[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 116 (Thursday, July 31, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10591-S10594]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
THE NOMINATION OF WILLIAM PRYOR
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, it is with reluctance and disappointment
that I must rise in opposition to another cloture vote for a judicial
nominee. But once again, the extreme ideology of a nominee has left us
with no other option. But even if there were no questions about Mr.
Pryor's ability to apply and interpret the law fairly, the open
questions surrounding Mr. Pryor's ethical fitness, the unfinished
investigation in the Judiciary Committee, and the fact that his
nomination was reported out of committee in violation of committee
rules, should compel the Senate to delay voting on this nomination. For
both substantive and procedural reasons, Mr. Pryor's nomination should
be put on hold. For that reason, I must oppose cloture.
I would remind my colleagues that we have invoked our right to
unlimited debate with great rarity. Since President Bush took office,
Democrats have been eager to cooperate in the nomination and
confirmation of qualified judges who will enforce the law and protect
the rights of all Americans. And we are proud of our record. When the
Democrats held the Senate, we confirmed 100 of the President's judicial
nominees. We rejected only two, Charles Pickering and Priscilla Owen.
This year, we have already approved 40 more judges, and only 2
nominees, Miguel Estrada and Priscilla Owen, have previously met with
sustained opposition. Democrats have sought compromise and consensus.
And today, there are 140 judges sitting on the bench who serve as
testimony to our cooperation.
But the importance of the Federal judiciary is too important to stand
silently by and allow a nominee who has expressed hostility to the laws
that protect the rights of all Americans. Mr. Pryor has repeatedly put
his own personal and political beliefs above the dictates of the law.
Throughout his career, he has been unable to find constitutional
protection for even those rights that are clearly written and firmly
established in case law. Not civil rights. Not voting rights. Not the
right to privacy. In fact, Mr. Pryor has argued before the Supreme
Court that it should cut back on the protections of
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the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the American with Disabilities Act, and the Family and Medical Leave
Act. He referred to a recent decision reaffirming Miranda rights as
``preserving the worst examples of judicial activism.'' And he was, in
fact, the only State attorney general in the country to challenge the
constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act. Adhering to an
extreme interpretation of States rights, Mr. Pryor has stated that,
``Congress . . . should not be in the business of public education nor
the control of street crime.'' Mr. Pryor has taken this position, even
as President Bush has touted the importance of the Federal role in
education and the COPS Program has put tens of thousands of new police
officers on patrol in American towns and cities, contributing to the
historic reduction in the crime rate of the 1990s.
But even if we disagree on the merits of Mr. Pryor's record, there
can be no disagreement on the incompleteness of this debate. The Senate
rules have preserved the right of unlimited debate because, as a
deliberative body, we have an obligation to wait until all relevant
information is available. In the case of Mr. Pryor's nomination, there
are vitally important outstanding questions regarding his ethical
fitness to serve. There was a bipartisan investigation that could have
settled these questions once and for all. But in order to shield this
nomination from legitimate questions, the chairman of the Judiciary
Committee shut the investigation down. Then, in clear violation of the
committee's rules, he pushed the nomination out of committee and onto
the Senate floor. In the process, the chairman has not only allowed a
cloud of suspicion to hang above Mr. Pryor's nomination, he has denied
the Judiciary Committee the right to determine whether or not the
nominee was forthright.
Esteem for the Federal bench, and the Judiciary Committee, should
prevent such questions from going unanswered. And I would hope that my
colleagues would share that view. This is a body of rules. And this is
a country of laws. I cannot imagine that there is ever a time that any
one of us ought to be in a position to say the rules in this case are
simply not going to apply. But that is precisely what was done by the
chairman of the Judiciary Committee--ironically the committee which
passes judgment on those who will interpret the rule of law. Members of
the committee called attention to this extraordinary development with
grave concern about its implications, about its precedent, about the
message it sends. After assurances by the majority leader that this
would not occur, this nomination has nonetheless made it to the floor.
We should not reward this disregard for the rules of the Senate by
permitting the nomination to go forward.
Amazingly, this is not the ugliest aspect of this debate. Because we
have expressed our opposition to Mr. Pryor, Democrats have been accused
of anti-Catholic bigotry. Of course, nothing could be further from the
truth. I am proud of my Catholic faith. That pride is shared by many
members of our caucus. Many of us grew up listening to our parents or
grandparents tell stories of seeing signs that said No Catholics Need
Apply on storefront windows. In 1960, the Democratic nominee for
President, John Kennedy, faced questions regarding whether a Catholic
could be sufficiently independent of church doctrine in order to serve
his country. John Kennedy put those questions to rest and a generation
of Catholics have been able to serve their country without being forced
to justify their loyalty or patriotism.
This line of attack has resuscitated a profoundly un-American idea.
The charge that our opposition to Mr. Pryor is rooted in bigotry is
repugnant and divisive. This is an egregious misuse of religion for
profane political purposes. All Americans should be offended by this
charge and disappointed that the discourse has degraded to such an
extent. These are slanderous charges, and they have no place in this
body. Each time Democrats have risen to oppose cloture on a judicial
nomination, the majority's attacks against us have grown more vehement
and abrasive. We can't control that. But we can control our response.
Each Member of the Senate has sworn an oath to uphold and defend our
Constitution. That is precisely what we are doing today by opposing the
nomination of William Pryor. No attack, no matter how offensive, will
shake us from our duty.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, as I have mentioned a few times over the
last few days, and as anyone watching the horrible display here on the
floor last night knows, those opposing the confirmation of William
Pryor to the Eleventh Circuit have been subjected to a despicable
smear. Supporters of the nomination have turned reality on its head.
They accuse us of imposing a religious test, but it was a Republican
supporter of the nomination who was the only Senator to ask Mr. Pryor
what his religion was and to use what they now term a code phrase
``deeply held religious beliefs.''
The scurrilous accusations against opponents of the nomination must
be popular with the political gurus at the White House. It has been
echoed in recent days by the Committee for Justice, a group closely
associated with the President and his family, headed by the first
President Bush's White House counsel. I know about the bias against
immigrants and against Catholics. That was real discrimination. What is
being spread this week is a falsehood uttered for partisan political
purposes.
Those who know what real religious discrimination is have spoken out
against the advertising campaign. Earlier today I mentioned the members
of the Interfaith Alliance, who spoke so eloquently against this sort
of smear. Now I am pleased to recognize the Anti-Defamation League, so
well known and well respected for their work against religious bigotry,
for speaking out against the Committee for Justice's slurs. Abraham H.
Foxman, the National Director of the ADL, and Glen A. Tobias, its
National Chairman, have written to the head of the Committee for
Justice, Mr. Boyden Gray, to object to his advertisements. They explain
to Mr. Gray, that, ``[t]o promote the view that Mr. Pryor's opponents
object to his Catholic religious beliefs, rather than his views as
expressed in his prolific legal writings and speeches and his answers
to questions at his Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings,
needlessly and wrongfully injects religion into the Senate's `advise
and consent' role in the nomination process.''
I could not agree more. I appreciate that the ADL has added its voice
to those trying to show the Committee for Justice the error of its
ways. I ask unanimous consent the ADL's letter to Mr. Gray be printed
in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
July 30, 2003.
C. Boyden Gray, Esq.
Chairman, The Committee for Justice, Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering, Washington, DC 20037.
Dear Mr. Gray: On behalf of the Anti-Defamation League
(ADL), we write to strongly object to the recent advertising
campaign launched by the Committee for Justice (CFJ) that
harshly criticizes opponents of judicial nominee William
Pryor for ``playing politics with religion.'' These
misleading ads claim that ``some in the U.S. Senate are
attacking Bill Pryor for having `deeply held' Catholic
beliefs to prevent him from becoming a federal judge'' and
graphically illustrate the assertion with a picture of a sign
hanging on the door to ``Judicial Chambers'' that reads,
``Catholics need not apply.''
We are unaware of any Senator who has attacked Mr. Pryor
``for having `deeply held' Catholic beliefs.'' To promote the
view that Mr. Pryor's opponents object to his Catholic
religious beliefs, rather than his views as expressed in his
prolific legal writings and speeches and his answers to
questions at his Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings,
needlessly and wrongfully injects religion into the Senate's
``advise and consent'' role in the nomination process.
ADL does not as a practice endorse or oppose nominees to
the bench. However, because Mr. Pryor has written and spoken
so prolifically and so forcefully as an advocate on several
issues of deep concern, we believe his positions merit close
scrutiny by the Senate. Our objections to this nomination
stem from Mr. Pryor's well-documented views, not his
religious beliefs.
We believe that CFJ's ad campaign is misleading and
inflammatory. We urge you to reconsider further promotion of
this effort.
Sincerely,
Glen A. Tobias,
National Chairman.
Abraham H. Foxman,
National Director.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I oppose the nomination of William Pryor to
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Mr. Pryor holds extreme views on
a range of issues, has engaged in inflammatory rhetoric when expressing
those views,
[[Page S10593]]
and has exhibited a questionable commitment to separating politics from
the law.
Mr. Pryor has led Alabama's efforts to challenge Federal power and
argue that the State should be immune from violations of Federal law.
He has filed briefs challenging Congress' authority to enact parts of
the Family and Medical Leave Act; he has argued against Congress'
authority to protect disabled people from discrimination; and during
Mr. Pryor's tenure as attorney general, Alabama was also the only State
to file an amicus brief opposing the Government in a case limiting
Congress' authority under the Clean Water Act.
Our country is built upon tolerance for a diversity of faiths yet Mr.
Pryor has also shown little respect for the important constitutional
principle of separation of church and state.
As an appellate court judge, Mr. Pryor would be required to follow
precedents established by the Supreme court. But Mr. Pryor has openly
shown disdain and indeed personally attacked individual justices. For
instance, he stated, ``I will end my prayer for the next
administration: Please God, no more Souters.''
There are just too many indications that Mr. Pryor would be unable to
separate his politics from the law. Just listen to what Former
Republican Arizona Attorney General Grant Woods said about Mr. Pryor.
Mr. Woods described Pryor as ``probably the most doctrinaire and the
most partisan of any attorney general [he had] dealt with in eight
years, so people would be wise to question whether or not [Pryor is]
the right person to be non-partisan on the bench.''
The majority brought this nomination to the floor and immediately
filed a cloture petition, not allowing for adequate debate on Mr.
Pryor's controversial nomination. I think that is wrong Wrong for the
Senate. Wrong for our Federal courts. And wrong for the country. For
these reasons, I oppose cloture on Mr. Pryor's nomination.
Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, yesterday we voted on a motion to invoke
cloture on the nomination of William Pryor to be a judge on the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. After careful consideration of his
candidacy, I had no choice but to oppose his confirmation in the
Judiciary Committee last week and opposed cloture on his nomination as
well.
When considering a nominee to a Federal court judgeship, we consider
the nominee's legal skills, judgment, reputation, and acumen. The
nominee should be learned in the law. And the nominee should be well
regarded among his peers in his or her community. Perhaps most
important of all is the nominee's judicial temperament.
An appeals court judge's solemn duty and paramount obligation is to
do justice fairly, impartially, and without favor. An appeals court
judge must be open minded, must be willing to set his or her personal
preferences aside, and must be able to judge without predisposition.
And, of course, he or she must follow controlling precedent faithfully,
and be able to disregard completely any views he or she holds to the
contrary.
In the case of Attorney General Pryor, we are presented with a
nominee whose views are so extreme that he fails this basic test. In
case after case, and on issue after issue, Attorney General Pryor has a
public record of taking the most extreme position, often at odds with
controlling Supreme Court precedent, and in the most hard-line and
inflexible manner.
Pryor's views are outside of the mainstream on issues affecting civil
rights, women's rights, disability rights, religious freedom, and the
right to privacy. He assures us that despite these views, he will
follow settled law and Supreme Court precedent. After making extreme
statements to the committee and in his hearing and refusing to disavow
other zealous positions that he has taken throughout his career, he
wants us to believe that he will blindly follow the law as a judge.
Let me make clear that the mere fact that Attorney General Pryor
opposes abortion is not the reason I oppose him today. I have voted to
confirm literally hundreds of judges, nominees who have both supported
and opposed abortion. It is not Attorney General Pryor's views on
whether or not he believes legal abortion is good public policy which
concern me. Instead, the crucial issue is whether Attorney General
Pryor can put his personal views aside and apply the law of the land as
decided by the Supreme Court. It is my conclusion that he cannot.
His inability to set his personal views aside has been demonstrated
most explicitly in his activist attempts to challenge numerous federal
statutes. He has chosen to expand on his cramped view of federalism and
challenge the ability of the Federal Government to remedy
discriminatory practices. Many of the cases in which he took his most
extreme legal positions were on behalf of the State of Alabama where he
had the sole decision under state law as to what legal position to
assert. These cases include his assertion of federalism claims to
defeat provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the
Americans With Disabilities Act; his opposition to Congress's authority
to provide victims of gender-motivated violence to sue their attackers
in federal court; his argument that Congress exceeding its authority in
passing the Family and Medical Leave Act; and many other cases. The
extreme legal positions advanced in these cases were fully and entirely
the responsibility of Attorney General Pryor.
Of course, Attorney General Pryor has every right to hold his views,
whether we agree with him or not. He can run for office and serve in
the legislative or executive branches should he convince a majority of
his fellow Alabamans that he is fit to represent them. But he has no
right to be a Federal appeals court judge. Only those who we are
convinced are impartial, unbiased, fair, and whose only guiding
ideology is to follow the Constitution to apply equal justice to all
are fit for this position. Unfortunately, we can have no confidence
that he will set these views aside and faithfully follow the
Constitution and binding precedent. For these reasons, I must oppose
his confirmation.
I would be remiss if I did not address briefly--for a brief remark is
all this point is worth--the destructive charges that those of us who
oppose Mr. Pryor are anti-Catholic. The people who have put forward
this charge engage in the worst form of personal destruction. These
allegation are beneath the dignity of the process and beneath the
dignity of the Senate and must be rejected by everyone involved.
One last point. The Judiciary Committee began an investigation into
statements made by the nominee before this committee, Unfortunately,
that investigation has not been completed, so I am not ready at this
time to judge whether Mr. Pryor lied to the Judiciary committee at his
hearing with regard to his involvement in fundraising activities. This
investigation involves very serious matters and must be allowed to
proceed.
I will vote no.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I took the floor last night to
speak about the nomination of William Pryor and the unfortunate
circumstances surrounding that nomination, and since that time certain
of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have chosen to
mischaracterize my statements and perpetuate the unfair and baseless
charges I was trying to debunk.
I want to briefly correct the record on two of these
mischaracterizations, because I believe very strongly that these types
of wrongful allegations should not be allowed to stand.
First, the junior Senator from Pennsylvania stated that anyone who
questioned Mr. Pryor's ``deeply held beliefs'' would be questioning his
religious beliefs. Specifically, he said: I just suggest that it is
obvious to anyone that this code word is an antireligious bias.
Senator Durbin attempted to correct the record immediately but was
not allowed to do so until later. I appreciate his efforts in that
regard, but I think I should also set the record straight myself.
First, what I said in my statement was clearly not a religious
attack. I said, and I quote:
Many of us have concerns about nominees sent to the Senate
who feel so very strongly, and sometimes stridently, and
often intemperately about certain political beliefs and who
make intemperate statements about those beliefs. So we raise
questions about whether those nominees can be truly
impartial, particularly when the law conflicts with those
beliefs.
So Mr. President, I was very careful to raise this concern about
deeply held
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political beliefs, not religious beliefs. And my concern is not just
the beliefs themselves but the manner in which they are expressed. I
have found that intemperate statements often accompany intemperate
people.
Indeed, I went on to say that, and again I quote:
It is true that abortion rights can often be at the center
of these questions. As a result, accusations have been
leveled that any time reproductive choice becomes an issue,
it acts as a litmus test against those whose religion causes
them to be anti-choice. But pro-choice Democrats on this
committee have voted for many nominees who are anti-choice
and who believe that abortion should be illegal, some of whom
may even have been Catholic. I do not know because I have
never inquired.
So this truly is not about religion. This is about
confirming judges who can be impartial and fair in the
administration of justice. I think when a nominee such as
William Pryor makes inflammatory statements and evidences
such strongly held beliefs on a whole variety of core issues,
it is hard for many of us to accept that he can set aside
those beliefs and act as an impartial judge--particularly
because he is very young, 41; particularly because this is a
lifetime appointment; and particularly because we have seen
so many people who have received lifetime appointments then
go on and do just what they want, regardless of what they
said. So it is of some concern to us.
That is what I said. I did not attack Mr. Pryor's religion. Nobody in
this debate has. I did not attack his religious beliefs. Nobody in this
Senate has.
To accuse anyone in this body of using an anti-Catholic litmus test
is inaccurate, and wrong. It is ill-advised, and it risks bringing us
back to a day where religion and race and gender debates split this
Nation apart at its seams.
The judicial nominations process is a serious one and filled with
countless debates about very serious issues. We should focus on what is
important and real, not on what can inflame political supporters.
The second mischaracterization of my statement was by the junior
Senator from Alabama. I know he feels very strongly about this nominee,
so I do not blame him for fighting hard for Mr. Pryor.
Nevertheless, the junior Senator from Alabama did not accurately
portray what I said in my statement. Specifically, the Senator said
that I claimed Mr. Pryor had ``used his power as attorney general to
obstruct the enforcement of the Violence Against Women Act in
Alabama.''
What I actually said was that Pryor ``used his position as attorney
general to limit the scope of crucial civil rights laws like the
Violence Against Women's Act, VAWA, the Age Discrimination In
Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and the Family Medical Leave Act. . . . For example, he
was the only attorney general to argue against a key provision in the
Violence Against Women Act on federalism grounds.''
Now in retrospect, I should have been more careful in the wording of
my statement, and for that I am sorry. I said that Mr. Pryor ``used his
position as attorney general to limit the scope of crucial civil rights
laws . . .'' rather than saying what I meant to say, which was that he
argued for limiting the scope of those laws--sometimes successfully--in
briefs before the Federal courts.
But I certainly never said that he used his power to ``obstruct'' the
law in Alabama.
Some other comments have been made throughout this debate that
mischaracterize the Democratic opposition to this nominee and in many
instances state, or at least imply, that our opposition is based on
religion.
I will say once again, this is simply not true.
I hope, as I said yesterday, that this debate can focus on what it
should focus on, the qualifications of this nominee. That focus should
not have been lost through a violation of the committee rules, the
thwarting of an ongoing investigation into the nominee, or these false
charges of religious bias.
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