[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 117 (Friday, August 1, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10892-S10896]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
LIBERIA
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise to address the Senate concerning my
concern--I think there are others who feel similarly--about the crisis
situation that is rapidly developing in Liberia and the decision
framework that has confronted, is confronting, and will confront our
Government.
I carefully use the word ``Government'' because when men and women in
the Armed Forces are sent into harm's way, there is a constitutional
responsibility on the President as Commander in Chief and the principal
architect of our foreign policy to make the decision to send them into
harm's way. In no way in my 25 years in the Senate have I ever once
questioned that constitutional authority. In fact, I will match my
record--humble as it is--against any Member of this body with regard to
participation in the war power debates, participation in the
resolutions regarding the use of force, when we, as a body, are
addressing our responsibilities with regard to the men and women of the
Armed Forces.
The President has a constitutional right. There is always debate, as
reflected in the history of the War Powers Act, to what extent should
he consult and, indeed, to what extent should he receive the specific
concurrence of the Congress before exercising that very heavy
responsibility.
There are volumes written on this subject. But for simplicity,
clarity, and brevity today, I simply say the Constitution gives that
right to the President and should not be ever in question. To the
extent that Congress has the opportunity, through consultation and
through other actions working with the administration, I believe it is
wise that Congress speak to this issue.
About 4 weeks ago, I appeared on ``Meet the Press'' and somewhat
indirectly referenced my concern about Liberia at that time. I
expressed that the need to make a decision was coming down upon this
Government, as indeed it has, and that it would be wise for the
Congress to take a role. I cannot predict how this body would vote on
it if it got to a vote. But I think the involvement of Congress when
men and women go in harm's way is a very important responsibility as
coequal branches of the Government, the executive and the legislative,
and, indeed, an obligation.
I have tried each day to spend some time on these issues. I read what
I can from the press, which has been rather interesting and good
coverage so far, and from other documents, official and otherwise.
The complexity of this situation is really considerable. We do have
these historical ties dating to the 1840s to this small country. At
times, we have taken actions there. At times through the history of
this country, we have sort of looked the other way. We have gone in
before to try to quell disruption and violence, but I do not find a
long history of strong involvement. We now have a despot who has been
elected to the highest official post in that country, who has made
representation that he will leave subject to certain contingencies. The
President of the United States has indicated he wants to try and help
the people subject, again, to the Liberian leader taking certain
actions. This whole framework is quite unclear.
The Secretary General of the United Nations visited here 2 weeks ago.
I was privileged to sit in a small meeting hosted by the distinguished
majority leader, at which time we expressed our views. He was quite
concerned, as I am quite concerned--I think everybody is quite
concerned who has followed this--about the extraordinary dimensions of
human suffering, there is no dispute about that, human suffering as a
consequence of the frightful public record of the current leader in
Liberia, that leader who has indicated he is willing to leave.
As I stand here addressing the Senate, on orders from the President,
a very significant force, largely of marines, has progressed from the
Horn of Africa around to the Mediterranean and is approaching, probably
in the next 72 hours, a location somewhere off the coast of Liberia,
where the ships will be positioned to await such further orders as the
President may direct.
Now, what of the role of the Congress? As chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, I had hearings--at least a briefing--at my
request on July 8. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs provided a very
fine team of briefers where my committee, in S-407, heard their
reports. A day or so ago, recognizing the Congress would soon be
leaving for its August recess, I felt it wise to set a second briefing
of the Armed Services Committee to which I invited really anyone in the
Senate who wished to join, and also specifically a group of Senators,
of which I am one, who soon will be embarking on a trip to the African
continent. I was privileged to be included in that trip and expressed
an interest to go primarily because of my concerns of national security
in that region and the impending Liberian conflict. It had been my
expectation that several of those Senators would have joined today had
that briefing gone ahead.
Yesterday afternoon, the Department of Defense, following the regular
procedures we always follow, sent up the names of three briefers--2
from the Joint Staff and one from OSD policy--and it all seemed to be
ready to go this morning when quite unexpectedly we received word from
the Department of Defense that the briefers would not come.
I will not dwell further on that procedure. I will say in my 25 years
in the Senate, it is most unusual to conduct our affairs in that way
between the Senate and the Department of Defense. Indeed, I am not sure
I know of a precedent of that type of abrupt cancellation, but I will
put that to one side and press on. I did feel it would have been
helpful, certainly, to this Senator and several others--I know one or
two on the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday expressed to me their
concerns of where could they get information. Both of those Senators
were invited to attend this morning. One of them is on the Subcommittee
on African Affairs and he expressed to me his concern and asked how
best he could get involved in learning more.
I will move on now to this question about the seriousness of this
problem. This type of civil war, regrettably, has persisted in Liberia
for many years. There are essentially three factions now. There is one
faction to the sort of fragile, if almost inconsequential, government
that is in place today with this despotic leader. Then there is a group
to the south that refers to themselves as the Model, M-O-D-E-L. There
is a group in the north that refers to themselves as the Lurd, L U-R-D.
Both of them are a mixture of groups of Liberians and others from other
areas. Both groups are now converging on the central part of the
country, Monrovia, and we have witnessed this outbreak once again of
civil war and the devastation being wrought on innocent civilians.
So what to do about it? Again, I am not prepared to give a clear
answer. I would presume the administration is proceeding and in due
course will share this information, but it is likely one or more
decisions will be made in the absence of the Congress in formal
session, so that concerns me because I feel strongly that congressional
involvement in this situation is very important. I go back to our
obligation to the men and women in the Armed Forces.
Once this military force--that is the force at sea--is on station, I
anticipate that will increase the international pressure on our
Government--and I continue to use the phrase ``government''--to become
more actively involved and send these forces in. Again, under the
Constitution, the President has every right to make that decision on
his own initiative, with or without consultation with the Congress, and
to proceed.
In doing that, I call the attention of the Senate to the military
doctrine that has evolved since Vietnam. It was my privilege to serve
in the Department of Defense for over 5 years during the Vietnam
conflict as Navy Secretary. That period of history is indelibly etched
in my memory, a period of
[[Page S10893]]
history which reflected the Congress breaking away from successive
administrations that were involved in that conflict, and the animosity
in the Congress against the Department of Defense. I shared my burden
of that animosity, along with three Secretaries of Defense whom I
served with in that period. Two remain very dear friends and valued
advisers to me to this day. The third has passed on.
Out of that conflict, America began to examine the criteria by which
this Nation should send men and women in uniform into harm's way--a
very introspective, deep reflection on the tragic losses. My
recollection is close to 50,000 men and women gave their lives in that
conflict in Vietnam, and many more were wounded.
So often in the evening hours of our duties in the Pentagon in those
days, I would, as did the other service Secretaries, call families and
attend funerals. I frequently met with groups regarding their deep
concern about that conflict and their losses. I remember meeting with
the wives of the prisoners of war on regular occasions. Then this
country unfortunately, in many respects, turned its discontent on the
men and women of the Armed Forces themselves. When they would return
home from their tours of duty in Vietnam, indeed there were instances
in commands in the European theater of breakdown in discipline and
morale, because of the uncertainty surrounding that conflict, the
enormity of the casualities that we would take.
I mentioned the background because it was important America sit down
and reflect on those criteria that Presidents--and indeed to the extent
the Congress renders its approval--that Presidents and the Congress
should follow.
A brief summary of that doctrine would be that military action should
be used only as a last resort and only if there is a clear risk to
national security interests of the United States of America; and at
times we take into consideration the security interests of our valued
allies.
So, is there a clear risk to national security by the intended target
of our military action? What measure is the risk to the uniformed
American? What measure is the risk to his or her life and limb?
The force when used should be overwhelming and disproportionate to
the force used by the enemy. There must be strong support for the
campaign by the general American public and there must be a clear exit
strategy from the conflict in which the military is engaged.
I have generalized this but I ask unanimous consent to have printed
in the Record following my statement a very important set of guidelines
for the use of force that have been articulated through the years by
our distinguished Secretary of State, Colin Powell--the so-called
``Powell Doctrine.''
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibit 1.)
Mr. WARNER. I have fairly stated the basic precedents that I embrace
wholeheartedly. The Members of the Senate, in general, embrace these
precedents.
Therefore, I pose rhetorically the question: As the decision process
is made at this time, given the Congress will be out of town, that
process will be made by the executive branch, the President of the
United States, assuming, as he does, full accountability, will those
criteria for the use of force be the guideline or are we somehow going
to make a departure, and if so, what is that departure?
I fully recognize the dimension of human suffering today and the
potential for even greater human suffering tomorrow, perhaps the next
day. But at the same time, I fully recognize to the best I have been
able to assertain, and I have not been able to assertain it to my
complete satisfaction, but there will be an element of risk. I have
asked not one, not two, but half a dozen distinguished military
officers--some active duty, some not--whether they share my concern
that there will be a measure of risk should we send troops into
Liberia.
I made reference to this in hearings we have had in the Armed
Services Committee in connection with the reappointment of the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers and of the Vice Chairman,
General Pace.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an excerpt from
renomination hearing.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibit 2.)
Mr. WARNER. My concern is not just of today; it has been there for
some significant period of time. This Senator has pressed the questions
on that situation at every opportunity I have had to date.
I will also reflect on the personal involvement I have had in
addition to the period in Vietnam. When I first came to the Armed
Services Committee, I worked under some of the greatest men I have ever
known in the Senate: Scoop Jackson, John Stennis, Barry Goldwater, John
Tower. I try, as best I can, in my duties as Senator today to draw on
the wisdom they imparted to me in their teachings. Those men were
historic in proportion to the Senate. I shall never achieve but a small
fraction of their stature but, nevertheless, having the responsibility,
I do my very best.
I remember John Stennis asked me to work on a report for him of the
effort we made to rescue the hostages illegally taken by the Government
of Iran at the embassy. We all remember that challenge. The Pentagon
prepared what I thought was a well thought through plan to rescue those
hostages. It was the right thing to do. We put our military at great
risk. It was a plan to use covert action and helicopters. I will not
dwell on it because I did write that report for Senator Stennis. It is
somewhere in the archives.
The bottom line, a series of primarily mechanical failures, due to
dust being taken into the intake systems, prevented the consummation of
what I still to this day say could have been a successful operation.
Certainly the heroics of the men involved who volunteered for that
action were extraordinary.
John Tower, when he was chairman, we went together, just the two of
us, to Beirut shortly after the bombing of the marine barracks in
Beirut, marines who were sent there for the best of purposes to try to
alleviate the suffering. The tragic loss.
Later, I was entrusted to work on the report for Somalia. My
distinguished colleague, good friend, Carl Levin, and I went to
Somalia. We worked on that report. It took us months to interview many
individuals. How could we have experienced that tragic loss of men and
women in our Armed Forces at the hands of savage attacks? That is a
matter of record, the observations and conclusions Senator Levin and I
put in that report.
I don't want to take any more time of the Senate on what I personally
have done. Many have done as much, if not more, in respective
responsibilities, but I do draw on some experience.
I am not hesitant to express my own concerns about some situations.
If I were asked today, What should be done with respect to Liberia, I
would simply say, I do not have the facts to make an informed
decision. I hope in the executive branch there are those who do have
sufficient facts to make an informed decision. Is this situation
following the doctrine in our national security interests? I have even
seen the word ``vital'' national security interests used. It has not
been answered to my satisfaction.
If we are going to make a departure from the doctrine, is that
predicated on sound principles that equate, somehow, to violation of
security interests? If so, should we state them? If so, should we
explain to the people?
I strongly believe, as I pointed out, that as we ask our men and
women to take risks, we should, an as executive branch, as a
legislative branch, have informed the American people, prepared the
American--prepared them in a way to accept such losses as might occur.
Has that been done? I fear, in my judgment, it has not been done.
I have tried my best to respond to my constituents. I have been
questioned about it a number of times. I do not have the facts to my
satisfaction. But it is very clear throughout the history of that
Vietnam experience, we should have, as I stated, gained the support of
the general public, the support of the families of the men and women in
the Armed Forces who must go in harm's way. That has not, to my
satisfaction, been done.
It is my hope that whatever decision process has to be made in the
absence
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of the Congress will be made and carefully thought through. If we are
going to depart from this doctrine on the use of force, if there are
geopolitical pressures, if there are domestic political pressures--
whatever it is, spell it out: What were the factors taken into
consideration to make such decisions as may--and I underline may--be
made by the executive branch when the Congress is gone, assuming that
some decisions will be made--I don't predict in any way what they may
be, but assuming some decisions are made. Maybe the decision is not to
be involved.
I do fervently hope the Congress becomes engaged when we return, that
we consider whether we have a resolution--first at the request of the
administration, with the concurrence of the Senate leadership, and
perhaps maybe some consultation with the committee chairmen and ranking
members who are involved in the oversight committees--mine, Foreign
Relations, certainly the Subcommittee on Appropriations, and others. So
we go through a process.
I was privileged--I remember it so well--in 1991 to be asked by then
the distinguished leader, Robert Dole, to prepare a resolution for the
utilization by the President of force in the Persian Gulf in the 1991
conflict. How well I remember that debate--3 days, 3 nights on this
floor of the Senate and then the vote. And only by a margin of 5 votes
did the Senate adopt a resolution in support of then the first
President Bush to utilize force in that conflict.
We had a larger vote with regard to the operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq. We had some closer votes. I worked on these resolutions and so
forth and decisionmaking by the Congress in the Balkan situation. I
watched, carefully, all of those matters as they were addressed by this
body.
Now, as we look at this situation in Liberia, we have a background of
an ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and an ongoing conflict in Iraq.
This mighty Nation is mourning the losses of uniformed members of the
Armed Forces every week for some weeks now, doing the best we can
individually to comfort and share the grief of the families.
Just this week, one Senator approached me: His State suffered a loss,
and how could we facilitate the interment that this brave soldier
deserved in Arlington in a timely way? Those steps are being taken. But
a number of Senators have approached me, and I am glad to help as best
I can with this situation back home in the context of the loss of the
brave men and women of the Armed Forces.
This decision regarding Liberia could superimpose on those losses
another level. It could. The risk, it seems to us, to be there--some of
us who looked at this issue. Are we prepared as a nation to accept
another circumstance in another theater that poses the threat of more
casualties? I come back, is the United States of America--its
citizens--prepared?
Our Armed Forces today, in my humble judgment, are stretched. We have
seen some questioning the morale. I happen to think the morale is quite
high. The recruiting, to the everlasting credit of the American spirit,
is still strong; the retention is still strong. The All-Volunteer Force
has exceeded every expectation we had.
I was privileged to be part of the framework in the Pentagon, under
the leadership of a distinguished Secretary of Defense by the name of
Melvin Laird, and a successor Secretary by the name of Jim Schlesinger,
to envision and create and establish the All-Volunteer Force. It
worked, and worked well. But that has its breaking points. Like
everything else in life, it has its breaking points. I am not
suggesting we have reached that limit, but we should never take our eye
off the fact of that framework, that concept that everyone in uniform
today is there because he or she has raised their arm and pledged
allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and obligated
themselves to accept the risks of military service. They do so thinking
that the President, whoever that President may be, and the Congress,
whatever the composition may be, are standing guard, protecting them
and their families, protecting them and following the doctrine on the
use of force, which presumably they have some knowledge of before
accepting these obligations, that doctrine that I have enunciated and
others have enunciated.
That is a heavy obligation upon us. We have to make certain that, as
these conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are concluded and the goals
that we stated are reached--goals which enable both of those nations to
achieve a measure of democracy and freedom that they never have had,
certainly not in the last 30 years--after that, those successive
goals--and there is no doubt that we must be steadfast in our resolve
to achieve them--we have to make certain our Armed Forces remain strong
to meet the unexpected contingencies that arise around the world. Those
contingencies that could challenge the vital security interests of this
Nation. That means a strong, active, All-Volunteer Force, a strong
Guard and Reserve.
We have to take those steps now to ensure that they are in place as
we complete our mission in Afghanistan and Iraq, and indeed in many
ways where our troops are throughout the world. I think they are on the
border of being overdeployed and overextended, and we have to keep a
very watchful eye.
Early this week, the Secretary of Defense came up to the Hill along
with General Keane and went over a rotation policy which is going to
correct--and I repeat in their words--that ``some mistakes were made''
of late with regard to our troops currently engaged in the Iraqi
conflict. I commend the general. He recognized that some mistakes have
been made. They are going to correct them.
I think now our forces will have a much clearer understanding, and
their families--and I repeat--and their families will have a clear
understanding as to their obligation. But always keep in mind that
there is a tomorrow and a tomorrow, and what we do today in many ways
establishes the foundation of what we can and cannot do on a tomorrow.
I wish our President Godspeed to make his decision. And I am hopeful
that this body will engage itself when it returns from this recess.
Exhibit 2
u.s. senate committee on armed services
Sir/Madam: There will be a meeting of the Committee on
Armed Services, Room SR-325, the Caucus Room, Russell Senate
Office Building, Thursday, July 24, 2003-9:30 a.m.
To consider the following nominations: General Richard B.
Myers, USAF, for reappointment as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and reappointment to the grade of general;
and General Peter Pace, USMC, for reappointment as Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and reappointment to
the grade of general.
The nominees will be present.
____
Chairman Warner. My last question would relate to Liberia
and the decision process now underway by which the President
is trying to make an assessment as to the force level and
composition that could be put in by the United States to
stabilize a very tragic situation in terms of human
suffering.
But, on the other hand, in my judgment it is a situation
that poses great personal risk to forces such as our forces
that could be injected into that very fast-moving and
volatile situation there in Monrovia and the greater Liberia.
General Myers. If you will permit me, Mr. Chairman, let me
just describe the situation that we currently have in
Liberia. It hasn't changed dramatically in the last 24 hours.
But we have a situation where you have a leader who has got
to go who, as we know, is not a good leader, has not done
good things for Liberia or, for that matter, has not been--
been a lot less than helpful to the countries in the region,
and so President Taylor must leave, and that part is being
worked.
The other thing is that the two rebel groups, the two major
rebel groups, the LURD and the MODEL, it is unclear--in fact,
it's, I think the intelligence community would tell us that
it is probably not going to happen that you are going to get
political leadership out of these rebel groups, that they are
not a replacement for Taylor. So it is not clear who is going
to step forward in a political sense when the situation
settles down in Liberia, to take over the political
leadership.
In the meantime, you have a humanitarian situation where
food, clean water, medical care is a problem. All the
nongovernmental organizations that were in there providing
those kinds of capabilities have left because of the
security situation. So it is a situation that is, as you
have described it, is not a pretty situation. It is not
going to give way to any instant fix. Whatever the fix is
going to be is going to have to be a long-term fix.
Currently, we have the West African nations surrounding
that area, to include Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, others, are
looking to put a force in there to help stabilize the
situation in Liberia. They, of course, have asked for U.S.
support and what the administration is doing right now is
trying to determine what is going to be the character of that
support.
[[Page S10895]]
As a military person, I am concerned, like you, that
whatever we do, that we have a very clear mission, we
understand the mission we are asked to do, that we have an
idea of when the mission is going to be over, in other words,
when can we come out of the mission, and that we have
sufficient force to deal with the security situation, that we
do not go in on a shoestring when we need adequate force.
There are other things we can consider, but those are
probably the three main things.
We have looked at options, all sorts of options. There has
been no decision made--taken on this. I think I will just
leave it there, I think. I think in the next few days we
will--
Chairman Warner. I would also add, for myself, and I draw
that from statements made by our President in earlier days,
that there be a clear and identifiable strategic interest,
security interest, of this country. That to me remains
somewhat to be defined in this situation, should the decision
be made to go forward.
Can I just draw by way of conclusion your remarks that you
concur, that in my judgment, this is not a risk-free
operation, if we were to undertake it?
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, I don't think any operation
like this is risk-free. We have three, at least three warring
factions, the LURD, the MODEL, the two rebel groups, and the
government forces themselves. They are all armed. They are
not disciplined troops as we know them. There are a lot of
young people fighting in these groups. It is potentially a
dangerous situation.
So when you go into it, you need to go into it knowing
that. It may be that we can go in terms of support for these
ECOWAS forces. And ECOWAS countries have come forward and
volunteered forces. They will need some equipping and some
training, some of the forces will, before they go in. So
it is a little longer-term issue and it is a matter of
months, probably not weeks, for some of those forces. Some
of them probably can get in there fairly quickly, but
small numbers.
And then eventually I believe Kofi Annan up at the U.N.
said this will become a U.N. mission at some point. And that
all has to be blended into this.
But I will go back to the larger issue. There is a
political situation there with the president of a country, a
`'democracy,'' and how they deal with President Taylor, where
he goes, what this interim government is also important to
our security situation. And that is a somewhat cloudy picture
today.
Chairman Warner. General Pace, you had experience in your
previous command before becoming Vice Chairman, in terms of
Central and South America, do you have any views to add to
those of the Chairman, General Pace?
General Pace. Sir, my experience in Somalia is a little
more akin to the potential experience in Liberia. And I would
echo what General Myers just said, that it is potentially a
very dangerous situation. And when we--if we are asked to do
something militarily, we need to make sure we do it with the
proper numbers of troops and that we be prepared for the
eventualities of having to take a military action.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Just on that Liberian issue, would you
recommend going in unless Taylor is either gone or on his way
out as we arrive?
General Myers: So far, that has been one of the planning
assumptions that we made, that otherwise, you get into a
situation that General Pace knows only too well, and it would
define your mission, and the mission would be quite different
if Taylor were to remain there than if he were gone. And so
one of our planning assumptions is that he will leave, either
before or simultaneously with the troops entering, whether
they are ECOWAS troops or U.S., or U.S.-supported ECOWAS
troops.
____
Exhibit 1
[The first public articulation of the ``Powell Doctrine,'' a most
influential mindset throughout the 1990s--and through the current
administration, as well]
Excerpts From Colin Powell, ``U.S. Forces: The Challenges Ahead,''
Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992
To help with the complex issue of the use of ``violent''
force, some have turned to a set of principles or a when-to-
go-to-war doctrine. ``Follow these directions and you can't
go wrong.'' There is, however, no fixed set of rules for the
use of military force. To set one up is dangerous. First, it
destroys the ambiguity we might want to exist in our enemy's
mind regarding our intentions. Unless part of our strategy is
to destroy that ambiguity, it is usually helpful to keep it
intact. Second, having a fixed set of rules for how you will
go to war is like saying you are always going to use the
elevator in the event of fire in your apartment building.
Surely enough, when the fire comes the elevator will be
engulfed in flames or, worse, it will look good when you get
in it only to fill with smoke and flames and crash a few
minutes later. But do you stay in your apartment and burn to
death because your plans call for using the elevator to
escape and the elevator is untenable? No, you run to the
stairs, an outside fire escape or a window. In short, your
plans to escape should be governed by the circumstances of
the fire when it starts.
When a ``fire'' starts that might require committing armed
forces, we need to evaluate the circumstances. Relevant
questions include: Is the political objective we seek to
achieve important, clearly defined and understood? Have all
other nonviolent policy means failed? Will military force
achieve the objective? At what cost? Have the gains and risks
been analyzed? How might the situation that we seek to alter,
once it is altered by force, develop further and what might
be the consequences?
As an example of this logical process, we can examine the
assertions of those who have asked why President Bush did not
order our forces on to Baghdad after we had driven the Iraqi
army out of Kuwait. We must assume that the political
objective of such an order would have been capturing Saddam
Hussein. Even if Hussein had waited for us to enter Baghdad,
and even if we had been able to capture him, what purpose
would it have served? And would serving that purpose have
been worth the many more casualties that would have occurred?
Would it have been worth the inevitable follow-up: major
occupation forces in Iraq for years to come and a very
expensive and complex American proconsulship in Baghdad?
Fortunately for America, reasonable people at the time
thought not. They still do.
When the political objective is important, clearly defined
and understood, when the risks are acceptable, and when the
use of force can be effectively combined with diplomatic and
economic policies, then clear and unambiguous objectives must
be given to the armed forces. These objectives must be firmly
linked with the political objectives. We must not, for
example, send military forces into a crisis with an unclear
mission they cannot accomplish--such as we did when we sent
the U.S. Marines into Lebanon in 1983. We inserted those
proud warriors into the middle of a five-faction civil war
complete with terrorists, hostage-takers, and a dozen spies
in every camp, and said, ``Gentlemen, be a buffer.'' The
results were 241 Marines and Navy personnel and a U.S.
withdrawal from the troubled area.
When force is used deftly--in smooth coordination with
diplomatic and economic policy--bullets may never have to
fly. Pulling triggers should always be toward the end of the
plan, and when those triggers are pulled all of the sound
analysis I have just described should back them up.
Over the past three years the U.S. armed forces have been
used repeatedly to defend our interests and to achieve our
political objectives. In Panama a dictator was removed from
power. In the Philippines the use of limited force helped
save a democracy. In Somalia a daring night raid rescued our
embassy. In Liberia we rescues stranded international
citizens and protected our embassy. In the Persian Gulf a
nation was liberated. Moreover we have used our forces for
humanitarian relief operations in Iraq, Somalia, Bangladesh,
Russia and Bosnia.
All of these operations had one thing in common: they were
successful. There have been no Bay of Pigs, failed desert
raids, Beirut bombings or Vietnams. Today American troops
around the world are protecting the peace in Europe, the
Persian Gulf, Korea, Cambodia, the Sinai and western Sahara.
They have brought relief to Americans at home here in
Florida, Hawaii and Guam. Ironically enough, the American
people are getting a solid return on their defense investment
even as from all corners of the nation come shouts for
imprudent reductions that would gut their armed forces.
The reason for our success is that in every instance we
have carefully matched the use of military force to our
political objectives. We owe it to the men and women who go
in harm's way to make sure that this is always the case and
that their lives are not squandered for unclear purposes.
Military men and women recognize more than most people that
not every situation will be crystal clear. We can and do
operate in murky, unpredictable circumstances. But we also
recognize that military force is not always the right
answer. If force is used imprecisely or out of frustration
rather than clear analysis, the situation can be made
worse.
Decisive means and results are always to be preferred, even
if they are not always possible. We should always be
skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a
particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a
limited attack. When the ``surgery'' is over and the desired
results is not obtained, a new set of experts then comes
forward with talk of just a little escalation--more bombs,
more men and women, more force. History has not been kind to
this approach to war-making. In fact this approach has been
tragic--both for the men and women who are called upon to
implement it and for the nation. This is not the argue that
the use of force is restricted to only those occasions where
the victory of American arms will be resounding, swift and
overwhelming. It is simply to argue that the use of force
should be restricted to occasions where it can do some good
and where the good will outweigh the loss of lives and other
costs that will surely ensue. Wars kill people. That is what
makes them different from all other forms of human
enterprise.
When President Lincoln gave this second inaugural address
he compared the Civil War to the scourge of God, visited upon
the nation to compensate for what the nation had visited upon
its slaves. Lincoln perceived war correctly. It is the
scourge of God. We should be very careful how we use it. When
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we do use it, we should not be equivocal: we should win and
win decisively. If our objective is something short of
winning--as in our air strikes into Libya in 1986--we should
see our objective clearly, then achieve it swiftly and
efficiently.
I am preaching to the choir. Every reasonable American
deplores the resort to war. We wish it would never come
again. If we felt differently, we could lay no claim
whatsoever to being the last, best hope of earth. At the same
time I believe every American realizes that in the
challenging days ahead, our wishes are not likely to be
fulfilled. In those circumstances where we must use military
force, we have to be ready, willing and able. Where we should
not use force we have to be wise enough to exercise
restraint. I have finite faith in the American people's
ability to sense when and where we should draw the line.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I rise today to salute a very special
person, Joseph C. Chase, of the Senate Appropriations Staff who retired
yesterday after 31 days of service in the Senate.
When asked for his wisdom and advice after such a long period of
distinguished service, Joseph smiled and easily responded by saying
``deal with people as they are and always in a positive way.''
Joseph C. Chase was born on March 18, 1948. He was raised in
Brandywine in Prince Georges County. He is a graduate of Gwynn Park
Senior High School in 1967 and attended Bowie State University from
1968 to 1970 where he majored in physical education and studied to be a
teacher.
Joseph comes from a large family. He is the tenth child in a family
of 11, nine boys and two girls. In 1988, he donated a kidney to his
brother Andrew Chase who worked for the Sergeant at Arms.
He has been married to his lovely wife Peggy Elsey Chase for 29
years. The Chases met in 1969, and were married on July 27, 1974. Peggy
has been a teacher for over 30 years. The Chases have two children, a
daughter JoVonna, born August 1, 1977, and a son Joseph Jr., born
August 21, 1983. The have one granddaughter, Kylah who is 3\1/2\.
Joseph's family legacy on Capitol Hill started over 60 years ago with
his uncle Lewis Brooks, age 89, who worked on the House side as a
doorkeeper. Over the years, more than 20 members of Joseph's family
have worked on Capitol Hill. After working as a driver for Master
Distributors and Brody Brothers Trucking, Joseph started working for
the Senate Sergeant at Arms in July of 1972. He then came to the Senate
Appropriations Committee in March of 1973 under the chairmanship of
Senator John McClellan. In total, Joseph has worked for the Senate for
over 31 years.
Since that time, Joseph has witnessed the growth in size and power as
well as a host of other changes on the Senate Appropriations Committee.
When Joseph started it consisted of only 30 people--today we have 95.
Full committee meetings and conferences were held in the Old Supreme
Court Chamber, would last for days and days, and were usually closed to
only members and very few staff.
Joseph is actively involved in his church and community. He is a
senior member of Asbury U.M. Church in Brandywine which is pastored by
W. Otto Kent. In addition to being a member of the Prince Hall Masons,
he is a vice president of the Danville Floral Park Citizens
Association.
In closing, I just want to offer a special thank you to Joseph for
all his outstanding contributions to the Senate Appropriations
Committee over the past 31 years and wish him the best of luck in all
his future endeavors.
____________________