[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 67 (Wednesday, May 7, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5818-S5828]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Amendment No. 535
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: It is my
understanding that it is appropriate at this time to proceed to the
Warner-Levin-Roberts-Sessions amendment. I send the amendment to the
desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The senior assistant bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for himself, Mr.
Levin, Mr. Roberts, and Mr. Sessions, proposes an amendment
numbered 535.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To propose an additional declaration)
At the end of section 2, add the following new declaration:
(10) Consideration of certain issues with respect to nato
decision-making and membership.--
(A) Sense of the senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that, not later than the date that is eighteen months after
the date of the adoption of this resolution, the President
should place on the agenda for discussion at the North
Atlantic Council--
(i) the NATO ``consensus rule''; and
(ii) the merits of establishing a process for suspending
the membership in NATO of a member country that no longer
complies with the NATO principles of democracy, individual
liberty, and the rule of law set forth in the preamble to the
North Atlantic Treaty.
(B) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the discussion at
the North Atlantic Council of each of the issues described in
clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A), the President shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
that describes--
(i) the steps the United States has taken to place these
issues on the agenda for discussion at the North Atlantic
Council;
(ii) the views of the United States on these issues as
communicated to the North Atlantic Council by the
representatives of the United States to the Council;
(iii) the discussions of these issues at the North Atlantic
Council, including any decision that has been reached with
respect to the issues;
(iv) methods to provide more flexibility to the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe to plan potential contingency
operations before the formal approval of such planning by the
North Atlantic Council; and
(v) methods to streamline the process by which NATO makes
decisions with respect to conducting military campaigns.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I, first, wish to thank the distinguished
managers, my two colleagues and friends, with whom my friend and
partner for 25 years, Senator Levin, and I have had the privilege of
working these many years, over a quarter of a century in the Senate. We
have, I think, reached a common understanding that I will proceed for
several minutes, followed by my colleague from Michigan, and in such
time the two managers will address their perspective on this particular
amendment. I think they are generally in support; however, I shall let
the managers speak for themselves.
Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for the
ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on
Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia. The Protocols that we are considering today would allow
those seven nations to become full members of the NATO alliance.
My colleagues may recall that, in 1998, I did not vote in favor of
the expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic. My opposition at that time was not directed at those three
countries. Rather, I was concerned with the broader question of how the
expansion of NATO to include newly democratizing countries of Central
and Eastern Europe would affect NATO's future missions and its
effectiveness as a military alliance.
NATO's success in integrating the new members admitted in 1999, and
NATO's commitment to enhancing its defense capabilities and those of
its prospective new members, have helped persuade me to support the
enlargement of NATO today. But I remain concerned that NATO's
enlargement by seven additional nations--the largest enlargement in
Alliance history--could have dramatic implications for NATO's ability
to function as an effective military organization.
Today, the threats to NATO member nations come from within and
without NATO's periphery. Because of NATO' success, there is no Soviet
Union or Warsaw Pact. The threats--such as terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--are transnational in
nature, and they emanate from regions outside of Europe. This was
recognized in the Strategic Concept NATO adopted 1999, which envisioned
NATO ``out of area'' operations to address new threats. To remain a
viable military alliance, NATO must have both the military capability
and the political will to respond to the new threats. NATO's recent
decision to assume the lead of the International Security Assistance
Force in Afghanistan, and its willingness to consider supporting a
stabilization force in Iraq, are welcome examples of new NATO missions
appropriate to today's threats.
The Senate Armed Services Committee has a long tradition of strong
support for the NATO alliance, and has played an important role in the
Senate's consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty and its subsequent
amendments. In March and April 2003, the committee conducted two
hearings on the future of NATO and on NATO enlargement. The
Administration witnesses at these hearings unanimously supported
ratification of the NATO enlargement Protocols.
One of the issues the committee examined in its NATO hearings was
whether the prospective new members would enhance the military
effectiveness of the alliance, and how their membership would affect
the capabilities gap that currently exists between the United States
and many other members of NATO.
The witnesses who appeared before our committee testified that NATO
was taking concerted efforts to address the ongoing problem of a
capabilities and technology gap. They noted the decisions taken by
NATO's leaders at the Prague Summit in November, 2002, to launch the
Prague Capabilities Commitment and to create a NATO Response Force.
Through the Prague Capabilities Commitment, NATO members agreed to
spend smarter, pool
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their resources and pursue ``niche'' specializations such as lift
capability, or precision-guided munitions. The NATO response force is
envisioned to be a highly ready, rapid reaction force of approximately
25,000 troops with land, sea and air capability, deployable on short
notice and able to carry out missions anywhere in the world. The
response force will reinforce the need for individual alliance members
to develop and contribute unique capabilities to this new force.
Regarding the military capabilities of the prospective new members, I
was impressed that each of them is similarly being encouraged to focus
on specific ``niche'' capabilities where they can achieve a high level
of expertise and procure high quality equipment to make a substantial
contribution to NATO's military capabilities overall. Some of the
invitees already possess specialized capabilities that have served the
alliance in the Balkan operations and in the global war on terrorism,
including: special forces, nuclear, biological, and chemical defense,
mountain fighting, and demining.
Equally persuasive was the testimony of our witnesses regarding the
contributions of the nations admitted to NATO in 1989. Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic have proved to be steadfast allies and active
force contributors to NATO operations in the Balkans, and in the war
against terrorism.
Mr. President, historically, I was among those who objected to the
last enlargement of NATO. At this time, I very carefully considered the
proposal by our distinguished President, President Bush, and other
world leaders, that the time has come for new members to be brought in.
I commend the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense for the
careful procedures that led up to the nominations of these new
countries to come into the membership of NATO.
I am privileged to be on the floor now and to cast my vote in favor
of these protocols which will enable the seven countries to become
members of NATO in due course.
I have to say, I still have some of the concerns I had last time
because NATO is such a magnificent organization. Over half a century it
has proven its worth time and time again. The Warsaw Pact does not
exist, the threats from the Soviet Union do not exist, largely because
of the wisdom incorporated in this treaty, and the combination of the
military commitments and the political will of the North Atlantic
Treaty Alliance members over the years to have that alliance stand
there as a deterrent. It has worked, and it has worked well.
We cannot foresee the future and, therefore, we must be flexible
because worldwide threats have gone through such a major
transformation, from major nation-state-sponsored threats to worldwide
terrorism, so much of it non-state sponsored. For that reason I want to
support the admission of these new nations.
Further, while so many of these newly democratic nations do not bring
a large army, large navy, or a large air force, in due course their
``niche'' military capabilities will add a very valuable dimension to
NATO's ever expanding responsibilities.
NATO is participating actively in Afghanistan, and contemplating
participating actively in Iraq in peacekeeping and support roles. I
shall not discuss this in detail. Nevertheless, that is a tribute to
Lord Robertson and others who have recognized that the threat to NATO
nations comes from beyond their periphery now, but could be brought
within their periphery at any time by the threat of worldwide
terrorism. Those are the reasons I support NATO's participation in
``out of area'' operations in Afghanistan and post-conflict Iraq.
I remember the words of Ben Franklin as he emerged from the
Constitutional Convention and a reporter stopped and asked him: Mr.
Franklin: What have you wrought? And his reply was very simple: A
republic, if you can keep it.
There is a challenge to these NATO nations, soon to be 26 in number.
You have the heritage of this great treaty of over half a century, and
the challenge is, can we keep it?
I think we can. I think we will. Within the current thinking on NATO,
Senator Levin, I, and others have identified two issues that dominated
our committee's hearings on NATO: the so-called ``consensus rule'' by
which NATO operates and the question of whether NATO should have a
process for suspending the membership of a nation that is no longer
committed to upholding NATO's basic democratic principles.
With respect to the consensus rule, the recent divisive debate over
planning for the defense of Turkey in the event of war with Iraq
demonstrated that achieving consensus in NATO has become more
difficult. How difficult will it be with 26 nations? A different
manifestation of this problem occurred with respect to NATO operations
in Kosovo when ``command by committee'' hampered NATO's leaders'
ability to wage the most effective, rapidly responsive military
campaign. Such difficulties in reaching consensus are occurring in part
because respective NATO members have different views, as they should,
about today's threats and how best to respond to them. Achieving
consensus is likely to become even more complex as NATO enlarges its
membership. That is why I believe--and my colleagues join me on this--
the consensus rule, and NATO's operating procedures more generally,
should be periodically reexamined to ensure that NATO has procedures
that allow it to plan, reach decisions, and act in a timely fashion.
Regarding the issue of a suspension mechanism, some of our committee
members have expressed concern about the lack of a mechanism for
suspending a NATO member if that nation no longer complies with the
fundamental tenets of NATO--democracy, individual liberty, and the rule
of law.
While it may well be true that NATO has ways other than suspension to
deal with such a situation, it is prudent for NATO to consider the
matter now, as a conceptual problem, and have some options in mind,
rather than be confronted with a problem in the future, and be somewhat
unprepared should it arise.
Given the tremendous interest of the Armed Services Committee in
these two subjects, I, along with Senators Levin, Roberts, and
Sessions, am offering an amendment to the resolution of ratification
for these protocols that would urge the President--I repeat, urge the
President--of the United States to raise these subjects for discussion
in the North Atlantic Council at NATO, and request that a report on
these subjects be provided to the relevant committees of the Congress.
I have consulted closely with administration officials, and
negotiated the language in this amendment with administration officials
way into last night, in order to receive their support, and they have
no objections today. I hope we can achieve that because we have--
Senator Levin and I, speaking for our group--have made some concessions
in order to have this matter treated in such a way that the whole
Senate can be supportive.
I conclude by saying, based on the hearings conducted by the Armed
Services Committee and subsequent analysis, I am persuaded that the
NATO enlargement protocols we are considering today will advance the
national security interests of the United States and deserve the
Senate's support.
Lastly, on the assumption that NATO, I think very wisely, will take a
role in Afghanistan, on the assumption again that NATO, again very
wisely, will take a role in Iraq, which is a positive thing, I say this
with respect to the coalition of forces: We will achieve the end result
that is now unfolding in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is yet to be
completed, but basically the desired result will have been achieved in
Afghanistan and Iraq at some cost--with the bloodshed of Americans and
other coalition partners, with enormous tax dollars. These are very
significant contributions by the coalition of forces and this great
United States of America.
I think it is a minimal suggestion that NATO consider changing its
procedures for deciding to undertake such operations in the future to
avoid the problems we have recently witnessed.
I urge my colleagues to support the amendment to the resolution of
ratification I am proposing today, and to join me in giving our advice
and consent to ratification of the protocols to the North Atlantic
Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
[[Page S5820]]
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first let me thank my good friend from
Virginia for his great work on this resolution. We have worked together
not just in the Senate for all of these years but on this particular
issue we have worked together for a long time. I also thank the
managers of this bill, not just for working with us on this matter but
also for their work generally on a host of issues which they struggle
with to try to make our Nation a lot more secure. They work together
magnificently. They are both essential for this country's security and
strength and wisdom, which we surely need in these complicated days.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I thank him for
the reference to our long-term working relationship. The Senator has
really taken the lead for over 5 or 6 years. We have worked on this
issue for a very long time. It is not something that has just suddenly
come to mind.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from Virginia.
First, I very much support the expansion of NATO to include these
seven additional countries, just as I supported the expansion for the
three that we approved a few years ago. I believe this expansion, like
the last one, could lead to a safer, more united, more cohesive Europe
and reduce the possibility that Europe would ever again be divided by
war. I very much support the expansion.
I have been troubled by one issue for many years--actually a number
of issues relative to NATO--that as we expand NATO, there is a greater
likelihood, just statistically, that someday, some country is going to
no longer live up to NATO's requirements that it be a democratic
country with a free market. We hope that will never happen. We do not
expect it to happen. But what happens, after these nations are added
hopefully, if one day, one of the now 26 nations departs from the
alliance's fundamental principles?
As it now stands, there is no mechanism in the charter to suspend a
country that no longer complies with NATO's fundamental principles. It
is an unusual alliance in that regard that does not have a suspension
mechanism, but it does not. We could actually, theoretically, see a
country become a dictatorship and stop 25 democracies from acting in
their own self-defense or in defense of a secure world. That is an
unusual provision. It is one that was consciously adopted, but it is
one that as we add more countries to NATO we have to think about, it
seems to me.
Our amendment is aimed at raising this issue. We do not direct that
there be a solution to the problem. We simply believe that NATO
countries, as NATO expands, should address the issue of a country in
the future possibly departing from the fundamental principles that
guide NATO.
What happens, for instance, if one country becomes a dictatorship?
That dictatorship could veto a decision that all the other NATO member
nations wanted to take, perhaps to come to the aid of a people who were
being ethnically cleansed on a scale perhaps approaching what happened
in the genocide that occurred in Kosovo, or worse. That issue, as well
as the consensus issue Chairman Warner has raised, should be raised at
NATO. They should discuss it. They should decide whether or not they
want to proceed on the current course.
Again, I emphasize that our amendment, while expressing the sense of
the Senate that the administration raised this issue at the North
Atlantic Council, does not in any way indicate what the outcome of that
discussion would be, nor, indeed, does it in any way suggest what the
position of the United States should be during those deliberations. We
simply want the issue of suspension and consensus and the other issues
referred to in our resolution discussed at the highest level at NATO--
just discussed.
There is a question raised: Is this aimed at any particular country?
It is not. It is explicitly not aimed at any one of the 26 countries.
We made it clear we amended our language to make it clear this would
take effect 18 months after the resolution is adopted. We expect by
then all the new countries will have been in long enough so there will
be no sensitivity about that issue.
We also make it clear this is not a condition in any way on the
ratification of the NATO documents. It is drafted as a declaration of
the intent of the Senate rather than as a condition of any type. That
is, in essence, what we do.
A final discussion item that is listed in the resolution would be
methods to streamline the process by which NATO makes decisions with
respect to conducting military campaigns. We believe this is essential
because this refers to the actual conduct of military operations--not
to the approval to conduct it but it seeks to address the problems that
were experienced in the conduct of NATO operations in Kosovo where it
was reported that General Wesley Clark, the then NATO commander, was
restricted in his actions by a number of NATO countries that wanted to
review each day's bombing targets. The planning should be allowed to
proceed in advance in the event that the North Atlantic Council
approves the operation. This simply would expedite and streamline the
planning of military operations.
Our amendment is not intended to interfere with the passage of our
resolution of ratification. It would not cause any delay in the
ascension of the seven new members into the NATO alliance. Again, it
merely seeks to cause the alliance to consider some issues that could
pose problems in the future, if not addressed in a calm, careful, and
measured way before a crisis occurs.
Discussion and report is what we are asking the administration to
participate in and to initiate--again, not declaring what the position
of this administration or any future administration will be and not in
any way suggesting the outcome of those deliberations and discussions.
It is a matter of prudence that this issue, which would have such huge
ramifications down the road as to whether or not NATO can act, should
be discussed in advance, whatever the outcome of that discussion.
I thank Senators Lugar and Biden for working with us in a way so we
now believe this matter can be resolved and adopted.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Dole). The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. I will respond briefly. Anyone who is a C-SPAN watcher
will be a bit confused. We have Senator Warner talking about his 25-
year relationship with Senator Levin and I am about to talk about my
28-year relationship with my friend, Senator Lugar. This is proof there
is bipartisanship in this operation. We have a Democrat and a
Republican opposing a Democrat and Republican on the principle here but
not on whether or not this should be included and considered.
This is basically a procedural judgment we are making. I have a few
points notwithstanding the very well intended effort on the part of
Senator Levin who has, for a number of years, been concerned about this
issue and is concerned that, as he said, who knows, maybe some day we
will end up with one of these member states no longer being a
democracy. It is possible.
What do we do? Let me suggest what Secretary Powell said before our
committee when there was consideration, not by Senator Levin or Senator
Warner, but there was discussion about having a condition attached to
this treaty--which is not the case now. He said:
NATO is not a committee; it's not a council; it is not a
group. It is an alliance. When you call something an
alliance, I think it means that everybody has to be together
for the alliance to take action.
I am skipping ahead to make this short. Secretary-General Lord
Robertson told the members of the Foreign Relations Committee:
Even when times have been difficult, NATO has never failed
to get consensus or to find a way to work around the problem.
No country has ever used its national veto.
As Secretary General Lord Robertson also said, ``NATO is an
infinitely adaptable organization'' and has proven itself equal to all
organizational challenges.
Let me be more precise. When France pulled out of NATO's integrated
command in 1967, the alliance decided it had a problem. Ordinarily,
that would be enough to cripple NATO because it
[[Page S5821]]
would effectively veto everything. What did we do? Then NATO came up
with a Defense Planning Committee, the so-called DPC, which for years
has done the bulk of NATO's work. When France refused to go along on
the Turkey article 4 request last winter, saying the decision in the
NAC would be counterproductive to diplomatic discussions of the United
Nations, what did we do? We went over to the DPC effortlessly. We did
not have a great crisis in NATO.
If that had not worked, Lord Robertson could have ordered the SACEUR
to make the Patriots and AWACs available to Turkey, or he could have
done what former Secretary General Luns once did. He could have simply
declared his own decision was final unless there was unanimous
opposition.
I will not take more time, although there is much more to say. The
reason I bring these things up, we have, in fact, dealt with very
difficult crises in NATO, including member states not meeting the
criteria of a democratic free market, respecting human rights, et
cetera. We have had different countries who have been the odd man out
on different occasions. Every time, instead of having to go through the
process of a period of expulsion, we were able to weather the storm by
dealing with it through other mechanisms.
Here is the larger point I wish to make. I do not want to take too
much time, but it is a very important point to make, in my view.
Especially troubling is the opinion of Lord Robertson that
alternatives to the consensus principle would create more problems than
they are intended to solve.
Majority rule or a UN Security Council-type system would send members
scurrying for votes in support of their positions, merely delaying
action and reinforcing divisions among allies.
The consensus rule is a fundamental part of NATO, an essential second
element in the article 5 defense clause of NATO, requiring that any
NATO action taken as a result of an attack on a NATO member be decided
by consensus.
My colleagues should note that this Article was crafted back in 1949,
on American insistence, to prevent the U.S. from being pulled into wars
by European countries.
As Lord Robertson asked us, ``does the U.S. now really want to open
the door to the possibility of being dragged into a war it does not
want to participate in?''
I might quote from a thoughtful letter to Senator Lugar and myself
written by Bruce Jackson, president of the U.S. Committee on NATO:
At present, the United States is the only country that can
consistently produce unanimous outcomes at the level of the
North Atlantic Council or, failing in that, at the Defense
Planning Committee. The process of achieving unanimity is
uniquely and, perhaps intentionally, to the advantage of the
United States.
The countries whose ratification is before the Senate are
aghast that the Senate might consider weakening U.S.
leadership in NATO, which is the aspect of NATO they most
admire, just as their democracies reach the threshold of
membership. We share their concern.
Five years ago when this was brought up in the last expansion, I
said, ``Why would we indulge in unilateral disarmament and give up our
veto over a NATO decision?''
People wondered later, and asked me: What are you talking about? How
is this giving up any veto?
With regard to the mechanism to suspend a member that strays from
NATO's principles, that too is unnecessary. Here are two examples:
During the authoritarian rule of the Greek colonels from 1967 to 1973,
Greece was frozen out of the key NATO decisions. When it appeared
Portugal might go Communist in the summer of 1975, it, too, was frozen
out.
There would also be the temptation to play domestic politics with a
suspension mechanism.
We would not want NATO to be torn apart the way the European Union
was three years ago when other countries isolated Austria because Mr.
Haider's distasteful party had joined the governing coalition after a
free election.
For example one might envision a future scenario in which Turkey were
threatened with military attack and some members would argue that
Ankara's imperfect human rights record obviated the obligation of the
NATO allies to honor their Article 5 commitments.
This isn't far-fetched. In January 1991, Mr. Lambsdorff, then the
leader of the Free Democrats in Germany's Bundestag, voiced similar
sentiments.
The reality is that once a suspension clause was introduced into the
North Atlantic Treaty no country could fully rely upon Article 5.
Lord Robertson's summary judgment on creating a suspension mechanism
speaks volumes:
The worst possible thing would be to legislate in advance
for all possible occasions and then be locked in.
Our debate will be watched closely in the seven invited countries and
throughout the rest of Europe. Attaching this declaration to the
Senate's ratification would send an unsettling message through the
Alliance.
Lord Robertson gave us his bottom-line on Monday:
Putting these issues on the agenda of the NAC would be
``deeply unhelpful'' to him and would ``open a can of
worms.''
The bottom line here, Madam President, is that I really think we
should understand what is intended. The objective here to get NATO
itself to adopt such a rule would be the single most serious thing we
could do to U.S. leadership and U.S. de facto control of NATO.
I urge my colleagues to vote down this amendment, which is both
unnecessary and potentially disruptive to NATO as it is about to
welcome seven new members.
I thank my friend from Michigan and my friend from Virginia for being
willing not to go with the original resolution they had, and seek this
report from NATO within 18 months after the request being submitted by
the Secretary of State. I think that is a more prudent way to proceed.
But I hope when that is done, the NATO membership will uniformly reject
any change in the process. But again I thank my colleagues and yield
the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I agree with the analysis of history
given by my colleague, the distinguished Senator from Delaware, with
regard to the basic exclusion--or rather consensus and exclusion
argument we are having today. He states correctly this arose the last
time we discussed NATO accession. It is an important argument that has
been propounded by the distinguished Senator from Michigan, the
distinguished Senator from Virginia, and others. I simply rise to say
the substance of the issue is different from the procedure. In this
amendment offered by the distinguished Senators, we are discussing an
amendment that says:
It is the sense of the Senate that, not later than the date
that is eighteen months after the date of the adoption of
this resolution, the President should place on the agenda for
discussion at the North Atlantic Council--
(i) the NATO ``consensus rule''; and
(ii) the merits of establishing a process for suspending
the membership in NATO of a member country that no longer
complies with NATO's principles of democracy, individual
liberty, and the rule of law set forth in the preamble to the
North Atlantic Treaty.
The amendment also calls for reports on the points of view raised by
our Government and, likewise, its fulfillment, with the gist of this
amendment.
At the time we had Secretary Powell before the Foreign Relations
Committee in one of the five hearings the committee has conducted on
NATO, we requested his view on the subject of consensus and expulsion.
In fact, I requested a letter from Secretary Powell, which he sent to
me, and made clear as a matter of principle NATO's decisionmaking
process in his judgment works well and serves the United States
interests.
The Secretary affirmed that for 50 years, from the cold war to Kosovo
and now Afghanistan, NATO has been able to reach consensus on critical
decisions. NATO is an alliance, and no NATO member, including the
United States, would agree to allow alliance decisions to be made on
defense commitments without its agreement.
Regarding the suspension mechanism, the Secretary said NATO has been
able to deal successfully with the rare cases in the past of problem
countries, and NATO has dealt effectively with Allies that have
experienced regimes that did not support NATO's democratic principles
by isolating them or excluding them from sensitive discussions--just as
the Senator from Delaware has illustrated.
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I would add that when, at Senator Levin's request, these issues were
raised by Ambassador Burns in an informal discussion within the
alliance, there was no support from other members for creating a
suspension mechanism or for changing the consensus rule.
Essentially, the administration preference, when we asked them with
regard to this idea, is that these issues not be addressed in the
resolution of ratification and certainly that they not be termed as a
condition. The authors of the amendment today have not done so. This is
not a condition. Therefore, there is not an argument with the
administration.
The Secretary believes the questions are worthy of further study, and
so do I. My own view, having listened to the testimony by Secretary
Powell and then as Senator Biden suggested more recently, a visit in
the Foreign Relations Committee with Secretary General Robertson of
NATO and with our Ambassador, Nick Burns, is that essentially, as the
Secretary's letter has pointed out, the decisionmaking process has
worked well, has served the United States interests. As Senator Biden
pointed out, as you look into the fine print, it might not serve our
interests so well if in fact our effective veto was terminated.
Having said all of that, none of us has wisdom that is all
encompassing on these issues. Times change. Senator Levin in his
comments has cited some reasons and these are important to consider.
Therefore, I come out in this discussion on the side of thought that
within 18 months the United States ought to think through these
arguments, ought to put them on the agenda of the North Atlantic Treaty
Council for discussion. In 18 months the world may have changed a lot.
Even if a discussion of them in recent months led to apparently
universally negative views of our NATO allies, plus apparently a
negative viewpoint of our own Secretary of State, it is conceivable
that on further study, intensive study in this area, there may be some
other constructive results.
I say this because I respect very deeply the distinguished chairman
and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee. They, too, held
hearings, as I cited in my opening statement, on the NATO accession
issue. They are intensely interested, as we are in the Foreign
Relations Committee, and as all Members of this body are, in what is in
the best interests of our country, in our military alliances, in the
prosecution of peace, in those horrible instances, and in the
prosecution of war.
These are serious issues, and this is perhaps an appropriate time as
the body is focused on NATO to, once again, say these are discussions
that have to take place from time to time. We in the United States
ought to suggest that our Secretary of State take that initiative.
For these reasons, I am going to support the amendment. I hope that,
as a matter of fact, it will receive a unanimous verdict of support
today on the procedural issues and issues that are out there, even if
all of us have fairly strong views on the substance--and that would
include the administration as well as colleagues.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I rise in support of the Warner/Levin/
Roberts amendment to the resolution of ratification on NATO
Enlargement.
Before I talk about our amendment, I want to take a few moments to
express my strong support for the enlargement of the NATO Alliance to
include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia.
A significant aspect of any enlargement of the Alliance to the United
States, of course, is that it would represent a commitment by the
United States to treat an armed attack on any of these seven nations as
an armed attack on the United States. In 1998, when the Senate was
considering the enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic, the attitude of Russia to the inclusion of former
members of the Warsaw Pact was a factor which was part of the debate.
Such enlargement was not intended to be threatening and, appropriately,
it was not perceived as a threat by Russia, which wanted to establish a
constructive relationship with the United States and the other members
of NATO. As a matter of fact, Russia's decision on that matter was so
clear that its position relative to NATO membership for former Soviet
Republics Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia is not even an issue today.
One issue that I have wrestled with in 1998 and before was my belief
that NATO should have a mechanism to suspend the membership of a NATO
member, if that member no longer complies with the Alliance's
fundamental principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of
law. In the Armed Services Committee hearings that preceded the 1998
Senate floor action, I put the issue to former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger who said in part that ``I think in situations in which a
government emerges incompatible with the common purpose of the
Alliance, there ought to be some method, maybe along the lines you put
forward.'' I also raised the issue with former Secretary of Defense
William Perry who said in part that ``What you are describing is a
problem--in fact, I would call it a flaw--in the original NATO
structure, the NATO agreements. And, in my judgment, this is a problem
which should be addressed.''
I had a colloquy with the then Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator Biden, who said in part that ``I agree with the
Senator from Michigan that this is an important matter that raises
fundamental issues for the United States and our allies. I believe that
this is a matter that merits careful consideration within NATO
councils. It would certainly be preferable for NATO to discuss this in
a careful and measured way now, rather than be faced with the issue at
some future time when an emergency situation exists.''
That careful and measured consideration, however, has not been
undertaken within NATO councils in the interviewing years.
Just as I supported enlargement of the Alliance to a total of
nineteen nations in 1998, so I support enlargement of the Alliance
today to a total of 26. But I am mindful that the sheer number of
nations that will soon make up the alliance increases the chance that
one of them may some day depart from the alliance's fundamental
principles. Having said that, I want to be perfectly clear--our
amendment is not aimed at any of the seven nations whose accession is
before us today--it is not aimed at the three most recent NATO member
nations--it is not aimed at any of the long-term NATO member nations--
and it is not aimed at any potential future NATO member nation--it is
not aimed at any nation.
It is aimed at the possibility that a NATO member nation that, for
example, was no longer democratic and was ruled by a dictator, would be
in a position to veto a decision that all of the other NATO member
nations wanted to take--perhaps to come to the aid of a people who were
being ``ethnically cleansed'' on a scale that was approaching genocide
such as happened in Kosovo. I believe that the United States should put
the issue of whether a process should be established to suspend--
suspend, not expel--such a member nation so that it would not endanger
NATO's decision making when all but an undemocratic member nation wants
to act.
The growth in the number of NATO member nations to 26 also increases,
under the laws of mathematics, the potential that one NATO member
nation, even a nation that conforms to the alliance's fundamental
principles, could prevent the alliance from making a decision where all
other countries want to act. The recent experience, wherein France
prevented the North Atlantic Council from authorizing planning for the
defense of Turkey to proceed and the Alliance had to go to the Defense
Planning Council for that authorization, is a real-world example that
demonstrates the need for the alliance to reconsider whether the
consensus rule for NATO decisions should be changed.
I want to emphasize very strongly at this point that our amendment
doesn't mandate a particular outcome to the discussion of these issues
by the North Atlantic Council. It doesn't prejudge the result of the
discussion and it doesn't require the U.S. representative
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to take a particular position in the discussion. It merely seeks to
have the issues placed on the North Atlantic Council's agenda,
discussed in the council, and the results of that discussion be
reported back to the U.S. Senate.
Our amendment would require the President's report to discuss two
other matters. The first would be methods to provide more flexibility
to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, who is presently U.S.
General Jim Jones, to plan potential contingency operations before the
formal approval of such operations by the North Atlantic Council. In
the instance that I mentioned, wherein France blocked the planning for
Turkey's defense, it would have been very useful if NATO's military
planning staff could have been preparing contingency plans so that they
would have been immediately available once the civilian decision-makers
had approved the defense of Turkey.
A final discussion item would be methods to streamline the process by
which NATO makes decisions with respect to conducting military
campaigns. This refers to the actual conduct of the operation--not to
the approval to conduct it--and seeks to address the problems that were
experienced in the conduct of the NATO operations in Kosovo where it is
reported that General Wes Clark, the then-NATO Commander, was
restricted in his actions as a number of NATO capitals insisted on
reviewing and approving each day's bombing targets.
This amendment does not interfere with the passage of the resolution
of ratification. It does not cause any delay in the accession of the
seven new members into the NATO Alliance. It merely seeks to cause the
Alliance to consider some issues that could pose serious problems in
the future if not addressed in a calm, careful and measured way before
a crisis occurs.
I ask unanimous consent that the discussion between myself and former
Secretary of Defense Perry be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate
hearing to receive testimony on issues related to nato enlargement--
thursday, March 19, 1998, Washington, DC
We went into Bosnia, I understand, for legitimate reasons,
I think. But, still, it is not what NATO was invented for,
which was to reassure the Western Europeans that they would
not be attacked by the Russians. And if they were attacked by
the Russians, the United States would come to their defense.
And I do not think the operation in Bosnia qualifies to
that standard. Which does not mean I am against it, but,
still, I do not think you can square it with the original
Treaty.
Chairman Thurmond. My time is up.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Eisenhower, your sensitivity to the impact of this on
our relationship with Russia, it seems to me, is correct, in
terms of being aware of it. We should worry about it. We
should consider it.
I reach a different conclusion than you do, but it is not
politically incorrect to factor into the deliberation what
the impact on that relationship is. I reach a different
conclusion than you do for a number of reasons. And, by the
way, I, too, have talked to dozens of parliamentarians in
Russia, both here and in Moscow, as well as their leadership,
their minister of Defense, their Foreign Minister, and so
forth.
And I have heard their words. I have also seen their
actions, including the following actions: They entered into a
Founding Act with NATO after the decision to expand NATO was
made. And they have remained a member of that relationship.
And that Founding Act says--and this is between NATO, after
the announced expansion, and Russia--that Founding Act
reaffirms the determination of the parties, NATO and Russia,
to give concrete substance to our shared commitment to a
stable, peaceful and undivided Europe.
So one of the actions which they have taken is to both join
a Founding Act with NATO after the announced expansion, and
to remain a member of that Founding Act. Secondly, recently
the Partnership for Peace was expanded. A more active
participation was recently agreed to by Russia with NATO. So
we have a more active participation in NATO's Partnership for
Peace recently, after the actual decision to have three
additional countries join NATO.
Next, recently, their Prime Minister, Mr. Chernomyrdin,
publicly pledged, after meeting with our Vice President, that
the Russian Government will push hard for the Duma's
ratification of START II. This came within the last few
weeks.
We have heard--and I have heard from parliamentarians--that
the expansion of NATO will hurt the chances for ratification.
We understand that. But, nonetheless, the action taken by the
Prime Minister is that he is going to push hard for that
ratification. And that is despite his clear awareness that
NATO is, with great likelihood, going to be expanded and that
this Senate will ratify that expansion. So we have that
action taken on the part of Mr. Chernomyrdin.
We also have a recent--interestingly enough, we talked
about public opinion polls in here--we have a recent public
opinion poll by the Gallup people in Moscow, released last
Saturday, revealing that 57 percent of the people in Moscow
support the Czech Republic's bit to joint NATO; 54 percent
support Hungary's admission; 53 percent said Poland should
allowed to join NATO. And a quarter of those polled had no
views on the subject.
Now, I do not know what their sample was and so forth, but,
nonetheless, I am not so sure public opinion in Russia is so
wholly as one-sided as you indicate. And, again, I have also
had similar meetings, as you have had, with their
parliamentarians.
On the other hand, it is a very important factor to
consider. And I think we should all weigh that. We should not
give Russia a veto. That would be a very bad mistake, but we
surely should consider the impact of any expansion on our
relationship with Russia, and on the effort to bring Russia
into the democratic world and to keep them there, and to
keep them into the free market world. It is a very
important issue.
You have raised another issue, however, which I find--and I
join with you in finding troubling. And that is the inability
of NATO to suspend a member, to remove a member who no longer
comports with NATO's principles of democracy and free market
orientation, and a dedication to freedom. This could happen
in the future. It could happen. And there is no mechanism
inside of NATO to suspend a member. Every member has a veto.
And that could create a problem with your strategic vision. I
think all of us hopefully view the world somewhat
strategically. That could create a problem down the road.
And so I want to ask, Secretary Perry, about this issue. It
is something which has troubled me. I do not want to try to
condition the accession of these three new members on a
suspension agreement, because that would raise a false
implication that it has something to do with them--which it
does not. It is a general issue that I think we have to face
in NATO at some point, not related to these three particular
countries, or any other particular country.
But what happens in the future if a member of NATO no
longer comports to the principles of NATO in terms of
commitment to democracy, freedom and free markets, and then
has a veto on NATO operations? And my question, Mr. Perry, is
this: Should we at some point raise within NATO, and satisfy
ourselves, on the question of the suspension of a member at
some point in the future and a mechanism to accomplish that
end? That is my question.
Dr. Perry. That is a very good question, Senator Levin.
What you are describing is a problem--in fact, I would call
it a few--in the original NATO structure, the NATO
agreements. And, in my judgment, that is a problem which
should be addressed. It has been a problem for many, many
years. And therefore it is important, in addressing that
problem, to separate it from the issue of NATO accession. I
would not in any way want to tie that issue to the NATO
accession issue.
We could have predicted several decades ago that that would
cause a problem, that there would be some major issue come up
on which we could not reach consensus, and that would bring
NATO to a halt, or that some member would depart from the
NATO values. Happily, that has not happened. But it is a
potential problem, and I think we ought to address it.
Senator Levin. My time is up. I would appreciate, however,
for the record, if you or any other member here--my time is
up and the chairman here, I think, has got to stick to his 5-
minute rule--but if you or any other panelist here would
submit for the record your ideas on that subject, it would be
very helpful to us.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friends, the managers of this resolution, for
their tremendous work on NATO expansion and other issues.
Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, since the original North Atlantic
Treaty was signed in Washington in April 1949, the organization has
expanded far beyond its original 12 members. The amendment to this
treaty that I was proud to co-sponsor with my distinguished colleagues
Senators Warner, Levin, and Roberts acknowledges that we have had
recent difficulty with the consensus decision making methodology
currently in force within NATO.
Four more European nations later acceded to the Treaty between 1952
and 1982. In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were welcomed
and possibly tomorrow we will add Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia bringing the number to 26 members.
The following description of this consensus requirement is taken from
the NATO web site, and it says:
In making their joint decision-making process dependent on
consensus and common
[[Page S5824]]
consent, the members of the Alliance safeguard the role of
each country's individual experience and outlook while at the
same time availing themselves of the machinery and procedures
which allow them jointly to act rapidly and decisively if
circumstances require them to do so.
It stands to reason that with the addition of more members, that
consensus will be increasingly difficult to achieve.
Our amendment simply asks that the President do two things: to
examine the consensus requirement so that we ensure that we preserve
our sovereign right to act in our own national interest; and, examine a
procedure by which we can take action against a member who fails to
comply with the shared values upon which NATO was founded.
Not everyone agrees with this request to have NATO address these two
issues. I disagree.
The strength of the NATO Alliance is based upon adaptiveness. Our
recent experience with the UN, NATO and other formations clearly shows
we must address the changes we perceive in alliances.
Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I know I speak for all members of the
Foreign Relations Committee in commending the Armed Services Committee
for this discussion of these issues, and, most importantly, the comity
between the committee members and leadership. I think that is
demonstrated in our debate today on a serious issue but to one which we
have come to a good conclusion.
I know of no further debate. It would be a privilege if the Chair
would put the issue to us.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is all time yielded?
Mr. LUGAR. All on the amendment.
Mr. LEVIN. I yield our time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 535) was agreed to.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LUGAR. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. LUGAR. I yield as much time to the Senator from Texas as she may
require.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, I was interested in the previous
discussion because I think they were talking about going back to NATO
to discuss some contingencies that might occur and how they would be
addressed. That is the subject of my view on this issue.
I support the entrance of these new countries, but I think we need to
take a step back and make sure NATO is going to remain the greatest
defense alliance that the world has ever known.
In 1999, when the Senate voted to ratify the addition of Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary, I said at the time that we needed to
reassess the mutual threat to NATO nations to assure the strength of
our alliance in that agreement.
Four years later, as we prepared for what became Operation Iraqi
Freedom, we were disappointed, to say the least, to watch three NATO
countries refuse to support the defense of our ally, Turkey. That was
an initial signal that we have reached the point of stretching the
alliance.
That Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia are candidates for NATO is both a miracle and a testament to
the effectiveness of NATO itself. They survived brutal totalitarian
regimes during the cold war. Now they are free to fully join the world
community as valued members of NATO.
But what is the state of the alliance they seek to join? The world
has seen three NATO members refuse to support disarming Iraq. In the
view of the United States, this was the same as the failure to come to
the aid of a member country that has been attacked, a renunciation of
our mutual agreement.
Now is the time to ask: What is the mission of NATO today? Is NATO
going to protect the future or defend the past?
For NATO to remain relevant, we must agree on its fundamental
mission. Our alliance should recognize that the concern threats of
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have
replaced the common threat of Soviet imperialism. After the most recent
break in our bonds, it is essential to establish a new mission to
counter a new threat. NATO has always been unified around a common
purpose, but if it becomes nothing more than a patchwork quilt, we will
be wasting our money and endangering our own national security by
continuing to pay its bills and diverting our attention.
Fifty-four years ago this month, the United States pledged to protect
Europe from the Warsaw Pact. We were steadfast in our commitment. We
based 300,000 troops in Europe continuously throughout the cold war and
keep 119,000 troops there now. We have paid a quarter of NATO's costs,
even though we are only one of 19 nations belonging to the alliance.
Clearly, our commitment played a vital role in NATO's victory in the
cold war.
After the cold war ended, we turned our attention to areas of the
world that cried out for stability. We went to Somalia, Haiti and the
Balkans, with varying degrees of success. We became central to peace
negotiations in the Middle East. We focused more on our commitments
abroad and less on our own national defense closer to home. All that
changed on September 11, 2001, when terrorists and the countries
supporting them tried to destroy the icons of democracy, capitalism and
American power. Those attacks on our homeland marked the end of our
policy of containment.
The global war we are fighting against terrorism and our forceful
disarming of Iraq has forged new alliances unthinkable before September
11. Our relationship with Pakistan in the war on terrorism and
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan is one example of this
dynamic shift. But the war on terrorism has strained other
longstanding, traditional alliances.
Many of our friends in Europe do not comprehend the impact September
11 had on America. They viewed what happened within our borders from
arm's length, not acknowledging it as an attack on our country that
required a firm response. This disconnect has caused a rift among NATO
allies that would have been unthinkable before September 11. That split
was manifested in the refusal to help disarm Iraq.
As we prepared for Operation Iraqi Freedom, our long-time allies,
France, Germany and Belgium, countries we have been committed to defend
from attack for over half a century, opposed us at every turn. Even
today, they are thwarting the rebuilding of Iraq by refusing to lift
the U.N.-imposed sanctions that would allow oil to be sold to pay for
new infrastructure in that country.
A strong alliance cannot maintain its strength under such strain. It
is imperative that NATO establishes a new, common mission or risk
withering into irrelevance. If our purpose is a common defense, then we
must form a consensus in defining our common threats. And those who
agree should reconstitute a strong NATO.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, we created a valuable template for
how the world community can bond in this era of reckoning. We now
should lead the effort to reconfirm a coalition of the willing to stand
together against the common threat of terrorism to our democracies.
The seven invited countries have all demonstrated they are prepared
to contribute if they join NATO. Every one of them supported the U.S.-
led coalition to disarm Iraq. As the United States develops plans for
the reconstruction and administration of postwar Iraq, we are
consulting with all seven of these nations to determine how best to
proceed in this process and how they can contribute. All have indicated
a willingness to consider the requests of the United States or other
international organizations to help restore Iraq.
Just this week, Bulgaria pledged to provide combat troops under
international command. By doing so, Bulgaria has stepped forward--among
the first of the world's nations--to internationalize the U.S.-led
occupation. These seven countries are showing they are ready to do what
it takes within their means to make the world more secure.
Madam President, I am certainly going to vote to support this round
of NATO expansion because I do believe all of these prospective members
have
[[Page S5825]]
a clear understanding that NATO has new threats and new missions, and
they will make a positive contribution to this alliance.
But I do hope we will take the lead in bringing to NATO a clear
focus, a clear focus on the common threats that we all face, and the
methods for defending against those threats. That is what it will take
to assure that this great alliance will be a great alliance in the
future and not just something we talk about in the past with great
regard.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from
Virginia as much time as he might require.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Madam President. I thank the chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar, for his outstanding
leadership on this issue. I also very much agree with the remarks made
by Senator Hutchison of Texas.
As far as an enlarged NATO, we have had hearings on the mending of
fences and the moving forward that we will need to have as a country
with our Allies with a new sense of realism insofar as NATO and certain
alliances--who we can always count on and who we sometimes may not be
able to count on in the future.
I rise today to specifically address the issue of the enlargement of
NATO. I offer my very strong support for the enlargement of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance. The NATO alliance, over the
decades, has had a positive impact on the world.
Since the days I was Governor of Virginia, I have been a long-time
advocate of enlarging NATO, with new countries to contribute to
security and also to advance individual liberty.
I was an advocate of admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, and
Hungary, and they have been good participatory members. You can see how
the advancement of liberty has allowed the people of those countries to
have greater freedoms and greater prosperity.
I believe that enlarging the alliance will bring even greater peace
and security to the world, as well as confirm the value of economic
reforms that will offer all people greater individual freedoms and
protection of their rights.
The reforms and progress that have been made by Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania have transformed
once communist, oppressive states into vibrant democracies that
appreciate the newly reborn freedom to control their own destinies.
These nations are ascending into NATO at a serious time for the NATO
alliance. As these countries have made a positive transformation, so
must NATO transform from the cold war deterrent it has so successfully
been over the last 50 years into an alliance that is able to adapt to
meet the new challenges facing the world and the partner nations of
NATO.
NATO and its members must now develop the ability to meet the threat
of global terrorism wherever it may arise. This will no doubt be
challenging, as the structure and strategy of the NATO alliance for
decades has been to prepare for traditional conflict against the Soviet
Union.
To meet the defense needs of today, all NATO nations will need to
make a commitment to the forces and the resources that are necessary to
root out and defeat state-sponsored and itinerant terrorism beyond the
shores of the United States and Europe.
The seven nations that are poised to join NATO will be asked to take
an immediate role in implementing this new mission. While it is
unrealistic to ask these countries to meet the defense spending levels
of the United States, the alliance should urge these new members to
establish an expertise and an unmatched capability in a particular area
of combating terrorism. NATO does not particularly need large,
traditional forces or armaments. The alliance, rather, needs skilled
units that can neutralize the devastating impacts of chemical or
biological weapons, as well as seasoned intelligence organizations to
ensure that NATO and its members are always able to thwart terrorist
conspiracies or attacks before they are executed.
The seven aspirant countries have had to overcome significant
political and economic difficulties to reach the precipice of NATO
membership. Transforming a socialist-focused economy to one that is
market based requires tremendous perseverance and visionary leadership
and also an appreciation of liberty on the part of the people of these
countries.
Indeed, the people of these nations have made their decisions and
their choices. And now the economies of the aspirant countries are
growing markets with potential for prosperous growth. These experiences
will help these nations as they adjust to the burden of collective
defense and make the responsible decisions that come with NATO
membership.
I am confident that these countries--whether they are in the Baltics
or Central Europe or Southeastern Europe--will continue to meet their
responsibilities. You may ask, why are you so confident? Look at what
these aspirant countries are already doing, and have been doing, in the
current year and recent years. One must look only at the peacekeeping
missions currently, and those that have been going on for several years
in the Balkans.
You can look at the war in Afghanistan, and also the conflict in Iraq
to conclude that not only will these nations be prepared to take the
mantle of NATO membership--but are already contributing to the safety
and security of all members. Their contributions and support have been
substantive and significant in these current times of need.
NATO will certainly become a stronger alliance, with the capabilities
and the vitality these prospective new members bring to the
partnership.
I see these seven new members actually revitalizing NATO. There are
concerns that have been expressed about the adherence and the unity of
NATO. These seven countries will bring a revitalization, an
appreciation for the importance of NATO and the freedoms and values we
stand for.
When you discuss the expansion of NATO, the benefits of membership
are often the focus. However, it is important to understand the
tremendous value the alliance, and especially the United States, gains
when these seven countries are offered membership.
We have seen the impact of these nations in the positions and actions
taken during the recent military conflict in disarming Iraq. When the
alliance first addressed the Iraq issue, it was these countries that
immediately voiced their support for offering protection to an ally.
Once the conflict began, these countries offered staging support as
well as troops and chemical weapons teams which ensured Allied Forces
were prepared to confront all possible battlefield scenarios. In
particular, Bulgaria and Romania were helpful with their bases.
The alliance experienced a disconcerting event earlier this year when
a member nation, Turkey, requested defense assistance. Critics again
questioned the value and importance of NATO. However, those trying days
highlighted the importance of this alliance to the United States. And
while there was a small number of members who disagreed with the United
States, the vast majority were in agreement with our policy and were
extremely helpful in moving the alliance to assist Turkey in their
defense needs.
Beyond the military conflict in Iraq, expanding the membership in
NATO continues to be in the interest of this country. As the United
States continues to confront terrorism on all fronts, we will need the
continued support and intelligence assistance to make our efforts
successful. Again, I feel confident these nations will take the lead in
developing specialized programs that are needed within NATO.
Again, the aspirant countries are being asked to put together quick
response forces to deal with chemical or biological attacks, should one
occur. These are the invaluable programs that NATO will need as it
changes its focus to fighting terrorism.
The United States will always need allies with which to partner to
promote democratic values and our principles. By offering NATO
membership to these seven countries, our country is gaining valuable
allies that are intimately familiar with the value of individual
freedom and also the concept of representative government. They
appreciate what a blessing that is for the people.
[[Page S5826]]
The tremendous reforms and the progress that have been made by these
aspirant nations is a testament to their commitment to the core values
that have made NATO the strongest military alliance in history.
I strongly urge my colleagues to vote favorably on this resolution of
ratification and welcome Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia to our alliance of shared security but, more
importantly, to our alliance of shared values, principles, and
aspirations for free people.
I yield the floor.
Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask
unanimous consent that the time be charged equally to both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sununu). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, it is a privilege to yield as much time as
he requires to the distinguished Senator from Arizona.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Chair. I suggest the absence of a quorum for
1 minute.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield for that purpose?
Mr. LUGAR. Yes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Indiana, the
distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, for his work
on this very important legislation, for his leadership and continued
voice of maturity and reason that is often needed in our discussions
and debates over issues of national security.
The Senate's ratification of the NATO enlargement protocol before us
represents the ultimate victory of freedom over the fear and terror
that ruled Central and Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1989. The Berlin
Wall came down in 1989. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. NATO
expanded eastwards in 1999 and will do so again with the Senate's
consent in 2003. History will judge NATO's historic move eastwards as a
final chapter in a long struggle not simply to roll back oppression but
to consolidate a Europe whole and free.
The democracies of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria,
Slovakia, and Slovenia add a moral and strategic dimension to the
alliance. The Baltics were captive nations during the cold war.
Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia were subsumed into the Soviet empire,
and Slovenia was a constituent part of Tito's Yugoslavia.
These nations suffered over four decades of effective foreign control
and occupation. In 1989 and 1991, we celebrated their independence.
Today we celebrate their secure freedom, enshrined in our great Western
alliance in defense of our common values.
The Vilnius seven nations, as NATO's newest members are known, lent
their moral voice to our campaign to liberate Iraq and end Saddam
Hussein's tyranny. A February 5 letter from the V-7 nations, plus
Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia, stated:
The trans-Atlantic community, of which we are a part, must
stand together to face the threat posed by the nexus of
terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction. . .
. The clear and present danger posed by Saddam Hussein's
regime requires a united response from the community of
democracies.
These nations share our values because they understand oppression all
too well. Their voices carry special weight.
We received significant political and logistical support from the V-7
nations during the war in Iraq. NATO's new democracies provided their
airspace, airfields, ports, and military personnel in support of
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Several of these nations deployed troops to
the Iraq theater. Many of NATO's newest members more resolutely and
more concretely supported the military campaign in Iraq than did some
of NATO's founding members. These seven democracies have also served as
de facto Allies in NATO operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.
NATO's enlargement serves American leadership in Europe, anchoring
our commitment to security and freedom there. It welcomes into the
alliance a large group of nations that resolutely support American
leadership and the principles that guide it in Europe and across the
world.
As we saw during the Iraq debate, a majority of Europe's leaders,
including NATO's new members, supported America's determination to
disarm Iraq. NATO's new members will be solid allies that will expand
NATO's reach, amplify its voice, and enhance its moral authority to
defend freedom, including against the threat of global terrorism.
I have had the pleasure of traveling to each of the seven new member
states to review their preparations to join NATO. Like my colleagues, I
have been struck by these democracies' determination to rank among our
closest allies, and to see NATO membership not only as a way to
guarantee their security, but to contribute to the larger struggle for
freedom the West once waged on their behalf.
The success of the Prague Summit demonstrated the new NATO's shared
history, shared values, shared sense of threat, and an agreed way
forward in meeting those threats. This new NATO will provide a firmer
foundation for peace and a more resolute defense of our values. Prague
lent considerable momentum to the construction of an integrated and
peaceful Europe and taught us much about our alliance.
The decisions at Prague to invite seven new members to join the
alliance, create a NATO rapid reaction force, enhance military
modernization and interoperability, and streamline NATO's
infrastructure were tangible accomplishments that should make the
alliance more capable and flexible. Rather than debating out-of-area
operations, NATO forces and assets are supporting the peacekeeping
mission in Afghanistan. The NATO-Russia Council provides a forum for
security cooperation with Moscow. NATO's peacekeeping missions in the
Balkans have been a success. The United States is considering a new
military basing concept on the territory of new NATO Allies in
southeastern Europe. NATO remains central to American interests in
Europe and beyond.
This is not to suggest in any way that everything is going swimmingly
within the alliance. NATO has been put at grave risk by hostile French
obstructionism that is as dangerous as it is cynical.
Let me be clear: I believe the French government is pursuing a
systematic campaign to undermine American leadership in Europe and the
world. I believe France would ultimately like to see America's
withdrawal from Europe and the replacement of an American-led NATO with
an all-European army. France's active opposition to the United States
within the North Atlantic Council over a period of many years, and in
the daily workings of the NATO bureaucracy, make clear the French
agenda to weaken NATO's foundations and make the alliance less capable
of effectively meeting challenges to international security.
Officials at many levels of the French government, including
President Chirac, boldly assert France's ambition to serve as a
``counterweight'' to the United States. By definition, a country can be
either a counterweight or an ally, but it cannot be both. Official
pronouncements by the French government, and the daily actions of
France within NATO and at the Security Council, make clear that France
is not an ally of the United States.
France's decision in February to block a routine request for Turkey's
defense--I emphasize ``defense''--in the event of war with Iraq created
the most serious internal crisis the alliance has known in a
generation. France's open rejection of its commitment to a fellow NATO
ally required the decision on Turkey's reinforcement to be taken in the
Defense Planning Committee, which excludes France.
The Defense Planning Committee is the logical and appropriate venue
for
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decisions relating to the defense of NATO members to be made. France
does not contribute militarily to an alliance premised on the military
defense of member democracies. France has a political voice but not a
military stake in NATO decision-making. Decisions relating to the
military interests and defense of member states--the core of NATO's
mission, and the bulk of its agenda--fall under the authority of the
Defense Planning Committee. The French dilute their own influence in
NATO by not participating in its military arm, and the alliance should
recognize that condition of French membership by making defense
decisions in a forum that reflects France's absence from NATO's
military mission.
NATO did ultimately achieve a consensus in the DPC that met Turkey's
defense requirements. Achieving consensus in an institutionalized forum
that excludes France seems to me to have produced a better result than
a divisive majority vote in the North Atlantic Council, had we shelved
the consensus principle in favor of some other weighted voting
mechanism, as some in the Senate have proposed.
While I did not oppose the agreement reached today in the Senate
creating a reporting requirement on the issues of consensus and
suspension within NATO, I do not support overturning the consensus
principle and creating a suspension clause because I believe it could
weaken American leadership and interests in NATO while actually
improving the position of France within the alliance. Replacing the
consensus rule with a majority voting scheme would lead to factionalism
and could result in scenarios in which the United States was outvoted,
ceding our traditional leadership to others. Adopting a suspension
clause would gut the heart of the alliance, the commitment to mutual
defense, by introducing a reservation into the Alliance's commitment to
defend an embattled democracy.
Putting the issue of the consensus rule on the agenda of the North
Atlantic Council would be seen by some of our best allies as divisive.
It would create a debate within the Council not about the French fifth
column, but about an American proposal that would dilute the influence
of other NATO partners by weakening or negating their influence in a
majority voting scheme. Replacing the consensus rule with some form of
majority vote could threaten the supreme national interests of any NATO
member, including the United States, that might at some point find
itself dissenting from a majority of NATO members on a matter vital to
that country's national security. The United States would never give up
its effective veto over NATO military operations, and no country that
contributes militarily to the alliance could be expected to do the same
by endorsing a majority voting process.
Under consensus, no vote counts more than any other, which is not
true in a weighted majority voting system like that of the Security
Council. Consensus helps pull allies together and gives each an equal
stake in their outcomes. It prevents factionalism and the development
of voting blocs that would only divide allies, not draw us together.
Consensus prevents France from leading its own voting bloc in
opposition to the United States. Historically, the United States has
been the only NATO member whose initiatives regularly achieve
consensus. Why throw away such an effective tool for U.S. leadership?
Nor would I support conditioning NATO enlargement on developing a
mechanism to suspend any NATO member that fails to uphold alliance
principles. Advocating a kick-out clause suggests a lack of confidence
in the democratic character and commitment of our new allies. It sends
exactly the wrong message to these new members: that we fear they may
regress from the democratic values we have certified that they share by
inviting them to join NATO, values which NATO itself protects and
strengthens. Conditioning their membership with the suggestion that we
do not have confidence in the longevity of their democracies seems a
strange way to welcome them into our alliance.
A clause threatening any individual NATO member with expulsion would
weaken the heart of the Washington Treaty by casting doubt on the
commitment of the NATO Allies to come to the defense of any threatened
member state. A suspension clause would effectively condition the
mutual defense commitment that is at the heart of the alliance in a way
that would breed insecurity and mistrust, not security and confidence,
among member states. In the words of Bruce Jackson of the Project on
Transitional Democracies:
A provision to expel [NATO members] would introduce a
corrosive mental reservation into the commitment to defend an
embattled democracy and would, therefore, debilitate the most
powerful military alliance ever assembled.
NATO works so well for many of the reasons the U.N. Security Council
does not: it is a true community of values in which all members are
democracies; consensus requires unanimity that gives all members a
stake in decision-making and outcomes; the absence of majority voting
or weighted voting like the Security Council does not create different
classes of membership or hostile factions; and unlike the Security
Council, NATO has proven time and again that it is able to effectively
resist aggression and use its military and political power to expand
freedom. The reason the seven new members of NATO are so keen to join
the alliance underscores their clear belief it will protect their
security and advance their interests. Can anyone hold the Security
Council to the same standard?
NATO's value to American interests and the progress of freedom
endures. NATO enlargement serves American interests by delivering seven
committed treaty allies who share our perspective on the world.
Enlargement serves our common values by adding to our community of
allied democracies the voices and the people of countries that were
long denied their free destiny. NATO's expansion moves us decisively in
the direction of a Europe whole and free, one that has exorcized the
ghosts of a violent past and stands with us in its commitment to human
freedom.
As the leaders of Britain, Spain, Italy, Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, and Portugal have written, ``The real bond between
the United States and Europe is the values we share. . . . These values
crossed the Atlantic with those who sailed from Europe to help create
the United States of America. Today they are under greater threat than
ever. . . . Today more than ever, the transatlantic bond is a guarantee
of our freedom.'' Let that continue to be our creed in the uncertain
years ahead, confident that we are stronger together than apart, that
our values ennoble our common defense of them, and that we can,
together, make this a safer, freer, better world. It's worth fighting
for.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I know of no Senators who wish to debate. I
have consulted with the distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden. He
knows of no Members on the Democratic side seeking time to debate and I
know of no Republicans who seek further time in debate. Therefore, I
ask unanimous consent all time be yielded back on both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, my understanding, and I ask for guidance
from the Chair, is that a vote on final passage of the NATO treaty will
occur at 9:30 a.m. tomorrow.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. LUGAR. I advise all Senators that the next action on the treaty
will, in fact, be the final vote at 9:30 tomorrow. I also add as an
announcement that the foreign ministers of the countries seeking
ascension will be brought to the floor following the vote for
presentation to Senators. That will be a prelude for a number of
recognition ceremonies involving the President, the White House, and
others.
Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. LUGAR. I am happy to yield.
Mr. SARBANES. I simply commend chairman Lugar and Senator Biden,
ranking minority member, for their very effective leadership with
respect to this NATO enlargement issue. I am pleased to join with them
in supporting this very important step forward.
I underscore how quickly the chairman moved with respect to this
matter and how carefully it was done in the
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committee. Very extended consideration was given to this issue, which
of course, comports with its importance. This is a major step we all
need to recognize and the fact that it will happen without controversy,
at least of any consequence, ought not to make us lose sight of the
fact of the historic nature of what is being accomplished here--
tomorrow, presumably.
I thank the Senator for his skilled leadership on this issue.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the distinguished Senator from Maryland for his
leadership in our committee throughout the years and, likewise,
specifically, on the issue of NATO that has been before the Senate.
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