[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 41 (Thursday, March 13, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3704-S3708]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAQ
Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, there is an interesting turn of events.
Those who were looking for a debate on the war in Iraq had best turn to
C-SPAN and witness the question period in London before the British
House of Commons. I have been watching it. It is a fascinating debate.
Tony Blair is defending his position in support of the United States.
His own party is divided. The conservatives support him. The
questioning is very tough. In the course of defending his position,
some important questions are being asked and answered in the British
House of Commons.
If you would expect the same thing here in the U.S. Congress, you
might be surprised or disappointed to learn it is not taking place.
What is taking place is speeches on the floor by individual Senators.
Today, I have seen Senator Byrd of West Virginia, Senator Dayton of
Minnesota, Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts. Others have come to the
floor to speak about the war in Iraq. But there has literally been no
active debate on this issue on Capitol Hill, in the United States of
America, since last October.
The reason, of course, is that last October we enacted a use of force
resolution which virtually gave to the President of the United States
the authority
[[Page S3705]]
to declare war and execute it against Iraq at the time and place of his
choosing. I was one of 23 Senators who voted against that resolution,
believing that there were better ways to achieve our goals, and that if
Congress did that, we would be giving to this President the greatest
delegation of authority to wage war ever given to a President.
The time that has intervened since the passage of that resolution has
proven me right. Congress has had no voice. Oh, we have had moments of
criticism, moments of comment, but we are not a serious part of this
national concern and national conversation over what will happen in
Iraq. That is indeed unfortunate.
There are several facts I think everyone concedes, virtually
everyone, on either side of the issue. The first and most obvious is
that Saddam Hussein is a ruthless dictator. His continued domination
over the nation of Iraq will continue to pose a threat to the region
and a concern for peace-loving nations around the world. The sooner his
regime changes, the better. The sooner we control his weapons of mass
destruction, the better for the region and for the whole world. No one
argues that point, not even the nations in the U.N. Security Council
that are arguing with the United States about the best approach.
The second thing I think should be said at the outset is no one
questions the fact that the U.S. military, the men and women who make
it the best military in the world, deserve our support and our praise.
They deserve our continued devotion to their success, whatever our
debate about the policy in the Middle East or even in Iraq. As far as
those 250,000 American servicemen now stationed around Iraq, and many
others on the way, whatever our position on the President's policy,
that is irrelevant. We are totally committed to their safety and their
safe return. That is exactly the way it should be.
Having said that, though, I think it is still important for us to
step back and ask how we have possibly reached this state that we are
in today. The United States finds itself in a period of anti-
Americanism around the world that is almost unprecedented. I traveled
abroad a few weeks ago. I was stunned to find in countries that have
traditionally been our friends and allies that, although they are
saying little, in private they are very critical of the United States
and what we have done.
What happened between September 11, 2001, and March 13, 2003?
Remember that date, after the September 11 tragedy, when nations all
around the world, including some of our historic enemies, came forward
and said they would stand with the United States in fighting the war on
terrorism? It was an amazing moment in history. It is a moment we will
never forget as Americans.
For the first time since the British came into this building in the
War of 1812, the United States was invaded by an enemy. Of course,
Pearl Harbor was an attack on the territories as well, but that attack
on the continental United States on September 11, 2001, was one that
stunned us, saddened us, shocked us as a nation, and we looked for
friends and we found them in every corner of the world. They joined us
in a war on terrorism, sharing intelligence resources, working
together, making real progress. It was a good feeling, a feeling that
many of these countries now understood how important a friendship with
the United States would be for their future and for the world.
Look where we are today. We are at a point now where we are trying to
win enough friends to show that we have a multilateral coalition that
is going to wage this war against Iraq.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article that
was published in Business Week. The edition was March 10, 2003.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From Business Week, Mar. 10, 2003]
Dollar Diplomacy
Money, it is often said, is the mother's milk of politics.
It's also turning out to be the nectar of superpower
diplomacy.
As George W. Bush approaches the diplomatic climax of his
arduous drive to win backing for war with Iraq, U.S.
diplomats increasingly find themselves tempted to brandish
Uncle Sam's checkbook--and with it, the suggestion that
sticking with America now might mean rewards later. Much of
this bid to win friends is playing out in the U.N. Security
Council, which is grappling with a U.S.-backed resolution
that could trigger military action against Saddam Hussein.
But in broader terms, pressure on the White House to dangle
inducements transcends the U.N. debate and goes to the heart
of Washington's current dilemma--America's poverty of
friendship.
For two years, Administration diplomacy has been marked by
a brash Texas swagger that Bush partisans consider a
refreshing exercise in plain-speaking--and which some
traditional allies consider arrogance. But the differences go
beyond style. In walking away from global treaties and
disdaining the views of traditional allies, Bush foreign
policy has also been marked by an in-your-face unilateralism
that has set much of the world on edge.
Now, with the Administration struggling to round up allies
and hosting the leaders of such nations as Latvia and
Bulgaria to demonstrate the depth of its coalition, the price
of that disdain is coming into focus. ``We've made it harder
than it had to be by taking a high-handed approach,'' says
Samuel R. Berger, National Security Adviser during the
Clinton Administration.
Indeed, the bill for the Administration's approach is just
starting to come due--and the bottom line is breathtaking. On
Feb. 25, Bush aides revealed that the cost of a military
campaign could top $95 billion. That's a far cry from what
happened during the first Gulf War, when coalition
partners paid some $70 billion of the $75 billion war tab.
``Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from
many nations including our own.'' Bush said in speech to
the American Enterprise Institute on Feb. 26. But the fact
is, the U.S. will likely find itself shouldering
peacekeeping duties and much of Iraq reconstruction on its
own--meaning beleaguered American taxpayers may bear the
brunt of the costs.
True, a broad coalition never in the cards. Unlike
Operation Desert Storm, which was a response to Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait, this showdown looms as a exercise in
preemptive action. Still, while Bush talks of a ``coalition
of the willing'' backing a U.S. invasion of Iraq, in reality
the America finds itself with precious few allies as the hour
of decision approaches. And buying allegiances one country at
a time is a far cry from building a cohesive group committed
to a common cause.
Another consequence of the Bush Administration's Iraq
policy is that it could unintentionally undermine the
President's broader goal of implanting the seeds of reform in
the region. If the intervention comes to be seen by Iraq's
neighbors as illegitimate, the result could be more
radicalism, not less. The Administration's lofty goals in the
Mideast could be much harder to achieve if ``Americans are
seen less as a partner than as a foreign power,'' says Jon B.
Alterman, who recently left the Bush State Department.
In a sense, the current bargaining round was heralded by
the September 11 terror strike on America. In the subsequent
war on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the White House
decided it had to shore up friendship and showered largesse
on new allies ranging from Tajikistan to impoverished African
nations. None fared better than Pakistan, a desperately poor
country that was pivotal in the anti-terror war. President
Pervez Musharraf's regime suddenly found itself freed of
sanctions imposed for its nuclear testing and the beneficiary
of a $12.5 billion debt restructuring from the U.S. and other
nations. That helped lift Pakistan from a debtor nation to
one that now runs a modest current-account surplus.
Now, the Bush team faces a far more formidable chore in
mustering global support for disarming Iraq by force. With
skepticism rampant, France and a big bloc of nations fear the
consequences of the U.S. making preemptive attacks an
acceptable policy tool. Just as important, they fear that the
risks of a destabilized Mideast far outweigh the danger
Saddam poses. And in the region, where Saddam has been
weakened and contained since the 1991 war, resistance to a
U.S. invasion has led some countries to limit the American
military's rights to nearby bases.
With allies scarce, small wonder that the Bushies may be
tempted to float aid promises--or be hit with a raft of
``impact payment'' requests from countries such as Egypt,
Israel, Turkey, and Jordan, who claim their economies will be
damaged by the fallout of any conflict. ``When somebody knows
they're necessary for your game plan, they raise the price,''
says former top State Dept. official Chester A. Crocker.
The Bush Administration stoutly denies it's buying U.N.
support or military access. ``The President is not offering
quid pro quos,'' insists White House Press Secretary Ari
Fleischer. In fairness, the practice of cementing an entente
with aid is hardly limited to the Bushies. The Clintonites,
who currently assail Bush's need to reach for his wallet,
threw billions at North Korea to keep its nuclear program
shuttered. They also were forced to shrug when U.S.
contributions to the International Monetary Fund were
squandered by Russian kleptocrats. ``Checkbook diplomacy,''
says former State Dept. official Helmut Sonnenfeldt, ``is as
old as checkbooks.''
The most naked example of haggling came in the U.S.-Turkey
base talks. With Turkish public opinion strongly antiwar and
an economy on the ropes, the Turks sought upwards of $35
billion in U.S. assistance for the right
[[Page S3706]]
to station American troops on Turkish soil for use in a
pincer move against Saddam. After bitter negotiations, Ankara
came away with a package that includes up to $20 billion in
cash and loans, some NATO military gear, and assurances that
Iraq's Kurdish nationalists will be kept in check. Says
Mehmet Simsek, A London-based analyst with Merrill Lynch &
Co.: ``The bottom line is, it will give Turkey some breathing
room.''
One reason the talks were so tough is Turkey's history with
Desert Storm. After that war, the U.S. backed out of promises
to compensate the country for the loss of trade with Iraq and
aid to refugees. Now the Turks want money up front.
Jordan may actually be the hardest hit of Iraq's neighbors
this time, so Washington is also receptive to Amman's calls
for help. ``Nearly a quarter of our GDP could be knocked out
as a result [of a new war],'' frets Fahed Fanek, a Jordanian
economist. The Administration is expected to ask Congress for
$150 million in aid on top of the $300 million a year Jordan
now receives. The U.S. already has started to deliver on a
deal for F-16 fighters and Patriot II missiles, likely at a
discount.
Other neighbors have their hands out, too. Israel wants $4
billion in additional military aid and $8 billion in loan
guarantees. Egypt, which sees war losses of $1.6 billion to
its tourist-dependent economy, wants faster delivery of as
much as $415 million earmarked for Cairo.
Much of the dickering has been more subtle. Key swing votes
on the Security Council--Chile, Guinea, Cameroon, Angola,
Mexico, and Pakistan--have growing trade ties with the U.S.
that could be jeopardized by a vote against the U.S.
resolution. Both France and the U.S. are vying for those
votes, the U.S. by noting that the America drive to ease
agriculture subsidies among rich nations could open markets
to Third World farmers.
What will be most telling is how Pakistan votes. After all,
U.S.-backed debt restructuring allowed the country to adopt
reforms that have helped revive the economy. And President
Musharraf left Washington in late 2001 with a 15% increase in
clothing and textile exports to the U.S., worth $500 million
to Pakistani manufacturers. But Pakistani officials insist
money won't sway their vote. ``This is a matter of much
greater importance than just a question of incentives,'' says
Munir Akram, Pakistan's U.N. ambassador.
It's still far from clear whether dollar diplomacy will
give Uncle Sam a clearcut victory in the U.N. But even
without an affirmative vote, Bush seems intent on going ahead
with plans to attack Saddam by late March. Then the questions
become: What kind of alliance will Bush be heading, and how
durable will such a coalition of convenience be?
If all goes swimmingly on the battle-field, some of today's
qualms will surely fade--replaced by radiant TV images of
liberated Iraqis and new-wave technocrats who vow to build a
new nation. But if the intervention turns into the oft-
predicted miasma of Middle Eastern intrigue and dashed hopes,
America could find itself standing far more alone than it is
today. Fast friends may be hard to come by in the self-
centered world of diplomacy. Still, the kind you make because
of truly shared interests seem preferable to the kind you
rent.
Mr. DURBIN. Let me quote several lines from this article in Business
Week, not known as a liberal publication:
But in broader terms, pressure on the White House to dangle
inducements transcends the U.N. debate and goes to the heart
of Washington's current dilemma--America's poverty of
friendship.
It goes on to say:
And buying allegiances one country at a time is a far cry
from building a cohesive group committed to a common cause.
Another consequence of the Bush Administration's Iraq Policy
is that it could unintentionally undermine the President's
broader goal of implanting the seeds of reform in the region.
If the intervention comes to be seen by Iraq's neighbors as
illegitimate, the result could be more radicalism, not less.
The Administration's lofty goals in the Mideast could be
much harder to achieve if ``Americans are seen less as a
partner than as a foreign power,'' says Jon B. Alterman, who
recently left the Bush State Dept.
What a dramatic turn of events, and from the spirit of international
cooperation, fighting the war on terrorism, for the United States to be
in a bidding war to try to bring the Turks into the position where they
will allow us to use their country, it is just such a change from where
we were. It reflects a sad decline in our diplomatic skills.
Consider at the same time what is happening in North Korea. Here we
have a country which has decided to test the United States. Why they
have decided is anyone's guess. But let me hazard one. They see what is
happening in Iraq. Iraq is waiting for the United Nations and others to
protect them from a United States invasion, and they are not being
successful. North Koreans decided to take a much different course. They
are confronting the United States in the crudest and most dangerous
way--suggesting that they are going to build nuclear weapons; they are
going to fire missiles; they are going to harass our aircraft; and they
are going to defy us. They believe that is the way to hold the United
States back. The process they are building up could potentially
proliferate nuclear weapons around the world.
Our response there, unlike with Iraq where we are full bore with a
quarter million troops and billions of dollars committed, is to not
even speak to the North Koreans. I don't understand that level of
diplomacy. I don't understand how that will make this a safer world.
Let us reflect for a moment, though, on what is happening in the
United Nations. I have read the critics from the right who basically
said we should go right over the United Nations; we no longer need
them; we have the power; we don't need to wait around for small nations
with populations that are a fraction of the United States to decide
whether they will support us. In a way, in the world of realpolitik,
that is true. But the United States, in informing the United Nations,
had something else in mind. It is not just a matter of whether we have
the power and a show of more strength than the United Nations as a
member but whether the United States is stronger with collective
security engaging other countries around the world to join us in
efforts such as containing Iraq and its danger.
I happen to believe that collective security is not old fashioned and
outmoded. It is critically important for us to consider building
alliances to achieve important goals for the United States and the
world because in building those alliances through the collective
security of the United Nations, we bring together common values, a
consensus on strategy, and a world vision that will serve all of us
well.
To walk away from the United Nations and say, once having engaged
them in a resolution, that we may not be able to pass a use-of-force
resolution and that we will do it ourselves is to walk away from an
important concept which has been fostered by the United States and
supported by the United States and which has been critically important
to us as recently as our effort in the Persian Gulf and in Afghanistan.
But, by tomorrow, the decision may be made. If the United Nations
Security Council does not support us, it is indeed possible that we
will have unilateral action by the United States, with the possible
support of the British.
I asked the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld, several weeks
ago: Who are our allies in this coalition against Iraq? He said:
Certainly the United States with about 250,000 troops, and the British
with about 26,000 troops, and others. I said: Of the others, who would
rank third? At that point, he said: The Turks.
We know what is happening. Their Parliament will not allow us to use
their country as a base of operation. That may change. But it shows,
when it comes to this effort, that it is by and large a bilateral
effort by the United States and the British against the Iraqis. I think
that is not the best approach. I think it is far better for us to
acknowledge what I think is the real effective approach, and that is to
engage our allies in the United Nations and in the Security Council to
put meaningful deadlines on Saddam Hussein; for the inspectors to reach
their goals; to let Saddam Hussein know that every step of the way, his
failure to cooperate could result in the United Nations taking action
against him. That does not call for an invasion, but it puts him on a
tight timetable that he has to live by.
To abandon the inspections, to abandon the role of the United
Nations, and to launch a unilateral invasion of this country is going
to be something that I think we may regret. Will we be successful
militarily? I believe we will. I can't tell you the cost in terms of
American lives or in terms of Iraqis killed. But I trust our military
to succeed in this mission.
Having succeeded militarily, though, what will we then face? We will
face, of course, the devastation in Iraq.
This week, we learned that the United States was now soliciting bids
from companies in the United States for the reconstruction of Iraq
before
[[Page S3707]]
the bombs have even fallen. That could be momentous in terms of cost.
We will face it.
As Tom Friedman of the New York Times has written, when we go into a
gift shop and see the sign, ``If you break it, you own it,'' the fact
is when we invade Iraq and remove its leadership and occupy that
country, it is then our responsibility. Others may help us, but it is
primarily our responsibility.
The same thing is true in terms of the long-term vision of Iraq. This
is a country with no history of self-government, this is a country with
no history of democracy, and we want to bring certain values there. We
have to concede the fact that it will take some time before they arrive
at that point. We will be there in an occupational way with others
perhaps, but we will have the responsibility of making that
transformation a permanent or semipermanent presence of American troops
in the Middle East and all that that entails.
At the same time, it is bound to enrage our enemies around the
world--those who think the United States is acting unilaterally and not
acting in concert with other nations, peace-loving nations that would
share our ultimate goals. That, too, may complicate the war on
terrorism. That has been conceded by intelligence agencies and others.
Our efforts in Iraq may spread the seeds of terrorism on new ground,
and maybe even here in the United States. We will have to work that
much harder to protect ourselves.
I want to enter into the Record a letter sent to Secretary of State
Colin Powell from John Brady Kiesling, who is with the United States
Embassy in Athens, Greece.
I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Hon. Colin Powell,
Secretary of State,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Secretary: I am writing you to submit my
resignation from the Foreign Service of the United States and
from my position as Political Counselor in U.S. Embassy
Athens, effective March 7. I do so with a heavy heart. The
baggage of my upbringing included a felt obligation to give
something back to my country. Service as a U.S. diplomat was
a dream job. I was paid to understand foreign languages and
cultures, to seek out diplomats, politicians, scholars and
journalists, and to persuade them that U.S. interests and
theirs fundamentally coincided. My faith in my country and
its values was the most powerful weapon in my diplomatic
arsenal.
It is inevitable that during twenty years with the State
Department I would become more sophisticated and cynical
about the narrow and selfish bureaucratic motives that
sometimes shaped our policies. Human nature is what it is,
and I was rewarded and promoted for understanding human
nature. But until this Administration it had been possible to
believe that by upholding the policies of my president I was
also upholding the interests of the American people and the
world. I believe it no longer.
The policies we are now asked to advance are incompatible
not only with American values but also with American
interests. Our fervent pursuit of war with Iraq is driving us
to squander the international legitimacy that has been
America's most potent weapon of both offense and defense
since the days of Woodrow Wilson. We have begun to dismantle
the largest and most effective web of international
relationships the world has ever known. Our current course
will being instability and danger, not security.
The sacrifice of global interests to domestic politics and
to bureaucratic self-interest is nothing new, and it is
certainly not a uniquely American problem. Still, we have not
seen such systematic distortion of intelligence, such
systematic manipulation of American opinion, since the war in
Vietnam. The September 11 tragedy left us stronger than
before, rallying around us a vast international coalition to
cooperate for the first time in a systematic way against the
threat of terrorism. But rather than take credit for those
successes and build on them, this Administration has
chosen to make terrorism a domestic political tool,
enlisting a scattered and largely defeated al Qaeda as its
bureaucratic ally. We spread disproportionate terror and
confusion in the public mind, arbitrarily linking the
unrelated problems of terrorism and Iraq. The result, and
perhaps the motive, is to justify a vast misallocation of
shrinking public wealth to the military and to weaken the
safeguards that protect American citizens from the heavy
hand of government. September 11 did not do as much damage
to the fabric of American society as we seem determined to
do to ourselves. Is the Russia of the late Romanovs really
our model, a selfish, superstitious empire thrashing
toward self-destruction in the name of a doomed status
quo?
We should ask ourselves why we have failed to persuade more
of the world that a war with Iraq is necessary. We have over
the past two years done too much to assert to our world
partners that narrow and mercenary U.S. interests override
the cherished values of our partners. Even where our aims
were not in question, our consistency is at issue. The model
of Afghanistan is little comfort to allies wondering on what
basis we plan to rebuild the Middle East, and in whose image
and interests. Have we indeed become blind, as Russia is
blind in Chechnya, as Israel is blind in the Occupied
Territories, to our own advice, that overwhelming military
power is not the answer to terrorism? After the shambles of
post-war Iraq joins the shambles in Grozny and Ramallah, it
will be a brave foreigner who forms ranks with Micronesia to
follow where we lead.
We have a coalition still, a good one. The loyalty of many
of our friends is impressive, a tribute to American moral
capital built up over a century. But our closest allies are
persuaded less that war is justified than that it would be
perilous to allow the U.S. to drift into complete solipsism.
Loyalty should be reciprocal. Why does our President condone
the swaggering and contemptuous approach to our friends and
allies this Administration is fostering, including among its
most senior officials. Has ``oderint dum metuant'' really
become our motto?
I urge you to listen to America's friends around the world.
Even here in Greece, purported hotbed of European anti-
Americanism, we have more and closer friends than the
American newspaper reader can possibly imagine. Even when
they complain about American arrogance, Greeks know that the
world is a difficult and dangerous place, and they want a
strong international system, with the U.S. and EU in close
partnership. When our friends are afraid of us rather than
for us, it is time to worry. And now they are afraid. Who
will tell them convincingly that the United States is as it
was, a beacon of liberty, security, and justice for the
planet?
Mr. Secretary, I have enormous respect for your character
and ability. You have preserved more international
credibility for us than our policy deserves, and salvaged
something positive from the excesses of an ideological and
self-serving Administration. But your loyalty to the
President goes too far. We are straining beyond its limits an
international system we built with such toil and treasure, a
web of laws, treaties, organizations, and shared values that
sets limits on our foes far more effectively than it ever
constrained America's ability to defend its interests.
I am resigning because I have tried and failed to reconcile
my conscience with my ability to represent the current U.S.
Administration. I have confidence that our democratic process
is ultimately self-correcting, and hope that in a small way I
can contribute from outside to shaping policies that better
serve the security and prosperity of the American people and
the world we share.
Sincerely,
John Brady Kiesling,
U.S. Embassy Athens.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, this letter is a letter of resignation.
Mr. Kiesling, a career diplomat who has served in United States
embassies around the world, resigned over our foreign policy in Iraq. I
will not read the entire letter. But this I will read. It is the letter
from Mr. Kiesling to Secretary Powell:
The policies we are now asked to advance are incompatible
not only with American values but also with American
interests. Our fervent pursuit of war with Iraq is driving us
to squander the international legitimacy that has been
America's most potent weapon of both offense and defense
since the days of Woodrow Wilson. We have begun to dismantle
the largest and most effective web of international
relationships the world has ever known. Our current course
will bring instability and danger, not security.
Those are the words of a man who was a career diplomat serving the
United States with principle and convictions and who resigned from the
diplomatic corps over our policy in Iraq. That is a sad commentary, but
it is a reality.
The reality is that we are following a course of foreign policy that
is a dramatic departure from what we have followed for almost 50 years.
We are making decisions relative to this war in Iraq which are changing
the rules the United States has not only lived by but preached for
decades. We are confronting the world that has most recently been our
allies in the war on terrorism and telling them that, with or without
their cooperation and approval, we are going forward with an invasion
of Iraq. We are saying to the rest of the world that the United States
has the power and will to use it. It is certain that we have the power
and the strength. The question is whether or not we have the wisdom--
the wisdom to understand that simply having the strength is not enough.
I would like to quote a few words from a statement made on this floor
on October 3 last year by a man who used
[[Page S3708]]
to sit directly behind me here, Paul Wellstone of Minnesota. I miss him
every single day. I pulled out the statement he made relative to this
use of force resolution. I can recall now when he said some of these
words.
I quote from Senator Wellstone:
To act now on our own might be a sign of more power. Acting
sensibly and in a measured way in concert with our allies
with bipartisan congressional support would be a sign of our
strength.
It is still true today. It is true so many months later.
I think the President and this administration still have a chance to
take what could be a course of action that departs from a tradition in
values which we have stood by and preached for so many decades, and
return to those values in our efforts in Iraq.
And I hope we do it. I hope we do not discard the United Nations and
all of our allies who are part of it. I hope we understand that when
some of our best friends around the world question whether we are
approaching this sensibly, it does not demonstrate their weakness but
really calls into question whether we have the humility to step back
and say: Can we do this more effectively for a more peaceful world for
generations to come?
Madam President, I close by saying, I return now, in just a few
moments, to my home State of Illinois. As I walk the streets of
Springfield, of Chicago, and of other cities, people come up to me and
say: Why don't I hear a debate in the U.S. Congress about Iraq?
Well, the fact is, that debate was waged and decided last October. I
was one of 23 Members who voted against the use of force resolution
because I believe there is a better way: a collective approach with the
United Nations, that makes certain that the United States has a
coalition of nations behind it in suppressing the evil of Saddam
Hussein and his dangers to the region, rather than a coalition of
nations united against us. That, sadly, is what we face today.
The vote in the United Nations tomorrow is historic. I hope we have
the support of that institution. I hope, if we do not, this
administration will pause before unleashing the furies of war and
consider whether there is a better, more measured and sensible approach
to show not only our might but our strength and clarity of purpose.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
____________________