[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 32 (Thursday, February 27, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2906-S2909]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                              North Korea

  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Michigan for his courtesy and appreciate very much his comments with 
regard to the budget and his extraordinary leadership with regard to 
many issues involving our military challenges and priorities abroad.
  Three weeks ago, I came to the Senate floor to address the 
intensifying crisis in North Korea, a country and a situation that I 
believe poses a risk to our Nation every bit as serious as that posed 
by Saddam Hussein. At the time, I urged President Bush immediately and 
directly to engage the North Korean Government in discussions to bring 
about a verifiable end to that country's nuclear weapons program.
  Unfortunately, the administration so far has failed to act, and, in 
the meantime, the crisis in North Korea continues to escalate. In 
recent days, we have seen reports that North Korea test-fired a new 
missile, evidently that regime's idea of an inauguration present for 
South Korea's incoming President. Just today, the newspapers contain 
reports that North Korea has restarted one of the reactors at its 
primary nuclear complex, a reactor that produces spent plutonium which 
can then be converted into weapons grade material.
  Let's be clear about what this latest provocation means. It means 
North Korea could have a nuclear production line up and running and 
producing weapons grade nuclear material in a matter of months. It 
means the world's worst proliferator could have enough nuclear material 
to produce six to eight nuclear weapons by summer.
  According to Brent Scowcroft, President George Bush's National 
Security Adviser, if we fail to act, it means ``We will soon face a 
rampant plutonium production program that could spark a nuclear arms 
race in Asia and provide deadly exports to America's most implacable 
enemies.''
  Unfortunately, the administration continues to insist on downplaying 
this threat. These latest developments should confirm for anyone 
watching that this is a crisis that only grows with each day the 
administration fails to act. I come to the floor today to join with my 
colleague, the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, to urge 
the administration to act now.

[[Page S2907]]

  The first step toward action is to acknowledge there is a problem. 
Based on a series of administration statements that play down the 
threat posed by North Korea's actions, it appears many in the 
administration are not even willing to take this step. For example, for 
quite some time now, the administration refused to call this situation 
even a crisis.
  Last month, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the world's 
nonproliferation efforts, and the response from Under Secretary of 
State John Bolton, ``Not at all expected,'' and on Monday after the 
missile test, the administration is quoted as saying that this was 
``just a periodic event.'' Secretary Powell called the test ``not 
surprising and fairly innocuous.''
  So what do we do? I believe we must begin by making certain we are on 
the same page as our allies. Failure to do so will only produce a 
failed policy. Unfortunately, while the administration says the right 
things about the importance of coalitions, it is unwilling or unable to 
do the right things to build a coalition.
  The administration continues to insist on multilateral discussions 
with the North Koreans while our friends and others have consistently 
and repeatedly urged President Bush to engage in bilateral talks. 
Therefore, the administration must redouble its efforts with our allies 
in South Korea, Japan, with the Chinese, and the Russians.

  Second, we must make it clear to the North Koreans that separating 
plutonium from the spent fuel rods at Yongbyon represents an 
unacceptable threat to our collective security. We should tell North 
Korea what we expect of them directly: That if it verifiably freezes 
all nuclear activities, we and our allies are prepared to discuss the 
full range of security issues affecting the peninsula, as well as other 
steps North Korea can take to reenter the international community.
  This is not news to the administration. In fact, the President 
himself has suggested he is prepared to have just these kinds of talks.
  Yet, I must say, regrettably, the administration still delays. It 
allows the crisis to deepen and relations with our friends who are most 
directly threatened by North Korea to suffer. In fact, what would 
reward North Korea is to continue to stand by while it builds a nuclear 
arsenal. The danger within North Korea is too urgent for the President 
to delay this any further.
  Finally, let me also take advantage of having my colleague, Senator 
Levin, in the Chamber to discuss a recent exchange of letters with the 
administration on this issue. Senators Levin, Biden, and I laid out our 
concerns to the administration about its North Korean policies and 
provided recommendations in a series of letters. I recently received a 
response from Dr. Rice, and I ask unanimous consent to print our 
January 31 letter and Dr. Rice's February 10 response in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                 Washington, DC, January 31, 2003.
     Dr. Condoleezza Rice,
     National Security Adviser, The White House, Washington, DC.
       Dear Dr. Rice: We wrote to you earlier this month about our 
     increased concern regarding the crises on the Korean 
     peninsula. Our concern has deepended significantly as a 
     result of a report in today's New York Times, which was 
     confirmed by the Administration, that the U.S. government has 
     evidence that North Korea is removing spent nuclear fuel rods 
     from storage. These rods, which had been securely stored 
     under IAEA monitoring from 1994 until recently, reportedly 
     contain enough plutonium to produce roughtly a half dozen 
     nuclear weapons.
       As alarming as this report is, we are just as troubled by 
     the Administration's reported reaction to these developments. 
     Prior to this disclosure, the Administration said nothing 
     publicly or privately to Congress about these activities. 
     According to comments attributed to senior Administration 
     officials, the Administration has consciously decided to hold 
     this information in an effort to avoid creating a crisis 
     atmosphere and distracting international attention from Iraq.
       This muted response to the world's worst proliferator 
     taking concrete steps that could permit it to build a nuclear 
     arsenal stands in stark contrast to the President's statement 
     on Tuesday evening that ``the gravest danger in the war on 
     terror . . . is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, 
     chemical, and biological weapons.'' It is also increasingly 
     difficult to square the Administration's rehtroic on Iraq and 
     decades of U.S. policy aimed at discouraging the emergence of 
     declared nuclear powers with its continued downplaying of the 
     threat posed by North Korea's blatant disregard for 
     international rules on proliferation.
       As the crisis with North Korea continues to escalate, the 
     Administration's policy has not gotten any clearer. The 
     Administration's lack of a clear, consistent policy and our 
     failure to take concrete steps to address this growing crisis 
     has produced consternation and confusion. One result is that 
     our allies in the region appear to be taking a course 
     directly at odds with the Administration's latest 
     pronouncements.
       Given the stakes of the situation and the ongoing confusion 
     about the Administration's policy, we request that you come 
     brief the Senate as early as is practical to discuss that we 
     know about North Korea['s latest actions and what the United 
     States is doing in response.
       We look forward to hearing from you as soon as possible
           Sincerely,
     Tom Daschle.
     Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
     Carl Levin.
                                  ____



                                              The White House,

                                Washington, DC, February 10, 2003.
     Hon. Thomas A. Daschle,
     Democratic Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Leader: Thank you for your letter regarding U.S. 
     policy on North Korea.
       I agree with you about the need to take effective action in 
     light of North Korea's recent actions to restart its nuclear 
     facilities at Yongbyon. The United States is working closely 
     with friends and allies toward our objective of the 
     elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program in a 
     verifiable and irreversible manner.
       However, I disagree with the assertion contained in your 
     letter that, prior to the New York Times article on January 
     31 on recent North Korean activities, ``the Administration 
     said nothing publicly or privately to Congress about these 
     activities.'' I also reject any suggestion that the 
     Administration consciously withheld information from Congress 
     to avoid distracting attention from Iraq.
       The Administration has regularly briefed and consulted 
     Members of Congress regarding policy toward North Korea and 
     Iraq. For example, Deputy Secretary Armitage briefed Senators 
     on January 16 on recent intelligence on activities at North 
     Korean nuclear facilities and steps taken by the 
     Administration in response to these actions. He also 
     testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
     February 4.
       In addition, the CIA has routinely provided briefings and 
     written reports to Members and its oversight Committees. CIA 
     briefed Senate Foreign Relations staff on three occasions in 
     December on North Korea WMD issues, and on January 29, 
     published an article on North Korean nuclear-related 
     activities in the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) 
     that addressed the issues discussed in the New York Times on 
     January 31. The January 29 article was one of nine such 
     articles published in the SEIB on North Korea in January 
     alone. The SEIB is delivered daily to the CIA's oversight 
     Committees and to the Office of Senate Security where it is 
     available to Senators and appropriately-cleared staff.
       In the days and weeks ahead, it is my hope that we can work 
     together to address the challenges we face on a range of 
     critical national security issues, including North Korea and 
     Iraq.
           Sincerely,

                                             Condoleezza Rice,

                                        Assistant to the President
                                    for National Security Affairs.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Unfortunately, little in Dr. Rice's letter addresses our 
policy concerns. Rather, the bulk of her comments are dedicated to 
rebutting a claim in our letter that Congress has not been adequately 
consulted about some explosive findings revealed in a January 31 New 
York Times article.
  The article stated that the U.S. Government has evidence North Korea 
had begun moving spent fuel rods out of a secure storage area, a 
development that was subsequently confirmed by the administration. 
Movement of spent fuel rods would either suggest that North Korea was 
getting ready to reprocess that fuel to build new weapons or was trying 
to hide the spent fuel from the international community. In either 
case, this is a very significant finding that we believed then and 
still believe deserves to be brought to the Congress's attention.
  While Dr. Rice rightly points out that Congress has been briefed on 
North Korea issues generally, including a briefing by Deputy Secretary 
Armitage on January 16, we are not aware of any administration briefing 
that provided us with information on this specific development prior to 
the New York Times story. And in recent testimony before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Deputy Secretary Armitage implicitly 
acknowledged that fact.

[[Page S2908]]

  The reason to bring this up is because we are facing a crisis on the 
Korean peninsula, a crisis with extremely high stakes, a crisis that 
demands robust American response, a crisis that demands we be clear 
with each other and with the American people. Given the stakes of the 
situation and the ongoing confusion about the administration's policy, 
we should expect no less.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, will the Democratic leader yield just for 
some questions?
  Mr. DASCHLE. Before I yield the floor, I am happy to yield to the 
distinguished Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Is the Senator aware of a statement which was made before 
us--I do not know how he would be, but let me brief him on it. We had 
the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency in front of the Armed 
Services Committee a couple of days ago, and we asked him whether or 
not in his judgment there was a crisis on the Korean peninsula because 
of the actions of North Korea in removing these seals from the spent 
fuel, eliminating the cameras and kicking out the inspectors. Even 
though the administration is unwilling to put the label ``crisis'' on 
what is going on on the Korean peninsula, Admiral Jacoby was more than 
willing to say, yes, this is a crisis.
  I am wondering if the Democratic leader would agree that part of the 
problem that we have in dealing with the North Korean situation is the 
unwillingness to see it for what it is, which is a major proliferation 
threat when there is a country that has been the world's greatest 
proliferator, including Libya and Iran, missiles and missile 
technology, when there is a country with a nuclear program that they 
acknowledge removes the inspectors from its country, whether or not 
that would represent progress if we could just at least get the 
administration to acknowledge what the head of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency says, which is that we have a crisis on the Korean peninsula?
  Mr. DASCHLE. I think the Senator asks a very good question. This is 
more than just a semantical issue. Whether one calls it a crisis, an 
emergency, whatever volatile term one wishes to apply, clearly this 
deserves more of a response than this administration has provided.
  I wonder what would have happened if Iraq had been the country with 
the evidence now to suggest that weapons of mass destruction, nuclear 
weapons, would be produced with the degree of certainty that we now see 
them in North Korea, what would the administration have said to that? 
If Iraq had fired a test missile within the last 2 weeks, what would 
the administration have said of that? My hunch, is that they would have 
used the word ``crisis'' and then some.
  They have already claimed, of course, that North Korea is a member of 
the so-called axis of evil, an unfortunate term in my opinion. But to 
avoid using the word ``crisis,'' I believe, lends a real serious 
credibility question to the administration's foreign policy with regard 
to the region. This is a crisis. Every expert has acknowledged that it 
is a crisis. Unless we are willing to recognize the reality of the 
implications of this crisis, I believe the crisis will only worsen.
  The Senator from Michigan has made a very important point with his 
question.
  Mr. LEVIN. In addition to looking a problem square in the eye and not 
sugarcoating it, if we are going to solve it, another part of the 
administration's platform relative to Korea, or approach to the Korean 
problem, is to say that the multilateral approach is the right 
approach. I am always glad to hear when the administration is willing 
to work multilaterally. I have been a critic of the administration 
because their unilateral rhetoric activities, it seems to me, have been 
counterproductive in many parts of the world. So whenever the 
administration talks about a multilateral approach or consulting with 
allies and friends, that is good news. But when they do the 
consultation, when they talk to South Korea, both its former President 
and its new President, as well as when they talk to China, as well as 
when they talk to Japan, as well as when they talk to other allies in 
the area, they are told the same thing. When they do use the 
multilateral approach, they are told: Engage in direct discussions with 
North Korea. As a matter of fact, the representative of the new 
President of South Korea, the special envoy of new President Roh, 
visited us. His name is Dr. Chyung, and he visited with us on February 
3.

  That was, again, the open advice, he said, of the South Korean 
Government, is to have the United States talk directly with North Korea 
so that they can hear from us what our concerns are; so that both sides 
can avoid any kind of miscalculations; so that we do not fuel the 
paranoia this isolated regime has. They are paranoid. They are 
isolated. They actually believe we might strike them with one of our 
preemptive strikes. They actually believe it.
  So the advice we are getting when we talk to our allies and follow 
this multilateral approach is engage with North Korea, and yet we 
refuse to do so.
  I am wondering whether the Senator would agree that it is not only 
important that we consult with allies, not necessarily follow the 
advice but at least give serious consideration to the advice they give 
us when they talk to us about a direct engagement with North Korea to 
avoid miscalculation, so that the North can hear directly from us what 
our major concerns are?
  Mr. DASCHLE. I appreciate the question posed by the Senator from 
Michigan. This whole experience has turned logic on its head. We have 
220,000 troops in the gulf. We are told that there is almost an 
inevitability of war. We are told that the reason for this near 
inevitability is because of weapons of mass destruction that we have 
yet to find in Iraq and because of an unstable leader in Iraq.
  These assertions have required the administration to go to great 
lengths to try to prove that their findings are ones that could be 
recognized by the world community. With all of their best effort, they 
have yet to demonstrate to the satisfaction of some of our allies that 
the threat exists to the extent the administration perceives it, and 
yet there is a clear set of circumstances that are undeniable in North 
Korea. There is a very questionable leader spurring development of 
nuclear weapons in the most rapid way, which we know could be sold 
quickly to terrorist organizations and used against us and the world 
community. Yet this administration chooses to ignore it.
  The Senator asks the question, why would we not engage the community 
and recognize the importance of confronting North Korea? The 
administration says the answer to that is they do not want to reward 
bad behavior.
  I argue that we are rewarding bad behavior by ignoring the 
circumstances as this administration has chosen to do. What could be 
worse behavior than what is going on right now?
  As I understand it, we began to reship food assistance to the North 
Korean people within the last few days. We have no real guarantee that 
aid is going to get to the people, but it is a very unusual message 
they are sending to both Iraq and North Korea. Of all those who would 
be most confused it would be our allies. How do they explain all of 
this? What credibility do we have with them as we attempt to 
rationalize this odd position we find ourselves in today?
  I appreciate the question, and I would simply say to my colleague 
that it begs further explanation by the administration which, again, 
because they refuse to call this a crisis, they have yet to provide.
  Mr. LEVIN. This administration has blown hot and cold when it comes 
to policy relative to North Korea.
  I just have one final question.
  The Democratic leader points out just how confusing a policy it is, 
not just for North Korea but for our own allies. Our ally with the most 
at stake on the Korean peninsula is South Korea. They could be 
destroyed if there is a miscalculation. Their capital is within range 
of tens of thousands of artillery of North Korea.
  On March 6, 2001, on the eve of a summit between then South Korean 
President Kim Jong-Il and President Bush, Secretary of State Powell 
said we plan to engage with North Korea and to pick up where President 
Clinton and his administration left off.
  Within 24 hours was the Secretary of State's statement that we were 
going to engage with North Korea and pick

[[Page S2909]]

up where the Clinton administration left off because the Clinton 
administration obtained the framework agreement that resulted in the 
canning of that very material which is so dangerous which contains 
plutonium. Within 24 hours, at the summit the next day, President Bush 
basically said: We are not going to have any discussions with North 
Korea. We are not picking up where the Clinton administration left off. 
We do not trust North Korea.
  No kidding. That is a mild statement, that we do not trust North 
Korea. If we did not talk to people we did not trust, we would not be 
talking to half of the world, including some of the most dangerous 
people in the world.
  Talking to people does not mean we are going to reward anything. It 
simply means they will hear directly, eyeball to eyeball, from us as to 
what our concerns are, and also why we do not threaten them, and why, 
if they will terminate their nuclear program, they can rest assured 
they will get an agreement from us that there is not going to be any 
active aggression against them.
  The blowing hot and cold, the erratic policy, the undermining not 
just of our own Secretary of State 24 hours after he said we would 
continue a policy, but undermining our South Korean allies with so much 
at stake, it seems to me has contributed to a very uncertain policy on 
the Korean peninsula, has sowed the seeds of confusion, and fueled and 
contributed to the paranoia that already existed in spades in North 
Korea.
  I have been to Yongbyon, the place in North Korea where they were 
canning those fuel rods, where they had sealed them. I don't know that 
any other Member of the Congress got there, but I got there a couple 
years ago. I watched the International Atomic Energy Agency as they 
were sealing those fuel rods. That was a very positive thing to watch, 
to actually see, under IAEA inspection and supervision, those 
incredibly dangerous nuclear materials being canned instead of 
threatening to the rest of the world as potential proliferated 
material, to actually see it put under the supervision of the IAEA.
  That is now out the window. We are starting from scratch. I 
understate my feelings on the matter when I say the Senator, the 
Democratic leader here, has so accurately stated the fact that we have 
a problem. Step 1 is to recognize we indeed have a crisis. Step 2 is 
not just to consult with allies but to seriously consider what they 
recommend when they talk about having direct engagement with the North 
Koreans.
  I thank the Democratic leader for his constant determination to keep 
this Korean peninsula crisis in front of us. We cannot lose sight of 
it. It is a greater threat than Iraq because in North Korea you have a 
known proliferator who has removed the inspectors and who has nuclear 
material which could be so easily distributed, shipped, or sold to 
people who could do great harm with it.

  I thank my friend from South Dakota.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the distinguished Senator from Michigan.
  We can learn a lot from history. History, for most of my lifetime, 
involved a cold war, a cold war with an archenemy--the Soviet Union--
which had thousands of nuclear warheads pointed toward the United 
States. They posed an imminent threat that could at any moment destroy 
all of civilization.
  We made the choice, for good reason, Republican and Democratic 
administrations made the choice, that rather than engage in conflict, 
we would contain, negotiate, disarm, and ultimately wear down those 
leaders of the Soviet Union. That is ultimately what happened. The 
Soviet Union collapsed, negotiations for disarmament continued, and I 
recognize the contribution of many Presidents, from Harry Truman on.
  But it was Ronald Reagan who said: Trust but verify. He did not say: 
I don't trust the Soviet Union, so I'm not going to enter into dialog 
with them. He was criticized at times, but he said: I'm going to engage 
in dialog. I'm going to continue the effort of my predecessors. I'm 
going to trust. But then I'm going to verify.
  What the Senator from Michigan noted is that a couple of years ago 
that verification process was underway. We trusted. And we verified. 
His site visit was an indication of that verification.
  I can only hope that those responsible for the day-to-day decisions 
made with regard to U.S. foreign policy will recognize the importance 
of past precedent, that we engage our enemies, we engage those whom 
there is ample reason to distrust, but we recognize that without some 
communication, without some engagement, the only other option is 
conflict.
  The only other option is to see what is happening today. Nuclear 
weapons are being constructed. Nuclear weapons are being stockpiled. 
Nuclear weapons could be shipped. Nuclear weapons could be used not 
only in the region but against this country, as well. Every day we 
delay, every day we lack the will to confront and communicate, every 
day we lack the desire to verify, every day we create a problem more 
complex for future leaders and for future American policy.
  I hope this administration will very carefully reconsider their 
position. I hope they will listen to our allies. I hope they will 
engage the North Koreans. I hope they can give us greater appreciation 
with greater clarity of their intentions with regard to that part of 
the world.
  I yield the floor.

                          ____________________