[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 22 (Thursday, February 6, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2037-S2044]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ASBESTOS IN ATTIC INSULATION
Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I rise today to share a story with my
colleagues. It's a true story about a family who happened to live in a
neighborhood in Spokane, WA. They could have easily been in Memphis or
Minneapolis or Midland as well. But they lived in my State, in Spokane,
a typical American city in Eastern Washington.
Mr. President, as part of realizing their American dream, Ralph Busch
and his wife Donna bought a house. They were newlyweds, and this was
the home they bought after getting married. They soon discovered that
it needed roof repairs, and so Ralph spent quite a bit of time in the
attic, working on his roof.
The following year they found they had to renovate an addition that
was put on the house in the 1950s.
They both had full-time jobs, so they spent many nights and weekends
working on their home. They knocked down walls and tore through the old
insulation, drywall and wood. They sanded and hammered and spent two
entire years fixing up the place.
One morning, Ralph was reading the newspaper. Just by chance, he came
across a story about a company that manufactured a household insulation
called Zonolite. This insulation, he read, was tainted with deadly
asbestos.
Ralph suddenly realized that Zonolite was in his home.
Ralph Busch was stunned as it dawned on him. He had just spent two
years in his own home handling Zonolite insulation and he and his wife
may have unknowingly been exposed to deadly asbestos.
What would happen from his and his wife's exposure?
How come no one had told him he had asbestos in his attic?
The Zonolite insulation was a product from the little town of Libby,
MT. It was produced by the W.R. Grace Company.
W.R. Grace mined vermiculite from the hillside near Libby. The
company turned the ore into insulation known as Zonolite by heating
vermiculite to expand it into light granules.
The process was similar to popping popcorn. After sorting the popped
vermiculite, W.R. Grace poured it into bags and sold it to use as
insulation.
The company marketed Zonolite as ``perfectly safe''. . .
But laced throughout the vermiculite in the ground near Libby,
another mineral was present: asbestos. W.R. Grace's process to make
Zonolite and other products could not, and did not, remove all the
asbestos from the end product. Zonolite insulation contains between .5
percent and 8 percent asbestos.
The community of Libby has suffered immensely from decades of mining
the deadly vermiculite ore used to make Zonolite insulation and other
consumer products.
At least 200 men and women from Libby have died from diseases caused
by exposure to asbestos-tainted vermiculite, and hundreds more people
from the town are sick.
When inhaled, asbestos can cause deadly diseases, from asbestosis to
mesothelioma, a deadly cancer of the lining of the lung that is almost
always fatal. In fact, mesothelioma kills at least 2,000 people each
year and is caused only by asbestos.
The diseases induced by exposure to asbestos result in horrible
deaths and they are nearly always fatal. Treatment is harsh and
debilitating.
These diseases can take years to strike. The late Congressman Bruce
Vento and the father of the modern Navy, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt both died
from asbestos they had been exposed to years earlier.
The asbestos-tainted insulation manufactured by the W.R. Grace
Company was used in homes throughout the country for decades.
Vermiculite from Libby first started being sold commercially in 1921,
and W.R. Grace bought the mine in 1963. Reviews of invoices indicate
that more than 6 million tons of Libby ore was shipped to hundreds of
sites nationwide for processing over the decades.
This chart behind me shows more than 300 sites across the Nation,
where ore was processed, in many cases to make Zonolite insulation.
In internal memos and e-mails, the Environmental Protection Agency
has estimated that as many as 35 million homes, schools and businesses
may still contain this insulation. Moreover, W.R. Grace knew the Libby
mine contained asbestos when the company purchased it in 1963. But
Grace made millions of tons of Zonolite anyway and unabashedly marketed
it as ``safe.''
If the manufacturer of this insulation knew it was contaminated with
asbestos, why didn't it or the Federal Government make sure that Ralph
Busch and millions of others across the country knew to leave it alone?
The answer to the first question is that W.R. Grace still claims its
product isn't harmful. The answer to the second question is more
complicated.
According to published reports and internal EPA documents, the EPA
was preparing to tell the American people about the dangers of Zonolite
insulation. But it didn't happen.
An investigation by Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter Andrew Schneider
found that last spring while it was addressing the public health crisis
in Libby, MT, the EPA was preparing to tell the American people about
the dangers of Zonolite insulation in millions of homes across this
country. But first, EPA had to deal with Libby. EPA decided it needed
to minimize the exposure of Libby residents to asbestos-contaminated
vermiculite, and the agency drafted a press release announcing its
decision.
This document said that EPA:
. . . will spend $34 million to remove dangerous asbestos-
contaminated vermiculite insulation from 70 percent of
residential and commercial buildings in Libby.
I am glad that EPA has taken aggressive steps to protect people in
that small Montana town.
Senator Baucus deserves tremendous credit for the work he has done to
bring Federal resources to Montana to help people in Libby.
And EPA deserves credit for doing the right thing, and going in to
remove the insulation from Libby.
But what about the rest of the country? What about the millions of
other homes with Zonolite insulation?
Since EPA decided to help Libby, the agency anticipated the logical
follow-up question of what about the millions of homes nationwide that
contain the same Zonolite insulation as homes in Libby.
According to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the EPA had drafted news
releases, and drawn up lists of public officials to notify. The agency
was preparing to embark on an outreach and education campaign to let
people know about this hazard in their homes.
But what stopped EPA from following through with its warning?
It may have been the same person or people who blocked another
government health agency from warning workers about asbestos exposure.
Last April, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health--NIOSH--was preparing to release new guidance for workers who
come into contact with insulation in the course of their daily work.
NIOSH was preparing to alert workers, such as electricians, plumbers
and maintenance workers, about how they can better protect themselves
from exposure to asbestos in Zonolite insulation.
These materials were prepared last April, but they still have not
been released.
Let me read from a ``Pre-Decisional Draft'' of a NIOSH Fact Sheet
dated April 11, 2002.
I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record in its
entirety.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
NIOSH Recommendations for Reducing Risk of Worker Exposures to
Vermiculite That May Be Contaminated With Asbestos
A vermiculite deposit formerly mined in Libby, Montana was
contaminated with asbestos, raising concerns about
occupational and public health risks to former miners,
residents of Libby, and to workers and consumers who come in
contact with vermiculite end-products, such as insulation and
potting soil. This fact sheet summarizes existing
recommendations by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control's
(CDC) National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) for reducing risk of worker exposures to asbestos or
to materials that may be contaminated with asbestos. These
recommendations serve as interim guidance from NIOSH for
employers and workers involved at sites where vermiculite
used as attic insulation or for other purposes may be
contaminated with asbestos. NIOSH is conducting further
research on vermiculite to provide more information on
exposures that may pose the highest risks to workers.
[[Page S2038]]
How can a worker or an employer know if vermiculite they
have is contaminated with asbestos?
The only way to determine conclusively whether vermiculite
is contaminated is to have it analyzed by a trained
microscopist. (Any suggestions by NIOSH beyond OSHA 1910
regarding methods for bulk analysis would be extremely
helpful and reduce much of the confusion we are seeing as
polarized light microscopy (PLM) has not been useful in
evaluating and predicting airborne levels generated from
VAI).
As a rule, we believe that any vermiculite that originated
in Libby, Montana, before 1990 should be regarded as
potentially contaminated. It is known that vermiculite from
Libby was sold as attic insulation under the product name
Zonolite Attic Insulation, and that this product is still in
homes throughout the United States.
(Comment: WR Grace estimates several million homes contain
VAI, which is most likely very conservative. If we don't wish
to provide any indication of the magnitude of the potential
VAI exposure in number of homes, we should be clear about the
potential situation to provide a more accurate picture and
warning. Also, it is uncertain whether other vermiculite
products not originating in Libby contain potentially
hazardous concentrations of asbestos, until we have
definitive information to the contrary these materials should
also be treated with caution)
How can workers be protected from asbestos-contaminated
vermiculite?
They should isolate the work area from other areas in order
to avoid spreading fibers, use local exhaust ventilation to
reduce dust exposures, and use appropriate respiratory
protection. If the employer or worker is concerned about
potential exposure, and if at all possible, the vermiculite
should not be disturbed.
Which respirators are appropriate to protect workers from
asbestos exposure?
If asbestos cannot be contained to below 0.1 fibers per
cubic centimeter of air (fiber/cm \3\) by engineering
controls and good work practices, or when engineering
controls are being installed or maintained, appropriate
respirators should be provided to workers. When respirators
are worn, it is advisable to wear a fit-tested, tight fitting
half-mask air-purifying particulate respirator (not a
disposable dust mask) equipped with an N-100 filter or
better, because of the potential for episodic exposure to 1
fiber/cm \3\. A tight-fitting powered air-purifying
respirator should be provided instead of a negative-pressure
respirator whenever an employee chooses to use this type of
respirator. Tight fitting respirators should be used in
conjunction with a comprehensive respiratory protection
program under the direction of a health and safety
professional. Further information concerning respirator
selection can be found on the NIOSH web site at: http://
www.cdc.gov/niosh; or the OSHA web site at: http://
www.osha.gov.
What can workers do to protect themselves from exposure to
asbestos-contaminated vermiculite?
If at all possible, avoid handling or disturbing loose
vermiculite that is not contained in a manner that will
prevent the release of airborne dust.
Workers should guard against bringing dust home to the
family on clothes by using disposable protective clothing or
clothing that is left in the workplace. Do not launder work
clothing with family clothing.
Some measures can be used to avoid spreading potentially
contaminated dusts:
Use vacuum cleaners equipped with High-Efficiency
Particulate Air (HEPA) filters to collect asbestos-containing
debris and dust;
Employ wet methods or wetting agents, unless wetting is not
feasible or creates a greater hazard (wetting absorbent
vermiculite materials in an attic may not be feasible or
advisable);
Use negative pressure air units, which are large mobile
units that combine a fan and a HEPA filter critical for
preventing other exposures to non-workers, to keep
airborne asbestos levels to a minimum. Combined with
temporary barriers or enclosures, they can be set up to
make sure fibers do not contaminate other areas.
Dispose of wastes and debris contaminated with asbestos in
leak-tight containers;
Never use compressed air to remove asbestos-containing
materials;
Avoid dry sweeping, shoveling, or other dry clean-up
methods for dust and debris containing vermiculite that is
potentially contaminated with asbestos without environmental
controls to avoid spreading contamination;
Use proper respiratory protection.
Are there regulations that pertain to asbestos-contaminated
vermiculite?
Yes, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) asbestos regulations (29 CFR 1910.1001 and 1926.1101)
for general industry and construction should be consulted to
determine if there are specific requirements that need to be
followed when handling asbestos-contaminated materials or
potential asbestos-containing materials. Relevant information
is posted on the OSHA Internet page at: http://www.osha.gov/
SLTC/asbestos/index.html.
What should you do if you believe you have been exposed to
asbestos-containing vermiculite?
Workers who believe they have had significant past exposure
to asbestos-containing vermiculite, should consider getting
an appropriate medical check up. The appendices to the OSHA
asbestos standard describe the types of tests a physician
will need to provide.
What did NIOSH find from past studies at Libby, Montana?
NIOSH has responded to past and current concerns about
worker health by conducting needed research and disseminating
its findings. In the 1980s, NIOSH conducted research and
communicated findings about job-related exposures and health
effects among workers employed in mining and milling
vermiculite in Libby, Montana.
Our past studies identified asbestos contamination in the
vermiculite mined and milled in Libby.
We determined, from examination of x-rays of Libby miners,
that the miners showed evidence of adverse health effects
associated with asbestos exposure.
In a review of death certificates of former Libby
vermiculite miners, we identified an excess of deaths from
lung cancer, and other lung diseases that are known to be
related to asbestos exposure.
We made our findings available in 1985 through meetings in
Libby with workers and their representatives, employer
representatives, and members of the community. We also
published the results in peer-reviewed scientific journals.
Is NIOSH planning further occupational health research on
vermiculite?
NIOSH is currently conducting research to help determine
whether the processing of vermiculite produced by mines other
than the Libby mine results in workplace exposure to
asbestos. Vermiculite is used in a variety of occupational
settings including construction, agriculture, horticulture,
and for miscellaneous industrial applications. Through
carefully designed sampling, NIOSH will be better able to
define the extent to which workers may be occupationally
exposed to vermiculite that may be contaminated with
asbestos. Current plans are to: (1) conclude field exposure
sampling, (2) send company-specific reports to each of the
surveyed sites, and (3) prepare a summary of the overall
result of exposure assessments.
(Question will NIOSH be performing any field investigations
to evaluate the occupational exposures to airborne asbestos
associated with Vermiculite Attic Insulation among commonly
exposed workers (i.e. home reconstruction workers,
electricians, cable TV workers) ?)
Has NIOSH been involved in the public health response for
Libby community?
NIOSH has been providing technical assistance to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) which are the
lead agencies for the Federal government in assessing current
concerns about potential community health risks from asbestos
exposures in Libby.
Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, NIOSH recommended that workers:
. . . should isolate the work area from other areas in
order to avoid spreading fibers, use local exhaust
ventilation to reduce dust exposures, and use appropriate
respiratory protection.
If the employer or worker is concerned about potential
exposure, and if at all possible, the vermiculite should not
be disturbed.
But, astonishingly, this guidance was never released. How many of the
construction workers, maintenance people, electricians, plumbers and
homeowners across the country know they should ``avoid spreading
fibers, use local exhaust ventilation or appropriate respiratory
protection?''
I suspect that like Mr. Ralph Busch, thousands of people across the
U.S. are not taking these important precautions because they are simply
unaware of the danger.
I would like to read to my colleagues another section from the never-
released NIOSH Fact Sheet. This was in response to the question about
how workers can know if the vermiculite they have is contaminated with
asbestos. It says:
As a rule, we believe that any vermiculite that originated
in Libby, Montana, before 1990 should be regarded as
potentially contaminated . . .
It is known that vermiculite from Libby was sold as attic
insulation under the product name Zonolite Attic Insulation
and that this product is still in homes throughout the United
States.
But especially interesting is the next section, which is in
parentheses as a comment by the author:
W.R. Grace estimates several million homes contain
``vermiculite attic insulation,'' which is most likely very
conservative.
If we don't wish to provide any indication of the magnitude
of the potential VAI (or vermiculite attic insulation)
exposure in number of homes, we should be clear about the
potential situation to provide a more accurate picture and
warning.
I must ask my colleagues, why wouldn't NIOSH or others in the
Administration--when they are taking great pains to do the job right in
Libby--want to share with workers and the public an indication of the
magnitude of the number of homes with asbestos-tainted vermiculite?
[[Page S2039]]
Isn't it our government's job to protect people from risks associated
with hazardous substances such as asbestos?
Don't we need to know the scope of the problem in order to help gauge
the extent of the potential risks?
Why aren't we warning workers and giving them the new guidance that
has already been drafted by NIOSH?
Interestingly enough, on April 10, 2002, the day before the date on
this NIOSH Fact Sheet, EPA received a letter from W.R. Grace defending
their harmful product.
The letter read:
Zonolite Attic Insulation (ZAI) has been insulating homes
for over 60 years and there is no credible reason to believe
that ZAI has ever caused an asbestos-related disease in
anyone who has used it in his/her home.
How then does Grace explain the fact that the company has settled at
least 25 bodily injury claims caused by exposure to Zonolite?
Make no mistake. W.R. Grace is a company with one of the worst public
health and environmental records in America. I draw my colleague's
attention to a 1998 article by Dr. David Egilman, Wes Wallace and
Candace Hom published in the journal Accountability in Research
entitled ``Corporate Corruption of Medical Literature: Asbestos Studies
Concealed by W.R. Grace & Co.''
I will read briefly from the abstract of this article:
In 1963, W.R. Grace acquired the mine (in Libby) and
employee health problems at the mine became known to W.R.
Grace executives and to Grace's insurance company, Maryland
Casualty.
In 1976, in response to tighter federal regulation of
asbestos and asbestos-containing products, W.R. Grace funded
an animal study of tremolite toxicity.
They hoped to prove that tremolite did not cause
mesothelioma, the cancer uniquely associated with asbestos
exposure. However, the study showed that tremolite did cause
mesothelioma.
W.R. Grace never disclosed the results of this animal
study, nor did they disclose their knowledge of lung disease
in the Libby workers, either to the workers themselves or to
regulatory agencies.
These actions were intentional, and were motivated by
Grace's conscious decision to prioritize corporate profit
over human health.
Given the facts that W.R. Grace has knowingly manufactured and sold
an asbestos-tainted product, has suppressed research findings showing
that tremolite asbestos causes cancer, and has denied that their
product is potentially dangerous, the company is woefully lacking for
credibility.
Which brings us to our question: If EPA was planning to warn the
American public about the dangers of Zonolite insulation, what stopped
EPA from following through with its plan?
Why aren't we warning homeowners nationwide about Zonolite
insulation?
Why aren't we warning workers and giving them new safety guidelines?
The answers might lie, not with the EPA, but with the White House
Office of Management and Budget, OMB.
An internal e-mail from John F. Wood, the Deputy General Counsel at
OMB, to staff at EPA contained details about finalizing the Action Memo
for Libby.
Also copied on the e-mail were OMB Deputy Director Nancy Dorn and
Associate Director of Natural Resources Programs Marcus Peacock.
Here's what OMB's lawyer wrote to EPA. I ask unanimous consent that
this e-mail be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
John--thank you for your efforts to alleviate my concerns.
Here are just a few edits, which are necessary to avoid the
problems we discussed earlier. Please be sure to observe the
deletion of the citation of Sect. 104(a)(4).
Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, it says:
Thank you for your efforts to alleviate my concerns. Here
are just a few edits, which are necessary to avoid the
problems we discussed earlier. Please be sure to observe the
deletion of the citation of Sect. 104 (a) (4).
What is Section 104 (a) (4)?
It is a clause in the Superfund law, which enables the EPA to declare
a public health emergency.
And why did OMB tell the EPA to ``delete the citation'' to Section
104 (a) (4)?
We don't know for sure, but if EPA had issued the public health
emergency for Libby under Superfund, then the agency would have had to
answer questions about asbestos-tainted insulation from every other
homeowner in the country.
Here is what the St. Louis Post-Dispatch investigation concluded:
The Environmental Protection Agency was on the verge of
warning millions of Americans that their attics and walls
might contain asbestos-contaminated insulation. But, at the
last minute, the White House intervened, and the warning has
never been issued.
The Post-Dispatch got reaction from an EPA staffer about OMB's
intervention:
It was like a gut shot,'' said one of those senior staffers
involved in the decision. ``It wasn't like they ordered us
not to make the declaration, they just really, really
strongly suggested against it. Really strongly. There was no
choice left.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch article be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 29, 2002]
White House Office Blocked EPA's Asbestos Cleanup Plan
(By Andrew Schneider)
Washington.--The Environmental Protection Agency was on the
verge of warning millions of Americans that their attics and
walls might contain asbestos-contaminated insulation. But, at
the last minute, the White House intervened, and the warning
has never been issued.
The agency's refusal to share its knowledge of what is
believed to be a widespread health risk has been criticized
by a former EPA administrator under two Republican
presidents, a Democratic U.S. senator and physicians and
scientists who have treated victims of the contamination.
The announcement to warn the public was expected in April.
It was to accompany a declaration by the EPA of a public
health emergency in Libby, Mont. In that town near the
Canadian border, ore from a vermiculite mine was contaminated
with an extremely lethal asbestos fiber called tremolite that
has killed or sickened thousands of miners and their
families.
Ore from the Libby mine was shipped across the nation and
around the world, ending up in insulation called Zonolite
that was used in millions of homes, businesses and schools
across America.
A public health emergency declaration had never been issued
by any agency. It would have authorized the removal of the
disease-causing insulation from homes in Libby and also
provided long-term medical care for those made sick.
Additionally, it would have triggered notification of
property owners elsewhere who might be exposed to the
contaminated insulation.
Zonolite insulation was sold throughout North America from
the 1940s through the 1990s. Almost all of the vermiculite
used in the insulation came from the Libby mine, last owned
by W.R. Grace & Co.
In a meeting in mid-March, EPA Administrator Christie Todd
Whitman and Marianne Horinko, head of the Superfund program,
met with Paul Peronard, the EPA coordinator of the Libby
cleanup and his team of health specialists. Whitman and
Horinko asked tough questions, and apparently got the answers
they needed. They agreed they had to move ahead on a
declaration, said a participant in the meeting.
By early April, the declaration was ready to go. News
releases had been written and rewritten. Lists of governors
to call and politicians to notify had been compiled. Internal
e-mail shows that discussions had even been held on whether
Whitman would go to Libby for the announcement.
But the declaration was never made.
Derailed by White House
Interviews and documents show that just days before the EPA
was set to make the declaration, the plan was thwarted by the
White House Office of Management and Budget, which had been
told of the proposal months earlier.
Both the budget office and the EPA acknowledge that the
White House agency was actively involved, but neither agency
would discuss how or why.
The EPA's chief spokesman Joe Martyak said, ``Contact OMB
for the details.''
Budget office spokesperson Amy Call said, ``Those questions
will have to be addressed to the EPA.''
Call said the budget office provided wording for the EPA to
use, but she declined to say why the White House opposed the
declaration and the public notification.
``These are part of our internal discussions with EPA, and
we don't discuss predecisional deliberations,'' Call said.
Both agencies refused Freedom of Information Act requests
for documents to and from the White House Office of
Management and Budget.
The budget office was created in 1970 to evaluate all
budget, policy, legislative, regulatory, procurement and
management issues on behalf of the president.
office interfered before
Former EPA administrator William Ruckelshaus, who worked
for Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, called the
decision not to notify homeowners of the
[[Page S2040]]
dangers posed by Zonolite insulation ``the wrong thing to
do.''
``When the government comes across this kind of information
and doesn't tell people about it, I just think it's wrong,
unconscionable, not to do that,'' he said. ``Your first
obligation is to tell the people living in these homes of the
possible danger. They need the information so they can decide
what actions are best for their family. What right does the
government have to conceal these dangers? It just doesn't
make sense.''
But, he added, pressure on the EPA from the budget office
or the White House is not unprecedented.
Ruckelshaus, who became the EPA's first administrator when
the agency was created by Nixon in 1970, said he never was
called by the president directly to discuss agency decisions.
He said the same held true when he was called back to lead
the EPA by Reagan after Anne Gorsuch Burford's scandal-
plagued tenure.
Calls from a White House staff member or the Office of
Management and Budget were another matter.
``The pressure could come from industry pressuring OMB or
if someone could find a friendly ear in the White House to
get them to intervene,'' Ruckelshaus said. ``These issues
like asbestos are so technical, often so convoluted, that
industry's best chance to stop us or modify what we wanted
to do would come from OMB.''
The question about what to do about Zonolite insulation was
not the only asbestos-related issue in which the White House
intervened.
In January, in an internal EPA report on problems with the
agency's much-criticized response to the terrorist attacks in
New York City, a section on ``lessons learned'' said there
was a need to release public health and emergency information
without having it reviewed and delayed by the White House.
``We cannot delay releasing important public health
information,'' said the report. ``The political consequences
of delaying information are greater than the benefit of
centralized information management.''
It was the White House budget office's Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs that derailed the Libby
declaration. The regulatory affairs office is headed by John
Graham, who formerly ran the Harvard Center for Risk
Analysis.
His appointment last year was denounced by environmental,
health and public advocacy groups, who claimed his ties to
industry were too strong. Graham passes judgment over all
major national health, safety and environmental standards.
Sen. Dick Durbin, D-Ill., urged colleagues to vote against
Graham's appointment, saying Graham would have to recuse
himself from reviewing many rules because affected industries
donated to the Harvard University Center.
Thirty physicians, 10 of them from Harvard, according to
The Washington Post, wrote the committee asking that Graham
not be confirmed because of ``a persistent pattern of
conflict of interest, of obscuring and minimizing dangers to
human health with questionable cost-benefit analyses, and of
hostility to governmental regulation in general.''
Repeated requests for interviews with Graham or anyone else
involved in the White House budget office decision were
denied.
``It was like a gut shot''
Whitman, Horinko and some members of their top staff were
said to have been outraged at the White House intervention.
``It was like a gut shot.'' said one of those senior
staffers involved in the decision. ``It wasn't that they
ordered us not to make the declaration, they just really,
really strongly suggested against it. Really strongly.
There was no choice left.''
She and other staff members said Whitman was personally
interested in Libby and the national problems spawned by its
asbestos-tainted ore. The EPA's inspector general had
reported that the agency hadn't taken action more than two
decades earlier when it had proof that the people of Libby
and those using asbestos-tainted Zonolite products were in
danger.
Whitman went to Libby in early September 2001 and promised
the people it would never happen again.
``We want everyone who comes in contact with vermiculite--
from homeowners to handymen--to have the information to
protect themselves and their families,'' Whitman promised.
suits, bankruptcies grow
Political pragmatists in the agency knew the administration
was angered that a flood of lawsuits had caused more than a
dozen major corporations--including W.R. Grace--to file for
bankruptcy protection. The suits sought billions of dollars
on behalf of people injured or killed from exposure to
asbestos in their products or workplaces.
Republicans on Capitol Hill crafted legislation--expected
to be introduced next month--to stem the flow of these suits.
Nevertheless, Whitman told her people to move forward with
the emergency declaration. Those in the EPA who respect their
boss fear that Whitman may quit.
She has taken heat for other White House decisions such as
a controversial decision on levels of arsenic in drinking
water, easing regulations to allow 50-year-old power plants
to operate without implementing modern pollution controls and
a dozen other actions which environmentalists say favor
industry over health.
Newspapers in her home state of New Jersey ran front page
stories this month saying Whitman had told Bush she wanted to
leave the agency.
Spokesman Martyak said his boss is staying on the job.
EPA WAS POISED TO ACT
In October, the EPA complied with a freedom of Information
Act request and gave the Post-Dispatch access to thousands of
documents--in nine large file boxes. There were hundreds of
e-mails, scores of ``action memos'' describing the
declaration and piles of ``communication strategies'' for how
the announcement would be made.
The documents illustrated the internal and external battle
over getting the declaration and announcement released.
One of the most contentious concerns was the anticipated
national backlash from the Libby declaration. EPA officials
knew that if the agency announced that the insulation in
Montana was so dangerous that an emergency had to be
declared, people elsewhere whose homes contained the same
contaminated Zonolite would want answers or perhaps demand to
have their homes cleaned.
The language of the declaration was molded to stress how
unique Libby was and to play down the national problem.
But many in the agency's headquarters and regional offices
didn't buy it.
In a Feb. 22 memo, the EPA's Office of Pollution Prevention
and Toxics said ``the national ramifications are enormous''
and estimated that if only 1 million homes have Zonolite
``(are) we not put in a position to remove their (insulation)
at a national cost of over $10 billion?''
The memo also questioned the agency's claim that the age of
Libby's homes and severe winter conditions in Montana
required a higher level of maintenance, which in turn meant
increased disturbance of the insulation in the homes there.
It's ``a shallow argument,'' the memo said. ``There are
older homes which exist in harsh or harsher conditions across
the country. Residents in Maine and Michigan might find this
argument flawed.''
No one knows precisely how many dwellings are insulated
with Zonolite. Memos from the EPA and the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry repeatedly cite an estimate
of between 15 million and 35 million homes.
A government analysis of shipping records from W.R. Grace
show that at least 15.6 billion pounds of vermiculite ore was
shipped from Libby to 750 plants and factories throughout
North America.
Between a third and half of that ore was popped into
insulation and usually sold in 3-foot-high kraft paper bags.
Government extrapolations and interviews with former W.R.
Grace Zonolite salesmen indicate that Illinois may have as
many as 800,000 homes with Zonolite, Michigan as many as
700,000. Missouri is likely to have Zonolite in 380,000
homes.
With four processing plants in St. Louis, it is estimated
that more than 60,000 homes, offices and schools were
insulated with Zonolite in the St. Louis area alone.
Eventually, the internal documents show, acceptance grew
that the agency should declare a public health emergency.
In a confidential memo dated March 28, an EPA official said
the declaration was tentatively set for April 5.
But the declaration never came. Instead, Superfund boss
Horinko on May 9 quietly ordered that asbestos be removed
from contaminated homes in Libby. There was no national
warning of potential dangers from Zonolite. And there was no
promise of long-term medical care for Libby's ill and dying.
The presence of the White House budget office is noted
throughout the documents. The press announcement of the
watered-down decision was rewritten five times the day before
it was released to accommodate budget office wording
changes that played down the changes that played down the
dangers.
dangers of zonolite
The asbestos in Zonolite, like all asbestos products, is
believed to be either a minimal risk or no risk if it is not
disturbed. The asbestos fibers must be airborne to be
inhaled. The fibers then become trapped in the lungs, where
they may cause asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma, a
fast-moving cancer of the lung's lining.
The EPA's files are filled with studies documenting the
toxicity of tremolite, how even minor disruptions of the
material by moving boxes, sweeping the floor or doing repairs
in attics can generate asbestos fibers.
This also has been confirmed by simulations W.R. Grace ran
in Weed-sport, N.Y. in July 1977; by 1997 studies by the
Canadian Department of National Defense; and by the U.S.
Public Health Service, which reported in 2000, that ``even
minimal handling by workers or residents poses a substantial
health risk.''
Last December, a study by Christopher Weis, the EPA's
senior toxicologist supporting the Libby project, reported
that ``the concentrations of asbestos fibers that occur in
air following disturbance of (insulation) may reach levels of
potential human health concerns.''
Most of those who have studied the needle-sharp tremolite
fibers in the Libby ore consider them far more dangerous than
other asbestos fibers.
In October, the EPA team leading the cleanup of lower
Manhattan after the attacks of Sept. 11 went to Libby to meet
with
[[Page S2041]]
Peronard and his crew. The EPA had reversed an early decision
and announced that it would be cleaning asbestos from city
apartments.
Libby has been a laboratory for doing just that.
Peronard told the visitors from New York just how dangerous
tremolite is. He talked about the hands-on research in Libby
of Dr. Alan Whitehouse, a pulmonologist who had worked for
NASA and the Air Force on earlier projects before moving
to Spokane, Wash.
``Whitehouse's research on the people here gave us our
first solid lead of how bad this tremolite is,'' Peronard
said.
Whitehouse has not only treated 500 people from Libby who
are sick and dying from exposure to tremolite. The chest
specialist also has almost 300 patients from Washington
shipyards and the Hanford, Wash., nuclear facility who are
suffering health effects from exposure to the more prevalent
chrysotile asbestos.
Comparing the two groups, Whitehouse has demonstrated that
the tremolite from Libby is 10 times as carcinogenic as
chrysotile and probably 100 times more likely to produce
mesothelioma than chrysotile.
W.R. Grace has maintained that its insulation is safe. On
April 3 of this year, the company wrote a letter to Whitman
again insisting its product was safe and that no public
health declaration or nationwide warning was warranted.
Dr. Brad Black, who runs the asbestos clinic in Libby and
acts as health officer for Montana's Lincoln County, says
``people have a right to be warned of the potential danger
they may face if they disturb that stuff.''
Marytak, chief EPA spokesman, argues that the agency has
informed the public of the potential dangers. ``It's on our
Web site,'' he said.
Sen. Patty Murray, D-Wash., is sponsoring legislation to
ban asbestos in the United States. She said the Web site
warning is a joke.
``EPA's answer that people have been warned because it's on
their Web site is ridiculous,'' she said. ``If you have a
computer, and you just happened to think about what's in your
attic, and you happen to be on EPA's Web page, then you get
to know. This is not the way the safety of the public is
handled.
``We, the government, the EPA, the administration have a
responsibility to at least let people know the information so
they can protect themselves if they go into those attics,''
she said.
Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, because of OMB's involvement, EPA never
conducted the planned outreach to warn people about Zonolite. NIOSH's
guidance to workers about how to protect themselves was never
finalized.
In response to these shocking reports, on January 3, 2003, I wrote to
EPA Administrator Whitman and OMB Director Daniels to get some answers.
Mr. Daniels has not yet responded to the allegations that his office
blocked the announcement.
Ms. Whitman wrote that she is responding on behalf of OMB. I can only
ascribe this to OMB's desire to remain unaccountable and to hide the
role it played in these decisions.
Ms. Whitman's response was woefully inadequate. She failed to explain
the nature or the substance of OMB's involvement. She also wrote that
it is not possible to know how many homes contain vermiculite
insulation even though HER OWN AGENCY has estimated it may be between
15 and 35 million homes, schools, and businesses.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Administrator Whitman's
letter be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency,
Washington, DC, January 16, 2003.
Hon. Patty Murray,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Murray: Thank, you for your letters dated
January 3, 2003, to me and Mitch Daniels, Director of the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), regarding EPA's
efforts to address asbestos contamination in the town of
Libby, Montana. I am responding for both OMB and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
I assure you that since my tenure at the Agency, every
action regarding Libby, Montana has been taken with the goal
of protecting the health of Libby residents from further
harm. After visiting with the residents of Libby Montana in
September 2001, I committed to have EPA do everything as
quickly and comprehensively as possible to remove the
multiple sources of asbestos exposure of Libby residents. The
Action Memo signed on May 9, 2002, authorized significant
additional measures in Libby, including the removal of attic
insulation. Cleanup work has proceeded at an aggressive pace
and substantial sources of exposure have already been
removed.
While enclosed are EPA's Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response detailed responses to your questions, I
want to make it clear that neither OMB nor any other Federal
agencies directed EPA to take a specific course of action
regarding whether to employ the public health emergency
provision of the Comprehensive Environmental Response and
Liability Act (``CERCLA'', or the Superfund Law). The Agency
made its decision regarding the removal of asbestos
contaminated vermiculite attic insulation from Libby homes in
order to reduce the cumulative exposure to residents as
quickly as possible. EPA based this decision on many factors,
including legal, scientific, and practical considerations.
The Agency concluded that asbestos contaminated vermiculite
insulation found in homes in Libby could be removed without a
public health emergency. Ultimately, EPA chose not to rely
upon CERCLA's health emergency provision, in part, to
minimize the possibility of removal work being delayed by
possible legal challenges to this untested approach, and
instead relied upon more traditional removal authorities.
Additional, I want to clarify that the decision to proceed
with the cleanup in Libby is unrelated to the larger issue of
whether asbestos contaminated vermiculite insulation poses a
risk outside of Libby, Montana. Several questions in your
letter imply that invoking the public health provision in
CERCLA for the situation in Libby would give the Agency
additional authority or impose additional requirements to
inform the public nationwide about the health risks
associated with asbestos contaminated vermiculite attic
insulation. This is not the case. While the experience and
data collected in Libby are important to a larger national
evaluation, the Libby cleanup and the Agency's national
evaluation of the potential risks of asbestos contaminated
attic insulation are on parallel but different tracks.
Again, thank you for your support of EPA's cleanup efforts
in Libby, Montana and your commitment to making sure that
people nationwide are not at risk from asbestos. The Agency
looks forward to working with you and your staff to continue
our mutual goal to protect the health and welfare of the
residents of Libby, Montana, and of the United States. If you
have further questions or concerns, please contact me, or
your staff may contact Betsy Henry in the Office of
Congressional and Intergovernmental Relations at (202) 564-
7222.
Sincerely yours,
Christine Todd Whitman.
____
Enclosure: EPA Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response and Office
of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances
Detailed Responses to Senator Patty Murray's Questions on Vermiculite
Attic Insulation and the Libby, Montana Clean-Up
What were EPA's recommendations on formation of a policy to
inform consumers of potential dangers from exposure to
Zonolite insulation?
The Agency's activity in Libby reflects a unique situation
where citizens have been exposed for many years to
widespread, high levels of asbestos contamination, and suffer
unprecedented rates of asbestos related illness. After
extensive consideration of scientific and health-related
information, the Agency concluded that residents in Libby
were a sensitive population, and asbestos exposure which
would otherwise present an acceptable risk to a healthy
population may cause an increase in disease for a highly
impacted community like Libby. EPA decided to remove all
potential sources of exposure to asbestos in Libby, including
asbestos contamination in yards, playgrounds, parks,
industrial sites, the interiors of homes and businesses, and
vermiculite attic insulation.
The Agency's guidance to consumers outside of Libby has
consistently been to manage in place asbestos or asbestos
containing products found in the home. Based on currently
available information and studies the Agency continues to
believe that, absent the unique conditions present at Libby,
vermiculite insulation poses minimal risk if left
undisturbed. If removal of the insulation is desired, the
Agency recommends that this work be done professionally.
To better understand the potential risks of asbestos
contaminated vermiculite attic insulation, EPA's Office of
Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances (OPPTS) initiated
the first phase of a limited study to evaluate the level of
asbestos in vermiculite attic insulation in homes in the
Spring of 2001. The study included six homes in Vermont and
simulations in an enclosure. This preliminary study will be
used to help the Agency design the next phase of a more
comprehensive study and to help determine whether the
Agency's guidance in place for many years--to manage asbestos
contaminated material in place or hire professionals to
conduct removals--is still appropriate or should be revised.
Formal external peer review is finished for the first phase
of the study. The Agency's Office of Research and Development
(ORD), as well as others, are currently reviewing the
preliminary study.
Based on the findings from this study, EPA will revise or
supplement the existing guidance and outreach materials as
necessary, and further inform the public about how best to
manage vermiculite attic insulation.
[[Page S2042]]
2. Top what extent were OMB and other federal agencies and
departments involved in the decision whether to declare a
public health emergency in Libby or to notify people
nationwide of the dangers potentially posed by exposure
to Zonolite?
EPA consulted extensively with other federal and state
partners in determining the best course of action to address
all sources of asbestos contamination in Libby. This included
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Department of
Health and Human Services, the Center for Disease Control,
the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, U.S.
Geological Survey, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, the State of Montana, and many others.
These consultations focused on scientific issues
associated with asbestos contaminated vermiculite
exposure, not to discuss public health emergency
declarations. The Agency was also contacted by several
members of Congress who wished to express the depth of
their concern and share their views regarding this matter.
In general, EPA tries to share information and discuss
potential response decisions with interested parties,
especially those with expertise in the area, so it can
make the most informed decision.
After consulting broadly with experts in the field, the
Agency determined a course of action regarding both the
removal of asbestos contaminated vermiculite attic insulation
and the public outreach to be conducted beyond Libby,
Montana. These decisions were made by the Administrator, in
close consultation with the Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response, the Office of Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance, the Office of General Counsel, the Office of
Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances, and EPA Region
8.
3. What process did the Administration use in making these
decisions? Specifically what roles did individual
agencies play and who in these agencies was involved in
the process?
EPA's primary focus was on protecting the residents of
Libby by removing the multiple sources of asbestos exposure
as quickly as possible. EPA considered many factors,
including the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan. Ultimately, the Agency chose not to rely
upon CERCLA's health emergency provision, in part, to
minimize the possibility of removal work being delayed by
possible legal challenges to this novel approach, and instead
relied upon more traditional removal authorities. EPA
concluded that homes in Libby contained vermiculite attic
insulation that did not constitute a ``product.'' The Agency
therefore could clean up the insulation without addressing
the question of whether it constituted a public health
emergency.
In making its response decisions in Libby, EPA engaged in a
major effort to discuss and consider the issues associated
with its approach to cleaning up asbestos contamination, both
in Libby and at more than 20 contaminated sites out of the
241 domestic vermiculite processing facilities. Although 175
of these sites had processed Libby vermiculite, EPA's
sampling confirmed that contamination only remained at 22
sites. To date, EPA or the responsible parties have cleaned
up or have cleanup underway at 10 of these sites and the
remaining 12 sites are either being addressed or are under
further investigation and response planning. This effort has
been one of the most significant actions ever taken under the
Superfund program, and has involved the participation and
collaboration of a great many people and organizations at the
local, state and federal level.
4. Which outside parties, such as corporations, non-
governmental organizations or associations, did EPA
consult with on these decisions?
During the more than two years in which EPA has been
working on Libby, Agency officials have met with the Libby
community and its Technical Assistance Group, other agencies,
businesses in Libby and international corporations, various
associations, the State and subcommittees of both houses of
the U.S. Congress. Community members, the Vermiculite
Association, and W.R. Grace Corporation have all corresponded
with the Agency to state their opinions or to ask for
information about our work at the site.
5. What was OMB's final recommendation to EPA? What
recommendations, if any, did EPA receive from other
federal agencies and departments?
Neither OMB, nor any other federal agency directed EPA to
use a specific course of action regarding whether to employ
the health emergency provision of CERCLA. As stated
previously, EPA consulted extensively with other federal
partners, including OMB, in determining the best course of
action to address all sources of asbestos contamination.
6. Who ultimately directed EPA not to issue a public health
emergency in Libby last spring nor to proactively notify
the public in a proper manner?
No one directed the Agency. The decision was made by EPA.
After searching broadly for input from the many agencies
within the Executive Branch with expertise to inform our
thinking, the Agency decided to perform the cleanup under
traditional Superfund program removal authorities.
Furthermore, regarding outreach on the Libby decision, the
Agency has conducted many public meetings concerning the
Libby cleanup, and testified before Congress in July, 2001.
Since the Agency's first removal actions, the On-Scene
Coordinator in Libby has been in regular contact with the
citizens of Libby discussing the progress of the cleanup and
communicating about the issues of the vermiculite attic
insulation. The Administrator also spoke extensively on
issues concerning vermiculite contamination during her visit
to Libby, Montana in September of 2001.
7. What are EPA's most current estimates of how many homes,
businesses and schools still contain Zonolite? How did
EPA derive these numbers?
Over the years several attempts have been made to estimate
the number of homes that may contain vermiculite attic
insulation. While numbers have been included in at least one
study conducted for the Agency in 1985, the Agency does not
believe that these estimates are reliable. EPA recently again
tried to estimate the number of homes, businesses and schools
that may still contain vermiculite attic insulation but again
determined that this task was virtually impossible to
complete because there is little information about how many
homes contain vermiculite insulation (outside of Libby) as
well as little data about what happens to homes after they
are built. Any numbers derived from such an effort would be
inaccurate and misleading.
In the Libby valley, the Agency is identifying which homes
contain asbestos contaminated vermiculite insulation in the
attic and wall space by visually inspecting homes. The good
news is that EPA is finding vermiculite insulation in fewer
homes than the Agency anticipated in this region.
Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, my colleagues may be curious about why I
am so interested in EPA's decisions regarding vermiculite from Libby.
This issue is important to me because residents in my State are being
exposed to asbestos from Zonolite.
And, Mr. President, constituents in your state and every other State
in America may also have this insulation.
I am deeply concerned that most people with Zonolite in their homes
are completely unaware of this problem. I am afraid most will not learn
of it until they have already been exposed to dangerous levels of
asbestos. And I am most concerned that this administration may be
stifling EPA's efforts to warn homeowners, consumers, and workers
because of pressure from W.R. Grace.
And I must remind my colleagues: there is no safe known level of
exposure to asbestos. Deadly diseases such as asbestosis, lung cancer
and mesothelioma can develop decades after just brief exposures to high
concentrations of asbestos.
Ultimately, I believe Administrator Whitman wanted to do the right
thing by warning homeowners nationwide to be careful if they have
Zonolite in their homes when the agency began removing Zonolite from
homes in Libby, MT. But she was stopped. The reasons may never be
known--the excuse may be buried in ``executive privilege.''
So where do we go from here?
First, I hope my colleagues will support efforts to get to the bottom
of what stopped the EPA from warning the public. We have to increase
pressure on EPA, NIOSH, and other public health agencies to raise
public awareness about Zonolite.
Second, I hope my colleagues will support legislation to ban asbestos
in America and to warn people about the potential dangers posed by
Zonolite insulation.
I appreciate the support for this legislation I have received from
Senators Baucus, Cantwell, Dayton, and our late colleague, Senator
Wellstone, who were original cosponsors.
I have been working to raise awareness about the current dangers of
asbestos for over 2 years.
In July of 2001, I chaired a Senate Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions Committee hearing on asbestos and workplace safety.
In June of 2002, 2 days after introducing the Ban Asbestos in America
Act, I testified at a Senate Environment and Public Works Committee
hearing on Libby held by Senator Baucus.
My colleagues may wonder whatever happened to Ralph Busch and his
wife Donna.
After reading about Zonolite in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Mr.
Busch went to get the asbestos removed from his home. He learned it
would cost $32,000 to do so.
When he tried to secure compensation from his homeowners insurance to
pay to clean up the contamination, his insurance company rejected the
claim.
He got nowhere with the company that had inspected the home before he
[[Page S2043]]
purchased it. They hadn't known about Zonolite, either.
When he talked to his realtor about trying to sell his house, Mr.
Busch's realtor emphasized that Mr. Busch and his wife would be
responsible under the law for disclosing the presence of Zonolite to
any potential buyer.
According to Mr. Busch, even his realtor--and I quote--``. . .
expressed apprehension over entering the house saying he has young
children and was fearful of asbestos exposure without a proper
respirator . . . this about a house we were living in every day.''
In the end, having exhausted all of his options, Ralph Busch and his
wife Donna sacrificed their home to foreclosure, having lost thousands
of dollars and their good credit rating. They didn't feel that it was
safe to live there anymore, or to bring other people into their home.
Finally, they decided to move out of their ``dream house'' in Spokane.
To this day, that home remains vacant.
Apart from the tremendous economic loss, Mr. Busch and his wife are
concerned for their health. They are left wondering what long-term
negative health effects they may suffer as a result of their exposure
to asbestos fibers from the insulation.
Mr. Busch has told me, ``I feel like the poster-child for the
unsuspecting homeowner who unknowingly set off a time bomb in the
process of remodeling his home.''
To this day, Mr. Busch is haunted by words he read in the Spokesman-
Review almost three years ago. The March 12, 2000, article, entitled,
``Zonolite's Effects Outlive Plant,'' said this about mesothelioma.
[The disease] inflicts one of the most torturous deaths
known to humankind. Some people require intravenous morphine
to numb mesothelioma's pain. Some need part of their spinal
cord severed. Some are driven to suicide.
If there is a role for Government in people's lives, then it should
include protecting the public health. We have an opportunity to protect
the public's health so that Ralph Busch and thousands--perhaps
millions--of other Americans won't have to be needlessly exposed to the
time bomb sitting in their homes, schools, and businesses.
And meanwhile, if you are planning to do work in your attic, look at
your insulation carefully first to see if it is vermiculite. You can
see pictures of what this insulation looks like by going to EPA's web
site, which is www.epa.gov/asbestos/insulation.html.
If you think you have Zonolite, immediately contact EPA to get
additional advice about how to handle it. According to EPA's web site,
if you think you have Zonolite insulation, leave it alone and not
disturb it. And then contact your Representative in Congress and ask
him or her to pass legislation to ban asbestos, something we all should
have done decades ago. We can make a difference, but we must act today.
Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I would just like to follow up on the
statements regarding asbestos-contaminated insulation made by my good
friend from Washington, Senator Murray. The issues she raises are
extremely important, and I applaud her for her determined efforts on
behalf of her constituents, and her dedication to raising the profile
of the continued hazards associated with asbestos.
I was very moved by Senator Murray's description of what happened to
her constituent in Spokane, WA. I agree with her 100 percent that the
Government should not be in the business of keeping important health-
related information from the public, including information about the
health risks posed by Zonolite insulation. Again, I commend the Senator
from Washington for her leadership in championing this important public
health and safety issue.
I just believe it is important for me to speak directly to the
experience of my constituents in Libby, MT, to put some of this into
perspective.
The experience of the residents of Libby is truly, tragically,
unique. This little town in northwestern Montana, surrounded by
millions of acres of Federal forest lands, has lost over 200 people to
asbestos-related diseases and cancers. Hundreds more are sick, and
thousands more may become sick. Libby doesn't have that many people.
The magnitude of this tragedy is staggering.
The vermiculite mining and milling operations of W.R. Grace belched
thousands and thousands of pounds of asbestos-contaminated dust into
the air in and around Libby, coating the town and its inhabitants with
the deadly substance. Folks used raw vermiculite ore or expanded
vermiculite to fill their gardens, their driveways, the high school
track, the little league field, in their homes and attics. W.R. Grace
mineworkers brought the dust home with them on their clothing and
contaminated their own families, without knowing the dust was poison.
Asbestos was absolutely everywhere in Libby, for decades.
It is also becoming more and more clear that the fibers unique to
Libby, including tremolite asbestos fibers, are particularly deadly--
more so than other forms of asbestos, such as chrysotile asbestos.
Senator Murray is absolutely right to be concerned about insulation
manufactured from vermiculite ore mined and milled in Libby.
But let me also be clear, that the situation in Libby demanded a
unique, determined, and coordinated response from the Environmental
Protection Agency, other Federal agencies, the State, and the community
itself just to address the enormous task of cleaning up the town
because, as I just mentioned, the contaminated vermiculite was
everywhere.
Because of the extraordinary levels of asbestos contamination in
Libby, an important part of this clean-up effort included removing
asbestos-contaminated materials from Libby homes. People in Libby used
vermiculite insulation, raw vermiculite tailings, or other vermiculite
material that they brought home from W.R. Grace to fill their walls and
attics.
Last year, I personally urged the EPA to leave no stone unturned as
it sought to determine how to best begin an expeditious removal of
contaminated materials from homes in Libby, in an effort to continue to
reduce the exposure of Libby residents to deadly tremolite asbestos.
The EPA responded admirably to my requests, and as Senator Murray
mentioned, the agency is currently removing asbestos-contaminated
vermiculite material from homes in Libby.
I only highlight these issues because I believe the timing and scope
of the EPA's decision to go into Libby homes and remove the vermiculite
in their walls and ceilings was absolutely appropriate and necessary
given the sheer volume of asbestos to which the people in Libby have
been exposed.
Should the EPA have issued a public health emergency declaration in
Libby prior to taking that action? I don't know. What I do know is that
the decision was made and the correct on-the-ground result is happening
in Libby. I have recently written to Administrator Whitman asking her
to explain to me any health care benefits that may or may not be
available to the people of Libby in the event that a public health
emergency is declared in Libby. At this point, that is the most
important issue to the people in Libby.
In fact, the Montana delegation, the State of Montana, the community
of Libby, and many concerned private citizens have been working hard to
bring new economic development and much-needed health care resources to
Libby. It is amazing to see how everyone has come together to create
something positive from a terrible situation.
The people in Libby are proud folks. They have had more than their
share of hard knocks, and they just keep on going--getting up and
trying. They are survivors, and I am privileged to know them so well.
In January of 2000, I traveled to Libby to meet with 25 extremely ill
people for the first time.
I had been briefed a number of times on what I might expect to hear
that night. These kind men and women--some whom are no longer with us--
gathered to share huckleberry pie and coffee in the home of Gayla
Benefield. They opened their hearts and poured out unimaginable stories
of suffering and tragedy on a scale I was absolutely stunned and
unprepared to hear: entire families--fathers, mothers, uncles, aunts,
sons, and daughters all dead and all bound by their exposure to
tremolite asbestos, mined by W.R. Grace in this isolated, community of
several thousand--located as far away from Washington, DC, as one can
be, with a foot still in Montana.
[[Page S2044]]
I will never forget meeting another gentleman who has become my dear
friend, Les Skramstad. Les watched me closely all evening. He was wary
and approached me after his friends and neighbors had finished
speaking. He said to me, Senator, a lot of people have come to Libby
and told us they would help, then they leave and we never hear from
them again.
``Max,'' he said, ``please, as a man like me--as someone's father
too, as someone's husband, as someone's son, help me. Help us. Help us
make this town safe for Libby's sons and daughters not even born yet.
They should not suffer my fate too. I was a miner and breathed that
dust in. And what happened to me and all the other men who mined wasn't
right--but what has happened to the others is a sin.
``Every day, I carried that deadly dust home on my clothes. I took it
into our house, and I contaminated my own wife and each of my babies
with it, too. Just like me, they are sick, and we will each die the
same way. I just don't know how to live with the pain of what I have
done to them. If we can make something good come of this, maybe I'll
stick around to see that, maybe that could make this worthwhile.
``Find someone to use me, to study me, to learn something about this
dust that is still in my lungs right now.'' I told him I would do all
that I could and that I wouldn't back down and that I wouldn't give up.
Les accepted my offer and then pointed his finger and said to me,
``I'll be watching Senator.''
Les is my inspiration. He is the face of hundreds and thousands of
sick and exposed folks in this tiny Montana community. When I get
tired, I think of Les, and I can't shake what he asked me to do. In all
of my years as an elected official, this issue of doing what is right
for Libby is among the most personally compelling things I have ever
been called on to do.
Doing what is right for the community and making something good come
of it, is my mission in Libby, and I thank Les Skramstad every day for
handing me out my marching orders. My staff and I have worked
tirelessly in Libby--not for thanks or recognition but because the
tragedy is just that gripping.
The ``something good,'' Les challenged me to deliver keeps our eye on
the ball. I secured the first dollars from HHS 3 years ago to establish
the Clinic for Asbestos Related to Disease, to allow the Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry to begin the necessary screening
of folks who had been exposed to Libby's asbestos. Federal dollars have
flowed to Libby for cleanup, healthcare, and revitalizing the economy.
Last Congress, I was pleased to introduce the Libby Health Care Act,
to secure longterm health funding for sick people in Libby, and I will
introduce similar legislation this year. We seek ongoing funding for
asbestos patient care and continue to closely monitor and support
asbestos cleanup efforts by the Environmental Protection Agency.
At the first field hearing I held in Libby of the Committee for
Environment and Public Works, Dr. Blad Black, now the director of the
Libby Clinic for Asbestos Related Disease, called for developing a
research facility so that Libby's tragedy could be used to protect the
health of men, women, and children.
The wheels are on the cleanup and health screening, and the time for
making Brad's vision a reality is here. Working together with Montana
Congressional delegation and our State's Governor to develop a leading
edge, world class research facility with the mission of one day
developing cures for asbestos-related disease is exactly what Les
called for that evening more than 3 years ago as well. He and the
hundreds and thousands who suffer like Les and his family have my
commitment.
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