[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 105 (Wednesday, July 16, 2003)]
[House]
[Pages H6904-H6908]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON H.R. 1588, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 
                        ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the 
Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 1588) to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, 
for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department 
of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for 
the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, with a Senate amendment 
thereto, disagree to the Senate amendment, and agree to the conference 
asked by the Senate.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I yield to 
the gentleman from California for the purpose of explaining this 
request.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from 
Missouri for yielding.
  This unanimous-consent request allows the House and Senate Armed 
Services Committees to formally begin conference.
  Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.


                Motion to Instruct Offered by Mr. Spratt

  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct conferees.
  The Clerk read as follows:
       Mr. Spratt moves that the managers on the part of the House 
     at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses 
     on the Senate amendment to the bill H.R. 1588 be instructed 
     to insist upon the provisions contained in section 3111 of 
     the House bill.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 7(b) of rule XXII, the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Hunter) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I offer this motion simply to ask the House to stand by a bipartisan 
compromise that we struck last May in marking up the defense 
authorization bill, the bill we are now sending formally to conference 
which deals with the development of low-yield nuclear weapons.
  Members of the House may have read, they may have heard that the Bush 
administration is pushing to repeal the so-called ban on low-level 
nuclear weapons research. They disavow any intention of building such 
weapons, but they at least seek the flexibility to conduct research in 
that realm. Let me tell everybody, they basically won that argument. 
Both the House and the Senate defense authorization bills propose 
changes to current law that allow the flexibility of research into low-
yield nuclear weapons.
  The administration said this was a problem, the Department of Energy 
said it was a problem, existing law, so we have changed it. We have 
addressed the problem. I was an author of the so-called Spratt-Furse 
amendment in 1993. I believe that the language of that amendment as it 
now stands as amended in the committee mark is sensible and a fair 
compromise. That is what I am asking the House to do, to stand behind 
it.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking member on our committee.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  While there are many reasons to support this motion, let me say that 
one key reason for supporting it is that the provisions contained in 
section 3111 of the House bill are largely the same legislation adopted 
by this body in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2003 which, of course, was last year's defense bill.
  The House adopted that legislation after considerable and very 
careful deliberations and on a bipartisan basis led by the gentleman 
from South Carolina. We authorized research but retained the 
prohibition on development activities that could lead to the production 
of a destabilizing and unnecessary new low-yield nuclear weapon. We 
also described permissible activities necessary to address the safety 
and reliability of those issues.
  Mr. Speaker, being a student of history, the war in Iraq and Desert 
Storm some 12 years ago now have taught us that stealth technology, 
standoff capability and precision munitions are the key to future 
warfare. New conventional technologies have changed the way we fight 
and, if anything, will

[[Page H6905]]

allow us to become less reliant on low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.
  The House position on low-yield nuclear weapons makes sense. I urge 
my colleagues to support the motion to instruct conferees.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, this provision which is in the House-passed bill is a 
provision that was agreed to by the vice-chairman of the committee, the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), and the gentleman from South 
Carolina (Mr. Spratt) last year. It was restated this year. It is the 
House position going into conference. For that reason, we are certainly 
not going to urge anybody to vote against it.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Reyes), the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Strategic 
Forces.
  Mr. REYES. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the motion to instruct 
conferees offered by my friend and colleague, the gentleman from South 
Carolina.
  Earlier this year, the administration proposed a complete repeal of a 
law that has been on the books for over a decade, the Spratt-Furse ban 
on research and development of new nuclear weapons with yields below 
five kilotons. The Spratt-Furse ban is not a complete ban. It bans just 
R&D of new low-yield nuclear weapons. It permits R&D on new weapons 
with yields above five kilotons. It permits R&D of modifications to 
existing nuclear weapons regardless of their yield.
  It also permits our national laboratories to conduct R&D on low-yield 
nuclear weapons for the purposes of counterproliferation, that is, how 
to detect a low-yield nuclear terrorist device and devise ways in which 
to disable them.
  The Spratt-Furse ban also permits R&D of low-yield nuclear weapons if 
it is necessary to help keep our nuclear arsenal safe and reliable.
  When asked, Department of Energy officials admitted that there is no 
military requirement for a new low-yield nuclear weapon, and they had 
no plans to develop one anytime soon.

                              {time}  1330

  They simply wanted to repeal the Spratt-Furse ban because they 
maintain that it somehow has a chilling effect on the freedom of their 
scientists to look at any nuclear weapon option regardless of whether 
or not there is a military need.
  During the markup of the defense authorization, the gentleman from 
South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) offered an amendment that was adopted by 
the full committee by a voice vote, and I think this is a very sound 
compromise. The Spratt amendment permits research on new low-yield 
nuclear weapons, but draws the line on moving past research and into 
development. In short, the Spratt amendment makes sure that the 
Congress will be a coequal partner with the executive branch if there 
is any decision to move past research and actually start developing new 
low-yield nuclear weapons. I think that the Spratt amendment makes good 
sense and protects Congress's right to fully participate on any future 
decision to start up development of new low-yield weapons. I urge all 
of my colleagues to support this motion to instruct.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Let me take just a minute to explain the state of play and why it is 
important that the House provisions prevail over the Senate provision. 
The Senate defense authorization bill repeals these provisions in their 
entirety, but then backfills the gap with language that requires 
specific authorization of Congress to move from development into 
production of low-yield nuclear weapons. This amounts, really, to 
restating what the law already is, that to do something this 
significant with respect to a new product money has to be authorized 
and appropriated.
  The House bill is similar in consequence but better, in my opinion, 
because it makes it absolutely clear that any movement beyond just 
research will require Congress to change by law the nuclear weapons 
policy of the United States. The House and Senate both addressed these 
specific concerns raised by the administration and the weapons labs and 
the Department of Defense to permit more flexibility in basic research, 
but our version contains a stronger guarantee that the Congress is 
going to be a partner in any decision to go beyond the scope.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California 
(Mrs. Tauscher).
  Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr Speaker, I would like to offer my strong support for the motion to 
instruct which sends an important message that it is the will of the 
House to maintain the ban on development of low-yield nuclear weapons, 
and I commend the chairman of the full committee for his initiative to 
work with us on this.
  Nuclear weapons will remain a crucial part of America's arsenal for 
the foreseeable future. They provide a hedge against potentially 
hostile nuclear powers and underpin security commitments to our allies. 
Today, however, the United States is addressing the threat of weapons 
of mass destruction from North Korea, India, Pakistan, and a growing 
list of countries.
  As we have seen in Afghanistan and in the global war on terrorism, 
when the United States leads with a purpose, the rest of the world will 
follow. And just as the world follows our lead on tackling common 
enemies, it also reacts when we take provocative and destabilizing 
action. I believe strongly that until our war fighters have a military 
requirement for a new nuclear weapon or have exhausted conventional 
alternatives, Congress should maintain its ban on the development of 
such weapons.
  Preventing the development of new nuclear weapons would not affect 
the RNEP study with focuses on existing warheads. It would not prevent 
any of the ideas that are currently being explored regarding missile 
systems. In addition to having no military requirement for them, new 
nuclear weapons are not the answer to threats being used to justify 
them. Nuclear weapons of any yield have a limited penetration ability 
and will never surgically destroy hardened targets. They offer no 
guarantee of destroying chemical and biological agents without 
releasing them into the atmosphere. Detonated in an urban area, even a 
1-kiloton nuclear bomb would kill tens of thousands of civilians and 
hinder friendly troops.
  Preserving the ban on new nuclear weapons is a small step that would 
also help restore the belief that the United States intends to fight 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I hope my colleagues 
would support this motion to recommit.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Holt), a nuclear physicist who understands what is at stake 
here better than possibly anybody in the House.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from South Carolina for 
yielding me this time.
  The direction in which the administration has been leading our Nation 
on nuclear weapons is becoming increasingly dangerous. That is why I 
wrote to President Bush in April, a letter co-signed by 33 of my 
colleagues here, to underscore our concern that our Nation's leaders 
not adopt a mindset of viewing nuclear weapons as just an extension of 
the continuum of conventional military options available to the United 
States. It is important that we maintain the nuclear distinction.
  I rise to support this motion because it gives us the opportunity to 
invoke at least one cautionary restraint on this dangerous path. Both 
the House and Senate versions of this bill eliminate the Spratt-Furse 
ban that has been in place since 1993. And this Senate language, 
especially, would allow Pandora's box to be opened to allow, in effect, 
unfettered research into low-yield nuclear weapons. As a scientist, I 
can talk about the studies that some of my scientific colleagues have 
prepared about why some of the newly conceived weapons like the bunker 
buster would not work as proposed, why they would be dirty, why they 
would be unwieldy; but I choose instead to focus for just a moment on 
the more important strategic and tactical questions.
  We should be stepping away from using tactical nuclear weapons, not

[[Page H6906]]

moving in that direction. U.S. battlefield commanders have said over 
and over again that they have long recognized the folly of battlefield 
nukes. The weapons and especially these newly conceived weapons put our 
troops at risk and are not useful in advancing military campaigns. And 
very important, this work would be sending the wrong message to our 
allies and to potential adversaries around the world. They would view 
the adoption of this bad, particularly the bad Senate language as 
further evidence that America is bent upon developing and procuring a 
new generation of nuclear weapons. As we go to war around the world in 
part to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we should not be 
sending the signal that we are bent on developing and procuring a new 
generation of nuclear weapons.
  So the Spratt motion is a very constructive step that provides, I 
think, an important safeguard that actually will help to make our 
country and our world more secure.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I thank the gentleman for his comments, and I rise to make one 
correction. The House bill does have language which we would like to 
retain. The gist of this motion is let us stand by the House language 
and reject the Senate language.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maine (Mr. 
Allen).
  Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  I rise in support of the motion to instruct and I rise to thank the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter), the distinguished chairman of 
my former committee, for his acceptance of this motion.
  Certainly this motion reflects a bipartisan compromise that has been 
worked out not just in this Congress but in the past Congress, and when 
that happens we should seize the moment. It does allow expanded 
research, but it stops short of allowing the development or the 
fabrication of new nuclear weapons. That is an essential step for this 
Congress to take, partly to make sure that we do not send the wrong 
signal to the rest of the world and partly to make sure that the 
institutional prerogatives of this House are protected when decisions 
of that magnitude are faced at any time.
  There is, of course, an important strategic deterrent role for 
nuclear weapons, but 10 years ago or more we stepped back from the 
brink with Russia. We stepped back from maintaining or developing 
tactical nuclear weapons. We do not need to go down that path again 
because if we do, we risk losing further our standing in the 
international community. Our arguments about nonproliferation will seem 
hollow.
  We are today continually concerned about weapons of mass destruction 
held by adversaries or held by other countries where we believe there 
is some risk to our security in the world. We do not advance those 
arguments about weapons of mass destruction if we start to develop new 
nuclear weapons that can only be used in a tactical way, whatever they 
are called. The nuclear Earth penetrator is one. We really need to make 
sure that we are exercising the kind of responsible leadership in this 
area that the world expects of us and that will redound to the benefit 
of our own national security.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, the Cold War is over and the good news, to 
my friends, is we won and the Soviet Union lost. We do not need a new 
arms race with ourselves. We do not now need to send a signal to 
countries around the world who harbor desires to obtain nuclear weapons 
that we believe that it is still worth our while to invest in a new 
generation of nuclear weapons which are more usable in battleground 
situations. We must avoid being viewed as the drunk preaching 
temperance from a bar stool. If we want to convince others to embrace 
our view that nuclear weapons are not usable, we must ourselves act in 
a way that does not leave the misimpression that we are still engaging 
in the same kind of mindless development of another generation of 
nuclear weapons that only encourages countries like North Korea, 
countries like Iran, which each have active nuclear weapons programs, 
that they are wise in pursuing that course.
  So the resolution that we are considering right now is one which is 
saying to the rest of the world we understand their concern about an 
initiation of another nuclear arms race, and we understand the 
consequences for regions around the world where there are bad actors, 
bad countries trying to develop nuclear weapons programs. We brought 
the country of Iraq to its knees militarily in 3 weeks. Our problem is 
not destroying any country's military capacity. Our real problem is in 
controlling the country after we do so, and nuclear weapons do not add 
to our capacity to accomplish those goals. So this is, in my opinion, a 
wise approach to take. The gentleman from South Carolina as usual is 
trying to draw a very fine line between programs that have already been 
put in place and do protect our country and new programs which would 
potentially add to an acceleration of an arms race, a nuclear arms race 
around the world.
  We now must turn our attention to Iran and North Korea. The only way 
to deal with it is with strong diplomacy, active diplomacy. Additional 
nuclear weapons will not help us, and that is why this resolution must 
pass.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, in conclusion, let me simply put in context why we have 
this particular provision before us and why we are emphasizing it in 
this motion to instruct. The Spratt-Furse prohibition on low-yield 
nuclear weapons was a follow-up to the decision by President Bush, the 
first President Bush, on September 27, 1991, a historic day.

                              {time}  1345

  That day he announced the withdrawal of all land-based tactical 
nuclear weapons from our overseas bases, particularly those in Europe, 
and all sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships, 
submarines, and naval aircraft. We decided to forgo the development of 
the follow-on to Lance, a battlefield tactical nuclear missile, and we 
sent a signal to the world by all of these decisions that we were 
serious about minimizing the role and possible uses of nuclear weapons 
early in a conflict and especially for tactical or theater purposes. We 
said that our arsenal in the future in effect would be a strategic 
arsenal, a strategic determinant, and we would not use nuclear weapons 
for tactical and theater purposes anymore, such as the Davy Crockett, 
to take out tanks or nuclear artillery, rounds, and sea-based mines and 
things of that kind.
  This move away from tactical nuclear weapons prompted the Soviet 
Union to move in the same direction; and Gorbechev shortly announced 
the elimination of their warheads, their land-based tactical nuclear 
missiles, mines, and artillery shells. He announced that he was 
removing warheads from surface-to-air missiles and removing sea-based 
tactical nukes on naval aircraft.
  Taken together, these steps marked a major step away from tactical 
nuclear weapons and a step toward global security. The initiative by 
the first Bush administration helped us persuade Kazakhstan, Ukraine, 
and Belarus to forswear nuclear weapons after the breakup of the Soviet 
Union. It also made it easier for the United States and our European 
allies to convince much of the rest of the world to extend indefinitely 
the nuclear proliferation treaty, or NPT.
  Now, the NPT is not the final, definitive answer to our proliferation 
concerns, but the world would be a lot riskier place without it. It 
definitely makes it harder for nations or terrorist groups to obtain 
nuclear materials and nuclear know-how, and it establishes the 
authority of the war community to question and inspect the activities 
of States that are a signatory to this treaty.
  I think a return by the United States back to the days of tactical 
nuclear weapons, especially nuclear weapons designed to be more usable 
by virtue of low yields, would send a troubling signal, a signal that 
nuclear weapons just maybe are useful for tactical purposes, 
battlefield purposes, strategic purposes, and were really just an 
extension of conventional weapons for the same tactical purposes. It 
would indicate that we see tactical utility in these weapons, and it 
would reverse the

[[Page H6907]]

step that was taken in 1991. I do not think we need to go down that 
path.
  Now, there are some who will say that we need to do this because we 
have to have weapons to take on deep, hard targets. The actual numbers 
are classified, of course, but even if we can improve the ability of 
our nuclear weapons to burrow in the hard terrain and into geologic 
formations such as granite, simple physics tells us we are going to 
come up way short of reaching the underground bunkers that we are 
really worried about, like those in North Korea.
  Some say that we need these new weapons, these low-yield weapons, 
deeper penetrators, because we need the heat and the gamma rays and the 
X-rays of a nuclear weapon to destroy the chemical and biological 
agents that might be stored in deep underground bunkers. But if the 
fireball and the X-rays and the gamma rays are to reach the bunker, 
then we need to use, we are told by qualified experts, weapons that are 
much, much bigger than 5 kilotons; and using even a 5 kiloton weapon 
has consequences that have to be dealt with, fallout, for example.
  Alternatively, if we want to use the pressure and blast of a nuclear 
weapon to crush a bunker, then we already have weapons to do that job.
  Supporters of full repeal also say that our restraint thus far on 
developing these tactical theater and battlefield nuclear weapons has 
not really had any effect on nations that are bent upon acquiring them, 
North Korea being a prominent example, but I am not so sure about that. 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in a momentous decision all decided to 
rid their countries of nuclear weapons. Brazil, South Africa, South 
Korea, and Taiwan have taken similar steps; and numerous countries have 
signed the NPT.
  So before we repeal this long-standing language in the code, we 
should keep in mind the effects that surround us and also, also I think 
we should point out what is already in this bill. This bill will reduce 
the amount of time it takes to resume underground nuclear testing. This 
bill will call for a review of nuclear weapons for ``bunker-busting'' 
missions, the so-called Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. This bill will 
call for building a brand-new, multi-billion-dollar facility to produce 
plutonium pits for nuclear weapons. Just the beginning, planning money, 
but these things that are in here of a still-robust nuclear policy but 
one that is slanted towards strategic usage and not tactical usage.
  Mr. Speaker, I commend the chairman of our committee for his 
generosity and collegiality in allowing us to reach an agreement on 
this. I know it is a compromise for him. He has his doubts, and we have 
our disagreements. But, nevertheless, I appreciate his kindness in 
doing it.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I just want to thank the gentleman for his 
participation as a great member of the committee. I did have and do 
have my reservations about his position, but it was an agreement 
between the gentleman from Pennsylvania and the gentleman from South 
Carolina and it is the position of the House. We are now going into 
conference with the other body, and I think it is appropriate to carry 
the House position forward.
  I thank the gentleman for his thoughtful words.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I have gratitude for the 
gentleman's agreeing to the amendment. As long as it passes by voice 
vote, I will not ask for a record vote on final passage.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the motion. The 
Administration and the Republicans in Congress have made clear their 
intent to explore new, low-yield nuclear weapons. Before we head down 
that path, we need to remember two things.
  (1) The Cold War is over and I have good news for my friends on the 
other side of the aisle. We won! The Russians are no longer our 
adversaries. Remember, President Bush has told us he's looked into 
President Putin's eyes and found him to be a man he could deal with! 
Let's stop fighting the last war. The Russians are no longer a threat 
and I see no reason why we should allow the development of mini-nukes 
because somebody in Russia may have talked about the possibility of 
developing new weapons. They're probably only talking about doing that 
because they hear all of this talk about new nuclear weapons being 
developed by the U.S. What does this mean? It means that the only 
reason to develop mini-nukes is to start a new arms race. But that begs 
the question: with whom would we have this arms race? No nation in the 
world has a conventional military that can compare with ours. The only 
country that has a nuclear arsenal that compares to ours is Russia, and 
we're paying them to dismantle their nuclear weapons! Where's the beef 
behind this threat?
  (2) These so called mini-nukes are still nuclear weapons. They may be 
smaller, but they will still kill tens of thousands of people, will 
still produce radioactive fallout and contaminate the countryside, and 
will still carry the stigma of being nuclear weapons. We already have 
big nuclear weapons, and medium-sized nuclear weapons, and small 
nuclear weapons. In fact, some of our nuclear weapons are ``dial-a-
yield'', meaning we can select the yield of the weapon--and some of 
them can be ``dialed'' down to less than 1 kiloton, which, by the scale 
of nuclear weapons, is pretty mini. We used to have a weapon with a 
yield of less than a kiloton that weighted only 163 pounds--we called 
that the SADM or Special Atomic Demolition Munition. Is that what we 
want? To have kicked out the nuclear-seeking Saddam, only to replace 
him with our own nuclear SADM?
  I would urge my colleagues to remember these two things: that to 
develop mini-nukes would be to start an arms race with ourselves, and 
that a mini-nuke is still a nuclear weapon, with all the associated 
consequences. We simply cannot preach nuclear temperance from a 
barstool. We cannot tell Iran, North Korea and other countries not to 
develop nuclear weapons while simultaneously developing our own new 
weapons.
  I urge you to support this Motion to Instruct. Let's not turn back 
the clock and start a new ``mini'' arms race.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bass). Without objection, the previous 
question is ordered on the motion.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to instruct 
offered by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).
  The motion to instruct was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the Chair appoints the 
following conferees:
  From the Committee on Armed Services, for consideration of the House 
bill and the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to 
conference: Messrs. Hunter, Weldon of Pennsylvania, Hefley, Saxton, 
McHugh, Everett, Bartlett of Maryland, McKeon, Thornberry, Hostettler, 
Jones of North Carolina, Ryun of Kansas, Gibbons, Hayes, Mrs. Wilson of 
New Mexico, Messrs. Calvert, Skelton, Spratt, Ortiz, Evans, Taylor of 
Mississippi, Abercrombie, Meehan, Reyes, Snyder, Turner of Texas, Ms. 
Loretta Sanchez of California, and Mr. Cooper.
  From the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for 
consideration of matters within the jurisdiction of that committee 
under clause 11 of rule X: Mr. Goss, Mr. Hoekstra, and Ms. Harman.
  From the Committee on Agriculture, for consideration of sections 1057 
and 2822 of the House bill, and modifications committed to conference: 
Messrs. Goodlatte, Lucas of Oklahoma, and Stenholm.
  From the Committee on Education and the Workforce, for consideration 
of sections 544, 553, 563, 567, 907, 1046, 1501, 1502, and 1504 through 
1506 of the House bill, and sections 233, 351, 352, 368, 701, 1034, and 
1036 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to 
conference: Messrs. Castle, Kline and George Miller of California.
  From the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for consideration of 
sections 601, 3113, 3201, and 3517 of the House bill, and sections 601, 
701, 852, 3151, and 3201 of the Senate amendment, and modifications 
committed to conference: Messrs. Tauzin, Barton of Texas, and Dingell.
  From the Committee on Financial Services, for consideration of 
sections 814 and 907 of the House bill, and modifications committed to 
conference: Mr. Oxley, Mr. King of New York, and Mrs. Maloney.
  From the Committee on Government Reform, for consideration of 
sections 315, 323, 551, 805, 822, 824, 828, 829, 1031,

[[Page H6908]]

1046, 1050, 1057, Title XI, Title XIV, sections 2825 and 2826 of the 
House bill, and sections 326, 801, 811, 813, 822, 831 through 833, 841, 
852, 853, 1013, 1035, 1102 through 1104, and 2824 through 2826 of the 
Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Mr. Tom 
Davis of Virginia, Mr. Shays, Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia, and 
Messrs. Putnam, Turner of Ohio, Waxman, Van Hollen, and Davis of 
Illinois.
  From the Select Committee on Homeland Security, for consideration of 
section 1456 of the House bill, and modifications committed to 
conference: Messrs. Cox, Shadegg and Thompson of Mississippi.
  From the Committee on House Administration, for consideration of 
section 564 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to 
conference: Messrs. Ney, Mica, and Larson of Connecticut.
  From the Committee on International Relations, for consideration of 
sections 1047, 1201, 1202, 1209, Title XIII, sections 3601, 3611, 3631, 
3632, 3634, 3635, and 3636 of the House bill, and sections 323, 343, 
921, 1201, 1202, 1204, 1205, 1207, 1208, Title XIII and section 3141 of 
the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: 
Messrs. Hyde, Bereuter, and Lantos.
  From the Committee on the Judiciary, for consideration of sections 
661 through 665 and 851 through 853 of the Senate amendment, and 
modifications committed to conference: Messrs. Sensenbrenner, Smith of 
Texas, and Conyers.
  From the Committee on Resources, for consideration of sections 311, 
317 through 319, 601, and 1057 of the House bill, and sections 322, 
330, and 601 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to 
conference: Messrs. Pombo, Gilchrest, Rehberg, Rahall, and Udall of New 
Mexico.
  From the Committee on Science, for consideration of sections 852 and 
911 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: 
Messrs. Boehlert, Smith of Michigan, and Hall of Texas.
  From the Committee on Small Business, for consideration of section 
866 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: 
Mr. Manzullo, Mrs. Kelly, and Ms. Velazquez.
  From the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, for 
consideration of sections 312, 601, 907, 1049, 1051 and 2824 of the 
House bill, and sections 324, 601, and 2821 of the Senate amendment, 
and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. Young of Alaska, 
Petri, and Carson of Oklahoma.
  From the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, for consideration of section 
565 of the House bill, and sections 644 and 707 of the Senate 
amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. Smith of 
New Jersey, Bilirakis, and Filner.
  From the Committee on Ways and Means, for consideration of section 
701 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: 
Messrs. Thomas, McCrery, and Stark.
  There was no objection.

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