[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 78 (Friday, May 23, 2003)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1081-E1082]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




INTRODUCTION OF THE VOTER CONFIDENCE AND INCREASED ACCESSIBILITY ACT OF 
                                  2003

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. RUSH D. HOLT

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                         Thursday, May 22, 2003

  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing The Voter Confidence 
and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003.
  After the Florida voting debacle of the 2000 election, we in Congress 
recognized that we had to act to restore the integrity and reliability 
of our electoral system by making dimpled chads and other voting 
irregularities a thing of the past. Last October, we enacted the Help 
America Vote Act (HAVA), groundbreaking election reform legislation 
that is currently helping states throughout the country replace 
antiquated and unreliable punch cards and butterfly ballots. Early this 
month, the newly-formed New Jersey HAVA Commission held it's first 
meeting. From those Commissioners and others I know, there is a great 
deal of enthusiasm about the increased Federal involvement in 
oversight, funding and guidance with respect to the conduct of 
elections for Federal office.
  But HAVA could have an adverse, unintended consequence. It is fueling 
a headlong rush by states and localities to purchase computer voting 
systems that suffer from a serious flaw. It generates suspicion about 
the voting. You, the voter, have no way of knowing if your vote is 
recorded as you intended.
  Imagine it's Election Day 2004. You enter your local polling place 
and cast your vote on a brand new ``touch screen'' voting machine. The 
screen is large and well lit, and your choices are clearly spelled out 
before you. In fact, it looks as easy to use as the ATM at your bank. 
You breathe a sigh of relief that you no longer have to figure out a 
complicated butterfly ballot or pull a lever. So you make a choice and 
touch the corresponding button to cast your vote. The screen says your 
vote has been counted. As you exit the voting booth, however, you begin 
to wonder: how do I know if the machine actually recorded my vote 
correctly. The fact is, you don't. No one knows.
  That is why hundreds of nationally-renowned computer scientists, 
including David Dill of Stanford University, consider a voter-verified 
paper trail to be a critical safeguard for the accuracy, integrity and 
security of computer-assisted elections.
  Without a physical record of votes cast, how will election officials 
in 2004 be able to launch an effective, honest recount in a closely 
contested election? How will they be able to ensure that a computer 
hacker has not tampered with votes?
  Dr. Rebecca Mercuri, also a nationally renowned expert on this 
subject and a constituent of mine, asks on her website: ``Think the 
November 5, 2002 US General Election went smoothly? Use your favorite 
Web engine and search for the words `election' and `glitch'--a recent 
scan on Google News turned up hundreds of disturbing press reports.'' 
Not all of these reported troubles were in Florida. They were in Texas, 
Alabama, Nevada, Georgia, California, South Carolina, Nebraska, and New 
Jersey. Voter News Service (VNS), the agency that provides exit poll 
data that might have been used as a cross-check against computerized 
returns, was coincidentally knocked out of service by an unidentified 
`massive computer glitch' on Election Day as well. Many of the election 
problems (including those at VNS) occurred in spite of hundreds of 
millions of dollars (soon to be billions) spent on new equipment.
  In the 2002 election, brand new computer voting systems used in 
Florida lost over 100,000 votes due to a software error. In New Jersey, 
several voting irregularities have been reported and, in one instance, 
a mainframe computer deployed to rapidly tally election results broke 
down entirely and had to be replaced in the last minute by bookkeepers 
using adding machines. In fact, in the 2000 election, it was also 
reported that in an election in South Brunswick in my congressional 
district, one new touch-screen machine simply did not record any votes 
at all for one Republican candidate and one Democratic candidate. The 
manufacturer was quoted in the Washington Post as saying ``no votes 
were lost--they were just never registered.'' The election officials in 
charge were quoted as saying ``it didn't matter whether the fault was 
the voters'' or the machine's, the expected votes were gone.''
  In Georgia, the entire state voted on 22,000 brand new touch-screen 
machines purchased in 2001 at a cost of $54 million. The Washington 
Post reported that when used in the November 2002 general election, 
``some people touched one candidate's name on the screen and saw 
another candidate's name appear as their choice. Voters who were paying 
attention had a chance to correct the error before finalizing their 
vote, but those who weren't did not.'' It is also disturbing to note 
that immediately prior to the election, a ``patch'' (a modification to 
the voting machines'' software program) was installed on the new 
machines. Although the patch reportedly ``was checked before it was 
installed,'' it also reportedly was not checked by election or 
certification officials. Nonetheless, the official who oversaw the 
statewide upgrade in Georgia declared that the voters were happy with 
how the system operated.
  Maryland also installed new touch screen machines in five counties 
that were first used in the November 2002 general election. Again, the 
election official who oversaw the purchase of the new equipment was 
reported in the Washington Post as saying ``the system performed 
flawlessly in two statewide elections. The public has a lot of 
confidence in it, and they love it.'' But, as Professor David Dill 
observes, ``I'm not concerned with elections that are a mess. I'm 
concerned about elections that appear to go smoothly, and no one knows 
that it was all messed up inside the machine.'' A Maryland reporter 
wrote an article on exactly that danger, immediately after the November 
2002 election, using the incident in which the computer betting system 
used in the Breeder's Cup Race was tampered with as a cautionary and 
analogous example.
  Not all election officials want to rely on voting technology that 
produces no voterverified record. Warren Slocum, Chief Elections 
Officer & Assessor-County ClerkRecorder for San Mateo County, 
California actively and enthusiastically endorses the use of voting 
equipment that produces a voter-verified paper trail. He says, ``the 
most naive argument against a paper trail is that the machines are 
accurate and tested properly before the election. It is argued that we 
don't need to worry about hackers, Trojan Horses or programming 
mistakes.... Surprisingly, some elections professionals say that 
touchscreen voting systems can be trusted. But when voters are given 
the choice, most say `absolutely not.' And the computer scientists who 
have studied this issue say no way.''
  Across the country, in growing numbers, people are studying and 
reading about electronic voting and saying--``wait a minute .... ``
  With the 2004 election around the corner and states lining up to buy 
new computerized voting machines, Congress needs to act immediately 
before it's too late. We need to

[[Page E1082]]

make sure that voters receive a physical, paper verification of their 
votes. After all, voting should not be an act of faith. It should be an 
act of record.
  That is why I am introducing this bill--- The Voter Confidence and 
Increased Accessibility Act of 2003 --- to amend HAVA to require a 
voter-verified record for all votes cast in federal elections. Under my 
bill, funds expended under HAVA will be utilized in a manner that 
ensures that this minimum standard of voter protection will be built 
into computer voting systems before the next general election.
  Key provisions of my bill include:
  1) A requirement that all voting systems produce a voter-verified 
paper record for use in manual audits. A system using optical scanning 
of cards marked by the voters is one acceptable version. For those 
using the increasingly popular direct recording electronic (DRE) voting 
machines (such as `touch-screen' machines), this requirement means 
those machines would print a receipt that each voter would verify as 
accurate and deposit into a lockbox at the polling station for later 
use in a recount. States would have until November 2003 to request 
additional funds to meet this requirement.
  (2) A ban on the use of undisclosed software and wireless 
communications devices in voting systems.
  (3) A requirement that all voting systems meet these increased 
standards of protection in time for the general election in November 
2004. Jurisdictions anticipating that their new computer systems may 
not be able to meet this deadline will be able to use a paper system, 
as an interim measure and at federal expense, in the November 2004 
election.
  (4) A requirement that electronic voting systems be provided for 
persons with disabilities by January 1, 2006--one year earlier than 
currently required by HAVA. Like the voting systems used by persons 
without disabilities, those used by disabled voters must also provide a 
mechanism for voter-verification, though not necessarily a paper trail. 
Jurisdictions unable to meet this requirement by the deadline must give 
disabled voters the option to use the interim paper system with the 
assistance of an aide of their choosing.
  (5) A requirement of mandatory surprise recounts in 0.5 percent of 
domestic jurisdictions and 0.5 percent of overseas jurisdictions.
  Mr. Speaker, there is nothing more crucial to democracy than 
guaranteeing the integrity, fairness, and accuracy of elections. The 
election of 2000 was a fiasco, but unless this legislation is promptly 
enacted the election of 2004 could be a disaster.

                          ____________________