[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 37 (Friday, March 7, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3358-S3365]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     EXTENSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

  Mr. WARNER. Certainly. The Senator from Massachusetts has been most 
patient.
  I ask unanimous consent that morning business be extended to the hour 
of 1 o'clock, the time equally divided between myself and my colleagues 
on the other side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cornyn). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. With reference to two points that you make, Senator, 
first--I copied in my notes--you questioned was the United States ever 
genuinely engaged in the inspection process, some words to that effect.
  Mr. DODD. Before you put words in my mouth, my concern has been that 
the administration has not been terribly supportive of the inspections 
process. Numerous Administration officials have been very dismissive of 
the inspections effort. My colleague from Virginia may have a different 
one. But my impression is that the administration has never embraced 
the inspections process, endorsed it, or supported it with the kind of 
rhetoric that I would have assumed would have been the case since we 
certainly supported the resolution that established the inspections 
initiative.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are entitled to an honest difference of 
opinion. My colleague and I debated last night in a public forum on 
this very issue. But I believe our Government has been very thoroughly 
engaged in the inspection process, trying to support it.
  I provide today some tangible evidence in the sense that I have a 
letter from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, addressed 
to me with a copy to my distinguished colleagues, Senator Levin and 
Senator Roberts, in which they set out for the record exactly what we 
have done by way of giving the U.S. intelligence regarding likely sites 
where weapons of mass destruction could be in the process of being 
manufactured, stored, or otherwise. We have cooperated mightily in this 
effort.
  I think that corroborates the assertion of the Senator from Virginia 
that our Government is engaged. I just read one paragraph here, Tenet 
stating we, the United States:

       . . . have now provided detailed information on all of the 
     high value and moderate value sites to UNMOVIC and the IAEA.

  That is in rebuttal to your comment about genuine engagement. I think 
that shows good faith.
  Second, this rush headlong?
  As the Senator well knows, 1441 was adopted on November 8. 
Immediately thereafter the United Nations began to put in place and 
formalize work that Blix had been doing for some period of time.
  As you well know, the United Nations contemplated that there could be 
a second inspection regime, and Blix was put in office and began his 
work some months before. Had he undertaken to go into Iraq as quickly 
as I think feasible from a logistics standpoint, and having with him 
trained individuals, and he has been there basically since the latter 
part of November, early December--am I not correct in that?
  The reason there has not been greater productivity by Blix--I think 
he has tried diligently--is the absolute lack of cooperation of Iraq, 
to which my colleague from Connecticut has agreed.
  Here we are now. Our President and the Prime Minister and other 
nations of the coalition of the willing, having called up their 
reserves, called up their guard, transported the forces and put them in 
place. I was visiting there with Senator Levin, Senator Roberts, and 
Senator Rockefeller 10 days ago. We have placed them there. As the 
Senator from Connecticut I think quite properly said, in fairness, 
their presence has, indeed, supported the diplomatic efforts undertaken 
by the President and others in the United Nations, which is still going 
on.
  Our President said last night that we will wait and see what the Blix 
report comes forth with. He has come forth again today. With due 
respect to Blix, he tends to be somewhat contradictory.

  In previous reports he quite actively deplored the fact that Iraq has 
not been more cooperative and that lack of cooperation has hindered his 
efforts. As the Senator well knows, the concept of this inspection was 
not that Blix and his team had to find the weapons; it was that Iraq 
was to cooperate and show where the weapons are so Blix could supervise 
their destruction.
  This thing got totally, as we say as sailors, off course because of 
the need for Blix to do both the destruction, which he is now 
supervising, of a modest cache of missiles, and at the same time trying 
to search, using U.S. intelligence and intelligence from other nations, 
for the sites.
  I say to the Senator, I see no basis for saying that this President, 
the Prime Minister of Great Britain, or others are rushing, as you 
said, headlong to try to utilize force as the final solution. We have 
been at this thing 12 years. Blix has been in business since November.
  Mr. DODD. Let me respond to your rather long question.
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. DODD. I presume there is a question there.
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. DODD. My response is the inspection teams were not at full 
strength until about the end of January.
  Obviously, we didn't think Saddam Hussein was a wonderfully truthful, 
reliable head of state last fall when the U.S. voted for U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1441. We have known Saddam Hussein for a long time, 
and it therefore comes as no great surprise that it has taken 
international pressure to get results.
  It has only been about a month since the inspections team has been 
fully operational in Iraq. That is a fact. To expect somehow that 
within a month's period of time, or a little more than a month, an 
inspections team was going to be able to complete the job was naive.
  This morning U.N. Weapons Inspections chief, Mr. Blix--whom I think 
most people respect as being an honorable person and certainly one who 
has dedicated much of his career to eliminating weapons of mass 
destruction--reported that the inspections are making progress, that 
today inspectors are getting a lot more done than they did in the 
1990s. We should listen to Mr. Blix and give his remarks serious 
consideration as we decide the next steps.
  My only point in taking the floor today is not to suggest, as some 
may, that we ought to under no circumstances in dealing with Iraq ever 
contemplate the use of force. I would disagree with that. I think 
having a threat of force is absolutely critical to achieving a desired 
result. The only point is that we ought not do this alone. I don't 
think it is necessary, and I think we ought to at least give this 
process time to work. I think the cost

[[Page S3359]]

of not doing that could be profoundly dangerous to our country. I hope 
I am wrong about that, but I am fearful I may be right. In waiting a 
few weeks to get this right, I don't think the dangers posed by Iraq 
are that imminent that a few weeks or a few months would necessarily 
cost us.
  I would argue differently about North Korea. I don't think we have 
that much time. I think every day we lose in dealing with North Korea 
raises the risks to this country and the world profoundly. I don't 
disagree with my colleague from Virginia at all about this except to 
the extent that the impression is we really are not going to give this 
the kind of time to prove it can work and then have the kind of support 
that I think we ought to have internationally.
  We only paid about 10 percent of the cost of the gulf war. The rest 
of the world which felt most threatened by Iraq contributed 90 percent 
of that cost.
  As I shared with my colleagues last evening a conversation which I 
had with one of the major European Commissioners, a great ally of ours, 
the Commissioner said: We have been delighted to support the effort in 
Afghanistan. I think the European Community contributed about $1 
billion. He said: I would not anticipate any financial support under 
the present circumstances in winning the peace in Iraq if this is a 
unilateral effort on the part of the United States.
  That is a very troubling comment. This problem is a problem not just 
for us, it is a problem for the region, as my colleagues have said.
  I believe Saddam Hussein poses a global threat, and that certainly 
needs to be addressed. But we need to understand that diplomacy has 
value. And I think there are those who today are in positions of making 
a difference who don't appreciate that enough. That is my concern as I 
take the floor today.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I see the Senator from Massachusetts.
  I ask unanimous consent that the time the Senator from Virginia 
consumed in this colloquy be charged to his allocation and the time 
consumed by the Senator from Connecticut be charged to the other side.
  I thank my colleague. I hope to have more to say on this.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, this morning we heard the most 
encouraging report so far on the recent developments in Iraq from the 
United Nations' chief weapons inspectors. Progress is clearly being 
made. Iraq is beginning to destroy its missiles. As a result of strong 
international pressure on Saddam, the inspectors are receiving greater 
cooperation from the Iraqi Government.
  Hans Blix, the chief United Nations weapons inspector, reported this 
morning that the international pressure is working. He says the 
inspectors are encountering fewer difficulties than when inspections 
occurred there a decade ago. The inspectors have free access to the 
entire country, and they can now conduct air surveillance throughout 
Iraq. The question is, For how long? Hans Blix says it will not take 
years or weeks, but months. So we are not talking about an endless 
process. Saddam knows he is on the clock at the United Nations. The 
eyes of the world are on him, and he must disarm.
  We all agree there is still much more to be done before full 
disarmament is achieved. But inspections are working and Saddam is 
being disarmed. Yet in its rush to war with Iraq, the Bush 
administration ignores this progress and rejects the wise words of 
caution from our allies.
  President Bush deserves great credit for the progress so far--both in 
the war against al-Qaida terrorism, and in disarming Saddam. Al-Qaida 
is on the run, and Saddam is disarming.
  But it is time for this President and this White House to pause 
before pushing aside the rest of the world and ordering an invasion of 
Iraq. Rash action will only place our troops in greater harm's way. As 
we unleash a firestorm of military might over Iraq, we could easily 
unleash a firestorm of hatred for America creating a far more dangerous 
world for Americans here at home and in many other countries.
  We are squandering the immense good will and support for America 
following the tragedy of 9/11. We are shattering the coalition that is 
effectively fighting the war against terrorism, and that is pursuing 
Osama bin Laden at this very moment. War now will inflame the Arab and 
Muslim world against us as never before, and generate intense new 
support for anti-American terrorists who will stop at nothing to do us 
harm.
  In recent days, Iraq has destroyed 34 of its 100 illegal missiles--a 
process which continues. Seven more scientists have been privately 
interviewed, and each day more come forward. The Iraqi government 
stepped up and revealed the location of previously destroyed biological 
weapons in order to enable the inspectors to verify their destruction.
  Many of us wish that this cooperation had occurred earlier, and that 
Iraqi officials were more forthcoming. No one ever said it would be 
easy to disarm Iraq. Even South Africa, which agreed to unilaterally 
disarm its nuclear program, required two full years of inspections to 
confirm that its nuclear capability was destroyed.
  Disarmament is a process--not a single simple event. Disarmament 
takes time. Progress comes step by step. But when progress does occur, 
it makes no sense to reject it out of hand. It makes no sense to start 
a war when we have a genuine chance to preserve the peace.
  The wisest course for America is to give the inspectors more time and 
to maintain the pressure on Saddam by keeping our troops in the region. 
It is better to pay the price of keeping our troops there to pressure 
Saddam than to pay the far greater cost of going to war.
  It is clear from the foreign ministers who spoke today at the 
Security Council that a majority of the world's governments still want 
to wait before pulling the trigger for war. Even the British are now 
asking for more time.
  This is a delicate and dangerous situation. We need allies to help us 
meet our goals, and to provide for the security of the American people. 
But surely we can have effective relationships with other nations 
without adopting a chip-on-the-shoulder, my-way-or-the-highway policy 
that makes all our other goals in the world more difficult to achieve. 
We cannot be a bully in the world schoolyard and expect cooperation, 
friendship, and support from the rest of the world.
  The threat of war may be tough talk that Saddam needs to hear. But 
continuing inspections is a tough-minded policy. It takes patience and 
perseverance. There is the chance that they will succeed in disarming 
Iraq. And inspections build international support if other steps are 
required.
  The goal is the disarmament of Iraq by peaceful means--not to use 
every opportunity to justify a war, as the administration is doing.
  All of us agree that Saddam is a despicable and deceitful dictator, 
but I am deeply concerned that such a war will make the world even more 
dangerous for Americans--not less dangerous. But as long as inspectors 
are on the ground and making progress, we must give peace a chance. War 
must always be a last resort.
  The question now is whether the Bush Administration will view Iraqi 
cooperation as a glass half empty, or a glass half full.
  At his press conference last night, President Bush still failed to 
offer adequate answers to the key questions on the minds of the 
American people about the issues at stake in this war and its 
aftermath. In his speech last week, he also painted a simplistic 
picture of the brightest possible future--with democracy flourishing in 
Iraq, peace emerging among all nations in the Middle East, and the 
terrorists with no place of support there. We have all heard of rosy 
scenarios, but that was ridiculous.
  War with Iraq runs the very serious risk of inflaming the Middle East 
and provoking a massive new wave of anti-Americanism in other countries 
that may well strengthen the terrorists, especially if the Muslim world 
opposes us. What if al-Qaida were to time the next terrorist attack to 
the day we go to war?
  A year ago, the Wall Street Journal quoted a dissident in Saudi 
Arabia who has turned his focus from his own government to the U.S. 
Government. He said the main enemy of the Muslims and the Arabs is 
America, and that they do not want us to impose on them.

[[Page S3360]]

He said many Arabs would rather tolerate dictatorship in their own 
countries than import reforms from America.
  The burning of the U.S. flag has become a common ritual in Arab 
capitals. Calling someone an American is now regarded as an insult in 
parts of the Arab world.
  What a tragic change in the support we had in the world after 9/11, 
let alone from the time when America stood as a beacon of hope and a 
model for freedom and democracy throughout the world.
  In a desperate effort to justify its focus on Iraq, the 
administration has long asserted there are ties between Osama and 
Saddam--a theory with no proof, and widely doubted by the intelligence 
experts.
  Two weeks after 9/11, Secretary Rumsfeld claimed we had 
``bulletproof'' evidence of the link. But a year later, CIA Director 
Tenet conceded in a letter to the Senate Intelligence Committee that 
the administration's understanding of the link was still ``evolving'' 
and was based on sources of ``varying reliability.''
  In fact, the link is so widely doubted that intelligence experts have 
expressed their concern that intelligence is being politicized to 
support the rush to war.
  The Bush administration was wrong to allow the anti-Iraq zealots in 
its ranks to exploit the 9/11 tragedy by using it to make war against 
Iraq a higher priority than the war against terrorism.
  Al-Qaida--not Iraq--is the most imminent threat to our national 
security. Our citizens are asked to protect themselves from Osama with 
plastic sheeting and duct tape, while the administration prepares to 
send our Armed Forces to war against Iraq. Those priorities are wrong.
  There is also much more we need to do at every level of government to 
strengthen our defenses at home against terrorist attack, especially if 
we go to war alone against Iraq and inflame the Arab world. America is 
already on constant alert. There is no time to shortchange our security 
at home. Yet across the country the Bush administration is leaving 
local governments high and dry in the face of continuing threats at 
home. Despite promises of funding from Washington, our cities are not 
receiving the urgent help they need.
  If there is any lesson from September 11, it is that we cannot afford 
to fail to meet this threat. The cost in lives at home is too great. 
The war with al-Qaida is far from over, and war with Iraq may well make 
it worse.
  And what about the aftermath of war? We know a stable government will 
be essential in a postwar Iraq. But the administration refuses to 
discuss, in any real detail, how it will be achieved and how long our 
troops will need to stay. President Bush assumes everything will go 
perfectly.
  But war and its consequences hold enormous risks and uncertainties.
  As Retired General Anthony Zinni has asked, will we do what we did in 
Afghanistan in the 1970s--drive the old Soviet Union out and let 
something arguably worse emerge in its place?
  The administration has also tried to convince us the war will not be 
costly to the Treasury. If our national security were at stake, we 
would spare no expense to protect American lives. But the 
administration still owes the Nation a more honest discussion about the 
war costs we are about to face, especially if America has to remain in 
Iraq for many years, with little support from others.

  The vast majority of the Iraqi people may well want the end of 
Saddam's rule, but they may not welcome the United States to create a 
government in its own image. Regardless of their own internal 
disagreements, the Iraqi people still feel a strong sense of national 
identity and could quickly reject an American occupation force that 
tramples on local cultures.
  We must recognize that the day we occupy Iraq, we shoulder the 
responsibility to protect and care for its citizens. We are accountable 
under the Geneva Convention for public safety in neighborhoods, for 
schools, and for meeting the basic necessities of life for 23 million 
Iraqi civilians.
  This daunting challenge has received little attention from the 
administration. As the dust settles, the repressed tribal and religious 
differences of the past may come to the fore--as they did in the brutal 
civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, in Rwanda, and other countries. As 
our troops bypass Basra and other Iraqi cities on our way to Baghdad, 
how will we prevent the revenge bloodletting that occurred after the 
last gulf war in which thousands of civilians lost their lives? What do 
we do if the Kurds in northern Iraq claim an independent Kurdistan or 
the Shia in southern Iraq move toward an alliance with Iran, from which 
they have long drawn their inspiration?
  We have told the Government of Turkey that we will not support an 
independent Kurdistan, despite the fact the Kurdish people already have 
a high degree of U.S.-supported independence and have even completed 
work on their own constitution. Do we send troops again to keep Iraq 
united? This administration's record in postwar Afghanistan is not 
exactly the best precedent for building democracy in Iraq.
  Sixteen months after the fall of the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai is still referred to as the ``Mayor 
of Kabul'' because of the weak and fragile hold of his government on 
the rest of the nation. Warlords are in control of much of the 
countryside. The Afghan-Pakistan border is an area of anarchy and 
ominous al-Qaida cells.
  If we have not been able to get it right in Afghanistan, where we 
went in with strong international support and involvement, how do we 
expect to go it alone in Iraq? Everyone talked about a Marshall Plan 
for Afghanistan where there is a clear need to rebuild and get it right 
so the Taliban and al-Qaida cannot take over again.
  President Karzai was here last week at the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, begging for the adequate support and resources his new 
government needs to take hold. To get it right in Iraq, we need the 
international community and a long-term commitment on the part of the 
United States. That is less likely to happen if we do not have the 
international community with us from the start.
  Depending on our welcome, it could take as many as 200,000 American 
troops, as General Shinseki told the Armed Services Committee just over 
a week ago, or even more, to stabilize Iraq. We already have 37,000 
troops in South Korea, 8,000 in Afghanistan, 5,000 in the Balkans, and 
another 1,000 in the Philippines and Colombia. We need to know whether 
our Armed Forces are being spread too thin. We need to know how long 
they can keep up this pace.
  The large-scale mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves for 
Iraq is already having an effect on police, firefighters, and others 
who are needed on the front lines at home, especially if there are new 
terrorist attacks on the United States. We have called up 167,000 Guard 
and Reserve personnel for active duty. We know the effect on their 
families who are left behind. What is the effect on the economy in lost 
productivity as these jobs go unfilled?

  Can we meet all these obligations now, let alone shoulder the long-
term costs of war with Iraq? These may well total hundreds of billions 
of dollars in the years ahead.
  One of the highest and worst costs of the war may be the humanitarian 
costs. Sixty percent of the Iraqi people rely on the United Nations 
Oil-for-Food Program for their daily survival. Food is distributed 
through 46,000 government distributors supplied by a network of food 
storage barns. A war with Iraq will disrupt this network. Many Iraqis, 
especially low-income families, have no other source of food. Women and 
children will be the most vulnerable victims of war. According to 
recent reports, 500,000 Iraqi children already suffer from 
malnutrition.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
at the conclusion of my remarks an excellent article in this morning's 
Washington Post by Ken Bacon and George Rupp.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. KENNEDY. I will quote from the article.

       . . . The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the world's 
     first responder when people flee their countries, lacks the 
     resources to prepare for a flood of refugees. . . .
       Although the United States has spent $2.4 billion to send 
     troops to the Persian Gulf region, it has spent less than $1 
     million to position relief agencies in the region. An 
     official at the U.N. Office for the Coordination

[[Page S3361]]

     of Humanitarian Affairs recently told a conference that his 
     biggest concern is the small number of private relief 
     agencies ready to move quickly into Iraq.

  We don't have the nongovernmental agencies that do humanitarian work 
in Iraq. We had them in Afghanistan. We have refused to permit them 
licenses to go in and set up some kind of system in the past months, 
although they have all desired to do so.
  Listen to this:

       Lack of preparedness by the [United Nations] and private 
     relief agencies means the U.S. military will have to do most 
     of the relief work, and this in turn could mean the suffering 
     of the Iraqi people will be greater than necessary. 
     Administration officials have done little to match the skills 
     of relief agencies--some are specialists in medical care, 
     others in water and sanitation projects, for instance--with 
     projected needs.

  It is talking about the nongovernmental agencies. It continues:

       In modern warfare, precision bombs will limit civilian 
     casualties during the conflict, so that most death and 
     suffering occurs in the post-conflict period, when people are 
     displaced, poorly fed or prone to disease because water 
     sanitation and sewer systems have been disabled. This means 
     that rapid humanitarian intervention is just as important to 
     holding casualties and quick military victory.
       The United States may be ready for war, but it is not yet 
     ready to help Iraq recover from war.

  This is Ken Bacon and the spokesman for the nongovernmental agencies 
that have worked so well historically on humanitarian needs. The U.S. 
military is far from equipped to handle the challenge. Our Government 
must have a plan in place to care for the population. Despite the 
immense need for help from relief organizations, we have had too few 
discussions with key nongovernmental agencies to provide the food, 
tents, medicines, and other supplies that will be needed. All we have 
to do is look in the newspaper and we find out where the preposition of 
every one of these aircraft carriers are, where the armored divisions 
are. Yet when you ask the Defense Department where are the prepositions 
on food, the tents, and medicines, we can't disclose those because 
those are secret.
  Are all these possible consequences acceptable to the American 
people? Are they manageable? Does the administration really have a plan 
that considers how we will reap--in the international community, in the 
Arab street, and in American families--what we sow in a war with Iraq.
  Finally, the President must explain why war with Iraq won't distract 
us from the more immediate and graver danger posed by North Korea. 
Something is gravely wrong at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue if we rush to 
war with a country that poses no nuclear threat, but won't even talk to 
one that brandishes its nuclear power right now. Any nuclear threat 
from Iraq is at least five years into the future. But the threat from 
North Korea exists now--today. CIA Director George Tenet recently 
informed the Senate Armed Services Committee, North Korean missiles can 
now reach American soil with a nuclear warhead.
  Look at this article from the Washington Post of March 4:

       The United States and Asian countries have begun to accept 
     the idea of a nuclear-armed North Korea.

  I ask unanimous consent to print the article at the conclusion of my 
remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 2.)
  Mr. KENNEDY. Continuing from the article:

       ``The administration has acquiesced in North Korea becoming 
     a nuclear power,'' said a Senate source who was briefed last 
     week on the administration's evolving policy.
       ``Our major fear is that North Korea would pass on fissile 
     materials or other nuclear technology'' to ``rogue states'' 
     or outlaw groups, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. 
     Armitage warned Congress last month. ``I don't think, given 
     the poverty in North Korea, that it would be too long'' 
     before such sales could take place, he said.

  In other words, they are willing to accept North Korea as a nuclear 
power that has sold missiles to Iran, to Syria, to other countries that 
have supported terrorism and not give that the first priority when we 
are talking about the security of the United States.
  This makes no sense.

       ``The total red line is the sale of nuclear weapons 
     material,'' said [a spokesman for the administration] who 
     follows the North Korea issue closely. ``Nuclear weapons 
     transferred to the Iraqis would be tantamount to nuking 
     Jerusalem.''

  You can have them, as long as you don't sell them, for a country that 
has already sold the technology of making nuclear weapons to Iran, to 
Syria, and other nations and has that capability itself.
  Experts--including professionals within our own government--have been 
ringing alarm bells for months about North Korea's pursuit of nuclear 
weapons. The views of the experts are brushed aside, despite the 
continually growing list of dangerous behavior by that government.
  This is a country that celebrated the inauguration day of South 
Korea's new president by test firing a missile into the nearby sea. 
Yet, last night, President Bush did not even mention North Korea in his 
statement.
  North Korea has long had advanced missiles which it sells to other 
countries. It has restarted its plutonium--producing reactor, kicked 
out the international inspectors, pulled out of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and threatened to break the Armistice agreement 
that has brought 50 years of peace to the Korean peninsula.
  Desperate and strapped for cash, North Korea is the greatest current 
nuclear danger to the United States, and it is clearly taking advantage 
of the situation in Iraq. It is the country most likely to sell nuclear 
material to terrorists, and has missiles that can strike our soil. How 
long can the Administration continue to ignore North Korea? How will a 
war with Iraq affect our ability to deal with this escalating danger?
  Just the other day, two North Korean Mig fighter jets tailed an 
American plane near the Korean Peninsula, in a further attempt to get 
the attention of President Bush.
  But in his zeal on Iraq, the President has refused to call the 
situation on the Korean peninsula what it is--a genuine crisis. He has 
refused to even talk directly to the North Koreans to try to end its 
nuclear program.
  The Administration may even have tried to conceal information about 
North Korea. Intelligence analysts at the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory in California concluded in November 2001 that North Korea 
had begun construction of a plant to enrich uranium to use in nuclear 
weapons. Yet, the Administration did not reveal this information until 
eleven months later, in October 2002--after Congress had voted on the 
legislation authorizing the use of force in Iraq.
  Only the Administration knows if the timing of the release of the 
information on North Korea was by design or coincidence. But if the 
Administration did conceal its knowledge of North Korea's dangerous 
nuclear weapons program until after the Congressional vote on Iraq, it 
would represent a breach of faith by our government not seen since the 
Vietnam War.
  The very real danger is that the Administration is making it more 
likely that North Korea will provide nuclear material or even nuclear 
weapons to terrorists or nations supporting terrorists. Is war with 
Iraq worth that risk--not taking more time with inspectors?
  We are poised at a moment of truth in the stewardship of the 
President. If President Bush commits our men and women to war, then all 
of us will close ranks behind them, and pray for their safety and a 
swift end to the conflict.
  But with inspectors on the ground and stiff international pressure 
still possible, this is an unnecessary war. History will judge how well 
we meet the challenges of this new era and this new century. We should 
move forward as the great and honorable nation we are--with patience 
and perseverance--as we carry on the difficult work of build a better 
and more peaceful world for all its people.

                               Exhibit 1

                [From the Washington Post, Mar. 7, 2003]

                       Unready for the Aftermath

                 (By Kenneth H. Bacon and George Rupp)

       Despite months of planning by the Bush administration to 
     respond to the humanitarian challenges that could follow an 
     attack against Iraq, preparations for dealing with 
     displacement, injury, illness and food shortages remain 
     inadequate. If current problems continue, the suffering 
     caused by war could be amplified by lack of aid resources and 
     coordination.
       The most urgent need could be food. The United States 
     boasts that it has shipped 3 million humanitarian daily 
     rations to the region to help feed Iraqis. But individual 
     meal

[[Page S3362]]

     packets will feed only a tiny portion of Iraq's 24 million 
     people, and for just a few days. A United Nations official 
     recently called U.S. and U.N. preparations to feed the Iraqi 
     people ``grossly inadequate.'' The official said that ``they 
     need to be sending ships of wheat to the Persian Gulf, along 
     with ships of soldiers.''
       More than a decade of U.N. sanctions has left approximately 
     16 million Iraqis dependent on government rations for their 
     entire food supply under the U.N. Oil-for-Food program; most 
     of the remaining 8 million Iraqis rely on government rations 
     for a portion of their daily food basket. The U.N. Children's 
     Fund estimates that more than 2 million Iraqi children will 
     require therapeutic feeding in the event of a conflict.
       A break in the U.N. food pipeline could cause ``extremely 
     grave'' conditions, Ramiro Lopes da Silva, director of the 
     U.N. World Food Program office in Baghdad, told The Post. He 
     estimates that 10 million people could run out of food within 
     six weeks of the start of a war. ``After that we will have to 
     feed 10 million people. Eventually, we'll have to feed the 
     entire population,'' Lopes da Silva said. The World Food 
     Program currently has enough food in the region to feed 
     900,000 people for 10 weeks.
       Preparations to deal with refugees and displace people also 
     are behind schedule. The United Nations estimates that in the 
     ``medium impact scenario''--a two- to three-month conflict 
     involving ground troops--1.45 million refugees and asylum 
     seekers would try to reach neighboring countries, and 900,000 
     people would be newly displaced within Iraq. Yet Ruud Lubbers 
     says that his agency, the U.N. High Commissioner for 
     Refugees, the world's first responder when people flee their 
     countries, lacks the resources to prepare for a flood of 
     refugees.
       So far the U.N. refugee office has raised less than $20 
     million of the $60 million it is seeking for tents, stoves, 
     blankets and other materials for refugee camps. Most of that 
     money came from the United States. As a result, the agency 
     has positioned only about 20 percent of the equipment it 
     needs in the region.
       In a flurry of news conferences last week, administration 
     officials admitted that the military may have to provide food 
     and medical assistance during and immediately after a 
     conflict, but they say humanitarian tasks would quickly be 
     turned over to the United Nations and private relief 
     agencies. Sadly, private relief agencies, most of which 
     depend on government funding, aren't yet well prepared for 
     the task.
       Although the United States has spent $2.4 billion to send 
     troops to the Persian Gulf region, it has spent less than $1 
     million to position relief agencies in the region. An 
     official at the U.N. Office for the Coordination of 
     Humanitarian Affairs recently told a conference that his 
     biggest concern is the small number of private relief 
     agencies ready to move quickly into Iraq.
       Lack of preparedness by U.N. and private relief agencies 
     means the U.S. military will have to do most of the relief 
     work, and this in turn could mean that the suffering of the 
     Iraqi people will be greater than necessary. Administration 
     officials have done little to match the skills of relief 
     agencies--some are specialists in medical care, others in 
     water and sanitation projects, for instance--with projected 
     needs. One urgent unanswered question is: Who will care for 
     Iraqis exposed to weapons of mass destruction? Humanitarian 
     organizations lack the skills and equipment to handle this 
     challenge.
       In modern warfare, precision bombs limit civilian 
     casualties during the conflict, so that most death and 
     suffering occurs in the post-conflict period, when people are 
     displaced, poorly fed or prone to disease because water 
     sanitation and sewage systems have been disabled. This means 
     that rapid humanitarian intervention is just as important to 
     holding casualties down as quick military victory.
       The United States may be ready for war, but it not yet 
     ready to help Iraq recover from war.
                                  ____


                               Exhibit 2

                [From the Washington Post, Mar. 5, 2003]

               Foes Giving In to N. Korea's Nuclear Aims

                   (By Doug Struck and Glenn Kessler)

       Tokyo, March 4.--The United States and Asian countries have 
     begun to accept the idea of a nuclear-armed North Korea, 
     according to officials and analysts here and in Washington. 
     Increasingly, the Bush administration is turning its 
     attention to preventing the Communist government in Pyongyang 
     from selling nuclear material to the highest bidder.
       Envoys for the new South Korean president, Roh Moo Hyun, 
     shocked Bush advisers in Washington recently when they said 
     they would rather have a nuclear North Korea than a chaotic 
     collapse of the government there, according to sources in 
     Seoul.
       And in Japan, located within missile range of North Korea, 
     officials feel their neighbor cannot be stopped from 
     producing a bomb. ``We need to be debating how to live with 
     North Korea, with or without nuclear weapons,'' Taro Kono, a 
     lawmaker from the ruling party, said in an interview.
       Washington had issued repeated warnings to North Korea not 
     to begin reprocessing materials that could become fuel for a 
     nuclear bomb, but administration officials have become 
     resigned to North Korea taking that step sometime within the 
     next two to four weeks. ``The administration has acquiesced 
     in North Korea becoming a nuclear power,'' said a Senate 
     source who was briefed last week on the administration's 
     evolving policy.
       U.S. officials have begun to contend that a decision by 
     North Korea to begin reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods 
     into weapons-grade plutonium will represent a diplomatic 
     opportunity to swing international opinion to its side in the 
     impasse over North Korea's nuclear ambitions, administration 
     and congressional officials said today.
       The administration thinks the shock of a decision by 
     Pyongyang to export nuclear materials would force Russia, 
     China, South Korea and other nations to drop their reluctance 
     to confront the Communist state. According to that view, they 
     would go along with the United States in mounting a tough 
     campaign to further isolate the North and possibly to try to 
     interdict suspected shipments of nuclear materials.
       Production of plutonium that could flow abroad in 
     clandestine sales ``fundamentally changes the equation,'' 
     contends an administration official. ``Literally every city 
     on the planet would be threatened.''
       During the last crisis over North Korea's nuclear 
     ambitions, in 1994, the Clinton administration warned 
     Pyongyang that reprocessing materials for a nuclear bomb 
     could prompt a military strike. Many officials in Asia 
     believe that Washington will now set new ``red lines'' that 
     it will not tolerate North Korea crossing. But Bush and his 
     senior advisers have refused to do that, publicly at least, 
     saying it would only encourage North Korea to charge past 
     them.
       North Korean already is a major source of missile 
     technology, and an Iranian resistance group recently said 
     that North Korean experts are assisting Iran in its pursuit 
     of nuclear weapons. Now officials worry about a new kind 
     of export.
       Even the Administration says North Korea's nuclear weapons 
     are dangerous. ``Our major fear is that North Korea would 
     pass on fissile material or other nuclear techology'' to 
     ``rogue states'' or outlaw groups, Deputy Secretary of State 
     Richard L. Armitage warned Congress last month. ``I don't 
     think, given the poverty of North Korea, that it would be too 
     long'' before such sales took place, he said.
       ``The total red line is the sale of nuclear weapons 
     material,'' said Rep. Mark S. Kirk (R-Ill.), who follows the 
     North Korea issue closely. ``Nuclear weapons transferred to 
     the Iraqis would be tantamount to nuking Jerusalem.'' You can 
     have them, as long as you don't sell them?
       The Senate source said the administration was playing ``a 
     very dangerous game'' in not acting to stop reprocessing 
     before it starts, because the resulting materials could be 
     hidden in the country's network of caves awaiting export.
       But administration officials argue they have no good 
     military options for eliminating North Korea's nuclear 
     capability. A surgical strike might neutralize the plutonium 
     plant, but the country's effort to enrich uranium is 
     proceeding at another, unknown site.
       President Bush told reporters this week that he was still 
     seeking a diplomatic solution and that a ``military option is 
     our last choice.'' He also said that he would seek to 
     ``accelerate the development of an anti-ballistic missile 
     system'' to counter a potential threat from North Korean 
     missiles.
       U.S. officials quietly dropped the phrase that the United 
     States has ``no hostile intent'' toward North Korea in their 
     talking points about a month ago, an official said ``It's 
     clear North Korea has hostile intent to us,'' he said.
       ``I wouldn't rule out use of military coercion if North 
     Korea crosses . . . red lines,'' said Michael A. McDevitt, a 
     retired rear admiral and director of the Center for Strategic 
     Studies in Washington. ``The one I am most worried about is 
     if they produce enough plutonium to start hawking it on the 
     open market.''
       An administration official said Chinese officials have told 
     North Korea that China would consider any attempt to produce 
     nuclear weapons a ``direct threat to Chinese national 
     security.'' While the Chinese told U.S. officials that they 
     made it clear to North Korea they would not accept such a 
     step, the Chinese statement did not address reprocessing or 
     foreign sales of the resulting materials.
       Many strategists have long asserted that the United States, 
     China and Russia would not allow a nuclear-armed North Korea 
     because it could dramatically alter the power structure in 
     northeastern Asia and lead to an arms race as both Seoul and 
     Tokyo demanded nuclear weapons.
       Increasingly, however, it appears that North Korea is 
     determined to defy those wishes. ``In a way we are wasting 
     our time to talk about dialogue with North Korea,'' said 
     Masashi Nishihara, president of Japan's National Defense 
     Academy. ``Only after they develop a nuclear program will 
     they come to the table.

  Mr. KENNEDY. I see my friend and colleague, the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee. I would like to maybe ask him a question.
  Mr. WARNER. Of course.
  Mr. KENNEDY. If I could ask unanimous consent to ask him a question 
and retain the right to the floor.
  I was interested in what our rules of engagement will be for our men 
and

[[Page S3363]]

women in Iraq. I am concerned, as are many of the nongovernmental 
agencies, that if we go past Basra, if we let it alone for a period of 
48 hours--this is a community that is largely Shia, ruled by the 
Sunnis--I have heard estimates of up to 10,000 people being slaughtered 
there in bloodletting unless there is an immediate kind of police 
action and force presence which would keep these parties apart.
  I am wondering, in those circumstances, what will be the rules of 
engagement of American servicemen. Are they going to be called upon in 
terms of separating these blood feuds, which have been so much a part 
of these revolutions in Iraq? I want to know whether American 
servicemen are going to be instructed that they are to fire on the 
Iraqi people who are involved in these kinds of acts of violence. I am 
interested in what the rules of engagement will be for northern Iraq, 
if there should be a rush by the Kurds to go back to their old homes 
where, in many instances, families have lived for centuries and have 
been separated by Saddam Hussein. What are American troops going to be 
told to do when the Iraqi forces collapse and the Kurds make a rush to 
Kirkuk, for example, one of the great oil-producing areas? What are 
American service men and women going to be told to do? What will be the 
rules of engagement outside of just engaging with the Iraqi Army? What 
are going to be the rules of engagement in terms of maintaining 
civilian control?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I welcome the question from my colleague. 
He is a very valued member of the Armed Services Committee.
  We had briefings this week by the Department of Defense, and indeed a 
representative from the Department of State, on the plans now being 
formulated by the Bush administration, should force be necessary, as to 
exactly what we would do with respect to the questions raised by my 
colleague.
  First and foremost, our forces, as they would move in, are 
responsible for the objective of trying to keep Iraq together and 
constituted as a nation, as it is today. It is the elimination of 
weapons of mass destruction and the consequent regime change that are 
the goals. Now, they are to provide first protection for the 
nongovernmental organizations which stand ready to assist our country. 
In other words, we will be making an effort to feed and care for the 
people of Iraq, as well as outsiders. That is the highest priority. So 
we are to provide a secure framework in which the people of Iraq can be 
cared for as best they can under wartime conditions.
  With respect to factions in Iraq and their desire to fight among each 
other, we are going to do our best to contain that. Our goal is to have 
Iraq as a nation, with its present boundaries, remaining intact. We are 
bringing in experts to put out any fires Saddam Hussein may set at the 
oil wells. We are bringing in people to establish, as quickly as 
possible, a secure framework in which the people of Iraq can begin to 
select their own leadership and government in due course. So there has 
been a lot of planning.
  As to the exact rules of engagement that commanders, as the Senator 
and I understand, will issue to their troops, at the moment I do not 
have those orders. But I assure the Senator that we are contemplating 
the challenge to maintain the integrity of Iraq as a nation. That could 
well involve stopping the civil strife between factions. But a lot of 
planning has been done.
  I think the administration has been subjected to undue criticism 
because the planning as yet has not been fully made public. But it is 
there, I say to the Senator.
  Mr. KENNEDY. I appreciate the Senator's response. This is enormously 
important because we have seen in Kosovo and other areas where 
servicemen did not protect local populations because they did not have 
what they call the ``orders'' and the appropriate rules of engagement 
to provide those protections.
  We are on notice about what is going to happen now in northern Iraq, 
with the desire of Kurd families returning to many of their home 
communities. We are on notice about the southern part of Iraq, where 
many of the Shia who have been denied their cities and communities want 
to reclaim them. It seems to me we ought to have some understanding 
about what our servicemen are going to be asked to do during those 
periods. I don't understand, for the life of me, why we cannot know 
that information and cannot have that information.

  One more word. Why can we not say, if we are going to have these 
circumstances, these are going to be the rules of engagement? At least 
we need to have some awareness and understanding that we are going to 
meet our responsibilities under the Geneva Convention. We have an 
international responsibility, obviously, in terms of protecting 
civilian populations. We have seen, in Kosovo and Serbia, where those 
populations were not protected in a number of instances because the 
rules of engagement were not proper.
  I say to the chairman of the committee, I hope prior to the time we 
go to war, we will have at least some understanding about what these 
instructions are. There is no reason they need to be kept secure. If we 
are interested in avoiding large bloodletting in that region of the 
country, we ought to know exactly what we are expecting of our service 
men and women. They are the best in the world, and they are trained to 
overcome any military force.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I assure my colleague that we are greatly 
concerned about the safety of our service personnel as they undertake 
this mission, if it has to be done. I visited with them, together with 
Senators Levin, Rockefeller, and Roberts. They are ready.
  The Senator raises, quit properly, the record we had first in Kosovo. 
I happen to have visited there during the early part of that securing 
of it by the United States and other forces. I assure the Senator that 
the rules of engagement were spelled out. I remember American 
servicemen guarding the Serbian churches from destruction. I remember 
instances where they would carefully respond to protect the Serbs, who 
were at that point in time in minority status, so to speak. So we 
performed that mission, and we did it admirably, together with a 
coalition of nations.
  We will have other nations assisting us in this engagement. Then you 
bring about Afghanistan. That is a country, historically, that has been 
fought over by factions. We visited there a week or 10 days ago. There 
is relative quietude there. There is no severe amount of factional 
strife today; that is, outbursts of actual casualties and the like. 
Tensions are present. We are trying to reconstitute an armed forces 
under the Government of Afghanistan now. So we have a good track record 
on that.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Does the Senator want to explain, on the reconstituting 
of the armed forces, how successful that has been?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes. We met with President Karzai. I assume you saw him 
when he visited here. Incidentally, the French are very active in the 
training of those forces, and the Germans are taking an active role in 
the training of those forces. It is coming together, I say to the 
Senator.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Well, my information is somewhat different from the 
Senator's, in terms of the recruitment and the ability to hold these 
individuals into any kind of a national army.
  I want to finish with this point. We are facing a variety of security 
challenges in this country. My belief is the No. 1, which is 
continuing, is al-Qaida and the dangers of terrorism. We have to look 
at everything. We know Saddam Hussein is a despot. We know progress is 
being made. We also have on the scene the danger of North Korea and the 
imminent threat they present. We ought to be making a judgment about 
our national security interests, our overall security--the security of 
the American people within the construct of the dangers of al-Qaida, 
the threat that is posed in North Korea, and whatever the current 
situation is with the inspectors in Iraq.
  On that kind of a situation, I draw the conclusion that we should 
give more time to the inspectors and work to try to galvanize the 
international community to support us in that effort.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to also--if I may, on my 
time--address points raised by my colleague from Massachusetts. Quite 
properly, the Senator raises the issue of North Korea. The President 
addressed that last night.

[[Page S3364]]

  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record his comments.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       The PRESIDENT. We, of course, are consulting with our 
     allies at the United Nations. But I meant what I said, this 
     is the last phase of diplomacy. A little bit more time? 
     Saddam Hussein has had 12 years to disarm. He is deceiving 
     people. This is what's important for our fellow citizens to 
     realize; that if he really intended to disarm, like the world 
     has asked him to do, we would know whether he was disarming. 
     He's trying to buy time. I can understand why--he's been 
     successful with these tactics for 12 years.
       Saddam Hussein is a threat to our nation. September the 
     11th changed the strategic thinking, at least, as far as I 
     was concerned, for how to protect our country. My job is to 
     protect the American people. It used to be that we could 
     think that you could contain a person like Saddam Hussein, 
     that oceans would protect us from his type of terror. 
     September 11th should say to the American people that we're 
     now a battlefield, that weapons of mass destruction in the 
     hands of a terrorist organization could be deployed here at 
     home.
       So, therefore, I think the threat is real. And so do a lot 
     of other people in my government. And since I believe the 
     threat is real, and since my most important job is to protect 
     the security of the American people, that's precisely what 
     we'll do.

  Mr. WARNER. These are in strong rebuttal of my colleague's comments. 
I will read what the President said with reference to North Korea:

       Well, I think it is an issue. Obviously, I am concerned 
     about North Korea developing nuclear weapons, not only for 
     their own use, but perhaps choose to proliferate them, sell 
     them.

  The President is working in a national multilateral forum to try to 
address this problem because it is regional in that Russia, Japan, 
South Korea and, indeed, China have a heavy stake in seeing that the 
Korean peninsula does not become nuclearized.
  It is clear as that, I say to my friend, and I think the President, 
in a very responsible way, the initial approach to this, a multilateral 
approach, the approach my colleague is urging on the President with 
regard to Iraq, is applying in the Korean peninsula situation. It does 
not preclude possibly bilateral discussions at some later date and 
time.
  Second, on the issue of Iraq, the question is time, months. Time is 
not on our side. The President addressed this very explicitly last 
night in his remarks. He simply said that his concern--and I will put 
the text in the Record--his concern is, again, the question of 
proliferation.
  No one in this Chamber thus far, in the weeks and the months we have 
debated this issue, has denied Saddam Hussein has enormous caches of 
weapons of mass destruction which he has failed to declare and which 
the inspectors have failed to destroy because of the inability to 
locate them through lack of cooperation from Iraq.
  What is to prevent Saddam Hussein, if he has not already done it, 
from taking small amounts of these weapons and allowing an 
international terrorist organization, be it al-Qaida or others, to take 
this material and begin to carry it to places throughout the world, 
whether it be Europe or the United States, and dissemble it?
  I bring back the tragic aftermath of the discovery of anthrax sent to 
Members of this body. Postal employees lost their lives. One of our 
Senate office buildings was shut down. We suffered a severe blow as a 
consequence of an unopened envelope which contained but a few ounces, 
if that, of this material. And Saddam Hussein, it is documented, has 
tons of it, undeclared, not found, and all of this could have been 
achieved if he had cooperated with the inspection regime which was 
initiated in November of last year.
  Time is not on our side. The failure of the United States and the 
coalition of willing nations, principally Great Britain, not to act is 
not in our interest. The price of inaction is far greater than the 
price of action.
  As I listened to my colleague from Massachusetts--and he has spoken 
very eloquently on these subjects over the past several days. I admire 
his courage to get out and lead in this debate. It is an important 
debate. It is taking place across the Nation. But I cannot find in my 
colleague's comments where he specifically has a program whereby to 
force Iraq to cooperate. Why is it that he has not emphasized the need 
for Iraq to cooperate and what steps should our country, Great Britain, 
or others do to force that cooperation, other than the steps we have 
taken thus far, which have not proved fruitful?
  Yes, here and there Saddam Hussein steps up and does some little 
thing to buy time, but he would not have needed that time if he had 
cooperated and began that cooperation when the inspection regime began 
last November. Mr. President, wherein does the Senator lay out a 
program to compel Iraq to cooperate?
  Mr. KENNEDY. Let me answer, if I may, in this way. First of all, the 
administration was strongly opposed to inspections. I heard the 
exchange with my friend and colleague from Connecticut. That is very 
clear. Secretary Rumsfeld said it. They never believed in inspections, 
No. 1.
  Then they agreed to the inspection process at the United Nations. It 
is only today, evidently, when the CIA is giving the inspectors all the 
information we have.
  The Senator from Virginia attended the Armed Services Committee 
hearings that I attended where our colleague and friend from Michigan, 
Senator Levin, pointed out time and again that the administration and 
the CIA had still not provided all of the material on intelligence to 
the inspectors. But all during this time, the administration was 
saying: Let's go to war; let's go to war; let's go to war; Saddam isn't 
complying.

  Now the Senator--and I have not had a chance to look at the 
document--says the record is clear, and he put the document in the 
Record an hour ago, that finally we are giving everything to the 
inspectors. Today, we had the leader of the inspection team say he 
believes they can do the job not in weeks, not in years but in some 
months. The international community says: We will be with you if you 
can do that in a period of months.
  My position is, it is better to work the international community to 
try and do it in weeks--if we cannot, do it in months. It is cheaper in 
terms of treasure and human life to keep the necessary military force 
there to make sure it is done.
  That is my position, I say to the Senator. I know we differ on some 
aspects, but we do not differ on the willingness to give to the 
inspectors the intelligence information.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say to my good friend, a couple of 
letters are about to be handed to him. They are in the Record. He is 
mistaken in the facts. The letters cite what we have done over an 
extensive period of time--over the last 3 or 4 months. I personally, 
together with the former chairman, Senator Levin, now ranking member of 
the Armed Services Committee, have consulted with Director Tenet on 
this matter. We have been in a room with the actual person entrusted to 
convey on a daily basis to Hans Blix this information. It has been 
going on for months. It did not just start.
  Let me read one paragraph, and then I will yield.

       Statement for the record: The American intelligence 
     community has--

  That is past tense--

     has provided extensive intelligence and other support to the 
     United Nations on Iraq and WMD, and potential inspection 
     sites for over 10 years. There is, therefore, a very strong 
     common understanding of sites of potential interest to the 
     inspectors, whether UNSCOM inspectors or UNMOVIC inspectors 
     or IAEA inspectors. When the current round of inspections 
     began, the Intelligence Community assembled several lists of 
     suspect sites, which we combined into a common list in early 
     January. This list consisted of high, moderate, and low value 
     sites, depending on our assessment of recent activities 
     suggesting ongoing WMD association or other intelligence 
     information that the sites were worth inspecting.

  We have now provided detailed information on all of the high value 
and moderate value sites to UNMOVIC and IAEA.
  The letter continues to detail what has been done over a period of 
months, I say to the Senator. It just did not start yesterday.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator yield on this point? First of all, I 
will put in the Record--and the Senator was there--the exchange between 
Senator Levin and Secretary Rumsfeld. The Senator from Virginia was at 
the Armed Services Committee meeting. I remember this meeting--it was 
2\1/2\ weeks ago--when Senator Levin said the briefing he had and the 
answers he

[[Page S3365]]

had from the intelligence community were not consistent with Secretary 
Rumsfeld.
  I am going to put that exchange in the Record, and that will stand in 
terms of 3 weeks ago.
  I want to draw attention to this letter. ``The American intelligence 
community has provided extensive intelligence''--extensive 
intelligence. It does not say ``all'' or ``complete intelligence.'' It 
says ``extensive intelligence.'' That is what my letter says.
  Mr. WARNER. Go on to the second paragraph.
  Mr. KENNEDY. I know, but why do they say--I will be glad to read this 
and go through it, Mr. President, but I want to stick with the facts I 
know about. The facts I know about are the testimony of the Secretary 
of Defense and the exchange that he had with Senator Levin in open 
session in the Armed Services Committee where Senator Levin had been 
told the evening before, and it was represented that a complete list of 
these sites had been provided, and he had the materials that 
demonstrated it had not been complete. Those are security matters, as 
the Senator well knows. That was 2\1/2\ weeks ago.
  The point is, as to the intelligence given to the inspector, whatever 
has been given, is it the Senator's statement now as chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee that all of the information the intelligence 
agency has in terms of weapons has been given to the inspectors? Is 
that what the Senator is telling us?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think this letter answers Senator 
Kennedy's first statement: We have just begun to provide information.
  Mr. KENNEDY. I did not say ``just begun.'' No, the Senator is not 
correct. There was a provision, there was a filtering out of this 
material.
  It was very slow in January. We are getting close to classified. I 
remember the briefing we had from the deputy of the CIA at that time. 
It was clear they were cooperating. It was also clear there were a 
limited number of inspectors and they were going to provide more, and 
it would be soon. I think the Senator would remember that briefing. I 
remember it clearly. This has been a process of filtering out.
  The authority I have, I sat right next to Carl Levin, 2\1/2\ weeks 
ago, when he looked in the eyes of the Secretary of Defense and they 
reviewed documents, and the Secretary of Defense leaned over and shared 
various documents. At the end of that, he had to agree with the 
position Senator Levin had, that all of the information had not been 
provided. I will put that in the Record.
  My point is, if we still, 2\1/2\ weeks ago, had a ways to go with 
intelligence information that would be advantageous to the inspectors, 
it strengthens those who believe we should make sure our inspectors 
have all of the relevant material that will help them do the job which 
we all agree should be done.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in fairness, this letter is part of a very 
complex and long dialog between Senator Levin and various members of 
the administration. Were he here today, he would say he is still not 
satisfied with regard to this issue.
  At one point I recognized that one member of the administration said 
to him, Senator, I gave you incorrect numbers at one time and I am now 
correcting them. I think a good-faith effort has been made by the 
administration to resolve such differences as Senator Levin has had.
  Having been in most, if not all, of the discussions with Senator 
Levin at the time he raised these important questions, the 
preponderance of the facts shows unequivocally our Nation has 
cooperated fully on the matters of intelligence. I stand by that. I 
heard the National Security Adviser state that, the Director of Central 
Intelligence state that, and others. We have cooperated.
  Have there been some disjoints of timing and perhaps numbers? I 
cannot say it is perfect, but there has been overall sincere 
cooperation.
  We have had an excellent debate today. I thank my colleagues for 
joining me on the floor, both on my side of the aisle and the other 
side of the aisle. We have met the test of the Senate addressing this 
question.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sununu). The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________