[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 42 (Monday, March 17, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3769-S3774]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I would like to take a few minutes to 
speak about the current situation in Iraq.
  There has been a broad consensus that Saddam Hussein is a murderous 
tyrant and that the world is a more dangerous place if he has weapons 
of mass destruction. There has also been consensus that he has not 
complied with his obligations under the U.N. ceasefire resolution at 
the end of the Gulf War and the numerous resolutions that followed, 
which called for him to disarm, particularly with respect to weapons of 
mass destruction. And

[[Page S3770]]

there has been consensus that the U.N. should enforce its resolutions 
more forcefully than it had in recent years. This led to passage of 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 which resulted in the resumption 
of weapons inspections by the U.N.
  Now there is division at the U.N.
  Many members of the United Nations want to complete the inspections 
and keep Saddam contained and in a box until those inspections are 
completed. Just a few days ago, the President said he would call for a 
vote at the U.N. Security Council to authorize the use of force so that 
every member nation could state its position. The President has now 
apparently reversed himself in the face of a likely rejection by the 
Security Council.
  The issue, until yesterday, was whether to proceed militarily without 
the support of the world community as expressed by the Security Council 
or, alternatively, to give the inspectors the months they said they 
need to complete their work, the position which many members of the 
Security Council apparently favor.
  The President has apparently chosen the former course. I have felt 
that course was unwise for a number of reasons. By failing to rally the 
Security Council to a common view, we have lost the best chance to 
force Saddam Hussein to capitulate because it is likely that only if 
Saddam Hussein sees a united world at the other end of the barrel will 
he see no potential to turn the tide to his favor. A world solidly 
against him would be a world that an anti-U.S. propaganda machine would 
have great trouble stirring up. Just as in the gulf war, Saddam was 
unable to score any propaganda points when 28 nations, including a 
number of Muslim nations, provided military forces against him.
  Another reason I have felt that proceeding without the U.N. would be 
unwise is we would lose some support in the region, with the resulting 
loss of staging areas and overflight rights, as is apparently the case 
in Turkey, which, in turn, could increase the length of the war and the 
number of casualties.
  There are also serious long-term risks in proceeding without support 
of the world community as expressed through the U.N. Such an attack on 
Iraq would be viewed by much of the world as an attack by the West 
against an Islamic nation, rather than of the world against Saddam. We 
would fuel the anti-Americanism that is already so prevalent, and stoke 
the terrorism which is already our No. 1 threat.
  Admiral Lowell Jacoby, the Director of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in February:

       Much of the world is increasingly apprehensive about U.S. 
     power and influence. Many are concerned about the expansion, 
     consolidation, and dominance of American values, ideals, 
     culture, and institutions. Reactions to this sensitivity to 
     growing ``Americanization'' can range from mild ``chafing'' 
     on the part of our friends and allies, to fear and violent 
     rejection on the part of our adversaries. We should consider 
     that these perceptions mixed with angst over perceived ``U.S. 
     unilateralism'' will give rise to significant anti-American 
     behavior.

  I have also felt that proceeding without the U.N. would make it less 
likely that other nations will join us in the difficult tasks of 
providing stability in reconstructing Iraq in the aftermath of the 
conflict. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan recently said the 
following:

       If they [the members of the U.N. Security Council] cannot 
     agree on a common position and if some of them launch action 
     without the support of the [Security] Council, the legitimacy 
     of this action will be widely questioned and it will not 
     obtain the political support required to ensure its success 
     in the long term, once the military phase is over.

  The European Union's External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten, 
likewise pointed out recently that ``if it comes to war, it will be 
very much easier'' to make a case for other countries to contribute to 
the reconstruction of Iraq ``if there is no dispute about the 
legitimacy of the military action that has taken place.''
  Further, and of great significance, President Bush's principal basis 
for launching a military action is Iraq's failure to comply with U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1441 and other U.N. resolutions. But how is 
it credible to invoke the Security Council's resolutions as a basis for 
our action and then ignore that same Security Council if it does not 
agree with us on the wisdom of military action at this time and does 
not give us the resolution we want?
  Stressing the importance of a U.N. authorization does not give the 
U.N. a veto over American action. Nobody has a veto over America's 
foreign policy or decisionmaking. The decision is America's and 
America's alone. The issue is not whether we need the U.N.'s permission 
to use force; we don't. The issue is whether it would be wise to have 
the U.N.'s support and whether we will be more secure from terrorists 
and other threats if we initiate a military action against Iraq without 
the support of the world community. If there were an imminent threat 
against us, we would not--and should not--hesitate to use force. But 
attacking in the absence of an immediate threat is a very different 
scenario with very different risks.
  The President has said that the U.N. will become irrelevant if it 
does not authorize member states to use military force at this time 
against Iraq. But the Security Council's decision in this matter, 
whichever way it would have gone, would have been highly relevant.
  If the Security Council authorized force by member states, that would 
be relevant as a statement of the world community against Saddam. But 
if the Security Council rejected authorizing force at this time, as 
they apparently would have, it would still be relevant because our use 
of military force in the face of such a Security Council rejection 
could have a worldwide negative political impact with great peril to 
us.
  The issue is not whether we will prevail militarily without the 
U.N.'s support; we will. The issue is whether our long-term security 
would be enhanced in that circumstance or whether chaos and instability 
in the Middle East, following our unilateral action, will be deep and 
long and more costly, and whether the level of terrorism against us in 
the world will rise to a higher point than it otherwise would.
  The U.N. too often has been seen by the administration as an obstacle 
to overcome instead of an opportunity to rally the world. And the 
administration has also weakened its case at the U.N. in a number of 
ways.
  It has used divisive rhetoric and denigrating attitude towards the 
views of other nations whose support we seek. Countries have been told 
``you are either with us or against us.'' The U.N. has been told that 
while we welcome U.N. endorsement, we can do just fine without you. 
U.N. inspectors were called ``so-called'' inspectors. And before U.N. 
inspections even began, they were called useless. Germany and France 
were sneered at as being part of ``old Europe.'' This kind of rhetoric 
alienates our friends and fuels the inflammatory propaganda of our 
enemies. Divisive and dismissive rhetoric is no way to rally the 
Security Council. It comes across as bullying and domineering.
  The White House spokesmen have also spun facts in a transparent way, 
contradicting themselves from day to day. The refusal of Iraq to assure 
the safety of U-2 surveillance planes was at first called a serious 
breach of resolution 1441. When agreement was reached between U.N. 
inspectors and Iraq to fly the planes shortly thereafter, the White 
House spokesman said the agreement was no big deal. Similarly, when the 
inspectors determined that Iraqi missiles violated U.N. resolutions 
limiting their range, the White House pointed to the violation as 
significant evidence of noncompliance. When, soon thereafter, Iraq 
agreed to destroy those missiles, with U.N. inspectors looking on, the 
White House spokesman said that action was evidence of the Iraqis' 
deception. That kind of spinning and reversal of field by White House 
spokesmen has not helped our credibility or our cause.

  We will prevail militarily in Iraq on our own, albeit with increased 
risk, but it will be more difficult to win the larger war on terrorism 
without the world community in our corner. We need the eyes and the 
ears and the intelligence of the people of the world if we are going to 
detect and ferret out, deter, and destroy those who care nothing for 
international law and do not even accept the rules of war.
  Historically, America has been strongest when we found common cause 
with other nations in pursuit of common goals. The path to a safer 
world and a more secure America has

[[Page S3771]]

rarely come from a go-it-alone approach. Thomas Friedman wrote recently 
in the New York Times:

       [I]f Mr. Bush acts unilaterally, I fear America will not 
     only lose the chance of building a more decent Iraq, but 
     something more important--America's efficacy as the strategic 
     and moral leader of the free world.

  If war against Iraq comes, far better it be seen as the decision of 
the world community, not just a U.S.-British decision.
  The President said accurately on January 3 that Saddam Hussein has no 
respect for the Security Council and does not care about the opinion of 
mankind. But surely we should.
  President Bush has now decided to end the diplomatic effort. Those of 
us who have questioned the administration's approach, including this 
Senator, will now be rallying behind the men and women of our armed 
forces to give them the full support they deserve, as it seems certain 
we will soon be at war.

  Last October a majority of both Houses of Congress voted to authorize 
the President to use military force with or without the authority of 
the United Nations. While I disagreed with that decision and offered an 
alternative, the overriding fact is that this democracy functions 
through debate and decision. The decision to give the President wide 
authority was democratically arrived at.
  The courageous men and women whom we send into harm's way are not 
just carrying out their orders with bravery and the highest form of 
professionalism. They are also implementing the outcome of the 
democratic debate which this Nation protects and honors. Those men and 
women should know that they have the full support and the fervent 
prayers of all of the American people as they carry out their missions.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that my recent remarks to 
the Council on Foreign Relations and the Boston World Affairs Council, 
along with two of my opening statements at recent Armed Services 
Committee hearings, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

    Remarks of Senator Carl Levin, Chairman, Senate Armed Services 
Committee, ``U.S. Policy Towards Iraq,'' Council on Foreign Relations, 
                            October 8, 2002

       Thank you, Walt, for your kind introduction. I understand 
     that with the change in Administrations, you have returned to 
     your tax law practice. I think it was John Maynard Keynes who 
     remarked that ``The avoidance of taxes is the only 
     intellectual pursuit that carries any reward.'' We'll ask you 
     about the truth of that statement when I'm finished speaking 
     about U.S. policy towards Iraq!
       I want to thank Les Gelb, the Council on Foreign Relations 
     President, and Pete Peterson, the Council's Chairman of the 
     Board, for inviting me this evening, and I want to thank the 
     Council for its 80 years of outstanding service to our Nation 
     and to the world as the ``privileged and preeminent 
     nongovernmental impresario of America's pageant to find its 
     place in the world.'' Those are the ``objective'' words of 
     Les Gelb, by the way.
       Last night, President Bush described in detail the threat 
     that Saddam Hussein's regime poses. I have relatively few 
     differences with that description, and there is also a 
     consensus that if Saddam Hussein continues to refuse to meet 
     his obligation to destroy his weapons of mass destruction and 
     prohibited missile delivery systems, the United Nations 
     should authorize member states to use military force to 
     destroy those weapons and systems and that the United States 
     Armed Forces should participate in and lead a United Nations 
     authorized force.
       So the issue that is in dispute is whether unilateral force 
     should be authorized by Congress now in case the U.N. does 
     not act. How we answer that question could have a profound 
     and lasting impact on the safety of our children and 
     grandchildren for decades to come. Because the difference 
     between attacking a nation with the support of the world 
     community or attacking it without such support is 
     fundamental, and it can be decisive.
       The President answers the question by seeking a resolution 
     from Congress that gives him the authority to use force under 
     the auspices of the United Nations or to go-it-alone if the 
     United Nations fails to act. He seeks this unilateral 
     authority even though he does not condition its use on the 
     threat to the United States by Saddam being imminent. Indeed, 
     he argued in the National Security Strategy that was released 
     by the White House last month that preemptive attacks to 
     forestall or prevent hostile acts by our adversaries can now 
     be undertaken although a threat is not imminent. The new 
     strategy states explicitly that ``We must adapt the concept 
     of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of 
     today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek 
     to attack us using conventional means.'' The President's Iraq 
     resolution and the National Security Strategy, therefore, 
     both take the position that an ``imminent'' threat is no 
     longer required as a basis for our military action in self-
     defense. The President is explicitly seeking to modify the 
     traditional concept of preemption by deleting the need for 
     ``imminence'' and substituting that of ``sufficient'' 
     threat in the Strategy and ``continuing'' threat in the 
     proposed resolution.
       That the President is seeking the authorization for 
     unilateral preemptive attack without U.N. authorization is at 
     the heart of the Senate debate that is presently taking 
     place, and the vote on that resolution will come soon.
       Under the traditional international law concept of 
     preemption in self-defense, the United States would be 
     justified in acting alone in the case of a serious threat to 
     our nation that is imminent. In a case where such a threat is 
     not imminent, military action would be justified only if it 
     were carried out pursuant to an authorization for the use of 
     force by Member states by the United Nations.
       The choice facing the Senate is whether Congress should 
     now--at this time--give the President the authority to ``go-
     it-alone,'' to act unilaterally against Iraq if the United 
     Nations fails to act. Congress is being presented with this 
     issue at the very same time our Secretary of State is trying 
     to get the United Nations to back a tough new resolution 
     authorizing member states to use military force to enforce 
     Iraqi compliance with inspections and disarmament.
       Last night the President said, ``I have asked Congress to 
     authorize the use of America's military if it proves 
     necessary to enforce U.N. Security Council demands.'' But, 
     the White House resolution asks for much more. It isn't 
     limited to the use of force if the United Nations authorizes 
     it; on the contrary, it specifically authorizes, now, the use 
     of force on a unilateral, ``go-it-alone'' basis, that is, 
     without Security Council authorization. The President's 
     rhetoric doesn't match the resolution. Moreover, the White 
     House approach authorizes the use of force beyond dealing 
     with Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
     delivery.
       The resolution I introduced is consistent with how I think 
     most Americans want us to proceed. It emphasizes the 
     importance of dealing with Iraq on a multilateral basis and 
     it withholds judgment at this time on the question of whether 
     the United States should ``go it alone,'' that is, should act 
     unilaterally against Iraq, if the United Nations fails to 
     act.
       My resolution does the following: First, it urges the U.N. 
     Security Council to adopt a resolution promptly that demands 
     unconditional access for U.N. inspectors so Iraq's weapons of 
     mass destruction and prohibited ballistic missiles may be 
     located and destroyed; and within that same U.N. resolution, 
     authorizes the use of necessary and appropriate force by U.N. 
     Member States as a means of enforcement in the event Iraq 
     refuses to comply.
       My resolution also specifically authorizes the use of the 
     United States Armed Forces, pursuant to that U.N. Security 
     Council resolution, if Iraq fails to comply with its terms 
     and the President informs the Congress of his determination 
     that the United States has used appropriate diplomatic and 
     other peaceful means to obtain Iraqi compliance with such a 
     U.N. resolution.
       My resolution affirms that under international law and the 
     U.N. Charter, especially Article 51, the United States has at 
     all times the inherent right to use military force in self-
     defense, affirming the fact there is no U.N. veto over U.S. 
     military action. It also affirms that Congress will not 
     adjourn sine die so that Congress can return to session, if 
     necessary, and promptly consider proposals relative to Iraq 
     if, in the judgment of the President, the U.N. Security 
     Council does not promptly adopt the resolution I described 
     above.
       My resolution, therefore, supports the President's appeal 
     to the United Nations and approves--right now--the use of our 
     Armed Forces to support the action of the United Nations to 
     force compliance by Saddam Hussein with inspections and 
     disarmament. It does not, however, authorize now--before we 
     know what the United Nations intends to do, before we know 
     whether or not we have the world community on our side--it 
     does not authorize the United States Armed Forces going-it-
     alone. Should we need to consider that possibility at a 
     future time, the resolution provides for the immediate recall 
     of Congress to do so. My resolution doesn't--on a matter of 
     war and peace/life and death--exceed the grant of authority 
     needed at the present time.
       If Congress instead endorses the resolution proposed in the 
     Senate by Senator Lieberman and others allowing the 
     unilateral use of force at this time--even in the absence of 
     a U.N. authorization--we will be sending an inconsistent 
     message. We will be telling the United Nations that, if you 
     don't act, we will--at the same time that we are urging them 
     to act. We will be telling the United Nations that they are 
     not particularly relevant--at the same time we are urging 
     them to be very relevant.
       If we want the United Nations to be relevant and credible--
     if we want the United Nations to succeed--if we want the 
     United Nations not to be limited to humanitarian and disaster 
     relief and other tasks that are

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     mighty useful but are not essential--and I think most of us 
     do--then we have to focus our efforts there and give those 
     efforts a chance to succeed.
       If we act wisely--authorizing the use of our forces 
     pursuant to a U.N. resolution authorizing Member states to 
     use force--we will not only unite the Congress; ultimately, 
     we would unite the world community, on a course of action 
     that we all seek: the elimination of Saddam Hussein's ability 
     to threaten the world with weapons of mass destruction. 
     That's where our focus should be: uniting the world, not 
     dividing it.
       Moreover, a go-it-alone approach in which we attack Iraq 
     without the support and participation of the world community 
     entails serious risks and could have serious consequences for 
     us in the Middle East and around the world. It makes a 
     difference, when deciding to use force, whether that use of 
     force has the support of the world community.
       It makes a difference for us in the current situation 
     involving a possible attack on Iraq:
       If we go it alone, will we be able to secure the use of 
     airbases, ports, supply bases, and overflight rights in that 
     region? Those rights and those capabilities are so 
     important to the success of a military operation against 
     Saddam.
       If we go it alone, will there be a reduction in the broad 
     international support for the war on terrorism, including the 
     law enforcement, financial, and intelligence cooperation that 
     is so essential?
       If we go it alone, will that destabilize an already 
     volatile region and undermine governments such as Jordan and 
     Pakistan? Could we possibly end up with a radical regime in 
     Pakistan, a country that has nuclear weapons?
       If we go it alone, will Saddam Hussein or his military 
     commanders be more likely to use weapons of mass destruction 
     against other nations in the region and against our military 
     forces in response to our attack than would be the case if he 
     faced a U.N.-authorized coalition, particularly if that 
     coalition included Muslim nations as the coalition did during 
     the Gulf War?
       If we go it alone, will other nations view our action as a 
     precedent for threatening unilateral military action against 
     their neighbors in the future?
       If we go it alone, will we be undercutting efforts to get 
     other countries to help us with the expensive, lengthy task 
     of stabilizing Iraq after Saddam is removed?
       Beyond the current situation relative to using force in 
     Iraq, going-it-alone without U.N. authorization, based on a 
     modified concept of preemption that no longer requires the 
     threat to be imminent, will lead to a serious risk to 
     international peace and security.
       If we act unilaterally, without U.N. authority or an 
     imminent threat, that will create a dangerous situation for 
     international peace and stability in the long term. We would 
     be inviting other nations to forego an important rule of 
     international law requiring a serious and imminent threat 
     before one nation can attack another in the name of self 
     defense.
       By seeking a U.N. resolution that will authorize U.N. 
     Member States to use force if Iraq does not comply with its 
     terms, we are not giving the United Nations a veto over the 
     conduct of our foreign policy. Rather, we are getting from 
     the United Nations strength and international credibility and 
     legitimacy, should military force be needed.
       We should be seeking to unite the world against Saddam 
     Hussein, not dividing it. Our immediate objective should be 
     to get the United Nations to act--to locate and destroy 
     Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the means of 
     delivering them. The threat Saddam presents is real, and we 
     should deal with it. But authorization for preemptive, 
     unilateral U.S. action in Iraq does not need to and should 
     not be granted at this time. If the U.N. doesn't act, 
     Congress can be called back promptly to consider a request to 
     authorize force unilaterally and to consider the serious and 
     different risks involved in pursuing that course at that 
     time.
       Last Monday's Washington Post carried a story in which a 
     senior European official's response to the United States 
     going-it-alone was, ``A lot of Europeans would feel they'd 
     been put in an intolerable position.'' For those who would 
     agree to participate militarily, ``it would be less a 
     coalition of the willing than of the dragooned.''
       Javier Solana, former NATO Secretary General and currently 
     High Representative for the European Union's Common Foreign 
     and Security Policy, the EU's top foreign policy official, in 
     an address at NATO Headquarters last Thursday, stated ``Ad 
     hoc coalitions of docile followers to be chosen or discarded 
     at will is neither attractive nor sustainable.''
       Just last week, after hearing from Prime Minister Blair and 
     Foreign Minister Straw, the ruling Labor Party's Conference 
     issued a formal position on Iraq that included the following: 
     ``Conference believes that the authority of the U.N. will be 
     undermined unless it is enforced, and recognises that in the 
     last resort this could involve military action but considers 
     that this should be taken within the context of international 
     law and with the authority of the U.N.''
       And just last Friday, Turkey's presidential spokesman said 
     that his nation would participate in a campaign against Iraq 
     only if the world body blessed it, stating ``An operation not 
     based on international law cannot be accepted.''
       The best chance of having Saddam Hussein comply with U.N. 
     Security Council resolutions is to make sure that when he 
     looks down the barrel of a gun, he sees the world at the 
     other end, and not just the United States.
       Congress should give the President what he said last night 
     he was asking for--the authority to use U.S. military force 
     to enforce U.N. Security Council demands, not what the White 
     House resolution also provides--go-it-alone authority. Our 
     focus then would be where it belongs: securing a United 
     Nations resolution that can unite the world; that has the 
     best chance of forcing compliance; that reduces the risk to 
     our forces and to our interests throughout the world; that 
     avoids to the maximum extent possible the negative 
     consequences if force is required, including the loss of 
     cooperation on the war on terrorism; and that has the best 
     chance of isolating Saddam Hussein rather than isolating the 
     United States.
       Thank you for listening. That concludes my remarks. I would 
     be happy to answer your questions.
                                  ____


   Senator Carl Levin's Remarks to the Boston World Affairs Council 
       Regarding the Christian A. Herter Award, December 2, 2002

       Thank you for honoring me with this prestigious award.
       The past recipients of the Christian A. Herter Award are a 
     distinguished group of people who have made significant 
     contributions to better understanding among nations, and I am 
     honored to be included in this group.
       It is a particular pleasure to be receiving this award with 
     Dick Lugar, who will become the Chairman of the Senate 
     Foreign Relations Committee in January. No member of the 
     Senate is better qualified for this important position than 
     Dick. He is a true internationalist who enjoys the confidence 
     of both Senate Democrats and Republicans, as well as the 
     respect of foreign leaders and parliamentarians around the 
     world.
       A Senator from Michigan can't talk about the importance of 
     national consensus and bipartisanship in America's foreign 
     policy without recalling the career of Arthur Vandenburg, who 
     was an ardent champion of a bipartisan American foreign 
     policy. Senator Vandenberg helped draft the 1945 United 
     Nations Charter and steered its passage through the Senate. 
     He later played a leading role in constructing the Marshall 
     Plan and in the formulation of NATO. Over the years, his name 
     has become synonymous with the expression that ``politics end 
     at the water's edge.''
       That expression is a good one to keep in mind in the weeks 
     after a hard-fought mid-term election and a lengthy debate in 
     Congress over U.S. policy in Iraq. Both these events revealed 
     differences over foreign policy between Democrats and 
     Republicans, and even in some cases among Democrats and 
     Republicans.
       For the most part, Democrats and Republicans will be in 
     agreement on a foreign policy agenda in the coming year.
       We agree on the need to continue an all-out effort against 
     al Qaeda and other international terrorist groups.
       We agree on the need to follow to the finish the effort to 
     disarm Saddam Hussein, especially if the multilateral path 
     that the President started at the United Nations is followed.
       We agree on the need to deal with the problem presented by 
     North Korea's recently acknowledged nuclear weapons program, 
     working calmly and determinedly with South Korea, Japan and 
     others.
       We agree on the need to strengthen the authority of the 
     central government in Afghanistan.
       We agree on the need to combat the proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction, a goal to which Dick Lugar has 
     contributed so much by creating the Cooperative Threat 
     Reduction Program.
       We agree on the value of expanding NATO and modernizing its 
     mission and operations.
       But leaving politics at the water's edge doesn't mean that 
     there won't be differences over foreign policy. While a 
     bipartisan foreign policy is important for both domestic and 
     international purposes, it is healthy--indeed essential at 
     times--for constructive alternative positions to be 
     expressed, as long as these alternatives are not prompted by 
     partisan motivations.
       The Bush Administration's initial foreign policy positions 
     on a host of issues had a pronounced unilateral, and at 
     times, even an isolationist tone. Despite Candidate Bush's 
     call for humility on the part of the world's sole superpower, 
     President Bush too often ignored Candidate Bush's good 
     advice. For instance, his early statements on international 
     treaties and peacekeeping in the Balkans served to undercut 
     or offend even close Allies and, perhaps more importantly, 
     unnecessarily provoked feelings of hostility among the 
     peoples of many nations.
       Constructive criticism of some of the Administration's 
     foreign policies and foreign policy statements over the past 
     year has had a positive impact on both the policies and the 
     rhetoric. That criticism came from within the Administration, 
     from members of Congress of both parties, from the media, and 
     from the leaders of allied and friendly nations.
       For example, during the weeks leading up to the 
     Congressional vote on an authorization for the use of 
     military force against Iraq, many members of Congress sought

[[Page S3773]]

     changes to the Administration's initial proposal. The 
     Administration, in essence, originally sought authority to 
     act unilaterally to bring about regime change in Iraq at a 
     time of the President's choosing.
       Senator Lugar joined forces with Senator Biden to modify 
     the Administration's proposal to refocus the grant of 
     authority to use military force on Iraq's weapons of mass 
     destruction and on seeking a new U.N. Security Council 
     resolution authorizing the use of force.
       I offered an alternative resolution, which was not adopted, 
     which was designed to give even greater importance to a 
     multilateral approach through the United Nations. It deferred 
     a Congressional decision on authorizing the unilateral use of 
     force until such time as the multilateral approach proved to 
     be beyond our reach. My alternative would have called on the 
     United Nations to promptly adopt a new resolution demanding 
     that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional and unrestricted 
     access to the U.N. weapons inspectors so its weapons of mass 
     destruction could be destroyed, authorizing the use of 
     military force by U.N. Member States to enforce the 
     resolution in the event that Iraq refused to comply. My 
     alternative would have authorized the President to use U.S. 
     military force to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 
     pursuant to such a U.N. resolution, and would have provided 
     that Congress not adjourn so we could consider proposals 
     relative to the use of unilateral force if the U.N. Security 
     Council failed to adopt a resolution authorizing the use of 
     force by member states.
       I have urged a multilateral approach to the Iraq threat 
     because I believe that approach has the greatest chance of 
     success. A multilateral approach reduces the risks involved 
     in military action and minimizes the fallout from vengeful, 
     violent retaliatory responses which often result if we're 
     perceived as a unilateral bully. The events of 9/11 made 
     clear that dealing with international terrorism must be our 
     first priority, but we can't effectively deal with 
     international terrorism without the political, law 
     enforcement, intelligence, and, at times, military assistance 
     and cooperation of the world community. That same 
     multilateral approach is essential to combating the 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or to 
     dealing with the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear 
     program.
       I believe the efforts of many within and without the 
     Administration had an impact on the course of action chosen 
     by the Administration and on the legislation on Iraq that was 
     enacted by Congress, which endorsed the multilateral approach 
     and conditioned the unilateral use of force on the President 
     certifying that diplomatic means will not succeed. I also 
     believe those efforts helped Secretary Powell to prevail, at 
     least temporarily, over other views within the Administration 
     during the painstaking negotiations that led to the unanimous 
     adoption of U.N. Security Council resolution 1441 on November 
     8th.
       The U.N. resolution was a victory for those who favor a 
     multilateral approach to the use of force. It's great to be 
     the world's only superpower, and I hope it stays that way. 
     But I do not believe that our national interests are well 
     served when we engage in rhetoric that needlessly inflames 
     passions and incites hostility towards the United States and 
     its citizens. Teddy Roosevelt's soft rhetoric and big stick 
     approach was about the right balance.
       We must be more than powerful; we must be wise in the use 
     of our power and wise in the use of our rhetoric. The United 
     States must be a leader, not a loner. Otherwise, we will turn 
     what has been admiration for our values and our beliefs into 
     fear of domination by us and hostility towards our apparent 
     arrogance.
       Recently I was struck in reading an excerpt from Bob 
     Woodward's new book, ``Bush at War,'' in the Washington Post. 
     Woodward was reporting on an interview with the President, 
     and at the end which Laura Bush joined them. The President 
     had just told Woodward that the First Lady wished the 
     President's rhetoric wasn't quite so harsh about getting them 
     ``dead or alive.'' When the President asked her why, the 
     First Lady said, ``It just didn't sound that appealing to me, 
     really.'' The First Laey added that she tells the President 
     from time to time, ``Tone it down, darling,''
       In the spirit of the Christian Herter award, I pledge to 
     work with others in the Congress to seek consensus in support 
     of the Administration's foreign policies whenever possible 
     and, when necessary, to support constructive alternatives 
     that I believe will better suit the interests of the United 
     States. And relative to the Administration's rhetoric, I also 
     will from time to time will urge them to ``tone it down, 
     darlings.''
                                  ____


 Opening Statement of Senator Carl Levin, Hearing on Worldwide Threats 
With George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence and Lowell Jacoby, 
       Defense Intelligence Agency, Wednesday, February 12, 2003

       All of us want Saddam Hussein to be disarmed. The best way 
     to accomplish the goal of disarming Saddam Hussein without 
     war is if the United Nations speaks with one voice relative 
     to Iraq. I also believe that if military force is used, the 
     best way of reducing both the short-term risks, including the 
     risks to U.S. and coalition forces, and the long-term risks, 
     including the risk of terrorist attacks on our interests 
     throughout the world, is if the United Nations specifically 
     authorizes the use of military force.
       That's the bottom line for me--the best way of increasing 
     any chance of disarming Saddam Hussein without war and of 
     minimizing casualties and future attacks on the United States 
     if war does ensue is if the United Nations acts relative to 
     Iraq.
       Supporting U.N. inspections is an essential step if we are 
     going to keep the Security Council together. We can support 
     those U.N. inspections by sharing the balance of our 
     information about suspect sites, by quickly getting U-2 
     aircraft in the air over Iraq, with or without Saddam 
     Hussein's approval, and by giving the inspectors the time 
     they need to do their work as long as the inspections are 
     unimpeded.
       I disagree with those, including high officials in our 
     government, who say that U.N. inspections are useless. We 
     heard that before the inspections began. We heard it from Dr. 
     Rice at the White House last week. I am astounded that some 
     of those high officials have gone so far as to refer in a 
     derogatory way to the ``so-called'' U.N. inspectors. If these 
     inspections are useless without Iraqi assistance in pointing 
     out where they have hidden or destroyed weapons of mass 
     destruction, why are we sharing any intelligence at all with 
     the inspectors; and why are we apparently finally 
     implementing U-2 flights to support the inspectors?
       It's one thing to be realistic about the limitations of the 
     U.N. inspections and not have too high hopes about what they 
     can produce.
       It's another thing to denigrate their value, prejudge their 
     value, be dismissive and disdainful about the beliefs of 
     others on the U.N. Security Council about their value, and be 
     cavalier about the facts relative to those inspections.
       Referring to being cavalier about facts brings me to my 
     next point, the sharing of intelligence information in our 
     possession with the U.N. inspectors.
       This is an issue that I have followed very closely. For the 
     last several weeks, at my request, the CIA has been providing 
     me with the classified details of how much information we 
     have been sharing with the U.N. inspectors in Iraq. We just 
     began sharing specific information in early January, 
     according to Secretary Powell as quoted in the Washington 
     Post on January 9th. While I can't go into those classified 
     details in an open hearing, I can say that the information 
     the CIA has provided me made it very clear that we had shared 
     information on only a small percentage of the suspect sites 
     in Iraq and that we had not shared information on the 
     majority of the suspect sites, which was confirmed by CIA 
     staff.
       At yesterday's hearing, I was astounded when Director Tenet 
     told us that we have now shared with U.N. inspectors 
     information about every site we have where we have credible 
     intelligence. Then, last night, in Director Tenet's presence 
     and in the presence of Senator Warner, his staff acknowledged 
     that we still have useful information that we have not shared 
     with the inspectors--which is the opposite of what Director 
     Tenet told the Intelligence Committee yesterday in open 
     session. If we haven't shared yet all the useful information 
     that we have with the U.N. inspectors, that would run counter 
     to the Administration's position that the time for 
     inspections is over.
       When President Bush addressed the U.N. General Assembly on 
     September 12th of last year, he said that ``We want the 
     United Nations to be effective, and respectful, and 
     successful. Well we have some responsibility to help the 
     United Nations achieve that. Saying to other countries, 
     including allies, that if you don't see it our way, you must 
     have some ulterior motive, doesn't help.
       While a number of heads of State and Government have called 
     for the U.N. Security Council to take the necessary and 
     appropriate action in response to Iraq's continuing threat to 
     international peace and security and some have pledged to 
     contribute military forces to that effort, others believe 
     that we should give the strengthened inspections the time 
     they need to finish their job. Both groups agree on the 
     necessity of disarming Iraq. Rather than following a course 
     that divides the United Nations and separates us from some of 
     our closest allies, we should at least fairly consider 
     courses of action that unite the world community against 
     Iraq.
                                  ____


 Opening Statement of Senator Carl Levin, Ranking Member, Committee on 
 Armed Services Hearing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and 
   Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Richard B. Myers, Thursday, 
                           February 13, 2003

       Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, thank you for coming.
       Mr. Chairman, as we meet today, America's Armed Forces 
     stand on the brink of possible military action. In the next 
     few weeks, as many as 250,000 of our soldiers, sailors, 
     airmen and marines will be in the Persian Gulf region, 
     preparing for a possible war against Iraq. Almost 40,000 more 
     stand on the front lines in Korea, within range of North 
     Korean artillery and rockets. Thousands of additional 
     American troops are risking their lives every day in 
     continued operations in the global war on terrorism in 
     Afghanistan and other hot spots around the world. And of 
     course many more continue to work to keep the peace and work 
     to build a more stable future in the Balkans and elsewhere. 
     To support these efforts, the President has already called up 
     more than 110,000 members of the Reserve components to active 
     duty.

[[Page S3774]]

       Many questions have been raised in recent months about our 
     policy moves on Iraq, Korea, and elsewhere. Concerns have 
     been raised about our proclivity to proceed unilaterally; 
     about a rising tide of anti-Americanism overseas; about the 
     risk that the focus on Iraq has reduced our focus on the war 
     against terrorism, which has to be fought and won here at 
     home as well as overseas; about whether our refusal to talk 
     directly with the North Korean regime as urged by our South 
     Korean allies may be undermining our interests in that area 
     of the world; and about the degree of our commitment to 
     rebuilding Afghanistan and the possible consequences of a 
     similar lack of follow-through in Iraq.
       I share many of these concerns. I believe that America is 
     at its strongest and best when we make common cause with 
     other nations in pursuit of common goals. I believe that the 
     path to a safer world and a more secure America rarely comes 
     from a go-it-alone approach. Specifically, I believe that, in 
     the absence of an imminent threat, it is in our interest to 
     have a U.N. resolution authorizing member States to take 
     military action before initiating a pre-emptive attack 
     against Iraq.
       If there is any chance of disarming Saddam Hussein without 
     war, it is for the United Nations to speak with one voice. 
     And if military force is used, the best way of reducing both 
     the short-term risks, including the risks to U.S. and 
     coalition forces, and the long-term risks, including the risk 
     of terrorist attacks on our people throughout the world, is 
     also a U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force.
       Supporting U.N. inspections is an essential step if we are 
     going to keep the Security Council together. We can show 
     support for those U.N. inspections by sharing with the U.N. 
     inspectors the balance of our significant intelligence 
     information about suspect sites, by quickly getting U-2 
     aircraft in the air over Iraq without conditions and with or 
     without Saddam Hussein's approval, and by giving the 
     inspectors the time they need to finish their work as long 
     as the inspections are unimpeded.
       Yesterday, I talked about statements by the administration 
     that all useful intelligence information in our possession 
     has now been shared with the U.N. inspectors.
       Condoleeza Rice told us that at the White House 10 days 
     ago. George Tenet told us that at an open Intelligence 
     Committee hearing two days ago. They were in error. Director 
     Tenet acknowledged yesterday here that we still have 
     information and will be sharing it.
       The premature declaration that we've already shared all 
     useful intelligence makes us seem excessively eager to bring 
     inspections to a close.
       Top administrative officials from the beginning said 
     inspections were useless and that inspectors couldn't find 
     anything without Saddam showing them where it was.
       Well, that's what he is supposed to do, but there's at 
     least a chance inspections will prove useful even without his 
     cooperation. Inspectors caught him in lies about his 
     biological weapons program in the '90s. And in this morning's 
     paper it appears they are catching him in lies about the 
     range of missiles he's developing.
       Another way to support the inspectors is to back up their 
     request for U-2 surveillance planes, with a U.N. resolution 
     that any interference with them by Saddam Hussein would be 
     considered an act of war against the United Nations.
       During the State of the Union speech, President Bush noted 
     that ``Iraq is blocking U-2 surveillance flights requested by 
     the United Nations.'' Secretary Powell, during his address to 
     the U.N. Security Council a week ago noted that ``Iraq also 
     has refused to permit any U-2 reconnaissance flights that 
     would give the inspectors a better sense of what's being 
     moved before, during and after inspections.''
       Indeed the New York Times on January 30th quotes a senior 
     White House official as describing Iraq's refusal to allow 
     the U-2 surveillance flights ``the biggest material breach of 
     all, so far.''
       I met with Dr. Blix and his staff in New York on January 
     31st. They told me that U-2 flights would be very useful 
     because of their ability to observe large areas of Iraq and 
     to loiter for extended periods of time. U-2 flights would be 
     particularly helpful to track trucks that appear to be moving 
     items from one suspicious place to another, and to track 
     mobile labs. Satellites can't track suspicious vehicles; U-2s 
     can.
       For this reason, I was astonished to read on Tuesday that 
     State Department spokesman Richard Boucher characterized what 
     appears to be an agreement to implement U-2 flights as 
     nothing ``worth getting excited about.'' If Iraq's refusal to 
     allow U-2 surveillance flights is cited by the President and 
     characterized by the White House as ``the biggest material 
     breach of all,'' if Secretary Powell is right when he says 
     that U-2 surveillance flights would give the inspectors a 
     better sense of what's being moved before, during and after 
     inspections, then minimizing their usefulness at this point 
     can only be explained as further disdain for the inspections 
     effort.
       It may be unlikely that inspectors will catch Saddam with 
     the goods without his cooperation. But it's at least possible 
     and we should increase that possibility by sharing all our 
     useful intelligence and using the U-2s.
       Supporting the inspectors in these and other ways is not 
     inconsistent with the position that administration has 
     correctly taken that the burden is on Saddam Hussein to show 
     where the prohibited material is or what he's done with it. 
     The fact that he hasn't carried his burden is undeniable. But 
     how best to deal with his deceit and deception is still ours 
     and the world's challenge.
       There is unanimity around here about one thing at least: 
     all of us and the American people will stand behind our 
     uniformed forces if they are engaged in military conflict. 
     Should they be so engaged, we will provide our men and women 
     in uniform with everything they need to ensure that they 
     prevail promptly and with minimal casualties.

  Mr. LEVIN. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________