[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 73 (Thursday, May 15, 2003)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E956-E957]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




             CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. STEVE CHABOT

                                of ohio

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, May 14, 2003

  Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, C.J. (Chien-Jen) Chen, Taiwan's ambassador 
to the United States, in an address to the Foreign Policy Research 
Institute in Philadelphia earlier this year, spoke on the important 
issue of ``Cross-Strait Relations: Past, Present, Future.'' I know my 
colleagues will be interested in reading the ambassador's abridged 
remarks, which I include in the Record:

 Remarks by Representative C.J. (Chien-Jen) Chen at the Foreign Policy 
                  Research Institute--January 16, 2003

       I know that the most pressing international issues at the 
     moment involve Iraq and North Korea and that, in contrast, 
     cross-strait relations appear to be quite tranquil. But, I am 
     also sure that you know cross-strait relations are highly 
     sensitive. Both now and for the foreseeable future, cross-
     strait relations directly affect not only Taiwan but also 
     U.S. interests in the Western Pacific and peace and security 
     in the entire region. So, this is a topic that merits further 
     discussion.
       Of course, to understand where cross-strait relations stand 
     at present and to see where they might stand in the future, 
     one must know something about the historical background of 
     Taiwan's relationship vis-a-vis the Chinese mainland.


                              I. The Past

       Over the course of the last four centuries, Taiwan has been 
     transformed from a neglected backwater and unsettled frontier 
     into a prosperous modern democracy of 23 million people. 
     During this time, control over the island has passed through 
     the hands of a succession of masters: indigenous tribes, 
     Dutch colonizers, Han Chinese pioneers, Manchu officials, 
     Japanese imperialists . . . In 1945, the island reverted to 
     Chinese control under the Republic of China government. But 
     just four years later, in a tragic twist of fate, China 
     itself was divided by a Civil War into two parts: the free 
     and capitalistic ROC on Taiwan and the tightly controlled and 
     authoritarian People's Republic of China on the Chinese 
     mainland. Throughout the Cold War, the two sides faced each 
     other across the narrow Taiwan Strait in a tense 
     confrontation marked by enmity, rancor, and distrust. For the 
     past 16 years, my government has been working to break the 
     impasse and facilitate reconciliation with the other side. In 
     some respects, we have made much progress. In others, we have 
     met with disappointment.
       For the sake of brevity, I will not delve into all the 
     twists and turns of Taiwan's fascinating history. But, I do 
     want to point out that several factors and historical truths 
     continue to influence cross-strait relations today and will 
     likely shape them in the future.
       First, Taiwan is situated on China's strategic periphery at 
     the very nexus of international trade routes that crisscross 
     East Asia. The Taiwan Strait, which is as narrow as 90 
     nautical miles in some places, is the only geophysical 
     feature separating Taiwan from the Chinese mainland.
       Second, the vast majority of people on Taiwan are Han 
     Chinese whose ancestors arrived in Taiwan at different times 
     over the course of the last four centuries. They share many 
     ancestral, historic, cultural and linguistic ties with the 
     people across the strait
       Third, owing to their geographical proximity and cultural 
     affinity, economic exchanges between Taiwan and the Chinese 
     mainland have been nearly unavoidable and usually beneficial 
     to both sides.
       Fourth, owing to that fact that Taiwan and the Chinese 
     mainland were united for less than five years in the 20th 
     century and the fact that the PRC regime on the mainland has 
     never ruled Taiwan even for a single day, distinct political, 
     economic, and social systems have developed on each side.
       Fifth, the long separation has also produced on either side 
     of the Taiwan Strait different values, perspectives, visions, 
     and even identities.
       Sixth, cross-strait relations are dynamic, fluid, 
     malleable. Taiwan's relationship to the Chinese mainland has 
     changed a number of times in the past, is not static at 
     present, and will likely evolve in the future. It is our hope 
     that the relationship will change for the better.


                            II. The Present

       That certainly was the motivation of our government, which, 
     in 1987, sensed that the time had come to break the impasse 
     between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait by allowing 
     veterans on Taiwan to visit their relatives on the Chinese 
     mainland. In the years following, private exchanges (i.e., 
     travel, mail, phone calls) between the people on both sides 
     have grown enormously as have indirect trade and investment. 
     Along the way, our government unilaterally declared the end 
     of hostilities against the Chinese mainland (1991) and 
     amended ROC laws to recognize that, at present, our 
     jurisdiction covers the Taiwan area only. Just as 
     significantly, both sides of the Taiwan Strait set up liaison 
     agencies to discuss practical issues arising from the various 
     forms of interaction across the Taiwan Strait.
       Now let us take a look at current developments--both 
     positive and negative--in the relationship.

                                Positive

       To give you a sense of the scope of that interaction, allow 
     me to cite a few statistics. In addition to exchanging 
     millions of phone calls and letters with people on the 
     mainland, residents of Taiwan have, over the last 16 years, 
     made nearly 27 million trips there, including more than 3 
     million trips in 2002. And during these trips to the 
     mainland, they have spent roughly 30 billion U.S. dollars. At 
     the same time, thanks to the gradual relaxation of our policy 
     regarding visits from the people of the mainland, they have 
     been able to make 817,000 short trips to Taiwan in the last 
     few years.
       Bilateral trade has surpassed 272 billion U.S. dollars 
     since 1987. In just the first nine months of 2002, two-way 
     trade between Taiwan and the mainland rose 26 percent over 
     the same period the year before to 25 billion dollars.
       The number of Taiwan-based businessmen investing in 
     mainland China has also risen

[[Page E957]]

     rapidly since restrictions on travel to the mainland were 
     lifted in 1987. According to my government, which counts only 
     pre-approved cases of investment, as of June 2002, Taiwan's 
     private sector has invested 24.2 billion U.S. dollars in the 
     Chinese mainland. Other non-governmental sources estimate 
     that Taiwan has actually invested well over 140 billion 
     dollars in the mainland.
       This trend may continue to strengthen now that both Taiwan 
     and the mainland have acceded to the World Trade 
     Organization. Under the WTO, Taiwan and the PRC are co-
     equals. They must abide by the same rules and regulations, 
     meet the same standards, abide by the same procedures, and 
     resolve trade disputes through the same mechanisms.
       Other positive developments include some less-publicized 
     events such as the start of the three mini links between our 
     off-shore islands and the mainland coast, my government's 
     decision to allow mainland Chinese to visit Taiwan as 
     tourists, its decision to allow Taiwan-based banks to set up 
     representative offices in the mainland, and the present 
     efforts to establish indirect charter flights between the two 
     sides during the Chinese New Year holiday.

                                Negative

       But there have been negative developments as well.
       First and most fundamental has been the PRC's continued 
     insistence that Taiwan is a province of China. And since the 
     PRC equates itself with China, this is tantamount to saying 
     that Taiwan is a part of the PRC and should be subject to PRC 
     leadership. Such a formulation not only runs contrary to the 
     facts on the ground, it also alienates the people of Taiwan.
       Second, because it insists that Taiwan is merely a local 
     territory, the PRC also works very hard to deny Taiwan any 
     room in the international community. To this day, the PRC 
     strenuously objects to Taiwan's presence, participation, or 
     even observership in certain non-political international 
     organizations such as the World Health Organization or the 
     International Civil Aviation Organization, not to mention 
     numerous international activities. This has not helped cross-
     strait relations and has indeed further antagonized the 
     people in Taiwan.
       Third, the PRC refuses to resume dialogue with us or our 
     designated liaisons. The PRC insists that no talks can be 
     held unless we first agree to the so-called ``one-China'' 
     principle. We, on the other hand, have made it clear that we 
     are willing to discuss any issue with them including the one 
     China issue, but that talks should be held without any 
     preconditions.
       Fourth, the PRC still refuses to renounce the use of force 
     against us. In recent years, the PRC has deployed more than 
     350 advanced ballistic missiles along its coastline opposite 
     Taiwan and is increasing the number of these missiles by 50 a 
     year. These missiles are targeted directly at Taiwan and 
     constitute a clear and present danger to us. In addition, 
     they have increased their military budget by more than 17 
     percent a year for the past two years and they have been 
     acquiring advanced weapons including Russian warships and 
     fighters.
       We cannot but increase our purchase of more and better 
     defensive weapons from the U.S. It is most regrettable that 
     resources, which could have been better used for other more 
     meaningful purposes, must instead be used to finance those 
     purchases.

                    The ROC's Policy Pronouncements

       Let me now summarize the current policies of Taiwan and the 
     mainland regarding their mutual relationship.
       When President Chen Shui-bian was inaugurated almost three 
     years ago, he declared that so long as Beijing has no 
     intention of using military force against Taiwan, he would 
     not declare Taiwan Independence, change our national title, 
     push for the inclusion of the ``state-to-state'' formulation 
     in our Constitution, or promote a referendum on the question 
     of independence or unification. He also said that the 
     abolition of the National Unification Council or the National 
     Unification Guidelines would not be an issue. This policy, 
     which was quickly named the ``five noes policy'' by media in 
     Taiwan, remains unchanged.
       On January 1, 2002, the president further said, ``If the 
     Chinese mainland can renounce military intimidation and 
     respect the people's free will, the two sides can begin with 
     integration in the cultural, economic, and trade fields, 
     before further seeking a new framework for permanent peace 
     and political integration.''
       On January 1 of this year, President Chen reiterated this 
     policy formulation and called upon both sides of the Taiwan 
     Strait to ``strive toward building a framework of interaction 
     for peace and stability.'' The two sides, he said, should 
     ``foster an environment conducive to long-term engagement'' 
     and ``work together, abiding by the principles of democracy, 
     parity and peace in an effort to resolve longer term 
     issues.''
       Such policy pronouncements, I believe, fully demonstrate 
     our sincere goodwill and pragmatic approach to cross-strait 
     relations.

                    The PRC's Policy Pronouncements

       For its part, the PRC has toned down its rhetoric somewhat.
       Last October and again yesterday, PRC vice Premier Qian 
     Qichen also said that the establishment of direct air and 
     shipping links between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait was 
     a purely economic issue that need not by influenced by 
     political factors. But, the PRC still insists on its ``one 
     China'' principle and refuses to accept the role of our 
     government whose participation is inevitable if links are to 
     be established.
       The fact is, the PRC still refuses to renounce the use of 
     force against us. It still seeks to isolate us 
     internationally. It still targets us with missiles, and it 
     still insists that we must accept its ``one China'' principle 
     before dialogue can be resumed. Just recently, when Jiang 
     Zemin suggested the PRC might consider reducing these missile 
     deployments in return for reductions in U.S. defensive arms 
     sales to Taiwan, it was obviously an attempt to deflect 
     criticism from their unprovoked arms buildup and their 
     refusal to renounce use of force against us. We are glad the 
     American people, and your leaders, see through such cynical 
     gestures.


                  The U.S. Can Be a Positive Influence

       Your government, under either Republican or Democratic 
     leadership, has frequently declared that the Taiwan Strait 
     issue should be resolved peacefully, with the freely given 
     assent of our people. It is very clear this policy has broad 
     bipartisan support in your country.
       Let me emphasize that we are grateful for American support 
     of our democratic system and right of free choice.
       The PRC depends greatly on U.S. trade, investment, 
     cultural, and other relations. So we think Washington can be 
     a very effective, positive influence in persuading Beijing to 
     sit down and resume dialogue with us. Resolute and prudent 
     U.S. policy commitments can go a long way towards preventing 
     aggression and encouraging peaceful talks. Taken together, 
     the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances of 1982, 
     which have governed U.S. policy towards Taiwan for many 
     years, are crucial to the trust underlying our relationship. 
     And they are critical for peace across the Strait.
       Let me point out that we have never asked the United States 
     to act as a mediator between the two sides of the Taiwan 
     Strait. But we do hope the U.S. continues to play an active 
     role as a stabilizer to encourage peace across the Strait. We 
     appreciate that the U.S. handles its relationships with both 
     Taiwan and PRC in a very even-handed way. Balanced treatment 
     serves the United States' own interests as well as ours.


                            iii. The Future

       What does the future hold for cross-strait relations? No 
     one can be sure.
       Leaders in Taipei and Beijing will no doubt continue 
     fashioning cross-strait policies in light of tangible 
     economic and security interests as well as intangible 
     cultural and value-laden interests. But, cross-strait 
     relations are also influenced by other sets of bilateral 
     relations including our close and friendly relationship with 
     the United States as well as by changes in the international 
     environment.
       Furthermore, we must keep in mind that many intractable 
     differences remain between the two sides: (1) Our disparate 
     economic. and political systems. (2) Our different standards 
     of living. (3) Our distinctive mentalities and outlooks. And, 
     (4) the lingering sense of misunderstanding and distrust. 
     Until and unless the gaps in those areas can be narrowed and/
     or until and unless a better appreciation and acceptance of 
     the differences between the two sides can be realized, cross-
     strait relations can only proceed at a slow and deliberate 
     pace.
       And yet, there are also a number of reasons for guarded 
     optimism. For one thing, the governments and the people on 
     both sides seem to understand peace, security, and continued 
     economic development are in the interests of both sides. 
     Secondly, to meet real needs, exchanges are sure to increase. 
     Dialogue, though interrupted, is inevitable. And, with 
     dialogue, the two sides eventually may reach some 
     accommodation. Third, the twin processes of globalization and 
     technological advancement are causing both sides to move 
     toward a higher degree of,interaction, understanding, and 
     perhaps common interests.
       What is required now is patience, wisdom, and goodwill. 
     These three things we possess in ample quantity, so I am 
     reasonably optimistic and hopeful that a better relationship 
     between the ROC and the PRC is in the cards.
       I would therefore encourage you to keep an eye on cross-
     strait relations, to lend your support for positive change, 
     and to help us bring lasting peace and prosperity to the 
     entire Western Pacific region.

                          ____________________