[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 59 (Friday, April 11, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5371-S5372]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Ms. SNOWE:
  S. 909. A bill to provide State and local governments with 
flexibility in using funds made available for homeland security 
activities; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.
  Ms. SNOWE. Madam President, I rise today to introduce legislation 
that will provide State and local governments the flexibility they need 
for preparedness activities associated with the planning, procurement 
and training for homeland security and counter terrorism activities.
  Quite simply, this legislation would permit State and local 
governments to use up to twenty percent of any funds provided for the 
procurement of new equipment to train first responders in the use of 
that equipment and secondly, allow State level Emergency Management 
personnel to conduct activities such as FEMA related strategic planning 
on behalf of smaller communities that may not otherwise have the 
resources to adequately perform that planning.
  I became acutely aware of this need when I visited the Maine 
Emergency Management Agency and learned that, although they had been 
provided the funds to purchase new chemical and biological protection 
equipment, they had not received any funds to train personnel to use 
that equipment.
  As we are all aware, homeland security needs at the State level vary 
widely. From State to State, there are varying degrees of risk, varying 
percentages of full-time versus volunteer responders, and different 
areas of strengths and weaknesses in the responder community. Any 
successful Federal program that seeks to improve response capability 
must therefore have flexible rules for implementation.
  For example, in fiscal years 2000 through 2002, FEMA funded states 
for terrorism preparedness activities. The State of Maine received 
$246,000 annually for these activities and the funds were administered 
through the Emergency Management Performance Grant. Those funds were 
based on a strategic plan submitted by each State that outlined its 
most urgent needs, and the steps to be taken to meet those needs. If 
planning was the need, the State could put an emphasis on planning. If 
training or exercise was the need, they could stress that.
  While there was no set quota for how much money had to go to local 
communities, States were required to track performance measures that 
showed how local communities were benefitting because in rural States 
such as Maine, it is often more efficient and cost-effective for States 
to sponsor programs for the benefit of local officials, rather than 
providing funds to communities that may not have the organizational 
infrastructure to plan and execute programs.
  States were given wide authority to reimburse communities for time 
and equipment costs, purchase training materials, and contract for 
services--whatever was necessary to accomplish the ultimate goal of 
improved preparedness for responders. These dollars could also support 
basic emergency management activities, such as incident command 
training, emergency planning or exercise design, which supported the 
communities' overall all-hazard preparedness as well as their 
capability to react to a terrorist incident.
  By contrast, let's go back and look at FEMA's FY2002 Supplemental 
Budget and the Office of Domestic Preparedness' funding for emergency 
response equipment for it was during this cycle that the previous 
flexibility began to be restricted. First, while the FEMA FY2002 
Supplemental Budget supported emergency operations planning, Citizen 
Corps, Community Emergency Response Teams, CERT, and emergency 
operations center assessment and improvement, 75 percent of the funding 
for planning and for Citizen Corps and CERT efforts was required to be 
passed through to local communities, even if the capacity to administer 
those funds was generally lacking and the communities would have been 
better served by programs brought to them by the state.
  In addition, planning dollars could not be spent on exercises to test 
plans, or training to support those plans. Funds for Citizen Corps and 
CERT programs, which are voluntary efforts, could not be used for any 
other preparedness purpose, even if no communities came forward 
desiring to participate in those programs. It is likely that Maine will 
return a portion of these funds because the local need for them does 
not exist. Furthermore, emergency operations center assessment funds 
could only be spent on assessment, even if a current assessment of 
facilities was in place.
  The Office of Domestic Preparedness' funding for the procurement of 
equipment has been equally restrictive. The lion's share is of course 
for equipment, and only equipment that provides protection, detection, 
decontamination and communications could be procured.
  Beyond the fact that it took two rounds of funding to build a 
critical mass of resources such that equipment purchases could begin in 
earnest, much of this equipment is highly technical in nature, and 
requires extensive training to operate safely and properly. However, of 
the funds provided for that equipment, none could be used for training. 
While there were some exercise funds, they were specifically targeted 
to weapons of mass destruction. With the FY2003 allocation, some 
funding has been allocated for training, which is a positive step but, 
again, it comes with very strict limits and dollars allocated for 
exercise cannot be used for training, or vice versa.
  In the emergency management world, planning comes first, then 
training, then exercise.
  If you need a plan, you can't substitute an exercise and get the same 
result. If you need an exercise, you can't substitute training. Even 
within the training and exercise grants, there are restrictions that 
make it extremely difficult for full-time departments, for example, to 
free up employee time to take needed training or participate in 
exercises. And with the focus on homeland security, the need for 
flexibility to improve basic response capability has also been 
overlooked. In communities that do not have the resources to create 
special response forces for every hazard--and that includes all towns 
in Maine--it is imperative to be able to build a base of planning and 
training for all hazards, on which one can build the capability to 
respond to a terrorist incident.
  Our strategy in Maine has been to build a regional response 
capability. In some areas we could build that capability around 
existing response capacity, and in others we have had to build 
capability from the ground up.
  For example, the Portland and South Portland fire departments have 
formed a regional response team and are undertaking training required 
to stand up a fully qualified hazardous materials response team. This 
entails 80 hours of training for each individual. But, I'm told the 
City of Portland is in the process of cutting 20 fire positions and 
some police officers because of budget constraints at the local level, 
as they are facing additional security requirements around the city. 
This makes it very difficult to free up responders for the required 
training, especially as there are no budget dollars for overtime, and 
no Federal grant currently

[[Page S5372]]

available will reimburse training costs to include overtime.
  In other parts of the State, private paper companies have stepped up 
and volunteered their already-trained hazardous materials teams to 
respond off site. During the anthrax scare in the fall of 2001, these 
teams responded to any and all ``suspicious package'' calls, at a cost 
of $2,000 per hour to field a team of 22 people.
  These companies have responded out of patriotism and a sense of civic 
responsibility, and despite challenging economic times in the paper 
industry. These teams are now faced with maintaining the full ``level 
A'' capability and further facing more than 20 hours of additional 
training to be fully WMD compliant. No grant monies currently available 
allow reimbursement for their response or for their training time.
  In Maine, we have by necessity been flexible in our approach to each 
region, looking at the different needs in planning, training, exercise 
and equipment procurement. However, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to practice flexibility when the Federal programs that 
provide the resources to build capability are becoming more and more 
rigid.
  The events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax attacks 
have brought our Nation to heightened level of awareness. Nowhere is 
this more evident than in Maine's hospitals, upon which we rely to 
respond quickly and effectively in the event of any disaster affecting 
our residents' health.
  While hospitals have always had disaster plans in place, recent 
events have dramatically changed the definition of ``disaster''. Since 
September 11, 2001, hospitals have stepped up their readiness efforts 
to be better prepared in responding not only to conventional disasters, 
but also to the more concrete threat of previously unimaginable 
terrorist attacks using chemical, biological or radiologic agents that 
could lead to large-scale emergencies with mass casualties.
  Hospitals have to change their mind-set on established norms and 
standard ways of operating to embrace a broader spectrum of roles and 
responsibilities. The relationship between traditional first responders 
and the non-traditional role of hospitals in community-wide first 
response overall is moving closer, emphasizing the need for 
collaboration and compatibility.
  No one doubts that in the event of a weapons of mass destruction 
event, hospitals are likely to see large numbers of potentially 
contaminated patients seeking treatment. The reality is that hospital 
emergency department staff and hospital providers in general are truly 
the new ``first responders.'' Hospitals are critical elements of the 
community response system and if they are not prepared and protected, 
there will be serious gaps in the system that could cause it to break 
down completely.
  One of the largest barriers to optimal emergency preparedness is 
staff education and training. To date, hospitals have had to absorb all 
these costs, as the limited funding assistance available to hospitals 
has not been permitted to be spent on education and training. The full 
costs of providing training is daunting, particularly in these lean 
economic times of declining reimbursement to hospitals.
  The costs of the courses and/or instructors' fees pale in comparison 
to the staff time that must be paid to attend any given course. Staff 
time must essentially be paid twice--first to pay the staff person's 
on-duty time to attend the course or drill, and once again to pay 
another staff person's time to replace the worker being trained. The 
cost of staff time is significant, and even finding staff to replace 
the one attending training is especially costly due to the nursing 
shortage in hospitals. Consider the following facts: The vacancy rate 
for hospital staff nurses in Maine has been 8-9 percent. The average 
hourly rate for registered nurses in Maine is $21.67, and rising. Any 
staff training must be done on a large scale so that trained staff are 
available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
  As just one example of training needed, Maine recognizes that 
hospitals need to be prepared to manage contaminated patients who come 
to their facility. The Maine Emergency Management Agency is working to 
provide hospitals with the necessary equipment, but the training 
necessary to competently use that equipment is extensive and currently 
underfunded.
  According to Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
regulations, staff must be trained to the hazardous material 
``operations'' level in order to safely use the equipment. Meeting 
Federal Government standards for that level of training requires at 
least two full days of initial training, with refresher courses 
required annually. Conservatively speaking, if 35 Maine hospitals train 
25 nurses to that level, the approximate cost of nursing staff time 
alone for the initial course would be $606,760. And remember, because 
six to eight staff members are required to man the decontamination 
line, the nursing costs are just the beginning.
  The same staffing costs apply to sending staff to local and regional 
emergency drills and training sessions--which are absolutely critical 
components of Maine's disaster readiness. It is simply not possible for 
hospitals to absorb all of these costs, given the declining 
reimbursements. Hospital operating margins in Maine declined from an 
average of 2.3 percent in 2001 to 1.7 percent in 2002 and about one 
third of all Maine hospitals experienced zero or negative operating 
margins in 2002.
  Yet, our hospitals continue their efforts to provide the best 
possible patient care while simultaneously increasing their level of 
emergency preparedness. Federal assistance with training funding would 
provide excellent support for hospitals, as they work to respond to any 
crisis and protect their staff so they can perform the critical 
functions of caring for the citizens of Maine in any crisis.
  These are but a few examples of the burdens being experienced by 
State, local and private industry responders as they struggle to 
prepare themselves and the citizenry to prevent and respond to 
terrorist attacks and other crises. This legislation will provide some 
of the flexibility emergency management personnel require to be truly 
prepared. I urge my colleagues to support this much needed legislation.
                                 ______