 
     thought not. They still do.
       When the political objective is important, clearly defined 
     and understood, when the risks are acceptable, and when the 
     use of force can be effectively combined with diplomatic and 
     economic policies, then clear and unambiguous objectives must 
     be given to the armed forces. These objectives must be firmly 
     linked with the political objectives. We must not, for 
     example, send military forces into a crisis with an unclear 
     mission they cannot accomplish--such as we did when we sent 
     the U.S. Marines into Lebanon in 1983. We inserted those 
     proud warriors into the middle of a five-faction civil war 
     complete with terrorists, hostage-takers, and a dozen spies 
     in every camp, and said, ``Gentlemen, be a buffer.'' The 
     results were 241 Marines and Navy personnel and a U.S. 
     withdrawal from the troubled area.
       When force is used deftly--in smooth coordination with 
     diplomatic and economic policy--bullets may never have to 
     fly. Pulling triggers should always be toward the end of the 
     plan, and when those triggers are pulled all of the sound 
     analysis I have just described should back them up.
       Over the past three years the U.S. armed forces have been 
     used repeatedly to defend our interests and to achieve our 
     political objectives. In Panama a dictator was removed from 
     power. In the Philippines the use of limited force helped 
     save a democracy. In Somalia a daring night raid rescued our 
     embassy. In Liberia we rescues stranded international 
     citizens and protected our embassy. In the Persian Gulf a 
     nation was liberated. Moreover we have used our forces for 
     humanitarian relief operations in Iraq, Somalia, Bangladesh, 
     Russia and Bosnia.
       All of these operations had one thing in common: they were 
     successful. There have been no Bay of Pigs, failed desert 
     raids, Beirut bombings or Vietnams. Today American troops 
     around the world are protecting the peace in Europe, the 
     Persian Gulf, Korea, Cambodia, the Sinai and western Sahara. 
     They have brought relief to Americans at home here in 
     Florida, Hawaii and Guam. Ironically enough, the American 
     people are getting a solid return on their defense investment 
     even as from all corners of the nation come shouts for 
     imprudent reductions that would gut their armed forces.
       The reason for our success is that in every instance we 
     have carefully matched the use of military force to our 
     political objectives. We owe it to the men and women who go 
     in harm's way to make sure that this is always the case and 
     that their lives are not squandered for unclear purposes.
       Military men and women recognize more than most people that 
     not every situation will be crystal clear. We can and do 
     operate in murky, unpredictable circumstances. But we also 
     recognize that military force is not always the right 
     answer. If force is used imprecisely or out of frustration 
     rather than clear analysis, the situation can be made 
     worse.
       Decisive means and results are always to be preferred, even 
     if they are not always possible. We should always be 
     skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a 
     particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a 
     limited attack. When the ``surgery'' is over and the desired 
     results is not obtained, a new set of experts then comes 
     forward with talk of just a little escalation--more bombs, 
     more men and women, more force. History has not been kind to 
     this approach to war-making. In fact this approach has been 
     tragic--both for the men and women who are called upon to 
     implement it and for the nation. This is not the argue that 
     the use of force is restricted to only those occasions where 
     the victory of American arms will be resounding, swift and 
     overwhelming. It is simply to argue that the use of force 
     should be restricted to occasions where it can do some good 
     and where the good will outweigh the loss of lives and other 
     costs that will surely ensue. Wars kill people. That is what 
     makes them different from all other forms of human 
     enterprise.
       When President Lincoln gave this second inaugural address 
     he compared the Civil War to the scourge of God, visited upon 
     the nation to compensate for what the nation had visited upon 
     its slaves. Lincoln perceived war correctly. It is the 
     scourge of God. We should be very careful how we use it. When

[[Page S10896]]

     we do use it, we should not be equivocal: we should win and 
     win decisively. If our objective is something short of 
     winning--as in our air strikes into Libya in 1986--we should 
     see our objective clearly, then achieve it swiftly and 
     efficiently.
       I am preaching to the choir. Every reasonable American 
     deplores the resort to war. We wish it would never come 
     again. If we felt differently, we could lay no claim 
     whatsoever to being the last, best hope of earth. At the same 
     time I believe every American realizes that in the 
     challenging days ahead, our wishes are not likely to be 
     fulfilled. In those circumstances where we must use military 
     force, we have to be ready, willing and able. Where we should 
     not use force we have to be wise enough to exercise 
     restraint. I have finite faith in the American people's 
     ability to sense when and where we should draw the line.

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I rise today to salute a very special 
person, Joseph C. Chase, of the Senate Appropriations Staff who retired 
yesterday after 31 days of service in the Senate.
  When asked for his wisdom and advice after such a long period of 
distinguished service, Joseph smiled and easily responded by saying 
``deal with people as they are and always in a positive way.''
  Joseph C. Chase was born on March 18, 1948. He was raised in 
Brandywine in Prince Georges County. He is a graduate of Gwynn Park 
Senior High School in 1967 and attended Bowie State University from 
1968 to 1970 where he majored in physical education and studied to be a 
teacher.
  Joseph comes from a large family. He is the tenth child in a family 
of 11, nine boys and two girls. In 1988, he donated a kidney to his 
brother Andrew Chase who worked for the Sergeant at Arms.
  He has been married to his lovely wife Peggy Elsey Chase for 29 
years. The Chases met in 1969, and were married on July 27, 1974. Peggy 
has been a teacher for over 30 years. The Chases have two children, a 
daughter JoVonna, born August 1, 1977, and a son Joseph Jr., born 
August 21, 1983. The have one granddaughter, Kylah who is 3\1/2\.
  Joseph's family legacy on Capitol Hill started over 60 years ago with 
his uncle Lewis Brooks, age 89, who worked on the House side as a 
doorkeeper. Over the years, more than 20 members of Joseph's family 
have worked on Capitol Hill. After working as a driver for Master 
Distributors and Brody Brothers Trucking, Joseph started working for 
the Senate Sergeant at Arms in July of 1972. He then came to the Senate 
Appropriations Committee in March of 1973 under the chairmanship of 
Senator John McClellan. In total, Joseph has worked for the Senate for 
over 31 years.
  Since that time, Joseph has witnessed the growth in size and power as 
well as a host of other changes on the Senate Appropriations Committee. 
When Joseph started it consisted of only 30 people--today we have 95. 
Full committee meetings and conferences were held in the Old Supreme 
Court Chamber, would last for days and days, and were usually closed to 
only members and very few staff.
  Joseph is actively involved in his church and community. He is a 
senior member of Asbury U.M. Church in Brandywine which is pastored by 
W. Otto Kent. In addition to being a member of the Prince Hall Masons, 
he is a vice president of the Danville Floral Park Citizens 
Association.
  In closing, I just want to offer a special thank you to Joseph for 
all his outstanding contributions to the Senate Appropriations 
Committee over the past 31 years and wish him the best of luck in all 
his future endeavors.

                          ____________________