[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 105 (Wednesday, July 16, 2003)]
[House]
[Pages H6904-H6908]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON H.R. 1588, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the
Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 1588) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense,
for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department
of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for
the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, with a Senate amendment
thereto, disagree to the Senate amendment, and agree to the conference
asked by the Senate.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I yield to
the gentleman from California for the purpose of explaining this
request.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from
Missouri for yielding.
This unanimous-consent request allows the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees to formally begin conference.
Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
Motion to Instruct Offered by Mr. Spratt
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct conferees.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Spratt moves that the managers on the part of the House
at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses
on the Senate amendment to the bill H.R. 1588 be instructed
to insist upon the provisions contained in section 3111 of
the House bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 7(b) of rule XXII, the
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) and the gentleman from
California (Mr. Hunter) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I offer this motion simply to ask the House to stand by a bipartisan
compromise that we struck last May in marking up the defense
authorization bill, the bill we are now sending formally to conference
which deals with the development of low-yield nuclear weapons.
Members of the House may have read, they may have heard that the Bush
administration is pushing to repeal the so-called ban on low-level
nuclear weapons research. They disavow any intention of building such
weapons, but they at least seek the flexibility to conduct research in
that realm. Let me tell everybody, they basically won that argument.
Both the House and the Senate defense authorization bills propose
changes to current law that allow the flexibility of research into low-
yield nuclear weapons.
The administration said this was a problem, the Department of Energy
said it was a problem, existing law, so we have changed it. We have
addressed the problem. I was an author of the so-called Spratt-Furse
amendment in 1993. I believe that the language of that amendment as it
now stands as amended in the committee mark is sensible and a fair
compromise. That is what I am asking the House to do, to stand behind
it.
Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking member on our committee.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
While there are many reasons to support this motion, let me say that
one key reason for supporting it is that the provisions contained in
section 3111 of the House bill are largely the same legislation adopted
by this body in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003 which, of course, was last year's defense bill.
The House adopted that legislation after considerable and very
careful deliberations and on a bipartisan basis led by the gentleman
from South Carolina. We authorized research but retained the
prohibition on development activities that could lead to the production
of a destabilizing and unnecessary new low-yield nuclear weapon. We
also described permissible activities necessary to address the safety
and reliability of those issues.
Mr. Speaker, being a student of history, the war in Iraq and Desert
Storm some 12 years ago now have taught us that stealth technology,
standoff capability and precision munitions are the key to future
warfare. New conventional technologies have changed the way we fight
and, if anything, will
[[Page H6905]]
allow us to become less reliant on low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.
The House position on low-yield nuclear weapons makes sense. I urge
my colleagues to support the motion to instruct conferees.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, this provision which is in the House-passed bill is a
provision that was agreed to by the vice-chairman of the committee, the
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), and the gentleman from South
Carolina (Mr. Spratt) last year. It was restated this year. It is the
House position going into conference. For that reason, we are certainly
not going to urge anybody to vote against it.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Reyes), the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces.
Mr. REYES. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the motion to instruct
conferees offered by my friend and colleague, the gentleman from South
Carolina.
Earlier this year, the administration proposed a complete repeal of a
law that has been on the books for over a decade, the Spratt-Furse ban
on research and development of new nuclear weapons with yields below
five kilotons. The Spratt-Furse ban is not a complete ban. It bans just
R&D of new low-yield nuclear weapons. It permits R&D on new weapons
with yields above five kilotons. It permits R&D of modifications to
existing nuclear weapons regardless of their yield.
It also permits our national laboratories to conduct R&D on low-yield
nuclear weapons for the purposes of counterproliferation, that is, how
to detect a low-yield nuclear terrorist device and devise ways in which
to disable them.
The Spratt-Furse ban also permits R&D of low-yield nuclear weapons if
it is necessary to help keep our nuclear arsenal safe and reliable.
When asked, Department of Energy officials admitted that there is no
military requirement for a new low-yield nuclear weapon, and they had
no plans to develop one anytime soon.
{time} 1330
They simply wanted to repeal the Spratt-Furse ban because they
maintain that it somehow has a chilling effect on the freedom of their
scientists to look at any nuclear weapon option regardless of whether
or not there is a military need.
During the markup of the defense authorization, the gentleman from
South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) offered an amendment that was adopted by
the full committee by a voice vote, and I think this is a very sound
compromise. The Spratt amendment permits research on new low-yield
nuclear weapons, but draws the line on moving past research and into
development. In short, the Spratt amendment makes sure that the
Congress will be a coequal partner with the executive branch if there
is any decision to move past research and actually start developing new
low-yield nuclear weapons. I think that the Spratt amendment makes good
sense and protects Congress's right to fully participate on any future
decision to start up development of new low-yield weapons. I urge all
of my colleagues to support this motion to instruct.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Let me take just a minute to explain the state of play and why it is
important that the House provisions prevail over the Senate provision.
The Senate defense authorization bill repeals these provisions in their
entirety, but then backfills the gap with language that requires
specific authorization of Congress to move from development into
production of low-yield nuclear weapons. This amounts, really, to
restating what the law already is, that to do something this
significant with respect to a new product money has to be authorized
and appropriated.
The House bill is similar in consequence but better, in my opinion,
because it makes it absolutely clear that any movement beyond just
research will require Congress to change by law the nuclear weapons
policy of the United States. The House and Senate both addressed these
specific concerns raised by the administration and the weapons labs and
the Department of Defense to permit more flexibility in basic research,
but our version contains a stronger guarantee that the Congress is
going to be a partner in any decision to go beyond the scope.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California
(Mrs. Tauscher).
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding me this
time.
Mr Speaker, I would like to offer my strong support for the motion to
instruct which sends an important message that it is the will of the
House to maintain the ban on development of low-yield nuclear weapons,
and I commend the chairman of the full committee for his initiative to
work with us on this.
Nuclear weapons will remain a crucial part of America's arsenal for
the foreseeable future. They provide a hedge against potentially
hostile nuclear powers and underpin security commitments to our allies.
Today, however, the United States is addressing the threat of weapons
of mass destruction from North Korea, India, Pakistan, and a growing
list of countries.
As we have seen in Afghanistan and in the global war on terrorism,
when the United States leads with a purpose, the rest of the world will
follow. And just as the world follows our lead on tackling common
enemies, it also reacts when we take provocative and destabilizing
action. I believe strongly that until our war fighters have a military
requirement for a new nuclear weapon or have exhausted conventional
alternatives, Congress should maintain its ban on the development of
such weapons.
Preventing the development of new nuclear weapons would not affect
the RNEP study with focuses on existing warheads. It would not prevent
any of the ideas that are currently being explored regarding missile
systems. In addition to having no military requirement for them, new
nuclear weapons are not the answer to threats being used to justify
them. Nuclear weapons of any yield have a limited penetration ability
and will never surgically destroy hardened targets. They offer no
guarantee of destroying chemical and biological agents without
releasing them into the atmosphere. Detonated in an urban area, even a
1-kiloton nuclear bomb would kill tens of thousands of civilians and
hinder friendly troops.
Preserving the ban on new nuclear weapons is a small step that would
also help restore the belief that the United States intends to fight
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I hope my colleagues
would support this motion to recommit.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Holt), a nuclear physicist who understands what is at stake
here better than possibly anybody in the House.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from South Carolina for
yielding me this time.
The direction in which the administration has been leading our Nation
on nuclear weapons is becoming increasingly dangerous. That is why I
wrote to President Bush in April, a letter co-signed by 33 of my
colleagues here, to underscore our concern that our Nation's leaders
not adopt a mindset of viewing nuclear weapons as just an extension of
the continuum of conventional military options available to the United
States. It is important that we maintain the nuclear distinction.
I rise to support this motion because it gives us the opportunity to
invoke at least one cautionary restraint on this dangerous path. Both
the House and Senate versions of this bill eliminate the Spratt-Furse
ban that has been in place since 1993. And this Senate language,
especially, would allow Pandora's box to be opened to allow, in effect,
unfettered research into low-yield nuclear weapons. As a scientist, I
can talk about the studies that some of my scientific colleagues have
prepared about why some of the newly conceived weapons like the bunker
buster would not work as proposed, why they would be dirty, why they
would be unwieldy; but I choose instead to focus for just a moment on
the more important strategic and tactical questions.
We should be stepping away from using tactical nuclear weapons, not
[[Page H6906]]
moving in that direction. U.S. battlefield commanders have said over
and over again that they have long recognized the folly of battlefield
nukes. The weapons and especially these newly conceived weapons put our
troops at risk and are not useful in advancing military campaigns. And
very important, this work would be sending the wrong message to our
allies and to potential adversaries around the world. They would view
the adoption of this bad, particularly the bad Senate language as
further evidence that America is bent upon developing and procuring a
new generation of nuclear weapons. As we go to war around the world in
part to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we should not be
sending the signal that we are bent on developing and procuring a new
generation of nuclear weapons.
So the Spratt motion is a very constructive step that provides, I
think, an important safeguard that actually will help to make our
country and our world more secure.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I thank the gentleman for his comments, and I rise to make one
correction. The House bill does have language which we would like to
retain. The gist of this motion is let us stand by the House language
and reject the Senate language.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maine (Mr.
Allen).
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
I rise in support of the motion to instruct and I rise to thank the
gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter), the distinguished chairman of
my former committee, for his acceptance of this motion.
Certainly this motion reflects a bipartisan compromise that has been
worked out not just in this Congress but in the past Congress, and when
that happens we should seize the moment. It does allow expanded
research, but it stops short of allowing the development or the
fabrication of new nuclear weapons. That is an essential step for this
Congress to take, partly to make sure that we do not send the wrong
signal to the rest of the world and partly to make sure that the
institutional prerogatives of this House are protected when decisions
of that magnitude are faced at any time.
There is, of course, an important strategic deterrent role for
nuclear weapons, but 10 years ago or more we stepped back from the
brink with Russia. We stepped back from maintaining or developing
tactical nuclear weapons. We do not need to go down that path again
because if we do, we risk losing further our standing in the
international community. Our arguments about nonproliferation will seem
hollow.
We are today continually concerned about weapons of mass destruction
held by adversaries or held by other countries where we believe there
is some risk to our security in the world. We do not advance those
arguments about weapons of mass destruction if we start to develop new
nuclear weapons that can only be used in a tactical way, whatever they
are called. The nuclear Earth penetrator is one. We really need to make
sure that we are exercising the kind of responsible leadership in this
area that the world expects of us and that will redound to the benefit
of our own national security.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, the Cold War is over and the good news, to
my friends, is we won and the Soviet Union lost. We do not need a new
arms race with ourselves. We do not now need to send a signal to
countries around the world who harbor desires to obtain nuclear weapons
that we believe that it is still worth our while to invest in a new
generation of nuclear weapons which are more usable in battleground
situations. We must avoid being viewed as the drunk preaching
temperance from a bar stool. If we want to convince others to embrace
our view that nuclear weapons are not usable, we must ourselves act in
a way that does not leave the misimpression that we are still engaging
in the same kind of mindless development of another generation of
nuclear weapons that only encourages countries like North Korea,
countries like Iran, which each have active nuclear weapons programs,
that they are wise in pursuing that course.
So the resolution that we are considering right now is one which is
saying to the rest of the world we understand their concern about an
initiation of another nuclear arms race, and we understand the
consequences for regions around the world where there are bad actors,
bad countries trying to develop nuclear weapons programs. We brought
the country of Iraq to its knees militarily in 3 weeks. Our problem is
not destroying any country's military capacity. Our real problem is in
controlling the country after we do so, and nuclear weapons do not add
to our capacity to accomplish those goals. So this is, in my opinion, a
wise approach to take. The gentleman from South Carolina as usual is
trying to draw a very fine line between programs that have already been
put in place and do protect our country and new programs which would
potentially add to an acceleration of an arms race, a nuclear arms race
around the world.
We now must turn our attention to Iran and North Korea. The only way
to deal with it is with strong diplomacy, active diplomacy. Additional
nuclear weapons will not help us, and that is why this resolution must
pass.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, in conclusion, let me simply put in context why we have
this particular provision before us and why we are emphasizing it in
this motion to instruct. The Spratt-Furse prohibition on low-yield
nuclear weapons was a follow-up to the decision by President Bush, the
first President Bush, on September 27, 1991, a historic day.
{time} 1345
That day he announced the withdrawal of all land-based tactical
nuclear weapons from our overseas bases, particularly those in Europe,
and all sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships,
submarines, and naval aircraft. We decided to forgo the development of
the follow-on to Lance, a battlefield tactical nuclear missile, and we
sent a signal to the world by all of these decisions that we were
serious about minimizing the role and possible uses of nuclear weapons
early in a conflict and especially for tactical or theater purposes. We
said that our arsenal in the future in effect would be a strategic
arsenal, a strategic determinant, and we would not use nuclear weapons
for tactical and theater purposes anymore, such as the Davy Crockett,
to take out tanks or nuclear artillery, rounds, and sea-based mines and
things of that kind.
This move away from tactical nuclear weapons prompted the Soviet
Union to move in the same direction; and Gorbechev shortly announced
the elimination of their warheads, their land-based tactical nuclear
missiles, mines, and artillery shells. He announced that he was
removing warheads from surface-to-air missiles and removing sea-based
tactical nukes on naval aircraft.
Taken together, these steps marked a major step away from tactical
nuclear weapons and a step toward global security. The initiative by
the first Bush administration helped us persuade Kazakhstan, Ukraine,
and Belarus to forswear nuclear weapons after the breakup of the Soviet
Union. It also made it easier for the United States and our European
allies to convince much of the rest of the world to extend indefinitely
the nuclear proliferation treaty, or NPT.
Now, the NPT is not the final, definitive answer to our proliferation
concerns, but the world would be a lot riskier place without it. It
definitely makes it harder for nations or terrorist groups to obtain
nuclear materials and nuclear know-how, and it establishes the
authority of the war community to question and inspect the activities
of States that are a signatory to this treaty.
I think a return by the United States back to the days of tactical
nuclear weapons, especially nuclear weapons designed to be more usable
by virtue of low yields, would send a troubling signal, a signal that
nuclear weapons just maybe are useful for tactical purposes,
battlefield purposes, strategic purposes, and were really just an
extension of conventional weapons for the same tactical purposes. It
would indicate that we see tactical utility in these weapons, and it
would reverse the
[[Page H6907]]
step that was taken in 1991. I do not think we need to go down that
path.
Now, there are some who will say that we need to do this because we
have to have weapons to take on deep, hard targets. The actual numbers
are classified, of course, but even if we can improve the ability of
our nuclear weapons to burrow in the hard terrain and into geologic
formations such as granite, simple physics tells us we are going to
come up way short of reaching the underground bunkers that we are
really worried about, like those in North Korea.
Some say that we need these new weapons, these low-yield weapons,
deeper penetrators, because we need the heat and the gamma rays and the
X-rays of a nuclear weapon to destroy the chemical and biological
agents that might be stored in deep underground bunkers. But if the
fireball and the X-rays and the gamma rays are to reach the bunker,
then we need to use, we are told by qualified experts, weapons that are
much, much bigger than 5 kilotons; and using even a 5 kiloton weapon
has consequences that have to be dealt with, fallout, for example.
Alternatively, if we want to use the pressure and blast of a nuclear
weapon to crush a bunker, then we already have weapons to do that job.
Supporters of full repeal also say that our restraint thus far on
developing these tactical theater and battlefield nuclear weapons has
not really had any effect on nations that are bent upon acquiring them,
North Korea being a prominent example, but I am not so sure about that.
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in a momentous decision all decided to
rid their countries of nuclear weapons. Brazil, South Africa, South
Korea, and Taiwan have taken similar steps; and numerous countries have
signed the NPT.
So before we repeal this long-standing language in the code, we
should keep in mind the effects that surround us and also, also I think
we should point out what is already in this bill. This bill will reduce
the amount of time it takes to resume underground nuclear testing. This
bill will call for a review of nuclear weapons for ``bunker-busting''
missions, the so-called Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. This bill will
call for building a brand-new, multi-billion-dollar facility to produce
plutonium pits for nuclear weapons. Just the beginning, planning money,
but these things that are in here of a still-robust nuclear policy but
one that is slanted towards strategic usage and not tactical usage.
Mr. Speaker, I commend the chairman of our committee for his
generosity and collegiality in allowing us to reach an agreement on
this. I know it is a compromise for him. He has his doubts, and we have
our disagreements. But, nevertheless, I appreciate his kindness in
doing it.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I just want to thank the gentleman for his
participation as a great member of the committee. I did have and do
have my reservations about his position, but it was an agreement
between the gentleman from Pennsylvania and the gentleman from South
Carolina and it is the position of the House. We are now going into
conference with the other body, and I think it is appropriate to carry
the House position forward.
I thank the gentleman for his thoughtful words.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I have gratitude for the
gentleman's agreeing to the amendment. As long as it passes by voice
vote, I will not ask for a record vote on final passage.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the motion. The
Administration and the Republicans in Congress have made clear their
intent to explore new, low-yield nuclear weapons. Before we head down
that path, we need to remember two things.
(1) The Cold War is over and I have good news for my friends on the
other side of the aisle. We won! The Russians are no longer our
adversaries. Remember, President Bush has told us he's looked into
President Putin's eyes and found him to be a man he could deal with!
Let's stop fighting the last war. The Russians are no longer a threat
and I see no reason why we should allow the development of mini-nukes
because somebody in Russia may have talked about the possibility of
developing new weapons. They're probably only talking about doing that
because they hear all of this talk about new nuclear weapons being
developed by the U.S. What does this mean? It means that the only
reason to develop mini-nukes is to start a new arms race. But that begs
the question: with whom would we have this arms race? No nation in the
world has a conventional military that can compare with ours. The only
country that has a nuclear arsenal that compares to ours is Russia, and
we're paying them to dismantle their nuclear weapons! Where's the beef
behind this threat?
(2) These so called mini-nukes are still nuclear weapons. They may be
smaller, but they will still kill tens of thousands of people, will
still produce radioactive fallout and contaminate the countryside, and
will still carry the stigma of being nuclear weapons. We already have
big nuclear weapons, and medium-sized nuclear weapons, and small
nuclear weapons. In fact, some of our nuclear weapons are ``dial-a-
yield'', meaning we can select the yield of the weapon--and some of
them can be ``dialed'' down to less than 1 kiloton, which, by the scale
of nuclear weapons, is pretty mini. We used to have a weapon with a
yield of less than a kiloton that weighted only 163 pounds--we called
that the SADM or Special Atomic Demolition Munition. Is that what we
want? To have kicked out the nuclear-seeking Saddam, only to replace
him with our own nuclear SADM?
I would urge my colleagues to remember these two things: that to
develop mini-nukes would be to start an arms race with ourselves, and
that a mini-nuke is still a nuclear weapon, with all the associated
consequences. We simply cannot preach nuclear temperance from a
barstool. We cannot tell Iran, North Korea and other countries not to
develop nuclear weapons while simultaneously developing our own new
weapons.
I urge you to support this Motion to Instruct. Let's not turn back
the clock and start a new ``mini'' arms race.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bass). Without objection, the previous
question is ordered on the motion.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to instruct
offered by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).
The motion to instruct was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the Chair appoints the
following conferees:
From the Committee on Armed Services, for consideration of the House
bill and the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to
conference: Messrs. Hunter, Weldon of Pennsylvania, Hefley, Saxton,
McHugh, Everett, Bartlett of Maryland, McKeon, Thornberry, Hostettler,
Jones of North Carolina, Ryun of Kansas, Gibbons, Hayes, Mrs. Wilson of
New Mexico, Messrs. Calvert, Skelton, Spratt, Ortiz, Evans, Taylor of
Mississippi, Abercrombie, Meehan, Reyes, Snyder, Turner of Texas, Ms.
Loretta Sanchez of California, and Mr. Cooper.
From the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for
consideration of matters within the jurisdiction of that committee
under clause 11 of rule X: Mr. Goss, Mr. Hoekstra, and Ms. Harman.
From the Committee on Agriculture, for consideration of sections 1057
and 2822 of the House bill, and modifications committed to conference:
Messrs. Goodlatte, Lucas of Oklahoma, and Stenholm.
From the Committee on Education and the Workforce, for consideration
of sections 544, 553, 563, 567, 907, 1046, 1501, 1502, and 1504 through
1506 of the House bill, and sections 233, 351, 352, 368, 701, 1034, and
1036 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to
conference: Messrs. Castle, Kline and George Miller of California.
From the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for consideration of
sections 601, 3113, 3201, and 3517 of the House bill, and sections 601,
701, 852, 3151, and 3201 of the Senate amendment, and modifications
committed to conference: Messrs. Tauzin, Barton of Texas, and Dingell.
From the Committee on Financial Services, for consideration of
sections 814 and 907 of the House bill, and modifications committed to
conference: Mr. Oxley, Mr. King of New York, and Mrs. Maloney.
From the Committee on Government Reform, for consideration of
sections 315, 323, 551, 805, 822, 824, 828, 829, 1031,
[[Page H6908]]
1046, 1050, 1057, Title XI, Title XIV, sections 2825 and 2826 of the
House bill, and sections 326, 801, 811, 813, 822, 831 through 833, 841,
852, 853, 1013, 1035, 1102 through 1104, and 2824 through 2826 of the
Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Mr. Tom
Davis of Virginia, Mr. Shays, Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia, and
Messrs. Putnam, Turner of Ohio, Waxman, Van Hollen, and Davis of
Illinois.
From the Select Committee on Homeland Security, for consideration of
section 1456 of the House bill, and modifications committed to
conference: Messrs. Cox, Shadegg and Thompson of Mississippi.
From the Committee on House Administration, for consideration of
section 564 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to
conference: Messrs. Ney, Mica, and Larson of Connecticut.
From the Committee on International Relations, for consideration of
sections 1047, 1201, 1202, 1209, Title XIII, sections 3601, 3611, 3631,
3632, 3634, 3635, and 3636 of the House bill, and sections 323, 343,
921, 1201, 1202, 1204, 1205, 1207, 1208, Title XIII and section 3141 of
the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference:
Messrs. Hyde, Bereuter, and Lantos.
From the Committee on the Judiciary, for consideration of sections
661 through 665 and 851 through 853 of the Senate amendment, and
modifications committed to conference: Messrs. Sensenbrenner, Smith of
Texas, and Conyers.
From the Committee on Resources, for consideration of sections 311,
317 through 319, 601, and 1057 of the House bill, and sections 322,
330, and 601 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to
conference: Messrs. Pombo, Gilchrest, Rehberg, Rahall, and Udall of New
Mexico.
From the Committee on Science, for consideration of sections 852 and
911 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference:
Messrs. Boehlert, Smith of Michigan, and Hall of Texas.
From the Committee on Small Business, for consideration of section
866 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference:
Mr. Manzullo, Mrs. Kelly, and Ms. Velazquez.
From the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, for
consideration of sections 312, 601, 907, 1049, 1051 and 2824 of the
House bill, and sections 324, 601, and 2821 of the Senate amendment,
and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. Young of Alaska,
Petri, and Carson of Oklahoma.
From the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, for consideration of section
565 of the House bill, and sections 644 and 707 of the Senate
amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. Smith of
New Jersey, Bilirakis, and Filner.
From the Committee on Ways and Means, for consideration of section
701 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference:
Messrs. Thomas, McCrery, and Stark.
There was no objection.
____________________