[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 25 (Tuesday, February 11, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2182-S2183]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
WHY NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE DOES NOT PROTECT HAWAII
Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, in December 2002 President Bush announced
his decision to deploy a limited national missile defense system by
2004. Our distinguished colleague, Senator Levin, detailed the
limitations of the proposed system and testing procedures in an article
in the Detroit News on December 29 entitled, ``Untested Missile Defense
Setup Poses Risks.'' I ask unanimous consent that his entire article be
placed in the Record following my statement. I would like to elaborate
on some of the concerns raised by the distinguished ranking member of
the Armed Services Committee and discuss my concern that this system
does nothing to protect my State or other parts of the United States
from attack.
President Bush's limited national missile defense system, first
proposed by the administration in March 2001 and called ``the Alaska
Option,'' consists of 5 to 10 silos/interceptor launchers in Fort
Greely, AK and an upgraded Cobra Dane radar on Shemya Island, AK.
At that time, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Missile
Defense Agency Director Gen Ronald Kadish called the Alaska site a
``test bed'' that could be transformed into a fully operational
facility easily. During an Armed Services Committee hearing in July
2001, Mr. Wolfowitz stated, ``This developmental capability could
become, with very little modification, an operational capability.'' In
a later statement, he added that ``it would be essentially a software
change to turn it into an operational capability.''
I believe that more than modest modifications would be required. Even
if the test bed was functioning and proven effective, significant
changes would be needed to make it an operational system. The changes
may not be technically difficult but they are very complicated when
applied as a whole system. They involve many command, control,
communication issues that will determine who makes the decision to fire
and when and with how much information. In large and complex research
and development programs, one should always be wary of anything that is
described as ``just a software fix.''
In July 2001 Phil Coyle, former Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation in the Pentagon testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee and defined effective deployment as the fielding of an
operational system with some military utility that is effective under
realistic combat conditions, against realistic threats and
countermeasures, possible without adequate prior knowledge of the
target cluster composition, timing, trajectory, or direction, and when
operated by military personnel at all times of the day or night and in
all weapons.
Mr. Coyle estimated that it would take a decade, rather than 4 years,
to produce an effective defense system. As Senator Levin raised in his
article, no part of the limited missile defense system has been tested
against realistic targets, and there are no plans to test the
integrated system as a whole before it is deployed. Senator Levin
correctly questions whether such a system will be even marginally
effective.
One could also question whether this system should be labeled a
``national'' missile defense. Given the geometry of the Cobra Dane
radar, the system may be better labeled a continental missile defense.
The Cobra Dane Radar on Shemya Island was built to detect Soviet
missile launches. It has a fixed orientation and a narrow field of
view, northwest from Shemya, towards Russia. This radar cannot see
missiles launched from North Korea towards Hawaii, and will have only
marginal capability for southern California. The radar cannot see the
current missile defense target range between California and Hawaii.
The administration is well aware of the limitations of the radar and
exclusion of Hawaii in the proposed deployed system. General Kadish
referred to this as ``the Hawaii problem'' during a briefing for
Senator Reed and members of the Armed Services Strategic Subcommittee
on July 27, 2001. At that time, General Kadish said that they were
considering using an Aegis cruiser to supplement the Cobra Dane radar.
Such a cruiser would have to be permanently on station to provide
adequate coverage.
Even with upgrades to increase the radar's field of view, the radar
still will not be capable of discriminating launch characteristics or
trajectory. An X band radar, such as the one now in Kwajalein, is
needed. In fact, no radar in Alaska will be able to discriminate launch
characteristics. The administration has not asked for funding to
upgrade the existing radar or build a new one.
The President characterized in December 2002 his initiative to field
a missile defense system as ``modest.'' The program is less than
modest. It is inadequate and expensive. The path towards an effective
and efficient missile defense program is the one outlined by Senator
Levin.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Detroit News, Dec. 29, 2002]
Levin: Untested Missile Defense Setup Poses Risks; Can Missile Shield
Be Built?
(By Senator Carl Levin)
President Bush's decision to deploy a limited national
missile defense system starting in 2004 before it has been
tested and shown to work violates common sense. The Pentagon
will spend large amounts of money to deploy an unproven
defense, money that could be better used to fight more likely
and imminent threats of terrorism.
Many of us have reservations about deployment of a national
defense against long-range ballistic missiles because: (1)
the intelligence community says such missiles are one of the
least likely threats to our security (in part because use of
such missiles would leave a ``return address'' that would
guarantee a devastating response from the United States); and
(2) because deployment of a national missile defense is
likely to unleash an arms race with other countries.
However, even ardent proponents of a national missile
defense should not support deployment of an untested,
unproven system. The United States may eventually succeed in
developing a national missile defense system that will
actually work against real world threats, but we have not
done so yet. According to the Pentagon, the national missile
defense system to be deployed in 2004 requires a new booster
rocket that has never been tested against any target.
[[Page S2183]]
The 2004 system would rely on a radar in Alaska built in
the 1970's that was never designed for missile defense, that
has no capability to differentiate the target warhead from
decoys, that has never been tested against a long-range
ballistic missile, and that the administration never plans to
test against a long-range missile.
No part of the system has been tested against realistic
targets, and there are no plans to test the integrated system
as a whole before it is deployed. Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld has said that this is just an ``initial capability''
in a program that ``will evolve over time'' and will
ultimately ``look quite different than it begins.''
What the Pentagon has tried not to emphasize is that this
``initial capability'' is likely to be marginally effective,
if it works at all. Declaring this untested, marginal system
ready to deploy is like declaring a newly designed airplane
ready to fly before the wings have been attached to the
airframe and the electronics installed in the cockpit.
In his previous tenure as Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld
had to preside over the dismantling of the Safeguard missile
defense system which he had inherited and which was
operational for less than six months because the technical
limitations of the system rendered it ineffective. The
development, deployment and dismantling of the Safeguard
system cost the taxpayers tens of billions of dollars without
enhancing our national security in any way. This is an
experience that we should not want to repeat.
Since that time, Congress has instituted reforms in the
Defense Department to help prevent the premature and costly
fielding of unproven systems. Congress established the
Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to
oversee major defense programs and ensure they are adequately
tested and demonstrated to work before they are deployed--in
other words, that any new system is proven to ``fly before we
buy.''
Congress also established the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council, which gives the military services oversight over
weapons programs to ensure that they perform well enough to
be useful on the battlefield.
The Bush administration, however, has unwisely exempted all
missile defense programs from the normal oversight of these
important organizations. As a result, these programs are not
subject to normal review by senior military and civilian
acquisition officials, and they are not subject to the normal
operational test and evaluation process.
Instead, the secretary of defense has delegated many of the
functions of these offices to the Missile Defense Agency,
effectively making that agency responsible for overseeing
itself. History shows that without real oversight, major
weapon systems don't work well, suffer serious schedule
delays and have major cost overruns.
The Bush administration should re-establish effective
oversight of missile defense programs by the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation, the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council, and other oversight organizations with the
Department of Defense. Rather than rushing to deploy an
unproven national missile defense system, the administration
should focus on completing the development of a missile
defense that will be effective against likely threats and
that is shown to work through proper testing.
____________________