[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 95 (Wednesday, June 25, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8547-S8548]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      NATIONAL PEACE ESSAY CONTEST

  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I am honored today to present to my 
colleagues in the Senate an essay by Collette N. Roberts of Rapid City, 
SD. Collette is a student at St. Thomas More High School, and she has 
been awarded first place in the 16th annual National Peace Essay 
Contest for South Dakota. ``Justification of War: the Anglo-Zulu and 
Kosovo Wars'' examines the Anglo-Zulu war of the late 19th century as a 
paradigm for understanding Kosovo's struggle against the military 
campaign of Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia. Collette has tackled a vitally 
important subject with insight and maturity. I can only hope that she 
continues to share her wisdom with the world, and I commend her essay 
to my colleagues' attention. I ask unanimous consent that Collette 
Roberts's essay be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

         Justicifaction of War: The Anglo-Zulu and Kosovo Wars

                        (By Collette N. Roberts)

       ``. . . this has never been and never can be/one territory 
     under two masters'' (Judah, 2000, p. 4). The line in the poem 
     by Anne Pennington and Peter Levi holds the ring of truth. 
     Many wars have been waged over a piece of land such as the 
     Anglo-Zulu and Kosovo Wars. The circumstances surrounding 
     these wars are similar, but are justified only in part. In 
     both wars, one side had reached the last resort: either 
     defend their homeland or face subjugation. Both were waged by 
     legitimate authorities; however, nothing justifies the 
     genocide of a race and the slaughter of innocent civilians. 
     Upon examination, the justness of the Anglo-Zulu and Kosovo 
     Wars and NATO involvement in Kosovo is subjective, contingent 
     upon the motives and actions of each party.
       The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries mark the 
     imperialistic age for Great Britain. by the 1870s, most of 
     South Africa had succumbed to British rule. Zululand, 
     however, one of the last independent African states in the 
     region, presented challenge to an advancing white frontier 
     (The Diagram Group, 1997, p. 105). Not only did the 
     independent state disrupt Britain's confederation plans for 
     the region, but also prevented sugar farmers from using the 
     spacious tracts of land within the boundaries of Zululand. 
     Furthermore, as long as the Zulu remained independent, they 
     could not be sued for cheap labor. Zululand became a dollar 
     sign in the eyes of the British. When the Zulu defied British 
     subjugation, war inevitably ensued (Gump, 1949, p. 3).
       British military forces, commanded by Frederick Thesiger 
     (better known as Lord Chlemsford), began the invasion of 
     Zululand in 1879. The Zulu, under the rule of King Cetshwayo, 
     rose to defend their homeland. The first major battle 
     occurred at Islandhlwana. Losses were heavy to both armies; 
     but the Zulu, underestimated by the British, claimed victory. 
     To justify his actions, Dabulamanzi, a Zulu general, said, 
     ``It is the whites who have come to fight with me in my own 
     country and not I that do to fight with them'' (Gump, 1994, 
     p. 54).
       Despite the intensity and valor with which the Zulu fought, 
     the battle oNdini marked the end of the Anglo-Zulu War. 
     Poorly provision and outgunned, the Zulu military system was 
     broken. Between six and ten thousand Zulu men died defending 
     their homeland (Knight, 1995, p. 270). Following the war, 
     the British began decentralizing the Zulu royal house. 
     Zululand was carved into thirteen regions, each headed by 
     British sympathizers. Finally subjugated, young Zulu men 
     soon found themselves traveling outside Zululand in search 
     of work. The system of migrant labor, as in other parts of 
     south Africa, had at last taken hold of Zululand. The 
     economic seeds of apartheid, the racist system of black 
     oppression, had been sown (Knight, 1995, p. 272).
       Those, like the Zulu, who are invaded by a conquering power 
     are faced with only two choices: subjugation or was (Gump, 
     1994, p. 3). Though the chances for success were poor for the 
     Zulu, war was the only chance to defend their homeland and 
     preserve their way of life. When the British could not easily 
     lay their hands on what they wanted, they believed they had 
     reached the last resort, and therefore initiated war. These 
     attitudes are common throughout all imperialistic societies. 
     Britain justified its actions through claims to ``savage'' 
     Zulu; to expose them to a ``new and better way of living'' 
     (Gump, 1994, p. 14). However, war, from the imperialistic 
     standpoint not be the final option when a piece of land and 
     the promise of a profit are found to be superior to human 
     life.
       The Anglo-Zulu War is not the only confliction history that 
     has occurred over a piece of land. For centuries, opposition 
     has brewed between the Serbs and Albanians of the Balkans. 
     The source of conflict is Kosovo, a province of Serbia, 
     sharing borders with Albania (Andryszewski, 2000, p. 9). The 
     claim of the area is bitterly disputed between the Serbs and 
     the Albanians. Serbs hold that, despite the ethnic shift only 
     a few generations ago, the people of Kosovo have been 
     primarily serbian. The Albanians, on the other hand, argue 
     that their ancestors, the ancient Illyrians and the 
     Dardanians, habituated the region prior to the Slavic 
     invasions of the sixth and seventh centuries. Therefore, they 
     believe, Albanians have the right to what they call ``first 
     possession.'' The truth concerning the claim of Kosovo is 
     unclear. However, as in most cases, the truth is not what 
     matters, but rather is what the people believe the truth to 
     be (Judah, 2000, p. 2).
       In April, 1987, a politician from Belgrade delivered a 
     speech glorifying the Serbian nation. Because of high 
     tensions between the Albanians and the Serbs, biased 
     speechmaking had been against certain unspoken ``rules'' in 
     Yugoslavia. However, by the end of the year, he became the 
     most powerful politician in Serbia (Andryszewski, 2000, p. 
     18). In 1991, Milosevic began his war in Bosnia for a 
     ``Greater Serbia.'' By the time the Dayton Peace Agreement 
     had been approved and signed, hundreds of thousands of 
     Muslims and Croats had fallen victim to the program of 
     ``ethnic cleansing,'' driven from their homes, tortured, 
     raped, and murdered (Andryszewski, 2000, p. 20). Despite 
     the declaration of peace, Milosevic's ambitions for a 
     ``Greater Serbia'' had not been eliminated. His ambitions 
     soon turned toward Kosovo.
       Kosovo remained under the harsh rule of Serbia. In 1997, 
     the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a small guerrilla force, 
     began to wage a war against Serbian authorities. Alone, the 
     KLA's chances for a sweeping victory were slim. However, the 
     worthy cause of self-defense justifies their actions. The 
     occasional skirmishes between the KLA and Serbian authorities 
     culminated in the Serbian massacre in Drenica where dozens of 
     ethnic Albanian civilians were slaughtered (Andryszewski, 
     2000, p. 30). Despite NATO threats of airstrikes to end the 
     fighting, the violence between the Albanians and Serbs 
     continued to escalate. In January, 1999, Serbs massacred 
     forty-five ethnic Albanians in the Kosovar village of Racak. 
     NATO, acting as a peace-keeper gave the Serbs and Kosovar 
     Albanians an ultimatum: make peace or face NATO military 
     action. The Albanians were willing to make peace, but all 
     agreements proved futile when Milosevic refused to sign 
     (Andryszewski, 2000, p. 33).
       Far from any kind of last resort, Milosevic, wielding the 
     power of a legitimate authority, instigated a massive Serb 
     military attack on Kosovo. Kosovar Albanians, both military 
     and civilian, were his paramount targets. A campaign of 
     ethnic cleansing, echoing that of Bosnia, was launched on the 
     Kosovar Albanians. Homes were burned, women were raped, and 
     men were slaughtered; mass graves, freshly dug, could be seen 
     from the air (Andryszewski, 2000, p. 48). Milosevic justified 
     his unjust actions through his call for a ``Greater Serbia.'' 
     Again, the desire for a piece of land was put before the 
     sanctity of human life.

[[Page S8548]]

       When peace became impossible and violence continued, NATO 
     was left with the last resort. As promised, NATO took 
     military action to halt the Serbian offensive and its mass 
     genocide of the Albanians. A reasonable chance for success 
     was existent. Furthermore, there was the belief that the 
     consequences of these aggressive actions would be better than 
     the situation that would exist had these actions not 
     been implemented. In March 1999, NATO airplanes and cruise 
     missiles began bombing Serbian military targets. 
     Ultimately, through the joint efforts of the KLA and NATO, 
     Serbia withdrew from Kosovo seventy-eight days later and 
     signed NATO peace agreements. By the time peace had been 
     achieved, 900,000 Albanians had been removed from their 
     homes in Kosovo (Andryszewski, 2000, p. 54). Another ten 
     thousand lay dead--murdered by Serbs during their ethnic 
     cleansing of Kosovo (Andryzsewski, 2000, p. 57).
       Critics may argue that the decision to bomb Serbia may not 
     have been the most effective course of action. Regrettably, 
     serious mistakes were made and the bombings killed civilians, 
     both Serb and Albanian. Furthermore, a bomb hit the Chinese 
     embassy in Belgrade, killing three and wounding nearly two 
     dozen (Andryszewski, 2000, p. 50). Despite these tragic 
     events, had NATO not put pressure on Serbia to end its 
     campaign of ethnic cleansing, the number of genocide victims 
     would have only increased.
       As demonstrated, one territory cannot serve two masters. 
     The Anglo-Zulu and Kosovo Wars were waged because two parties 
     tried to control one piece of land. Each party had reasons 
     for taking part in the fight. Many factors come into play 
     that do or do not justify these reasons. The Zulus and 
     Albanians were justified by reaching the last resort and 
     defense of their homeland. Though neither of these parties 
     had any reasonable chance of victory, the justness of their 
     cause is in no way lessened. NATO military action was 
     justified in its attempts to check the violence. Britain and 
     Milosevic, though legitimate authorities, valued land over 
     human life. Their motives were unjust. Justice is blind, but 
     will forever be weighed by our motives and actions.


                               references

       Andryszewski, T. (2000). Kosovo: the splintering of 
     Yugoslavia. Brookfield, CT: The Millbrook Press, Inc.
       Diagram Group, The. (1997). People of South Africa. New 
     York: Author.
       Gump, J.O. (1994). The dust rose like smoke: the 
     subjugation of the Zulu and the Sioux. Lincoln, NE: 
     University of Nebraska Press.
       Judah, T. (2000). Kosovo: war and revenge. New Haven, CT: 
     Yale University Press.
       Knight, I. (1995). Anatomy of the Zulu Army: from Shaka to 
     Cetshwayo. London: Greenhill Books.

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