[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 36 (Thursday, March 6, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3221-S3244]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
MOSCOW TREATY--Continued
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I believe we are considering the Moscow
Treaty.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. CRAIG. I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business
for no longer than 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CRAIG. I see my chairman here. I want to make sure it is OK with
him. It is.
(The remarks of Mr. Craig are printed in today's Record under
``Morning Business.'')
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 252
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, in a few moments, I will send an amendment
to the desk. Before I do so, I will make some general comments on the
Moscow Treaty which is before the Senate.
I first wish to congratulate and commend our good friends from
Indiana and Delaware for their great work on this treaty. As on so many
other issues, they have worked together well in the national interest.
The document which is before us, as well as the Resolution of
Ratification, represents a lot of significant work on their part. I
applaud them for it.
The treaty before us is a modest but a positive step in the United
States-Russia relationship. It is particularly important we have this
treaty. At some point it was suggested the agreement not be in the form
of a treaty. As a matter of fact, the administration finally decided--I
think wisely so, and I believe with the support of the chairman and
ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee--that we have a
legally binding treaty rather than relying on unilateral steps that are
not binding on future administrations and can be easily changed.
Having a treaty ensures that the Senate is going to be able to
fulfill its constitutional role, giving due consideration of any treaty
and providing advice and consent before ratification.
I view this treaty as a starting point for further nuclear arms
reductions and a useful boost to our new and developing and evolving
relationship with Russia. There is much more work to be done to
continue to improve our mutual security with Russia, and that work
includes further reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons, reducing
nuclear proliferation dangers, and improving confidence, transparency,
and cooperation with Russia on nuclear weapon matters.
This treaty, while important, is also somewhat unusual. Its central
obligation is that both nations will reduce their operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between
[[Page S3222]]
1,700 and 2,200 some 10 years from now. There are no gradual steps. It
is just at a moment in time, 10 years from now, that level of between
1,700 and 2,200 must be reached. It could be a reduction in the
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads for a very brief
period, providing 10 years from the date of ratification that level is
reached, and then the treaty expires.
Contrary to numerous media reports, this treaty does not require
reductions in nuclear warhead stockpiles or delivery systems. In fact,
it does not require the elimination of a single warhead. Under this
treaty, both sides can simply remove warheads from land-based or
submarine-based missiles and from bombers. Both sides are free to keep
every warhead so removed and to store these warheads indefinitely for
possible redeployment. The only limitations that will bind the United
States and Russia are the limitations on nuclear weapon delivery
systems under START I, and that is at least until 2009.
After December 5, 2009, when the START I treaty is scheduled to
expire, it is not clear what will happen. At least in the case of START
I, the delivery systems must be destroyed.
As the Senate fulfills its constitutionally mandated role in the
treaty process and considers whether to provide its advice and consent
to the ratification of the Moscow Treaty, there are a number of
questions about the proper role of the Senate in the treaty-making
process. These are questions to which I know our managers--our chairman
and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee--have given a
great deal of time, attention, and thought, and many others in the
Senate have as well.
Some of these questions are as follows:
Do we want to agree to ratify a treaty if the executive branch does
not clearly commit itself to submitting a substantive change in that
treaty as an amendment to the Senate for its advice and consent? And do
we want to approve a treaty where there is doubt that the executive
branch could extend or withdraw from the treaty without even notifying
or consulting with the Senate, without that guarantee, that commitment
being written into a Resolution of Ratification?
These are highly significant questions that apply to the treaty-
making power and to the advice and consent power of the United States.
I want to address those issues in the amendments that I have to offer
this afternoon.
The first amendment deals specifically with the question of whether
the Resolution of Ratification should provide that the Senate must be
notified and consulted prior to the withdrawal from that treaty or the
agreement to extend that treaty by the President of the United States.
Article 4, paragraph 2 of the treaty states that this treaty shall
remain in force until December 31, 2012, and may be extended by
agreement of the parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent
agreement.
Paragraph 3 of article 4 states:
Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may
withdraw from this Treaty upon three months written notice to
the other Party.
These are somewhat unusual provisions, as are the administration's
statements about them. Previously, extending a treaty was considered
something that would require Senate advice and consent.
In the seminal study written in 2001 by the Congressional Research
Service for the Foreign Relations Committee called ``Treaties and Other
International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate,'' the
issue of extending treaties is clearly presented:
Modifying and extending an international agreement amount
to the making of a new agreement that should be done by the
same method as the original agreement. For treaties, this
means with the advice and the consent of the Senate.
In its article-by-article analysis of the Moscow Treaty, the
administration asserts that ``Extension of the Treaty is not automatic
and must be done by agreement of the parties.''
The article-by-article analysis continues, with the administration
writing:
Since such an extension is authorized by Treaty, it would
constitute an agreement pursuant to the Treaty and would
accordingly not be subject to Senate advice and consent.
That is the extension issue.
On the matter of treaty withdrawal, the administration's article-by-
article analysis states:
Unlike some other arms control agreements, this withdrawal
clause is not tied to a party's determination that
extraordinary circumstances jeopardizing its supreme national
interests exist. Rather, the Moscow Treaty includes a more
general formulation that allows greater flexibility for each
party to respond to unforeseen circumstances.
So the withdrawal clause permits either party to withdraw from the
treaty for any reason short of a supreme national interest.
The Resolution of Ratification addresses this issue of withdrawal or
extension with a declaration numbered 6, which:
Urges the President to consult with the Senate prior to
taking actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of article IV of
the treaty.
So the resolution before us, and before my amendment is considered,
simply urges the President--it is precatory language that says, Mr.
President, we urge you, whether it is you or your successor, to consult
with the Senate prior to taking the actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or
3, the extension or the withdrawal from a treaty.
The declaration urges the President to consult with the Senate, but
it does not protect the interests of the Senate because it is not
binding. A President--this President or his successor--could simply
decide to extend or withdraw from this treaty without notice or
consultation with the Senate.
The U.S. should not either enter into a treaty or withdraw from a
treaty lightly and either action--either entering into a treaty,
withdrawing from a treaty, or extending a treaty's operations--should
be done only with the involvement of the Senate. We have to give our
advice and consent to permit ratification in the first place.
We, the Members of this Senate, have the responsibility to assure
that involvement. That constitutional responsibility rests in our
hands, and we should not leave that constitutional mandate and
responsibility up to the discretion of the executive branch. We want
the executive branch to consult, and we are going to urge them to
consult in a Resolution of Ratification. The question is whether we are
going to require that resolution. Barring some circumstances, which I
will describe in a minute, we are going to require a chief executive to
consult with this body, to give us notice, and to consult, not to seek
ratification--that is a second-degree amendment which my friend from
Wisconsin will be offering in a moment--but the proposal in my
amendment is that we simply require there be notice and consultation of
the Senate before there is withdrawal from a treaty which we have
ratified, or extension of a treaty which we have ratified. That is the
least we can do. That is a middle course, short of saying we have to
ratify an extension or withdrawal, which I think is also an appropriate
course of action which has been much debated over the years. Short of
that, which it seems to me is a matter which is going to be of some
debate between the executive and legislative branch, I think a middle
course, which we all ought to be able to agree upon, is that a
Resolution of Ratification require there be notice to the Senate so we
can exercise whatever action we decide to take at that point--no
guarantee that we would have to ratify it before it actually occurs but
assurance we will be given notice and an opportunity to give our
advice, or take whatever action we want, prior to the withdrawal from a
treaty or prior to the life of the treaty being extended.
The amendment I am going to be offering is very straightforward. I do
not know if this amendment is at the desk. If not, I will send it on
behalf of myself, Senator Feingold, and Senator Akaka, and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for himself, Mr.
Feingold, and Mr. Akaka, proposes an amendment numbered 252.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
[[Page S3223]]
(Purpose: To provide an additional condition requiring notice and
consultations prior to withdrawal from, or extension of, the Treaty)
At the end of section 2, add the following new condition:
(3) Notice and consultations prior to withdrawal or
extension.--(A) Prior to taking any action relevant to
paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article IV of the Treaty, and except as
provided in subparagraph (B), the President shall--
(i) provide not less than 60 days advance notice of such
action to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(ii) consult with the Senate on such action.
(B) The President may waive a requirement in subparagraph
(A) if the President--
(i) determines that national security needs prevent the
President from meeting the requirement; and
(ii) submits to the committees of the Senate referred to in
subparagraph (A) a written notice of the waiver, including a
description of the national security needs and the reasons
justifying the waiver.
In section 3, strike declaration (6).
Mr. LEVIN. I will explain it at this point. This amendment is
straightforward. It says that prior to taking any action to extend or
withdraw from this treaty, the President shall provide not less than 60
days' notice to the Senate and shall consult with the Senate.
Now, what happens if there is some national security need which
prevents the President from providing such notice or consultation? The
amendment foresees that possibility and has a waiver provision in case
there is some unforeseen national security need that would prevent the
President from immediately requiring to notify and consult with the
Senate. So there is considerable flexibility given to the President if
it is needed for national security reasons.
There has been a lot written about whether or not the Senate must
actually ratify a withdrawal from a treaty. There has been much debate
on that subject. In a Congressional Research treatise on treaties,
written in 1993 and then republished more recently with the same
language, this is what the Research Service says about the issue of
withdrawal from a treaty and the Senate role in that process, that the
U.S. Constitution is silent with respect to the power to terminate
treaties. The matter is not discussed in the debates of the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. Briefly:
While the Constitution tells us who can make treaties, the
President shall have the power, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to make treaties.
It does not say who can unmake them. As a consequence of the
Constitution's silence in this regard, there has been some confusion of
doctrine upon this point and a variety in practice.
A little later on in this study, the Congressional Research Service
says the same: Whether the President alone can terminate a treaty's
domestic effect remains an open question. As a practical matter,
however, the President may exercise this power since the courts have
held that they are conclusively bound by an executive determination
with regard to whether a treaty is still in effect. The same result may
apply to a congressional termination, particularly if it is regarded as
a declaration of war.
So according to the Congressional Research Service, the issue of
whether the President alone can terminate a treaty is an open question.
This amendment does not intend to resolve that question. A second-
degree amendment, however, will be offered which will address that
issue. My amendment does not. My amendment simply says--and it seems to
me this is a very modest amount of protection for the Senate's
constitutional responsibility in the treaty-making process--unless
there is some national security reason why you cannot give notice to
the Senate that you are intending to withdraw or extend the treaty,
give us 60 days' notice so we can take whatever action we deem is
appropriate, so we can give consultation and advice on the question of
withdrawal or extension. It does not prevent the administration from
extending or withdrawing from the treaty. It does not--``it'' being my
amendment--require Senate approval of extension, even though that is
the policy and practice to date often as elaborated by that study.
It does not require Senate approval of withdrawal from a treaty. It
simply says the President shall notify and consult with the Senate
before extending or withdrawing from the treaty.
This amendment is consistent with what the Foreign Relations
Committee wrote in its report about the treaty relative to the issue of
consultation on arms control treaties. It is a very thorough report.
The committee that we have before us, on page 22, says the following:
The Senate and this committee have an institutional
interest in the close observation of arms control
negotiations and the successful implementation of resulting
agreements. Past administrations have recognized that
consultations with the Senate prior to taking actions
relating to assigning, amending, or withdrawing from such
agreements may avert serious disagreements.
On the specific question of withdrawal, the committee report says:
Should it become necessary for a party to withdraw from the treaty,
article 4 provides for 3 months' notice of such a decision. Events can
well occur between submissions of the annual report required in
condition 2 that would warrant informing and consulting with the
Senate. In any circumstance, the Senate would desire notification and
consultation.
So the parties, the two countries involved, must give each other 3
months' notice prior to the withdrawal. But relative to the Senate, the
report simply says the Senate would desire notification and
consultation.
I could not agree more with that statement: ``desire.'' But it is not
enough to say we desire a consultation. If we are going to protect the
constitutional responsibilities of this body, we must assure our
constitutional responsibility and the operation of treaties is going to
be protected and our role under the Constitution is, in fact, honored--
not just honored in the breach but in the actual life of the treaty. I
believe this is the minimum we should do.
We should write into our Resolution of Ratification a requirement in
the absence of some national security reason that the President,
whoever the President might be at the time, do give us the notice and
give us the opportunity to take whatever action or consult as we deem
might be appropriate relative to the issue of withdrawal or extension
of this treaty prior to the administration making that decision giving
that notice to the other party to this treaty.
The amendment is consistent with what the administration says it is
willing to do. Secretary Powell stated: While it is the President who
withdraws from treaties, the administration intends to discuss any need
to withdraw from the treaty with the Congress, to include the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, prior to announcing any such action.
That is a welcome statement of intent. We should incorporate that
assurance. We should enshrine that assurance. We should embody that
assurance. Intentions and administrations change. The obligation of
this body to the Constitution endures. It is a solemn responsibility.
It does not change. The intention of the President or a new President
with new intentions changes. Language of the Constitution, relative to
what this body's responsibility is relevant to treaties, is unchanging.
This amendment simply requires notification and consultation which
Secretary Powell and the committee indicate they want and would expect
would happen. It simply assures that, in fact, in the absence of some
national security need, which is unexpected, which would permit a
waiver of the notice requiring that a President would notify this body
before withdrawal or extension of a treaty would occur.
The committee report concludes that: Declaration (6), while not
binding on the President, is a formal request that the executive branch
maintain the consultation policy enunciated in the Secretary of State's
answer to the question--which I gave above that the administration
intends to discuss. That is what the committee report says Declaration
(6) provides, which is in the Resolution of Ratification. It is a
request to the executive branch. That is not strong enough in terms of
our obligations to the Constitution and to our responsibility relative
to the treaty-making power.
If we want to really assure what we are requesting is, in fact, part
of the operation of this treaty, we should include in this Resolution
of Ratification a condition which my amendment offers, which is that
the President would
[[Page S3224]]
do what the committee said it really wants and really desires and
really urges, to use the words of the report, and that is to notify,
consult with the Senate prior to taking action to withdraw from or
extend a treaty.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
Amendment No. 253 to Amendment No. 252
Mr. FEINGOLD. I compliment the Senator from Michigan for his
tremendous leadership on this issue.
I rise today to add my thoughts to the debate on the first arms
control treaty between the United States and Russia during the 21st
century, and to offer an amendment that will reaffirm the role of the
Senate in the treaty extension and withdrawal process.
When the Senate adopts this resolution of ratification, as I expect
that it will be a wide margin, the Moscow Treaty will be on its way to
becoming the law of the land, and the Senate will have fulfilled its
constitutional responsibility to provide advice and consent to its
ratification.
As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I believe that we
covered a lot of ground in the series of hearings that the Committee
had to examine this brief, 3-page document last year, and that we
explored a number of the concerns that I and a number of members of the
Committee and of the Senate have regarding the issues of compliance and
verification, the lack of a timetable for the reductions required by
the treaty, the fact that this treaty does not require that any nuclear
warheads actually be destroyed, and a number of other important issues.
I continue to be troubled by the language contained in article IV of
the Moscow Treaty regarding the process by which one of the Parties may
withdraw from this treaty. I am concerned that either of the Parties
would be able to withdraw with only 3 months' written notice and
without a reason. And unlike other arms control treaties, the Moscow
Treaty does not require that the Parties cite ``supreme national
interest'' upon announcing withdrawal. In fact, this concept is not
even mentioned in article IV.
As my colleagues may recall, I found the President's decision to
unilaterally withdraw the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty last year troubling on both policy and constitutional
grounds. I discussed this issue at some length with Secretaries Powell
and Rumsfeld during the Foreign Relations Committee's hearings on this
treaty last year, and I am troubled by the administration's contention
that consultation with and approval by the Senate would not be required
to withdraw from the Moscow Treaty.
I agree with the Senator from Michigan. The Senate has a
constitutional role to play in treaty withdrawal, and I am concerned
that the administration is not taking seriously our role in this
process.
While I recognize that Declaration (6) in the resolution before the
Senate today urges the President to consult with this body prior to
withdrawing from the Moscow Treaty, I am concerned that there is no
specific requirement for such consultation.
So, Mr. President, I send a second-degree amendment to the desk and I
ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Feingold] proposes an
amendment numbered 253 to amendment No. 252.
Mr. FEINGOLD. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment
be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To modify the condition)
At the end of the proposed condition, add the following:
(C) Prior to taking any action relevant to paragraphs 2 or
3 of Article IV of the Treaty, the President shall obtain the
approval of two thirds of the Senators present.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the second-degree amendment that I offer
today would add to the underlying Levin amendment a provision that
would require the President to obtain the approval of two-thirds of the
Senate before withdrawing from or extending this treaty.
Mr. President, Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that
the President ``shall have the Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided that two thirds of
the Senators present concur. . . .''
The Senator from Michigan pointed out in his remarks that the
Constitution is silent on the process by which the United States can
withdraw from a treaty, and the record in the Congress and the
executive branch is mixed. However, I believe and I think many others
believe the intent of the Framers as explained by Thomas Jefferson is
clear. In section 52 of Jefferson's Manual, he writes:
Treaties are legislative acts. A treaty is the law of the
land. It differs from other laws only as it must have the
consent of a foreign nation, being but a contract with
respect to that nation.
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution states that the President
shall:
take Care that the laws be faithfully executed. . . .
Jefferson continues:
Treaties being declared, equally with the laws of the
United States, to be the supreme law of the land, it is
understood that an act of the legislature alone can declare
them infringed and rescinded. This was accordingly the
process adopted in the case of France in 1798.
It is worth noting, that four signers of the Constitution were
serving in Congress when this first treaty termination occurred--by an
Act of Congress--in 1798, just 11 years after the Constitutional
Convention.
It is clear to me, as it was to Thomas Jefferson, that the Senate has
a constitutional role to play in terminating treaties. Since the advice
and consent of the Senate is required to enter into a treaty, this body
should at a minimum be consulted before the President makes the
decision to withdraw this country from a treaty, and especially from a
treaty of this magnitude.
As Jefferson noted, a treaty is equal with a law. A law cannot be
declared to be repealed by the President alone. Only an Act of Congress
can repeal a law. Action by the Senate or the Congress should be
required to terminate a treaty. Anything less could tip the scale
dangerously in favor of the executive branch.
That said, I recognize it is unlikely that my amendment would be
adopted, or that the President would agree to move forward with this
process if my amendment were included in this resolution of
ratification, but I very much thought we ought to make this point on
the floor of this body that is charged by the Constitution with this
responsibility. It is a responsibility which I believe was intended by
the Founders, that we act specifically with a two-thirds vote to
withdraw from a treaty.
Amendment No. 253 To Amendment No. 252, Withdrawn
In light of the reality here, I now withdraw my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment is
withdrawn.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I regret that this Treaty will move
forward without a requirement for a Senate vote on its abrogation or
extension, but I do express my support for the amendment offered by the
Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin, of which I am pleased to be a
cosponsor. I also want to thank the Senator for his work on this
important issue.
The Levin amendment is consistent with my view that the Senate
should--at a minimum--be consulted if the President decides to withdraw
from or extend this treaty in the future. I believe that this is a step
in the right direction, and I urge my colleagues to support the Levin
amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment
offered by the distinguished Senator from Michigan. I do so reluctantly
because of my high regard for the Senator and his work on arms control,
which has been indefatigable. His wisdom I respect.
As a rule, we are on the same side. I, however, wish to oppose the
amendment for the reasons I will relate in this testimony. I read, in
my opening statement yesterday, words that the Foreign Relations
Committee addressed to this issue in the Resolution of Ratification.
The Senator has referenced that fact.
[[Page S3225]]
It was drafted by us in an attempt to address concerns put forward by
the Senator from Michigan, the Senator from Wisconsin, and others
regarding the treaty's withdrawal clause contained in article 4.
Our text is based on Secretary Powell's commitment to consult with
the Senate should the President consider the utilization of the
withdrawal provision.
It is worth repeating, especially in light of the amendment offered
today, the answer Secretary Powell submitted for the record on the
issue of treaty withdrawal. The Foreign Relations Committee asked the
Secretary:
What role will the Congress have in any decision to
withdraw from this treaty?
Will the administration agree to at least consult closely
with this committee--
That is the Foreign Relations Committee--
before making any such decision?
The Secretary responded:
While it is the President who withdraws from treaties, the
administration intends to discuss any need to withdraw from
the treaty with the Congress, to include the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee prior to announcing any such action.
This was a carefully considered answer of Secretary Powell for the
record.
Past Senate consideration of this issue has resulted in the view that
one of the bases on which a President may terminate a treaty without
congressional participation is when a decision to withdraw is taken in
conformity with the provisions of the treaty. The Moscow Treaty, as it
stands, provides for this.
I am aware of Senators' concerns and arguments about the need to
insert the Senate into the process. Many of the arguments we have heard
about withdrawal stem from President Bush's decision to withdraw from
the ABM Treaty. That decision was taken in full compliance with the
terms of the ABM Treaty. The President made no secret about his desire
to do so, and Congress held innumerable hearings and public statements
about the need to take the action.
I am sympathetic to arguments from Senators regarding the need to
maintain Senate prerogatives. The process governing termination and
withdrawal is a point of constitutional debate. Although the
Constitution assigns a specific role for the Senate in the treaty
ratification process, it is silent on the issue of treaty termination.
Furthermore, nothing in the Constitution restricts the President from
terminating or withdrawing from a treaty on his own authority.
Presidents have consistently terminated advice and consent treaties
on their own authority since 1980. Twenty-three of the thirty treaties
terminated during this period were bilateral; seven of these treaties
were multilateral, all of them terminated by the President.
Prior to 1980, Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona challenged
President Carter's termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan. Senator Goldwater's challenge failed and the treaty was
terminated.
The White House legal adviser has long argued that the President is
the principal spokesman of the Nation in foreign affairs, and
restrictions on that power have been strictly construed. Given the
absence of a textual basis conferring the termination power on another
branch or an established practice derogating from the President's
termination power, it is difficult to envision such a role for the
Senate.
Proponents of a senatorial role in this process will often respond by
suggesting that the President cannot, on his own authority, terminate a
treaty because it is the law of the land. Again, the White House
suggests this is a fallacy. A terminated treaty no longer has effect in
much the same way that a provision of a law or treaty found by the
courts to be unconstitutional no longer has effect. However, in neither
case is the law repealed.
Historically, there is evidence of only one instance in which the
Senate sought by a resolution of advice and consent to limit the
President's constitutional power to terminate a treaty. The first
condition to the 1919 proposed resolution of advice and consent to
ratification of the Versailles Treaty would have provided:
Notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a
concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.
On that occasion, the Vice President of the United States, Thomas
Marshall, addressing the Senate before the vote, called the condition
an unconstitutional limitation on the President's powers, a view with
which a number of leading scholars of the day concurred. The resolution
failed to receive the required two-thirds vote and the question has
remained moot for the better part of a century--I might say, until
today.
Beyond the legal issues that underlie this debate, some have
expressed concern that article 4 differs from previous arms control
agreements in that it only requires 3 months' notice and permits
withdrawal based upon issues related to national sovereignty. Critics
point out the START treaty allows the parties to withdraw after giving
6 months' notice, and only ``if it decides that extraordinary events
related to the subject of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme
interest.''
The withdrawal clause is reflective of the changed nature of our
relationship with Russia, not a desire to rob the Senate of its role in
the treaty-making process. As the administration's article-by-article
analysis sent to the Senate with the treaty states--this is the
analysis by the administration as it submits the treaty:
Unlike some other arms control agreements, the withdrawal
clause is not tied to a Party's determination that
extraordinary circumstances jeopardizing its supreme national
interests exist. Rather, the Moscow Treaty includes a more
general formulation that allows greater flexibility for each
Party to respond to unforeseen circumstances.
Indeed, as we have related in this debate, the Moscow Treaty arose
from a desire on the part of the United States unilaterally to destroy
its nuclear weapons and likewise a similar desire by the Russians.
Finding these coincident interests, they have joined in this treaty;
nevertheless, there is no timetable. Some critics have pointed out that
the nature of this treaty is substantially different. It is one that
comes from the volition of the two without specific verification
procedures.
I do not view the withdrawal provisions as a weakness in the treaty.
Instead, I believe it is another manifestation of the improved U.S.-
Russian relationship. It should also be pointed out that our bilateral
relationship provides us with some confidence that the time and reasons
for withdrawal would not necessarily relate to the agreement. As the
Secretary of State told the Committee: ``The Moscow Treaty's
formulation for withdrawal reflects the likelihood that a decision to
withdraw would be prompted by causes unrelated either to the Treaty or
to our bilateral relationship. We believe this formulation more
appropriately reflects our much-improved strategic relationship with
Russia.''
In sum Mr. President, I was hopeful that our resolution of
ratification would have resolved this issue. For the benefit of the
Senate let me again read the text of our resolution of ratification.
Given the Senate's continuing interest in the Treaty and in
continuing strategic offensive reductions to the lowest
possible levels consistent with national security
requirements and alliance obligations of the United States,
the Senate urges the President to consult with the Senate
prior to taking actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 or
Article IV of the Treaty.
This text was negotiated closely with Administration officials with
the goal of striking a compromise that would preserve Senate
prerogatives while not infringing upon the power provided to the
President by the Constitution. I believe we succeeded in doing so.
For these reasons, I oppose the amendment, and I urge my colleagues
to do so as well.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cornyn). The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me begin by saying I agree with the
Senator from Michigan as well as my colleague from Wisconsin in that I
believe--and, as the old joke goes, I have history to prove it--that
the Senate has in the treaty power in the treaty clause of the U.S.
Constitution an equal responsibility with the President of the United
States.
As the old joke goes, if you want to learn a subject, teach it. For
the last 10 years, I have been teaching a three-credit course at the
Widener University Law School on Saturday mornings on separation of
powers issues. In one of
[[Page S3226]]
the three parts of the course, ``What is treaty power? And who has what
authority under the Constitution?'' I come down clearly on the side
that the Senate has the authority to insist that any extension, or
withdrawal, for that matter, from a treaty be confirmed by the Senate.
We have a right to do that, I believe. But it is an open constitutional
question.
I will, unless we are ready to go to a second amendment, be happy to
take a few minutes and go through what I believe to be constitutional
law and history on this point.
Let me cut through that for a moment and go to the place where I
think it is not worth the fight on this particular treaty. I believe
this treaty is so open ended and so, in some sense, amorphous and rests
so much upon not merely the goodwill--I assume goodwill on the part of
the administration--but on the intensity with which the administration
believes this treaty should come to fruition that a provision that
marginally increases the substance of the possibility of a substantive
outcome which I support--which is getting down to 1,700 or below
2,200--that to jeopardize this treaty that rests on an awful lot on
good faith over a genuinely serious constitutional fight which I think
someday has to be resolved, that it is not worth the candle on this
treaty and may in fact in turn, if we were to prevail--and I don't
think we have the votes to prevail, but if we did prevail on this--
would be sufficient in my view for this administration to not pursue
through the treaty mechanism this agreement.
I want to remind everybody, the administration made it clear from the
outset that they did not want a treaty. They did not want to have to
come back to us with this treaty.
Because of the steadfastness of Senator Helms, we agreed on the
principle that we would insist that any agreement--we knew it was being
negotiated in Moscow--be brought back before the Senate.
So my concern is that this agreement, which the administration
unilaterally and bilaterally supports--that is, with the Russians or
without the Russians, and they don't really much care what we think
about it anyway, whether it be in terms of a treaty--that they would be
prepared to walk away from this over a genuine, legitimate,
significant, constitutional issue and debate.
White House Counsel in this administration and in Democratic
administrations who have suggested that Senator Feingold, Senator
Levin, and I are wrong about the prerogative of the Senate, I suggest,
would be inclined to say to the President: You are going to do this
anyway unilaterally--that is, move down to these ranges--you have said
you are going to do it anyway; the treaty is so loose, it doesn't bind
you much at all anyway; forget the treaty; just proceed on this course,
and don't sign onto this principle on this fight.
I was asked by the press how I could not be willing to go to the wall
on this issue since I was the guy who went to the wall that resulted in
the so-called Biden condition on interpretation of treaties, which was
initially added to the INF Treaty in 1988. There was a simple reason.
There was a lot more at stake in that treaty in terms of the
substantive impact upon the strategic balance and doctrine. We also had
a circumstance where the administration very much wanted that treaty.
And it was an opportunity to set in law, in principle, the principles
of treaty interpretation.
So it was worth the fight, the stakes were high enough, and the
administration was not likely to reject the underlying treaty if it
passed, which it did. That is the practical distinction I would make.
But let me speak just another 5 minutes or so to the constitutional
side of this argument. Although it is not specified in the
Constitution, I believe there is a concurrent power both the President
and the Senate have; and that is, the power with regard to the
termination of a treaty.
Our history for over 200 years of practice is, though, decidedly
mixed. At various times in our history, the Congress has directed or
authorized the President to terminate a treaty.
On a few occasions, the Senate alone has done that, terminated a
treaty. The President has terminated a treaty without prior
congressional authorization but then received subsequent approval by
the Congress and the Senate. And the President has terminated treaties
unilaterally.
For example, Presidents have done so with several commercial treaties
in the first half of the 20th century. President Lyndon Johnson gave
notice of his intent to have the United States withdraw from a
multilateral treaty on international aviation known as the Warsaw
Convention. Although this notice was subsequently withdrawn, the
Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the treaty at issue, and
did not challenge President Johnson's power to withdraw from it.
More recently, President Carter unilaterally terminated the Mutual
Defense Treaty with Taiwan in connection with diplomatic recognition of
the People's Republic of China. President Carter also gave notice of
the termination of several other treaties, most related to immigration.
President Clinton withdrew from multilateral agreements, including our
membership in the United Nations's Industrial Development Organization.
The question of who has the power to terminate a treaty has never
been definitively resolved by the Supreme Court. President Carter's
decision to terminate the Taiwan Treaty was challenged by several of
our Republican colleagues, and that case reached the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court decision, though, does not provide much legal precedent,
though perhaps it gives us some guidance as to how the Court might rule
today.
In Goldwater v. Carter--that was the case about withdrawing from the
Taiwan Treaty, when we recognized the People's Republic of China--the
Supreme Court vacated a decision of the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia Circuit, a decision which had affirmed the
President's power to unilaterally terminate a treaty.
By vacating the lower court ruling, though, no legal precedent was
left to stand. The Supreme Court decision commanded no majority. Four
Justices invoked what I know my colleagues on the floor and the
Presiding Officer fully understand; they invoked what is called the
Political Question Doctrine and thereby decreed the case not a matter
for the courts.
The fifth Justice held the case should not be before the Supreme
Court because it was not ripe for judicial review.
The only Justice who addressed the merits of the case, Justice
Brennan, held for the President's power in that case because he thought
termination of the treaty with Taiwan was an act that necessarily
flowed from the recognition of the People's Republic of China. He
argued further that recognition power is clearly held by the President
within the Constitution.
The leading scholarly authority on the subject, the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law, of which the noted scholar, Columbia Law
Professor Lou Henkin was a chief reporter, states: ``The President has
authority unilaterally to suspend or terminate'' a treaty ``in
accordance with its terms, or to make the determination that would
justify . . . terminating or suspending an agreement because of its
violation by another party or because of supervening events.'' The
Restatement concludes that this power of the President is based upon
his constitutional power to conduct foreign relations.''
The Restatement concedes, however, that the Senate has concurrent
authority, and it could circumscribe the President's power by
conditioning its consent--which is what I understood in the withdrawn
amendment by my friend from Wisconsin--by conditioning its consent to
that treaty on a requirement that the termination clause only be
exercised with the consent of the Senate, which I happen to think we
have the power to do as well.
But without turning this into a seminar--which all of my colleagues
understand this full well; I am not educating anybody on this floor as
to something they do not already know--without going into any more of
it, I believe the Senate has concurrent power it could exercise.
I believe there will come a treaty which is of such consequence that
the Senate will determine it must exercise that power. But whether it
is wise to do so as is done in the Levin-Feingold amendment is another
matter, in my view.
[[Page S3227]]
In closing, I think Senators Levin and Feingold raise important legal
and substantive concerns. I think it would prompt, in this case--
because it goes, in a sense, beyond this treaty the precedent we would
be establishing--I think it would prompt--and obviously I don't know--
strong executive branch opposition, and all done at this point to make
a legal point. No matter how much I agree with it, it is to make a
legal point that does not substantively have much impact here. I think
it is really better made for a treaty of more substance and consequence
than this one.
Let me make it real clear what I mean by that. I do not want to
belittle this treaty. I do not mean to imply it is of no value. But I
think, quite frankly, if we are to go to the point to take this to the
wall, and we were to pass this amendment--and I realize it has been
changed now; it is not as consequential as both the Senators would have
liked, because the Feingold provision has been withdrawn, and as much
as I would like it if we were going to set down a principle here, I
think the consequence of its passage, if it resulted in this
administration walking away from this treaty, would do much more harm
than any possible good could be done by our adopting this amendment.
The point made by the chairman is we are no worse off
constitutionally on this unresolved, substantive issue because of the
language unanimously added in the committee. So essentially what we are
saying here--what I am saying here, and I think the chairman--and I am
not suggesting he should associate himself with my remarks as to what
the President's and the Senate's power is--but we are basically saying
we have agreed to fight this fight another day on another treaty at
another time.
How do you define in treaty language what ``consult'' means? In
declaration 6, we use the term ``consult,'' but it needs much less
specificity there because it is even more vague. So I think you build
in confusion, difficult to define, in even adding the Levin language.
This is an uncomfortable position for me to be in, both
intellectually and politically, to be not supporting this amendment. I
want my colleagues to understand why. I want to make it clear, even
though I agreed with the chairman that I would not, as the ranking
member, support amendments beyond what we had agreed to in order to get
this done, I want to make it clear to my Democratic colleagues, I am
not in any way asking anyone to be bound by that. I am not trying to
speak for the Democrats on that issue. I am giving my best advice as to
how I think, for what it is worth, we can enhance the prospect that we
really will, through this treaty, accomplish a momentum that relates to
reducing the number of nuclear weapons each side has at its disposal.
And ultimately, hopefully by the provisions we have in some of the
declarations, we will not stop at this treaty. We will not stop at this
methodology. We will try to move on to everything, including tactical
weapons at some point down the road.
That is my reasoning, for what it is worth. I am not going to support
even the less constitutionally controversial provision of the Levin-
Feingold amendment for the reasons I have stated.
I pledge to my colleagues, assuming I am around and assuming we have
the opportunity, God willing, to be able to establish this principle on
a really significant agreement that we make, a mutual agreement or
multilateral agreement with other parties in the world that promotes
everything from arms reduction to our interest, this fight has to be
made at some point. I just don't think it is worth the candle on this
at this moment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Let me thank my colleagues for their comments. Some of
what they say frankly amazes me and startles me.
How the administration could possibly walk away from this treaty
because a Resolution of Ratification contains the requirement that they
give us 60 days' notice before withdrawing, when in fact they say they
are intending to give us that notice, amazes me. The administration has
represented to the Senate by Secretary Powell that it is their
intention to discuss any need to withdraw from the treaty with the
Congress. That is their intention.
How it can be suggested they are going to walk away from a treaty
which simply puts into our ratification resolution and embodies what
they intend to do, anyway, is a complete mystery to me. It raises the
question, are they serious about that intention? Can't we take them
seriously? Can't we assure ourselves that maybe the next
administration, because it might not have the same intention, should be
bound by us? Do we have to leave this requirement to give notice of
withdrawal from a treaty up to the absolute discretion of an executive
branch? That is not protecting the constitutional role and requirement
and obligation and responsibility of the Senate.
The question was raised by my dear friend from Delaware about what
the word ``consult'' means in the amendment. It means the same thing as
in the language which the Foreign Relations Committee has given us. In
declaration 6 of the resolution, it says the Senate urges the President
to consult with the Senate. We define ``consult'' in the way the
Foreign Relations Committee defines it.
Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield.
Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to.
Mr. BIDEN. The difference is the declaration is not binding.
Mr. LEVIN. That is the important difference. But the word is the same
word.
Mr. BIDEN. It is the same word, but the need for precision in a
nonbinding declaration is a lot less important, in a judicial sense,
than it is in a binding provision. That is the only point I was making.
Mr. LEVIN. The important fact is it is not binding.
Mr. BIDEN. Yes.
Mr. LEVIN. That is what it comes down to. This is not an issue as to
who has the power to withdraw from a treaty. Both the Senator from
Indiana and the Senator from Delaware make arguments about that issue.
That is not resolved in this amendment. Both of their remarks address
that issue, as did my remarks. I am the first one to acknowledge that
as a matter of fact the Constitution is silent with respect to the
power to terminate treaties. That is the quote I used before that came
from the Congressional Research Service. The Constitution is silent.
There has not been a resolution of this issue.
There is the Goldwater case that can be interpreted as the Senator
from Delaware did. We do not resolve that issue in this amendment. This
amendment does not remove from the President, nor does it purport to
remove from the President, the power to terminate or extend a treaty.
That issue is a major constitutional issue.
I cannot believe, and I did not hear that either of our colleagues
suggested, that there is a constitutional problem with my amendment
because my amendment does not require the President to get the advice
and consent of the Senate to withdraw from the treaty. My amendment
simply says: Before you exercise your right to withdraw, give 60 days'
notice to the Senate. I don't think there is the slightest
constitutional infirmity in simply providing what the President says he
intends to do and what the committee says is desirable be done in the
language of the committee ratification resolution, that we urge a
formal request that the executive branch consult with the Senate of the
United States.
There is no constitutional issue with my amendment. With the Senator
from Wisconsin's second-degree amendment, which has been withdrawn,
there was a very serious constitutional issue, one which we could spend
days on in the Senate, as to whether or not we can require in a
ratification resolution that the President obtain our consent to the
withdrawal from a treaty. That is a major, massive constitutional
issue. That one has resonated around the country for a couple hundred
years. That was not going to be resolved in this Resolution of
Ratification. I hope some day it is resolved in a lengthy debate.
But what I am proposing is simply the most modest step to give some
protection to the obligation and responsibility of this institution
relative to treaty-making power, which is that we just be given notice,
60 days' notice, and consultation prior to a decision of
[[Page S3228]]
the President to withdraw from a treaty.
I have not heard today, and I don't believe that there is, a serious
argument that my amendment raises constitutional issues. As a matter of
fact, almost by definition, it cannot, since the President says he is
intending to consult with us and since the committee says it is
desirable that he do so.
I have not heard that argument. Again, I don't believe it could be a
serious argument, that we could simply not do what this amendment does,
which is to require that there be 60 days' notice and consultation.
But how the suggestion could be made that the President would walk
away from this treaty if the Resolution of Ratification contains
language that embodies what the intention of the administration is to
do anyway, and what the committee is urging the administration to do
anyway, is a complete mystery to me. That one befuddles me--the idea
that this administration, which has proposed and signed this treaty,
would walk away from the treaty if the Senate says in a ratification
resolution that the administration will give us the same notice that
the administration says it intends to give us. That one, it seems to
me, is not a credible argument.
So there is going to be disagreement as to whether or not the Senate
has the power to put in a ratification resolution a provision that the
President must, before extension or withdrawal, get the approval of the
Senate. If that were part of my amendment, I could understand why there
would be a massive debate over that issue--mainly between the White
House, which I think would say no way, and many Members of the Senate
would say that is the only way we can protect the constitutional
obligation of the Senate. But that is not this amendment. That was the
Feingold amendment, which was withdrawn.
This amendment walks a middle road and says we want to get a
commitment in this resolution that we be given the notice and
consultation which the administration says it intends to give us. It
cannot bind future administrations. This administration--I don't have
any doubt--intends to do what it says it intends to do. Secretary
Powell says he intends to give notice. I take him at his word. He is an
honorable man. But administrations come and go and intentions change
with future administrations. That is the relevance of this amendment--
to put in our ratification resolution what the committee says is
desirable, and what the committee says it urges the administration to
do, and what the administration says it intends to do, and about which
I have not heard a constitutional argument, for good reason, because
here we are not limiting the power of the President to withdraw from a
treaty.
The President has the same power to withdraw from a treaty before or
after my amendment is defeated or accepted. That power doesn't change.
What changes, however, with this amendment, would be to say that the
Senate, as part of its treaty obligation and responsibility, wants to
be informed prior to the withdrawal from or extension of a treaty that
the executive branch enters into.
That is, again, a summary of the amendment. I hope, even though
obviously the leaders of the Foreign Relations Committee oppose this
for the reasons they give--and I don't think there are two Members of
the Senate for whom I have greater respect than these two Members. We
have worked together on these issues. Senator Lugar, Senator Biden, and
I have worked together on so many issues over the years that I have
lost count. My respect and regard for them is boundless. But I think
this is an issue of important principle that the Senate should
address--whether or not we want to be given notice before a President
withdraws from this treaty that we are about to ratify, hopefully.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, again, I will simply say that in our
Resolution of Ratification--and this is what we have before the Senate
now:
Given the Senate's continuing interest in the treaty and in
continuing strategic offensive reductions to the lowest
possible levels consistent with national security
requirements and the alliance obligation of the United
States, the Senate urges the President to consult with the
Senate prior to taking action relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3
of article 4 of the treaty.
It seems to me the language is clear. We have spelled it out. In
addition, we have had testimony and have queried Secretary Powell
regarding his interpretation of the role of the Congress, and he has
assured us that there would be consultation.
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. LUGAR. Yes.
Mr. LEVIN. This is a procedural inquiry. We are trying to determine--
to assist a colleague who has an urgent, unusual need--if we can set a
time on this amendment at 4:05; would that be amenable? I hate to
interrupt my friend.
Mr. LUGAR. Yes, that would be very satisfactory. In fact, I even will
propose a time sooner than that if that is in the realm of the
possible.
Mr. LEVIN. That is what is difficult. The earlier we are able to set
a time, the earlier we will be able to vote. If we set it 10 minutes
from now, it would have to be 4:15 instead of 4:05.
Mr. LUGAR. Let me make a proposal and, in fact, offer a unanimous
consent at this time to that effect.
I ask unanimous consent that the vote in relation to the Levin
amendment No. 252 occur at 4:05 today, and that the time until then be
equally divided in the usual form; further, that no second-degree
amendments be in order prior to the vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Senator from Michigan for that suggestion.
I will conclude by indicating that the Senator from Michigan and the
Senator from Wisconsin proposed a serious constitutional issue. At the
initiation of this debate, I indicated that this is not a settled law.
I also argue that this is not the treaty on which to attempt to settle.
There has been precedent--at least in terms of activity that both the
distinguished Senator from Delaware and I have decided. I pointed out
30 treaties terminated by the President since 1980. This is a lot of
treaties. That has been the regular practice.
I referred to a debate on this issue indicated in 1919 on the
Versailles Treaty on which the Vice President of the United States
addressed the Senate. The Senate did not come up with a two-thirds vote
to change the fact that the Constitution is silent.
I accept the fact that the Senator from Michigan pointed out at some
point in our history--and I think the Senator from Delaware made the
same point--we may want to have this debate, but I hope not on this
treaty at this time, given the assurance by the Secretary of State, and
likewise by the committee, in our article 4 to this treaty.
For the benefit of Senators, there are about 26 minutes left and,
essentially, we will leave it to the Chair how that should be divided.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have a minor point, but the Record should
be clarified. When I was referring to what my friend from Michigan said
about the difference between the declaration and his condition--one
being binding, one not--I referred to the word ``consult.'' It goes
beyond that. The ambiguous language really is in the declaration. In
his proposal is ``any action relevant'' to paragraphs 2 or 3 of article
4 of the treaty, which is the action relevant to the extension or
withdrawal--that is the language that was taken by him, properly so,
from the declaration, and that is the part that is ambiguous, not the
word ``consult.''
At any rate, it is a distinction without a great difference.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from Delaware
does not control the time and cannot suggest the absence of a quorum.
The Senators from Indiana and Michigan control time under the order.
Mr. LUGAR. I suggest the absence of a quorum equally divided.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
[[Page S3229]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 252, As Modified
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I believe the yeas and nays have not been
ordered. I modify my amendment by striking the word ``any'' on line 5
and striking the word ``relevant'' on line 5 and substituting the word
``pursuant'' for the word ``relevant'' on line 5. The modification is
at the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so
modified.
The amendment (No. 252), as modified, is as follows:
At the end of section 2, add the following new condition:
(3) Notice and consultations prior to withdrawal or
extension.--(A) Prior to taking action pursuant to paragraphs
2 or 3 of Article IV of the Treaty, and except as provided in
subparagraph (B), the President shall--
(i) provide not less than 60 days advance notice of such
action to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(ii) consult with the Senate on such action.
(B) The President may waive a requirement in subparagrah
(A) if the President--
(i) determines that national security needs prevent the
President from meeting the requirement; and
(ii) submits to the committees of the Senate referred to in
subparagraph (A) a written notice of the waiver, including a
description of the national security needs and the reasons
justifying the waiver.
In section 3, strike declaration (6).
Mr. LEVIN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent Senator Kennedy
be added as a cosponsor to the amendment, and I ask for the yeas and
nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The clerk will call the
roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. FRIST. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr.
Domenici), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. McConnell), and the Senator
from Oregon (Mr. Smith) are necessarily absent.
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Byrd),
the Senator from Florida (Mr. Graham), and the Senator from Georgia
(Mr. Miller), are necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from West
Virginia (Mr. Byrd) would vote ``aye''.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Collins). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 44, nays 50, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 41 Ex.]
YEAS--44
Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Cantwell
Carper
Clinton
Conrad
Corzine
Daschle
Dayton
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feingold
Feinstein
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Mikulski
Murray
Nelson (NE)
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Stabenow
Wyden
NAYS--50
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Bennett
Biden
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Chambliss
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Dole
Ensign
Enzi
Fitzgerald
Frist
Graham (SC)
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
McCain
Murkowski
Nelson (FL)
Nickles
Roberts
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Voinovich
Warner
NOT VOTING--6
Byrd
Domenici
Graham (FL)
McConnell
Miller
Smith
Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote and move to
lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 254
Mr. AKAKA. Madam President, I have an amendment I send to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Akaka] proposes an amendment
numbered 254.
Mr. AKAKA. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that further
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To specify information to be included in the annual report on
the role of Cooperative Threat Reduction and nonproliferation
assistance under condition 1 in section 2)
At the end of the last sentence of condition 1 in section
2, strike the period and insert the following: ``, and shall
include--
``(A) an estimate of the funding levels required in the
fiscal year following the year of the report to implement all
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and other
nonproliferation programs relevant to the Treaty and ensure
that nuclear weapons, materials, technology, and expertise in
the Russian Federation are secure from theft and diversion;
and
``(B) a description of any initiatives proposed by the
President to address any matter covered by subparagraph (A)
in order to improve the implementation or effectiveness of
the Treaty.''.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.
Mr. AKAKA. Madam President, this amendment is the result of several
hearings I chaired in the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on
International Security and Proliferation on the importance of Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance to national security.
The collapse of the Soviet Union left stockpiles of nuclear weapons
and materials vulnerable to theft and diversion. The Nunn-Lugar
legislative initiative of 1991 established several threat reduction
programs in the Departments of Defense and Energy to help dismantle
weapons of mass destruction or improve their security. These programs,
along with others in the State Department, are critical to preventing
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or the diversion of
material to terrorists.
U.S. nonproliferation activities have accomplished a great deal. With
American assistance, all nuclear weapons have been removed from
Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus. Our nonproliferation programs also
prevent the recruitment by terrorists or other countries of WMD
scientists and engineers.
The CTR and other nonproliferation programs are making progress but
face a new set of responsibilities in light of the Moscow Treaty. The
Russian Federation intends to reduce and destroy various weapons
systems with U.S. assistance under the CTR and other nonproliferation
programs.
I strongly support language in the Moscow Treaty that directs the
President to ``submit to Congress . . . a report and recommendations on
how United States Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance to the
Russian Federation can best contribute to enabling the Russian
Federation to implement the Treaty efficiently. . . .''
In November 2001, President Bush and President Putin met to discuss
historic cuts to the nuclear stockpiles in the U.S. and in Russia. This
discussion led to the Moscow Treaty before us today.
After the first day of that summit, President Bush remarked that:
[o]ur highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction . . . we will strengthen our
efforts to cut off every possible source of biological,
chemical, and nuclear weapons material and expertise.
The CTR and other nonproliferation programs are the primary means we
have to prevent weapons, weapon-usable materials, and expertise in the
Russian Federation from falling into the hands of terrorists. Secretary
of State Powell said, in testimony before the Senate, that the CTR
program will be used to ``make warhead storage facilities more secure.
Such U.S. assistance will also increase the security of the Russian
warheads made excess as provided in the Moscow Treaty.''
The goals of the CTR and other nonproliferation programs are vital to
national security. Getting there will be difficult. We must provide
these programs with the funding necessary to
[[Page S3230]]
accomplish their important and challenging task.
I have joined my friend and colleague, Senator Lugar, in supporting
adequate funding and high-level administration support for these
programs for years. For this reason, my amendment would ensure funding
estimates are included in this annual report on CTR contributions to
Russian implementation of the Moscow Treaty. It is important that
Congress know how the CTR and nonproliferation programs can be used to
help the Russian Federation with its treaty obligations. It is equally
important for Congress to know what these programs require to realize
their full potential for enhancing security.
Amendment No. 254, Withdrawn
Madam President, I have had discussions with the distinguished
chairman concerning my amendment. He has given me assurances that the
intent of my amendment will be covered in the report mentioned in
condition 1 and other reports already required by Congress. For this
reason, I withdraw my amendment, and Senator Lugar and I will enter
into a colloquy on this issue.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The
amendment is withdrawn.
The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I thank the distinguished Senator from
Hawaii for his very important thoughts about threat reduction and about
our mutual quest and support.
Mr. AKAKA. I thank my friend, the Senior Senator from Indiana, for
this opportunity to discuss with him the Cooperative Threat Reduction
and other non-proliferation programs and their importance to effective
implementation of the Moscow Treaty.
I have chaired several hearings in the Governmental Affairs
Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal
Services, and undertaken several studies, on the importance of the
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction. Because of this work it was my
intent today to offer an amendment to the Moscow Treaty to expand the
report on Cooperative Threat Reduction and non-proliferation programs
contained in the recommended resolution of ratification by including
funding requirements.
As my colleague knows, the collapse of the Soviet Union left
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials vulnerable to theft and
diversion. The Senate and the Nation have benefited from the Senior
Senator's leadership in the Nunn-Lugar legislative initiative of 1991
that established threat reduction programs in the Departments of
Defense and Energy to help dismantle weapons of mass destruction or
improve their security. These programs, along with others in the State
Department, are critical to preventing the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction or the diversion of material to terrorists.
My amendment would amend Condition One in the Resolution of
Ratification so that the annual report on non-proliferation programs
includes two important pieces of information. First, the report would
include an estimate of funding levels necessary for the CTR and other
non-proliferation programs relevant to the Treaty to ensure that
nuclear weapons, materials, technology, and expertise in the Russian
Federation are secure from theft and diversion. Second, the report
would include a description of any initiatives proposed by the
President for the CTR or other non-proliferation programs that will
improve the implementation or effectiveness of the Treaty. I understand
through my conversation with the chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee that, while he appreciates my concerns and reasons behind my
amendment, it should not be included in the resolution before us.
U.S. non-proliferation activities have accomplished a great deal.
With American assistance, all nuclear weapons have been removed from
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Our non-proliferation programs also
prevent the recruitment by terrorists or other countries of WMD
scientists and engineers.
Mr. LUGAR. I agree with my friend. The CTR and other non-
proliferation programs are making progress but face a new set of
responsibilities in light of the Moscow Treaty. The Russian Federation
intends to reduce, destroy, and account for various weapons systems,
materials, and expertise with U.S. assistance under the CTR and other
non-proliferation programs. For this reason, the Foreign Relations
Committee included Condition One to the Treaty to require the President
to submit to Congress an annual report and recommendations on how
Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance can best help the Russian
Federation implement the Treaty efficiently and maintain the security
and accurate accounting of its nuclear weapons and weapons-usable
components and material.
Mr. AKAKA. I strongly support this language. The Committee Report on
the Moscow Treaty states that this report will include ``the role of
Cooperative Threat Reduction and nonproliferation assistance.'' Am I
correct in my interpretation that the annual report will include the
contribution of both the Department of Defense CTR program and other
programs that are relevant to Treaty implementation and security and
accounting of nuclear weapons and materials?
Mr. LUGAR. Yes, this report is intended to establish the rationale
for all U.S. non-proliferation programs insofar as they can be used to
help Russia dismantle weapons or assure the security of those weapons
and of the fissile material in them. The report also will include the
amount of CTR assistance that the Russian Federation will need to meet
its obligations under the Treaty.
Mr. AKAKA. That is good to hear. I have joined with my friend in
advocating for adequate funding and high-level administration support
for these non-proliferation programs for years. For this reason, I was
considering offering an amendment to include funding estimates needed
to assist Russia meet its obligations under the Moscow Treaty. It is
important that Congress know how the CTR and non-proliferation programs
can be used to help the Russian Federation with its Treaty obligations
and how best to fund these programs to meet Treaty obligations. Does my
colleague believe it would be useful if such information was provided
to Congress?
Mr. LUGAR. Yes, I agree that such information is useful. However I
believe that this information already is provided as part of the
overall CTR annual report to Congress by the Department of Defense and
annual reports by other non-proliferation programs. Specifically, the
CTR annual report contains funding levels for individual projects as
well as five-year cost estimates.
I understand my colleague's concern that this report does not address
Treaty-specific programs. The report required in the resolution of
ratification could lay the groundwork for future cost and program
requirements for non-proliferation that perhaps can be addressed in the
Defense authorization bill.
Mr. AKAKA. As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I look
forward to the opportunity to work with you in defining the amount and
extent of information we need to adequately fund and support these
important programs. I also understand your desire to keep paperwork and
reporting requirements to a minimum for the small but hardworking staff
of the CTR program. Accurate and timely reporting of this information
is crucial for proper congressional oversight of these programs. It is
my hope that the administration understands my concerns.
In November 2001 President Bush remarked that ``[o]ur highest
priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass
destruction . . . we will strengthen our efforts to cut off every
possible source of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons material
and expertise.'' I know my friend shares my respect for the CTR and
other non-proliferation programs that are the primary means we have to
prevent weapons, weapons-usable materials, and expertise in the Russian
Federation from falling into the hands of terrorists.
The goals of the CTR and other non-proliferation programs are vital
to national security. Getting there will be difficult. I know that by
working together we can provide these programs with the funding
necessary to accomplish their important and challenging task.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. REED. Madam President, I rise to express my support for the
Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, otherwise known as the Moscow
Treaty, which
[[Page S3231]]
was signed by President Bush and President Putin on May 24, 2002. This
treaty is important because it signifies that Russia and the United
States are committed to and cooperating on the reduction of nuclear
weapons. It carries the weight of law and will remain in force for a
decade. It is also important because it binds the United States and the
Russian Federation to each reduce the number of operationally deployed
strategic weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012.
Presently, the United States has approximately 6,000 nuclear weapons
and the Russian Federation has almost 5,500 nuclear weapons. The Moscow
Treaty is a step forward, reducing the danger of large numbers of
operationally deployed nuclear weapons. This treaty is a good step, but
it is only a small step. Much more must be done. Russia entered into
negotiations seeking a legally binding document that would limit
strategic nuclear warheads, and in their words ``provide transparency
and predictability'' by containing definitions, and counting and
elimination rules that resembled those in the START Treaties.
Ultimately, Russia wanted to ensure that this process would be
irreversible; in their words, that it would ensure the
``irreversibility of the reduction of nuclear forces.''
This administration, however, had different goals. Russia had to
convince the United States to sign a legally binding document rather
than a less formal exchange of letters. The United States rejected any
limits and counting rules that would have required the elimination of
delivery vehicles and warheads, stating that it wanted flexibility to
reduce its forces at its own pace and to restore warheads to deployed
forces if conditions warranted. So while this treaty changes the status
of some operationally deployed warheads, it does not require the
dismantling of a single weapon. Once this treaty is fully implemented,
the United States will still have approximately 6,000 nuclear weapons.
There will just be more weapons in storage. And similarly, the Russians
could have approximately 5,500 nuclear weapons, but they would be
nonoperational according to the lines of this treaty.
The treaty does not bind either party to any schedule for
deactivation. It only requires that cuts be completed by December 31,
2012, the day the treaty expires. This means that either side can stop
or even reverse the reduction process over the decade as long as both
parties comply by the final date of the treaty.
The treaty does not specifically address the problems of tactical
nuclear weapons or MIRV'd ICBMs. The number of Russian tactical nuclear
weapons is believed to be between 8,000 and 15,000, while the United
States has approximately 2,000. Russian tactical nuclear weapons are
subject to fewer safeguards and are more prone to theft and
proliferation. These are the proverbial suitcase weapons, often
discussed in the press, which are the ones that are most mobile, most
difficult to trace and detect. And the treaty does not deal with these
weapons at all.
In addition, the Moscow Treaty effectively ends START II, which I
will discuss in more detail later, which means that Russia will likely
keep its weapons MIRV'd, meaning they will have multiple warheads on
their weapons. Since MIRV'd weapons are fewer and more vulnerable, it
increases the perceived need for a first strike.
Another shortcoming of the Moscow Treaty is that it includes no
verification procedures. START I verification procedures will remain in
place until 2009. But there was never agreement between the parties
about which, if any, procedures could be used in the Moscow Treaty.
Discussion of verification procedures is supposed to continue, but the
administration recently stated: We have determined that specific
additional transparency measures are not needed and will not be sought
at this time.
I also believe the treaty withdrawal provisions are too lax. Parties
can withdraw from the Moscow Treaty with 3-months notice without giving
any reason. This means a party needs no compelling reason to stop
complying with the terms of this treaty.
Finally, the terms of this treaty must be met by December 31, 2012,
but that is the day the treaty expires. It is possible that it could be
extended, but another agreement would have to be reached to do that. On
the other hand, it could also lapse so the parties could raise the
numbers of operationally deployed warheads above 2,200 on January 1,
2013. In effect, they could go through the term of the treaty without
significant reductions, let the treaty lapse, and nothing would have
been affected by the treaty. I hope certainly that doesn't happen.
I commend my colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senator Lugar and Senator Biden. They have done a remarkable job of
adding some detail to the treaty.
The resolution we are considering today contains two important
conditions. The first condition requires a report and recommendation on
how cooperative threat reduction assistance to the Russian Federation
can best contribute to the efficient implementation of the treaty and
maintain the security and accurate accounting of Russia's nuclear
weapons and materiel. As I will discuss in detail later, the CTR
program is the most effective tool to counter proliferation, and we
must do all we can to maintain it.
Secondly, the resolution requires an annual implementation report
which will include, among other items, a listing of strategic nuclear
weapons force levels for both parties, a detailed description on
strategic offensive reductions planned by each party for the current
year, and how these reductions will be achieved, verification and
transparency measures taken or proposed by each party, and actions
taken or proposed to improve the implementation and effectiveness of
the treaty.
There are also several nonbinding declarations, most of which request
reports to Congress and encourage the President to continue to work to
reduce nuclear weapons. These conditions and declarations make the
treaty more substantial and, I believe, more effective.
I will support this treaty strengthened by this resolution. I want to
say to the administration, however, that this is simply not enough. The
rise of rogue nations and rogue nonstate actors, has made the threat of
proliferation even more urgent. One of the legacies of the cold war is
the abundance of nuclear weapons and fissionable material that is no
longer under the clear control of the Russian Federation or other
former states of the Soviet Union. Moreover, many of these nuclear
weapons are housed in nations which are struggling economically and are
susceptible to offers from rogue actors to acquire these materials.
As Graham Allison of Harvard, former dean at the Kennedy School,
stated:
The single largest threat to American lives and liberties
going forward for the next decade is terrorism, particularly
terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. The one that I
have been most concerned about is loose nukes.
We must do everything possible to counter proliferation through
protection, containment, and interdiction. In 1991, former Senator Sam
Nunn and Chairman Richard Lugar recognized the risk presented by the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They created--history
will record this--one of the most important initiatives that has been
seen in this Senate, in this country in many years; that is, the
counterproliferation program, the cooperative threat reduction program.
The programs they established in the Department of State, the
Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense, have had
significant success in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Through these programs, the United States has secured tons
of nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union; helped deactivate,
dismantle, or destroy thousands of Russian nuclear weapons and delivery
systems; and helped provide employment for hundreds of Russian
scientists and engineers with expertise in building nuclear, chemical,
or biological weapons, who otherwise might be tempted to sell their
expertise to unfriendly nations or terrorist organizations. This is an
extraordinary accomplishment, but so much needs to be done in addition.
Even though only about $1 billion of the $400 billion defense budget
is annually allocated to support these programs, they have been among
the most successful of all nonproliferation efforts undertaken by this
country.
[[Page S3232]]
Given the success of the programs, it is difficult to understand why
securing adequate funding has been a significant challenge in the Bush
administration.
I also want to add my voice to those of my many colleagues who
believe the United States and the international community are capable
of doing, and must do, much more in this regard. Let me quote once
again from the expert, Senator Lugar, who in his article in the
December 2002 issue of Arms Control Today, said:
It is critical that the United States lead in establishing
a global coalition capable of exerting pressure on states to
cooperate with the safeguarding, accounting, and (where
possible) destruction of weapons and materials of mass
destruction. Given that a war is being contemplated with Iraq
over the question of their weapons programs, it is reasonable
to ask why more is not being done on a global scale to
control other proliferation risks.
I agree with the chairman. I also agree with his statement:
We must not only accelerate dismantlement efforts in
Russia, we must broaden our capability to address
proliferation risks elsewhere and build a global coalition to
support such efforts.
Clearly, undeniably, there is a lot of work to be done in these
programs, not the least of which is to make up for time lost to these
programs over the past 2 years.
The Bush administration put most of the nonproliferation programs on
hold during fiscal year 2001, in order to conduct a review to determine
the validity of the programs. Luckily, most of the programs survived
the review, and some were even strengthened; but little progress was
made as very little work was done during this yearlong review.
Then, at the completion of the review, the fiscal year 2002, and all
previous years, funds for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program were frozen for over a year because the Bush administration
failed to make the required certification to spend the money.
Just recently, these funds have been released as a result of waiver
authority included in the fiscal year 2003 Defense Authorization Act.
This is waiver authority that the Republicans in the other body wanted
to severely restrict and limit to 1 year, but luckily, in the end, the
Senate was able to prevail and provide an unrestricted waiver for 3
years.
These two events, the program review and the inability to certify,
effectively stopped the Nunn-Lugar programs for approximately 2 years.
The effectiveness of some of these programs has clearly been inhibited,
if not damaged. The challenge now is to work to regain and then
increase their effectiveness.
The sheer magnitude of the problem of proliferation dictates that we
must find an international consensus and work through multilateral
arrangements.
Despite the bureaucracy and delay that accompanies international
cooperation, I believe it is necessary, especially in the area of arms
control regimes, to have a multilateral approach.
A report by the Rand Corporation to the then-President-elect Bush
pointed out:
Without our democratic allies, many emerging global issues
will likely prove to be beyond our ability to manage, but
together with them, the United States will gain unparalleled
ability to respond to tomorrow's demands and shape the
future.
Regrettably, the Bush administration has demonstrated a distrust of
international organizations.
Since President Bush took office, the administration has withdrawn
from the ABM Treaty and walked away from meaningful negotiations
concerning START II.
Indeed, in the preamble and article 2 of the Moscow Treaty, the first
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is referred to as START, not START I.
START II is evident only in its absence from this treaty.
Assistant Secretary of Defense J. D. Crouch has said:
I think we have sort of moved beyond START II.
Many Russian officials have recognized what appears to be the
inevitability of this and indicated they are considering START II
dead--meaning that Russia is no longer obligated to eliminate its
MIRV'd ICBMs.
We must recognize that in many areas, including arms control, the
United States cannot go it alone, and we have to not only encourage but
actively work to create an international coalition, particularly with
respect to proliferation of these weapons and nuclear materials.
I am also concerned that recent actions by the United States seems to
indicate that while we talk about nonproliferation in principle, in
practice we seem to be somewhat ambivalent. This is exacerbated when it
appears that the U.S. is increasing the importance of nuclear weapons
in our defense policy.
While the nonproliferation programs were being held up, the
administration was working on a new nuclear posture review that would
put more emphasis on nuclear weapons. The December 2001 Nuclear Posture
Review laid out a framework which includes maintaining the current size
of the nuclear weapons stockpile, not reducing it; blurring the
distinction between nuclear offensive strike and conventional offensive
strike; introducing the notion that new nuclear weapons might be needed
to meet changing security requirements; holding open the possibility of
resuming nuclear weapons testing, either to develop nuclear weapons, or
to maintain the current stockpile; supporting a robust nuclear weapons
complex, not just to implement the stockpile stewardship program, but
to manufacture hundreds of new plutonium pits per year, and to be able
to design a new weapon if needed; and increase ``test readiness''--the
level of readiness to conduct a nuclear weapons test, reducing that
time period from 36 months to 18 months, essentially leaning further
forward to the possibility of resuming nuclear tests. In addition, the
Bush administration sought $15.5 million in its fiscal year 2003
request for a robust nuclear earth penetrator to use against hardened
and deeply buried targets. This RNEP would modify an existing nuclear
weapon with yields up to a megaton. Despite the fact that the fiscal
year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act requires a report of the
plan for this weapon before funds are released, there is an additional
$15 million requested for this program in the fiscal year 2004 budget,
indicating that the administration is still determined to try to
develop this new variety of nuclear weapon.
There has also been a renewed interest in the development of small
nuclear weapons. Even though there is clearly no military requirement
for such a weapon, again in its fiscal year 2004 legislative proposal,
the Department of Defense seeks the total repeal of a current ban on
research and development that could lead to production of a low-yield
nuclear weapon.
DOD states that this law, in their words, ``has negatively affected
U.S. Government efforts to support the national strategy to counter
weapons of mass destruction and undercuts efforts that could strengthen
our ability to deter, or respond to, new or emerging threats.''
Frankly, this adds up to a very disturbing path of legitimizing the
use of nuclear weapons in a world in which we are dramatically
concerned with the possibility that Iraq is attempting to obtain
nuclear weapons, a world in which the North Koreans are beginning to
flaunt their ability to produce nuclear weapons, in which India and
Pakistan are on the brink of conflict with nuclear weapons. The idea
that we are lowering our own threshold to deploy, to use, to consider
in our doctrine the use of nuclear weapons is, I think, an unfortunate
and very dangerous approach. These continued efforts, both in the
posture review, in requests for new weapons, in requests to investigate
and do research on new types of nuclear weapons, and this legitimacy
for the use of nuclear weapons, will have profound and detrimental
consequences throughout the world.
It is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to urge other
nations to forswear the development and use of nuclear weapons if we
are so routinely talking about the development and use of nuclear
weapons. This is a very disturbing development.
We have to look at nonproliferation as part of our overall defense
policy. Advocating new or usable nuclear weapons destroys, inhibits,
and damages the credibility of the United States as we seek to restrain
the development and deployment of nuclear weapons. I hope that message
comes through in not only today's discussions, but in this treaty.
[[Page S3233]]
I am also concerned with another aspect of the current situation. We
are talking about our approach to Iraq as a need to disarm Saddam
before he acquires nuclear weapons. Yet we have moved rather gingerly
and pushed over to the United Nations the problem of North Korea which
is on the verge of beginning to operate its reprocessing facilities,
with the capability of building nuclear devices within months, if not
weeks.
I think this leads many people, and not just those who follow these
policy debates but most ordinary Americans, to wonder what is the
difference. Why is the situation in Iraq so compelling, even though
there is little evidence that Saddam is on the verge of producing a
nuclear weapon, that we engage in a military conflict, while, on the
other hand, when there is glaring evidence of the ability of the North
Koreans to produce such a weapon, we have moved this along into the
category of not a crisis, something the U.N. can handle? That
intellectual dilemma is puzzling many people throughout this country.
I believe there is a crisis in North Korea, and I believe it is a
crisis that requires the prompt attention of the President. If one
looks at the strategic vision we have to embrace, it can perhaps be
divided into several major tasks.
The first is to preempt terrorists and, indeed, we saw this week an
effective use of our military and intelligence forces and our allies in
Pakistan. Then we have to interdict, contain, and stop the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The North Koreans, in my mind, pose a much more difficult challenge
to us than the Iraqis at the moment. Not only are they on the verge of
producing a nuclear weapon because they have the nuclear material, they
also have a history of selling anything to anyone because their major
cash crop is selling weapons to anyone who will buy them.
We are here today to conclude a very small but a very important step
forward with the support of the Moscow Treaty, but we have much more to
do when it comes to particularly supporting efforts by our country in
an international coalition to preempt, to interdict, to stop the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and I
think to reexamine carefully and thoroughly the new emphasis we are
putting on the development and use of nuclear weapons in our inventory.
I believe we will regret the day we give legitimacy to the potential
use of nuclear weapons by any power, including the United States.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cornyn). The Senator from Massachusetts.
Amendment No. 255
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) proposes an
amendment numbered 255.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To provide an additional condition)
At the end of section 2, add the following new condition:
(3) Annual reports on monitoring capabilities.--(A) Not
later than 60 days after the exchange of the instruments of
ratification of the Treaty, and annually thereafter on May 1,
the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign
Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate an estimate, prepared
by the Director of Central Intelligence, on the capability of
the United States to monitor the compliance of the Russian
Federation with the requirements of the Treaty.
(B) Each estimate shall meet the requirements of a national
intelligence estimate under section 103(b)(2)(A) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(b)(2)(A)), and
shall include--
(i) an estimate, for each strategic nuclear weapons system
of the Russian Federation, of the confidence of the United
States, whether low, medium, or high, in the capability of
the United States to monitor the deployed warheads on such
system;
(ii) an assessment of the capability of the United States
to monitor the compliance of the Russian Federation with the
requirements of the Treaty--
(I) under the verification measures of the verification
regime under the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, with Annexes, Protocols, and
Memorandum of Understanding, signed at Moscow on July 31,
1991 (START Treaty); and
(II) after the verification regime expires upon termination
of the START Treaty; and
(iii) additional mechanisms to ensure United States
monitoring of the compliance of the Russian Federation with
the requirements of the Treaty, including--
(I) further agreements between the United States and the
Russian Federation;
(II) mutual data exchanges between the United States and
the Russian Federation;
(III) improvements in the transparency of strategic
offensive reductions under the Treaty;
(IV) improvements to existing monitoring technologies; and
(V) other appropriate mechanisms.
(C) Each estimate shall be submitted in both classified and
unclassified form.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty
that has been under consideration for a couple of days, also known as
the Moscow Treaty, is, in my judgment, in the 18 years I have been here
thinking about arms control and certainly as part of the debate in the
Foreign Relations Committee and on the floor in the ratification of
treaties, as flimsy a treaty as the Senate has ever considered. I
believe its faults are many. At best, its defenders contend that it
does no harm, but I find fault even in that assessment, and I find
fault ultimately in this treaty.
The Moscow Treaty promises to reduce the deployed offensive weapons
of the United States and Russia to a range of between 1,700 to 2,200
each by December 31, 2012. As far as the treaty goes, that is the
highlight.
I think, under certain circumstances, one would certainly say that
reducing its own number of deployed missiles is a worthy goal and
something we want to achieve, but in the world we live in today, simply
reducing their deployment, where they are sometimes under better
control than they are going to be if they are not deployed, it may, in
fact, be taking a dangerous situation and perhaps lending itself to the
greater dangers of this particular moment of history.
In my assessment, regrettably, the treaty amounts to little more than
a series of missed opportunities. Let me be precise about that point.
It does not mandate a reduction in total warheads. None must be
dismantled. The treaty merely requires both parties to reduce the
number of warheads in their operationally deployed arsenals. It
provides no timetable for the planned reductions in deployed forces
prior to the treaty's 2012 target date. It never requires the
destruction of a single launcher.
In effect, the treaty allows each side to upload, download, and mix
weapons in and out of storage. It contains no verification procedures,
and the vast stockpiles of nuclear warheads in this country and in
Russia remain unchanged.
Nuclear weapons, as we all know, are the legacy of the cold war, the
most pressing single threat that we face today as we contemplate
dealing with Saddam Hussein and as we wish we were dealing with North
Korea. The most pressing threat, however, is really that nuclear
weapons, or their lethal components, might fall into the hands of
terrorists or irresponsible governments at the head of rogue regimes.
This fact makes the provisions of this treaty even more troubling.
Instead of requiring the dismantlement of warheads or launchers, the
treaty simply requires that on one day in 2012, the sides are to have
no more than the 1,700 or 2,200 operationally deployed nuclear weapons.
The remaining thousands of weapons will be held in reserve, stockpiled
for some other unforeseen need, a need, I might say, in the context of
the threats we are looking at in the year 2003 that is extraordinarily
hard to explain, particularly when those stockpiled weapons become the
risk of stolen, bartered, sold, or blackmailed materials. By their
continued existence, they present a tempting target for thieves and for
terrorists.
It is no secret that there are those who are eager to capitalize on a
deadly market for weapons-usable nuclear materials. The GAO has
documented numerous failed attempts to smuggle nuclear materials out of
Russia. I say to
[[Page S3234]]
my colleagues that out of 20 of these incidents over the last decade,
the materials involved in 13 of the 20 that we know about, and possibly
as many as 15, were traced back to Russian sources.
I will tell my colleagues from my experience as a law enforcement
official that if you know you caught 20 and you know you are operating
with limited capacities to detect, anyone ought to be asking the
question, How many did we miss and how many will we miss in the future?
The great security challenge of our day is to keep nuclear weapons
out of the hands of those who would do us harm, but this treaty only
expands the stockpile of nondeployed warheads in Russia, and in this
country for that matter. It may advance some old cold war calculus for
arms control, but it is not a part of a broader comprehensive approach
to our nuclear relationship with Russia, particularly in the area of
threat reduction, and there I think the treaty runs the risk of
increasing the danger of nuclear theft by stockpiling thousands of
warheads.
Obviously, it is the task of all of us to try to make the world more
secure, not less secure. As I have said previously, we need to
revitalize the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program by giving it the
sustained leadership, attention, and funding it deserves.
Over the last decade, the United States has spent about $7.5 billion
to deactivate 6,000 warheads and destroy thousands of delivery
vehicles. Why would we spend $7.5 billion to deactivate and destroy and
then bring a treaty to the floor of the Senate which does neither? We
have to make good on our pledge of $10 billion over the next 10 years
to the G-8 threat reduction partnership, and we need to encourage the
good faith participation of our allies. But we know that even those
efforts are not going to be enough.
In 2001, the bipartisan Baker-Cutler commission concluded that for
our efforts to secure Russia's nuclear weapons materials and expertise
to succeed, we will have to spend $30 billion over the next 10 years.
That is a challenge we ought to be meeting as a primary goal prior even
to the implementation of this treaty.
The treaty's supporters have noted that its brevity is important, as
if the length of a treaty somehow constitutes a real accomplishment,
and that provisions in it are a reflection of our new relationship with
Russia.
My question is, if we are in a new environment with Russia, then why
not include verification and transparency measures that reflect that
new environment? The treaty does not mandate the dismantlement or
destruction of warheads or launchers. Yet the provisions of this treaty
turn upon themselves and the very logic underpinning the treaty as
argued by its proponents. For instance, they argue, as Secretary
Rumsfeld did before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last summer,
that no arms control treaty in the history of our country has ever
required the destruction of warheads.
Well, if this treaty is based on the conclusion that we live in a
different time, if this treaty is based on the conclusion that the cold
war is really over, if this treaty is based on the conclusion that we
have a new and better relationship with Russia and that we therefore
can look to a new period, why then keep these warheads in storage for
another day when the numbers we are reducing to under any SIOP or any
warfighting plan we have ever seen are sufficient to destroy the world
several times over? It simply does not make sense.
Why expand the stockpiles of stored nuclear warheads and materials
when we know to a certainty, as the CIA tells us, we do not have the
capacity today to safeguard those materials? Why would we do that when
we are prepared to go to war against Iraq to prevent Iraq from
illicitly receiving the very kinds of materials that we are about to
encourage the capacity for others to seek out in the same way as we
have seen others do in those 20 examples I cited a few moments ago?
The logic escapes anybody who stops to really think about what we are
doing with this treaty. If we have really entered a new age and a new
relationship with Russia--and I believe we have in fact--then neither
Russia nor the United States should hedge on a commitment to real and
meaningful arms reduction to an agreement that addresses in its very
fabric the new and real threat of proliferation by theft or diversion.
By doing so, we would send a signal to Saddam Hussein and to the rest
of the world that we are not hedging our bets; that, in fact, we are
serious and we are setting an example, and that the rest of the world
is earning the justification for moving to disarm another nation for
moving to nuclearization.
Those same supporters who say we need to hold on to vast stockpiles
of nuclear warheads ironically argue that the profoundly changed nature
of the relationship with Russia means we need not have negotiated
verification regimes for this treaty.
There are still those in this country, as surely there are some in
Russia, who continue to view our former cold war adversary with some
measure of suspicion and distrust.
This treaty had the potential to deepen Russian-American cooperation
and confidence building. If it had included verification measures, the
treaty would have silenced skeptics of our new relationship by
demonstrating mutual weapons reductions through inspection and
verification. But, regrettably, it does not. Both sides understand that
each has the potential to redeploy all of these weapons unless we can
verify, at a minimum, their location. So by this feature alone, this
treaty contains the seeds of future doubt and suspicion.
Verification ought to be a crucial aspect of our effort to secure
nuclear weapons and materials, and if we cannot be certain that the
numbers of deployed warheads have been reduced, we will not be certain
of the magnitude of the challenge of securing those materials.
Since the height of the arms control negotiations, now almost two
decades ago, the cry of many of my colleagues on the other side of this
aisle--which I remember well for years as we tried to move through
various arms control treaties--was appropriately, as Ronald Reagan
said, ``trust but verify.''
This treaty exhibits a lot of trust but no verification. Accordingly,
I am offering an amendment to help address the critical issue of
verification. It is a very simple amendment, and it really ought not to
present a problem to colleagues. If we are to have more confidence in
this treaty, we should be working with the Russians now to achieve a
viable regime to verify that reductions are indeed taking place on both
sides and that they are taking place in a way that safeguards those
materials. In the absence of any mutually agreed upon verification
regime, we are left to rely on national means and methods to determine
whether or not Russia is making the reductions promised on a reasonable
schedule to meet the December 2012 target date.
My amendment adds a new condition to the Resolution of Ratification
requiring an annual report prepared by the intelligence community on
our ability to monitor Russia's compliance with the Moscow Treaty. For
all those who have worried about trusting, verifying, and knowing what
is happening, this is a very simple requirement, that we learn from our
own intelligence community about our capacity to safeguard the
interests of the United States of America. This national intelligence
estimate must also provide an assessment of the ability of the United
States to monitor compliance with the SORT treaty through the
verification regime of the START I treaty and our ability to monitor
compliance after the START I verification regime terminates in 2009.
Perhaps most notably, under my amendment the intelligence community
is required to inform us of the mechanisms they need to verify treaty
compliance with a high degree of confidence, including consideration of
further agreements between the United States and the Russian
Federation, mutual data exchanges between the two countries,
improvements in the transparency of reductions that are called for in
this treaty, technological improvements, and other appropriate
mechanisms.
I have long viewed this treaty's lack of verification measures as a
source of grave concern. I spoke out in the Foreign Relations Committee
on each occasion that this treaty was considered. Last summer, when the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on
[[Page S3235]]
the treaty, I noted the huge contradiction in it, the lack of
verification and accountability in the reduction, and the fear that
these weapons or materials might fall into the hands of terrorists.
While I understand that we cannot mandate the dismantlement of
warheads or the security of nuclear materials without renegotiating
this treaty, it is critical we have an understanding, in order to
protect the security interests of our country, of our own ability to
monitor Russian compliance, where that ability might fall short and to
understand a perspective on what we simply do not know. Without
meaningful verification, there is a great deal that we will not know.
And in this case, what we don't know can, indeed, hurt us in this
dangerous world that we live in today.
Last month, I voted in committee to bring the treaty to the full
Senate but not without reservation. At that time, I registered my
serious concern about the treaty's lack of verification measures, about
the lack of milestones or targets other than the 2012 date, and about
the peculiarity of a treaty that expires on the very same day that it
reaches its intended goal.
The amendment I offer today is intended to drive at the heart of the
verification issue. I know several of my colleagues have offered or
talked about other important fixes to address the shortcomings of this
treaty, and I applaud their efforts, but at its heart this treaty
represents a missed opportunity. It almost represents a treaty for the
sake of a treaty without regard to the longer term security interests
and strategic interests of the United States.
We missed an opportunity to help make the world safer for our
children in the long term. We missed an opportunity to eliminate
thousands of nuclear weapons for the long term, and not just to reduce
deployed weapons for the short term. We missed an opportunity to
advance American-Russian relations in a way that, in fact, builds a
stronger foundation of trust between our two great countries.
By addressing the verification issue as envisioned in my amendment, I
believe we can at least learn from our own intelligence community--
which we ought to be willing to trust--what more needs to be done to
provide the transparency and verification so essential to any agreement
of this nature. If we are to make America safer, and we must, it will
take more than cosmetic treaties that leave Russia's nuclear arsenal in
place. As Ronald Reagan told the Nation, ``History has shown that peace
will not come, nor will our freedoms be preserved, by good will
alone.''
We have work still to be done to meet today's challenges, and I
believe one of those challenges is to fix the Moscow Treaty.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, let me respond to the distinguished Senator
from Massachusetts by reviewing, once again, the origins of the Moscow
Treaty. At the time that President Putin and President Bush met in May
of last year, Russia had made the decision that the distinguished
Minister of Defense of Russia, Sergei Ivanov, announced that the
Russians would be destroying warheads in a matter of course,
dismantling them from missiles. President Bush had indicated that as a
matter of fact, unilaterally, the United States was prepared to do the
same. For a variety of reasons--some economic, some safety--both
countries had decided upon a course of action. When the two Presidents
came together to formulate their joint announcement, the Moscow Treaty
was formed.
As has been pointed out, first it was not clear that a treaty would
be formulated, but ultimately both leaders decided that was the best
course. That is why the treaty is simple. It, clearly, does not cover
all of the objectives of arms control that can be covered in further
negotiations, and many of us hope there will be further negotiations,
not only in the nuclear area but in the biological area where in the
course of this we have pointed out there is still a lack of
transparency on the part of the Russians, as we perceive it at certain
military facilities.
In the case of the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator
from Massachusetts as a way of shoring up a treaty that he has
criticized, let me say that the major verification procedure now in
place is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, very specifically.
At Surovatika, Senators and Members of the House have witnessed four
missiles coming into that plant each month. They are destroyed.
Clearly, the warheads have been separated from the missiles prior to
that destruction. That four-a-month situation is going to continue
unless for reasons of our own parliamentary procedure we stop the
funding.
Clearly, you can verify the missiles. In my last visit to the site, I
was accompanied by the governor of the territory, the mayors of various
towns and radio stations in Russia. Why? Because this is a jobs issue.
Russians employ people destroying missiles. Nothing very secret about
it; they are swarming around. A television station from Indianapolis,
channel 13, accompanied me on that occasion, took pictures of the
entire process and put it on a remarkable documentary on Indianapolis
television.
We need to catch up with where verification is in the world. It is on
the ground, with Americans working in cooperative threat reduction with
Russians.
The missiles that come in are interchangeable SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS-
19s. We visited with plant officials about their further planning on
SS-24s and 25s. This is the comprehensive scope of what we are talking
about. These are, in fact, the missiles on which the warheads were
located and from which they have been separated.
In a future treaty the United States and Russia may decide they wish
to go much further with regard to the destruction of the warheads
themselves. That point has been made by many Senators that the treaty
does not call for the destruction of warheads. But, in fact, warheads
are being destroyed by Russia and by the United States.
In terms of both of our countries, we have decided not to have
transparency to the point that both nations are inspecting that
process, but we are able to verify the results. I point out that the
intelligence report that perhaps the Senator is calling for may be
covered in large part by the cooperative threat reduction annual report
to Congress. This one is for fiscal year 2002, a detailed summary not
only of nuclear dismantlement and demolition but, likewise, anything we
are doing in chemical and biological, too.
I admit there are areas, as I have said earlier, that we are not into
yet, and we wish we were. My hope is we will be successful as two
nations in seeing eye to eye on movement in that direction.
When it comes, however, to the verification of this Moscow Treaty, it
flows from the fact that both nations of their own will want to destroy
the missiles and separate the warheads and thus reduce the viability of
these situations. We have indicated at our own time, at our own speed,
we will do that. And the linchpin from the beginning, it seems to me,
is the fact not only of the START requirements that do expire in 2009
but the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program on the ground which has no
expiration unless Congress decides to terminate it. That is a different
debate and a different set of decisions.
I am hopeful Senators will understand that. I appreciate the fervent
plea for verifiability for all of us. As I say, I admit, I wish we had
a better insight into the disposition of all of the warheads, but even
here both Russians and Americans indicate in the fullness of time that
these warheads have to be destroyed. In large part that is because
sometimes the fuel components in them are unstable. They become a
danger for the nation that is simply holding them.
This is not a sporting goods situation of inert matter on shelves.
These, unfortunately, are far too living, viable, dynamic instruments.
This is why we have worked with Russia on the fissile material that
comes from the destruction of these warheads; to provide storage for
that. It is a whole new set of problems.
Some arms control people have suggested that while the warhead is on
the missile, you do not have the problem of fissile material that might
get loose and be bought or sold. It is contained. That is still true
while it is in the warhead. As it comes out of the warhead, a whole new
set of problems is created--
[[Page S3236]]
of storage and of accountability. We are working with the Russians
through our Department of Energy on these accountability projects,
which are intense and vigorous.
For these reasons, I oppose the amendment of the distinguished
Senator from Massachusetts. I hope other Senators will oppose it. It
appears to me to be unnecessary. I would say, simply, other criticisms
of the treaty are certainly a matter of the opinion of the Senator, but
it was a modest treaty. It came from the volition and the will of both
countries coming together at their own time, at their own speed, and
with procedures that seem to me to offer an adequate amount of
verifiability, much of it on the site and through the eyes of the
Russian press, as well as our own.
I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, as the chairman of the committee knows, I
have so much respect for him. We rarely have disagreements.
In essence, he sort of made my case just now. I have never argued
about the destruction of some of the missiles that are going in. I
talked about the warheads and fissionable material. Fissionable
material is not in the missile; it is in the warhead. The distinguished
chairman just said, I wish we had a better sense of the disposition of
those warheads. I wish we had a better sense of the disposition of
those warheads.
All I am asking for is that we ask our intelligence communities. Is
the Senate scared of asking its own intelligence community for a report
on our capacity to know where those materials are and what is
happening? That is all I am asking.
On the floor of the Senate, I cannot go into what we have heard in
private, in classified sessions. But this amendment is based on my
knowledge of what our intelligence community is concerned about and
what I believe we ought to be concerned about in this country. So as
the chairman says, I wish we had a better sense of what is happening to
those warheads.
If we are willing to go to war in Iraq because we think it is
dangerous for that man to have nuclear warheads, and we know that 15
out of some 20 efforts to transfer this material has come from Russia,
we better be concerned about these warheads. That is what this is
about. That is precisely what involves the security of the people of
the United States of America, and that is what this amendment is about.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote in
relation to the Kerry amendment, No. 255, occur at 5:40 today, and the
time until then be equally divided in the usual form, provided that no
further second-degree amendment be in order to the amendment prior to
the vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I add one final argument, and that is the
actual text of the amendment of the distinguished Senator from
Massachusetts requires these intelligence reports on the capability of
the United States to monitor the compliance of the Russian Federation
to the requirements of the treaty.
The treaty does not require insight into the warhead destruction.
That is a desirable aim, and I have indicated in due course we may be
able to negotiate that, but that is not a part of this treaty.
Therefore, the report that is being asked for really asks for
information that is not covered by the treaty.
I repeat, the information that is covered by the treaty, it seems to
me, is really adequately monitored by the cooperative threat reduction
personnel.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. LUGAR. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be very brief. Let me, as we say in
this body, associate myself with the remarks of my colleague and say it
in a slightly different way. The Senator is asking us to have the
intelligence community monitor something that there is no capacity to
monitor because there is no provision in the treaty requiring the
monitoring. It is a little bit like saying we would like the President
to report to us, on a yearly basis, the cost of the destruction or
dismantling or taking off of alert or removing from a silo every
missile that is removed by the Russians.
That would be great, but it is not in the treaty. There is no
provision.
Regarding the ultimate criticism, the primary criticism the Senator
from Massachusetts makes of the treaty is accurate. There is not much
to this treaty. There is not much to it. As I said in my very long
opening statement, the administration, when they testified before the
committee, said: Look, we were going to do this anyway. We were going
to do this anyway. So we told the Russians, in effect paraphrasing the
Secretary of State, we told the Russians if you want to come along,
come along; if you don't, you don't.
The whole rationale of this administration is the bet that the cold
war is over, it is truly and forever behind us. I hope they are right.
This treaty affords few protections in the event of a heightened
mistrust that develops, or a crisis. It doesn't have any protections.
So we are not kidding each other, between now and 2012 the Russians
could go out, if they were capable of doing it financially, and build
10,000 more nuclear weapons. They could dig 40,000 more holes for
silos, if they had the money. There is nothing in this treaty that
prevents that.
I know we are all railing against what the treaty should have been;
what, if we personally were negotiating it, we would have done. But,
unfortunately, I say to my friend from Massachusetts, he has a tough
call the rest of us must make. If you don't like what is in it, and
there is a great deal that is not in it that we would like to have in
it, vote against it. Vote against it. But you can't fix something that
is not broken, in effect--the treaty has no verification. It has no
requirement the warheads be destroyed. There is no requirement they be
accounted for. There is no requirement that there, in fact, be any
progress shown until December 31, 2012.
If you view all of these deficiencies as fatal flaws, then vote no,
just flat vote no because you cannot fix them. You cannot fix them. The
only way I think we could fix them is if we get the administration and
Russia and the United States on a positive track here. We have them on
a track. The track is that upon which we have agreed. As Sam Nunn said,
this is a good-faith treaty. That is the bottom line.
The reason I am for this treaty is failure to ratify it, I believe,
will be read as bad faith. Ratifying it demonstrates good faith, and
our hortatory language--the message we have sent personally in terms of
each individual Senator speaking to the administration--the language in
our declarations and conditions and the amendments on the floor makes
it clear to the administration that there is clearly a majority of
Members of the Senate who would like to see more done. We are not
criticizing what has been done. We just would like more done.
I understand the frustration. Believe me. I understand the
frustration. The greatest concern--and I think we have taken care of
it--is if, in fact, the Russians do not have the engineering and/or
financial capability of meeting the commitment they have made to reduce
their deployed forces, we will help them. That is the best thing we can
do. That is what we have done.
I suggest we should support this treaty and we should oppose this
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the
distinguished ranking Member. Let me be very clear. I am not asking for
anything to be done here that isn't monitoring of this treaty. If you
look on page 2 of my amendment, it says I am looking for ``an estimate,
for each strategic nuclear weapons system in the Russian Federation, of
the confidence of the United States, whether low, medium, or high, in
the capability of the United States to monitor the deployed warheads of
such systems.''
[[Page S3237]]
I am looking for ``an assessment of the capability of the United
States to monitor the compliance of the Russian Federation with the
requirements of the Treaty.''
This is to make sure we can see that this treaty, as the minority
ranking Member has called it, as limited as it is--I am trying to
making sure we can comply and know that we have the ascertainment of
our intelligence community with respect thereto.
That is precisely what my amendment does.
I yield my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. FRIST. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr.
Domenici), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. McConnell), and the Senator
from Oregon (Mr. Smith) are necessarily absent.
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Florida (Mr. Graham) and
the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Miller) are necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coleman). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 45, nays 50, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 42 Ex.]
YEAS--45
Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Byrd
Cantwell
Carper
Clinton
Conrad
Corzine
Daschle
Dayton
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feingold
Feinstein
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Mikulski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Stabenow
Wyden
NAYS--50
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Bennett
Biden
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Chambliss
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Ensign
Enzi
Fitzgerald
Frist
Graham (SC)
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
McCain
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Voinovich
Warner
NOT VOTING--5
Domenici
Graham (FL)
McConnell
Miller
Smith
The amendment (No. 255) was rejected.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and I move to
lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Amendment No. 256
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I expect to take just a few minutes. I will
be offering an amendment and then having a colloquy. I send an
amendment to the desk on behalf of myself, Senator Daschle, Senator
Akaka, and Senator Nelson of Florida.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The senior assistant bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin] for himself, Mr.
Akaka, Mr. Daschle, and Mr. Nelson of Florida, proposes an
amendment numbered 256.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To provide an additional element in the annual implementation
report)
In section 2, in paragraph (2)(F), strike ``; and'' and
insert a semicolon.
In section 2, redesignate paragraph (2)(G) as paragraph
2(H).
In section 2, after paragraph (2)(F), insert the following
new subparagraph:
(G) with respect to the strategic offensive reductions
described pursuant to subparagraph (B) for a calendar year, a
listing of--
(i) the total number of each type of strategic offensive
nuclear warhead that will be in the nuclear weapons stockpile
of the United States during the calendar year, and the total
number of each type of strategic offensive nuclear weapon
that will operationally deployed by the United States during
the calendar year;
(ii) the number and type of nuclear warheads in the United
States that are dismantled during the previous calendar year;
and
(iii) to the extent possible, the total number of each type
of strategic offensive nuclear warhead that will be in the
nuclear weapons stockpile of the Russian Federation during
the calendar year, and the total number of each type of
strategic offensive nuclear weapon that will be operationally
deployed by the Russian Federation during the calendar year.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, condition 2 of the Resolution of
Ratification requires the President to submit to the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committee an annual report
that would include, among other things, the following: A, a listing of
the strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the United States and a
best estimate of the strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the
Russian Federation as of December 31 of the preceding calendar year; B,
a detailed description, to the extent possible, of strategic offensive
reductions planned by each party for the current calendar year.
The purpose of this amendment is to clarify that those elements of
the report should include certain important information on
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
I have discussed this matter with Senators Lugar and Biden, and I
think we can address the issue satisfactorily with a colloquy between
myself and Senators Lugar and Biden.
My question of Senator Lugar is the following: Will the committee
urge the administration to include under the annual reporting
requirements required by conditions 2(a) and 2(b), that the Committees
on Foreign Relations and Armed Services would receive information on
the following: During the calendar year of the report, the specific
number and type of warheads that are planned to be no longer
operationally deployed; secondly, during that current calendar year,
the planned total size and makeup of the stockpile of strategic nuclear
warheads by number and by type; and as to the past year, the report
would then, hopefully, include and be urged to include by Senators
Lugar and Biden the total number and type of any warheads that were
dismantled during the preceding calendar year?
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I am pleased to respond to the
distinguished Senator from Michigan. Our report does not require
information on those warheads that are not operationally deployed. We
would urge the administration to provide this information.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I may respond to my colleague, I am not
sure whether condition 2 requires the executive branch to list force
reductions or force levels by warhead types. But I certainly think it
is a good idea to do so, and I would urge the administration to do so.
In addition, I think the administration should make a decision on
warhead dismantlement. Quite frankly, my support for ratification of
this treaty is based in part on the administration's assurance before
our committee that at least some warheads removed under the treaty will
be destroyed or dismantled, and I fully expect the administration to
live up to this. So I think the Senator is making a very valid point.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank both Senators for the assurance that they will
urge the administration that the reporting provided for under the
Resolution of Ratification would hopefully include the information I
have just outlined.
Amendment No. 256, Withdrawn
Mr. President, I now withdraw the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment is
withdrawn.
Alert Status of U.S. Russian Nuclear Forces
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I wish to ask the Senator from
Delaware and the Senator from Indiana some questions about one of the
issues that was raised during the hearings conducted by his committee
on this treaty, and one of the questions not addressed by this treaty
that I believe to be critical to reducing the danger of accidental or
unauthorized nuclear war: the alert status of U.S. and Russian nuclear
forces.
Like me, I know that they are concerned that the current alert status
of
[[Page S3238]]
U.S. and Russian nuclear forces leaves open the possibility that, by
continuing to maintain those nuclear forces that will not be
operationally deployed under the Moscow Treaty on so-called hair
trigger alert status, we increase the chances of an accidental or
mistaken launch of nuclear weapons or, worse still, provide additional
vulnerability to terrorist who might seek to hack into our nuclear
command and control system and launch weapons.
I was pleased to note that the report of the Foreign Relations
Committee on this treaty addresses the concerns that the alert status
issue creates for crisis stability raised by former Senator Nunn, and
the suggestion made by Gen. Eugene Habiger, the former Commander in
Chief of U.S. Strategic Command that ``We may have to find a way to
move more weapons off alert status''.
What are the views of the Senator from Delaware and the Senator from
Indiana on this issue, and the desirability of moving nuclear weapons
off alert status?
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I think that the new relationship between
the United States and Russia can only be improved by taking nuclear
weapons off alert status. By giving decision makers more time to react
to disturbing information, this would lower the risk of a nuclear war
caused by one side's mistaken belief that the other was attacking it. I
am especially impressed, moreover, by the fact that Gen. Eugene
Habiger, former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command feels
that the time has come to do this. I would note, however, that General
Habiger warned that existing specific de-alerting proposals were often
not viable.
Mr. LUGAR. During our hearings on the treaty, a number of witnesses
expressed concern about the alert status of U.S. strategic nuclear
warheads. As the United States and Russia enter a new era of friendship
and cooperation, we must take a close look at what we can do, in a safe
and effective manner, to take nuclear weapons off alert status and
prevent an accidental nuclear launch due to a false alarm or a
miscalculation. I know our friend and former colleague Senator Sam Nunn
expressed hope in our hearings that we might address the cold war-era
nuclear postures of the United States and Russia as a critical next
step following ratification of the Moscow Treaty.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. In addition to recommending an ``immediate
standdown'' in the alert status of the nuclear forces reduced under
this treaty, it is my understanding that in his testimony, General
Habiger also suggested that a system to take weapons off alert status
in ways that make sense, are transparent, and do not compromise our
security be designed by teams by people who actually build the weapons.
Given this commonsense recommendation--and the failure of the treaty
to address this question--I would like to ask the Senator what action
he would recommend the Senate take to make General Habiger's suggestion
a reality? What measures, if any, does he plan to address this issue in
an appropriate manner this Congress?
Mr. BIDEN. The Foreign Relations Committee's report encourages the
President to establish a commission of weapon system experts to
undertake the review that General Habiger proposed. It adds that if the
President does not do so, Congress could usefully act on its own,
either to establish such a commission or, perhaps, to commission the
National Academy of Sciences to set up such a group.
Mr. LUGAR. The Senator from Delaware is correct, and while we have
not determined precisely how to proceed, I expect that we will want to
encourage action by the President before we move on our own. Such a
measure could be offered as an amendment to major legislation such as
the Department of State authorization bill.
I can say with confidence that Senator Biden and I are agreed that we
should continue to pursue this initiative in ways that will provide
productive results.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Senator from the Delaware and the Senator
from Indiana for their leadership and hard work on this issue, and I
look forward to continuing to work with him, on additional legislation,
if need be, to pursue this initiative.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise to engage the distinguished
leadership of the Foreign Relations Committee in a colloquy.
Mr. President, for the past several years I have been increasingly
concerned about the ``loose nuke'' threat presented by the Russian
Federation's arsenal of non-strategic or ``tactical'' nuclear warheads.
Unlike strategic nuclear forces, intermediate range nuclear forces, or
even conventional forces in Europe, tactical nuclear arms are not
covered by any arms control treaty. There are no formal negotiated
limits of any kind, no way to hold current and future Russian leaders
to the unfulfilled promises of steep reductions made by former Soviet
President Gorbachev and former Russian President Yeltsin more than a
decade ago. In fact, we do not even have a good estimate of how many
tactical warheads Russia has because the United States has no
inspection rights. Unclassified estimates of the current Russian
stockpile have ranged widely, from 7,000 warheads to 18,000 warheads--
four to eleven times as many as the United States. I am very troubled
by the insufficient security at Russian nuclear warhead storage
facilities and al Qaida's known interest in acquiring these horrific
weapons. Am I right to understand that my colleagues share this
concern?
Mr. LUGAR. I share the concern voiced by the senior Senator from
North Dakota on the potential proliferation threats posed by non-
strategic nuclear weapons in Russia. As the Senator knows, the United
States has voiced serious concerns about the safety and security of
these dangerous weapons stored at multiple locations around Russia. I
believe the Russian tactical nuclear weapons arsenal represents an area
of concern and needs attention.
Mr. BIDEN. I agree with the Senator from North Dakota and the
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar. During
hearings last year on the Treaty of Moscow now before the Senate,
several of our distinguished witnesses mentioned Russia's tactical
nuclear stockpile, including former Senator Nunn. The smaller size and
greater number of these weapons puts them at higher risk for theft by,
or illicit sale to, terror networks such as al-Qaida.
Mr. CONRAD. I thank my colleagues, who perhaps remember that in 1998
I authored legislation passed by Congress that identified Russia's
tactical nuclear stockpile as a serious proliferation threat and called
for United States pressure on Russia for real reductions. I was
therefore disappointed that a requirement for Russian tactical warhead
dismantlement and United States inspection rights were not part of the
Treaty of Moscow. The disconnect between the ability of the United
States to maintain current strategic force levels almost indefinitely,
and Russia's inevitable strategic nuclear decline due to economic
realities, gave our side enormous leverage that I believe we should
have used to win Russian concessions on tactical nuclear arms. While I
am encouraged that the resolution of ratification before us includes a
declaration on accurate accounting and security, it does not mention
Russian tactical nuclear reductions. I have prepared a corrective
amendment and would welcome the support of the chairman and ranking
member of the Foreign Relations Committee.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Senator from North Dakota for his work on this
important issue and his thoughtful invitation. I would ask that the
Senator from North Dakota withhold his amendment with the understanding
that the Foreign Relations Committee will make a serious effort to
elevate the matter of Russian tactical nuclear weapons to a top
priority on our Nation's arms control and threat reduction agenda.
Mr. CONRAD. Would the chairman and ranking member be willing to hold
hearings in the coming months focusing on the threats associated with
Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile? Furthermore, would the chairman
and ranking member be willing to join me in urging the President to
develop a comprehensive plan to reduce the Russian tactical threat,
including making Russian tactical warhead reductions a priority in our
dealings with the Russian Federation?
[[Page S3239]]
Mr. LUGAR. The ranking member and I have plans to hold hearings on
the continued proliferation challenges in Russia. Clearly the threat
posed by tactical nuclear weapons would be an important topic to be
discussed and investigated in that forum. I believe that tactical
nuclear warhead reductions should be a top United States priority in
our new relationship with Russia.
Mr. CONRAD. Would the chairman and ranking member consider sharing
their views on the threats posed by the proliferation of tactical
nuclear weapons with the administration? Might I propose a letter
indicating our shared concerns and our hopes that this issue will be a
high priority for the administration in future discussions with Russia?
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Senator for his thoughts. This issue was
raised repeatedly during our hearings on the Treaty. I am confident of
the administration's efforts to engage Russia on this issue. I would be
happy to reinforce the committee's views on these issues with the
appropriate Administration officials.
Mr. BIDEN. Let me echo the comments on the chairman. After entry into
force of the Moscow Treaty, getting a handle on Russian tactical
nuclear weapons must be a top arms control and non-proliferation
objective of the United States Government. I look forward to joining
the chairman in holding hearings on this matter and in writing to the
administration with the Senators from Indiana and North Dakota. A
comprehensive approach to this problem, as the senior Senator from
North Dakota suggests, is sorely needed.
Mr. CONRAD. I thank my colleagues for their concern about this clear
and present ``loose nuke'' threat and for their supportive statements
today. We cannot afford for this blind spot in our non-proliferation
efforts to go uncorrected. With the assurances of the chairman and
ranking member, I withdraw my amendment and yield the floor.
Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, the treaty between the United States of
America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions
also known as the ``Moscow Treaty'' obligates each side to reduce the
number of its strategic offensive nuclear warheads to a range of 1,700
to 2,200 by the end of 2012. This treaty is a good beginning and I
congratulate the President for making a complete break with past arms
control approaches by placing reliance on deterrence and missile
defense. The enemies of American must clearly understand that they
cannot attack or threaten us with impunity and that our Nation will
have a national missile defense in place as soon as possible.
President Reagan coined the phrase ``trust but verify,'' This phrase
could have no greater meaning than when it is applied to the Moscow
Treaty.
I recently returned from Moscow where I was deeply impressed by the
dramatic transformation underway in that huge country. While there is
no doubt that Russia is on the track towards democracy and a free
market economy, it is equally clear to me that the Russians are not at
the stage where they can be given a blank check to implement the Moscow
Treaty. Congress has authorized more then $4.7 billion for U.S.
programs aimed at helping Russia and other newly independent states to
reduce the threats from their weapons of mass production. The Moscow
Treaty does not expressly deal with the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction program but the objectives of the treaty cannot be achieved
without extending this assistance to Russia. The only certainty about
future costs to implement this treaty is that the costs are uncertain
and that the uncertainty goes toward how much higher costs will be.
According to a GAO report issued this week, ``. . . a pilot facility to
destroy 14 percent of Russia's chemical weapons over an 11-year period
would cost the United States almost $890 million--an increase of about
$150 million from the estimate . . .'' Higher program cost uncertainty
is compounded by Russia's apparent inability to pay for its agreed-upon
share of project costs.
Another problem with an effective reduction of weapons of mass
destruction is that Russia is not always willing to provide access to
its sensitive national security sites. Access is essential to verify
that the Parties are living up to their part of the agreement.
According to the same GAO report, U.S. inspectors do not have access to
the sites in Russia where 90 percent of the materials used in weapons
of mass destruction are stored. Access issues largely revolve around
trust, and, frankly, this treaty highlights the need for access; it
does not solve the problem.
Despite its obvious incompleteness and inadequacies, the Moscow
Treaty is a step in the right direction of reducing and limiting
strategic nuclear warheads. Reliance on a START I verification regime
as provided in the treaty is not, of course, satisfactory, but it can
provide a block in the foundation for good faith implementation through
a genuine verification scheme.
President Bush is headed in the right direction in working to build a
constructive partnership with Russia. American does not fight wars with
democracies. While a reduction in nuclear weapons is an important
element on both sides in building the trust and mutual dependence
needed for a stable, long-term relationship, I want to stress the
importance of maintaining the Nuclear Triad. Our land-base missile
systems, in particular, play an essential role in ensuring this
Nation's security. With 200 Minuteman III missiles, Malmstrom Air Force
Base, in my State of Montana has and will continue to play a critical
role in our national security.
The Moscow Treaty deserves the advice and consent of the Senate so
long as it is seen as the beginning and not the end of the long path we
must follow to rid the earth of weapons of mass destruction and threats
to our national security.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, it is one of those ironies of history that
the U.S. Senate began debate on the ratification of the latest and
historic arms control treaty on the day that historians mark as the
50th anniversary of death of Stalin. Whether, in fact, Stalin died on
this day, or whether he had been poisoned a few days before, is a fact
that, like so many others of Soviet history, is clouded with
uncertainty. But it is a fact that he was one of the most brutal
dictators of the 20th century and he died at a time when the Soviet
Union was a global foe of the United States.
More interesting for this debate, Stalin's death in 1953 occurred at
a time when our nations were just beginning a strategic competition
that would see our nuclear stockpile grow to massive and frightening
levels before we reached our first accommodations, nearly 20 years
after Stalin's death.
Today, while we still have many cultural and political differences
with the Russian state, we cooperate on more issues than we compete,
and we do not compete under the threat of nuclear annihilation.
A decade ago, the Soviet Union went to the dustbin of history, and
with it went an ideological enmity that locked us in a spiral of
growing nuclear arsenals and the existential comfort of mutually
assured destruction, a comfort that made sense to the strategic
thinker, but left of lot of other people all over the world, including
in our own societies, feeling quite insecure.
After President Nixon initiated an era of arms control agreements
with the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, or SALT, the pendulum
began to swing the other way. And, as is often the case with historic
pendulums, it far exceeded a sensible point. By the early 1980s, while
strategic arms treaties had already reduced the aggregate megatonnage
of our combined strategic arsenals, a school of arms control theology
had been accepted that, as is often the case with the social science
theology of the moment, threatened to overcome all rationale thinking
on strategic issues. The answer to all arms control issues was always
yet another treaty. Existing treaties were sacrosanct, with the wise
old dictum so famously and wisely uttered by Bismarck in the 19th
century ignored: ``At the bottom of all treaties is written in
invisible ink, rebus sic stantibus''--Until circumstances change.
Circumstances did change. Technologies barely imaginable in the
1960s, when the first strategic treaties were contemplated, became
commonplace in the 1980s. An era of self-enforced vulnerability to
mutually assured destruction, enshrined in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, became anachronistic as physicists and engineers first
[[Page S3240]]
imagined missile defense and then a visionary president, Ronald Reagan,
grasped its potential to defend societies against missiles armed with
weapons of mass destruction. In doing so, President Reagan reflected a
very American belief that know-how and new thinking can provide
security to those who never felt secure under mutual assured
destruction.
What bumpkins and dreamers, the conventional arms control theologians
declaimed. Let us dismiss these simpletons and disparage their thinking
as ``Star Wars,'' they said; as if the Strategic Defense Initiative had
anything to do with stars or wars, but instead a more secure world here
on earth.
Today, it would be inaccurate to state that we have developed missile
defense to a functionally deployable state. But, we are closer to a
functional stage than those who dismissed it out-of-hand ever imagined.
They were wrong and, today, our challenges to perfecting missile
defense are largely in engineering, no longer scientific. A grateful
Nation has President Reagan to thank for being able to transcend the
conventional wisdom and believe in American creativity and technology
to move us into a new strategic era.
But the arms control lobby would not relent, or even reform, through
the 1980s and 1990s. We had some good arms control agreements
negotiated, signed and ratified--I supported the START treaties. We had
some treaties that I believed did not enhance our security--and I voted
against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. While I have generally
supported the idea that bilateral and verifiable reductions of the
strategic arsenals of Russia and the U.S., preserving necessary
strategic arsenals of Russia and the U.S., preserving necessary
strategic force structures, was stabilizing and therefore in our
interest, I have never believed that this world would be more secure if
the U.S. handicapped its nuclear option.
Circumstances changed. Our global foe of 30 years ago is not our
primary threat today. The mutual assured destruction doctrine that held
the world in nuclear check for nearly 50 years became suspect, an old
strategic doctrine of vulnerability. New threats and new, vicious
substate actors became the threats that brought us grief and anxiety.
We saw technologies spread to a host of rogue nations, many of which
hold explicitly antagonistic postures toward the U.S. In 1998, a
congressionally mandated Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United States, chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, brought to
light the fact that, ``concerted effects by a number of overtly or
potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with
biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the U.S., its
deployed forces and its friends and allies.'' Further, the report
concluded that ``the threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging
capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has
been reported in estimates and reports by the intelligence Community.''
Such clarity in assessment forced us to refocus the efforts of the
Intelligence Community, and they responded.
But it also forced us to continued to challenge the conventional
wisdom on arms control at the time, and that required that we face up
to fact that we needed to proceed with our research and development of
a missile defense capability, and that, if we were serious about this,
we had to recognize that we would need to abandon the ABM Treaty.
One candidate for the 2000 presidential election shared the vision of
President Reagan. He recognized that the ABM Treaty was not sacrosanct.
In fact, he had read the test, which plainly allowed for the U.S. to
withdraw. I don't know if President Bush knew the doctrine in
international law of rebus sic stantibus, but President Bush certainly
knew that the strategic situation had changed, and U.S. national
security required that we not constrain our security for tomorrow by a
concept from yesterday. Such an approach was to guarantee insecurity.
And President Bush understood something fundamental about strategic
doctrine: insecurity does not sustain stability.
President Bush told us all that the days of the ABM were limited. And
the arms control lobby went, to make a bad pun, ballistic. Abandoning
the ABM Treaty with Russia would herald a new era of unrestrained
nuclear competition, as both sides would try to outbid the other's
arsenal with enough weapons to overwhelm, they declared with certainty
bread of doctrinaire conviction.
President Bush and his advisers didn't flinch in their thinking. But
they did address the question: If the fear is that withdrawing from the
ABM Treaty which we did--the U.S. withdrew from the Treaty on December
13, 2001 and the Treaty was effectively terminated 6 months later--then
the U.S. will match our withdrawal from the ABM with a new proposal to
lower the START II levels to historic new reductions.
And on March 24 of last year, the Russian Federation and the United
States concluded the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which
will now be overwhelmingly passed as this body provides our advice and
consent.
This is a historic moment for nuclear arms reduction. It is, more
importantly and in my opinion, a historic moment in the evolution of
arms control doctrine.
The treaty reduces operationally deployed warheads for both sides to
a range of 1,700 to 2,200 by December 31, 2012. Today our arsenals are
more than twice that level. The reductions are to be implemented based
on the established START I verification regime and mechanism, which
will be in place until 2009. The treaty allows for consultation and
extension of verification mechanisms beyond that time.
The Treaty allows either party to ``determine for itself the
composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms,'' meaning
that we will be able to configure our triad according to the evolving
needs of our nuclear posture review. The treaty does not link the
objectives to our continued Cooperative Threat Reduction program,
appropriately known as the Nunn-Lugar programs, recognizing all of the
work the current chairman of Foreign Relations Committee and our former
Democratic colleague have committed in their careers toward the cause
of disarmament. I commend my colleagues on the Foreign Relations and
Armed Services committees for engaging the administration in extensive
discussions about continued support for this program. I strongly
approve the administration's commitment to this program, and I will
continue to support their budget for this.
Lord Palmerston said in the 19th century, ``We have no eternal allies
and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and
perpetual.'' Our interests evolve year-by-year, and the world remains a
very hostile place. Russia competes with us geopolitically, but it does
so in the Security Council, not in strategic arms.
It is in the interests of the world that our two arsenals be reduced,
and it is in the interests of both of our countries that we reduce them
with transparency, and flexibility.
These principles are enshrined in the Moscow Treaty. I commend the
administration for concluding it with Russian administration, and I
urge the Russian Duma to proceed with their own ratification, as I
encourage my colleagues today to join me in support of this historic
treaty.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for
ratification of the Moscow Treaty which will require the United States
and Russia to reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700
and 2,200 each by December 31, 2012. This treaty marks an important
step forward in the relationship between the United States and Russia
and reduces the dangers posed by strategic nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, I am concerned that the treaty does not go far enough and
I believe its flaws must be addressed if we truly want to make the
threat of nuclear war a thing of the past.
It should be pointed out that at one time the administration did not
even want a treaty, preferring to reach a ``gentleman's agreement''
with Russia instead. I am pleased that President Bush changed course
and recognized the value in committing the reduction of strategic
nuclear warheads to a binding, legal document.
That document now before us is welcome but its brevity--all of three
pages--indicates that certain issues were left out or swept aside.
[[Page S3241]]
First, the treaty does not actually require the United States or
Russia to destroy any nuclear warhead. Either side may comply with the
provisions of the treaty simply by ``deactivating'' the warhead and
placing it in storage for possible redeployment. And, each side
reserves the right to decide what exactly ``deactivation'' means.
This runs counter to the whole point of reducing the dangers of
nuclear weapons by eliminating them once and for all. Have we really
made a step forward in securing a better world for ourselves and future
generations if both sides can re-arm at a moment's notice? And have we
really made progress if the actual number of warheads destroyed is
rather small?
Russia, for one, simply can not afford to maintain its current number
of strategic nuclear warheads. But I am concerned that if we do not
actively destroy more of our strategic nuclear warheads, Russia may
feel compelled to keep more of its own, thus diverting valuable
resources away from more pressing needs. And, I think everyone
recognizes that Russia's ability to safely and securely store any
warheads is far less than our own and the potential that they may fall
into the wrong heads much higher.
Second, the treaty does not contain a detailed verification regime to
judge compliance with its provisions. The treaty only mentions the
creation of a Bilateral Implementation Commission that will meet twice
a year. No more. The START Treaty, in contrast, contained provisions on
detailed notifications, regular data exchanges, onsite inspections, and
continuous monitoring of select facilities.
President Reagan was found telling his Soviet counterparts that when
it came to reducing the number of nuclear weapons, his motto was
``Trust, but verify.'' Though the Soviet Union is no more and Russia
and the United States have a new relationship based on friendship and
cooperation, I believe President Reagan's words still ring true.
Eliminating nuclear warheads is serious business and it is beneficial
and, necessary, even for friends, to closely monitor, and verify, the
progress of each side. We will enhance and deepen the trust and
cooperation between Russia and the United States by doing so. So, I
would urge the administration to use the Bilateral Implementation
Commission as a forum for negotiating a detailed verification regime.
Third, there is no timetable for implementation and no mileposts to
judge progress before the Treaty expires. The only date and milepost
mentioned is the deadline to reach 1,700 to 2,200 strategic nuclear
warheads by December 31, 2012.
Thus, over a 10-year period, with no verification regime, we will
have no indication on how Russia is achieving the goals of the treaty
until the very day it is bound to reach those goals. And then the
treaty expires unless both sides agree at some point to extend it.
Again, trust and cooperation are built on verification and openness.
I urge the administration to press for detailed timetables and
mileposts to ensure that both sides are actively complying with the
provisions of the treaty and will reach the final marker at the stated
time.
Fourth, the treaty does not address tactical nuclear weapons. As my
colleagues know, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the number,
location, and secure storage of Russian tactical nuclear weapons.
Smaller and more portable than strategic nuclear weapons, they are
vulnerable to theft or sale to terrorist groups. Yet, the treaty does
not even mention them.
This is a glaring oversight and the dangers posed by tactical nuclear
weapons--especially now in the post-September 11 world of global
terrorism--warrants the immediate attention and action by both Russia
and the United States. I urge the administration to press for an
accurate accounting of and adequate safeguards for tactical nuclear
warheads and to work towards reducing their number.
Finally, the treaty does not address the alert status of our nuclear
forces. I offered, and withdrew, an amendment to address this issue
earlier. Suffice to say that I am very concerned that in this era of a
new relationship between the United States and Russia, we still keep
our nuclear weapons on high alert or hair trigger status. This greatly
increases the chances of an accidental or unauthorized launch or
miscalculation which would result in unthinkable devastation.
Clearly there are problems with this treaty but I will vote for
ratification because it is a step forward towards the goal of reducing
the dangers posed by strategic nuclear weapons.
But there is a lot of work to be done to make this Treaty truly
worthwhile. As our former colleague Senator Sam Nunn stated in hearing
held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Moscow Treaty:
If [the Treaty] is not followed with other substantive
actions it will become irrelevant at best and
counterproductive at worst.
I hope the administration will take these words to heart and get to
work on the important issues left out of the treaty so that we will be
able to leave a world for future generations safer from the horror of
nuclear war.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of this resolution
of ratification for the Treaty Between the United States of America and
the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, otherwise
known as the Moscow Treaty.
This treaty is a masterstroke. It represents, and, I am sure, will be
sent as ushering in a wholly new approach to arms control for a wholly
new era. The simplicity of this treaty is a marvel. It is extremely
brief, indeed just three pages long. It is shorn of the tortured
benchmarks, sublimits, arcane definitions and monitoring provisions
that weighed down past arms control treaties.
This is for a very good reason. The simplicity and brevity of this
treaty reflect the simple fact that the US and Russia have moved beyond
the enmity of the cold war era. The treaty recognizes this fact. It
assumes a degree of trust between nations that are no longer on the
precipice of war. Indeed, this treaty is the ultimate confirmation of
the fact that arms control does not lead to real peace; rather, real
peace--in this case made possible by a democratic transformation in
russia--leads to arms control.
The old cold war approach to arms control treaties is clearly
outmoded. Can anyone truly believe that a 700-page behemoth like the
START I treaty is relevant to today's situation? Clearly, such an
approach would not reflect today's radically changed political and
strategic environment. As such, it would not serve America's real
security needs.
This treaty does. The most important thing to remember about this
treaty is that it was negotiated after the United States independently
determined the number of strategic warheads that were needed for our
security. The outcome of the negotiations with Russia simply ratified
our own prior determination. This is in stark contrast to the old
approach to arms control, whereby arms control agreements preceded and
ultimately drove our military and strategic decisions.
The long lead time for achieving reductions and the lack of sublimits
and interim benchmarks in the treaty also serve our interests by
preserving much needed flexibility. Looking at the fluid, almost
chaotic, situation in the world today, with new threats having arisen
in just the past year or so--attacks on our homeland, nuclear weapons
developments in North Korea and Iran--one can foresee that
circumstances could easily change over the next decade. If
circumstances and threats change, so too might our strategic nuclear
requirements. Thus, it is only prudent that we not box ourselves in.
The drafters of this treaty in the Bush administration were wisely
cognizant of that fact.
Mr. President, this treaty--and the forward-looking, post-cold war
mindset that serves as its basis--deserves our strongest support. I
urge my colleagues to approve this resolution of ratification.
Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I support ratification of the Moscow
Treaty without any amendments or further conditions set upon it by the
Senate. Ratifying this resolution as it was unanimously reported out of
the Committee on Foreign Relations is the right thing to do.
This treaty is a tremendous step forward in the effort to make this
world a safer place. This is especially significant in light of all
that is going on in the world with our fight against terrorism. It is
especially important and
[[Page S3242]]
significant to work in this way with the Russian Federation. This
treaty and mutual framework helps further align and strengthen the
growing relationship between Russia and the United States. We should
all be encouraged that Russia's Duma has made no reservations about
this treaty and is expected to approve it soon after the Senate
approves it.
The Moscow Treaty reduces the aggregate number of operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a range of 1,700 to 2,200 by the
end of 2012. This is a tremendous accomplishment that deserves the full
support of the Senate and the Russian Duma. President Bush and Russian
President Putin hold this as a high priority in getting this treaty
ratified in a timely manner.
This treaty was considered in a deliberative and thoughtful manner by
the Senate. The Foreign Relations Committee worked in conjunction and
cooperatively with the Armed Services Committee and Intelligence
Committee. As well, the insights, reservations and recommendations on
this issue were solicited and received by Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Richard Myers.
The Moscow Treaty is unlike any arms control agreement we have
participated in with Russia or the former Soviet Union before.
Previously, we spent decades with our counterparts in conferences and
meetings to negotiate treaties. This agreement was concluded more
quickly--with openness, trust, and verification prevailing in a new era
of American and Russian relations.
Traditionally, there have always been many objections to treaties
such as these which limit our arms and possibly put the United States
as risk. Now, we are hearing of some who have said this treaty is not
strong enough. And there has been some legitimate debate about the
verification system and reduction schedule which I and many of my
colleagues share.
But I do not believe these concerns rise to the level to oppose this
treaty since it provides a mutual framework for pursuing the continued
destruction of weapons and missiles whose sole purpose was to be used
against the Untied States. This treaty is too important to oppose. It
highlights and emphasizes the vitality of the new relationship between
the United States and Russia. And with the ongoing war on terrorism,
this is of utmost importance.
Like the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, I believe our storage procedures are sound and I am thankful
for the flexibility within the treaty for our strategic systems. Yet I,
like many others, do share some concerns on the Russian side. But these
concerns are alleviated since the Treaty has avenues we can pursue
which addresses these possible problems to ensure that weapons do not
ever slip into the wrong hands. Also, I am thankful Russia is agreeable
to work with the United States to ensure that these weapons never fall
into the hands of terrorists or rogue states.
Also, one certainly must pay attention to, and demand, a solid
verification system for these weapons. Some point out that the treaty
has a flawed verification system that must be watched closely. But this
criticism has not reached the level of doubt and worry to scrap the
treaty. As well, those critics are operating under the guise of a cold
war mentality. But things have changed in our relationship with Russia.
Secretary Powell has been upfront on this issue in regards to the
verification system in the Treaty. On behalf of the administration, he
has clarified the need to keep the verification process the way it is
within the treaty. The administration points to the fact that the cold
war is over and we must move beyond that thought process. Also,
Secretary Powell argues that we are better served with flexibility and
not rigidity under the treaty.
I believe the level of verification in this treaty is what is needed.
We do know that our American verification experts already have the
START Treaty verification procedures underway. These experts and
procedures will be around for another decade. So, we do have
dismantlement teams and equipment from the United States in Russia.
These teams have been and will continue to cooperatively--with
verification--dismantle these Russian weapons.
Overall, I believe this treaty is in the national interest of the
United States, the Russian Federation, and the world. Of course there
are those critics who say this treaty does not go far enough, and some
may say it goes too far. The purpose of this treaty is not to put an
umbrella over all arms policy for all countries all at once. These
objectives and goals can be made through piecemeal approaches, and this
is exactly what this treaty does.
We have a new ally with the Russian Federation, and we must move
ahead to strengthen our relationship with this new ally and make this
world a safer place. I urge my colleagues to support the Moscow Treaty
without further conditions being set upon it. It is the right thing to
do.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I congratulate Senators Lugar and Biden
on their efforts on this treaty. In their new roles as chairman and
ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, they have gotten off
to an impressive start.
By holding a series of hearings on pressing foreign policy questions,
including the looming war in Iraq, they have helped every Member of
this body and every American.
In addition, they have taken the Moscow treaty, a treaty that came to
us with perhaps more questions than answers, and added some definition.
Their collective labors on behalf of this treaty demonstrate what
bipartisanship leadership on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee can
accomplish.
This treaty represents a positive step forward by calling on the
United States and Russia to reduce their operational strategic nuclear
weapons.
But it is a step long overdue. Many in this body felt these kinds of
cuts were possible years ago. Unfortunately, despite our best efforts
for much of the last decade, Republican opposition prevented us from
implementing the kind of cuts this treaty now recommends.
To ensure that we derive the maximum security benefit possible from
this treaty, the Administration will have to fill in a number of
important holes.
Though the administration has assured us that some nuclear warheads
will be dismantled, the treaty itself does not require the destruction
of any Russian or American nuclear warheads. At best, the treaty will
put warheads out of reach, but, unfortunately, not out of use.
Moreover, the treaty does not include a schedule that spells out when
the deactivations must occur. In fact, the treaty language does not
require the deactivation of a single weapon until December 31, 2012,
the day the Treaty expires.
Finally, the treaty also lacks any concrete commitments on
verification, undermining longstanding, commonsense principle of our
arms control policy.
In years past during Senate discussion of other arms control
treaties, some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle based
their opposition to these treaties on the lack of adequate verification
provisions. Evidently, either verification is no longer as important to
them or they are more willing to trust rather than verify.
Notwithstanding these shortcomings and inconsistencies, Mr.
President, I intend to vote for the Resolution of Ratification, and I
do so because it points our country in the right direction.
But at the same time I would like to send a message as loudly and
clearly as I can to the administration and to my colleagues here in the
Senate: our work to deal with the threat posed by weapons of mass
destruction does not--in fact cannot--stop with this vote.
Last fall, the President's National Security Strategy stated that:
The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads
of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly
declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction,
and evidence indicates that they are doing so with
determination.
We need look no further than the steadily escalating crisis in North
Korea to recognize that the President was right on that point.
You will have to look much harder, however, to ascertain exactly what
the administration proposes to do about this crisis, let alone the
larger issue of proliferation worldwide.
[[Page S3243]]
That is why last night I joined with several of my colleagues,
including Senators Lieberman and Biden, to introduce S. Res. 77, a
resolution that calls on the administration to devise a comprehensive
strategy to confront the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.
The Bush administration's policy to counter proliferation has
suffered from inconsistency. It downplays immediate threats, such as
North Korea, while emphasizing others. It puts together a coalition
against terrorism, but has ignored allies and undercut international
action against proliferation. In sum, the administration's actions have
served to weaken the effort to establish a robust coalition against
proliferation.
Since taking office, the Administration has been deeply ambivalent
about U.S. efforts to secure loose Russian nuclear weapons and
materials and unemployed nuclear scientists. While focusing on Iraq, it
has ignored looming problems elsewhere, such as North Korea and Iran.
And rather than seeking ways to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons,
it pursues doctrines that would effectively lower the threshold for the
use of nuclear weapons, further compounding the threat of
proliferation.
This is too dangerous a situation to ignore any longer. Our
resolution calls for a comprehensive strategy--not unhelpful actions or
ad hoc reactions--to confront the threat proliferation presents to
American citizens.
Among other proposals, we urge the President to begin to build a
coalition against proliferation, immediately and directly engage North
Korea, vastly increase the funding for U.S. programs that secure loose
nuclear weapons, and deliver sufficient homeland security funds to the
state, local and tribal governments so they can prepare their first
responders to respond against further terrorist attacks.
The administration tells us that the Moscow Treaty represents a new
kind of agreement, one that acknowledges we have emerged fully from the
cold war era. We join the President in welcoming this new era.
But we must take this opportunity to create a comprehensive strategy
that recognizes we have entered a new and potentially dangerous era of
proliferation.
To date the administration has failed in that effort. But we cannot
afford to delay any longer.
Time is not on our side. The risks to our security mount with each
day that passes without an administration strategy.
Mr. LUGAR. My understanding is the distinguished majority leader has
a statement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, first of all, I thank Senators Lugar and
Biden for their excellent work over the past 2 days. I appreciate their
leadership on this very important Resolution for Ratification of the
Moscow Treaty.
The treaty is critically important to making the world a safer place
and will lead to dramatic reductions in nuclear arsenals. I commend the
chairmen. The next vote on the adoption of the Resolution of
Ratification will be the last vote of the evening.
In addition, there will be no rollcall votes during tomorrow's
session, although the Senate will be in session to allow Members to
speak in morning business. Many will be speaking on Iraq. If any
Members are interested, I encourage them to come to the floor to do so
tomorrow. The next rollcall vote will be on Monday at 6 p.m.
I thank all Senators for their attention.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the
Resolution of Ratification.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
Is there further debate?
If not, the question is on agreeing to the Resolution of Ratification
with conditions and declarations to Calendar No. 1, Treaty Document No.
107-8, the Moscow Treaty. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. FRIST. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr.
Domenici), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. McConnell), and the Senator
from Oregon (Mr. Smith) are necessarily absent.
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Florida (Mr. Graham) and
the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Miller) are necessarily absent.
The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 95, nays 0, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 43 Ex.]
YEAS--95
Akaka
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Clinton
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Cornyn
Corzine
Craig
Crapo
Daschle
Dayton
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Ensign
Enzi
Feingold
Feinstein
Fitzgerald
Frist
Graham (SC)
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hollings
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
McCain
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Nickles
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden
NOT VOTING--5
Domenici
Graham (FL)
McConnell
Miller
Smith
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two-thirds of the Senators present having
voted in the affirmative, the Resolution of Ratification is agreed to.
The Resolution of Ratification agreed to is as follows:
Resolved, (two thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein),
SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS
AND DECLARATIONS.
The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (T. Doc. 107-8,
in this resolution referred to as the ``Moscow Treaty'' or
``Treaty''), subject to the conditions in section 2 and
declarations in section 3.
SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.
The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of
the Moscow Treaty is subject to the following conditions,
which shall be binding on the President:
(1) Report on the role of cooperative threat reduction and
nonproliferation assistance. Recognizing that implementation
of the Moscow Treaty is the sole responsibility of each
party, not later than 60 days after the exchange of
instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and annually
thereafter on February 15, the President shall submit to the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed
Services of the Senate a report and recommendations on how
United States Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance to the
Russian Federation can best contribute to enabling the
Russian Federation to implement the Treaty efficiently and
maintain the security and accurate accounting of its nuclear
weapons and weapons-usable components and material in the
current year. The report shall be submitted in both
unclassified and, as necessary, classified form. (2) Annual
implementation report. Not later than 60 days after exchange
of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and annually
thereafter on April 15, the President shall submit to the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed
Services of the Senate a report on implementation of the
Treaty by the United States and the Russian Federation. This
report shall be submitted in both unclassified and, as
necessary, classified form and shall include
(A) a listing of strategic nuclear weapons force levels of
the United States, and a best estimate of the strategic
nuclear weapons force levels of the Russian Federation, as of
December 31 of the preceding calendar year;
(B) a detailed description, to the extent possible, of
strategic offensive reductions planned by each party for the
current calendar year;
(C) to the extent possible, the plans of each party for
achieving by December 31, 2012, the strategic offensive
reductions required by Article I of the Treaty;
(D) measures, including any verification or transparency
measures, that have been taken or have been proposed by a
party to assure each party of the other party's continued
intent and ability to achieve by December 31, 2012, the
strategic offensive reductions required by Article I of the
Treaty;
(E) information relevant to implementation of this Treaty
that has been learned as a result of Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) verification measures, and the status of
consideration of extending the START verification regime
beyond December 2009;
(F) any information, insufficiency of information, or other
situation that may call into
[[Page S3244]]
question the intent or the ability of either party to achieve
by December 31, 2012, the strategic offensive reductions
required by Article I of the Treaty; and
(G) any actions that have been taken or have been proposed
by a party to address concerns listed pursuant to
subparagraph (F) or to improve the implementation and
effectiveness of the Treaty.
SEC. 3. DECLARATIONS.
The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of
the Moscow Treaty is subject to the following declarations,
which express the intent of the Senate:
(1) Treaty interpretation. The Senate reaffirms condition
(8) of the resolution of ratification of the Document Agreed
Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE) of November 19, 1990 (adopted at
Vienna on May 31, 1996), approved by the Senate on May 14,
1997, relating to condition (1) of the resolution of
ratification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.
(2) Further strategic arms reductions. The Senate
encourages the President to continue strategic offensive
reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with
national security requirements and alliance obligations of
the United States.
(3) Bilateral implementation issues. The Senate expects the
executive branch of the Government to offer regular
briefings, including consultations before meetings of the
Bilateral Implementation Commission, to the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate on any implementation issues related to the Moscow
Treaty. Such briefings shall include a description of all
efforts by the United States in bilateral forums and through
diplomatic channels with the Russian Federation to resolve
any such issues and shall include a description of
(A) the issues raised at the Bilateral Implementation
Commission, within 30 days after such meetings;
(B) any issues related to implementation of this Treaty
that the United States is pursuing in other channels,
including the Consultative Group for Strategic Security
established pursuant to the Joint Declaration of May 24,
2002, by the Presidents of the United States and the Russian
Federation; and
(C) any Presidential determination with respect to issues
described in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
(4) Nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Recognizing the
difficulty the United States has faced in ascertaining with
confidence the number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons
maintained by the Russian Federation and the security of
those weapons, the Senate urges the President to engage the
Russian Federation with the objectives of
(A) establishing cooperative measures to give each party to
the Treaty improved confidence regarding the accurate
accounting and security of nonstrategic nuclear weapons
maintained by the other party; and
(B) providing United States or other international
assistance to help the Russian Federation ensure the accurate
accounting and security of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
(5) Achieving reductions. Recognizing the transformed
relationship between the United States and the Russian
Federation and the significantly decreased threat posed to
the United States by the Russian Federation's strategic
nuclear arsenal, the Senate encourages the President to
accelerate United States strategic force reductions, to the
extent feasible and consistent with United States national
security requirements and alliance obligations, in order that
the reductions required by Article I of the Treaty may be
achieved prior to December 31, 2012.
(6) Consultations. Given the Senate's continuing interest
in this Treaty and in continuing strategic offensive
reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with
national security requirements and alliance obligations of
the United States, the Senate urges the President to consult
with the Senate prior to taking actions relevant to
paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article IV of the Treaty.
Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. REID. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I express my appreciation to Senator Biden
for his leadership and management of this treaty and to all Members of
the Foreign Affairs Committee, including the distinguished occupant of
the Chair, and also Senators who contributed constructively to, I
believe, a very important achievement.
I specifically mention staff Members who were most supportive and
helpful: Tom Moore, Ed Levine, Jofi Joseph, Brian McKenan, Jason Hamm,
Ken Myers, Sr., and Kenny Myers, Jr. We are appreciative of staff on
both sides of the aisle for a remarkable piece of work.
I yield the floor.
Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________