[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 102 (Friday, July 11, 2003)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1447-E1448]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      QUESTIONING THE CASE FOR WAR

                                 ______
                                 

                       HON. JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY

                              of illinois

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, July 10, 2003

  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, many questions are swirling around the 
country about whether President Bush and members of his Administration 
knowingly misled the American people into believing that Iraq was an 
imminent threat to our security and that we had no choice but to invade 
and occupy that nation. That is why I rise today to call my colleagues' 
attention to an editorial that appeared in today's Chicago Tribune, 
entitled ``Questioning the Case for War.''
  The editorial states: ``Instead of dodging questions and branding 
critics `revisionist historians,' Bush must cooperate with 
congressional inquiries and diligently work to set the record straight. 
Bush has enjoyed the patience and the support of a majority of the 
American public. But that patience can run thin.''
  It continues, ``The American people deserve a full accounting of the 
evidence. Were mistaken assertions based on faulty intelligence reports 
or was there a deliberate effort to trump up evidence to make the case 
for war?''
  For the sake of his credibility, President Bush ``must put to rest 
any suspicions that Americans accepted an argument for war that was 
built on a lie,'' the editorial concludes.
  The American people deserve answers and that is why I strongly 
support H.R. 2625, a bill sponsored by Representative Waxman that would 
establish an independent commission to respond to the questions raised 
today by the Chicago Tribune. We need to get to the truth. President 
Bush's credibility and America's standing in the world are at stake.

               [From the Chicago Tribune, July 10, 2003]

                      Questioning the Case for War

       Like any good salesman, President Bush highlighted the 
     facts that made the most compelling case as he sold the 
     American people on the urgent need for war against Iraq. In 
     his State of the Union address in January, he spoke of 38,000 
     liters of the deadly botulinum toxin and as much as 500 tons 
     of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent--all unaccounted for by 
     Saddam Hussein. He spoke of Hussein's continued quest to 
     build nuclear weapons.
       He and his administration made the case forcefully for 
     months, at the United Nations and elsewhere, using an 
     impressive array of intelligence reports and satellite 
     photos. Many Americans were convinced, as was this editorial 
     page.
       For several weeks, however, the case that Bush & Co. made 
     has been coming under intense scrutiny, with suggestions that 
     the president deliberately exaggerated some evidence or 
     misrepresented intelligence reports to gild the arguments for 
     war.
       After weeks of denying those charges, the White House 
     acknowledged Monday that one of the president's points in his 
     State of the Union address may have been mistaken. That 
     claim: that Hussein had attempted to buy uranium for a 
     nuclear weapon from a nation in Africa.
       White House officials wouldn't say how the president came 
     to use the erroneous information or when he knew that the 
     assertion was probably wrong. Bush and his team didn't fess 
     up voluntarily. They were compelled to respond to an account 
     in Sunday's New York Times by Joseph Wilson, a former 
     American ambassador who was enlisted by the CIA last year to 
     travel to Niger to investigate claims that Hussein had tried 
     to buy the uranium.
       Wilson wrote that he found no evidence for those claims and 
     shared his skepticism in briefings with the CIA and other 
     agencies. Nevertheless, almost a year later, Bush cited that 
     information in his speech. Top officials, including National 
     Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, deny that they or the 
     president knew of Wilson's findings before he delivered the 
     speech.
       But Wilson wrote that ``Based on my experience . . . I have 
     little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence 
     related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to 
     exaggerate the Iraqi threat.''
       That is a logical--and deeply distrubing--conclusion.
       The African uranium claim is not the only statement in 
     question. The president asserted that Hussein had attempted 
     to buy high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear 
     weapons production. That claim was disputed by the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency, and now is widely viewed 
     as doubtful. The Pentagon has acknowledged that a Defense 
     Intelligence Agency study last December couldn't pinpoint 
     evidence of Iraqi weapons sites, though administration 
     pronouncements at the time seemed far more certain of their 
     existence.
       With all those questions, it's natural to wonder what other 
     errors--intentional or not--crept into the president's case 
     for war. Prime Minister Tony Blair faces similar scrutiny in 
     Britain.
       Bush insists that those who raise such questions are 
     ignoring the preponderance of the evidence, which clearly 
     showed Hussein posed a threat to the world. There was, 
     indeed, a strong case, starting with Hussein's longstanding 
     defiance of U.N. resolutions and cat-and-mouse game with U.N. 
     weapons inspectors.
       Bush also complains that this debate is charged with 
     political partisanship. Yes, in some quarters, it surely is.
       But Bush seriously miscalculates if he chalks up the rising 
     din of questions only to those who opposed the war. This 
     debate goes to the president's most precious asset: his 
     credibility.
       The American people deserve a full accounting of the 
     evidence. Were mistaken assertions based on faulty 
     intelligence reports or was there a deliberate effort to 
     trump up evidence to make the case for war?
       It's time for the administration to scrub down every piece 
     of evidence it made public and level with the American public 
     about what, if anything, was exaggerated to make the case for 
     war. Instead of dodging questions and branding critics 
     ``revisionist historians,'' Bush must cooperate with 
     congressional inquiries and diligently work to set the record 
     straight.
       Bush has enjoyed the patience and the support of a majority 
     of the American public. But that patience can run thin.
       Americans know the hunt for weapons of mass destruction 
     isn't over yet. They realize that no intelligence report is 
     perfect; that such reports can be misleading or flat-out 
     wrong. They understand that mistakenly using a faulty 
     intelligence report does not automatically lead to the 
     conclusion that much of the evidence for war was twisted or 
     intentionally misused.
       But they also know a too-slick sales job when they see one. 
     History is full of presidents who fudged facts to advance 
     objectives--be it declaring a war or more mundane domestic 
     matters.
       These questions will not fade. If anything, as the 
     presidential campaign heats up, these kinds of questions will 
     only grow louder.
       If some of the intelligence Bush used was faulty or 
     incomplete--as it seems to have

[[Page E1448]]

     been--he should say so and explain why. If he made mistakes, 
     he should admit them. Bluster and bravado will not suffice. 
     He must put to rest any suspicions that Americans accepted an 
     argument for war that was built on a lie.

                          ____________________