[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 41 (Thursday, March 13, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3704-S3708]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, there is an interesting turn of events. 
Those who were looking for a debate on the war in Iraq had best turn to 
C-SPAN and witness the question period in London before the British 
House of Commons. I have been watching it. It is a fascinating debate.
  Tony Blair is defending his position in support of the United States. 
His own party is divided. The conservatives support him. The 
questioning is very tough. In the course of defending his position, 
some important questions are being asked and answered in the British 
House of Commons.
  If you would expect the same thing here in the U.S. Congress, you 
might be surprised or disappointed to learn it is not taking place. 
What is taking place is speeches on the floor by individual Senators. 
Today, I have seen Senator Byrd of West Virginia, Senator Dayton of 
Minnesota, Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts. Others have come to the 
floor to speak about the war in Iraq. But there has literally been no 
active debate on this issue on Capitol Hill, in the United States of 
America, since last October.
  The reason, of course, is that last October we enacted a use of force 
resolution which virtually gave to the President of the United States 
the authority

[[Page S3705]]

to declare war and execute it against Iraq at the time and place of his 
choosing. I was one of 23 Senators who voted against that resolution, 
believing that there were better ways to achieve our goals, and that if 
Congress did that, we would be giving to this President the greatest 
delegation of authority to wage war ever given to a President.
  The time that has intervened since the passage of that resolution has 
proven me right. Congress has had no voice. Oh, we have had moments of 
criticism, moments of comment, but we are not a serious part of this 
national concern and national conversation over what will happen in 
Iraq. That is indeed unfortunate.
  There are several facts I think everyone concedes, virtually 
everyone, on either side of the issue. The first and most obvious is 
that Saddam Hussein is a ruthless dictator. His continued domination 
over the nation of Iraq will continue to pose a threat to the region 
and a concern for peace-loving nations around the world. The sooner his 
regime changes, the better. The sooner we control his weapons of mass 
destruction, the better for the region and for the whole world. No one 
argues that point, not even the nations in the U.N. Security Council 
that are arguing with the United States about the best approach.
  The second thing I think should be said at the outset is no one 
questions the fact that the U.S. military, the men and women who make 
it the best military in the world, deserve our support and our praise. 
They deserve our continued devotion to their success, whatever our 
debate about the policy in the Middle East or even in Iraq. As far as 
those 250,000 American servicemen now stationed around Iraq, and many 
others on the way, whatever our position on the President's policy, 
that is irrelevant. We are totally committed to their safety and their 
safe return. That is exactly the way it should be.
  Having said that, though, I think it is still important for us to 
step back and ask how we have possibly reached this state that we are 
in today. The United States finds itself in a period of anti-
Americanism around the world that is almost unprecedented. I traveled 
abroad a few weeks ago. I was stunned to find in countries that have 
traditionally been our friends and allies that, although they are 
saying little, in private they are very critical of the United States 
and what we have done.
  What happened between September 11, 2001, and March 13, 2003? 
Remember that date, after the September 11 tragedy, when nations all 
around the world, including some of our historic enemies, came forward 
and said they would stand with the United States in fighting the war on 
terrorism? It was an amazing moment in history. It is a moment we will 
never forget as Americans.
  For the first time since the British came into this building in the 
War of 1812, the United States was invaded by an enemy. Of course, 
Pearl Harbor was an attack on the territories as well, but that attack 
on the continental United States on September 11, 2001, was one that 
stunned us, saddened us, shocked us as a nation, and we looked for 
friends and we found them in every corner of the world. They joined us 
in a war on terrorism, sharing intelligence resources, working 
together, making real progress. It was a good feeling, a feeling that 
many of these countries now understood how important a friendship with 
the United States would be for their future and for the world.
  Look where we are today. We are at a point now where we are trying to 
win enough friends to show that we have a multilateral coalition that 
is going to wage this war against Iraq.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article that 
was published in Business Week. The edition was March 10, 2003.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                  [From Business Week, Mar. 10, 2003]

                            Dollar Diplomacy

       Money, it is often said, is the mother's milk of politics. 
     It's also turning out to be the nectar of superpower 
     diplomacy.
       As George W. Bush approaches the diplomatic climax of his 
     arduous drive to win backing for war with Iraq, U.S. 
     diplomats increasingly find themselves tempted to brandish 
     Uncle Sam's checkbook--and with it, the suggestion that 
     sticking with America now might mean rewards later. Much of 
     this bid to win friends is playing out in the U.N. Security 
     Council, which is grappling with a U.S.-backed resolution 
     that could trigger military action against Saddam Hussein. 
     But in broader terms, pressure on the White House to dangle 
     inducements transcends the U.N. debate and goes to the heart 
     of Washington's current dilemma--America's poverty of 
     friendship.
       For two years, Administration diplomacy has been marked by 
     a brash Texas swagger that Bush partisans consider a 
     refreshing exercise in plain-speaking--and which some 
     traditional allies consider arrogance. But the differences go 
     beyond style. In walking away from global treaties and 
     disdaining the views of traditional allies, Bush foreign 
     policy has also been marked by an in-your-face unilateralism 
     that has set much of the world on edge.
       Now, with the Administration struggling to round up allies 
     and hosting the leaders of such nations as Latvia and 
     Bulgaria to demonstrate the depth of its coalition, the price 
     of that disdain is coming into focus. ``We've made it harder 
     than it had to be by taking a high-handed approach,'' says 
     Samuel R. Berger, National Security Adviser during the 
     Clinton Administration.
       Indeed, the bill for the Administration's approach is just 
     starting to come due--and the bottom line is breathtaking. On 
     Feb. 25, Bush aides revealed that the cost of a military 
     campaign could top $95 billion. That's a far cry from what 
     happened during the first Gulf War, when coalition 
     partners paid some $70 billion of the $75 billion war tab. 
     ``Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from 
     many nations including our own.'' Bush said in speech to 
     the American Enterprise Institute on Feb. 26. But the fact 
     is, the U.S. will likely find itself shouldering 
     peacekeeping duties and much of Iraq reconstruction on its 
     own--meaning beleaguered American taxpayers may bear the 
     brunt of the costs.
       True, a broad coalition never in the cards. Unlike 
     Operation Desert Storm, which was a response to Iraq's 
     invasion of Kuwait, this showdown looms as a exercise in 
     preemptive action. Still, while Bush talks of a ``coalition 
     of the willing'' backing a U.S. invasion of Iraq, in reality 
     the America finds itself with precious few allies as the hour 
     of decision approaches. And buying allegiances one country at 
     a time is a far cry from building a cohesive group committed 
     to a common cause.
       Another consequence of the Bush Administration's Iraq 
     policy is that it could unintentionally undermine the 
     President's broader goal of implanting the seeds of reform in 
     the region. If the intervention comes to be seen by Iraq's 
     neighbors as illegitimate, the result could be more 
     radicalism, not less. The Administration's lofty goals in the 
     Mideast could be much harder to achieve if ``Americans are 
     seen less as a partner than as a foreign power,'' says Jon B. 
     Alterman, who recently left the Bush State Department.
       In a sense, the current bargaining round was heralded by 
     the September 11 terror strike on America. In the subsequent 
     war on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the White House 
     decided it had to shore up friendship and showered largesse 
     on new allies ranging from Tajikistan to impoverished African 
     nations. None fared better than Pakistan, a desperately poor 
     country that was pivotal in the anti-terror war. President 
     Pervez Musharraf's regime suddenly found itself freed of 
     sanctions imposed for its nuclear testing and the beneficiary 
     of a $12.5 billion debt restructuring from the U.S. and other 
     nations. That helped lift Pakistan from a debtor nation to 
     one that now runs a modest current-account surplus.
       Now, the Bush team faces a far more formidable chore in 
     mustering global support for disarming Iraq by force. With 
     skepticism rampant, France and a big bloc of nations fear the 
     consequences of the U.S. making preemptive attacks an 
     acceptable policy tool. Just as important, they fear that the 
     risks of a destabilized Mideast far outweigh the danger 
     Saddam poses. And in the region, where Saddam has been 
     weakened and contained since the 1991 war, resistance to a 
     U.S. invasion has led some countries to limit the American 
     military's rights to nearby bases.
       With allies scarce, small wonder that the Bushies may be 
     tempted to float aid promises--or be hit with a raft of 
     ``impact payment'' requests from countries such as Egypt, 
     Israel, Turkey, and Jordan, who claim their economies will be 
     damaged by the fallout of any conflict. ``When somebody knows 
     they're necessary for your game plan, they raise the price,'' 
     says former top State Dept. official Chester A. Crocker.
       The Bush Administration stoutly denies it's buying U.N. 
     support or military access. ``The President is not offering 
     quid pro quos,'' insists White House Press Secretary Ari 
     Fleischer. In fairness, the practice of cementing an entente 
     with aid is hardly limited to the Bushies. The Clintonites, 
     who currently assail Bush's need to reach for his wallet, 
     threw billions at North Korea to keep its nuclear program 
     shuttered. They also were forced to shrug when U.S. 
     contributions to the International Monetary Fund were 
     squandered by Russian kleptocrats. ``Checkbook diplomacy,'' 
     says former State Dept. official Helmut Sonnenfeldt, ``is as 
     old as checkbooks.''
       The most naked example of haggling came in the U.S.-Turkey 
     base talks. With Turkish public opinion strongly antiwar and 
     an economy on the ropes, the Turks sought upwards of $35 
     billion in U.S. assistance for the right

[[Page S3706]]

     to station American troops on Turkish soil for use in a 
     pincer move against Saddam. After bitter negotiations, Ankara 
     came away with a package that includes up to $20 billion in 
     cash and loans, some NATO military gear, and assurances that 
     Iraq's Kurdish nationalists will be kept in check. Says 
     Mehmet Simsek, A London-based analyst with Merrill Lynch & 
     Co.: ``The bottom line is, it will give Turkey some breathing 
     room.''
       One reason the talks were so tough is Turkey's history with 
     Desert Storm. After that war, the U.S. backed out of promises 
     to compensate the country for the loss of trade with Iraq and 
     aid to refugees. Now the Turks want money up front.
       Jordan may actually be the hardest hit of Iraq's neighbors 
     this time, so Washington is also receptive to Amman's calls 
     for help. ``Nearly a quarter of our GDP could be knocked out 
     as a result [of a new war],'' frets Fahed Fanek, a Jordanian 
     economist. The Administration is expected to ask Congress for 
     $150 million in aid on top of the $300 million a year Jordan 
     now receives. The U.S. already has started to deliver on a 
     deal for F-16 fighters and Patriot II missiles, likely at a 
     discount.
       Other neighbors have their hands out, too. Israel wants $4 
     billion in additional military aid and $8 billion in loan 
     guarantees. Egypt, which sees war losses of $1.6 billion to 
     its tourist-dependent economy, wants faster delivery of as 
     much as $415 million earmarked for Cairo.
       Much of the dickering has been more subtle. Key swing votes 
     on the Security Council--Chile, Guinea, Cameroon, Angola, 
     Mexico, and Pakistan--have growing trade ties with the U.S. 
     that could be jeopardized by a vote against the U.S. 
     resolution. Both France and the U.S. are vying for those 
     votes, the U.S. by noting that the America drive to ease 
     agriculture subsidies among rich nations could open markets 
     to Third World farmers.
       What will be most telling is how Pakistan votes. After all, 
     U.S.-backed debt restructuring allowed the country to adopt 
     reforms that have helped revive the economy. And President 
     Musharraf left Washington in late 2001 with a 15% increase in 
     clothing and textile exports to the U.S., worth $500 million 
     to Pakistani manufacturers. But Pakistani officials insist 
     money won't sway their vote. ``This is a matter of much 
     greater importance than just a question of incentives,'' says 
     Munir Akram, Pakistan's U.N. ambassador.
       It's still far from clear whether dollar diplomacy will 
     give Uncle Sam a clearcut victory in the U.N. But even 
     without an affirmative vote, Bush seems intent on going ahead 
     with plans to attack Saddam by late March. Then the questions 
     become: What kind of alliance will Bush be heading, and how 
     durable will such a coalition of convenience be?
       If all goes swimmingly on the battle-field, some of today's 
     qualms will surely fade--replaced by radiant TV images of 
     liberated Iraqis and new-wave technocrats who vow to build a 
     new nation. But if the intervention turns into the oft-
     predicted miasma of Middle Eastern intrigue and dashed hopes, 
     America could find itself standing far more alone than it is 
     today. Fast friends may be hard to come by in the self-
     centered world of diplomacy. Still, the kind you make because 
     of truly shared interests seem preferable to the kind you 
     rent.

  Mr. DURBIN. Let me quote several lines from this article in Business 
Week, not known as a liberal publication:

       But in broader terms, pressure on the White House to dangle 
     inducements transcends the U.N. debate and goes to the heart 
     of Washington's current dilemma--America's poverty of 
     friendship.

  It goes on to say:

       And buying allegiances one country at a time is a far cry 
     from building a cohesive group committed to a common cause. 
     Another consequence of the Bush Administration's Iraq Policy 
     is that it could unintentionally undermine the President's 
     broader goal of implanting the seeds of reform in the region. 
     If the intervention comes to be seen by Iraq's neighbors as 
     illegitimate, the result could be more radicalism, not less.
       The Administration's lofty goals in the Mideast could be 
     much harder to achieve if ``Americans are seen less as a 
     partner than as a foreign power,'' says Jon B. Alterman, who 
     recently left the Bush State Dept.

  What a dramatic turn of events, and from the spirit of international 
cooperation, fighting the war on terrorism, for the United States to be 
in a bidding war to try to bring the Turks into the position where they 
will allow us to use their country, it is just such a change from where 
we were. It reflects a sad decline in our diplomatic skills.
  Consider at the same time what is happening in North Korea. Here we 
have a country which has decided to test the United States. Why they 
have decided is anyone's guess. But let me hazard one. They see what is 
happening in Iraq. Iraq is waiting for the United Nations and others to 
protect them from a United States invasion, and they are not being 
successful. North Koreans decided to take a much different course. They 
are confronting the United States in the crudest and most dangerous 
way--suggesting that they are going to build nuclear weapons; they are 
going to fire missiles; they are going to harass our aircraft; and they 
are going to defy us. They believe that is the way to hold the United 
States back. The process they are building up could potentially 
proliferate nuclear weapons around the world.
  Our response there, unlike with Iraq where we are full bore with a 
quarter million troops and billions of dollars committed, is to not 
even speak to the North Koreans. I don't understand that level of 
diplomacy. I don't understand how that will make this a safer world.
  Let us reflect for a moment, though, on what is happening in the 
United Nations. I have read the critics from the right who basically 
said we should go right over the United Nations; we no longer need 
them; we have the power; we don't need to wait around for small nations 
with populations that are a fraction of the United States to decide 
whether they will support us. In a way, in the world of realpolitik, 
that is true. But the United States, in informing the United Nations, 
had something else in mind. It is not just a matter of whether we have 
the power and a show of more strength than the United Nations as a 
member but whether the United States is stronger with collective 
security engaging other countries around the world to join us in 
efforts such as containing Iraq and its danger.
  I happen to believe that collective security is not old fashioned and 
outmoded. It is critically important for us to consider building 
alliances to achieve important goals for the United States and the 
world because in building those alliances through the collective 
security of the United Nations, we bring together common values, a 
consensus on strategy, and a world vision that will serve all of us 
well.
  To walk away from the United Nations and say, once having engaged 
them in a resolution, that we may not be able to pass a use-of-force 
resolution and that we will do it ourselves is to walk away from an 
important concept which has been fostered by the United States and 
supported by the United States and which has been critically important 
to us as recently as our effort in the Persian Gulf and in Afghanistan.
  But, by tomorrow, the decision may be made. If the United Nations 
Security Council does not support us, it is indeed possible that we 
will have unilateral action by the United States, with the possible 
support of the British.
  I asked the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld, several weeks 
ago: Who are our allies in this coalition against Iraq? He said: 
Certainly the United States with about 250,000 troops, and the British 
with about 26,000 troops, and others. I said: Of the others, who would 
rank third? At that point, he said: The Turks.

  We know what is happening. Their Parliament will not allow us to use 
their country as a base of operation. That may change. But it shows, 
when it comes to this effort, that it is by and large a bilateral 
effort by the United States and the British against the Iraqis. I think 
that is not the best approach. I think it is far better for us to 
acknowledge what I think is the real effective approach, and that is to 
engage our allies in the United Nations and in the Security Council to 
put meaningful deadlines on Saddam Hussein; for the inspectors to reach 
their goals; to let Saddam Hussein know that every step of the way, his 
failure to cooperate could result in the United Nations taking action 
against him. That does not call for an invasion, but it puts him on a 
tight timetable that he has to live by.
  To abandon the inspections, to abandon the role of the United 
Nations, and to launch a unilateral invasion of this country is going 
to be something that I think we may regret. Will we be successful 
militarily? I believe we will. I can't tell you the cost in terms of 
American lives or in terms of Iraqis killed. But I trust our military 
to succeed in this mission.
  Having succeeded militarily, though, what will we then face? We will 
face, of course, the devastation in Iraq.
  This week, we learned that the United States was now soliciting bids 
from companies in the United States for the reconstruction of Iraq 
before

[[Page S3707]]

the bombs have even fallen. That could be momentous in terms of cost. 
We will face it.
  As Tom Friedman of the New York Times has written, when we go into a 
gift shop and see the sign, ``If you break it, you own it,'' the fact 
is when we invade Iraq and remove its leadership and occupy that 
country, it is then our responsibility. Others may help us, but it is 
primarily our responsibility.
  The same thing is true in terms of the long-term vision of Iraq. This 
is a country with no history of self-government, this is a country with 
no history of democracy, and we want to bring certain values there. We 
have to concede the fact that it will take some time before they arrive 
at that point. We will be there in an occupational way with others 
perhaps, but we will have the responsibility of making that 
transformation a permanent or semipermanent presence of American troops 
in the Middle East and all that that entails.
  At the same time, it is bound to enrage our enemies around the 
world--those who think the United States is acting unilaterally and not 
acting in concert with other nations, peace-loving nations that would 
share our ultimate goals. That, too, may complicate the war on 
terrorism. That has been conceded by intelligence agencies and others. 
Our efforts in Iraq may spread the seeds of terrorism on new ground, 
and maybe even here in the United States. We will have to work that 
much harder to protect ourselves.
  I want to enter into the Record a letter sent to Secretary of State 
Colin Powell from John Brady Kiesling, who is with the United States 
Embassy in Athens, Greece.
  I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

     Hon. Colin Powell,
     Secretary of State,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Secretary: I am writing you to submit my 
     resignation from the Foreign Service of the United States and 
     from my position as Political Counselor in U.S. Embassy 
     Athens, effective March 7. I do so with a heavy heart. The 
     baggage of my upbringing included a felt obligation to give 
     something back to my country. Service as a U.S. diplomat was 
     a dream job. I was paid to understand foreign languages and 
     cultures, to seek out diplomats, politicians, scholars and 
     journalists, and to persuade them that U.S. interests and 
     theirs fundamentally coincided. My faith in my country and 
     its values was the most powerful weapon in my diplomatic 
     arsenal.
       It is inevitable that during twenty years with the State 
     Department I would become more sophisticated and cynical 
     about the narrow and selfish bureaucratic motives that 
     sometimes shaped our policies. Human nature is what it is, 
     and I was rewarded and promoted for understanding human 
     nature. But until this Administration it had been possible to 
     believe that by upholding the policies of my president I was 
     also upholding the interests of the American people and the 
     world. I believe it no longer.
       The policies we are now asked to advance are incompatible 
     not only with American values but also with American 
     interests. Our fervent pursuit of war with Iraq is driving us 
     to squander the international legitimacy that has been 
     America's most potent weapon of both offense and defense 
     since the days of Woodrow Wilson. We have begun to dismantle 
     the largest and most effective web of international 
     relationships the world has ever known. Our current course 
     will being instability and danger, not security.
       The sacrifice of global interests to domestic politics and 
     to bureaucratic self-interest is nothing new, and it is 
     certainly not a uniquely American problem. Still, we have not 
     seen such systematic distortion of intelligence, such 
     systematic manipulation of American opinion, since the war in 
     Vietnam. The September 11 tragedy left us stronger than 
     before, rallying around us a vast international coalition to 
     cooperate for the first time in a systematic way against the 
     threat of terrorism. But rather than take credit for those 
     successes and build on them, this Administration has 
     chosen to make terrorism a domestic political tool, 
     enlisting a scattered and largely defeated al Qaeda as its 
     bureaucratic ally. We spread disproportionate terror and 
     confusion in the public mind, arbitrarily linking the 
     unrelated problems of terrorism and Iraq. The result, and 
     perhaps the motive, is to justify a vast misallocation of 
     shrinking public wealth to the military and to weaken the 
     safeguards that protect American citizens from the heavy 
     hand of government. September 11 did not do as much damage 
     to the fabric of American society as we seem determined to 
     do to ourselves. Is the Russia of the late Romanovs really 
     our model, a selfish, superstitious empire thrashing 
     toward self-destruction in the name of a doomed status 
     quo?
       We should ask ourselves why we have failed to persuade more 
     of the world that a war with Iraq is necessary. We have over 
     the past two years done too much to assert to our world 
     partners that narrow and mercenary U.S. interests override 
     the cherished values of our partners. Even where our aims 
     were not in question, our consistency is at issue. The model 
     of Afghanistan is little comfort to allies wondering on what 
     basis we plan to rebuild the Middle East, and in whose image 
     and interests. Have we indeed become blind, as Russia is 
     blind in Chechnya, as Israel is blind in the Occupied 
     Territories, to our own advice, that overwhelming military 
     power is not the answer to terrorism? After the shambles of 
     post-war Iraq joins the shambles in Grozny and Ramallah, it 
     will be a brave foreigner who forms ranks with Micronesia to 
     follow where we lead.
       We have a coalition still, a good one. The loyalty of many 
     of our friends is impressive, a tribute to American moral 
     capital built up over a century. But our closest allies are 
     persuaded less that war is justified than that it would be 
     perilous to allow the U.S. to drift into complete solipsism. 
     Loyalty should be reciprocal. Why does our President condone 
     the swaggering and contemptuous approach to our friends and 
     allies this Administration is fostering, including among its 
     most senior officials. Has ``oderint dum metuant'' really 
     become our motto?
       I urge you to listen to America's friends around the world. 
     Even here in Greece, purported hotbed of European anti-
     Americanism, we have more and closer friends than the 
     American newspaper reader can possibly imagine. Even when 
     they complain about American arrogance, Greeks know that the 
     world is a difficult and dangerous place, and they want a 
     strong international system, with the U.S. and EU in close 
     partnership. When our friends are afraid of us rather than 
     for us, it is time to worry. And now they are afraid. Who 
     will tell them convincingly that the United States is as it 
     was, a beacon of liberty, security, and justice for the 
     planet?
       Mr. Secretary, I have enormous respect for your character 
     and ability. You have preserved more international 
     credibility for us than our policy deserves, and salvaged 
     something positive from the excesses of an ideological and 
     self-serving Administration. But your loyalty to the 
     President goes too far. We are straining beyond its limits an 
     international system we built with such toil and treasure, a 
     web of laws, treaties, organizations, and shared values that 
     sets limits on our foes far more effectively than it ever 
     constrained America's ability to defend its interests.
       I am resigning because I have tried and failed to reconcile 
     my conscience with my ability to represent the current U.S. 
     Administration. I have confidence that our democratic process 
     is ultimately self-correcting, and hope that in a small way I 
     can contribute from outside to shaping policies that better 
     serve the security and prosperity of the American people and 
     the world we share.
       Sincerely,
                                              John Brady Kiesling,
                                              U.S. Embassy Athens.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, this letter is a letter of resignation. 
Mr. Kiesling, a career diplomat who has served in United States 
embassies around the world, resigned over our foreign policy in Iraq. I 
will not read the entire letter. But this I will read. It is the letter 
from Mr. Kiesling to Secretary Powell:

       The policies we are now asked to advance are incompatible 
     not only with American values but also with American 
     interests. Our fervent pursuit of war with Iraq is driving us 
     to squander the international legitimacy that has been 
     America's most potent weapon of both offense and defense 
     since the days of Woodrow Wilson. We have begun to dismantle 
     the largest and most effective web of international 
     relationships the world has ever known. Our current course 
     will bring instability and danger, not security.

  Those are the words of a man who was a career diplomat serving the 
United States with principle and convictions and who resigned from the 
diplomatic corps over our policy in Iraq. That is a sad commentary, but 
it is a reality.
  The reality is that we are following a course of foreign policy that 
is a dramatic departure from what we have followed for almost 50 years. 
We are making decisions relative to this war in Iraq which are changing 
the rules the United States has not only lived by but preached for 
decades. We are confronting the world that has most recently been our 
allies in the war on terrorism and telling them that, with or without 
their cooperation and approval, we are going forward with an invasion 
of Iraq. We are saying to the rest of the world that the United States 
has the power and will to use it. It is certain that we have the power 
and the strength. The question is whether or not we have the wisdom--
the wisdom to understand that simply having the strength is not enough.
  I would like to quote a few words from a statement made on this floor 
on October 3 last year by a man who used

[[Page S3708]]

to sit directly behind me here, Paul Wellstone of Minnesota. I miss him 
every single day. I pulled out the statement he made relative to this 
use of force resolution. I can recall now when he said some of these 
words.
  I quote from Senator Wellstone:

       To act now on our own might be a sign of more power. Acting 
     sensibly and in a measured way in concert with our allies 
     with bipartisan congressional support would be a sign of our 
     strength.

  It is still true today. It is true so many months later.
  I think the President and this administration still have a chance to 
take what could be a course of action that departs from a tradition in 
values which we have stood by and preached for so many decades, and 
return to those values in our efforts in Iraq.
  And I hope we do it. I hope we do not discard the United Nations and 
all of our allies who are part of it. I hope we understand that when 
some of our best friends around the world question whether we are 
approaching this sensibly, it does not demonstrate their weakness but 
really calls into question whether we have the humility to step back 
and say: Can we do this more effectively for a more peaceful world for 
generations to come?
  Madam President, I close by saying, I return now, in just a few 
moments, to my home State of Illinois. As I walk the streets of 
Springfield, of Chicago, and of other cities, people come up to me and 
say: Why don't I hear a debate in the U.S. Congress about Iraq?
  Well, the fact is, that debate was waged and decided last October. I 
was one of 23 Members who voted against the use of force resolution 
because I believe there is a better way: a collective approach with the 
United Nations, that makes certain that the United States has a 
coalition of nations behind it in suppressing the evil of Saddam 
Hussein and his dangers to the region, rather than a coalition of 
nations united against us. That, sadly, is what we face today.
  The vote in the United Nations tomorrow is historic. I hope we have 
the support of that institution. I hope, if we do not, this 
administration will pause before unleashing the furies of war and 
consider whether there is a better, more measured and sensible approach 
to show not only our might but our strength and clarity of purpose.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.

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