[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 59 (Friday, April 11, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5336-S5337]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR WEAPONS: THE MYTH AND DANGER
Mr. AKAKA. Madam President, I rise today to discuss the myth and
dangers posed by the nuclear earth penetrating weapons proposed by the
Bush administration.
The administration suggests that new nuclear weapons could be needed
to destroy a growing number of hard and deeply buried targets, HDBT.
The Intelligence Community has estimated that there are over 10,000
potential HDBTs worldwide. Many of these are near the surface, serve
tactical roles, and can be attacked with conventional weapons. But some
hundreds of these targets have stronger concrete reenforcement, or are
buried at great depths, or are in tunnels. They play a strategic role,
protecting senior leaders, command and control centers, or stored
weapons of mass destruction. Of particular concern are the very
hardened or deeply buried HDBTs located in so-called rogue nations
To attack the most deeply buried structures, the administration would
like to have a nuclear weapon that could destroy a bunker some 300
meters, or about 1,000 feet, underground without causing substantial
``collateral damage.'' The administration is proposing to explore two
new nuclear weapons for attacking this category of targets. The first
is the so-called Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, or RNEP for short.
The second is a new class of low-yield nuclear warheads.
These two initiatives are often confused in the press or thought to
be different versions of a mini-nuke bunker-busting nuclear weapon. The
two candidates being considered by the administration for modification
into a RNEP, the B61 and B83 bombs, have been in the U.S. arsenal for a
number of years. They are not, however, low-yield weapons. In fact,
they have yields in the tens of kilotons to megaton range.
Due to congressional concerns, the fiscal year 2003 Defense
authorization bill required the Department of Defense to deliver to the
Armed Services Committees of both Chambers a report on the need for an
RNEP before funds could be spent on the program. On March 19, 2003, the
administration delivered the report. After a 30-day waiting period, the
administration has said it will begin to study whether the B61 or B83
bombs can be modified into a RNEP. The administration plans to spend
some $15 million on this work in fiscal year 2004, and the study could
cost as much as $46 million.
As for low-yield nuclear weapons, these are nuclear weapons with an
explosive yield of less than 5 kilotons. Ten years ago, Congress placed
a prohibition on ``research and development'' that could lead to the
production of a new low-yield nuclear weapon in the fiscal year 1994
Defense Authorization Act. In the early 1990s, advocates of low-yield
weapons claimed that precision strikes with such weapons could be used
to attack weapons of mass destruction in third-world states that had
acquired them. Congress was concerned that the development of such
weapons would send the wrong message about the U.S. commitment to
nonproliferation. In addition, there were fears that if such weapons
were developed, the firewall between nuclear and conventional weapons
would be removed.
The administration now seeks to remove the prohibition on research on
low-yield weapons research. The administration's Nuclear Posture Review
calls for exploring new nuclear weapons ``concepts'' to be able to
attack HDBTs with reduced collateral damage. According to the
administration, the congressional restriction on research on low-yield
nuclear weapons ``impedes this effort.''
Ignoring the policy implications of making a nuclear weapon an
acceptable tool to be used like a conventional weapon, there is still
the critical question of whether such a weapon could destroy a deeply
buried target without massive collateral damage. Could a weapon burrow
so deep that its nuclear explosion could be safely contained within the
Earth? The short answer to this question is no.
To be a bunker buster, the weapon design must protect the warhead and
associated electronics while it tunnels into the ground. This severely
limits the missile to smaller impact velocities, which, in turn,
severely limits how far down it can go. In fact, limits on material
strengths make 50 feet about the maximum depth to which a missile could
penetrate into dry rocky soil while maintaining its integrity until the
warhead detonates.
The radioactive fallout from a nuclear weapon detonated at a maximum
depth of 50 feet could not be contained. Even a low-yield nuclear
weapon of 0.1 kiloton, according to Princeton physicist Robert Nelson,
must penetrate about 230 feet underground for the explosion to be fully
contained. Based on the experience of U.S. underground tests at the
Nevada Test Site, a 5-kiloton explosive has to be buried at least 650
feet to be fully contained. A 100-kiloton explosive must be at least
1,300 feet deep.
To comprehend what would happen if a nuclear bunker-busting weapon
were used, consider the damage that would result from the use of a
``low-yield'' 1-kiloton warhead. Such a weapon would be one-thirteenth
the size of the atomic bomb dropped over Hiroshima, and of a size that
may be pursued if the congressional prohibition on research on low-
yield weapons is removed. At the maximum depth possible of 20 to 50
feet, a 1-kiloton warhead would eject more than 1 million cubic feet of
radioactive debris from a crater bigger than a football field. If such
low-yield weapon were used to attack a HDBT in or near a city, it could
devastate the area. There would be major collateral damage because the
ejected radioactive debris would create a lethal gamma-radiation field
over a large area.
For the shock of a nuclear explosion to reach a hardened target at
1,000 feet, a much larger warhead would be required, like the B61 and
B83 bombs being considered for the RNEP. But the B61 and B83 bombs
would dig a much larger crater and create a substantially larger amount
of radioactive debris, causing that much more radioactive fallout and
devastation.
I also am concerned about the logistical problems of using nuclear
weapons in a combat setting. Destroying bunkers requires knowing
exactly where they are and delivering a weapon with precision and
accuracy. During Operation Enduring Freedom, American Special Forces
were used as spotters on the ground near the targets to provide the
intelligence necessary to strike suspected al-Qaida command bunkers and
weapon depots. Our Special Forces would be in great danger if on-the-
ground spotting were required for nuclear bunker busters.
As we have seen in our efforts to target Saddam Hussein, his bunker
complexes are often located inside Baghdad. Leaders of other ``rogue
states'' can be expected to construct their command and control centers
inside their capital cities too. The potential for collateral damage to
our troops and the public our forces are liberating are obvious.
Another consideration is battlefield assessment. Some bomb damage
assessment can be done from the air, but if a closer look is needed,
how soon could troops be sent in to determine if the strike was
successful? The answer depends on the importance we place on the safety
and health of our forces. If we use the underground Nevada Test Site as
one real-world example, it will be a very long time. If battle planners
need assessment more quickly, or we need to recover evidence of what
was contained in a bunker, then American soldiers and marines will be
put at risk.
[[Page S5337]]
This is not a theoretical consideration. We are discussing DNA
testing of bodies found in Iraq to determine if they are in fact Saddam
Hussein, his sons, or his closest associates. Had the administration
used a nuclear weapon to destroy Saddam Hussein's command bunker, this
task would be infinitely more difficult, and more dangerous.
I appreciate the challenge that deeply hardened bunkers pose. I am
not convinced that RNEP or low-yield nuclear weapons are the answer.
Indeed, the Pentagon already has a number of conventional weapons
capable of destroying hardened targets buried at 50 feet, or putting
them out of action by blocking entrances and exits. Moreover, ADM James
Ellis, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. STRATCOM, recently told Congress that
he plans to emphasize conventional options in STRATCOM's new global
strike mission in order to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons.
Research and development have improved the precision, penetrating
capability, and explosive power of conventional weapons dramatically
over the last decade. Further research and development on conventional
weapons to attack buried and hardened targets are underway.
Sometimes, the simplest solution is the correct one. We do not need a
nuclear weapon to destroy a tunnel entrance or a mineshaft. The same
research in material science and precision guidance that will allow a
missile to aim and protect the warhead to penetrate farther should be
applied to conventional bunker busters. Conventional bunker busters
could meet the challenge of threatening the several hundred most
hardened and deep targets in question. Conventional bunker busters
would not place civilian populations or our forces at undue risk and
harm, and would keep the barrier between nuclear and conventional
weapons high and wide.
Finally, we must keep in mind the serious international implications
of the administration's pursuit of new nuclear weapons designs. Russian
nuclear weapons designers have advocated new generations of more usable
nuclear weapons. If the United States starts down this path, Russia
will be encouraged to do the same. If Russia begins, maybe China will
too. A new arms race in supposedly low-yield and ``usable'' nuclear
weapons will result. If NATO forces move farther east, Russia may
deploy such weapons opposite NATO forces. China may view them as usable
in crisis with Taiwan. We should stop this new tactical nuclear arms
race before it starts. We should not develop the RNEP. We should keep
the prohibition on research on the low-yield nuclear weapons.
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