

We are right now in the middle of filibusters against two highly qualified, exceptional people, and the arguments used against them are almost unreal. The only argument I keep hearing about Miguel Estrada is he just hasn't answered all the questions. We have had very few circuit court nominees who have even come close to answering the number of questions that have been asked of Mr. Estrada. We hear arguments against Priscilla Owen, about the only thing left that has not been totally obliterated by the facts: that she joined in dissent—in a few of the better than 800 cases—of a young girl who asked for a judicial bypass so her parents would not have to be notified about her upcoming abortion.

Polls indicate that more than 70 percent of the American people support parental notification. It has nothing really to do with *Roe v. Wade*. It has to do with whether parents have a right to assist or consult with their young daughter who may be going through the most momentous medical procedure in her lifetime. But the finder of fact in these few cases found that these young women—these young girls—should consult with their parents. That is being held against Priscilla Owen as though she is against *Roe v. Wade*, when she clearly and unequivocally said she will support the decision in *Roe v. Wade* as a circuit court of appeals judge. You couldn't ask anything more of her, but they are asking more.

Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. COLEMAN). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## EXECUTIVE SESSION

### NATO EXPANSION TREATY

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 12 noon having arrived, the Senate will proceed to executive session to consider Executive Calendar No. 6, which the clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolution of Ratification to Accompany Treaty Document No. 108-4, Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there are 4 hours of debate on the treaty.

The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, we now commence a very important debate on the NATO treaty.

On behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am pleased to bring the protocols of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 to the floor for

the Senate's consideration and ratification. The protocols extending membership to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were signed on March 26, 2003, and were transmitted by President Bush to the Senate on April 10, 2003. The accession of these countries to the NATO Alliance is a tremendous accomplishment. It deserves the full support of the Senate and the governments of the other 18 NATO members.

The Foreign Relations Committee has held 10 hearings on NATO since 1999. Five of these hearings were held during the last 2 months, as we prepared for this debate on the Senate floor. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee gave its unanimous approval to the resolution of ratification.

I especially thank Senator JOSEPH BIDEN for his assistance in moving NATO expansion forward and for his insightful participation in the wider debate on NATO policy. The resolution of ratification before us today reflects our mutual efforts to construct a bipartisan resolution that could be broadly supported by the Senate.

During the course of the committee's consideration of the Protocols of Accession for these seven nations to join NATO, we received testimony from Secretary of State Colin Powell, Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith, and United States Ambassador to NATO Nick Burns. Each expressed strong support for NATO expansion. In addition to efforts undertaken in the Foreign Relations Committee, Senators LEVIN and WARNER and the Committee on Armed Services conducted two hearings examining the military implications of the treaty and shared an analysis of their findings with us. This letter has been made a part of the RECORD and our committee report.

When NATO was founded in 1949, its purpose was to defend Western democracies against the Soviet Union. But the demise of the Soviet Union diminished the significance of NATO's mission. We began to debate where NATO should go and what NATO should do. In early 1993, I delivered a speech calling for NATO not only to enlarge, but also to prepare to go "out of area." At that time, many people were skeptical about enlarging NATO's size and mission. Those of us who believed in NATO enlargement prevailed in that debate. And I believe that events have proven us right.

As we consider this new enlargement, it is clear that the last round has been highly beneficial. Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic are among the most dynamic countries in Europe. They are deeply interested in alliance matters, and they have sought to maximize their contribution to collective security. The prospect of NATO membership gave these countries the incentive to accelerate reforms, to settle disputes, and cooperate with their neighbors. Their success, in turn, has been a strong incentive for democra-

tization and peace among Europe's other aspiring countries.

Many observers will point to the split over Iraq as a sign that NATO is failing or irrelevant. I disagree. Any alliance requires constant maintenance and adjustment, and NATO is no exception. The United States has more at stake and more in common with Europe than with any other part of the world. These common interests and shared values will sustain the alliance if governments realize the incredible resource that NATO represents. As the leader of NATO, we have no intention of shirking our commitment to Europe.

But as we attempt to mend the alliance's political divisions over Iraq, we must go one step further and ask, if NATO had been united on Iraq, could it have provided an effective command structure for the military operation that is underway now? And would allies, beyond those currently engaged in Iraq, have been willing and able to field forces that would have been significant to the outcome of the war? In other words, achieving political unity within the alliance, while important to international opinion, does not guarantee that NATO will be meaningful as a fighting alliance in the war on terror.

In the coming years, NATO will have to decide if it wants to participate in the security challenge of our time. If we do not prevent major terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, the alliance will have failed in the most fundamental sense of defending our nations and our way of life.

This reality demands that as we depend NATO, we also retool NATO, so that it can be a mechanism of burden sharing and mutual security in the war on terrorism. America is at war, and we feel more vulnerable than at any time since the end of the cold war and perhaps since World War II. We need allies to confront this threat effectively, and those alliances cannot be circumscribed by geographic boundaries.

In our committee hearings on NATO, we have heard encouraging testimony that our allies are taking promised steps to strengthen their capabilities in such areas as heavy airlift and sea-lift and precision-guided munitions. We also have heard that the seven candidates for membership are developing niche military capabilities that would be useful in meeting NATO's new military demands. But clearly, much work is left to be done to transform NATO into a bulwark against terrorism. An early test will be NATO's contribution to peacekeeping and humanitarian duties in the aftermath of combat in Iraq. A strong commitment by NATO nations to this role would be an important step in healing the alliance divisions and reaffirming its relevance for the long run.

The Resolution of Ratification we are considering today includes nine declarations and three conditions. I will review each of these provisions for the benefit of the Senate:

Declaration 1 reaffirms that membership in NATO remains a vital national security interest of the United States.

Declaration 2 lays out the strategic rationale for NATO enlargement.

Declaration 3 emphasizes that upon completion of the accession process, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia will have all the rights, privileges, obligations, responsibilities, and protections of full NATO members.

Declaration 4 emphasizes the importance of European integration.

Declaration 5 reiterates NATO's "open door" policy, and declares that the seven new countries will not be the last invited to join the alliance.

Declaration 6 expresses the Senate's support for the Partnership for Peace.

Declaration 7 expresses support for the NATO-Russia Council established at the Prague Summit, but reinforces the Senate's view that Russia does not have a veto or vote on NATO policy.

Declaration 8 declares that the seven candidate countries have implemented mechanisms for the compensation of victims of the Holocaust and of Communism.

Declaration 9 states that the committee has maintained the constitutional role of the U.S. Senate in the treaty-making process.

Condition 1 requires the President to reaffirm understandings on the costs, benefits, and military implications of NATO enlargement.

Condition 2 requires the President to submit a report to the Congressional Intelligence Committees on the progress of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in meeting NATO security sector and security vetting standards.

Finally, Condition 3 requires the President to certify to Congress that each of the governments of the seven candidate countries is fully cooperating with the U.S. efforts to obtain the fullest accounting of captured and missing U.S. personnel from previous conflicts and the Cold War.

When President Bush made his first trip to Europe 2 years ago, he strongly voiced the U.S. commitment to Europe generally and to NATO in particular. Now at a moment when relations with some of our European allies are strained, a clear showing of bipartisan support for NATO enlargement takes on added importance. The affirming message of the first round of enlargement led to improved capabilities and strengthened transatlantic ties. I am confident that this second round will do the same. I ask my colleagues to join me in voting for this resolution of ratification.

I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will proceed with an opening statement relative to the matter before us, and that is expansion of NATO.

Mr. President, today we begin consideration of an amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 to admit to NATO seven new members—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

If we approve this legislation, as I hope we will, it will mark an important step in the strategic transformation of the Alliance to respond to a new security environment.

I would like to discuss the history of this strategic transformation and then to examine the qualifications of each of the seven candidate countries.

The process of transforming the Alliance actually began shortly after the collapse of communism in Europe in 1989.

The first major change in the post-Cold War NATO was an absolutely critical event that is all-but-forgotten today: the accession to NATO, without fanfare, of the former East Germany when it reunited with the Federal Republic of Germany on October 3, 1990.

We talk about the expansion of NATO and we never really mention that. Again, the first significant thing that happened in transforming the alliance in the new security environment was that East Germany, a former Warsaw Pact member, was accepted and subsumed into and became part of Germany again, but also became part of NATO as a consequence of that.

The following year, in June 1991, the Warsaw Pact disbanded, and in December 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved.

At the Madrid Summit in July 1997, NATO invited three countries from the former Warsaw Pact—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary—to enter into final accession negotiations with the Alliance.

I might say a word about the care with which this body scrutinized that round of NATO enlargement.

The Committee on Foreign Relations alone held a dozen detailed hearings and published a 550-page book containing hearing transcripts, policy analyses, a detailed trip report, and other documents. Other committees also held hearings on enlargement.

Then, during March and April of 1998, came seven full days of intense debate on ratification here on the floor. I had the privilege of being floor manager for the ratification, which was approved by a 80-19 vote on the evening of April 30, 1998.

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic formally joined NATO on March 12, 1999. Less than 2 weeks later, the Allied air war was launched against Serbian aggression in Kosovo.

The events of the 1990s, and the increasing instability in the Middle East and Central Asia, led my farsighted colleagues—Senator LUGAR and former Senator Nunn, to the memorable con-

clusion that the NATO Alliance had to "go out of area, or out of business."

Still, most analysts remained skeptical. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, dispatched any remaining doubts about the nature of the threats we now face. The unanimous decision on the following day by the NATO Allies to invoke Article 5 for the first time in NATO's history confirmed the vitality of NATO's collective defense principle.

At the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002, the Allies agreed that in order to meet security threats, NATO needed forces that could be deployed quickly to wherever they are needed and sustained over time to complete their mission. This agreement effectively settled, at least conceptually, the "out-of-area" debate.

Meanwhile, in Brussels and among NATO members a discussion had begun on the merits of a so-called "Big Bang" next round of enlargement to give meaning and force to the new missions ahead.

Recognizing that potential members in Central and Eastern Europe would individually require years to reach all of the military standards of NATO, members began to view their entrance as a regional grouping as politically and geographically strategic.

Initially, I personally had some skepticism of this perspective and was concerned about the abilities of these countries to contribute to the alliance. But the determined response of these countries to the war against terrorism, their participation in SFOR and KFOR peacekeeping in the Balkans, their participation in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and the progress they have made on their NATO membership action plans, so-called MAPs, convinced me all seven of these countries would serve us well as formal allies. I declared my support for all seven of these countries in an article I wrote for the Los Angeles Times of September 1, 2002.

The critical turning point in defining new tasks for NATO occurred at Prague in November 2002, at NATO's so-called "Transformation Summit."

Prague crystallized the debate over NATO's new missions, new capabilities, and new members, and it afforded members opportunity to set forth a strategic agenda for a revitalized NATO.

Among the accomplishments at Prague, the alliance agreed to the Prague Capabilities Commitment. NATO, because it is a military organization—I think it is beyond that and is a political organization as well—loves all these acronyms. It takes a while; I apologize for my colleagues who do not follow this closely. The PCC, the Prague Capabilities Commitment, replaced the overly ambitious and broad Defense Capabilities Initiative of 1999 with a more concrete framework for force modernization and adaptation, including acquisition of equipment and technology through consortia of members and the development by individual

countries of so-called niche capabilities, which I will describe later. That is a new term that is formally being used.

NATO also adopted an American proposal to develop a NATO response force, NRF, a high-readiness, mobile combat unit that would allow NATO to go out of area to meet threats where they arise.

Finally, the alliance invited the seven countries whose qualifications we are considering today to begin final negotiations with the alliance on joining as full members.

NATO issued the invitation knowing that the militaries in most of the seven countries would not greatly enhance the war-fighting ability of the alliance, at least in the short term. Taken together, however, they will measurably increase NATO's potential.

The seven invited countries will add 220,000 active-duty troops to the alliance immediately, or about 175,000 by the end of the decade, once current reform and restructuring of forces are completed in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. This represents a 6 percent overall increase in NATO military forces.

This round of enlargement will also yield strategic infrastructure benefits. The membership of the seven countries will increase the number of airfields with long runways available to the alliance by 6 percent and the number available in Europe by 13 percent.

Airfields and ports in these countries also factor in to the Pentagon's initial plans to reshuffle its forces in Europe, including the possibility of building U.S. bases and airfields in Bulgaria and the nearby Black Sea port of Burgas, as well as at a Romania airbase and a Black Sea port of Constanta.

In addition, Romania has unmanned aerial vehicles and a C-130 lift capability, while Slovakia has air-to-ground training ranges.

Moreover, the enlargement will add so-called niche capabilities to NATO's array of professional forces, several of which could be directly applicable to future out-of-area missions. These specialized capabilities include Bulgarian and Slovak antinuclear, biological, and chemical weapons teams; Slovenian demining units; Romanian elite force and mountain troops; Lithuanian special forces and medics; Estonian explosive detection teams; Latvian explosive ordinance destruction specialists, including underwater demolition teams; and a joint Baltic Sea air surveillance network.

While their forces may be small in number, the seven invited countries have shown no hesitancy in deploying their uniformed men and women in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and, in some cases, in the Middle East, as coalition operations have required.

In February of this year, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined NATO candidates Albania, Croatia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as the so-called Vilnius Ten in

bravely standing with the United States and its coalition partners.

They declared the importance of the transatlantic alliance and called for action by the international community in response to the clear and growing danger posed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

Mr. President, a short excerpt from their declaration demonstrates the vigorous spirit these nations I believe will bring to NATO:

Our countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend our shared values. The trans-Atlantic community, of which we are a part, must stand together to face the threats posed by the nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction.

In word and in deed, these countries have already demonstrated their value as partners and de facto allies, and it is in the interest of the United States, in my view, to see this partnership be made formal by their acceptance into NATO.

The governments of the seven involved countries have also taken tremendous steps and, in some cases, faced considerable political risk to align their institutions and policies in accordance with NATO's standards and values. Let me summarize their individual qualifications for NATO membership.

Bulgaria: Bulgaria has committed to spend around 2.8 percent of GDP on defense in 2003, a higher percentage than that of several of our current allies, and to continue to downsize its armed forces by the thousands. On October 31, 2002, Bulgaria announced that it had destroyed all of its FROG, SCUD and SS-23 missiles, remnants of the old Soviet arsenal.

To shut down any further proliferation of gray arms, Sofia has adopted a supplemental export control legislation, drafted a new border security act, and adopted new regulations on border checkpoints.

Moreover, it took immediate and decisive action against those involved in the illegal shipment that occurred last year from the Terem military complex.

Bulgaria, a rare country that protected its Jewish citizens during World War II, has generally been tolerant of all its religious, ethnic, and political minorities. An exception was the anti-Turkish campaign in the late eighties, the dying spasms of a discredited Communist regime. Today a largely ethnic Turkish party is a member of the governing coalition. Bulgaria is now moving to complete the process of property restitution to its Jewish community with only one property still under legal procedure.

Estonia: Estonia leads the Baltic region in free market reforms, increased defense spending last year of 2 percent of GDP, and is developing a light infantry brigade, the first battalion of which should be equipped and trained by the end of this month. The organization, Transparency International, has rated

Estonia the least corrupt country in central and Eastern Europe.

Building on an already good record, last year, they adopted an action plan to improve the administration and judicial capacity in their country.

Estonia has amended minimum language requirements in its laws on citizenship and employment to address needs particularly of its large Russian ethnic community. As a result, in the most recent national elections, the ethnic Russian parties failed to clear the 5 percent hurdle necessary to enter Parliament. In other words, the majority of Estonia's ethnic Russian citizens cast their vote for multinational parties on the basis of substantive issues, not ethnicity. I think that is remarkable.

In August 2002, overcoming a few voices of intolerance, the Estonian Parliament voted to recognize January 27 as a day of remembrance for the Holocaust.

I know the Presiding Officer is a student of that era, as well as my colleague from Indiana, the chairman.

That is also a fairly remarkable undertaking. People in this country think it would be automatic, but that is a pretty big deal.

Latvia has enacted a law to require 2 percent of its GDP to be spent on defense beginning this year. By the end of 2003, Latvia's first professional infantry battalion will be ready to participate in NATO-led operations, with three additional mobile reserve battalions ready in 2004.

Riga's economic reform efforts have been well funded and generally successful, and Latvia is now assisting other post-Communist countries such as Georgia and Ukraine with their own reform efforts.

After a somewhat contentious start in the early 1990s, Latvia has had considerable success in integrating its large Russian-speaking minority by dismantling citizenship and bureaucratic restrictions to full social and political participation within Latvia.

Lithuania has increased its spending on defense to 2 percent of GDP in 2002. By the end of 2004, Lithuania will be able to deploy and sustain a mobile, professional infantry battalion, and by 2006 a rapid reaction brigade.

A small, elite unit of Lithuanian special operations forces is currently serving in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Recently, this unit was involved in ground combat against al-Qaida forces during a strategic reconnaissance mission and together, with allied reinforcements, captured several of the enemy.

Lithuania signed a border treaty with Russia in 1997, which the Russian Duma is expected to ratify later this month, and has reached an agreement to permit Russian military traffic to transit Lithuania on its way to Kaliningrad.

In 2002, Vilnius launched a Program for Control and Prevention of Trafficking in Human Beings and Prostitution. The Government has established

a public center for the Roma in Vilnius, launched a program to integrate Roma into Lithuanian society, and developed information campaigns to promote this tolerance.

Conscripts in Lithuania's armed forces have a unit in their training on the history of World War II and the Holocaust in Lithuania, and the Government is working with international nongovernment organizations to establish legal procedures for Jewish communal property restitution.

Quite frankly, in a sense, as I go through this, if we did nothing other than accomplish these changes in the countries I have mentioned so far, unrelated to the military, in order to get them to move toward NATO—not to get them to make it clear what they had to accommodate to move toward NATO—I would argue it would be a significant success, a singular success, but the story goes on.

Romania, by far the largest of the seven candidate countries, spends \$1 billion, or 2.38 percent of its GDP, on defense. Moreover, Romania is committed to being a net contributor to NATO and is upgrading its 21 MiG-29 fighter aircraft, its navy ships, and its missile launching systems.

An elite Romanian infantry battalion, the Red Scorpions, served in Afghanistan—that is how they are referred to, the “Red Scorpions”—and was replaced by the Carpathian Hawks that are currently there. I love these names. It is sort of part of the history of Romania, which is another question.

I might add that Romania flew these units to Afghanistan on their own C-130s, a feat which many of our current NATO allies are unable to duplicate.

The Romanian economy has grown substantially over the past 3 years, by 4 percent in 2002, and inflation, although it remains high, has been brought under the IMF target rate of 22 percent.

Romania opened a National Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office in September 2002 and has begun a judicial reform effort that includes prosecuting judges for bribery and corruption, an act called “unprecedented in the region.” Romania's relations with Hungary have improved following the 2001 agreement on Hungarian “status law” for ethnic Hungarians outside Hungary's border. I might add, one of the major changes that took place when Hungary wished to come in was Hungary made similar reforms.

These changes are consequential. As a student of European history, some of this is centuries in coming. The animosities and antagonisms have been real. This is a big deal. The reason I bother to point that out is that it all has a ripple effect, in my view.

Hungary's admission to NATO began Hungary forming their policies that related to ethnicity. That, in turn, I believe, has made it easier for Romania—and necessary, by the way, to become part of NATO—to act in a similar way.

Slovakia has made great progress in democratic reforms and is the first

country to reelect a center-right reform government in Central and Eastern Europe since the end of the cold war.

Under Prime Minister Dzurinda, Bratislava committed to raise its defense spending and maintain it at 2 percent of GDP in 2003 and beyond. A sweeping defense reform plan, known as the Slovak Republic Force 2010, will establish by 2010 a small, well-equipped interoperable armed force integrated into NATO military structures.

In February 2003, Slovakia opened a new department to fight corruption, which is overseen by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice. Bratislava is preparing new laws to create an Office of the Special Prosecutor and to prevent corruption in public administration and the judiciary.

I remember, after the Prague Spring was crushed back several decades ago, I went to Bratislava to meet the fellow who was responsible for the Prague Spring.

To think that today this is all happening is, to me, amazing, just within the time that I have been in the Senate.

Alone among the seven candidates, Slovenia comes out of a tradition of nonalignment as a part of the former Yugoslavia. It is the exception. Also alone among the candidates, it won its independence by force of arms in a short, successful war against the Federal Yugoslav forces in June of 1991.

I might add, I pushed very hard in the first round for Slovenia to be added. I thought they were qualified then.

Moreover, Slovenia has won widespread acclaim for aspects of peacekeeping activities. Its International Trust for Demining and War Victims Assistance is currently responsible for two-thirds of all the demining operations in southeastern Europe.

Although the wealthiest in per capita terms of the candidate countries, Slovenia has lagged behind the other six in terms of defense spending as a percentage of GDP. Ljubljana has committed to reach 2 percent GDP by 2008. Slovenia has focused on creating two battalions of rapid reaction forces for combat and peacekeeping operations.

Freedom House gave Slovenia the highest rating of all the candidate countries with respect to rule of law and preventing and combating corruption. Slovenia is the only country among the seven candidates to have held a referendum on NATO membership. On March 23 of this year, 66 percent of those participating voted in favor of membership, a considerable achievement during the first week of the highly televised military operations in Iraq, which I need not tell my colleagues was not particularly politic or popular among most European voters.

No society anywhere is perfect, and despite their outstanding record of accomplishment, significant challenges

remain for each of the seven candidate countries. They include: permanently curtailing all gray arms sales in Bulgaria; implementing strict control over classified information in Bulgaria and Latvia; eliminating discrimination against ethnic minorities, especially Roma, in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia; abolishing the remaining restrictions on the freedom of the news media in Romania; completing the restitution of religious and communal properties that had been seized by the Communists or by the Fascists during the Holocaust in all of the seven countries; educating the publics of all of these countries about the Holocaust and the poison of anti-Semitism; and fully implementing legislation designed to eradicate corruption in all seven countries.

Membership in NATO, however, in my view, will reinforce the process of democratic and economic reforms ongoing in these countries.

That is why I mentioned Hungary before. I think this is a process. I think they have all met the minimum standards required, both in terms of their militaries, at this point, and in terms of reforms necessary.

I truly believe we were unwilling—and I don't believe we will be—to admit them, we would turn this progress in the wrong direction. As a member of NATO, what we have seen is that these countries will get better and better and better. At least that is my hope and expectation.

Each country has worked with NATO under the Membership Action Plan process and has developed a subsequent Timetable for the Completion of Reforms to identify strategies to conclude and build on the steps necessary to assume the full responsibilities and obligations of NATO membership.

As Ambassador Nick Burns, the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, recently told the Foreign Relations Committee, “We have pushed these countries hard to be ready,” and “they will be among our most committed allies when they walk through NATO's doors as full members.”

The Resolution of Ratification before the Senate today is similar to the resolution approved during the last round of NATO enlargement. Let me briefly summarize it.

The text reflects bipartisan agreement, in accord with the view of the administration, that U.S. membership in NATO remains a vital national security interest of the United States.

The Resolution of Ratification makes clear that any threat to the stability of Europe would jeopardize vital U.S. interests.

It reaffirms that the security and prosperity of the United States is enhanced by NATO's collective defense against aggression that may threaten the territory of NATO members.

It affirms that all seven countries have democratic governments, have demonstrated a willingness to meet all

requirements of membership, and are in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.

The resolution underscores the importance of European integration, mentioning the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—OSCE—and the European Union in that regard.

The resolution also contains positive declarations on the alliance's "Open Door" policy toward potential future members, on the alliance's successful Partnership for Peace program, on the NATO-Russia Council created last year, and on compensation for victims of the Holocaust and of communism.

The resolution contains three substantive and sensible conditions relating to costs and burden-sharing, on intelligence matters, and on full cooperation with efforts to obtain full accounting of captured and missing U.S. personnel from past military conflicts or cold war incidents.

In summary, I believe the Resolution of Ratification accomplishes the objective of providing the strategic rationale for the accession of these seven new members and preserving U.S. interests with respect to future enlargement.

This round of enlargement isn't the end of the road. Rather, it is a historic milestone in a process that began with the end of the cold war.

Thus, it is essential that the door to membership remain open for candidates states Albania, Croatia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as down the road for potential candidates like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine, and perhaps other countries.

By endorsing NATO enlargement, we recognize the soundness and relevance of the vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace.

We acknowledge that a larger, stronger transatlantic relationship anchored in NATO will better serve us in confronting the transnational terrorist threats of the twenty-first century.

We affirm that the United States will continue to play a leadership role in the security of the North Atlantic area, which I think is critical for us to reaffirm.

I urge my Senate colleagues to vote in favor of the Resolution of Ratification and endorse the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia as full members of the NATO Alliance.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. LUGAR. We are pleased to yield time to the distinguished Senator from Kansas, as much as he would require.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for admitting Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As NATO's focus evolves to include transnational threats, it is important to have as many like-minded nations abroad as possible.

At the same time Congress and the President must ensure NATO as a military alliance can act efficiently and with precision in the post 9/11 world.

These days I hear some pundits talk about rebuilding the alliance as if it is in the same shape as post-war Iraq or post-war Afghanistan. NATO is in no such condition. The inability to achieve North Atlantic Council approval for assistance to Turkey was damaging but not catastrophic. NATO is in good shape.

Nonetheless, it would be productive for NATO to consider improvements that would streamline its decision-making process, increase operational planning for contingencies, and more appropriately respond to a member nation who refuses to uphold basic alliance mandates such as Article IV.

Toward that end, I am pleased to join Chairman WARNER and Senator LEVIN in offering an amendment to the Resolution of Ratification that adds a declaration concerning potential reforms to NATO internal processes.

Specifically, the declaration includes a Sense of the Senate that the President should place on the agenda for discussion at the North Atlantic Council the consensus rule as well as a process for suspending a member nation that acts contrary to the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Further, the Warner-Levin-Roberts amendment requires a report from the President regarding Alliance dialogue on these issues as well as methods to provide more flexibility to NATO's military leadership for operational planning prior to formal alliance approval.

My primary focus is on the process of consensus and planning for new contingencies.

The decision-making process of consensus within the NATO alliance served the organization and is purpose well in the 20th Century. While the bipolar security environment of the previous century shaped our command, and defined our mission, the 21st Century requires that we depart from the clearly defined role of territorial defense.

NATO must recognize the need to change from the traditional terrain-based military of a defensive alliance to an effects-based alliance in order to prepare for a new set of security challenges. Our adversaries do not recognize international law, sovereignty or accepted norms of behavior.

As we recognize the growing need to conduct operations outside the alliance's boundaries as we do in Afghanistan in order to protect our interests and enhance our security, we also need to acknowledge the inherent limitations of consensus voting by 26 nations.

Issues of security and the need to take military action will likely not be perceived uniformly in an organization that spans a wide geographic area, encompassing different interests. Recognizing this reality and the need to adopt a different modality for decision

making within the alliance is imperative.

I would argue NATO needs to consider adopting—I emphasize needs to consider—a decision-making model that doesn't require a consensus vote to act. Nations that choose not to take military action would not be compelled to participate. However, they would not block the alliance and those nations that decide to act from carrying out military operations.

That brings me to contingency planning. Currently, NATO's military leadership is forbidden to even conduct prudent planning for contingency operations until the matter is voted on in the North Atlantic Council.

The difficulty in crafting viable plans to often complex military operations amongst nineteen separate nations is a daunting task. The measure of difficulty to conduct planning will be exacerbated with the addition of seven new members.

Current planning processes may even prevent the full realization of the NATO Response Force, something that could be stood up at the June principal meeting. This capability is central to NATO's appropriate effort to develop an agile and responsive force that will enable the alliance to respond to terrorism and instability.

To transform the military capability into a viable, very responsive force without the means to rapidly employ it, is counterproductive. It is time for NATO to consider developing a methodology by which the military leadership is permitted to conduct prudent planning for contingency operations.

These are my concerns, as we vote—and I will vote—to approve further expansion of the alliance. I commend my colleagues, the chair and ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services, for sharing these concerns and for crafting a worthy amendment.

I am a cosponsor, and I urge support for Warner-Levin-Roberts amendment.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HAGEL). Who yields time?

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I yield 20 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Ohio.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.

Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I am so proud to stand on the floor of the Senate today as we consider the candidacy of seven new European democracies—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia—for membership in the NATO Alliance.

The question of NATO enlargement is one that has long been close to my heart. As Mayor of Cleveland and Governor of the State of Ohio, I worked closely with constituents in my State with ties to countries that were once subject to life behind the Iron Curtain.

It is amazing to me to see how far many of these countries have come in such a short time, rising to embrace democratic reforms after so many years under communist rule. The fact that seven countries that were once part of the former Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact or Tito's Yugoslavia have been invited to join the NATO alliance is testament to how much has been achieved since the collapse of the Soviet Empire more than a decade ago.

We owe so much to Pope John Paul II, President Reagan, President George H.W. Bush, and now President George W. Bush. As I said to the President in a letter prior to his trip to Poland in June 2001, when he clearly articulated his support for enlargement of the Alliance:

During my entire life I have supported the Captive Nations and yearned that someday they would have freedom, but I doubted that would happen during my lifetime. However, it did happen because of your dad and President Reagan, who said "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall."

I also said:

You, Mr. President, have the opportunity to guarantee the freedom and security of those once subjected to life under Communist control by making it clear that you will support the expansion of NATO to include former territories of the Soviet Union, Tito's Yugoslavia and the Warsaw Pact regardless of Russia's opposition.

And he did it.

President Bush outlined his vision for enlargement in a landmark speech to the students and faculty at the University of Warsaw on June 15, 2001, when he remarked that as we approach the NATO Summit in Prague:

We should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom.

That speech was very strategic because at the time there were many people who were wondering whether or not the President would move away from the expansion of NATO in consideration of compromising with at that time President Putin in regard to the ABM Treaty—the ABM Treaty at the time looking like it would stand in the way of moving forward with the President's National Missile Defense Initiative.

The President was true to his word, and it was extremely gratifying to see this vision begin to turn to reality when President Bush joined other NATO heads of state in Prague last November. I remain grateful to the President for inviting me to join him as a member of the Congressional delegation to the NATO Summit, along with Senator BILL FRIST, Congressman TOM LANTOS, Congressman ELTON GALLEGLY and Congressman DOUG BEREUTER. The thrill of being in the room when NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson an-

nounced the decision to invite the three Baltic nations, as well as Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, to join the Alliance, is something that I will always remember.

On that historic day, I listened as heads of state from our allied nations including the Czech Republic, France, Spain, Great Britain, Poland, Canada, Turkey, and many others praised the work done by the seven candidate countries and expressed their strong support for enlargement to include these new European democracies.

While there are disagreements within NATO that must be addressed, there is general consensus among the current members of the Alliance on the question of enlargement. It is acknowledged that in addition to shared values, the seven candidate countries bring defense capabilities that will enhance the overall security and stability of the NATO Alliance. President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and the highest-ranking member of the U.S. military, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, have all expressed this view. America's top leaders believe that in addition to niche military capabilities, these seven countries bring energy, freshness and enthusiasm to the Alliance.

As Secretary Powell remarked in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week, enlargement of the NATO Alliance to include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia is in the national security interest of the United States. It will, he said:

Help to strengthen NATO's partnerships to promote democracy, the rule of law, free markets and peace throughout Eurasia. Moreover, it will better equip the Alliance to respond collectively to the new dangers we face.

NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, after working with the NATO aspirant countries on comprehensive domestic reforms in preparation for membership in the Alliance, has also concluded that this round of enlargement will enhance the strength and vitality of NATO a view which he expressed at the Prague Summit and reiterated earlier this week during a meeting with members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

I share this view, and I believe it is appropriate and timely that we now consider these candidates for membership in NATO. They have provided crucial support in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against our country on 9/11, and continue to make significant contributions to the ongoing campaign against international terrorism. They have shown their solidarity in our efforts to disarm Saddam Hussein and liberate the Iraqi people, and have pledged to work with the international community to promote security and reconstruction in Iraq following the end of military action.

The candidate countries have also moved forward with democratic re-

forms to promote the rule of law and respect for human rights. I am strongly concerned about the disturbing rise in anti-Semitic violence in Europe and other parts of the world. Several of the candidate countries, including Latvia, Bulgaria, and Romania, have joined with the United States, Poland and other countries to actively encourage the chair-in-office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—OSCE—to mount a serious and credible OSCE conference on anti-Semitism. Due in part to their efforts, the OSCE has agreed to conduct such a conference, and it is scheduled to take place in June. This is just one example, but it is indicative of important action that is taking place.

As was highlighted during a series of hearings on NATO enlargement conducted by the Foreign Relations Committee, the seven candidate countries bring nearly 200,000 new troops to the alliance. They have also pledged to commit significant resources to national defense, with Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, and Lithuania all at or above 2 percent of the gross domestic product mark in 2002. Slovakia and Latvia were just under 2 percent, and Slovenia at 1.6 percent in 2002, and they have pledged and committed to reach the 2-percent mark by 2008.

The average defense spending among candidate countries was 2.1 percent for 2002, which is equal to the average spent by the current NATO members for the same period. It is interesting to note that 11 of the 19 members of the alliance did not reach the 2-percent mark for defense spending in 2002, which we should all be concerned about. Clearly, there is room for improvement in this regard for current members of the alliance.

On March 27, 2003, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman testified before the Armed Services Committee regarding the future of NATO. When asked about the benefits of enlargement, he said:

I believe, Senators, that the accession of these countries are about the future of NATO, and will be good and directly benefit U.S. interests. Why? They're strong Atlanticists. They're allies in the war on terror. They've already contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul.

The list goes on. I agree with Secretary Grossman's assessment. These countries already make significant contributions that strengthen the transatlantic relationship.

They have acted as *de facto* Allies. In fact, they have acted as better Allies than some of the members that are currently in NATO. And I believe they will make important contributions, as members, to the NATO alliance.

While much has been achieved, there is still work to be done as the candidate countries continue to work on their membership action plans. As was said in Prague, Prague should be viewed as the starting line, not the finishing line. There is still a lot more that has to be done on those maps.

Efforts have continued since the Prague summit. I was very pleased to learn that the people of Slovenia—who have been engaged in a discussion about NATO membership for many years now—voted overwhelmingly in support of Slovenia's membership in NATO during a national referendum on March 23, with roughly two-thirds of the voters favoring accession to the alliance. This was a crucial step for the country that was the birthplace of my maternal grandparents. Hooray for Slovenia. I am glad they understood.

It is imperative that the candidates continue to address the outstanding issues that require attention, including military reform, respect for human rights, and efforts to combat organized crime and corruption. It is this last piece, perhaps, that concerns me the most. These problems have the potential to undermine democratic reforms, respect for the rule of law, and other core NATO values, and I believe they could be very dangerous if left unchecked.

I was glad to hear from Secretary Powell, during his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee last week, that there are, in fact—this is wonderful—significant steps that have taken place on behalf of the NATO aspirants to combat corruption and organized crime. With regard to Bulgaria, for example, the Secretary of State remarked that the Bulgarian Government recently created an interagency anticorruption commission to be led by the Minister of Justice. The Bulgarian Parliament also passed anticorruption legislation and antibribery legislation.

Secretary Powell noted that the Romanian Government is now working on legislation to reform its judiciary, civil service, and political party financing activities. I am also hopeful that Romania will move forward with steps to ensure progress on outstanding property restitution issues, including those of significance to Hungarian and other minority groups in Romania.

So while I still think there is work to be done, I am satisfied that things are moving in the right direction.

After meeting with leaders from these seven countries and spending time in each country that has been invited to join NATO—I have been in all of them and have met with all of their leaders—I am confident that reforms will continue. I sincerely believe reforms will be swifter and more complete as these countries are brought into the alliance rather than left out. History tells us this has been the case with other countries that have been part of the alliance. NATO has a way of asserting pressure and, as General Lord Robertson said during our meeting Monday, squeezing those who need to shape up.

As we consider enlargement today, it is clear that the world is a different place than it was when Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were brought into NATO. The world's democracies and multilateral institu-

tions, including the NATO alliance, face new threats to freedom, marked not by Communist aggression but, instead, by the dangerous nexus between weapons of mass destruction, rogue nations, and terrorists who have shown their willingness to use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons against those who value freedom and democracy, if given the chance.

NATO's decision to invoke article 5 in the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11 signifies that an attack on one is an attack on all, and that sent a strong message of solidarity to the people of the United States and the world at large. I suspect that when the resolution was put together in regard to article 5, we were very careful to make sure we did not get ourselves in entangling alliances. Never did we ever believe we would be calling on the other nations in NATO to come to our assistance as they did.

NATO's mission to transform to meet these growing threats does not make the alliance irrelevant; rather, it means we need the shared commitment to freedom, democracy, and security embodied by the NATO alliance now more than ever before. A NATO alliance enlarged to include seven new democracies that have embraced these values will enhance our ability to meet new challenges for peace in the world.

At the Prague summit, NATO heads of state embarked upon a course to identify the capabilities needed to confront new challenges to international security. They agreed that new challenges would require the alliance to operate beyond Europe's borders. The Prague Declaration noted:

In order to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, upon decision by the North Atlantic Council, to sustain operations over distance and time, including in an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve their objectives.

As Secretary General Lord Robertson has said, NATO must either go out of area, or go out of business.

This will become crucial as NATO prepares to assume new responsibilities in Afghanistan this August, moving forward on the North Atlantic Council's decision on April 16 to provide enhanced support to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. NATO's new ISAF role is perhaps indicative of the types of missions the alliance could take on in years to come. As Secretary Powell indicated last week, this is the largest step to date that the alliance has taken outside its traditional area of responsibility. And, as you know, Mr. President, they are now talking about the possibility of NATO being involved in security forces in Iraq.

As the alliance prepares for its role in Afghanistan, it does so at a time when current members of NATO and other countries in Europe have considerable experience working together, due to operations in Kosovo, Bosnia,

and Macedonia. As former Supreme Allied Commander Joe Ralston noted in remarks before the Atlantic Council on Monday evening, this is in stark contrast to the past, when members of the alliance depended on annual training exercises.

I think that is really something we should emphasize, that these nations have been working militarily together since Bosnia. They are in Kosovo today. They will be in Afghanistan. It is amazing how well the NATO command has worked in Kosovo. And I am confident it will work as well in Afghanistan.

But new missions will demand that NATO step up efforts to improve its military capabilities. This was a major theme at the Prague summit last November, where NATO heads of state approved the creation of a NATO response force, which is envisioned to consist of approximately 25,000 troops who are ready and able to deploy anywhere in the world within 30 days. The goal is to have the force operational by 2006. While work has been ongoing to flesh out the details of the NATO response force, this is still a paper concept, and we look forward to learning more about efforts to turn this into a viable force at the June ministerial meeting in Madrid.

The NATO response force goes hand in glove with the Prague Capabilities Commitment, which replaces the Defense Capabilities Initiative, or DCI, that was initiated at the 1999 Washington summit. As many of us know, very little progress was made on that 1999 Defense Capabilities Initiative.

The Prague Capabilities Commitment, though, calls on Allies to improve and develop military capabilities, focusing on defense against weapons of mass destruction, intelligence, command, control and communications, and strategic air and sea lift, among other things.

This initiative focuses on pooling resources and identifying niche capabilities that certain countries can bring to the table in order to strengthen NATO's military reach. I have been pleased to hear from Secretary Powell, Lord Robertson, and General Ralston that the alliance has begun to identify niche contributions that the seven candidates can make to future operations.

They are willing and able. They have, in fact, already demonstrated their willingness to use them in NATO operations in the Balkans as well as military efforts to combat international terrorism.

For example, Bulgaria contributes troops to NATO operations in the Balkans, with military personnel in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Bulgaria has also contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom, allowing for coalition aircraft to refuel at Burgas, and sending a nuclear, biological and chemical decontamination unit to Afghanistan. Bulgaria has also deployed a NBC unit to the Iraqi theater of operations at the request of U.S. Central Command.



Estonia also supports NATO missions in southeast Europe, and has approved the deployment of troops to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq.

Latvia has deployed medical teams to Afghanistan, and in April the Latvian Parliament approved the deployment of troops to Iraq for peace enforcement and humanitarian operations.

Lithuania has deployed a medical team and a Special Operations Unit to Afghanistan. Lithuania has also deployed troops to support Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Romania sent a military police platoon to support the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Romania has also provided an NBC unit in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Slovakia has deployed an engineering unit to Afghanistan, and was the first NATO candidate country to deploy troops—an NBC unit—in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Slovenia provides troops and equipment to NATO operations in the Balkans, and has also provided crucial assistance in de-mining and mine victims assistance, running the International Trust Fund for De-mining. Additionally, Slovenia has provided humanitarian and de-mining assistance to Afghanistan.

They are all doing a job right now and will do more once they are brought into NATO formally.

While there is still work to be done, these contributions are encouraging. If NATO is to meet future challenges, it is imperative that the capabilities gap between the U.S. and our European allies be addressed. The Prague Capabilities Commitment highlights critical needs within the alliance. This is a good place to start, and I am hopeful that it will succeed in producing tangible results. Without adequate capabilities, NATO's ability to respond to future security challenges will be seriously undermined.

As NATO looks to the future, there will be other challenges. Bringing in seven members will, I believe, strengthen the alliance; at the same time, there will be adjustments as NATO adapts to membership at 26 rather than the current 19. I share the sentiments expressed by Secretary of State Colin Powell and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson that the alliance will adapt, as it always have.

I disagree with some of my colleagues, who may argue that significant changes should be made to the NATO decision-making process. The alliance has always been based on consensus, protecting the view of each member. As Secretary Powell remarked in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee last week, NATO is not a committee or a council. It is an Alliance that has traditionally—and successfully—been based on the rule of consensus.

I was interested when Lord Robinson spoke to us on Monday. We were talk-

ing about this issue. He said somehow we worked it out. We had the problem with Turkey, and there was a question of how that would all be worked out. The alliance had the flexibility to move forward and take care of that problem.

He specifically said that they need the flexibility, that somehow they will work it out. If we come in with some specific way of how we will do this, it will tie their hands and won't give them the flexibility to do what they have to do when the time comes. I am confident they will do that.

It is my sincere belief that the European democracies of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia will, as they have already demonstrated, contribute to NATO's proud tradition and serve to strengthen the alliance. I strongly support enlargement of the alliance to include these countries, and look forward to further expansion in the future to those countries who have demonstrated the ability to accept the responsibilities that come with membership in the NATO alliance. I never thought I would be here today on the Senate floor able to recommend this to my colleagues. It is a wonderful day.

I rise today in strong support of the Resolution on Ratification before us today, which will extend U.S. support to make NATO membership a reality for these new European democracies.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LUGAR. I ask unanimous consent that the time be charged equally to both sides during the quorum call.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, since the end of the cold war, the mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has changed from one of confronting the Soviet Union to one of securing democracy and stability in one undivided, free Europe.

By passing the resolution of ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, the Senate supports a giant step toward realizing that goal.

I want to speak just for a moment about the recent disagreements among

NATO countries regarding Iraq. After many years of supporting NATO enlargement, and my particular interest in Baltic membership in NATO—which I will speak about—I confess that I am concerned that now that my dream is on the cusp of reality, NATO is divided and torn.

I was one who thought the United States should have taken a longer diplomatic path before resorting to war with Iraq and I am particularly concerned about the impression expressed by many of our allies that there is no room for disagreement with US policy.

I believe that our relations with our NATO allies can and must be repaired. But I also want to remind my colleagues that NATO is an alliance of democratic countries whose populations were overwhelmingly opposed to the US going to war with Iraq.

If our goal is to support an undivided, democratic, and free Europe, we must accept and welcome debate within the NATO alliance and work harder to hear and accommodate the views of our allies. It would be the height of irony if the organization originally formed to confront totalitarian communism would disintegrate because of a lack of tolerance for disagreements with United States policy.

I want to focus my remarks today on this resolution on the Baltic states, not because I oppose the membership of Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. On the contrary, I supported the policy of seeking the largest possible enlargement of NATO in this round. I always confess my prejudice when I speak about the Baltic states. My mother was born in Lithuania. So when I speak of the Baltic countries, it is with particular personal feeling.

I could not have predicted a few years ago that we could not have to fight, and fight hard, to get Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into NATO.

Even as recently as three years ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed the NATO membership for the Baltic States would be a "reckless act" that removed a key buffer zone and posed a major strategic challenge to Moscow that could "destabilize" Europe.

Russian objections to Baltic membership in NATO had no credibility. Russia has nothing to fear from NATO and nothing to fear from Baltic membership in NATO. The tiny Baltic States are no military challenge to Russia, and certainly a democratic Russia does not threaten Europe.

I give credit where it is due, and I believe President Bush's strong leadership in supporting NATO enlargement and his firm rejection of Russian objections to Baltic membership were key to securing broad support, both here and in Europe, for this round of NATO enlargement.

A quick review of history is called for to help appreciate just how remarkable it is that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are on the verge of membership.

In June 1940, the Soviet Union occupied the Baltic countries of Estonia,



Latvia, and Lithuania and forcibly incorporated them into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Throughout the occupation, the United States maintained that the acquisition of Baltic territory by force was not permissible under international law and was unjust. We refused to recognize Soviet sovereignty over these Baltic States.

On July 15, 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt issued an Executive order freezing Baltic assets in the United States to prevent them from falling into Soviet hands. On July 23, 1940, Secretary of State Sumner Welles issued the first public statement of such policy of nonrecognition of the Soviet takeover of the Baltic countries. The United States took steps to allow the diplomatic representatives of those countries to continue to represent them in Washington despite the Soviet occupation.

In 1959, Congress designated the third week in July as "Captive Nations Week," and time after time, year after year, I would gather in Daley Plaza in Chicago with those from Baltic States and other occupied countries to wonder and pray if there would ever be freedom in those countries again.

The good news about Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia's membership in NATO is it did not come about by accident. The people of the Baltics never let go of their dreams of freedom. They never let our Government forget that they were going to live by those dreams. The official U.S. policy of nonrecognition of Soviet takeover of the Baltics gave them hope.

I went to Lithuania a few years ago with my late brother, Bill. We went to the tiny town where my mother was born, Jurbarkas. When we were there, we found we had relatives, cousins, that we never knew we had, family separated by the Iron Curtain.

I did not believe in my lifetime that I would see the changes come to pass in the Baltic States. When I visited Lithuania the first time in 1979, it was under Soviet domination. Freedom was at a premium, and the poor people of that country slogged by day after day wondering if they would ever have another chance at self-governance.

Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia asserted their independence from the domination of the Soviet Union, but at a great cost. Soviet paratroopers stormed the Press House in Vilnius, injuring four people. Barricades were set up in front of the Lithuania Parliament, the Seimas. On January 13, 1991, Soviet forces attacked the television station and tower in Vilnius, killing 14 Lithuanians. I was there shortly thereafter. Today, one can see how it is a standing memorial to those who died in the latest fight for freedom in the Baltics.

Images of crowds of unarmed civilians facing down Soviet tanks in the Baltics to protect their parliaments were a powerful message of resistance. It created hope across the world.

The Baltic countries have nurtured their relations with the West, but they have also worked to have a good relationship with Russia. Despite the bitter experience of years of Soviet occupation, each Baltic country has tried to establish a good working relationship so that citizenship and language laws conform to European standards, taking care not to discriminate against ethnic Russians still living in their borders. As a result of these steps, and because of U.S. and NATO's efforts to engage Russia in a positive relationship, Russia's opposition to Baltic membership has disappeared.

The Baltic countries, I wish to add, have also taken an extraordinary and historic step to face up to the bitter legacy of the Holocaust, when hundreds of thousands of Lithuanian, Estonian, and Latvian Jews perished, by setting up a Holocaust museum, teaching about the history of the Holocaust in school, returning the Torah scrolls taken from synagogues and destroyed during that sad period, and working to restore Jewish property rights.

Some people question whether these tiny countries bring anything to NATO. NATO is not a country club; it is a military alliance. When the Soviet troops finally left the Baltic countries, they took almost everything, and these tiny countries started to rebuild their economy and rebuild their power to defend themselves.

The old Soviet ways disappeared, and new thinking, new leaders appeared. Western ways of thinking about military organization, whether civilian control of the military, took their place. To be sure, these are small countries, but they have been helpful countries. They will make a positive contribution to NATO. They already have in Bosnia, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

When we ratified the membership of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, some in the Senate doubted their contributions and worried about the cost burdens. I think they realize today that those worries have not materialized into anything serious. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have been great allies of NATO.

Let me conclude by saying this. Today, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have worked hard to become market economies, to watch their democracies flourish. The fact they want so much to be part of NATO is an affirmation of great hope and great optimism for Europe. I am glad we stood by these countries during the dark hours of Soviet occupation.

I am sorry my mother did not live long enough to see this day, but she did live long enough for two of her three sons to return to the tiny village of Lithuania that she never saw after leaving in 1911. Our return trip to Lithuania was part of closing a loop in our own family history, but it also established a bond, a uniting, a tie between the United States and a small Baltic nation.

By the action of the Senate today in expanding NATO for these new countries, and particularly to expand them to include all of the Baltic countries and my mother's home nation of Lithuania, I believe we are completing the job which was started in 1999: to expand NATO and cement a stable democratic and free Europe.

I yield the floor.

Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I rise today to support the resolution ratifying the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, to include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria.

NATO has been the bedrock of international security since its establishment 54 years ago. Although the military dimension of the alliance was instrumental in containing the Soviet Union, NATO was always about more than military security. America's relationship with our NATO allies has symbolized the common values, as well as the common interests, of democracies united against those international actors who represent tyranny and aggression.

We live at a time of danger, unpredictability, and potential global instability. But we also live in a time of historic opportunity. Alliances are not absolved from the forces of change in world affairs. The ability to adapt to the challenges of this new era in world affairs—challenges from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction—speak to the importance of NATO and other international institutions, including the United Nations, that have played such key roles in promoting and protecting our common interests since World War II.

NATO's decision in November 2002 to expand its current membership of 19 by inviting Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria to begin accession negotiations acknowledges the imperatives of change. I strongly endorse this action. Today, member and candidate countries are expected to do what they can to modernize their forces, including development of niche capabilities and the establishment of a NATO response force. But we know that the contributions of an enlarged NATO will not be defined solely by military capabilities. Expanding NATO also encourages a process of political and economic reform in candidate states.

There is a deep security dimension to an expanded NATO. The threats from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction cannot be handled by the United States or any country alone. Defeating terrorism requires unprecedented international cooperation in the diplomatic, military, law enforcement, intelligence, and economic areas. If our purpose in an expanded NATO is about defeating these threats to our common security, than bringing these seven new members into NATO is critical to our national security.

Although America's military power may be unprecedented in world history,

NATO will continue to play a vital role in American and global security. In Afghanistan, the German proposal for NATO to take charge of the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, represents a new and significant turn in NATO's mission. NATO may well play a role in maintaining security in postwar Iraq. At some point, when there is an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, NATO troops may be called upon to help guarantee that peace.

I believe NATO's next 50 years will be just as important for world peace as its first 50 years.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise to urge the ratification of Treaty Document 108-14, allowing for the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO.

I wish to commend the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator LUGAR, as well as the ranking minority member, Senator BIDEN, for the work their committee has done to prepare for this historic vote. Since the first accession to the original membership of NATO, when Greece and Turkey were admitted, the Senate has preserved its role of advice and consent on amending this treaty. Senators LUGAR and BIDEN, who have made the advancement of the Atlantic alliance a central concern in their respected careers as two of the Senate's most thoughtful members on foreign policy, have maintained the Senate's critical function, and have, through hearings and statements through the years, provided many opportunities to study the policies and the evolution of the U.S. national interest within the Atlantic alliance.

This is the second time we have voted to ratify the North Atlantic treaty since the end of the cold war. President Clinton supported the first group of new entrants in 1998, and at that time I joined 79 of my colleagues in support of membership for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. When I took to this floor to urge ratification, I said: "I hope this is not the last enlargement, although I am confident that future enlargements, if they occur, will occur with the same detailed, painstaking consideration as we have conducted over the past 4 years." Senators LUGAR and BIDEN have given this accession treaty that consideration, and their committee has unanimously recommended passage. In so doing, the committee has concluded its work to achieve a major platform in President Bush's foreign policy: the admittance to this alliance of the latest group of nations willing and capable to advance the mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

We will all note that the debate today will be shorter than it was in 1998. And I predict that the vote for passage will be at least as strong, although it is worthwhile noting that every vote this Senate has had since

1955 on all of the new entrants to NATO has been with strong majorities. The reason the debate will be shorter today reflects the consensus that has formed on the subject we address today:

The enlargement of NATO, Mr. President, is good foreign policy for the United States.

Of course it is also good for the candidate countries. Working through our detailed membership action plans, these nations have transformed their militaries, improving interoperability and—this is equally important—developing complementarities of missions. They have had to accept goals for defense expenditures, exceeding, in some cases, the percentage of GNPs dedicated to defense by some of NATO's older members.

And the desire to join NATO has forced the applicant nations to promote and meet other conditions of open and democratic societies. These nations have had to resolve all border issues, establish political norms for the protection of minorities, open their historical archives and accept the responsibilities of their captive or totalitarian pasts, including the Holocaust era and the communist era, combat corruption and set standards of transparency, and educate their publics on the nature of the commitment to NATO. Throughout these years of preparation, we have seen, in varying strong and distinct measures, a host of nations enthusiastically embracing our values and earnestly accepting the responsibilities explicit in membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The core of that responsibility lies in article V of the North Atlantic treaty. That article states: "The Parties (that is, the member states) agree that an armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

This is the commitment at the core of the NATO alliance. It is that commitment that served to deter a Soviet attack against Europe and North America for nearly 50 years. That was a deterrence that was backed up by an explicit understanding that, if deterrence failed, NATO's goal would be to predominate in victory. The deterrence worked, the peace was kept, and that is why NATO is rightly considered the most effective military alliance in modern history.

The end of the cold war brought on a reevaluation of the role of NATO, with a few suggesting that NATO was no longer necessary without a Soviet

threat. That misguided view—that mistook the end of the Soviet threat for an era of unprecedented peace and security—never took hold. More sober minds recognized that security and stability were not to be assumed as the status quo, and that conflict would take new forms, be it ethnic war from the dissolution of Yugoslavia to transnational threats emanating from other parts of the world and threatening the security of Europe and North America.

As has already been mentioned in the debate, NATO has only invoked article V once in its history, and it was not during the cold war when, as I mentioned, the deterrence of the alliance always held. Article V was invoked after September 11, 2001, when the members of the alliance determined that the attacks by al-Qaida on the United States were to be considered an attack against the entire alliance. In the days after September 11, 2001, NATO aircraft flew patrols over U.S. airspace as the U.S. military prepared to deploy to Afghanistan in the first phase of our global war on terrorism.

Under U.S. leadership, NATO has accepted that it will face new missions in the 21st century, and that many of those activities defending the members of the alliance will be out-of-area missions. A quick review of the contributions of the nations seeking membership in this latest treaty accession demonstrates, in my view, that they understand the new missions and are already contributing.

Bulgaria was a member of the President Bush's "coalition of the willing," and granted use of its airspace as well as an airbase for our Iraq operations, and has offered infantry forces for peacekeeping. While Iraq was not a NATO operation, our ability to rely on Bulgaria, as well as other existing NATO members for equipment and support, made our victory in Iraq more easily attainable.

Estonia has been contributing to NATO operations in the Balkans, providing forces to SFOR and KFOR. It was also a member of the "coalition of the willing," and has also offered soldiers for post-conflict peacekeeping in Iraq. Similarly, Latvia has also contributed to SFOR and KFOR in the Balkans, supported U.S. policy in Iraq, and has sent medics to support our operations in Afghanistan. Lithuania has contributed to U.S. operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and was a vocal member of the "coalition of the willing" in Iraq.

Romania has made significant contributions to U.S. operations, providing troops and transport aircraft to our mission in Afghanistan, and granting use of their territory during our operations in Iraq. One thousand American troops are currently stationed in Romania.

These are just highlights of ways that these countries have directly contributed to the challenges we face

today, and they do not include the specialties these various countries are developing to confront the challenges of tomorrow.

I raise these highlights because I believe that ratifying this treaty is good foreign policy, Mr. President, in that it strengthens America's position in the world, and enhances our ability to achieve our goals when the defense of our national security requires us to go beyond our borders.

This second wave of nations joining NATO since the end of the cold war brings political stability and expands security to most of Central and Eastern Europe, a geographic zone that brought us calamitous strife and bloodshed in the 20th century. We are referring to a region that Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, has felicitously termed the "New Europe." I have nothing against the Old Europe, and note that history shows a common bond with many of the nations of that "Old" Europe, a bond reaffirmed by our coalition partner, Great Britain, and currently and I hope temporarily denied by other members, such as France, Germany and Belgium.

Today we vote for New Europe. In recognizing their contributions, we should not deny their enthusiastic embrace of America's role in the world. They were, after all, the captive nations of the Soviet era, and we were, after all, the leading light in the fight against communism. In their enthusiastic embrace of our values and our missions, I think of the line of Cicero, that "Gratitude is not only the greatest of virtues, but the parent of all others." These nations have shown already that they are willing to defend freedom, and their membership in the Atlantic alliance will advance that defense.

I will repeat again what I said in 1998, and say that I hope this is not the last enlargement. Croatia and Ukraine have indicated that they wish to join some day, and I would welcome them. The mission of NATO is to defend, not exclude.

Today I urge my colleagues to join me in ratifying this latest round of accession to NATO, and in so doing, to add force and depth to an organization that has long served the security of this Nation.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise in support of the proposed North American Treaty Alliance expansion before the Senate today.

When the NATO countries met in Prague last November, they agreed to invite seven new countries to join the Alliance as full members. These seven countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia have submitted their applications and proven their willingness and ability to respect the political and military obligations of NATO membership and to contribute to the Alliance's common-funded budgets and programs.

The NATO Alliance has been enormously successful over the last 50

years and will continue to do so for many to come. Too often some only see NATO as a coalition of nations organized for collective defense. It is so much more. NATO enhances the political and economic stability for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. By helping these new members as they strengthen good governance, rule of law, and human rights, NATO will also facilitate a better long-term environment for American trade and investment as well as collective defense and security.

In our war against terrorism, NATO serves a vital role. Strengthening the Alliance for this purpose is a positive development. From the conflicts in the Balkans, the war in Afghanistan or the most recent Operation Iraqi Freedom, the seven invitee nations have contributed, or have committed to contribute, critical support in the form of personnel, overflight or basing rights.

As a matter of fact, in this most recent war with Iraq, we received greater support from these seven countries than some of our more historical European allies. The value of loyal allies committed to democracy and making the world free from tyranny, regardless of any business dealings, cannot be understated.

These seven countries are committed to eliminating and addressing past wrongs. Whether it is the atrocities performed during the Second World War and the Holocaust to the proliferation of military weaponry known as Grey Arms, each of these countries has recognized the issues and is committed to correcting the wrongs done.

Expansion of NATO is not a new or unusual event. Throughout its tenure, NATO has continually added new members. Turkey and Greece were the first new members to join in 1952, followed soon after by Germany, in 1955. Spain entered in 1982 and the first former Warsaw Pact countries, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined in 1999.

It is also likely there will be another round of expansion, inviting such countries as Albania, Croatia and Macedonia. President Bush has espoused an "open door" policy to NATO membership.

Today the door should not be held open for some and kept shut for others. The defined membership criteria encourages all that satisfy these requirements will be welcomed.

NATO expansion will serve U.S. interests by strengthening both NATO and our bilateral ties with these new allies, who have already done a great deal to support our vision for NATO and collective security.

I do have concerns regarding NATO and its future viability. We need to take a long look at the arbitrary and politically motivated, but indefensible use of the "consensus rule" NATO employs, and those nations who try to manipulate the path to peace for less than honorable purposes.

I understand my good friend from Virginia, Senator WARNER, and Senator

LEVIN will offer an amendment related to the "consensus rule." I think the amendment is a good idea and deserves the support of this body.

Finally, the path to peace is broad enough to allow all those who wish to traverse it in good company. We should welcome them with open arms.

Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I have enjoyed watching this debate with my colleagues on the topic of expanding the North Atlantic Alliance. This new round of expansion is one of the most significant events in the alliance's history and will have a profound impact on Trans-Atlantic relations for a long time. The message I bring and I think my colleagues bring is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, is still vital to our security and expansion will make it all the more stronger. Seven countries, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, have made bids to join NATO.

This debate has evolved in such a way as to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of the alliance in a sober way. The hyperbolic debate over burden-sharing and the contributions of some of our allies, whether material or physical, has gone by the way-side with this new round of expansion. The contributions of alliance members is no less important—in fact, it is a central tenet to the success of the alliance. Rather, by inviting these seven new members, we have focussed more attention on how better to integrate, and give opportunity and prominence to those states that wish to contribute more to the collective security of the alliance.

At a hearing the Foreign Relations Committee held on the first of April, one of the witnesses, Bruce Jackson of the Project on Transitional Democracies made several excellent points about these new candidates, one of which I should emphasize for the sake of my colleagues who were not present.

I will revert to the question of contributions and military power. Many critics have focussed on the current capabilities and potential contributions of these seven countries and questioned whether and what they will bring to the alliance. Mr. Jackson pointed to the fact that when West Germany was invited to join NATO, it had neither an army nor a defense budget.

By contrast, the Baltic states have taken it upon themselves to orchestrate regional security agreements and contribute a rational portion of their budgets to national defense. The Balkan countries joining the alliance, Romania and Bulgaria, have militaries that can be immediately utilized for NATO operations. In fact, all of the seven countries, have themselves contributed to NATO missions in Europe, to Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF, in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF.

Romania pulled together 100 of its personnel for SFOR in Bosnia, contributed 200 to KFOR in Kosovo. Romania

committed itself and contributed substantially to our efforts during Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF, and the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF. For OEF, they sent a 400-person battalion to serve in Kandahar. For ISAF, they sent a military police platoon to Kabul to support securing the Afghan capital. In support for the security and revitalization of a post-conflict Afghanistan, Romania air-lifted arms and munitions to be used by a newly reconstituted Afghan National Army. In Iraq, Romania has sent a WMD unit to assist in force protection and have committed to providing peacekeepers and police to assist in the security of that country.

In 1997, during the debate to enlarge NATO for the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, the emphasis was and for President Bush especially, still is a unified and free Europe. Our mission then was to stand beside these democracies and direct them to a bright future of freedom, democracy and prosperity.

The assumption of all the states woven into the North Atlantic Treaty is a common set of values among its members. These values, democracy and free markets, are the values in which this collective security agreement is defending. Enscribed in the treaty signed on April 4, 1949 were the shared values of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, civilian control of the military, and central to the treaty's purpose, commitment to the stability and well-being of the countries party to the treaty.

I have in my hands a copy of the Atlantic Charter, a document that very much predates the North Atlantic Alliance and was penned during the dark days of World War II by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin Roosevelt. This document espoused the foundations on which NATO was born—liberty, self-determination, perpetuation of prosperity and collective security.

Though not the axiom which keeps the alliance glued together, it is difficult to ignore that, as much as the territory, it is those principles that the alliance is fighting to protect.

Here in this building we should think proud of our institutions and their triumph on the world's stage. Not for the hubris at the moment of victory, but for the better tomorrow which all our new European friends will enjoy after the half-century of abandonment behind the Berlin Wall.

Our commitment should never waiver and our continuing mission should remain clear in our minds. We should have enough charity in our hearts to realize the world around us that does not enjoy the freedom we do, and be willing to push the borders of liberty beyond the comfortable world in which we occupy. Seven countries are now eagerly awaiting the advice and consent of this body.

I ask unanimous consent to print the following document in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security;

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Winston S. Churchill

Source: Samuel Rosenman, ed., *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. 10 (1938-1950), 314.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of a letter dated May 7, 2003, be printed in the RECORD in regard to the NATO enlargement protocol.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### U.S. SENATE,

#### SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,

Washington, DC, May 7, 2003.

Hon. BILL FRIST,

Hon. TOM DASCHLE,

U.S. Senate,

Washington, DC.

DEAR LEADER FRIST AND MINORITY LEADER DASCHLE: As the full Senate prepares to take up consideration for modifications to the North Atlantic Treaty in order to accommodate new members in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance, we feel that it is fitting to make a number of

observations concerning this important step forward in trans-Atlantic relations.

We wish to express our satisfaction with those portions of the draft resolution of ratification now before the Senate which preserve intelligence equities.

Draft Condition (3) has two parts. Subsection (A) would require the President to submit a report, by January 1, 2004, to the Congress intelligence committees on the progress of the indicted accession countries in satisfying the security sector and security vetting requirements for NATO membership. We feel that this report is essential. Fitness for NATO membership is a function not only of adequate general security procedures, but also of the strength of national structures ostensibly in place to ensure effective political control over the activity of security services. We suggest that the indicated report should cover the latter consideration as well as the former.

Subsection (B) of draft Condition (3) would require the President to report, by January 1, 2004, to the Congressional intelligence committees on the protection of intelligence sources and methods by accession countries. The report would identify the latest procedures and requirements established by accession countries to protect intelligence sources and methods. The report would also include an assessment of how these countries' overall procedures and requirements for the protection of intelligence sources and methods compare with the same procedures and requirements of other NATO members.

As the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence observed during the last round of NATO expansion (see, Exec. Rpt. 105-14, 105th Congress, 2d Session, p. 56, 57, March 6, 1998), a number of factors should be taken into account to assess the reliability of accession countries to protect NATO sources and methods, namely: The strength of democratic reforms, with a focus on ministerial and legislative oversight of intelligence services and activities; the degree to which accession countries have succeeded in reforming their civilian and military intelligence services, including the ability of the services to hire and retain qualified Western-oriented officers, and the evolution of political and public support for these services; Russian intelligence objectives directed against these countries, including any disinformation campaigns designed to derail, retard, or taint their integration with the West; counterintelligence and other security activities being pursued by the accession countries and the adequacy of resources devoted to these efforts; and the work underway between the [accession countries] and NATO to ensure that security standards will be met by the time [they] join the Alliance.

The context for cooperation with NATO accession countries has changed drastically since 1998, given Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and other events which have underscored the willingness of several accession countries to cooperate with their former adversaries in the West to fight terrorism and other critical threats. It is also apparent that democratic reforms among the NATO accession countries have taken strong root and are irreversible.

It is less clear that there has been similar progress in other areas identified by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 1998 as critical indicators of likely performance, such as counter-intelligence and resistance to Russian attempts to influence policy. In short, security-related concerns about NATO expansion that concerned Senators in 1998 remain valid, although the atmosphere for lasting and positive change is vastly improved. We look forward to the Administration's report on these indicators.

On the whole, we feel that U.S. intelligence equities can be safeguarded with this new round of NATO enlargement. We look forward to continuing our work with the Administration during the accession process.

Sincerely,

PAT ROBERTS,  
*Chairman.*

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,  
*Vice Chairman.*

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of this resolution of ratification for the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The accession to NATO of these seven new democracies—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia—is an historic event that will have far-reaching and, in my view, very beneficial consequences.

Just a dozen or so years ago, these countries were under the boot of Soviet domination and communist dictatorship. Against their will, they were arrayed against NATO as members of the now defunct Warsaw Pact. Today, they stand ready and willing to join forces with NATO, the organization that played such a major role in bringing freedom to their part of the world.

We are striking a blow for freedom here today. Millions of people in eastern Europe live free today because of the commitment, patience and firmness of America and her allies during the cold war. And through their accession to NATO, those millions will now be able to live in greater security, as well as take part in the noble pursuit of defending the liberty of others.

The expansion of NATO into eastern Europe will serve American interests in several ways. For starters, these seven nations, I believe, will help reinvigorate NATO's sense of purpose; which is, first and foremost, the defense of liberty.

With memories of tyranny so fresh in their minds, the people of these nations no doubt have a deep appreciation for the freedom that is sometimes taken for granted in the West. Thus, they are apt to have fewer reservations than some of our other allies about confronting the aggression of those who are hostile to our way of life. This appreciation for freedom—and for those who helped them during the cold war—was unquestionably a factor in the strong support that each of these seven nations gave us in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Most of the prospective members have very limited military capabilities, and we will certainly expect them to invest properly in their armed forces in the coming years. But many of these countries already possess excellent specialized capabilities, such as the Polish special forces who fought in Iraq or the Slovak WMD defense unit now serving in the Gulf. Over time, I am confident that each of these countries will find its own niche in NATO.

Expansion of the NATO alliance to these countries will also offer us the opportunity to diversify and reorder our basing arrangements—the need for which, I believe, has been dem-

onstrated by 9/11 and the runup to the Iraq War. In the future, it is clear that U.S. forces will need more flexibility—both geographic and political—than ever. It thus behooves us to review our basing structure in Europe with an eye toward relocating some—though certainly not all—of our forces.

NATO expansion serves that end. Many of the prospective members—Romania and Bulgaria in particular—are located closer to where U.S. forces are likely to see action in the future. Their governments are known to be actively interested in hosting U.S. forces. Polls indicate strong pro-American sentiment in these countries.

Mr. President, 65 years ago, Eastern Europe began a horrific descent into darkness with the deal that was struck at Munich. Yalta then solidified what was to be another 45 years of communist tyranny for these nations. Those tragic mistakes are being rectified here today, and we should be proud.

But make no mistake, the expansion of NATO is more than just a rearward-looking act of humanity. It is also a forward-looking act of statemanship that will serve U.S. interests well in the future.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I rise today to express my full support for the Treaty on NATO Expansion. As chairman of the Senate Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I cannot underscore strongly enough the value of including these seven nations in the NATO Alliance. I applaud and support the administration's leadership on bringing NATO enlargement to the Senate.

These seven prospective member nations have made great strides in developing responsible democratic governments, free-market economies, civil society, and transparent and accountable armed forces. As their active support for the Global War on Terrorism and Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrates, these nations share our values and are willing—and able—to help promote democracy and freedom around the world.

I believe that it is significant that each invitee has provided direct military support for the Global War on Terrorism, having contributed overflight rights, transit and basing privileges, military and police forces, medical units, or transport support to U.S.-led efforts. They have provided noteworthy support to the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, in Afghanistan and NATO efforts to stabilize the Balkans. And, as has been mentioned many times today, these countries provided resounding support for U.S. policy on Iraq. I believe that these efforts merely herald the beginning of immense, enduring contributions to come from these nations.

As cochair of the Senate Baltic Freedom Caucus, I would be remiss to not express particularly ardent support for the accession of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to NATO. Through working

with groups like the Baltic American Freedom League, the U.S.-Baltic Foundation and the Joint Baltic American National Committee, I have first-hand knowledge of the large grassroots public support across the U.S. for inclusion of these noble nations in NATO. These organizations deserve recognition for their decades of work to help liberate and secure the future of the Baltics.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, as you know, I had originally intended to offer an amendment to the pending resolution adding an additional declaration to the nine that were added during the Foreign Relations Committee's consideration of this matter. My amendment would have dealt with a topic already covered by the Warner-Levin amendment, namely the relevancy of the consensus rule by which the North Atlantic Council has historically carried out its decision making. Now that the Senate has adopted the Warner-Levin amendment by voice vote, I do not see any need to proceed with my amendment.

My amendment would not have answered the question of whether in fact the consensus rule is relevant now that the world has profoundly changed and the membership of the organization has greatly expanded. It would however have appropriately called upon the President to review this matter as we move forward to sign off on the accession of seven additional members to this important organization.

We all know that the latest round of NATO expansion—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—will bring NATO membership up to 26 countries. And at least three more remain poised for admission in the coming years: Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia.

Let me be clear. I am all for offering NATO membership to any democracy that wants to join and can contribute to our common security. But I am wondering how all this expansion will affect the decision-making capabilities of NATO as an organization.

For more than 50 years, NATO decisionmaking has been based on consensus—every member state must agree on every important course of action. When 16 NATO countries all faced a common Soviet threat, achieving consensus on major issues was not much of a problem.

We may very soon—within a few years—have 29 members of NATO, from all across Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe. That is almost double the number we had not too many years ago. The idea that the alliance's decisions will soon be dependent on the unanimous consent of so many diverse nations, seems to me, potentially a recipe for stalemate in NATO decision-making.

My personal view is that NATO should consider creating some form of “top-tier administrative council”—similar the U.N. Security Council—to prevent the diminution of NATO's power and effectiveness as a military alliance.

At last year's NATO summit in Prague, President Bush pressed for "the most significant reforms in NATO since 1949." He was mainly referring to the creation of a rapid reaction force to deal swiftly and effectively with new and emerging threats.

Last month, Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman reiterated this idea during his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He rightly pointed out that NATO needs to be "equipped with new capabilities and organized into highly ready land, air and sea forces able to carry out missions anywhere in the world."

Mr. Grossman was referring to the need for the creation of a "NATO Response Force" to handle serious global challenges, such as proliferation and terrorism. I agree with him that such a force would be beneficial. But I also believe that is only half of the story. It seems to be stating the obvious that each addition to NATO will logically affect in some way the organization, mission, and effectiveness of this proposed rapid response force.

Just as I agree that NATO needs to tailor itself to future global challenges by standing up a NATO Response Force, I can foresee scenarios in which quick and decisive action will be needed in a very short amount of time—perhaps days.

I think it is reasonable to ask whether it will always be necessary or desirable for all 26, or 29, members of NATO to be involved in every aspect of the deployment of this force?

If the answer to that question is no, then shouldn't we at least ask the U.S. administration to study the question of whether NATO should consider a more streamlined decisionmaking structure for NATO to take into account both NATO's new missions, and the alliance's ever-expanding membership. The Levin-Warner amendment should allow a serious review and discussion of that issue.

As I have stated earlier, I am a strong supporter of the pending Protocol approving the new members to NATO. We all want a strong and vibrant NATO. I believe that the resolution of ratification, with the declarations and conditions that have been appended by the Senate will help to make that possible.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

AMENDMENT NO. 535

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: It is my understanding that it is appropriate at this time to proceed to the Warner-Levin-Roberts-Sessions amendment. I send the amendment to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The senior assistant bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Virginia [Mr. WARNER], for himself, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. ROBERTS, and Mr. SESSIONS, proposes an amendment numbered 535.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To propose an additional declaration)

At the end of section 2, add the following new declaration:

(10) CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO NATO DECISION-MAKING AND MEMBERSHIP.—

(A) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Senate that, not later than the date that is eighteen months after the date of the adoption of this resolution, the President should place on the agenda for discussion at the North Atlantic Council—

(i) the NATO "consensus rule"; and

(ii) the merits of establishing a process for suspending the membership in NATO of a member country that no longer complies with the NATO principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law set forth in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(B) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the discussion at the North Atlantic Council of each of the issues described in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes—

(i) the steps the United States has taken to place these issues on the agenda for discussion at the North Atlantic Council;

(ii) the views of the United States on these issues as communicated to the North Atlantic Council by the representatives of the United States to the Council;

(iii) the discussions of these issues at the North Atlantic Council, including any decision that has been reached with respect to the issues;

(iv) methods to provide more flexibility to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to plan potential contingency operations before the formal approval of such planning by the North Atlantic Council; and

(v) methods to streamline the process by which NATO makes decisions with respect to conducting military campaigns.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I, first, wish to thank the distinguished managers, my two colleagues and friends, with whom my friend and partner for 25 years, Senator LEVIN, and I have had the privilege of working these many years, over a quarter of a century in the Senate. We have, I think, reached a common understanding that I will proceed for several minutes, followed by my colleague from Michigan, and in such time the two managers will address their perspective on this particular amendment. I think they are generally in support; however, I shall let the managers speak for themselves.

Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for the ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The Protocols that we are considering today would allow those seven nations to become full members of the NATO alliance.

My colleagues may recall that, in 1998, I did not vote in favor of the expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. My opposition at that time was not di-

rected at those three countries. Rather, I was concerned with the broader question of how the expansion of NATO to include newly democratizing countries of Central and Eastern Europe would affect NATO's future missions and its effectiveness as a military alliance.

NATO's success in integrating the new members admitted in 1999, and NATO's commitment to enhancing its defense capabilities and those of its prospective new members, have helped persuade me to support the enlargement of NATO today. But I remain concerned that NATO's enlargement by seven additional nations—the largest enlargement in Alliance history—could have dramatic implications for NATO's ability to function as an effective military organization.

Today, the threats to NATO member nations come from within and without NATO's periphery. Because of NATO's success, there is no Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact. The threats—such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—are transnational in nature, and they emanate from regions outside of Europe. This was recognized in the Strategic Concept NATO adopted 1999, which envisioned NATO "out of area" operations to address new threats. To remain a viable military alliance, NATO must have both the military capability and the political will to respond to the new threats. NATO's recent decision to assume the lead of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and its willingness to consider supporting a stabilization force in Iraq, are welcome examples of new NATO missions appropriate to today's threats.

The Senate Armed Services Committee has a long tradition of strong support for the NATO alliance, and has played an important role in the Senate's consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty and its subsequent amendments. In March and April 2003, the committee conducted two hearings on the future of NATO and on NATO enlargement. The Administration witnesses at these hearings unanimously supported ratification of the NATO enlargement Protocols.

One of the issues the committee examined in its NATO hearings was whether the prospective new members would enhance the military effectiveness of the alliance, and how their membership would affect the capabilities gap that currently exists between the United States and many other members of NATO.

The witnesses who appeared before our committee testified that NATO was taking concerted efforts to address the ongoing problem of a capabilities and technology gap. They noted the decisions taken by NATO's leaders at the Prague Summit in November, 2002, to launch the Prague Capabilities Commitment and to create a NATO Response Force. Through the Prague Capabilities Commitment, NATO members agreed to spend smarter, pool