[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 95 (Wednesday, June 25, 2003)]
[House]
[Pages H5883-H5903]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 295 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, 
H.R. 2417.

                              {time}  1824


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of 
the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United 
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Simpson (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose 
earlier today, all time for general debate had expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill 
for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be 
considered read.
  The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is 
as follows:

                               H.R. 2417

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Intelligence elements of the Department of the Treasury.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

                Subtitle A--Recurring General Provisions

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.

                        Subtitle B--Intelligence

Sec. 311. Modification of notice and wait requirements on projects to 
              construct or improve intelligence community facilities.

                    Subtitle C--Counterintelligence

Sec. 321. Counterintelligence initiatives for the intelligence 
              community.

                       Subtitle D--Other Matters

Sec. 331. Extension of suspension of reorganization of Diplomatic 
              Telecommunications Service Program Office.
Sec. 332. Modifications of authorities on explosive materials.
Sec. 333. Modification of prohibition on the naturalization of certain 
              persons.
Sec. 334. Modification to definition of financial institution in the 
              Right to Financial Privacy Act.
Sec. 335. Procedural requirements for Central Intelligence Agency 
              relating to products of Federal prison industries.
Sec. 336. Improvement of information sharing among federal, State, and 
              local government officials.

              Subtitle E--Reports and Technical Amendments

Sec. 341. Extension of deadline for final report of the National 
              Commission for the Review of the Research and Development 
              Programs of the United States Intelligence Community.
Sec. 342. Modification of various reports required of intelligence 
              community elements.
Sec. 343. Technical amendments.
Sec. 344. Report on lessons learned from military operations in Iraq.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Protection from tort liability for certain Central 
              Intelligence Agency personnel.
Sec. 402. Repeal of limitation on use of funds in Central Services 
              Working Capital Fund.

          TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Sec. 501. Use of funds for counterdrug and counterterrorism activities 
              for Colombia.
Sec. 502. Authority to provide living quarters for certain students in 
              cooperative and summer education programs of the National 
              Security Agency.
Sec. 503. Authority for intelligence community elements of Department 
              of Defense to award personal service contracts.
Sec. 504. Protection of certain National Security Agency personnel from 
              tort liability.
Sec. 505. Measurement and signatures intelligence program.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2004 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (6) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
       (7) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Department of Homeland Security.
       (14) The Coast Guard.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to

[[Page H5884]]

     be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized 
     personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2004, for the conduct 
     of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of 
     the elements listed in such section, are those specified in 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to 
     accompany the bill H.R. 2417 of the One Hundred Eighth 
     Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of 
     the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, 
     within the executive branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     2004 under section 102 when the Director of Central 
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the 
     performance of important intelligence functions, except that 
     the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
     authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such section for such 
     element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority 
     granted by this section.

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2004 the sum of $192,640,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and 
     Development Committee shall remain available until September 
     30, 2005.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     Central Intelligence are authorized 320 full-time personnel 
     as of September 30, 2004. Personnel serving in such elements 
     may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community 
     Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements 
     of the United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are 
     also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account for fiscal year 2004 such 
     additional amounts as are specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). 
     Such additional amounts shall remain available until 
     September 30, 2004.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2004, there are hereby authorized such additional personnel 
     for such elements as of that date as are specified in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations.
       (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during 
     fiscal year 2004 any officer or employee of the United States 
     or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff 
     of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another 
     element of the United States Government shall be detailed on 
     a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, 
     or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a 
     period of less than one year for the performance of temporary 
     functions as required by the Director of Central 
     Intelligence.
       (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated in subsection (a), $34,248,000 shall be 
     available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within 
     such amount, funds provided for research, development, 
     testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until 
     September 30, 2005, and funds provided for procurement 
     purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2006.
       (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds 
     available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under 
     paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so 
     transferred for the activities of the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center.
       (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the 
     provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
       (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the 
     operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.

     SEC. 105. INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE 
                   TREASURY.

       (a) In General.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new section:


   ``bureau of intelligence and enforcement of the department of the 
                                treasury

       ``Sec. 119. (a) In General.--There is within the Department 
     of the Treasury a Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement 
     headed by an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and 
     Enforcement, who shall be appointed by the President, by and 
     with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       ``(b) Responsibilities.--(1) The Assistant Secretary for 
     Intelligence and Enforcement shall oversee and coordinate 
     functions of the Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement.
       ``(2) The Assistant Secretary shall report directly to the 
     Secretary of the Treasury.
       ``(c) Composition of Bureau.--The Bureau of Intelligence 
     and Enforcement shall consist of the following offices:
       ``(1) The Office of Intelligence Support.
       ``(2) The Office of Foreign Assets Control.
       ``(3) The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
       ``(4) Such other offices as the Assistant Secretary may 
     establish.''.
       (2) The table of contents contained in the first section of 
     such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
     section 118 the following new item:

``Sec. 119. Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement of the Department of 
              the Treasury.''.
       (b) Consultation with DCI in Appointment of Assistant 
     Secretary for Intelligence and Enforcement.--Section 
     106(b)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-6(b)(2)) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(E) The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and 
     Enforcement.''.
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Section 3(4) of such Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended--
       (A) by striking ``the Department of the Treasury,'' in 
     subparagraph (H);
       (B) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (J);
       (C) by redesignating subparagraph (K) as subparagraph (L); 
     and
       (D) by inserting after subparagraph (J) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(K) the Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement of the 
     Department of the Treasury; and''.
       (2) Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended 
     in the item relating to Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury 
     by striking ``(7)'' and inserting ``(8)''.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2004 the sum of $226,400,000.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

                Subtitle A--Recurring General Provisions

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise permitted under 
     the Constitution or authorized pursuant to the laws of the 
     United States.

                        Subtitle B--Intelligence

     SEC. 311. MODIFICATION OF NOTICE AND WAIT REQUIREMENTS ON 
                   PROJECTS TO CONSTRUCT OR IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY FACILITIES.

       (a) Increase of Thresholds for Notice.--Section 602(a) of 
     the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 
     (Public Law 103-359; 108 Stat. 3432; 50 U.S.C. 403-2b(a)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``$750,000'' each place it appears and 
     inserting ``$5,000,000'';
       (2) by striking ``$500,000'' each place it appears and 
     inserting ``$1,000,000''; and
       (3) in paragraph (2), as amended by paragraph (2) of this 
     subsection, by inserting after ``$1,000,000'' the second 
     place it appears, the following: ``but less than 
     $5,000,000''.
       (b) Notice and Wait Requirements for Emergency Projects.--
     Section 602(b)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-359; 108 Stat. 3432; 50 
     U.S.C. 403-2b(b)(2)) is amended--
       (1) in the third sentence, by striking ``21-day'' and 
     inserting ``7-day''; and,
       (2) by adding at the end the following new sentence: 
     ``Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this paragraph, 
     when the Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of 
     Defense jointly determine that an emergency relating to the 
     national security or to the protection of health, safety, or 
     environmental quality exists and that delay would irreparably 
     harm any or all of those interests, the project may begin on 
     the date the notification is received by such committees.''.

                    Subtitle C--Counterintelligence

     SEC. 321. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES FOR THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--(1) Title XI of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new section:


                   ``counterintelligence initiatives

       ``Sec. 1102. (a) Inspection Process.--(1) In order to 
     protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
     disclosure, the Director of Central Intelligence shall 
     establish and implement an inspection process for all 
     agencies and departments of the United States that handle 
     classified information relating to the national security of 
     the United States intended to assure that those agencies and 
     departments maintain effective operational security practices 
     and programs directed against counterintelligence activities.

[[Page H5885]]

       ``(2) The Director shall carry out the process through the 
     Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.
       ``(b) FBI Counterintelligence Office.--The Attorney 
     General, acting through the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, shall establish an Office of 
     Counterintelligence within the Bureau to investigate 
     potential espionage activities within the Bureau.
       ``(c) Annual Review of Dissemination Lists.--(1) The 
     Director of Central Intelligence shall establish and 
     implement a process for all elements of the intelligence 
     community (as defined in section 101(4)) to review, on an 
     annual basis, individuals included on distribution lists for 
     access to classified information. Such process shall ensure 
     that only individuals who have a particularized `need to 
     know' (as determined by the Director) are continued on such 
     distribution lists.
       ``(2) Not later than October 15 of each year, the Director 
     shall certify to the congressional intelligence committees 
     that the review required under paragraph (1) has been 
     conducted in all elements of the intelligence community 
     during the preceding fiscal year.
       ``(d) Required Completion of Financial Disclosure 
     Statements.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall 
     establish and implement a process by which heads of the 
     elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 
     101(4)) direct that all employees, in order to be granted 
     access to classified information, submit financial disclosure 
     forms required under section 1.3(b) of Executive Order No. 
     12969 (August 2, 1995; 60 F.R. 40245; 50 U.S.C. 435 note).
       ``(2) The Director shall carry out paragraph (1) through 
     the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.
       ``(e) Arrangements To Handle Sensitive Information.--The 
     Director of Central Intelligence shall establish, for all 
     elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 
     101(4)), programs and procedures by which sensitive 
     classified information relating to human intelligence is 
     safeguarded against unauthorized disclosure by employees of 
     those elements.''.
       (2) The table of contents contained in the first section of 
     such Act is amended in the items relating to title XI by 
     adding at the end the following new item:

``Sec. 1102. Counterintelligence initiatives.''.
       (b) Intelligence and National Security Aspects of Espionage 
     Prosecutions.--The Attorney General, acting through the 
     Office of Intelligence Policy and Review of the Department of 
     Justice, in consultation with the Office of the National 
     Counterintelligence Executive, shall establish policies and 
     procedures to assist the Attorney General in the Attorney 
     General's consideration of intelligence and national security 
     equities in the development of charging documents and 
     related pleadings in espionage prosecutions.

                       Subtitle D--Other Matters

     SEC. 331. EXTENSION OF SUSPENSION OF REORGANIZATION OF 
                   DIPLOMATIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROGRAM 
                   OFFICE.

       Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-108; 115 Stat. 1401; 22 
     U.S.C. 7301 note), as amended by section 351 of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public 
     Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2401; 22 U.S.C. 7301 note), is 
     amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``two-year'' before 
     ``suspension of reorganization''; and
       (2) in the text, by striking ``ending on October 1, 2003'' 
     and inserting ``ending on the date that is 60 days after the 
     date on which appropriate congressional committees of 
     jurisdiction (as defined in section 324(d) of that Act (22 
     U.S.C. 7304(d)) are notified jointly by the Secretary of 
     State (or the Secretary's designee) and the Director of the 
     Office of Management and Budget (or the Director's designee) 
     that the operational framework for the office has been 
     terminated''.

     SEC. 332. MODIFICATIONS OF AUTHORITIES ON EXPLOSIVE 
                   MATERIALS.

       (a) Authority To Distribute Explosive Materials To 
     Qualified Aliens.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, it shall be lawful for any person knowingly to 
     distribute explosive materials to any qualified alien--
       (1) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in 
     subsection (c)(1), the distribution to, shipment to, 
     transportation to, receipt by, or possession by the alien of 
     the explosive materials is in furtherance of such 
     cooperation; or
       (2) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in 
     subsection (c)(2), the distribution to, shipping to, 
     transporting to, possession by, or receipt by the alien of 
     explosive materials is in furtherance of the authorized 
     military purpose.
       (b) Authority for Qualified Aliens To Ship Explosive 
     Materials.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it 
     shall be lawful for a qualified alien to ship or transport 
     any explosive in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce 
     or to receive or possess any explosive which has been shipped 
     or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign 
     commerce--
       (1) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in 
     subsection (c)(1), the possession, shipment, or 
     transportation by the alien of the explosive materials is in 
     furtherance of such cooperation; or
       (2) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in 
     subsection (c)(2), the possession, shipment, or 
     transportation by the alien of explosive materials is in 
     furtherance of the authorized military purpose.
       (c) Qualified Alien Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``qualified alien'' means an alien--
       (1) who is lawfully present in the United States in 
     cooperation with the Director of Central Intelligence; or
       (2) who is a member of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
     (NATO), or other friendly foreign military force (as 
     determined by the Attorney General with the concurrence of 
     the Secretary of Defense) who is present in the United States 
     under military orders for training or other military purpose 
     authorized by the United States.

     SEC. 333. MODIFICATION OF PROHIBITION ON THE NATURALIZATION 
                   OF CERTAIN PERSONS.

       Section 313(e)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1424(e)(4)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``when Department of Defense activities 
     are relevant to the determination'' after ``Secretary of 
     Defense''; and
       (2) by inserting ``and the Secretary of Homeland Security'' 
     after ``Attorney General''.

     SEC. 334. MODIFICATION TO DEFINITION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 
                   IN THE RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT.

       (a) In General.--Section 1101(1) of the Right to Financial 
     Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3401(1)) is amended by 
     inserting ``, except as provided in section 1114,'' before 
     ``means any office''.
       (b) Definition.--Section 1114 of such Act (12 U.S.C. 3414) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(c) For purposes of this section, the term `financial 
     institution' has the same meaning as in section 5312(a)(2) of 
     title 31, United States Code, except that, for purposes of 
     this section, such term shall include only such a financial 
     institution any part of which is located inside any State or 
     territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, 
     Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the United States 
     Virgin Islands.''.

     SEC. 335. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AGENCY RELATING TO PRODUCTS OF FEDERAL PRISON 
                   INDUSTRIES.

       The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a 
     et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:


 ``procedural requirements for central intelligence agency relating to 
                 products of federal prison industries

       ``Sec. 23. (a) Market Research.--Before purchasing a 
     product listed in the latest edition of the Federal Prison 
     Industries catalog under section 4124(d) of title 18, United 
     States Code, the Director shall conduct market research to 
     determine whether the Federal Prison Industries product is 
     comparable to products available from the private sector that 
     best meet the Agency's needs in terms of price, quality, and 
     time of delivery.
       ``(b) Competition Requirement.--If the Director determines 
     that a Federal Prison Industries product is not comparable in 
     price, quality, or time of delivery to products available 
     from the private sector that best meet the Agency's needs in 
     terms of price, quality, and time of delivery, the Director 
     shall use competitive procedures for the procurement of the 
     product or shall make an individual purchase under a multiple 
     award contract. In conducting such a competition or making 
     such a purchase, the Director shall consider a timely offer 
     from Federal Prison Industries.
       ``(c) Implementation by Director.--The Director shall 
     ensure that--
       ``(1) the Agency does not purchase a Federal Prison 
     Industries product or service unless a contracting officer of 
     the Agency determines that the product or service is 
     comparable to products or services available from the private 
     sector that best meet the Agency's needs in terms of price, 
     quality, and time of delivery; and
       ``(2) Federal Prison Industries performs its contractual 
     obligations to the same extent as any other contractor for 
     the Agency.
       ``(d) Market Research Determination Not Subject to 
     Review.--A determination by a contracting officer regarding 
     whether a product or service offered by Federal Prison 
     Industries is comparable to products or services available 
     from the private sector that best meet the Agency's needs in 
     terms of price, quality, and time of delivery shall not be 
     subject to review pursuant to section 4124(b) of title 18.
       ``(e) Performance as a Subcontractor.--(1) A contractor or 
     potential contractor of the Agency may not be required to use 
     Federal Prison Industries as a subcontractor or supplier of 
     products or provider of services for the performance of a 
     contract of the Agency by any means, including means such 
     as--
       ``(A) a contract solicitation provision requiring a 
     contractor to offer to make use of products or services of 
     Federal Prison Industries in the performance of the contract;
       ``(B) a contract specification requiring the contractor to 
     use specific products or services (or classes of products or 
     services) offered by Federal Prison Industries in the 
     performance of the contract; or
       ``(C) any contract modification directing the use of 
     products or services of Federal Prison Industries in the 
     performance of the contract.
       ``(2) In this subsection, the term `contractor', with 
     respect to a contract, includes a subcontractor at any tier 
     under the contract.
       ``(f) Protection of Classified and Sensitive Information.--
     The Director may not enter into any contract with Federal 
     Prison Industries under which an inmate worker would have 
     access to--
       ``(1) any data that is classified;
       ``(2) any geographic data regarding the location of--
       ``(A) surface and subsurface infrastructure providing 
     communications or water or electrical power distribution;
       ``(B) pipelines for the distribution of natural gas, bulk 
     petroleum products, or other commodities; or
       ``(C) other utilities; or
       ``(3) any personal or financial information about any 
     individual private citizen, including information relating to 
     such person's real property however described, without the 
     prior consent of the individual.
       ``(g) Application of Provision.--This section is subject to 
     the preceding provisions of this Act, and shall not be 
     construed as affecting any right or duty of the Director 
     under those provisions.

[[Page H5886]]

       ``(h) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) The terms `competitive procedures' and `procurement' 
     have the meanings given such terms in section 4 of the Office 
     of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403).
       ``(2) The term `market research' means obtaining specific 
     information about the price, quality, and time of delivery of 
     products available in the private sector through a variety of 
     means, which may include--
       ``(A) contacting knowledgeable individuals in government 
     and industry;
       ``(B) interactive communication among industry, acquisition 
     personnel, and customers; and
       ``(C) interchange meetings or pre-solicitation conferences 
     with potential offerors.''.

     SEC. 336. IMPROVEMENT OF INFORMATION SHARING AMONG FEDERAL, 
                   STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

       (a) Pilot Project To Encourage State and Local Officials, 
     As Well As Representatives of Critical Infrastructure, To 
     Collect and Share Relevant Information.--Section 892(c) of 
     the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6 
     U.S.C. 482) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(3)(A) The Under Secretary for Information Analysis and 
     Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Homeland 
     Security, in consultation with the Director of Central 
     Intelligence, may conduct projects in several cities to 
     encourage officials of State and local government, as well as 
     representatives of industries that comprise the critical 
     infrastructure in those cities to lawfully collect and to 
     pass on to the appropriate Federal officials information 
     vital for the prevention of terrorist attacks against the 
     United States.
       ``(B) The Director of Central Intelligence shall carry out 
     any duty under this paragraph through the Director of the 
     Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
       ``(C) Under the projects, training shall be provided to 
     such officials and representatives to--
       ``(i) identify sources of potential threats through such 
     methods as the Secretary determines appropriate;
       ``(ii) report information relating to such potential 
     threats to the appropriate Federal agencies in the 
     appropriate form and manner; and
       ``(iii) assure that all reported information is 
     systematically submitted to and passed on by the Department 
     for use by appropriate Federal agencies.
       ``(D) The Under Secretary shall carry out the pilot project 
     under this paragraph for a period of 3 years.
       ``(E) Not later than 1 year after the implementation of the 
     pilot project, and annually thereafter, the Under Secretary 
     shall submit to Congress a report on the pilot project 
     conducted under this paragraph. Each such report shall 
     include--
       ``(i) an assessment of the effectiveness of the project; 
     and
       ``(ii) recommendations on the continuation of the project 
     as well as any recommendations to improve the effectiveness 
     of information collection and sharing by such officials and 
     representatives and the Federal government.''.
       (b) Pilot Project To Test Use of Tear-line Intelligence 
     Reports.--(1) Subtitle C of title II of the Homeland Security 
     Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 226. PILOT PROJECT TO TEST USE OF TEAR-LINE 
                   INTELLIGENCE REPORTS.

       ``(a) Authority.--The Under Secretary for Information 
     Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of the Department of 
     Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of 
     Central Intelligence, may carry out a pilot program under 
     which the Under Secretary may make intelligence information 
     in the possession of the Department available to officials of 
     State and local governments through the use of tear-line 
     intelligence reports.
       ``(b) Tear-line Intelligence Reports Described.--For 
     purpose of this section, a tear-line report is a report 
     containing intelligence gathered by an agency or department 
     of the United States that is in the possession of the 
     Department that is prepared in a manner such that information 
     relating to intelligence sources and methods is easily 
     severable from the report to protect such sources and methods 
     from disclosure. Such a report may be in a paper or an 
     electronic format.
       ``(c) Duration of Project.--The Under Secretary shall carry 
     out the pilot project under this section for a period of 3 
     years.
       ``(d) Reports to Congress.--Not later than 1 year after the 
     implementation of the pilot project, and annually thereafter, 
     the Under Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     pilot project conducted under this section, and shall include 
     in the report an assessment of--
       ``(1) the effectiveness of the use of the tear-line reports 
     in providing intelligence information on a timely basis to 
     State and local authorities; and
       ``(2) if the use of such tear-line reports were to be made 
     permanent, whether additional safeguards are needed with 
     respect to the use of such reports.
       ``(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are 
     authorized to be appropriated to the Under Secretary such 
     sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.''.
       (2) The table of contents in section 1(b) of such Act is 
     amended in subtitle C of title II by adding at the end the 
     following new item.

``Sec. 226. Pilot project to test use of tear-line intelligence 
              reports.''.
       (c) Homeland Defender Intelligence Training Program.
       (1) Establishment of program.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence may establish a comprehensive program of 
     orientation and training to qualified State and local 
     officials in accessing and using available resources of the 
     intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(4))).
       (2) Consultation.--Insofar as the Director establishes the 
     intelligence training program under paragraph (1), the 
     Director shall consult and coordinate with the director of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security on the development and administration of 
     the program.
       (3) Program goals.--Any intelligence training program 
     established under paragraph (1) shall provide qualified State 
     and local officials instruction on the mission and roles of 
     the intelligence community to promote more effective 
     information sharing among Federal, State, and local officials 
     to prevent terrorist attacks against the United States.
       (4) Curriculum.--Insofar as the Director establishes the 
     intelligence training program under paragraph (1), the 
     Director shall develop a curriculum for the program after 
     consultation with qualified State and local officials. The 
     curriculum shall include classroom instruction with respect 
     to and orientation to the various elements of the 
     intelligence community.
       (5) Reports to congress.--Not later than 1 year after the 
     initial implementation of the intelligence training program 
     under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter, the Director 
     shall submit to Congress a report on the program. Each such 
     report shall include--
       (A) an assessment of the effectiveness of the project; and
       (B) recommendations on the continuation of the project as 
     well as any recommendations to improve the effectiveness of 
     information collection and sharing by qualified officials and 
     representatives and the Federal government.
       (6) Qualified state and local officials defined.--For 
     purposes of this subsection, the term ``qualified State and 
     local officials'' means officials of State and local 
     government agencies that Director of Central Intelligence 
     determines--
       (A) have received appropriate security clearances from the 
     Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for access to 
     classified information; and
       (B) oversee or manage first responders or counterterrorism 
     activities.
       (7) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Director such sums as are necessary 
     to carry out the intelligence training program under this 
     subsection.
       (d) Advisory Councils.--(1) The Director of the Terrorist 
     Threat Integration Center shall establish two advisory 
     councils (described in paragraph (2)) to provide the Director 
     such advice and recommendations as the Director may require 
     to effectively carry out the functions of the Center.
       (2)(A) One advisory council shall have as its focus privacy 
     and civil liberties issues.
       (B) The other advisory council shall have as its focus 
     State and local government information needs.

              Subtitle E--Reports and Technical Amendments

     SEC. 341. EXTENSION OF DEADLINE FOR FINAL REPORT OF THE 
                   NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE 
                   RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED 
                   STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public 
     Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended 
     by striking ``September 1, 2003'' and inserting ``September 
     1, 2004''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect as if included in the enactment of section 
     1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2003.

     SEC. 342. MODIFICATION OF VARIOUS REPORTS REQUIRED OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ELEMENTS.

       (a) Reports on Acquisition of Technology Relating to 
     Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional 
     Munitions.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 721 of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public 
     Law 104-293; 110 Stat. 3474; 50 U.S.C. 2366), as amended by 
     section 811(b)(5)(C) of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2424; 50 
     U.S.C. 2366), is amended by striking ``a semiannual'' and 
     inserting ``an annual''.
       (b) Periodic and Special Reports on Disclosure of 
     Intelligence Information to United Nations.--Section 
     112(b)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     404g(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``semiannually'' and 
     inserting ``annually''.

     SEC. 343. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.

       (a) National Security Act of 1947.--Section 112(d)(1) of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)) is 
     amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6)'' and inserting 
     ``section 103(c)(7)''.
       (b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of  1949.--(1) Section 
     6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 
     403g) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6)'' and 
     inserting ``section 103(c)(7)''.
       (2) Section 15 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``special policemen 
     of the General Services Administration perform under the 
     first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the 
     Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works 
     Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policeman 
     for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the 
     Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 
     318),'' and inserting ``officers and agents of the Department 
     of Homeland Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of 
     title 40, United States Code,''; and
       (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``the fourth section of 
     the Act referred to in subsection (a) of

[[Page H5887]]

     this section (40 U.S.C. 318c)'' and inserting ``section 
     1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States Code''.
       (c) National Security Agency Act of  1959.--Section 11 of 
     the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) 
     is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``special policemen 
     of the General Services Administration perform under the 
     first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the 
     Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works 
     Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policeman 
     for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the 
     Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 
     318)'' and inserting ``officers and agents of the Department 
     of Homeland Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of 
     title 40, United States Code,''; and
       (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``the fourth section of 
     the Act referred to in subsection (a) (40 U.S.C. 318c)'' and 
     inserting ``section 1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States 
     Code''.
       (d) Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.--
     Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2399; 50 U.S.C. 
     404n-2) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c), by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))'' 
     and inserting ``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))''; and
       (2) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``section 103(c)(6)'' 
     and inserting ``section 103(c)(7)''.
       (e) Public Law 107-173.--Section 201(c)(3)(F) of the 
     Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 
     (Public Law 107-173; 116 Stat. 548; 8 U.S.C. 1721(c)(3)(F)) 
     is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))'' and inserting 
     ``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))''.
       (f) Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.--
     Section 3535(b)(1) of title 44, United States Code, as added 
     by section 1001(b)(1) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
     (Public Law 107-296), and section 3545(b)(1) of title 44, 
     United States Code, as added by section 301(b)(1) of the E-
     Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347), are each amended 
     by inserting ``or any other law'' after ``1978''.

     SEC. 344. REPORT ON LESSONS LEARNED FROM MILITARY OPERATIONS 
                   IN IRAQ.

       (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
     report on the intelligence lessons learned as a result of 
     Operation Iraqi Freedom, including lessons relating to the 
     following:
       (1) The tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, 
     analysis, and dissemination of intelligence.
       (2) Accuracy, timeliness, and objectivity of intelligence 
     analysis.
       (3) Intelligence support to policymakers and members of the 
     Armed Forces in combat.
       (4) Coordination of intelligence activities and operations 
     with military operations.
       (5) Strengths and limitations of intelligence systems and 
     equipment.
       (6) Such other matters as the Director considers 
     appropriate.
       (b) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall 
     include such recommendations on improvement in the matters 
     described in subsection (a) as the Director considers 
     appropriate.
       (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
     means--
       (1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; 
     and
       (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on Armed Services of the Senate.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. PROTECTION FROM TORT LIABILITY FOR CERTAIN CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PERSONNEL.

       (a) In General.--Section 15 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new subsection:
       ``(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any 
     Agency personnel designated by the Director under subsection 
     (a) shall be deemed for purposes of chapter 171 of title 28, 
     United States Code, or any other provision of law relating to 
     tort liability, to be acting within the scope of their office 
     or employment if the Agency personnel take reasonable action, 
     which may include the use of force, to--
       ``(A) protect an individual in the presence of the Agency 
     personnel from a crime of violence;
       ``(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has 
     suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or
       ``(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom the Agency 
     personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of 
     violence in the presence of such personnel.
       ``(2) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has 
     the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United 
     States Code.''.
       (b) Construction.--Subsection (d) of section 15, as added 
     by subsection (a), shall not be construed as affecting the 
     authorities of the Attorney General under the Federal 
     Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 
     (Public Law 100-694; 28 U.S.C. 2671, 2674, 2679(b), 2679(d)).

     SEC. 402. REPEAL OF LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS IN CENTRAL 
                   SERVICES WORKING CAPITAL FUND.

       Section 21(f)(2) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u(f)(2)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``(A) Subject to 
     subparagraph (B), the Director'' and inserting ``The 
     Director''; and
       (2) by striking subparagraph (B).

          TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

     SEC. 501. USE OF FUNDS FOR COUNTERDRUG AND COUNTERTERRORISM 
                   ACTIVITIES FOR COLOMBIA.

       (a) Extension of Authority.--Subsection (a) of section 501 
     of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 
     (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2404) is amended by striking 
     ``for fiscal years 2002 and 2003'' and inserting ``for each 
     of fiscal years 2002 through 2005''.
       (b) Modification.--(1) Subsection (e) of such section is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(e) Prohibition.--No United States Armed Forces 
     personnel, United States civilian employee or contractor 
     engaged by the United States will participate in any combat 
     operation in connection with assistance made available under 
     this section, except for the purpose of acting to protect the 
     life or the physical security of others, in self defense, or 
     during the course of search and rescue operations.''.
       (c) Technical Amendment.--Subsection (d) of such section is 
     amended by striking ``Sections 556, 567, and 568 of Public 
     Law 107-115, section 8093 of the Department of Defense 
     Appropriations Act, 2002,'' and inserting ``Section 553 and 
     the certification requirements of section 564(a)(2) of the 
     Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
     Appropriations Act, 2003 (division E of Public Law 108-7; 117 
     Stat. 200, 205), and section 8093 of the Department of 
     Defense Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 107-248; 116 
     Stat. 1558; 10 U.S.C. 182 note),''.
       (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections (b) 
     and (c) shall apply to assistance made available under such 
     section 501 during fiscal years 2004 and 2005.

     SEC. 502. AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE LIVING QUARTERS FOR CERTAIN 
                   STUDENTS IN COOPERATIVE AND SUMMER EDUCATION 
                   PROGRAMS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

       Section 2195 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(d)(1) The Director of the National Security Agency may 
     provide a qualifying employee of a defense laboratory of that 
     Agency with living quarters at no charge, or at a rate or 
     charge prescribed by the Director by regulation, without 
     regard to section 5911(c) of title 5.
       ``(2) In this subsection, the term `qualifying employee' 
     means a student who is employed at the National Security 
     Agency under--
       ``(A) a Student Educational Employment Program of the 
     Agency conducted under this section or any other provision of 
     law; or
       ``(B) a similar cooperative or summer education program of 
     the Agency that meets the criteria for Federal cooperative or 
     summer education programs prescribed by the Office of 
     Personnel Management.''.

     SEC. 503. AUTHORITY FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ELEMENTS OF 
                   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO AWARD PERSONAL SERVICE 
                   CONTRACTS.

       (a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 426. Personal services contracts: authority and 
       limitations

       ``(a) Personal Services.--(1) The Secretary of Defense may, 
     notwithstanding section 3109 of title 5, enter into personal 
     services contracts in the United States if the personal 
     services directly support the mission of a defense 
     intelligence component or counter-intelligence organization.
       ``(2) The contracting officer for a personal services 
     contract shall be responsible for ensuring that a personal 
     services contract is the appropriate vehicle for carrying out 
     the purpose of the contract.
       ``(b) Definition.--In this section, the term `defense 
     intelligence component' means a component of the Department 
     of Defense that is an element of the intelligence community, 
     as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of such subchapter is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new item:

``426. Personal services contracts: authority and limitations.''.

     SEC. 504. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
                   PERSONNEL FROM TORT LIABILITY.

       Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 
     U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, agency 
     personnel designated by the Director of the National Security 
     Agency under subsection (a) shall be considered for purposes 
     of chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, or any other 
     provision of law relating to tort liability, to be acting 
     within the scope of their office or employment when such 
     agency personnel take reasonable action, which may include 
     the use of force, to--
       ``(A) protect an individual in the presence of such agency 
     personnel from a crime of violence;
       ``(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has 
     suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or
       ``(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom such agency 
     personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of 
     violence in the presence of such agency personnel.
       ``(2) Paragraph (1) shall not affect the authorities of the 
     Attorney General under section 2679(d)(1) of title 28, United 
     States Code.
       ``(3) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has 
     the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United 
     States Code.''.

[[Page H5888]]

     SEC. 505. MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH 
                   PROGRAM.

       (a) Research Program.--The Secretary of Defense, acting 
     through the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency's 
     Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection, shall carry 
     out a program to incorporate the results of basic research on 
     sensors into the measurement and signatures intelligence 
     systems of the United States, to the extent the results of 
     such research is applicable to such systems.
       (b) Program Components.--The program under subsection (a) 
     shall review and assess both basic research on sensors and 
     technologies conducted by the United States Government and by 
     non-governmental entities. In carrying out the program, the 
     Director shall protect intellectual property rights, maintain 
     organizational flexibility, and establish research projects, 
     funding levels, and potential benefits in an equitable manner 
     through Directorate.
       (c) Advisory Panel.--(1) The Director shall establish an 
     advisory panel to assist the Director in carrying out the 
     program under subsection (a).
       (2) The advisory panel shall be headed by the Director who 
     shall determine the selection, review, and assessment of the 
     research projects under the program.
       (3)(A) The Director shall appoint as members of the 
     advisory panel representatives of each entity of the MASINT 
     community, and may appoint as such members representatives of 
     national laboratories, universities, and private sector 
     entities.
       (B) For purposes of this subsection the term ``MASINT 
     community'' means academic, professional, industrial, and 
     government entities that are committed towards the 
     advancement of the sciences in measurement and signatures 
     intelligence.
       (C) The term for a member of the advisory panel shall be 
     established by the Director, but may not exceed a period of 5 
     consecutive years.
       (D) Members of the advisory panel may not receive 
     additional pay, allowances, or benefits by reason of their 
     service on the advisory panel, but may receive per diem in 
     lieu of subsistence, in accordance with applicable provisions 
     under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States 
     Code.
       (4) The Director may accept contributions from non-
     governmental participants on the advisory panel to defray the 
     expenses of the advisory panel.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. No amendment to the committee amendment is 
in order except those printed in House Report 108-176. Each amendment 
may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member 
designated in the report, shall be considered read, and shall not be 
subject to a demand for division of the question.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House 
Report 108-176.


                   Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Cox

  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Cox:
       Strike section 336.

  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the Select Committee on 
Homeland Security, I am pleased to rise in support of H.R. 2417. The 
amendment that I have introduced I will address in a moment but let me 
state at the outset that there is no more important function in the war 
on terrorism than having and acting on good intelligence, intelligence 
about attacks that are yet to come, intelligence about who is involved, 
what is planned, where and when it will take place and how it might be 
executed.
  The bill as it is written provides critical support for the 
Intelligence Community's efforts in the war on terrorism. I especially 
appreciate the provisions in the legislation focusing additional 
attention on enhancing our capability for gathering human intelligence 
as well as the provisions that provide additional resources to increase 
our analytical capacity to process and make use of the intelligence we 
do gather.
  The amendment that I am offering seeks to strike section 336 of the 
legislation. Section 336 would amend the Homeland Security Act to 
create two pilot programs, one, to encourage State and local officials, 
critical infrastructure owners to collect and share relevant 
information; and, two, to test use of tear-line intelligence reports. 
However, Mr. Chairman, the Homeland Security Act already includes 
training and information sharing requirements for State, local and 
private sector officials. The Director of Central Intelligence, the 
head of the CIA, would under the language of the bill as it is written 
have a central role in both of these pilot programs which would inject 
the CIA into this domestic, homeland security function.
  Under the first section 336 pilot program on sharing critical 
infrastructure information, the DCI would carry out his 
responsibilities through the Director of the Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center, or TTIC, which has never before been recognized in 
law and has no responsibilities whatever for critical infrastructure 
information. Using TTIC in this way would undermine the statutory 
function of the Office of Infrastructure Protection subdirectorate of 
the Department of Homeland Security. We do not need to pilotize the 
Department's existing statutory obligations.
  The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under 
Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, 
already is required to, and this is now a quote from existing law, 
``coordinate training and other support to the elements and personnel 
of the Department, other agencies of the Federal Government, and State 
and local governments that provide information to the Department, or 
are consumers of information provided by the Department, in order to 
facilitate the identification and sharing of information.'' That is the 
Homeland Security Act as it is written.
  The Homeland Security Act already requires that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security ``coordinate with elements of the Intelligence 
Community and with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, 
and the private sector.'' Extensive information sharing requirements 
covering State, local and private officials already exist in the 
Homeland Security Act, for example, in sections 891 and 892.
  Tear-line reporting, unclassified reports to convey the critical 
substance of classified intelligence reporting, is already a common 
practice. There is not a need for a pilot program. The Homeland 
Security Act already requires that the Secretary of Homeland Security 
``in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall work 
to ensure that intelligence or other information relating to terrorism 
to which the Department has access is appropriately shared with State 
and local governments.''

                              {time}  1830

  At this point I hope that the distinguished gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Goss), chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
could rise to enter into a colloquy so that I might obtain additional 
information on the amendments to the Homeland Security Act contained 
within section 336 of the legislation, and I would yield for this 
purpose to the chairman.
  As the chairman knows, I am offering an amendment to strike section 
336 of the legislation as it proposes amendments to the Homeland 
Security Act that fall within the jurisdiction of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Homeland Security. I am prepared to withdraw this 
amendment pending appropriate clarification by the gentleman.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. COX. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I would like to clarify for the record that the provisions of H.R. 
2417, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, amending the 
Homeland Security Act, fall within the jurisdiction of the Select 
Committee on Homeland Security and that their inclusion in H.R. 2417 
does not create a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction over the act 
by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Furthermore, I would 
like to clarify for the distinguished chairman that the chairman of the 
Select Committee on Homeland Security and I have indeed agreed upon a 
revision of the provisions that are acceptable to both our ranking 
members, that is, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner), the gentleman's committee's ranking 
member. I will commit to work with the gentleman's committee and the 
Committee on the Judiciary for substitution of the revised language in 
the conference negotiations between the House and the Senate, and to 
that end I have also agreed to support the request of the Select 
Committee on Homeland Security for the appointment of two conferees on 
H.R. 2417.
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman for 
his comments.

[[Page H5889]]

  I include in the Congressional Record copies of the exchange of 
correspondence between our two committees on this topic.

                                    U.S. House of Representatives,


                   Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

                                    Washington, DC, June 25, 2003.
     Hon. Christopher Cox,
     Chairman,
     Select Committee on Homeland Security, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter is to memorialize our 
     understanding that the provisions of H.R. 2417 (the 
     ``provisions'') amending the Homeland Security Act (the 
     ``Act'') fall within the jurisdiction of the Select Committee 
     on Homeland Security, and that their inclusion in H.R. 2417 
     does not create a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction 
     over the Act by the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence.
       We have agreed upon a revision of the provisions that is 
     acceptable to both of our Ranking Members, a copy of which is 
     attached, and we agree to work for a mutually agreeable 
     resolution of this provision with your Committee and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary, for substitution in the 
     conference negotiations between the House and the Senate.
       To that end, I have agreed to support the request of the 
     Select Committee on Homeland Security for the appointment of 
     two conferees on H.R. 2417.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Porter J. Goss,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                    U.S. House of Representatives,


                        Select Committee on Homeland Security,

                                    Washington, DC, June 25, 2003.
     Hon. Porter Goss,
     Chairman,
     House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Chairman Goss: This letter is to memorialize our 
     understanding that the provisions of H.R. 2417 (the 
     ``provisions'') amending the Homeland Security Act (the 
     ``Act'') fall within the jurisdiction of the Select Committee 
     on Homeland Security, and that their inclusion in H.R. 2417 
     does not create a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction 
     over the Act by the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence.
       We have agreed upon a revision of the provisions that is 
     acceptable to both of our Ranking Members, a copy of which is 
     attached, and we agree to work for substitution of the 
     revised language in the conference negotiations between the 
     House and the Senate.
       To that end, I have agreed to support the request of the 
     Select Committee on Homeland Security for the appointment of 
     two conferees on H.R. 2417.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Christopher Cox,
     Chairman.
                                  ____


 Amendment to H.R. 2417, as Reported Offered by Mr. Cox of California 
                 (for himself and Mr. Turner of Texas)

       Amend section 336 to read as follows:

     SEC. 336. IMPROVEMENT OF INFORMATION SHARING AMONG FEDERAL, 
                   STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

       (a) In General.--Section 892(c) of the Homeland Security 
     Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 482) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3)(A) The Secretary shall establish a program to provide 
     appropriate training to officials described in subparagraph 
     (B) in order to assist such officials in--
       ``(i) identifying sources of potential terrorist threats 
     through such methods as the Secretary determines appropriate;
       ``(ii) reporting information relating to such potential 
     terrorist threats to the appropriate Federal agencies in the 
     appropriate form and manner;
       ``(iii) assuring that all reported information is 
     systematically submitted to and passed on by the Department 
     for use by appropriate Federal agencies; and
       ``(iv) understanding the mission and roles of the 
     intelligence community to promote more effective information 
     sharing among Federal, State, and local officials to prevent 
     terrorist attacks against the United States.
       ``(B) The officials referred to in subparagraph (A) are 
     officials of State and local government agencies that oversee 
     or manage first responders or counterterrorism activities.
       ``(C) The Secretary shall consult with the Attorney General 
     to ensure that the training program established in 
     subparagraph (A) does not duplicate the training program 
     established in section 908 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Public Law 
     107-56; 28 U.S.C. 509 note).
       ``(D) The Secretary shall carry out this paragraph through 
     the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and 
     Infrastructure Protection (acting pursuant to the duties 
     described in section 201(d)(16)), in consultation with the 
     Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney 
     General.''.-
       (b) Report.--(1) Not later than 30 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall submit to Congress a report that describes the 
     Secretary's plan for implementing such section 892 (as in 
     effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this 
     Act) and an estimated date of completion of the 
     implementation.

  Because of the agreement between our two committees, I will also ask 
unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment.
  I look forward to working with the chairman and members of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for an agreeable resolution 
of this matter in conference.
  Mr. Chairman, if I have remaining time, I yield to the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I rise 
to state that I fully support the agreement that has been worked out 
between the chairmen of the two committees on which I serve. Since the 
language at issue was language that was inserted in our bill at my 
request, I want to make clear that we should work out these 
jurisdictional issues, but we also should proceed to find the right 
sections of the right bills to insert additional language on 
information sharing which is still a critical need in the homeland 
security and the terrorist threat areas.
  We also need to insert language at the right places about the 
protection of civil liberties. I listened to the comments by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) concerning the fact that we have no 
statutory language for TTIC, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, 
and perhaps we should decide about that in some other forum. 
Nonetheless, TTIC exists, and it is critically important that we make 
sure that it respects the civil liberties of Americans. So we will 
continue to search for new venues, but I thank both chairmen for 
finding the proper way to solve this issue.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I am not going to use the 5 minutes. I just want to 
clarify this point while the distinguished chairman of the Select 
Committee on Homeland Security is here that his efforts and the 
gentlewoman from California's (Ms. Harman) efforts to work out 
acceptable language had in fact transpired and we were prepared to 
accept an amendment to the bill to do that. There is another party 
involved, and we wanted to make sure that the appropriate full dialogue 
took place because what we are about here is really trying to plug in a 
Foreign Intelligence Program, which is what our portfolio is with the 
new efforts domestically to deal with terrorism on the homeland.
  We are not interested in any territorial acquisition, as I have said 
many times. We are interested in plugging in the national foreign 
intelligence activity and capability in the right places in the right 
way. That will involve working with a number of committees. 
Fortunately, we have good Members who serve on a number of committees 
and we are using that expertise to make these bridging arrangements. I 
would like to publicly thank the gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Harman) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) for their efforts 
to get the homeland security piece done. We have more work to do on 
this particular element. They have my pledge in the colloquy that we 
will work together to get this done properly, and I have nothing 
further to add to that.
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I want to return the favor and thank both the 
gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman), ranking member, for all of the work that went 
into making this language acceptable, the language that we had agreed 
upon. I am sorry it cannot be included procedurally, but our 
understanding to do it at the next step is certainly satisfactory to 
me; and I just want to say that I could not agree more with the 
sentiments of both the chairman and the ranking member about the 
importance of sharing information. That is what the mission of Homeland 
Security is all about, and we do have between us and among us ample 
opportunity to amend whatever laws it takes to get this job done; and I 
would point out that the Speaker has made it possible for all three of 
us to work together on the Select Committee on Homeland Security. So we 
are doing our version of fusion here in the House, and I am confident 
we will succeed.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment.

[[Page H5890]]

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment 
No. 2 printed in House Report 108-176.
  If the amendment proposed by the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr) 
is not to be offered, then it is now in order to consider amendment No. 
3. printed in House Report 108-176.


                 Amendment No. 3 Offered by Ms. Harman

  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 3 offered by Ms. Harman:
       At the end of title III, add the following new section:

     SEC. 345. MODIFICATION OF TERRORIST IDENTIFICATION 
                   CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM.

       (a) Certification Requirement for Consolidation of Watch 
     Lists.--Subsection (g)(1) of section 343 of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 
     116 Stat. 2399; 50 U.S.C. 404n2) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E);
       (2) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(D) Whether further consolidation or elimination of watch 
     list databases in the departments and agencies with access to 
     the System would contribute to the efficiency and 
     effectiveness of the System in identifying individuals who 
     are known or suspected international terrorists.''; and
       (3) in subparagraph (E), as so redesignated, by adding at 
     the end the following: ``If the certification under 
     subparagraph (D) is in the positive, the steps required to 
     consolidate or eliminate such watch lists.''.
       (b) Establishment of Advisory Council.--Subsection (b) of 
     such section is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(4) The Director shall establish an advisory council 
     comprised of experts in the field of civil liberties and 
     privacy issues to advise the Director on issues of civil 
     liberties and privacy as they relate to the maintenance of 
     the System.''.

  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me say first that the amendment which 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr) would have offered is an 
excellent amendment having to do with language skills, and my 
understanding is that we have accommodated him in some other way. I am 
sure the chairman will speak to that. And I would be happy to yield to 
him first on that subject.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentlewoman for yielding.
  All I would say is that I was going to compliment the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Farr) for a very helpful, thoughtful contribution to 
our work product. In fact, we have been working on this subject for a 
number of years, which is the training question and the language 
question; and the gentleman has some very unique perspectives on this 
which have been very helpful to us. We are improved in our committee 
for his participation in this process. I do not believe it is necessary 
to offer the amendment. Apparently he has not, but I nevertheless 
wanted to appreciate publicly the contribution he has made.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, turning to my amendment, in August, 2001, 
the FBI was frantically looking for two men who became part of the 
terrorist suicide team on 9-11. Had we been able to find Nawaf al-Hazmi 
and Khaled al-Mihdhar, we may have been able to unravel the plot for 9-
11. At least we would have stopped these two individuals from 
participating in it.
  The problem, it turns out, was that the State Department and INS 
watchlists, which included their names, were not available to the FAA 
and the airlines. So the hijackers were freely allowed to board the 
ill-fated American Airlines Flight 77.
  Two years later, the Federal Government still has as many as 50 
databases used for tracking international terrorists and international 
terrorist organizations. Just recently, the GAO highlighted 12 
watchlists run by nine agencies.
  This is shocking. Information contained in one database need not be 
connected to information in another. Vital data that could help prevent 
the next terrorist attack could be missed. We must consolidate or at 
least ensure the interoperability of government watchlists, and my 
amendment pending before this House to this intelligence authorization 
bill addresses this.
  In last year's intelligence authorization act, the Congress required 
the creation of a Terrorist Identification Classification System, TICS. 
This system is intended to be an authoritative real-time compilation of 
individuals and organizations known or suspected of international 
terrorism derived from all-source intelligence and available for use by 
other government agencies. The establishment of TICS is still a work in 
progress. The Director of Central Intelligence is required to report on 
progress by the end of November.
  My amendment requires the Director of Central Intelligence to certify 
whether further consolidation, or increased interoperability, is the 
best way to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of TICS. Either 
way we go, the point is to connect the dots in real time.
  The concept of a single government database to track suspected 
terrorists does raise some civil liberties concerns. To address the 
privacy and civil liberties concerns, my amendment requires the 
Director of Central Intelligence to establish an advisory council of 
experts on matters of civil liberties and privacy.
  Mr. Chairman, the relationship of civil liberties and security has 
been an abiding concern for this committee. The gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Holt), one of our members, has been active in this area, 
and so has our chairman, who convened the first hearing, public 
hearing, on civil liberties earlier this year where a panel of 
witnesses from the ACLU to the Heritage Foundation agreed that we need 
to balance civil liberty and security.
  As Ben Franklin once said: ``They that can give up essential liberty 
to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor 
safety.'' The Harman amendment addresses both liberty and safety, and I 
urge its adoption.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  First of all, I want to congratulate the gentlewoman on an amendment 
that she has worked hard on and I know cares a great deal about, and I 
will say right up front that the amendment is acceptable to the 
committee. I do want to make a comment on it, though.
  The amendment requires the DCI to consider whether further 
consolidation of the various U.S. Government terrorist watchlist 
databases might add to the efficiency of the watchlist system in 
identifying known or suspected terrorists. Absolutely a goal that we 
have to achieve. The question is what is the right way to do it? And 
the gentlewoman has raised the question properly. I commend her for it. 
Her dedication and expertise on counterterrorism issues I think is well 
known. She has served not only the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of this Congress but previous iterations of this effort on 
national commissions and so forth; and I think we all very much respect 
her judgment.
  And as I said, this amendment is a good one and it brings the issue 
to the floor. It asks the DCI to review and determine how much more 
consolidation of the various terrorist watchlists is needed, but I 
would add the words ``if any.'' And the reason I say that is I am 
concerned about the potential loss of data that might result from the 
consolidation of all the watchlists available to the government. I do 
not know that that would happen. It is a question that has to be asked.
  Additionally, I would think that there is one other area that I worry 
about a little bit, and that is sort of the idea of Big Brother. The 
one big unified, centralized U.S. Government computer database with all 
of the information available to the U.S. Government on individuals and 
their associates might be viewed to some as concerning, particularly 
those who worry about Big Brother invading their privacy.
  I am not saying I have the answer; but at this stage of my thinking, 
I am sort of in the position to be inclined to support a network 
solution that virtually combines the data in various databases without 
actually dumping all of the information from all the databases into one 
big government Big

[[Page H5891]]

Brother database. So I would think that something on the order perhaps 
of Web browser or Web sniffer, some way of searching out all the 
databases simultaneously, using some of those extraordinary 
technological tools that are developed in the gentlewoman's district, 
the software that is out there that not only searches all of them at 
the same time but also crossreferences the search results in such a way 
that maximizes the researchers' efficiencies and at the same time gives 
us some of the safeguards, or the appearance of safeguards anyway, the 
perception that we are safeguarding better than one big database.
  I do not wish to prejudge the outcome of the review. As we always do, 
we candidly state our positions on these things. As I said, I think the 
gentlewoman has raised exactly the right question. I thank her for her 
contribution in doing that, and I believe the amendment is worded 
properly so we go forward, and I will accept the amendment on behalf of 
the committee.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I support the gentlewoman's amendment also, and I am very pleased to 
acknowledge the atmosphere in this committee that allows us to function 
so well. It is what a committee should be. The gentleman from Florida 
(Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), 
ranking member, avoid, I think, destructive partisanship and allow us 
to air our differences in a very constructive way.
  I would like to draw attention to section 336 of this bill that 
includes a provision that I have strongly advocated for to require the 
director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center to establish two 
advisory councils to help the center carry out its critical and time-
sensitive work, Mr. Chairman.

                              {time}  1845

  One Advisory Council will focus on privacy and civil liberty 
concerns. We all know and understand that we are engaged in an ongoing 
fight against global terrorism and that our entire Intelligence 
Community is central to prosecuting and winning this struggle. But, at 
the same time, as we enhance our intelligence-gathering and analysis, 
it is equally important that the Director of the Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center and all employees there must respect the basic civil 
liberties that define our lives as Americans. Surely this Advisory 
Council will help us more nearly achieve the right delicate balance 
between security and liberty.
  Now, equally important, this section of the bill also requires an 
Advisory Council to the Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration 
Center be established to concentrate on getting more and better 
information to State and local governments. The efforts to improve 
substantially our homeland security as a matter of urgency fall 
primarily upon our first responders and the local and State governments 
who employ them. In my meetings with State and local officials in New 
Jersey, and with first responders in my district, I have heard 
repeatedly that they receive only the most general and vague and almost 
useless information from Washington. They seldom, if ever, receive any 
more specific information about what they should guard against. 
Clearly, they deserve more timely and useful information if they are to 
function to protect the lives, the safety, and the security of 
Americans. This Advisory Council should help overcome this incomplete 
communication of practically useful intelligence information from the 
Federal to the community level.
  Third, I would like to comment about the importance of incorporating 
information based on open sources. These sources of information are not 
classified secret. And traditionally, within the Intelligence Community 
and to this day, some individuals seem to think that if information is 
not classified secret, it is not valuable. In the 21st century this 
institutionalized mindset is unfortunate, since our sources of 
information and the amount of information readily available to the 
public domain and in the public domain have grown enormously. The 
Internet has enabled one to access information that was once extremely 
hard or impractical to obtain, and the dynamics of globalization, the 
accelerated integration of global industry, commerce, communication, 
and travel have created many new sources of information. The civil and 
commercial sectors, for instance, are looking into subjects and 
technologies that once were the exclusive preserve of governments and 
intelligence services. A prominent example is imagery from satellites 
that is publicly or commercially available. In HUMINT intelligence, 
open access to officials and experts is unparalleled today.
  I believe that the Intelligence Community should be exploiting such 
open source information far more than it is today, and achieving this 
goal will require a culture change and the application of technology. I 
thank the chairman for agreeing to include in the report a call for the 
Director of Central Intelligence to study and report back to Congress 
within 6 months how to incorporate and use open source material in 
virtually every aspect of intelligence, from collection to analysis, 
and across all disciplines. There are many instances where open source 
information can be useful, perhaps even more useful than classified 
sources, and surely, in many cases, cheaper.
  Now, Mr. Chairman, I spoke earlier about the decision by the 
gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from 
California (Ranking Member Harman) to investigate thoroughly concerns 
about weapons of mass destruction and the intelligence that led into 
our fighting in Iraq. Our committee intends to issue a written report 
on its findings as promptly as possible, and I spoke about that 
earlier.
  I would like to say a bit more, though. One concern that I have had 
is that the administration officials too often appear to have dropped 
the caveats and the uncertainties expressed in the intelligence 
reporting. Another concern is that at times the intelligence reporting 
or the officials presenting the intelligence appear to have been very 
certain about their conclusions that were based on uncertain evidence.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The time of the gentleman 
from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Holt was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, it is critically important to determine 
whether the Intelligence Community's estimates on Iraq were badly off 
base, or whether the Iraqi regime managed to destroy or spirit away the 
suspect weapons or materials. Either way, it seems clear that 
performance of the Intelligence Community was less than we would 
expect. It is clear to all of the world that the coalition did not have 
the intelligence information specific enough to find, identify, and 
secure any massively destructive weapons. That realization certainly 
raises questions about whether we were ready to go to war if the 
Commander in Chief and the Pentagon were convinced that the weapons 
were real, but they did not know quite where they were or how we would 
secure them once we went to war. But that is a question for another 
day. We will be talking about that in weeks to come.
  Now, I would say, with the amendments that we have in front of us 
today, I offer my full support to this legislation.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider Amendment 
No. 4 printed in House Report 108-176.


           Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Hastings of Florida

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Hastings of Florida:
       At the end of subtitle D of title III, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC. 337. IMPROVEMENT OF RECRUITMENT, HIRING AND RETENTION OF 
                   ETHNIC AND CULTURAL MINORITIES IN THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Pilot Project to Improve Diversity Throughout the 
     Intelligence Community Using Innovative Methodologies for the 
     Recruitment, Hiring and Retention of Ethnic and Cultural 
     Minorities and Women

[[Page H5892]]

     With the Diversity of Skills, Languages and Expertise 
     Reflective of the Current Mission.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall carry out a pilot project under this 
     section to test and evaluate alternative, innovative methods 
     to recruit and hire for the intelligence community women and 
     minorities with diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds, 
     skills, language proficiency, and expertise.
       (b) Methods.--In carrying out the pilot project, the 
     Director shall employ methods such as advertising in foreign 
     language newspapers in the United States, site visits to 
     institutions with a high percentage of students who study 
     English as a second language, and other methods that are not 
     used by the Director under the DCI Diversity Strategic Plan 
     to increase diversity of officers and employees in the 
     intelligence community.
       (c) Duration of Project.--The Director shall carry out the 
     project under this section for a 3-year period.
       (d) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date the 
     Director implements the pilot project under this section, the 
     Director shall submit to Congress a report on the project. 
     The report shall include--
       (1) an assessment of the effectiveness of the project; and
       (2) recommendations on the continuation of the project as 
     well as for improving the effectiveness of the project in 
     meeting the goals of increasing the recruiting and hiring of 
     women and minorities within the intelligence community.
       (e) Diversity Plan.--(1) Not later than February 15, 2004, 
     the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress 
     a report which describes the plan of the Director, entitled 
     the ``DCI Diversity Strategic Plan'', and any subsequent 
     revision to that plan, to increase diversity of officers and 
     employees in the intelligence community, including the short- 
     and long-term goals of the plan. The report shall also 
     provide a detailed description of the progress that has been 
     made by each element of the intelligence community in 
     implementing the plan.
       (2) In implementing the plan, the Director shall 
     incorporate innovative methods for the recruitment and hiring 
     of women and minorities that the Director has determined to 
     be effective from the pilot project carried out under this 
     section.
       (f) Definition.--In this section, the term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(4))).

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to offer an 
amendment to the Intelligence Authorization bill on behalf of myself 
and the following members who are immediate cosponsors of the Select 
Committee on Intelligence: The gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Harman), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Eshoo), the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. 
Ruppersberger), and the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell). I would also 
like to thank the chairman of the committee, my good friend, the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), for his previously stated support 
for this amendment.
  Further, I would be remiss if I did not recognize the efforts of 
former member Louis Stokes and now departed and former member Julian 
Dixon; our present minority leader of the Democratic Caucus, the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), and the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Bishop), and I had forgotten about Tim Roemer, who also 
was very instrumental in this particular arena as a former member, and 
others on both sides of the aisle that have been interested in this 
issue.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment directs the Director of Central 
Intelligence to establish a pilot program to improve the recruitment, 
hiring, and retention of ethnic and cultural minorities throughout the 
Intelligence Community.
  Leaders in the Intelligence Community have, for a number of years, 
expressed the view that diversity within their population can pay 
dividends with respect to cultural understanding and especially 
language capabilities. And, for an equal number of years, the Select 
Committee on Intelligence has urged them to improve their efforts of 
hiring, promoting, and retaining individuals from diverse backgrounds.
  While we noted in our report to accompany H.R. 2417 that progress has 
been made and, indeed, it has been, especially in the more recent years 
just passed, we also noted a lack of progress with respect to hiring, 
promotion, and retention of women and minorities under the current 
plan. The Secretary of Defense has stated that, ``The current personnel 
system is not flexible enough to confront the dangers of the 21st 
century.''
  The amendment we offer today addresses one of the many concerns 
raised by the Secretary and proposes a potential solution. It directs 
the DCI to develop a pilot program to achieve the goals for increased 
diversity amongst the Intelligence Community staff.
  This amendment requires that the Director use methods such as 
advertising in foreign language newspapers or conducting site visits to 
high schools, and I would even encourage middle schools as we look 
toward the future, because it is interesting that in those areas I feel 
we find many of our grandchildren and little children know a lot about 
computers that a lot of us older hands do not know about; and colleges 
as well, with a high percentage of students from diverse backgrounds as 
two or more recruitment methods. It also requires an annual report from 
the Director to assess the effectiveness of this project in meeting his 
goals.
  If the horrors of 9/11 taught us anything, it is that the biggest 
threat to our democratic ideals and cultural beliefs comes from those 
who do not share our ideals and beliefs.
  The war on terrorism has focused even greater attention on the 
Intelligence Community as they have collectively faced these and many 
other challenges with commendable determination. It will take time, 
innovation, and a long-term strategy to ensure that the Intelligence 
Community remains capable of both understanding and responding to the 
threats of the 21st century.
  I believe that this amendment will help the Intelligence Community 
meet the goals they have set for themselves and challenges in the 
decades to come. I urge my colleagues to support this noncontroversial 
amendment.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that this amendment is before us. It is 
entirely consistent with the committee position, and I am very happy to 
accept it. I want to congratulate the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Hastings) for his continued, persistent, effective leadership on this, 
along with our colleague, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), who 
have both done the committee a big favor by keeping us focused on this.
  The amendment directs the DCI to establish a pilot project to test 
and evaluate alternative and innovative methods to recruit and hire 
women and minorities with diverse skills, expertise, cultural, and 
ethnic backgrounds, and language proficiencies. That is obviously a 
very rich contribution to the Intelligence Community.
  The pilot project would be carried out for a 3-year period, with a 
report on the effectiveness of the project at the end of the second 
year, as I understand the amendment.
  The amendment also includes direction to the DCI to report to the 
committee by mid-February of the next calendar year on the DCI's 
diversity strategic plan, which is something we have been after for a 
while. This aspect of this amendment incorporates, in part, the 
amendment made to the schedule of authorizations by the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Reyes) in the committee's markup. I think they are 
complementary to each other. I see no conflict, and I think that 
combined, they are a benefit.
  Both members deserve and are commended for promoting the needs of the 
Intelligence Community in the area of diversity of skills, expertise, 
languages, cultural understanding, and ethnic background, which is not 
a fully met need, very clearly, in the Community, as we know.
  In the committee report we stated that, and I am going to quote the 
language, ``Diversity throughout the Intelligence Community population 
can pay dividends with respect to the richness it brings to the work of 
the IC, particularly as it relates to cultural understandings of 
particular target sets, increased language capabilities, and increased 
skills to address particular intelligence problems.'' Amen.
  I believe that this project will help. I very eagerly accept the 
amendment without reservation, and I am pleased that the gentleman has 
offered it.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for the civilized and 
collaborative way in which this whole debate is going.
  I rise in strong support of this amendment, and I just want to make a 
few brief points, Mr. Chairman.

[[Page H5893]]

  When the DDCICM, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for 
Community Management--that is a mouthful--Joan Dempsey, came to say 
good-bye recently, it occurred to me that she was one of the few senior 
women in the entire Intelligence Community. The only other one I can 
think of is Joanne Isham, who is the Deputy Director of the National 
Security Agency. The same story can be said about people from other 
ethnic groups. That is unfortunate.
  This amendment, which is carefully drafted and consistent with our 
policy in our committee for the last 15 years, will hopefully move the 
Community forward.

                              {time}  1900

  Earlier in this debate, I spoke, and others did, about the importance 
of beefing up HUMINT, our human intelligence resources. What is the 
point of human intelligence? The point is obviously to learn about 
terrorists. Their plans and intentions.
  How do you do that? Well, you try to penetrate terrorist cells. How 
do you do that? Well, it would help if you looked like the terrorists 
and spoke their languages. And we cannot succeed in our effort if we 
just recruit the same old, same old. So it should be obvious that this 
is not the politically correct thing to do; it is the intelligent thing 
to do if we are trying to expand the talent pool and the capability of 
our intelligence agencies.
  I strongly support this amendment. I thank the gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Hastings), and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes). They and 
others have done us a huge service.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Hastings amendment. As 
has been stated, and I hope those that are watching this debate tonight 
can see the kind of cooperation and willingness to work together to 
solve some of the issues that greatly effect the national security of 
our country watching our chairman and ranking member and other members 
of the committee talk about what is good for our country.
  Mr. Chairman, I think that people of diverse backgrounds can bring 
their unique cultural experiences, skills and language proficiencies to 
bear on intelligence problems, intelligence issues and intelligence 
expertise. The percentage of women and minorities in the intelligence 
community has for way too many years been smaller than the percentage 
of women and minorities in the total Federal workforce and the civilian 
workforce. Fiscal year 2002 data demonstrates that women and minorities 
continue to be under-represented in the intelligence community, 
especially in core mission areas and the senior ranks, as has been 
noted here by other members of our committee.
  The committee has repeatedly expressed grave concern about the lack 
of progress made by the intelligence community in recruiting, in hiring 
and retaining a diverse workforce, essential if we are going to protect 
our country's national security. New tools must be brought to bear on 
the challenge of sufficiently diversifying the intelligence community 
workforce. Intelligence agencies must think, as we like to say, outside 
the box. I believe that the Hastings amendment encourages this kind of 
thinking, out-of-the-box thinking, by requiring the Director of Central 
Intelligence to carry out a pilot project to test and evaluate 
innovative alternative methods for recruiting and hiring people with 
diverse backgrounds.
  The amendment, like the general provisions that have been reported 
out of our committee, also requires that the DCI report to Congress on 
his current diversity plan, including short- and long-term goals and 
the progress that is being made in implementing it by each of the 
intelligence community agencies.
  Mr. Chairman, not only does this make good sense. It is good 
practice, it is good business, and it is good public policy. And, 
therefore, I urge all of my colleagues to support the Hastings 
amendment.
  Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) for 
putting this before us. I think its time is overdue, and I think it is 
reasonable that he would have a pilot project.
  I just have to think back on my own life experience, and I will not 
tell you about that today, in starting in a country home, way out in 
the country. But I go to schools a lot, and I particularly want to talk 
to the young folk in regard to their futures and education and what it 
means to them. And I often tell them my story and, again, I will not 
tell you tonight, but what it can do for equal opportunity. It is the 
road to success.
  So I think that it would be very good if I can go to my African 
American schools, which I will, to my Hispanic community, to my Asian-
Americans and all the others and say to them, this opportunity is 
happening and you too can be an effective person if you will get your 
education and come forth, and we will have a pilot project to show 
that; but you can come forth, and you can be in the high-level place to 
make sure our country is secure as the others have done before you.
  So I encourage you to do this, and I am really glad that you have 
done this. It is a reasonable request that is needed. It ought to be 
done, and I am glad to hear the responses that we are hearing here 
tonight. I congratulate the gentleman, and I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt).
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding. I join him 
in expressing support for this amendment and accolades to the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Hastings), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), and 
the others who are working on this.
  I wanted to reiterate my concern about the lack of racial, 
linguistic, cultural and gender diversity within the intelligence 
community. Our intelligence network should reflect much more of the 
diversity and multicultural composition of the American people and of 
the world that we seek to understand. But no one should be comforted by 
the words in this amendment. This is the umpteenth time that the 
problem has been identified and that intelligence agencies have been 
exhorted, even required, to do better. I hope this amendment produces 
real results.
  Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his comments.
  Mr. BISHOP of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate 
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings), the chairman, and the 
members of committee for the sensitivity and the concern that we are 
now paying to the issue of diversity.
  For some time now this committee has been wrestling with the idea of 
diversity going back to former chairman Lou Stokes, former ranking 
member Julian Dixon. In my service on the committee for 6 years up 
until this term of Congress we have repeatedly been concerned. And I 
believe that the director has made it clear that diversity, cultural 
diversity, lingual diversity is a matter of good business sense for the 
intelligence community.
  We all wish that we had been a little more sensitive and a little 
more knowledgeable prior to 9-11. But this I think is an opportunity 
now for us to get it right. And the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Hastings) has done an excellent job in helping us to think out of the 
box by requiring the director to carry out this pilot test project to 
evaluate innovative alternative methods for recruiting and hiring and 
retaining members of the intelligence community with a diverse 
background.
  Let me take this opportunity to mention just one member of the 
African American community who is completing 30 years of service to 
both the military and the intelligence community, and that is Mr. 
Garnett Stowe who has retired as chief of staff of the National 
Reconnaissance Office. Mr. Stowe made tremendous contributions in his 
own right as a member of the intelligence community, but he too was 
very sensitive. And he took the time to come with the Congressional 
Black Caucus last year to appear on a panel that we had dealing with 
this issue of diversity in diplomatic and intelligence matters.
  He has made a tremendous contribution to our country, to the free 
world through his 30 years of service; and I

[[Page H5894]]

certainly would like to take this opportunity as we debate this bill to 
congratulate him on a career of great service and wish him well in the 
future.
  With that, I would just like to associate myself with all of the 
remarks that have been said in a positive way in support of the 
Hastings amendment. I worked very hard when I was on the committee. I 
am delighted that the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) and the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the other members of the committee 
are continuing this work because it is one on which we must be 
vigilant. We cannot afford to give it up. We have got to get it done, 
and we have got to do it until we get it right. And I want to commend 
the committee and commend my colleagues for a job well done. Hopefully, 
we can complete this and get on the road to having the best real-time 
intelligence for our policymakers and our war fighters based on the 
most broad net of collection devices and individuals.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BISHOP of Georgia. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. I appreciate the gentleman yielding. I just wanted to say I 
was remiss in my remarks not to note the gentleman's service on the 
committee on this particular issue and many other issues as well. It is 
a pleasure to welcome you back to the debate here.
  Mr. BISHOP of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very much.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the 
requisite number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the Hastings amendment and to again 
restate my appreciation for the service of the gentleman from Florida 
(Chairman Goss) and the service of the ranking member, the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Harman). I also want to thank the members who 
served on this committee, and I do not want to say served, I want to 
have it correct, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) is still 
serving on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. His 
leadership we have appreciated.
  In the debate previously, he extended to me an opportunity to pursue 
reviewing a number of documents dealing with the question of the 
weapons of mass destruction. I wanted to publicly say to him that I 
noted in my remarks earlier how pleased I was in a bipartisan way this 
committee would not only open up this massive documentation but also 
work together in a bipartisan way to find out the truth. And I still 
hold to that, and I will comment very briefly in my remarks on that 
point. But I wanted to rise initially to support the Hastings amendment 
because we learned a lot after 9-11.
  We learned that information would come or has come or needs to come 
from people from all walks of life, ethnic backgrounds and languages. 
We found that in our intelligence community we did not have the reach 
that we possibly needed to ensure the safety of this Nation, to secure 
the kind of intelligence we needed to have representation in parts of 
the world where languages are spoken that we may not be familiar with. 
And so the issue of diversity is crucial. Not only that, I think it is 
important to have the ``mosaicness'' of America represented in the 
intelligence community, the intellect that they bring, the sensitivity 
that they bring, the cultural understanding that they bring, the 
knowledge that they bring about the Muslim faith, and also the 
understanding that all immigration, all people who are different does 
not equate to terrorism. That comes from a cultural understanding.
  We know that in the United States military, we found that the 
military expanded its chaplain corps and that is, of course, to include 
people from many different faiths, and that those serving in the 
military come from many different faiths and many different racial and 
ethnic backgrounds. Many Hispanics are serving. Many Muslims are 
serving, many Native Americans, African Americans, obviously 
Caucasians, and certainly the wide breadth of diversity, Asian-
Americans, in our Nation.
  So this is a very good amendment, and I applaud the gentleman and I 
believe this will go a long way in securing America because that is 
what we are talking about in actually securing America.
  I would like to take this opportunity also to lend my support to the 
Kucinich amendment. That clearly speaks to, I think, us getting at the 
truth, and that is to secure an audit that would include information 
about telephone and electronic communications between the CIA and the 
office of the Vice President.
  I also lend my support to the distinguished representative, the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee), her amendment to require the 
Government Accounting Office to conduct a study to determine the extent 
of intelligence sharing by the Defense Department and the intelligence 
community with the United Nations.
  Collectively, these amendments do not in any way indict the good work 
of the intelligence committee. What it does is helps to build, it 
provides anchors, it moves us forward in staffing diversity, but it 
also moves us forward in finding out particular aspects of this 
question dealing with the weapons of mass destruction.
  I have already said on this floor that I believe that ultimately a 
commission, after the work of this House committee and after the work 
of the Senate committee, whatever their processes will be, that we look 
at creating an independent commission. I also believe that if we are to 
find wrong-doing that a special prosecutor would be appropriate as 
well.
  I am prepared to work in this bipartisan effort, but I think truth is 
important. And, again, it is important not only for the American 
people, but my colleagues who in good faith, many who, sincerely, all 
of us, might I say came to the floor of the House and voted our 
conscience, many voting because they believed that we were under 
imminent attack by the alleged weapons of mass destruction. Many would 
say that those of us who argue this point will find it out. We will get 
ours. They will find the weapons of mass destruction.

                              {time}  1915

  Mr. Chairman, I will not be in any way offended because the question 
of America is about democracy and truth. It is about sharing with the 
American people the reasons why we make such decisions. It is not about 
a ``get you'' foreign policy. I do not need a ``get you'' foreign 
policy. I do not need to be victorious in this independent commission 
or the work of the intelligence committee. I do not need to find out 
that there were no weapons of mass destruction. I simply need to find 
the truth because the administration is obligated to tell the truth to 
the American people and to this Congress, for us to make the life and 
death decision of war and peace.
  I also believe that war should have been the last option, but I 
believe my colleagues voted in good faith, and therefore, they should 
have the truth, the American people should have the truth, and I think 
a commission will bring us to a point of securing the truth.
  So I rise in support of the Hastings amendment enthusiastically, the 
Kucinich amendment and the Lee amendment so we can move forward in a 
bipartisan manner.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The question is on the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) 
will be postponed.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in House 
report 108-176.


                Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Kucinich

  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Kucinich:
       At the end of title III, add the following new section:

[[Page H5895]]

     SEC. 345. REPORT ON COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE OFFICE OF THE VICE 
                   PRESIDENT ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN 
                   IRAQ.

       (a) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall conduct an audit of all telephone 
     and electronic communications between the Central 
     Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Vice President that 
     relate to weapons of mass destruction obtained or developed 
     by Iraq preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom on or after 
     September 11, 2001.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General shall submit to 
     Congress a report on the audit conducted under subsection 
     (a). The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
     may contain a classified annex.

  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, we now know that there were not vast 
stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq when the U.S. invaded 
and that, therefore, Iraq did not pose an imminent threat to the United 
States, as the administration claimed before the war.
  The question remaining is whether the administration compelled the 
Central Intelligence Agency to release raw, undisseminated information 
they knew to be unreliable because it helped support the worst case 
scenario concerning Iraq's weapons program and, therefore, helped make 
the case, an erroneous case it turns out, that Iraq posed an imminent 
threat to the United States.
  The administration has made numerous assertions. The President in his 
State of the Union said, The British government has learned that Saddam 
Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. 
Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high 
strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.
  Number one, the claim about uranium from Africa was forged. Number 
two, the aluminum tubes were not suitable for a nuclear enrichment 
program. These assertions made by the President in his State of the 
Union to justify an immediate war with Iraq were false.
  Did the Vice President play a role in making false information become 
the public reason the President went to war in Iraq? The Vice 
President, as reported in the Washington Post of June 5, 2003, Vice 
President Cheney and his most senior aide made multiple trips to the 
CIA over the past year to question analysts studying Iraq's weapons 
programs and alleged links to al Qaeda, creating an environment in 
which some analysts felt they were being pressured to make their 
assessments fit with the Bush administration's policy objectives. That 
is from the Washington Post on June 5, 2003.
  Number two, the Vice President knew or should have known that 
documents purporting to show that Iraq had bought uranium from Niger 
were forged. On March 7, the IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei 
reported the following to the U.N. Security Council: These documents 
which form the basis for reports of recent uranium transactions between 
Iraq and Niger are, in fact, not authentic. We have, therefore, 
concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded. We have found 
no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons 
program in Iraq.
  It turns out that the forgeries were crude. Anyone with an Internet 
search engine could determine that these documents were forgeries. Yet 
on March 16, nine days afterwards, the Vice President repeated the 
falsehood on national television. He said, We believe, and he was 
talking about Hussein, has in fact reconstituted nuclear weapons.
  The Vice President knew 1 year earlier, it appears, that the 
documents were forgeries and, therefore, the allegations false. 
According to the New York Times of May 6, 2003, More than a year ago 
the Vice President's office asked for an investigation of the uranium 
deal. So a former U.S. ambassador to Africa was dispatched to Niger. In 
February 2002, according to someone present at the meetings, that envoy 
reported to the CIA and the State Department that the information was 
unequivocally wrong and that the documents had been forged.
  So public reports indicate the Vice President made assertions which 
were unreliable, and the Vice President visited the CIA, making 
analysts there feel, according to the Washington Post, that a certain 
output was desired from here.
  In summary, what this amendment seeks to do is to probe what role the 
Vice President played in causing the CIA to disseminate unreliable, 
raw, previously undisseminated, untrue information about Iraq's alleged 
threat to the United States.
  Specifically, this amendment would direct the Inspector General of 
the Central Intelligence Agency to audit all electronic and telephone 
communications between the Office of the Vice President and the CIA 
which would answer the question about how extensive the visits by the 
Vice President to the CIA were.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Kucinich 
amendment.
  The gentleman from Ohio has woven an interesting story and made a 
number of bald and bold assertions, but I think it is important to look 
at what the amendment says.
  The amendment calls for the Inspector General of the CIA to conduct 
an audit of all telephone electronic communications between the CIA and 
the Office of the Vice President relating to Iraq and WMD. The 
amendment is unusual and frankly a bit confusing. It purports to 
address what is allegedly a very serious issue, the altering or shading 
of intelligence for political, perhaps for strategic, purposes, but 
then it focuses only on the Vice President and only on his phone and e-
mail communications.
  If there was a real problem, one would expect a comprehensive review, 
but the amendment targets only one individual, the Vice President, and 
this is an individual who has the right, indeed he has the obligation, 
to receive information related to, for example, Iraq WMD and a run-up 
to a war.
  However, the Vice President's telephone conversations are not 
recorded. Thus, the information that is sought in this amendment does 
not exist when it comes to telephone calls. Perhaps a record of the 
number of telephone conversations between the Vice President and the 
CIA could be compiled, but this would tell us only how many calls were 
made and when they occurred. Frankly, this is not useful information.
  Mr. Chairman, the fact that the Vice President was in contact with 
the Intelligence Community should not be surprising. Frankly, it would 
be very upsetting if there was insufficient contact. These are 
sensitive communications, of course, on important matters. We should 
all expect the Vice President's office to talk regularly with the CIA, 
to visit the CIA for that matter, and the rest of the Intelligence 
Community. So should not the Vice President and the President be avid 
consumers of intelligence in order to be well-informed in the decisions 
that they make?
  Remember what the amendment says. It is targeting the telephone calls 
between the Vice President, only the Vice President, and the CIA, only 
that component of the Intelligence Community, and the electronic 
communications that took place between that individual and that agency.
  So it seems very clear to me that it is not a comprehensive review. 
It is targeted at the Vice President, and one simply has to realize 
that it is going to be unsuccessful in really revealing any information 
that it purports to have as an interest of the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I think the amendment should be defeated.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BEREUTER. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to point out for clarification 
purposes, and I thank the gentleman for yielding, that the result of 
this amendment would be both a count of the number of communications 
and an inventory of the substance of the communications. The count 
would establish the number of times the Vice President took the unusual 
step of traveling to the CIA to meet directly with CIA analysts and the 
inventory would establish the nature of those visits.
  I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Ohio raises the serious issue of 
politicization of intelligence. The question of the integrity of the 
intelligence process is a legitimate one and has

[[Page H5896]]

been a continuing concern in the oversight of the intelligence 
agencies. The question of politicization of intelligence is an area 
that our committee, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
will explore in its investigation of Iraq intelligence.
  I must, however, oppose the gentleman's amendment. The amendment, in 
my view, does not take the best approach to ensuring a comprehensive 
look at the matter. It is narrowly focused on one possible area for 
investigation, and it addresses that one area in a way I believe would 
be counterproductive.
  It is not clear to me that the audit as described in the amendment 
would develop useful information. The offices of the Inspectors General 
can be effectively utilized in congressional investigations and 
oversight, but the resources of these offices should be deployed 
according to a comprehensive plan of investigation.
  In sum, I believe the gentleman has raised an important issue, and 
that issue should and will be examined in the context of our 
committee's investigation. The amendment in this form should be 
defeated.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, just to point out to the gentlewoman that 
I think it would be helpful if the committee supported the amendment 
because, at worst, if the amendment would be repeating the work of the 
committee, if it would be essentially redundant, then it could not 
hurt, and I would also want to point out that the gentlewoman is 
correct.
  I mean, this amendment is narrowly focused, and it is aiming 
specifically at obtaining information relative to the relationship 
between the Vice President and the CIA. I thank the gentlewoman for 
yielding.
  Ms. HARMAN. Just to conclude, Mr. Chairman, I believe that we can get 
to the issue of politicization of intelligence in a different manner, 
one that is bipartisan and one that falls within the thorough and 
comprehensive investigation of this committee. That would be a better 
way for this House to go.
  Once again, I commend the gentleman for raising this issue but hope 
that we will decide to take a different course on this subject.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, the way I would characterize this amendment is as the 
cheap shot amendment. This is a totally political amendment. It is a 
totally cheap shot at the Vice President. It is an extension of a 
campaign being waged by the gentleman from Ohio who has made a number 
of speeches on this floor and around the country. I believe it is an 
extension of his presidential campaign to try and besmirch the record 
of this administration, to besmirch the good name of the Vice 
President, and I think when people have an opportunity to really look 
at the amendment, they can see that it is so shallow in its wording and 
in its nature, that it is what it is.
  It is a political amendment. It is only brought here to the floor to 
continue an opportunity for the gentleman from Ohio to try and find 
something that simply cannot be found.
  It also, I think, degrades the work of the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence. This gentleman who is offering this amendment has been 
a Member of this House. He knows of the work of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence. He knows that if he had some kind of a 
complaint about the kind of activity that he is trying to allege the 
Vice President has engaged in that he could come to the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence. He could petition the chairman, he 
could petition the ranking member. He could ask the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence. I guess we are not good enough to do our 
work that you have to seek some kind of an outside counsel or outside 
organization to try and look into it.

                              {time}  1930

  This is unprecedented what this amendment asks for. It is 
unprecedented in its nature to think that this body, under this 
amendment, is going to go after the phone records of the Vice 
President. Now, anybody who does not see the politicizing of what is 
going on here cannot see the nature of it. You can see it in the words, 
because they are very shallow.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. LaHOOD. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman. Under the 
gentleman's logic, there would be no reason at all for any amendments 
to be offered from this floor. We might as well dispense with the 
amendment process and move to a system in which the committees of 
Congress report bills for a simple up or down vote from the whole 
House. So we might as well extend the suspension calendar for all 
bills.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, let me respond to the 
gentleman by saying this. If this is the authorization for the 
intelligence bill, and the gentleman is offering this amendment under 
our authorization, why does the gentleman not give some direction to 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to look into the matter? 
Why does the gentleman have to find somebody else to do it? And the 
gentleman may respond, if he would like.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Well, Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
continuing to yield, and I would say that, first of all, the idea that 
it is the committee's jurisdiction and, therefore, should be left to 
the committee, I do not believe the gentleman is seriously proposing 
what I think is an absurdity, but the argument rests on the same absurd 
logic. All Members of the Congress have the privilege to offer 
amendments, and if a majority of the House agrees with the amendment, 
it passes. However, I do not believe it is legitimate or logical 
against my amendment to say that the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence should enjoy an exemption from the amendment process.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, what I am saying to the gentleman is 
apparently the gentleman does not think the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence is doing their job. Apparently, the gentleman does not 
think we have the capability to carry this out, and so he has crafted 
an amendment to go to some outside group, some outside organization 
because the gentleman does not have trust and faith in what we have 
been doing and the work that we have been doing.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, 
I would ask that the gentleman not take offense. This is certainly, I 
would hope the gentleman would agree, a salient issue of interest to 
the American people and that the public does have a right to know, and 
there have been published statements that provide contradictory 
information relative to what is really a question of a singular cause 
of war. So I respect the gentleman's right to make these statements, 
and I would ask the gentleman to respect my right as a Member of 
Congress to offer this amendment.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Well, I would say, Mr. Chairman, that if the gentleman 
wanted to offer an amendment on our authorization bill, at least he 
ought to give us the benefit of the doubt that we have professional 
staff and we have people who spend an inordinate amount of time, 
including the gentleman's ranking member because this is her only 
committee assignment. She spends all of her time in this Congress 
working on intelligence activities. Apparently the gentleman does not 
think enough of her expertise and the expertise of the committee staff 
on that side to give them some kind of an assignment.
  And why the Vice President? Why not the President? Why not the 
Director of the CIA? Why not the Director of the FBI? This is a 
political amendment. This is an extension of a campaign.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Upton). The time of the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. LaHood) has expired.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Illinois?
  Mr. KUCINICH. Reserving the right to object, I would be happy to 
grant the gentleman an additional 2 minutes if he would be happy to 
return the favor to me.

[[Page H5897]]

  Mr. LaHOOD. I will be more than happy to yield to the gentleman.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Illinois?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood) is 
recognized for 2 additional minutes.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Why the Vice President? Why not other officials of the 
government? Why not officials of the government who have direct 
responsibility for intelligence-gathering information? If there is some 
kinds of a cabal going on around here, why did the gentleman just 
happen to pick this individual?
  I believe this is what it is. This is a political amendment. This is 
an amendment to try and embarrass one member of this administration. 
This is an amendment to try and embarrass the second-highest-ranking 
elected official in our government by some way, shape, or form, 
thinking that if the gentleman gets some kind of phone records he is 
going to find something out.
  As members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, we get 
information every day, 24-7, our staff. Pretty much 24-7, our staff are 
working on gathering intelligence; and this is a slap in the face at 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to the gentleman's own 
members, to our members.
  It really is what it is. It is a political amendment, and I stand by 
what I said. It is the cheap shot amendment. It is the cheap shot 
amendment of the year. It gets the award, in my opinion; and I hope 
people see it for what it is.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent for an additional 
2 minutes.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Ohio?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) is 
recognized for 2 minutes.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to say to my friend, the gentleman 
from Illinois (Mr. LaHood), that I would hope the gentleman would 
appreciate receiving clear direction for an inquiry. I can only assume 
that the gentleman does not want the direction of the whole Congress to 
get to the bottom of the Vice President's role.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I simply would say to the gentleman that he 
knows that we have established in this bill two advisory committees. We 
had people on the floor earlier suggesting a commission; but 
apparently, the gentleman does not think the oversight obligation that 
we serve, as the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, is enough. 
And I say it is a slight. It is a slap at us.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I would just tell the 
gentleman that as a member of the Committee on Government Reform I 
certainly appreciate the role of government oversight, and I certainly 
appreciate the role of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
as well. I would say that if the gentleman did not want to get to the 
bottom of the role of the Vice President, which has been a matter of 
public contest and controversy long before I have spoken here, that 
would indeed be a reason to oppose the amendment; but it would not be a 
reason for anyone else in Congress to vote ``no'' on the amendment.
  And to the Members of Congress, I say if they want to demand a 
thorough investigation into the role that the Vice President may have 
played in offering the American public discredited intelligence reports 
of a nonexisting Iraqi weapons program, then they should vote ``yes'' 
for my amendment.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield once again?
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, let me simply say this. I would say that 
the gentleman's ranking member has bent over backwards. It was the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) and others who asked for the two 
advisory committees. And it is other people on the gentleman's side who 
are asking for some kind of a commission. Now, we have not acted on 
that, and that is not in this bill; but I think every request that was 
made by the gentleman's side to the chairman has been granted.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Time of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Kucinich) has expired.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Illinois?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood) is 
recognized for 2 additional minutes.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Really, Mr. Chairman, I think we have done everything we 
can. Now, to go outside of the jurisdiction of the committee and to 
take a cheap shot at the Vice President, it makes no sense, I say to 
the gentleman. It really does not. I think, really, the truth is, after 
listening to this and listening to the fact that the gentleman's 
ranking member is not going to support the gentleman's amendment, I 
think it is in his best interest to withdraw the amendment.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. LaHOOD. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the kind words, and it's nice 
that the gentleman from Illinois is worried about me and whether I am 
respected. I believe I am respected, and I believe that the person who 
offers this amendment respects me, and I certainly hope that he 
respects our committee.
  I just want repeat something I said earlier, which is that our 
investigation will be thorough and it will be bipartisan and we will 
follow the facts unflinchingly. So I do not want the gentleman from 
Ohio to assert, because it is not correct, that we are taking things 
off limits. The reason I oppose the gentleman's amendment is that I 
think we will do a comprehensive job in a fair way, and all of us, on a 
unanimous basis, will proceed and go forward. We will do the right job 
for this House, and we should have a chance to proceed and do it that 
way.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. LaHOOD. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I take great pride in serving in the 
Congress with the gentlewoman and the gentleman. I would say, though, 
that I do not see this so much as being a battle over turf as I see it 
being an assertion of the need for pursuing the truth. And I would 
expect that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has the 
capability to do the job, but I also think that this particular matter 
is so unique that it receive the attention of the House, which is why I 
have offered this amendment and why I will continue to insist on it.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to my colleague's amendment, and I 
put it in the context of the work that this committee has done and that 
we have accomplished and the vision that we outlined in the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for 2004.
  I serve as chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical 
Intelligence. As such, one of our jobs is to oversee some of the 
Nation's most sophisticated intelligence technologies. I have the 
opportunity and responsibility for critically reviewing new concepts of 
operation. I must ensure that currently fielded systems continue to be 
capable of meeting the needs that we have outlined.
  In this area, we are pursuing aggressive oversight. We have worked 
with the ranking member. We have been to the ranking member's district 
to meet with some of the contractors there; and I think it is a good 
example of how, in a bipartisan way, we have asked some tough questions 
of the intelligence community and of those groups that provide us with 
the materials and the equipment that we need. We have asked the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to provide us with a long-
range plan and how all of these pieces will fit together and what a 
strategic plan may look like for the next 6 to 10 years.
  In the comments attached to the bill, we have outlined our 
disappointment

[[Page H5898]]

that that plan has not come forward to the committee, so that we are 
moving forward with a little bit less information, perhaps, at this 
time, than what we would like to have had. But I do not think that the 
amendment that the gentleman is bringing up is one that is going to 
work in the best interest of what we are trying to get accomplished.
  On a weekly basis, this committee meets with the communities analytic 
cadre. We have met with them on a regular basis to review the 
intelligence that they prepared for us and they prepared for the 
President, the Vice President and Members of Congress; and that 
information is now available to all 435 Members of Congress so that 
they can take a look at what we were looking at and how we were shaping 
our judgments and where we were getting our information from.
  I think it is important for the American people to know that. That 
information is not secret. We are being very open with our colleagues 
because we recognize the importance of maintaining the credibility of 
the process, the individuals, and the analysis that goes into the 
intelligence that we have gathered. We take this job very, very 
seriously.
  One of the things that I am concerned about with this gentleman's 
amendment is that if we pursue this path, and in this case it 
identifies the Vice President but also implicates the folks at the 
different intelligence agencies as perhaps not keeping the best 
interest of the country in the forefront, then what we will end up 
with, and I agree with my colleague from Illinois that it is a cheap 
shot amendment because there is not a basis in fact to make these 
accusations against the Vice President or against the folks at the 
intelligence agency, but the result and danger is that what we are 
going to end up with is we are going to end up with a cadre of analysts 
that are going to be intimidated to such a point that they are going to 
go through the process, they are going to gather the intelligence, and 
they are going to be sitting there and saying, you know, I really 
cannot take the next step of providing some expert judgment, which I 
have been trained for, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 years. I am not going to be 
able to share that expert judgment with the folks who recognize the 
source and the art of this work.
  Remember, the job we give these folks, in plain English, is we ask 
them to go out and steal other people's secrets. We ask them to do that 
in an imprecise way and to put the pieces together. And when they have 
a few pieces of the puzzle, we ask them to try to paint for us what the 
picture and what the final puzzle may look like. If we put a cloud over 
their heads and say every time you have a few of the pieces out there 
and you have painted a picture for us, for us to better understand the 
environment after the fact, if what you laid out beforehand does not 
perfectly match what we find out afterwards, you have failed.
  In reality, these are talented people. They are doing a very, very 
good job.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Michigan 
(Mr. Hoekstra) has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Hoekstra was allowed to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.)

                              {time}  1945

  Mr. HOEKSTRA. They come back and they give us their best judgment. I 
am impressed with the work of the chairman and the ranking member, how 
they have set a course that says we are going to go through this in a 
bipartisan way. We are going to take a look at the information and how 
the people processed the information. We are going to take a look at 
how we analyzed it and how decisions were made off that information, 
but we are going to do that in a bipartisan way and we are going to 
make sure that we do not take this down a road of pure partisan 
politics because in the 2\1/2\ years I have been on this committee, in 
a bipartisan way we have kept as our primary focus what is good for 
this country, recognizing the sensitive nature of the information that 
we deal with, recognizing the importance of us to work through very, 
very difficult issues, but to reach a consensus that enables us to move 
forward.
  That is exactly what the leadership of this committee has done, it is 
exactly the way that the members of the committee have guided their 
behavior, and it is what sets the behavior of our committee and the 
members of that committee apart from the amendment that is brought 
forward at this time.
  It is a partisan amendment, it has a potential to be used in many, 
many different ways, but primarily in my analysis it hurts the prospect 
of truly improving the process so that when we move forward in the 
future, we will have the intelligence, the capability and the right 
people in place to ensure that we make the best possible decisions.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I rise to underscore the right of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Kucinich) to offer this amendment and say that he is getting at a very 
important point, but to say further it is a bad amendment and should be 
opposed. It is both too narrow and too broad. He is certainly intending 
to get at an important point, but it is too narrow in that it deals 
with the phone records of one public official, and it is too broad in 
the sense that it is a fishing expedition. It is the kind of fishing 
expedition which I think so sullied some previous Congresses.
  The question of whether intelligence has been cooked or coerced is a 
critical question, and I thank the gentleman for raising it. But in 
fact in the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence we have already 
raised that, and we will continue to raise that issue. I ask the 
assistance of every Member of this body on both sides of the aisle to 
help us formulate the questions that need to be asked and to hold us to 
task that those questions are asked to the satisfaction of all Members 
of this body and of the citizens of America. But I do not believe that 
this amendment will help us do that. I must oppose this amendment, and 
I encourage my colleagues to oppose it.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be useful as we begin 
these debates for us to reflect on the essential constitutional role of 
the Congress and on the importance of separation of powers and on the 
cause which took a Nation into war because we are not talking about 
just any other matter here, we are talking about a matter that resulted 
in the people of this country having their sons and daughters sent to 
Iraq.
  Nothing less than the entire involvement of this Congress will do to 
be able to hold safe the constitutional prerogatives of separation of 
powers. No congressional committee can override the requirements of the 
Constitution and the role of this Congress.
  When Members of this Congress gave the President authority to pursue 
an attack against Iraq, they took upon themselves a serious and grave 
responsibility, and since information has been presented that raises 
grave questions about the cause of our action against Iraq, we have a 
moral obligation to get into this, and I take nothing away from the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, but I would tell Members, 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence should take nothing away 
from Members of the House.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, perhaps the gentleman did 
not hear me earlier this evening when I said that what we are looking 
at are critical questions that have to do with lives and deaths that 
have occurred or might occur. It has a lot to do with the future 
direction of our country; but I do not believe that this amendment will 
help us carry out the investigation that we need to carry out and ask 
the questions that we need to ask and have for the future the kind of 
truth-telling intelligence agents and analysts who will help this 
country get where we want to go.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I want to respond to the latest speech of 
the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich), and that is to say if the 
gentleman really wants the prerogatives of the House to be worked out, 
let the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence do it. The 
gentleman's amendment says the IG or the GAO is supposed to

[[Page H5899]]

go in and get the Vice President's phone records. If the gentleman 
thinks it is such a great idea, let us do it. We have been doing it. 
Why have some outside group do it? That is the flaw in the gentleman's 
amendment. That is what our committee is supposed to do. That is the 
flaw, and that is what politicizes it.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I would direct the gentleman from 
Illinois to an article in the Washington Post on June 5 which says that 
the esteemed chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
said there is ``no indication that analysts at DIA or CIA changed their 
analysis to fit what they perceived as the desire of the administration 
officials.''
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The time of the gentleman 
from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) has expired.
  (On request of Mr. Kucinich, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Holt was 
allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, it goes on to say the intelligence 
oversight panels have received no whistleblower complaints from the CIA 
or other intelligence agencies on the issue. I would maintain that this 
would not be a subject of whistleblowing, and only the Office of 
Inspector General or in this case the investigative agency would have 
an opportunity to be able to get this in an evenhanded way, and it 
takes it out of politics at a time when Members suggest this is only 
political.
  I might further add that I did not make my reputation in this House 
by raising partisan issues, and I do not see this as a partisan issue, 
I see this as justifying the administration's claim that this country 
had to go to war against Iraq because there was imminent threat.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I want to point out two things, and they are meant to be 
constructive. First of all, it is certainly true everybody in the 
United States counts on it being true and it is true that the Vice 
President and the President are responsible for the protection of the 
national security. The national security team involves the Vice 
President. The President and the Vice President are regular consumers 
of intelligence information, and were they not, we probably should be 
calling for some kind of an investigation.
  I do recall it was not so long ago that one of the complaints from 
one of the Directors of the CIA was in fact just that, that he did not 
get enough quality time and enough access with the top leaders of the 
country and the Intelligence Community was not being well-served. That 
was at another time and we need not go into that.
  My suggestion to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich), who I have 
great respect for, is that this amendment is truly not worthy of his 
best efforts. I do not believe the gentleman is fully informed on it. 
It appears that the gentleman is basing his amendment and information 
and his case on media. Again, at the risk of getting impaled by the 
media, I have this trouble with the errancy problem in the media.
  Media simply does not know everything, and if they did, they would 
stop asking me and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and 
other members of the committee questions. Believe me, the media does 
not know everything. They are not fully informed, and if the gentleman 
is using the media, the gentleman is not fully informed.
  I invite the gentleman to come upstairs, sign the secrecy agreement 
if the gentleman has not already, and review the material. That is why 
we have it there. If the gentleman took advantage of that, the 
gentleman would be better able to understand what we are doing, and I 
would hope would be supportive of our efforts. Having said all that, I 
hope we are getting ready for a vote on this amendment.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I rise in support of the Kucinich amendment.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. The gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) is familiar 
with the amendment and the letter of the amendment, and I would ask if 
the chairman would be willing to commit the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence to seeking specifically the information that I am 
asking here of the Inspector General. Would the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence be willing to conduct publicly an audit of 
all telephone and electronic communications between the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Vice President as they relate 
to this matter?
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, certainly we will publicly not commit to 
that. We will publicly commit to where the review of the information 
takes us. We have a bipartisan agreement on that. We have 20 able 
members who are members of good judgment and good sense who will follow 
the review and the material that comes in to the appropriate places.
  The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) has used the word 
``unflinching.'' It is a fair word. I assure the gentleman I am going 
where the information takes us.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I would suggest to the gentleman and I would not impugn 
his answer by stating that his unwillingness to clearly commit to 
gathering this information publicly would in any way reflect a partisan 
position on his part, just as my desire to have the Inspector General 
bring that information forward is not reflective of a partisan position 
on my part.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. There are two reasons why this would be a difficult task to 
do publicly, and I would not make that broad a commitment. The first is 
that much of the material that the gentleman is talking about is 
probably classified if the gentleman is talking about the content of 
what may or may not be involved in calls, and I cannot go there.
  The second part is the matter of Constitution which does understand 
that working documents and so forth of the executive are respected and 
privileged. That has always been the case no matter who is in the White 
House.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, it would be more than instructive. It 
would be classified information if the Vice President manipulated CIA 
analysts to disseminate false, raw unreliable information to justify a 
war in Iraq. I am hopeful no one is saying that and I am not aware that 
the administration has asserted executive privilege in an attempt to 
shield such information from the Congress. I am not aware of that at 
all. Maybe that has happened privately, but I am not aware that such an 
assertion can be private and that in fact such an assertion has been 
made.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. That is an option that they have and that is why I cannot 
make a commitment. I cannot overcome that.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I would say in order for the test to be made to make 
the request first then imposes our responsibility as Members of 
Congress, and as a coequal branch of government, we are entitled to do 
that and the executive branch is entitled to assert executive 
privilege, if they so choose, and that would be illuminating, I think.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to ask that the Bush 
administration provide the American people with a full account of the 
events leading up to the war with Iraq.

[[Page H5900]]

  The amendment sponsored by Representative Kucinich is a good starting 
point but there is still much that we do not know about the basis of 
our war with Iraq. Since August of last year, when the administration 
began beating the war drum, they have offered little concrete evidence 
backing up their claims that Iraq posed an ``imminent threat'' to the 
United States.
  The rhetoric employed by the administration was strong and 
unwavering:
  On September 12, 2002, the President told the UN: ``Right now, Iraq 
is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production 
of biological weapons . . . . Iraq has made several attempts to buy 
high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear 
weapon.''
  On October 7, 2002, the President said: ``It [Iraq] possesses and 
produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear 
weapons.''
  The Vice President said earlier this year on ``Meet The Press'' that: 
``we believe he [Saddam Hussein] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear 
weapons.''
  And the Secretary of Defense joined in saying: ``We know where they 
[weapons of mass destruction] are, they are in the area around Tikrit 
and Baghdad.''
  Yet, despite this certainty, 3 months after the fall of Baghdad, no 
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons have been found. Nor have the 
facilities to make these weapons been found. The administration has 
tried to capitalize on our fears born out of the September 11th 
terrorist attacks, suggesting there was a link between Saddam Hussein 
and leaders of al Qaeda.
  Even though this connection has been disproved consistently, the 
President still cites it as fact.
  And today, we learned that at least one member of the intelligence 
community felt pressured to shape his reports to fit the 
administration's position on weapons of mass destruction even though he 
had no evidence to support those claims.
  Congress must work to ensure that the information that comes out of 
the intelligence community is reliable and is not unduly influenced by 
anyone. This is not a partisan issue. This is about restoring the 
credibility of the United States both with our constituents and 
throughout the world.
  The President has said that he is confident that weapons of mass 
destruction will be found; the evidence is strong he says.
  I encourage him to shine the light of day on the evidence so that the 
world can understand why the United States went to war--unprovoked--and 
put the lives of thousands in danger.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Kucinich) will be postponed.

                              {time}  2000

  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in House 
Report 108-176.


                   Amendment No. 6 Offered by Ms. Lee

  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The Clerk will designate the 
amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 6 offered by Ms. Lee:
       At the end of title III, add the following new section:

     SEC. 345. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH UNITED NATIONS 
                   WEAPONS INSPECTORS SEARCHING FOR WEAPONS OF 
                   MASS DESTRUCTION IN IRAQ.

       (a) In General.--The Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall conduct a study to determine the extent to which 
     intelligence developed by the Department of Defense and by 
     the intelligence community with respect to weapons of mass 
     destruction obtained or developed by Iraq preceding Operation 
     Iraqi Freedom was made available to the United Nations 
     weapons inspectors and the quantity and quality of the 
     information that was provided (if any).
       (b) Specific Matter Studied.--The study shall provide for 
     an analysis of the sufficiency of the intelligence provided 
     by the Director of Central Intelligence to those weapons 
     inspectors, and whether the information was provided in a 
     timely manner and in a sufficient quantity and quality to 
     enable the inspectors to locate, visit, and conduct 
     investigations on all high and medium value suspected sites 
     of weapons of mass destruction.
       (c) Access to Information.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), 
     the Comptroller General may secure directly from any agency 
     or department of the United States information necessary to 
     carry out the study under subsection (a).
       (2) The appropriate Federal agencies or departments shall 
     cooperate with the Comptroller General in expeditiously 
     providing appropriate security clearances to individuals 
     carrying out the study to the extent possible pursuant to 
     existing procedures and requirements, except that no person 
     shall be provided with access to classified information under 
     this section without the appropriate security clearances.
       (d) Report.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit 
     to Congress a report on the study conducted under subsection 
     (a). The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
     may contain a classified annex.

  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to thank the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) for 
her support and her leadership in crafting this bipartisan bill. Also 
to my staff, Julie Little and Shannon Smith, I want to thank them for 
their very diligent work.
  This is a commonsense amendment seeking an answer to a question that 
the American people have a right to know: How was our intelligence 
regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction handled in the months 
before the war? Specifically, this amendment seeks a GAO study to 
determine the extent and timeliness with which the Intelligence 
Community shared information about suspected weapons in Iraq with the 
United Nations inspectors on the ground searching for those weapons.
  There are growing questions being raised about the use or possible 
misuse of intelligence in the months leading up to the war against 
Iraq. If intelligence was distorted, that raises serious doubts around 
the world about United States credibility. Our President told the 
American people, the Congress and the world that inspections had 
failed, that Iraq unquestionably possessed weapons of mass destruction, 
and that these weapons posed such a dire, imminent threat to the United 
States that we had no choice but to go to war. All other options, he 
said, had been exhausted. But the question we must continue to ask is, 
were those options truly exhausted? Were they, in fact, fully pursued? 
Did the United States Intelligence Community share information with the 
United Nations inspectors about suspected weapons sites? Did it happen 
in a timely and sufficient manner?
  President Bush went before the United Nations General Assembly and 
stated, ``My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet 
our common challenge.'' He and Secretary Powell pledged to work with 
the United Nations to pursue inspections to seek out and destroy 
weapons of mass destruction. What we have before us is a question of 
both policy and credibility. If we failed to fully share intelligence 
with United Nations inspectors, we may have undermined their 
effectiveness. If we relied on intelligence that was distorted or less 
complete than implied, if we failed to share crucial information with 
our allies, then we have undermined our own national credibility.
  This Nation launched a preemptive war based on what it claimed was 
indisputable evidence. If that evidence was not so solid and especially 
if it was distorted, then we severely undercut our ability to convince 
the world about future dangers from weapons of mass destruction in 
other countries. The doctrine of preemption, which I happen 
incidentally to strongly oppose, totally collapses without credibility.
  For these reasons, we need to find the answer to these questions. The 
American people have a right to know. A respected and esteemed member 
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said that he has been 
working for the last 6 months to try to force disclosure of important 
facts relevant to the sharing of intelligence information on suspect 
weapons of mass destruction sites by the CIA with the United Nations 
arms inspectors.
  He continued, and I quote, ``If it had been public knowledge in 
February or March of this year that the CIA had not shared information 
on all of the top Iraqi WMD suspect sites with the United Nations 
inspectors, it could have worked against the administration's timetable 
for initiating military

[[Page H5901]]

action against Iraq. There could have been questions as to why; it 
could have made the administration's decision to cut short the U.N. 
inspection process and to institute military action less compelling; 
and there could have been greater demand that we share all such 
information with the United Nations before abandoning the inspection 
process.''
  I share his concerns and I echo his call for a bipartisan 
investigation. These are not partisan issues, they are fundamental 
questions about credibility and they need to be answered. This 
amendment calls for a GAO study into the sharing of United States 
intelligence with the U.N. inspections teams. It calls for a report to 
Congress with a classified annex if necessary for security reasons. We 
are all aware that to date the United States military has not found 
weapons of mass destruction in its searches since the end of the war. 
We also know that that does not prove the weapons are not there. They 
may well be. And I believe we should bring in more IAEA and United 
Nations inspectors to help seek out, secure and destroy them if they 
are hidden in Iraq.
  Given the Administration's confident and unequivocal statements that 
Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and given the President's 
assurances that he wanted to work with the United Nations to seek non-
military solutions through a renewed inspections process, it is 
important that we learn to answer to the question of whether or not 
intelligence was shared in a timely and sufficient manner with the UN 
inspections teams.
  I urge you to support this amendment.


                Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Members are reminded to refrain from 
improper references to the Senate.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. I rise in 
opposition to the Lee amendment. It calls, of course, for the 
Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study and 
determine the extent of intelligence sharing within the Intelligence 
Community, DOD and the U.N. inspectors in Iraq.
  I would like to make two general points first. As a part of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's review of the Intelligence 
Community regarding prewar intelligence on Iraq, the committee has 
already begun to examine this issue and will assess the effectiveness 
and procedures governing the sharing of intelligence to international 
and foreign bodies.
  Secondly, the committee acknowledges that the Comptroller has some 
capabilities for investigation. But I would note that the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence has a long and distinguished record of 
conducting bipartisan and thorough reviews of intelligence matters. 
Therefore, before outside help is requested, it seems only appropriate 
that the committee should have an opportunity to fulfill its mandate 
for the House and for the Congress to conduct rigorous oversight of the 
Intelligence Community. This subject area of the amendment is not going 
to be neglected.
  Now a few details. In the run-up to renewed weapons inspections in 
Iraq late last year, U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix told the press 
that although his team could use U.S. intelligence, the team was not 
supposed to trust anyone, and that it was the team's decision, not a 
particular government's, as to what facilities and where the 
inspections were to be carried out.
  The earlier U.N. mission to Iraq was accused of spying for the United 
States. Therefore, Hans Blix indicated that he had to make the 
distinction between his possible use of intelligence and his team's 
ability to conduct an independent and neutral investigation of Iraq's 
WMD facilities. Blix admitted using CIA reports in a November 28 
interview with CNN but cautioned that he would not allow his team to be 
dictated to by a foreign government.
  Some have suggested that the U.S. failed to provide the arms 
inspectors with useful information. At this point, this Member believes 
that this is simply not true, not true at all. We are going to find out 
about that, however, when we complete our investigation. Hans Blix 
actually received, I think, unprecedented access to intelligence.
  The U.S. provided the U.N. weapons inspectors with the ability to 
task and assign U.S. U-2 surveillance aircraft operating over Iraq. He 
told the U-2s where to go and what to target. This is virtually unheard 
of, U.N. civilians ordering U.S. pilots on hazardous missions. Why did 
we do this? Why did we give a U.N. official this extraordinary 
opportunity and authority? In the words of Hans Blix, ``The U-2 data 
will improve our ability to carry out our inspections.''
  If there was a problem in timely response to intelligence, the 
problem was in the U.N.'s ability to act on information after they had 
received it from the United States or from other sources. This is not 
really too surprising since there were literally hundreds of Iraqi 
agents or personnel whose job it was to slow down the inspectors, to 
send them in the wrong direction, or to make sure they would end up in 
the wrong place, or to report on their progress so that deception and 
deceit and cover-up could take place before they arrived. This is not a 
failing of the United States but, rather, the inability of UNMOVIC to 
overcome Iraqi denial and deception techniques.
  The gentlewoman, I hope, would understand that if there were problems 
in communication of intelligence, much of the problem was the U.N. 
reluctance to rely on U.S. sources. This is addressed in an article in 
USA Today and I do not cite it except that they are quoting Blix. They 
were reluctant, they said, to rely on U.S. intelligence for fear that 
Iraq would accuse them of spying for the United States, an accusation 
that Iraq made, of course, the first time we had inspectors in. Here is 
a quote:
  ``Still smarting from their admission that U.S. intelligence gave 
inspectors secret missions during the last round of inspections in 
1998, U.N. officials have deliberately curbed access to the CIA and 
allied intelligence agencies.''
  The ground rules established by the U.N. stipulated that the CIA 
would not equip the inspectors, unofficial discussions between the CIA 
and the inspectors were prohibited, and only the U.N. would be allowed 
to analyze the data that was collected.
  We have got a lot to look at. Members will have access to some of 
this very information across the board in an unprecedented fashion. 
This is a responsibility of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. We have the capabilities. We have the intent. I would say 
we ought to be given the opportunity. Therefore, I rise in opposition 
to the gentlewoman's amendment. I hope it will be rejected.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I have enormous respect for the sponsor of this 
amendment. She is prepared to vote her conscience in this House, even 
if she is a minority of one. I think that is admirable, courageous and 
her constituents should be enormously proud to be represented by her. I 
am certainly proud to serve with her.
  I listened carefully to the comments made by the gentleman from 
Nebraska. Frankly, I agree with them. I think that is the context of 
the search for weapons by the U.N. inspector. However, agreeing with 
them does not get me to his conclusion. My conclusion is that we should 
support this amendment because it contains a specific request for a 
discrete investigation that would be of value in understanding 
precisely what information was shared with the U.N. weapons inspectors.
  It may turn out that more was shared than we know. It may turn out 
that less was shared than we know. And it may turn out, and I think it 
will, that what the gentleman from Nebraska had to say includes the 
context in which it was shared. Nonetheless, I think this investigation 
could provide a constructive baseline in understanding the difficulties 
of conducting U.N. inspections.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me just say that the specific matters to 
be studied under this amendment are not to my knowledge currently part 
of the scope of our Committee's review. We are not specifically 
investigating what information was shared with the U.N., though we 
certainly could, I suppose. Thus, I believe the amendment is helpful 
and I would urge us to support it.
  Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I rise to support the Lee amendment. I thank the ranking member for 
her support. As this House, our Nation and

[[Page H5902]]

the world debate the quality of the intelligence that the war in Iraq 
was fought over, it is too easy to forget that our troops were not the 
first to search the Iraqi desert for weapons of mass destruction. 
United Nations inspectors spent a decade searching for and destroying 
illegal Iraqi weapons facilities, but in the days and months leading up 
to the war, they were scorned for their failure to find weapons of mass 
destruction.
  This resolution calls on the GAO to investigate how much cooperation 
the United States intelligence agencies gave United Nations inspectors. 
Understanding about that cooperation with the United Nations, or lack 
thereof, will give us a better picture of the efforts this Nation took 
to avoid war with Iraq. If America did not fully share its intelligence 
with U.N. inspectors, Congress needs to find out why.
  The fact is that the rhetoric leading up to the war in Iraq led many 
Americans to believe that finding weapons of mass destruction would be 
absolutely easy, that the U.N. inspectors must have been grossly 
incompetent. But I do not believe that to be true and I think that our 
inability to find weapons of mass destruction now requires the United 
States to reexamine the rhetoric and the events that led up to the war. 
We need to find out beyond reports from USA Today if our U.S. 
intelligence agencies were cooperating fully with the U.N. inspectors. 
And we need to find out if the prewar rhetoric reflected the 
intelligence we shared with the United Nations.
  This amendment is about getting answers to questions that we are all 
asking in this country. I urge my colleagues to support the Lee 
amendment.

                              {time}  2015

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I have given this amendment very careful consideration, and I 
appreciate the effort. I do believe we have got the matter handled 
already in the committee, and I will tell the gentlewoman that; and I 
would invite the gentlewoman upstairs to talk to us about it in a 
classified setting if she would like to.
  The reason I say that I think this is unnecessary is I think it is 
duplicative of work we are doing that, frankly, we are best prepared to 
do. But I would like to point out there are a couple of problems with 
the United Nations that we have been working with for quite a number of 
years, and I think we, frankly, have the expertise to judge better than 
anybody else. Perhaps our sister body in the Senate, Senate 
Intelligence Committee, would dispute that; but I would say that either 
the Senate or us are going to do a pretty good job on this, and in fact 
we are both working on it.
  The question of how much information we shared with the U.N. is a 
fair question to ask, and the answer is we shared a remarkable amount, 
more than they could handle. It turns out as we heard from the 
gentleman from Nebraska's (Mr. Bereuter) comments that the U.N. 
inspectors were very worried about being called spies of the United 
States and there was quite a debate about taking any information from 
the United States at all lest this be a U.S.-driven thing and Hans Blix 
did not want that and he said so publicly a number of times and said 
that frankly they could do the job fine without us.
  But notwithstanding, we had been working with them for some time and 
giving them some good information and frankly at some peril because the 
U.N. leaks like a sieve, and there are some things about the U.N. that 
are worth noting. Not all the members of the U.N. are particularly 
friendly to the United States of America, and that brings us to the 
question of do Americans want us to be sharing our crown jewels and our 
sovereignty with nations who may not want to be particularly helpful to 
us and some who may actually want to be harmful to us.
  So there is a question there of whether our American constituency 
would like us to keep this in control in the House or get it out where 
some other people might want to make some mischief for the United 
States of America and our security. And I am very much aware of that 
because we have actually had problems in the past that are documented, 
which I am not going to go into but which are documented, where 
materials and information was not properly safeguarded or was willfully 
given to the wrong people in the U.N. That is not a good track record 
and I think would not be prudent of us to ignore.
  I would say that for some time U.N. weapons inspectors had 
unprecedented access to U.S. intelligence information. Whether they 
used it or not or wanted to use it was their problem, including 
analytical reports. We obviously protected our sources. We had imagery 
from the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, which I think everybody knows 
now. Probably what some people do not know which I believe I can say is 
that the U.N. inspectors had the ability, the task to request how that 
U-2 was used. That is rather remarkable, turning over an asset like 
that to another country, a set of countries.
  I believe everybody knows that Colin Powell played intercepts for the 
Security Council that are frankly things that do not happen in our 
committee very often. They do not play intercepts for us very often. So 
I would say an unusual amount of information, perhaps more than I would 
have approved of, was given to the U.N.
  And there is a problem with the U.N. that I want to go into a little 
further, and it is an appearance problem; and it is one I think we are 
better prepared to handle in the House than an outside group trying to 
come in here. There is a lot of feeling, I think, that the U.N. does 
not always get it right in terms of our national purpose or national 
mission, and I would point out that the presidency of the Security 
Council for the month of June is the Russian Federation. I would like 
to also point out, and I think I can say this in a responsible way, 
that there are an extraordinary number of Russian espionage activities 
going on in our Nation's capital as I speak, even though we are on a 
friendly basis. Nations do spy on each other. Russians are still in a 
little bit of their paranoia and their conspiratorial mode that there 
are things to find out about us that if they just ask us, they will not 
believe the answer; so they have to spy on us. We have a good 
friendship with them, but it has got a ways to go. There is a little 
bit of a problem there.
  There is a problem with Syria which is on our terrorist list being on 
the Security Council. These kinds of things lead one to pause about how 
we do business, and these are matters which we are well aware of on our 
committee. And on the Commission on Human Rights, which has recently 
been in the news at the U.N., it is clearly true that the U.N. took a 
slap at the United States by throwing us off that commission in order 
to put Cuba on it. That is not really great. The chairmanship of that 
committee, I understand, right now is Libya. Libya's human rights 
record is not worth commenting on, it is so terrible. Zimbabwe? Give me 
a break.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The time of the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Goss) has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Goss was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, when we take a look at this, the U.N. 
business is a complicated, complex business. We work closely with the 
Department of State, I&R, and others in this. We for years had a good 
working relationship. I do not think it is necessary for us to abandon 
that relationship or supplement it. So I am going to urge that we do 
not mess with what we have got now. If it turns out that there is a 
need to do that down the road, I will come back and admit it. But I do 
not think we are there at this point; so I will thank the gentlewoman 
for her amendment and the spirit in which it is offered.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, let me just thank the gentleman very much for 
his response and for this debate, but I want to reiterate the purpose 
of this amendment, really, and it has nothing to do with whether one 
supports or opposes the United Nations. Basically, this amendment 
requires the GAO to conduct a study, a report, that would be submitted 
in an unclassified form but may contain a classified annex with regard 
to the sharing of information between our intelligence agencies and the

[[Page H5903]]

United Nations leading up to the war against Iraq. I believe the 
American people have a right to know this and this is what this 
sentiment of this amendment is, and I would urge the gentleman to 
reconsider.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Goss) has again expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Goss was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I well understand the purpose of the 
gentlewoman's amendment, and what I am trying to say and outline for 
her is that dealing with the United Nations with intelligence is an 
extraordinarily complex issue, and I do not think there is a particular 
body in Congress that has more experience than the oversight committees 
on intelligence, House and Senate. And I therefore say give us a chance 
to do our job and I think she will understand. If the gentlewoman wants 
to know how much intelligence has been shared with the U.N., I 
guarantee we can find out upstairs.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman again for that response; 
but, again, this amendment allows the American people to know what that 
information was in a declassified form. This amendment allows for a 
classified index, and I believe in terms of the fact that U.S. tax 
dollars were of course used in this war that people, the American 
people, just have a right to ask these questions and have the right to 
know. This has nothing to do with whether one supports or opposes the 
United Nations.
  Mr. GOSS. Reclaiming my time, this is not supporting or opposing the 
U.N. I will tell the gentlewoman flat out that I do not have the 
capacity to declassify information. Our committee does not. We can get 
involved in a process, but the declassification question is another 
issue which I would love to enlist her support on on how we can make it 
better, but that is not part of this amendment.


                Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair will once again remind Members to 
refrain from improper references to the Senate.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Lee).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Lee) will be postponed.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Dreier) having assumed the chair, Mr. Simpson, Chairman pro tempore of 
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported 
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 
2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, 
the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to 
no resolution thereon.

                          ____________________