[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 109 (Tuesday, July 22, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9712-S9716]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. GRASSLEY (for himself and Mr. Leahy):
  S. 1440. A bill to reform the Federal Bureau of Investigation; to the 
Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I am proud to be reintroducing the FBI 
Reform Act of 2003 with Senator Patrick Leahy. This reform bill is 
designed to address the accountability problems that have plagued the 
FBI for years. For almost a decade, I have been engaged in FBI 
oversight, and during that time, I have seen numerous scandals and 
coverups. I am pleased to see that Director Mueller is committed to 
changing the culture of the FBI. He is making good strides toward 
overcoming past bad policies and procedures at the Bureau. However, 
Congress also has a role to play in this overhaul of the FBI.
  A little over a year ago, a bill similar to this one was approved 
unanimously by the Judiciary Committee. Since then, a number of the 
provisions of that bill were enacted in separate legislation. However, 
some of the most important provisions of that bill--provisions 
protecting whistleblowers, creating a Security Career Program and 
Counterintelligence Polygraph Program, and ending the double standard 
for discipline of senior FBI executives--have yet to be taken up by the 
full Senate. These provisions are needed to maintain America's 
confidence in the FBI.

[[Page S9713]]

  When I was growing up, I was surrounded by a generation that believed 
the FBI could do no wrong. Yet today at a time when we rely on the FBI 
to protect us from acts of catastrophic terrorism that endanger the 
lives of the American people, a time when the need for confidence in 
the FBI is at its greatest, Americans' trust and confidence in the FBI 
has been shaken. Do not get me wrong, the majority of FBI agents and 
especially those who are posted all over the heartland of this country, 
are honorable, hard working Federal servants who are doing a great job 
of protecting us from harm. However, there are a few bad apples that 
must be dealt with because their actions give the Bureau a black eye. 
The spy cases of Robert Hanssen and Chinese espionage in Los Angeles 
have highlighted internal security problems. Retaliation against agents 
like John Roberts, Frank Perry, and Patrick Kiernan, who did their duty 
investigating internal wrongdoing and spoke the truth to Congress, 
highlight continuing cultural hostility to criticism. This bill goes a 
long way to address these systemic problems and shore up trust and 
confidence in the FBI in the wake of these concerns.
  While Congress sometimes follows a hands-off approach to the FBI, the 
Judiciary Committees hearings and other oversight activities over the 
last 2 or 3 years have highlighted the actions that Congress needs to 
take to do its part in reforming the Bureau. The hearings that spurred 
this legislation demonstrated the need to extend adequate whistleblower 
protections to the FBI, enhance the Bureau's internal security program, 
end the double-standard for discipline, and modernize the FBI's 
information technology systems. These and additional management issues 
the committee has explored are reflected in this bill. As the Patriot 
Act has increased the FBI's powers, as the American people have 
increased their reliance on the FBI to stop terrorism, and as we 
continue to increase the FBI's funding, it is time for Congress to take 
action with a more hands-on approach. Let me provide some more detail 
about the most important provisions of the FBI reform bill.
  First, title I of the bill contains much needed protections for FBI 
whistleblowers. As my colleagues know, I have long held that good 
government requires that the brave men and women who blow the whistle 
on wrongdoing be protected. It is my strong belief that disclosures of 
wrongdoing by whistleblowers are an integral part of our system of 
checks and balances. However, although whistleblowers play a critical 
role in ensuring that waste, fraud, and abuse are brought to light and 
that public health and safety problems are exposed, the same 
whistleblower protection laws that apply to almost all other Federal 
employees do not currently apply to the FBI. In fact, it is a violation 
for FBI agents to report problems to Congress. That restriction leaves 
patriotic, loyal FBI employees with little recourse. This bill will fix 
that problem.
  I truly believe that reform at the FBI will only occur when FBI 
employees feel free to blow the whistle on wrongdoing. Without adequate 
whistleblower protections, I am concerned that agents, such as Coleen 
Rowley and others, who speak out about abuses and problems at the FBI 
will be subject to retaliation. Thus, this bill finally gives FBI 
whistleblowers the same rights and protections that other Federal 
employees currently possess. When this bill is passed, FBI employees 
who are retaliated against for blowing the whistle will be able to 
avail themselves of all the protections afforded by the Whistleblower 
Protection Act.

  In order to enhance internal security at the FBI, title II of the 
bill requires the FBI to establish a career security program and ensure 
that appropriate management tools and resources are devoted to that 
task. Modeled after the Department of Defense Acquisition Career 
Program, security professional career development requirements would 
bring the FBI into line with the other Federal agencies that handle top 
secret intelligence. This bill establishes and defines the Career 
Security Program and sets out the framework for career development and 
training in internal security. With the development of a Career 
Security Program, the FBI can meet the challenges of espionage, 
information technology vulnerability, and the threat of direct 
terrorist attack.
  This bill requires the Attorney General to establish policies and 
procedures for career management of FBI security personnel. It directs 
the Director of the FBI to appoint a Director of Security who would 
chair a security career program board that would advise in the 
management of hiring, training, education, and career development. The 
bill also requires the FBI Director to designate certain positions as 
security positions. The bill requires that career paths to senior 
positions be published, and it ensures that all FBI personnel would 
have the opportunity to acquire the education, training and experience 
needed for senior security positions. Moreover, in order to ensure that 
security professionals gain the stature that special agents enjoy, the 
bill provides that special agents would not have preference for 
security positions and security positions could not be restricted to 
special agents unless the Attorney General makes a special 
determination.
  Furthermore, the bill would direct that education, training, and 
experience requirements be established for each position and that 
before assignment as a manager or a deputy manager of a significant 
security program, a person would have to complete an accredited 
security program management course and have at least 6 years security 
experience, including 2 years in a similar program.
  In addition to the Security Career Program, the bill will also 
enhance security through the creation of an FBI counterintelligence 
polygraph program. The program would consist of the periodic screening 
of employees and contractors who have access to sensitive information 
or restricted data. While the program recognizes the value of polygraph 
screening, it also provides safeguards for those subject to polygraph 
examination. The bill directs that the program have procedures to 
address false positives, ensure quality control, requires that no 
adverse personnel action could be taken solely by reason of 
physiological reaction on an exam without further investigation, and 
provides that employees would have prompt access to unclassified 
reports of their exams that relate to adverse personnel action. Thus, 
title III provides increased security while at the same time protecting 
employee rights.
  Title IV requires the Attorney General to report on the legal 
authority for the FBI's programs and activities. This report will help 
the FBI focus on its most important duty--preventing terrorism--by 
cutting back on the FBI's jurisdiction, which has become cumbersome and 
unwieldy. Currently, the FBI investigates over 300 different Federal 
offenses, which are divided between violent crime, white collar crime, 
organized crime, drugs, national security, and civil rights. In many of 
these areas, there are instances of concurrent or overlapping 
jurisdiction with other Federal law enforcement agencies who specialize 
in investigating these crimes.
  The FBI needs to scale back on the broad range of investigations 
which are duplicated by other Federal and State agencies. The Bureau 
needs to completely jettison some of these areas and in other areas, 
the Bureau could simply take a secondary role, allowing another agency 
to take the lead. In order to assist the FBI in scaling back its 
jurisdiction, this bill directs the Attorney General to report to 
Congress on the legal authority for FBI programs and activities, 
identifying those that have express statutory authority and those that 
do not. The bill also requires the Attorney General to recommend what 
criminal statutes for which he believes the FBI should have 
investigative responsibility.

  Additionally, there exists a gross inequality in the way Senior 
Executive Service, SES, employees of the FBI and rank and file agents 
are disciplined. SES employees are often given a slap on the wrist for 
an infraction, whereas the rank and file agents are often punished to 
the letter of the law. Title V of the bill attempts to address this 
double standard. The bill attempts to address the double standard by 
providing some flexibility in how SES employees can be punished. The 
Senate Judiciary Committee has heard repeatedly that this inflexibility 
is one of the main causes for the inequality in punishment at the FBI. 
Under the current

[[Page S9714]]

system, the minimum suspension that an SES employee can receive is 14 
days. This means that the FBI's management is often left with the 
choice of either an overly harsh penalty or no penalty at all. Often 
they decide not to impose any meaningful disciplinary action.
  In order to attempt to remedy this problem our bill lifts the 14-day 
minimum suspension for SES disciplinary cases to provide for additional 
options in disciplining senior executive employees. Hopefully, this 
change will help to remedy this double standard. In addition, our bill 
would require the Office of Inspector General to submit to the 
Judiciary Committees of both houses, for 5 years, annual reports by the 
FBI Office of Professional Responsibility on its investigations, 
recommendations, and their disposition including an analysis of whether 
any double standard is being employed.
  Finally, title VI of the bill attempts to provide further enhancement 
to security at the Department of Justice as a whole. This title would 
implement recommendations of the Webster Commission for enhancing 
security at the DOJ. It requires the Attorney General to submit a 
report to Congress on the manner by which the Department plans to 
improve protection of security information at the DOJ. Moreover, this 
title authorizes funds to meet the demands for increased security at 
the DOJ. Also, the bill would authorize funds for the DOJ Office of 
Intelligence Policy and Review to help meet the increased demands to 
combat terrorism, process applications to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, participate effectively in counterespionage 
investigations, provide policy analysis and oversight on national 
security matters, and enhance computer and telecommunications security.
  Mr. President, I say to my fellow colleagues, it is time we acted on 
the reforms in this bill. It has been almost a year since this bill 
passed unanimously out of committee. Let's act to reform the FBI and 
help maintain America's trust and confidence in the Bureau.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1440

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation Reform Act of 2003''.

                   TITLE I--WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION

     SEC. 101. INCREASING PROTECTIONS FOR FBI WHISTLEBLOWERS.

       Section 2303 of title 5, United States Code, is amended to 
     read as follows:

     ``Sec. 2303. Prohibited personnel practices in the Federal 
       Bureau of Investigation

       ``(a) Definition.--In this section, the term `personnel 
     action' means any action described in clauses (i) through (x) 
     of section 2302(a)(2)(A).
       ``(b) Prohibited Practices.--Any employee of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation who has the authority to take, direct 
     others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, 
     shall not, with respect to such authority, take or fail to 
     take a personnel action with respect to any employee of the 
     Bureau or because of--
       ``(1) any disclosure of information by the employee to the 
     Attorney General (or an employee designated by the Attorney 
     General for such purpose), a supervisor of the employee, the 
     Inspector General for the Department of Justice, or a Member 
     of Congress that the employee reasonably believes evidences--
       ``(A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or
       ``(B) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of 
     authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public 
     health or safety; or
       ``(2) any disclosure of information by the employee to the 
     Special Counsel of information that the employee reasonably 
     believes evidences--
       ``(A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or
       ``(B) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of 
     authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public 
     health or safety,

     if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and 
     if such information is not specifically required by Executive 
     order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense 
     or the conduct of foreign affairs.
       ``(c) Individual Right of Action.--Chapter 12 of this title 
     shall apply to an employee of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation who claims that a personnel action has been 
     taken under this section against the employee as a reprisal 
     for any disclosure of information described in subsection 
     (b)(2).
       ``(d) Regulations.--The Attorney General shall prescribe 
     regulations to ensure that a personnel action under this 
     section shall not be taken against an employee of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation as a reprisal for any disclosure of 
     information described in subsection (b)(1), and shall provide 
     for the enforcement of such regulations in a manner 
     consistent with applicable provisions of sections 1214 and 
     1221, and in accordance with the procedures set forth in 
     sections 554 through 557 and 701 through 706.''.

                 TITLE II--FBI SECURITY CAREER PROGRAM

     SEC. 201. SECURITY MANAGEMENT POLICIES.

       The Attorney General shall establish policies and 
     procedures for the effective management (including accession, 
     education, training, and career development) of persons 
     serving in security positions in the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation.

     SEC. 202. DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

       (a) In General.--Subject to the authority, direction, and 
     control of the Attorney General, the Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation (referred to in this title as the 
     ``Director'') shall carry out all powers, functions, and 
     duties of the Attorney General with respect to the security 
     workforce in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (b) Policy Implementation.--The Director shall ensure that 
     the policies of the Attorney General established in 
     accordance with this Act are implemented throughout the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation at both the headquarters and 
     field office levels.

     SEC. 203. DIRECTOR OF SECURITY.

       The Director shall appoint a Director of Security, or such 
     other title as the Director may determine, to assist the 
     Director in the performance of the duties of the Director 
     under this Act.

     SEC. 204. SECURITY CAREER PROGRAM BOARDS.

       (a) Establishment.--The Director acting through the 
     Director of Security shall establish a security career 
     program board to advise the Director in managing the hiring, 
     training, education, and career development of personnel in 
     the security workforce of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation.
       (b) Composition of Board.--The security career program 
     board shall include--
       (1) the Director of Security (or a representative of the 
     Director of Security);
       (2) the senior officials, as designated by the Director, 
     with responsibility for personnel management;
       (3) the senior officials, as designated by the Director, 
     with responsibility for information management;
       (4) the senior officials, as designated by the Director, 
     with responsibility for training and career development in 
     the various security disciplines; and
       (5) such other senior officials for the intelligence 
     community as the Director may designate.
       (c) Chairperson.--The Director of Security (or a 
     representative of the Director of Security) shall be the 
     chairperson of the board.
       (d) Subordinate Boards.--The Director of Security may 
     establish a subordinate board structure to which functions of 
     the security career program board may be delegated.

     SEC. 205. DESIGNATION OF SECURITY POSITIONS.

       (a) Designation.--The Director shall designate, by 
     regulation, those positions in the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation that are security positions for purposes of 
     this Act.
       (b) Required Positions.--In designating security positions 
     under subsection (a), the Director shall include, at a 
     minimum, all security-related positions in the areas of--
       (1) personnel security and access control;
       (2) information systems security and information assurance;
       (3) physical security and technical surveillance 
     countermeasures;
       (4) operational, program, and industrial security; and
       (5) information security and classification management.

     SEC. 206. CAREER DEVELOPMENT.

       (a) Career Paths.--The Director shall ensure that 
     appropriate career paths for personnel who wish to pursue 
     careers in security are identified in terms of the education, 
     training, experience, and assignments necessary for career 
     progression to the most senior security positions and shall 
     make available published information on those career paths.
       (b) Limitation on Preference for Special Agents.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in the policy 
     established under paragraph (2), the Attorney General shall 
     ensure that no requirement or preference for a Special Agent 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (referred to in this 
     title as a ``Special Agent'') is used in the consideration of 
     persons for security positions.
       (2) Policy.--The Attorney General shall establish a policy 
     that permits a particular security position to be specified 
     as available only to Special Agents, if a determination is 
     made, under criteria specified in the policy, that a Special 
     Agent--
       (A) is required for that position by law;
       (B) is essential for performance of the duties of the 
     position; or
       (C) is necessary for another compelling reason.
       (3) Report.--Not later than December 15 of each year, the 
     Director shall submit to the Attorney General a report that 
     lists--
       (A) each security position that is restricted to Special 
     Agents under the policy established under paragraph (2); and

[[Page S9715]]

       (B) the recommendation of the Director as to whether each 
     restricted security position should remain restricted.
       (c) Opportunities To Qualify.--The Attorney General shall 
     ensure that all personnel, including Special Agents, are 
     provided the opportunity to acquire the education, training, 
     and experience necessary to qualify for senior security 
     positions.
       (d) Best Qualified.--The Attorney General shall ensure that 
     the policies established under this Act are designed to 
     provide for the selection of the best qualified individual 
     for a position, consistent with other applicable law.
       (e) Assignments Policy.--The Attorney General shall 
     establish a policy for assigning Special Agents to security 
     positions that provides for a balance between--
       (1) the need for personnel to serve in career enhancing 
     positions; and
       (2) the need for requiring service in each such position 
     for sufficient time to provide the stability necessary to 
     carry out effectively the duties of the position and to allow 
     for the establishment of responsibility and accountability 
     for actions taken in the position.
       (f) Length of Assignment.--In implementing the policy 
     established under subsection (b)(2), the Director shall 
     provide, as appropriate, for longer lengths of assignments to 
     security positions than assignments to other positions.
       (g) Performance Appraisals.--The Director shall provide an 
     opportunity for review and inclusion of any comments on any 
     appraisal of the performance of a person serving in a 
     security position by a person serving in a security position 
     in the same security career field.
       (h) Balanced Workforce Policy.--In the development of 
     security workforce policies under this Act with respect to 
     any employees or applicants for employment, the Attorney 
     General shall, consistent with the merit system principles 
     set out in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 2301(b) of title 
     5, United States Code, take into consideration the need to 
     maintain a balanced workforce in which women and members of 
     racial and ethnic minority groups are appropriately 
     represented in Government service.

     SEC. 207. GENERAL EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND EXPERIENCE 
                   REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) In General.--The Director shall establish education, 
     training, and experience requirements for each security 
     position, based on the level of complexity of duties carried 
     out in the position.
       (b) Qualification Requirements.--Before being assigned to a 
     position as a program manager or deputy program manager of a 
     significant security program, a person--
       (1) must have completed a security program management 
     course that is accredited by the Intelligence Community-
     Department of Defense Joint Security Training Consortium or 
     is determined to be comparable by the Director; and
       (2) must have not less than 6 years experience in security, 
     of which not less than 2 years were performed in a similar 
     program office or organization.

     SEC. 208. EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAMS.

       (a) In General.--The Director, in consultation with the 
     Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of 
     Defense, shall establish and implement education and training 
     programs for persons serving in security positions in the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (b) Other Programs.--The Director shall ensure that 
     programs established under subsection (a) are established and 
     implemented, to the maximum extent practicable, uniformly 
     with the programs of the Intelligence Community and the 
     Department of Defense.

     SEC. 209. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT APPROVAL.

       (a) In General.--The Attorney General shall submit any 
     requirement that is established under section 207 to the 
     Director of the Office of Personnel Management for approval.
       (b) Final Approval.--If the Director does not disapprove 
     the requirements established under section 207 within 30 days 
     after the date on which the Director receives the 
     requirement, the requirement is deemed to be approved by the 
     Director of the Office of Personnel Management.

          TITLE III--FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE POLYGRAPH PROGRAM

     SEC. 301. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Polygraph program.--The term ``polygraph program'' 
     means the counterintelligence screening polygraph program 
     established under section 302.
       (2) Polygraph review.--The term ``Polygraph Review'' means 
     the review of the scientific validity of the polygraph for 
     counterintelligence screening purposes conducted by the 
     Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph 
     of the National Academy of Sciences.

     SEC. 302. ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.

       Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director of 
     Security of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall 
     establish a counterintelligence screening polygraph program 
     for the Federal Bureau of Investigation that consists of 
     periodic polygraph examinations of employees, or contractor 
     employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who are in 
     positions specified by the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation as exceptionally sensitive in order to minimize 
     the potential for unauthorized release or disclosure of 
     exceptionally sensitive information.

     SEC. 303. REGULATIONS.

       (a) In General.--The Attorney General shall prescribe 
     regulations for the polygraph program in accordance with 
     subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code 
     (commonly referred to as the Administrative Procedures Act).
       (b) Considerations.--In prescribing regulations under 
     subsection (a), the Attorney General shall--
       (1) take into account the results of the Polygraph Review; 
     and
       (2) include procedures for--
       (A) identifying and addressing false positive results of 
     polygraph examinations;
       (B) ensuring that adverse personnel actions are not taken 
     against an individual solely by reason of the physiological 
     reaction of the individual to a question in a polygraph 
     examination, unless--
       (i) reasonable efforts are first made independently to 
     determine through alternative means, the veracity of the 
     response of the individual to the question; and
       (ii) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     determines personally that the personnel action is justified;
       (C) ensuring quality assurance and quality control in 
     accordance with any guidance provided by the Department of 
     Defense Polygraph Institute and the Director of Central 
     Intelligence; and
       (D) allowing any employee or contractor who is the subject 
     of a counterintelligence screening polygraph examination 
     under the polygraph program, upon written request, to have 
     prompt access to any unclassified reports regarding an 
     examination that relates to any adverse personnel action 
     taken with respect to the individual.

     SEC. 304. REPORT ON FURTHER ENHANCEMENT OF FBI PERSONNEL 
                   SECURITY PROGRAM.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 9 months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation shall submit to Congress a report setting forth 
     recommendations for any legislative action that the Director 
     considers appropriate in order to enhance the personnel 
     security program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (b) Polygraph Review Results.--Any recommendation under 
     subsection (a) regarding the use of polygraphs shall take 
     into account the results of the Polygraph Review.

                           TITLE IV--REPORTS

     SEC. 401. REPORT ON LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR FBI PROGRAMS AND 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 9 months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall submit to 
     Congress a report describing the statutory and other legal 
     authority for all programs and activities of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation.
       (b) Contents.--The report submitted under subsection (a) 
     shall describe--
       (1) the titles within the United States Code and the 
     statutes for which the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     exercises investigative responsibility;
       (2) each program or activity of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation that has express statutory authority and the 
     statute which provides that authority; and
       (3) each program or activity of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation that does not have express statutory authority, 
     and the source of the legal authority for that program or 
     activity.
       (c) Recommendations.--The report submitted under subsection 
     (a) shall recommend whether--
       (1) the Federal Bureau of Investigation should continue to 
     have investigative responsibility for each statute for which 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation currently has 
     investigative responsibility;
       (2) the legal authority for any program or activity of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation should be modified or 
     repealed;
       (3) the Federal Bureau of Investigation should have express 
     statutory authority for any program or activity of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation for which the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation does not currently have express statutory 
     authority; and
       (4) the Federal Bureau of Investigation should--
       (A) have authority for any new program or activity; and
       (B) express statutory authority with respect to any new 
     programs or activities.

                  TITLE V--ENDING THE DOUBLE STANDARD

     SEC. 501. ALLOWING DISCIPLINARY SUSPENSIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE 
                   SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE FOR 14 DAYS OR LESS.

       Section 7542 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking ``for more than 14 days''.

     SEC. 502. SUBMITTING OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
                   REPORTS TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.

       (a) In General.--For each of the 5 years following the date 
     of enactment of this Act, the Office of the Inspector General 
     shall submit to the chairperson and ranking member of the 
     Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of 
     Representatives an annual report to be completed by the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Professional 
     Responsibility and provided to the Inspector General, which 
     sets forth--
       (1) basic information on each investigation completed by 
     that Office;

[[Page S9716]]

       (2) the findings and recommendations of that Office for 
     disciplinary action; and
       (3) what, if any, action was taken by the Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation or the designee of the 
     Director based on any such recommendation.
       (b) Contents.--In addition to all matters already included 
     in the annual report described in subsection (a), the report 
     shall also include an analysis of--
       (1) whether senior Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     employees and lower level Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     personnel are being disciplined and investigated similarly; 
     and
       (2) whether any double standard is being employed to more 
     senior employees with respect to allegations of misconduct.

       TITLE VI--ENHANCING SECURITY AT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

     SEC. 601. REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF SECURITY AND 
                   INFORMATION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

       Not later than 9 months after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the Attorney General shall submit to Congress a report 
     on the manner in which the Security and Emergency Planning 
     Staff, the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and the 
     Chief Information Officer of the Department of Justice plan 
     to improve the protection of security and information at the 
     Department of Justice, including a plan to establish secure 
     electronic communications between the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation and the Office of Intelligence Policy and 
     Review for processing information related to the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.).

     SEC. 602. AUTHORIZATION FOR INCREASED RESOURCES TO PROTECT 
                   SECURITY AND INFORMATION.

       There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department 
     of Justice for the activities of the Security and Emergency 
     Planning Staff to meet the increased demands to provide 
     personnel, physical, information, technical, and litigation 
     security for the Department of Justice, to prepare for 
     terrorist threats and other emergencies, and to review 
     security compliance by components of the Department of 
     Justice--
       (1) $13,000,000 for fiscal years 2004 and 2005;
       (2) $17,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
       (3) $22,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.

     SEC. 603. AUTHORIZATION FOR INCREASED RESOURCES TO FULFILL 
                   NATIONAL SECURITY MISSION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                   JUSTICE.

       There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department 
     of Justice for the activities of the Office of Intelligence 
     Policy and Review to help meet the increased personnel 
     demands to combat terrorism, process applications to the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, participate 
     effectively in counterespionage investigations, provide 
     policy analysis and oversight on national security matters, 
     and enhance secure computer and telecommunications 
     facilities--
       (1) $7,000,000 for fiscal years 2004 and 2005;
       (2) $7,500,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
       (3) $8,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce today, with my 
friend the senior Senator from Iowa, the FBI Reform Act of 2003.
  This legislation stems from the lessons learned during a series of 
Judiciary Committee hearings on oversight of the FBI that I chaired 
beginning in June 2001. The important changes which are being made 
under the FBI's leadership after the September 11 attacks and the new 
powers granted the FBI by the USA PATRIOT Act have resulted in FBI 
reform becoming a pressing matter of national importance.
  Since 9/11 and the anthrax attacks later that fall, we have relied on 
the FBI to detect and prevent acts of catastrophic terrorism that 
endanger the lives of the American people and the institutions of our 
country. The men and women of the FBI are performing this task with 
great professionalism at home and abroad. We have all felt safer as a 
result of the full mobilization of the FBI's dedicated Special Agents, 
its expert support personnel, and its exceptional technical 
capabilities. We owe the men and women of the FBI our thanks.
  For decades the FBI has been an outstanding law enforcement agency 
and a vital member of the United States intelligence community. As our 
hearings and recent events have shown, however, there is room for 
improvement at the FBI. To fully rise to its current challenges, the 
FBI must face and understand the mistakes of the past and make the 
changes needed to ensure that they are not repeated. In meeting the 
international terrorist challenge, the Congress has an opportunity and 
obligation to strengthen the institutional fiber of the FBI based on 
lessons learned from recent problems the Bureau has experienced.
  This view is not mine alone. When FBI Director Mueller testified at 
his confirmation hearings in July 2001, he forthrightly acknowledged 
``that the Bureau's remarkable legacy of service and accomplishment has 
been tarnished by some serious and highly publicized problems in recent 
years. Waco, Ruby Ridge, the FBI lab, Wen Ho Lee, Robert Hanssen and 
the McVeigh documents--these familiar names and events remind us all 
that the FBI is far from perfect and that the next director faces 
significant management and administrative challenges.'' Since then, the 
Judiciary Committee has forged a constructive partnership with Director 
Mueller to get the FBI back on track.
  Congress sometimes has followed a hands-off approach about the FBI. 
But with the FBI's new increased powers, with our increased reliance on 
the Bureau to prevent terrorism, and with the increased funding 
provided by the Congress should come increased scrutiny and 
accountability. Until the Bureau's problems are resolved and new 
challenges overcome, we should be taking a hands-on approach.
  Indeed our hearings and other oversight activities have highlighted 
tangible steps the Congress should take in an FBI Reform bill as part 
of this hands-on approach. Among other things, these hearings 
demonstrated the need to extend whistleblower protection, end the 
double standard for discipline of senior FBI executives, and enhance 
the FBI's internal security program to protect against espionage as 
occurred in the Hanssen case.
  Director Mueller once said it is ``critically important'' that he 
``hears criticisms of the organization . . . in order to improve the 
organization.'' I could not agree more. More than ever, the FBI must be 
open to new ideas, to criticism from within and without, and to facing 
up to and learning from past mistakes.
  During the last Congress, the Judiciary Committee unanimously 
approved the Leahy-Grassley FBI Reform Act of 2001. Unfortunately, our 
bipartisan efforts were stymied by an anonymous Republican hold, which 
prevented the bill from being considered on the floor. While we did 
eventually succeed in passing three of the bill's important reform 
provisions as part of the Department of Justice authorization act, 
other needed reforms were senselessly blocked. These reforms, which 
remain as important and urgent as ever, are included in the bill we 
introduce today.
  There are five key elements of our bill.
  First, it strengthens whistleblower protection for FBI employees and 
protects them from retaliation for reporting wrongdoing.
  Second, it addresses the issue of a double standard for discipline of 
senior executives by eliminating the disparity in authorized 
punishments between Senior Executive Service members and other Federal 
employees.
  Third, it establishes an FBI Counterintelligence Polygraph Program 
for screening personnel in exceptionally sensitive positions with 
specific safeguards.
  Fourth, it establishes an FBI Career Security Program, which would 
bring the FBI into line with other U.S. intelligence agencies that have 
strong career security professional cadres whose skills and leadership 
are dedicated to the protection of agency information, personnel, and 
facilities.
  And fifth, it requires a set of reports that would enable Congress to 
engage the Executive branch in a constructive dialogue building a more 
effective FBI for the future.
  The FBI Reform Act is designed to strengthen the FBI as an 
institution that has a unique role as both a law enforcement agency and 
a member of the intelligence community. As the Judiciary Committee 
continues its oversight work and more is learned about recent FBI 
performance, additional reforms may prove necessary. Especially 
important will be the lessons learned from the attacks of September 11, 
the anthrax attacks, and implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act and 
other counterterrorism measures.
  We need to help the FBI become as effective, as accountable and as 
agile as the American people need it to be to counter the threat of 
terrorism on our shores.
  Strengthening the FBI cannot be accomplished overnight, but with this 
legislation, we take an important step into the FBI's future.
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