[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 6 (Tuesday, January 14, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S295-S299]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. CORZINE (for himself, Mr. Jeffords, Mrs. Boxer, Mrs. 
        Clinton, and Mr. Lautenberg):
  S. 157. A bill to help protect the public against the threat of 
chemical attacks; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.
  Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I rise today to reintroduce an important 
piece of legislation that I worked on in the 107th Congress, the 
Chemical Security Act. I am proud to be joined by Senators Jeffords, 
Boxer, Clinton, and Lautenberg in reintroducing this bill. Senators 
Jeffords, Boxer, and Clinton were all strong allies in the 107th 
Congress, and I thank them for their continuing support. And I am 
pleased to have Senator Lautenberg as a cosponsor. He has a long 
history of working to protect communities from all types of chemical 
threats. I particularly want to thank Senator Jeffords for his hard 
work on this legislation in the 107th Congress. As Chairman of the 
Environment and Public Works committee, he provided critical leadership 
in bringing this bill through the committee successfully. I thank him 
and his staff for their hard work and look forward to continuing to 
work with them on this important issue.
  I'll describe what the bill does in a minute. But first I want to 
briefly explain why I think this legislation is so important.
  September 11 shocked us into the realization that our assets can be 
turned against us by terrorists. If you are a New Jersey Senator, you 
don't have to think about that idea for too long before you realize 
that chemical plants and other facilities that have hazardous chemicals 
would be high on a terrorists' list. The fact is, that we have a lot of 
those types of facilities in my State, and because we're such a densely 
populated State, chemical releases from these facilities pose grave 
risks. In fact, according to EPA data, there are eight plants in my 
State where a worst-case release of toxic chemicals could threaten more 
than a million people.
  But this is not a parochial issue. The same EPA data shows that there 
are 110 plants nationwide where such a release could threaten more than 
a million people. These plants are located in 22 States. And there are 
44 States that have at least one facility where such a release could 
threaten more than 100,000 people.
  I want to be clear that I am stating these facts here today in an 
effort to advance a measure that would protect workers and communities, 
not in an attempt to vilify our nations' chemical companies. Indeed, 
these companies are a key part of our industrial fabric, providing jobs 
and producing products essential to our lives. This is certainly true 
of my home State of New Jersey, as I have already indicated.
  But when you look at the numbers, as I have laid them out here today, 
you realize that we have a problem to deal with. I'm certainly not 
unique in recognizing this issue, EPA, the Justice Department, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commissions, industry groups, and public safety 
groups all agree. In addition, the White House Strategy for Homeland 
Security recognizes the chemical and hazardous materials sector as an 
infrastructure protection priority. Governor Ridge amplified this point 
in his testimony before the Senate Environment Public Works committee 
on July 10 of last year. He said that:

       The fact is, we have a very diversified economy and our 
     enemies look at some of our economic assets as targets. And 
     clearly, the chemical facilities are one of them. We know 
     that there have been reports validated about security 
     deficiencies at dozens and dozens of those.

  I want to pick up on that last point that Governor Ridge made about 
security deficiencies, because it speaks to why I am putting this bill 
forward.

[[Page S296]]

  Some companies have taken actions and are continuing to work to 
implement security measures in light of the post-September 11 
environments. Others, however, are not. That's one crucial reason why a 
Federal program is needed. We need to be able to assure our 
constituents that this major vulnerability is being addressed in a 
swift and effective manner. We also want to assure them that certain 
minimum standards are being met throughout the country.
  We already do that to address certain infrastructure vulnerabilities. 
Most notably, we require nuclear power plants to meet extensive 
security standards as a condition of their operating licenses. I think 
we ought to tighten those standards, but the fact is that we have no 
standards at all for our chemical facilities.
  Before I go into specifics, I want to outline the general 
organizational scheme of the bill. In my view, addressing the risk to 
communities from a terrorist-caused release of hazardous chemicals 
requires two fundamental components. The first is improving security, 
so that the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack is lowered. The 
second is reducing hazards so that the impact of a successful attack is 
minimized.
  This requires two fundamentally different types of expertise and 
skills. That's why the bill involves both the EPA and the Department of 
Homeland Security. EPA has the chemical hazard expertise, and the 
Department of Homeland Security has the security expertise. EPA has a 
lead role in most of the bill, because it already has relationships 
with chemical facilities through its existing accident prevention 
programs.
  As to the specifics of the bill, I think it is a common-sense 
approach to dealing with the issue. I want to note that this bill is 
nearly identical to the version of the bill that was reported out of 
the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee last July by a 19-0 
vote. Two minor technical changes have been made to clarify the intent 
of the legislation, but it is otherwise exactly the same as the 
committee-reported bill that was acted on unanimously by the EPW 
committee last year.
  The heart of the bill is section 4. This section requires EPA and the 
Department of Homeland Security to identify ``high priority'' chemical 
facilities and then require those facilities to assess vulnerabilities 
and hazards, and then develop and implement a plan to improve security 
and use safer technologies.
  Section 4(a)(1) establishes the priority setting process, by which 
the EPA Administrator, in consultation the Secretary of the Department 
of Homeland Security, as well as States and local government entities, 
is directed to identify high priority chemical facilities, based on 
factors identified in section 4(a)(2). These factors include the 
severity of harm that could be caused by a chemical release, proximity 
to population centers, threats to national security or critical 
infrastructure, threshold quantities of substances of concern that pose 
a serious threat, and such other safety or security factors that the 
Administrator considers appropriate.

  Because of the way the bill is structured, this means that EPA and 
the Department of Homeland Security are directed to start with the 
facilities that are subject to EPA's Risk Management Program 
requirements. This program applies to approximately 15,000 facilities 
in the United States that use, produce or store large quantities of 
hazardous chemicals. By applying the factors I mentioned, the priority 
setting process is meant to shorten this list of 15,000 facilities 
considerably. But the bill leaves it up to the Administration to 
determine exactly how many facilities within this universe ought to be 
covered by the bill.
  So that's step one, setting priorities, and that has to be done 
within one year of enactment.
  At this point, I want to mention the first of the clarifying 
technical changes that I have made to the bill. It was never the 
intent, nor I believe the effect, of the bill to include propane 
retailers as potentially regulated entities under this bill. But there 
was some confusion about the point after the bill was marked up last 
July. So last fall, I worked with the National Propane Gas Association 
on language that eliminates this confusion, and it is included in this 
bill. So I again want to make clear that the same propane retailers who 
are not subject to the EPA Risk Management Program requirements will 
not be ``high priority'' facilities under this bill, and therefore will 
not be subject to its requirements.
  In addition to identifying high priority facilities within the first 
year, EPA and the Department of Homeland Security must also promulgate 
regulations to require the high priority facilities to take the 
following steps: conduct a vulnerability and hazard assessment within 
one year after the regulations are promulgated; prepare and implement a 
response plan that addresses those vulnerabilities within 18 months 
after the regulations are promulgated.
  I want to say more about the assessments and response plans, because 
these requirements are really the core of the amendment.
  First, the amendment requires chemical facilities to work with local 
law enforcement and first responders, such as firefighters, in 
developing the assessments and plans. The second of the clarifying 
technical changes that I referred to in the opening part of my 
statement is simply to make clear the firefighters are among the first 
responders that the bill is referring to.
  September 11 showed us how brave and important these our first 
responders are. Every day, they are willing to risk their lives to 
respond to terrorist attacks if they need to. So it makes sense that 
they ought to be a part of the process of developing vulnerability 
assessments and response plans, as this bill would require.
  The same goes for employees of the high priority chemical facilities. 
They're on the front lines, which means two things. First, they are 
most at risk in case of a terrorist attack on their plants. Second, 
because they work in the plants every day, they will have ideas about 
how to secure the facilities and reduce hazards. So employees are part 
of the process as well.
  As to the assessments and plans themselves, the requirements in the 
bill are fairly general. There are a variety of vulnerability 
assessment tools that have already been developed by groups such as 
Sandia laboratories and the Center for Chemical Process Safety. I would 
expect that EPA and DHS would take advantage of existing methodologies 
such as these, but the bill leaves it up to the experts to decide what 
types of approaches make the most sense. And that probably won't be the 
same for everyone, I'm not advocating a one-size-fits-all approach 
here. But I do want to be sure that all of the high priority chemical 
facilities do a credible vulnerability assessment.
  The response plan requirements are also fairly general. Each facility 
is required to prepare prevention, preparedness and response plan that 
incorporates the results of the assessments. The plan must include 
actions and procedures, including safer design and maintenance, to 
eliminate or significantly lessen the potential consequences of a 
release.
  What this means in simple terms is that each facility has to develop 
a plan and take steps to reduce both the likelihood of a successful 
attack and to the harm that would occur if an attack were successful. 
In other words, they have to look at traditional security measures, 
such as fences, alarms, and guards. But they also have to look at 
whether they can make the plant safer. In other words, can less 
hazardous chemicals be used? Can containment technology such as fans or 
scrubbers be improved or employed to contain chemicals that may be 
released? Chemical facilities ought to evaluate the full range of 
options, look at the tradeoffs among them, and go forward with the best 
mix of security and technology options.
  Facilities are then required to send their assessments and plans to 
the EPA. EPA and DHS must review those assessments and plans, and 
certify compliance with the regulations. Any deficiencies identified by 
EPA and DHS can be remedies by issuance of an order. But the order can 
only be issued after a deliberate process that includes notification, 
compliance assistance, and an opportunity for a hearing.
  The certification process is there to ensure the public that 
facilities are complying the law. Those certifications will be the only 
information

[[Page S297]]

from the assessments and plans that is publicly available. The bill 
exempts all other information produced under the bill, most 
importantly, the assessments and plans themselves, from disclosure 
under the Freedom of Information Act. I don't take FOIA exemptions 
lightly. I believe strongly that, in general, the public has a right to 
information collected by the government. But I think it's pretty 
obvious that in the case of the information that would be submitted to 
the government under this bill, the vulnerability assessments and 
response plans, we simply can't allow the security details in these 
plans to be publicly available. But I think it does make sense that 
people who live near a chemical plant be able to find out from EPA and 
the DHS whether or not that plant has complied with the law.

  The bill goes even beyond FOIA exemptions to protect the assessments 
and plans. To ensure that the assessments and plans are properly 
safeguarded, the bill includes a requirement for EPA and Homeland 
Security to develop protocols to prevent unauthorized disclosure of 
those documents. And it attaches penalties to unauthorized disclosure.
  That's the essence of the bill.
  First, identify ``high priority'' chemical facilities.
  Second, require those facilities to assess vulnerabilities and 
hazards, and then develop and implement a plan to improve security and 
implement safer technologies.
  Third, EPA and the Department of Homeland Security review the 
assessments and plans, and they have the authority to require changes 
if deficiencies are identified.
  Fourth, assessments and plans are protected from unauthorized 
disclosure through a FOIA exemption and penalties that apply to 
unauthorized disclosure.
  The bill also includes an early compliance section that is designed 
to address concerns that the bill might slow ongoing voluntary security 
efforts. This provision enables companies to submit assessments and 
plans prior to promulgation of the regulations and have them judged by 
the standards in the Act. So companies don't have to wait for the 
regulations to come out to continue work or to submit plans.
  In conclusion, I think this is a balanced bill that puts common-sense 
requirements in place to deal with a significant problem. I think the 
bill has moved a long way from the introduced bill. It has accommodated 
many of the concerns that industry raised about the bill I introduced 
in the 107th Congress. It reflects intensive bipartisan negotiations, 
and I think it's a good bill.
  At the same time, I recognize that some of my colleagues have 
continuing concerns about the legislation. Last fall, I worked with 
Senators Inhofe, Breaux, Landrieu and Lincoln on these issues. I want 
them to know that I remain open-minded and committed to working with 
them, the rest of my colleagues and the Administration to resolve these 
issues so we can move quickly to protect Americans from the threat of 
attack on chemical facilities. And I want to extend the same commitment 
not only to the environmental and labor organizations that have 
supported the bill in the past, but also to the various industry groups 
that have worked on this bill. It's vital that we all find common 
ground quickly, and I stand ready to work with all interested parties.
  I want to close by expressing both my sense of urgency about this 
issue and my optimism that we will be able to move legislation quickly. 
Last fall, Governor Ridge and Administrator Whitman wrote to the 
Washington Post expressing their support for bipartisan legislation to 
deal with the chemical security threat. I ask unanimous consent that 
that letter be printed in the Record.
  I believe the letter was sincere, but the Administration has not yet 
engaged the Congress on this issue. I urge President Bush to provide 
leadership to ensure that his Administration works with us as the 
process moves forward.
  I am also encouraged that Senator Inhofe has identified chemical 
security as a legislative priority as he assumes the Chairmanship of 
the Environment and Public Works committee. I congratulate him on his 
new post, and again express my willingness to work with him on this 
important issue.
  With that, I yield the floor and urge my colleagues to support this 
important legislation.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the Washington Post, Oct. 6, 2002]

                         A Security Requirement

       The Bush administration is committed to reducing the 
     vulnerability of America's chemical facilities to terrorist 
     attack and is working to enact bipartisan legislation that 
     would require such facilities to address their 
     vulnerabilities [news story, Oct. 3].
       We applaud voluntary efforts some in the industry have 
     undertaken, but we believe that every one of the 15,000 
     chemical facilities nationwide that contain large quantities 
     of hazardous chemicals must be required to take the steps the 
     industry leaders are taking at their facilities; performing 
     comprehensive vulnerability assessments and then acting to 
     reduce those vulnerabilities.
       Voluntary efforts alone are not sufficient to provide the 
     level of assurance Americans deserve. We will continue to 
     work with Congress to advance this important homeland 
     security goal.
                                  ____


                                 S. 157

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Chemical Security Act of 
     2003''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds that--
       (1) the chemical industry is a crucial part of the critical 
     infrastructure of the United States--
       (A) in its own right; and
       (B) because that industry supplies resources essential to 
     the functioning of other critical infrastructures;
       (2) the possibility of terrorist and criminal attacks on 
     chemical sources (such as industrial facilities) poses a 
     serious threat to public health, safety, and welfare, 
     critical infrastructure, national security, and the 
     environment;
       (3) the possibility of theft of dangerous chemicals from 
     chemical sources for use in terrorist attacks poses a further 
     threat to public health, safety, and welfare, critical 
     infrastructure, national security, and the environment; and
       (4) there are significant opportunities to prevent theft 
     from, and criminal attack on, chemical sources and reduce the 
     harm that such acts would produce by--
       (A)(i) reducing usage and storage of chemicals by changing 
     production methods and processes; and
       (ii) employing inherently safer technologies in the 
     manufacture, transport, and use of chemicals;
       (B) enhancing secondary containment and other existing 
     mitigation measures; and
       (C) improving security.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Administrator.--The term ``Administrator'' means the 
     Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.
       (2) Chemical source.--The term ``chemical source'' means a 
     stationary source (as defined in section 112(r)(2) of the 
     Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(2))) that contains a 
     substance of concern.
       (3) Covered substance of concern.--The term ``covered 
     substance of concern'' means a substance of concern that, in 
     combination with a chemical source and other factors, is 
     designated as a high priority category by the Administrator 
     under section 4(a)(1).
       (4) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means--
       (A) a duly recognized collective bargaining representative 
     at a chemical source; or
       (B) in the absence of such a representative, other 
     appropriate personnel.
       (5) First responder.--The term ``first responder'' includes 
     a firefighter.
       (6) Head of the office.--The term ``head of the Office'' 
     means the Secretary of Homeland Security.
       (7) Safer design and maintenance.--The term ``safer design 
     and maintenance'' includes, with respect to a chemical source 
     that is within a high priority category designated under 
     section 4(a)(1), implementation, to the extent practicable, 
     of the practices of--
       (A) preventing or reducing the vulnerability of the 
     chemical source to a release of a covered substance of 
     concern through use of inherently safer technology;
       (B) reducing any vulnerability of the chemical source to a 
     release of a covered substance of concern through use of 
     well-maintained secondary containment, control, or mitigation 
     equipment;
       (C) reducing any vulnerability of the chemical source to a 
     release of a covered substance of concern by implementing 
     security measures; and
       (D) reducing the potential consequences of any 
     vulnerability of the chemical source to a release of a 
     covered substance of concern through the use of buffer zones 
     between the chemical source and surrounding populations 
     (including buffer zones between the chemical source and 
     residences, schools, hospitals, senior centers, shopping 
     centers and malls,

[[Page S298]]

     sports and entertainment arenas, public roads and 
     transportation routes, and other population centers).
       (8) Security measure.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``security measure'' means an 
     action carried out to increase the security of a chemical 
     source.
       (B) Inclusions.--The term ``security measure'', with 
     respect to a chemical source, includes--
       (i) employee training and background checks;
       (ii) the limitation and prevention of access to controls of 
     the chemical source;
       (iii) protection of the perimeter of the chemical source;
       (iv) the installation and operation of an intrusion 
     detection sensor; and
       (v) a measure to increase computer or computer network 
     security.
       (9) Substance of concern.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``substance of concern'' means--
       (i) any regulated substance (as defined in section 112(r) 
     of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(r))); and
       (ii) any substance designated by the Administrator under 
     section 4(a).
       (B) Exclusion.--The term ``substance of concern'' does not 
     include liquefied petroleum gas that is used as fuel or held 
     for sale as fuel at a retail facility as described in section 
     112(r)(4)(B) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(4)(B)).
       (10) Unauthorized release.--The term ``unauthorized 
     release'' means--
       (A) a release from a chemical source into the environment 
     of a covered substance of concern that is caused, in whole or 
     in part, by a criminal act;
       (B) a release into the environment of a covered substance 
     of concern that has been removed from a chemical source, in 
     whole or in part, by a criminal act; and
       (C) a release or removal from a chemical source of a 
     covered substance of concern that is unauthorized by the 
     owner or operator of the chemical source.
       (11) Use of inherently safer technology.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``use of inherently safer 
     technology'', with respect to a chemical source, means use of 
     a technology, product, raw material, or practice that, as 
     compared with the technologies, products, raw materials, or 
     practices currently in use--
       (i) reduces or eliminates the possibility of a release of a 
     substance of concern from the chemical source prior to 
     secondary containment, control, or mitigation; and
       (ii) reduces or eliminates the threats to public health and 
     the environment associated with a release or potential 
     release of a substance of concern from the chemical source.
       (B) Inclusions.--The term ``use of inherently safer 
     technology'' includes input substitution, catalyst or carrier 
     substitution, process redesign (including reuse or recycling 
     of a substance of concern), product reformulation, procedure 
     simplification, and technology modification so as to--
       (i) use less hazardous substances or benign substances;
       (ii) use a smaller quantity of covered substances of 
     concern;
       (iii) reduce hazardous pressures or temperatures;
       (iv) reduce the possibility and potential consequences of 
     equipment failure and human error;
       (v) improve inventory control and chemical use efficiency; 
     and
       (vi) reduce or eliminate storage, transportation, handling, 
     disposal, and discharge of substances of concern.

     SEC. 4. DESIGNATION OF AND REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH PRIORITY 
                   CATEGORIES.

       (a) Designation and Regulation of High Priority Categories 
     by the Administrator.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in consultation 
     with the head of the Office and State and local agencies 
     responsible for planning for and responding to unauthorized 
     releases and providing emergency health care, shall 
     promulgate regulations to designate certain combinations of 
     chemical sources and substances of concern as high priority 
     categories based on the severity of the threat posed by an 
     unauthorized release from the chemical sources.
       (2) Factors to be considered.--In designating high priority 
     categories under paragraph (1), the Administrator, in 
     consultation with the head of the Office, shall consider--
       (A) the severity of the harm that could be caused by an 
     unauthorized release;
       (B) the proximity to population centers;
       (C) the threats to national security;
       (D) the threats to critical infrastructure;
       (E) threshold quantities of substances of concern that pose 
     a serious threat; and
       (F) such other safety or security factors as the 
     Administrator, in consultation with the head of the Office, 
     determines to be appropriate.
       (3) Requirements for high priority categories.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in consultation 
     with the head of the Office, the United States Chemical 
     Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, and State and local 
     agencies described in paragraph (1), shall promulgate 
     regulations to require each owner and each operator of a 
     chemical source that is within a high priority category 
     designated under paragraph (1), in consultation with local 
     law enforcement, first responders, and employees, to--
       (i) conduct an assessment of the vulnerability of the 
     chemical source to a terrorist attack or other unauthorized 
     release;
       (ii) using appropriate hazard assessment techniques, 
     identify hazards that may result from an unauthorized release 
     of a covered substance of concern; and
       (iii) prepare a prevention, preparedness, and response plan 
     that incorporates the results of those vulnerability and 
     hazard assessments.
       (B) Actions and procedures.--A prevention, preparedness, 
     and response plan required under subparagraph (A)(iii) shall 
     include actions and procedures, including safer design and 
     maintenance of the chemical source, to eliminate or 
     significantly lessen the potential consequences of an 
     unauthorized release of a covered substance of concern.
       (C) Threat information.--To the maximum extent permitted by 
     applicable authorities and the interests of national 
     security, the head of the Office, in consultation with the 
     Administrator, shall provide owners and operators of chemical 
     sources with threat information relevant to the assessments 
     and plans required under subsection (b).
       (4) Review and revisions.--Not later than 5 years after the 
     date of promulgation of regulations under each of paragraphs 
     (1) and (3), the Administrator, in consultation with the head 
     of the Office, shall review the regulations and make any 
     necessary revisions.
       (5) Addition of substances of concern.--For the purpose of 
     designating high priority categories under paragraph (1) or 
     any subsequent revision of the regulations promulgated under 
     paragraph (1), the Administrator, in consultation with the 
     head of the Office, may designate additional substances that 
     pose a serious threat as substances of concern.
       (b) Certification.--
       (1) Vulnerability and hazard assessments.--Not later than 1 
     year after the date of promulgation of regulations under 
     subsection (a)(3), each owner and each operator of a chemical 
     source that is within a high priority category designated 
     under subsection (a)(1) shall--
       (A) certify to the Administrator that the chemical source 
     has conducted assessments in accordance with the regulations; 
     and
       (B) submit to the Administrator written copies of the 
     assessments.
       (2) Prevention, preparedness, and response plans.--Not 
     later than 18 months after the date of promulgation of 
     regulations under subsection (a)(3), the owner or operator 
     shall--
       (A) certify to the Administrator that the chemical source 
     has completed a prevention, preparedness, and response plan 
     that incorporates the results of the assessments and complies 
     with the regulations; and
       (B) submit to the Administrator a written copy of the plan.
       (3) 5-year review.--Not later than 5 years after each of 
     the date of submission of a copy of an assessment under 
     paragraph (1) and a plan under paragraph (2), and not less 
     often than every 3 years thereafter, the owner or operator of 
     the chemical source covered by the assessment or plan, in 
     coordination with local law enforcement and first responders, 
     shall--
       (A) review the adequacy of the assessment or plan, as the 
     case may be; and
       (B)(i) certify to the Administrator that the chemical 
     source has completed the review; and
       (ii) as appropriate, submit to the Administrator any 
     changes to the assessment or plan.
       (4) Protection of information.--
       (A) Disclosure exemption.--Except with respect to 
     certifications specified in paragraphs (1) through (3) of 
     this subsection and section 5(a), all information provided to 
     the Administrator under this subsection, and all information 
     derived from that information, shall be exempt from 
     disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code.
       (B) Development of protocols.--
       (i) In general.--The Administrator, in consultation with 
     the head of the Office, shall develop such protocols as are 
     necessary to protect the copies of the assessments and plans 
     required to be submitted under this subsection (including the 
     information contained in those assessments and plans) from 
     unauthorized disclosure.
       (ii) Requirements.--The protocols developed under clause 
     (i) shall ensure that--

       (I) each copy of an assessment or plan, and all information 
     contained in or derived from the assessment or plan, is 
     maintained in a secure location;
       (II) except as provided in subparagraph (C), only 
     individuals designated by the Administrator may have access 
     to the copies of the assessments and plans; and
       (III) no copy of an assessment or plan or any portion of an 
     assessment or plan, and no information contained in or 
     derived from an assessment or plan, shall be available to any 
     person other than an individual designated by the 
     Administrator.

       (iii) Deadline.--As soon as practicable, but not later than 
     1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
     Administrator shall complete the development of protocols 
     under clause (i) so as to ensure that the protocols are in 
     place before the date on which the Administrator receives any 
     assessment or plan under this subsection.
       (C) Federal officers and employees.--An individual referred 
     to in subparagraph (B)(ii)

[[Page S299]]

     who is an officer or employee of the United States may 
     discuss with a State or local official the contents of an 
     assessment or plan described in that subparagraph.

     SEC. 5. ENFORCEMENT.

       (a) Review of Plans.--
       (1) In general.--The Administrator, in consultation with 
     the head of the Office, shall review each assessment and plan 
     submitted under section 4(b) to determine the compliance of 
     the chemical source covered by the assessment or plan with 
     regulations promulgated under paragraphs (1) and (3) of 
     section 4(a).
       (2) Certification of compliance.--
       (A) In general.--The Administrator shall certify in writing 
     each determination of the Administrator under paragraph (1).
       (B) Inclusions.--A certification of the Administrator shall 
     include a checklist indicating consideration by a chemical 
     source of the use of 4 elements of safer design and 
     maintenance described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of 
     section 3(6).
       (C) Early compliance.--
       (i) In general.--The Administrator, in consultation with 
     the head of the Office, shall--

       (I) before the date of publication of proposed regulations 
     under section 4(a)(3), review each assessment or plan 
     submitted to the Administrator under section 4(b); and
       (II) before the date of promulgation of final regulations 
     under section 4(a)(3), determine whether each such assessment 
     or plan meets the consultation, planning, and assessment 
     requirements applicable to high priority categories under 
     section 4(a)(3).

       (ii) Affirmative determination.--If the Administrator, in 
     consultation with the head of the Office, makes an 
     affirmative determination under clause (i)(II), the 
     Administrator shall certify compliance of an assessment or 
     plan described in that clause without requiring any revision 
     of the assessment or plan.
       (D) Schedule for review and certification.--
       (i) In general.--The Administrator, after taking into 
     consideration the factors described in section 4(a)(2), shall 
     establish a schedule for the review and certification of 
     assessments and plans submitted under section 4(b).
       (ii) Deadline for completion.--Not later than 3 years after 
     the deadlines for the submission of assessments and plans 
     under paragraph (1) or (2), respectively, of section 4(b), 
     the Administrator shall complete the review and certification 
     of all assessments and plans submitted under those sections.
       (b) Compliance Assistance.--
       (1) Definition of determination.--In this subsection, the 
     term ``determination'' means a determination by the 
     Administrator that, with respect to an assessment or plan 
     described in section 4(b)--
       (A) the assessment or plan does not comply with regulations 
     promulgated under paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 4(a); or
       (B)(i) a threat exists beyond the scope of the submitted 
     plan; or
       (ii) current implementation of the plan is insufficient to 
     address--
       (I) the results of an assessment of a source; or
       (II) a threat described in clause (i).
       (2) Determination by administrator.--If the Administrator, 
     after consultation with the head of the Office, makes a 
     determination, the Administrator shall--
       (A) notify the chemical source of the determination; and
       (B) provide such advice and technical assistance, in 
     coordination with the head of the Office and the United 
     States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, as is 
     appropriate--
       (i) to bring the assessment or plan of a chemical source 
     described in section 4(b) into compliance; or
       (ii) to address any threat described in clause (i) or (ii) 
     of paragraph (1)(B).
       (c) Compliance Orders.--
       (1) In general.--If, after the date that is 30 days after 
     the later of the date on which the Administrator first 
     provides assistance, or a chemical source receives notice, 
     under subsection (b)(2)(B), a chemical source has not brought 
     an assessment or plan for which the assistance is provided 
     into compliance with regulations promulgated under paragraphs 
     (1) and (3) of section 4(a), or the chemical source has not 
     complied with an entry or information request under section 
     6, the Administrator may issue an order directing compliance 
     by the chemical source.
       (2) Notice and opportunity for hearing.--An order under 
     paragraph (1) may be issued only after notice and opportunity 
     for a hearing.
       (d) Abatement Action.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding a certification under 
     section 5(a)(2), if the head of the Office, in consultation 
     with local law enforcement officials and first responders, 
     determines that a threat of a terrorist attack exists that is 
     beyond the scope of a submitted prevention, preparedness, and 
     response plan of 1 or more chemical sources, or current 
     implementation of the plan is insufficient to address the 
     results of an assessment of a source or a threat described in 
     subsection (b)(1)(B)(i), the head of the Office shall notify 
     each chemical source of the elevated threat.
       (2) Insufficient response.--If the head of the Office 
     determines that a chemical source has not taken appropriate 
     action in response to a notification under paragraph (1), the 
     head of the Office shall notify the chemical source, the 
     Administrator, and the Attorney General that actions taken by 
     the chemical source in response to the notification are 
     insufficient.
       (3) Relief.--
       (A) In general.--On receipt of a notification under 
     paragraph (2), the Administrator or the Attorney General may 
     secure such relief as is necessary to abate a threat 
     described in paragraph (1), including such orders as are 
     necessary to protect public health or welfare.
       (B) Jurisdiction.--The district court of the United States 
     for the district in which a threat described in paragraph (1) 
     occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the 
     Administrator or Attorney General requests under subparagraph 
     (A).

     SEC. 6. RECORDKEEPING AND ENTRY.

       (a) Records Maintenance.--A chemical source that is 
     required to certify to the Administrator assessments and 
     plans under section 4 shall maintain on the premises of the 
     chemical source a current copy of those assessments and 
     plans.
       (b) Right of Entry.--In carrying out this Act, the 
     Administrator (or an authorized representative of the 
     Administrator), on presentation of credentials--
       (1) shall have a right of entry to, on, or through any 
     premises of an owner or operator of a chemical source 
     described in subsection (a) or any premises in which any 
     records required to be maintained under subsection (a) are 
     located; and
       (2) may at reasonable times have access to, and may copy, 
     any records, reports, or other information described in 
     subsection (a).
       (c) Information Requests.--In carrying out this Act, the 
     Administrator may require any chemical source to provide such 
     information as is necessary to--
       (1) enforce this Act; and
       (2) promulgate or enforce regulations under this Act.

     SEC. 7. PENALTIES.

       (a) Civil Penalties.--Any owner or operator of a chemical 
     source that violates, or fails to comply with, any order 
     issued may, in an action brought in United States district 
     court, be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 
     for each day in which such violation occurs or such failure 
     to comply continues.
       (b) Criminal Penalties.--Any owner or operator of a 
     chemical source that knowingly violates, or fails to comply 
     with, any order issued shall--
       (1) in the case of a first violation or failure to comply, 
     be fined not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day 
     of violation, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both; and
       (2) in the case of a subsequent violation or failure to 
     comply, be fined not more than $50,000 per day of violation, 
     imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
       (c) Administrative Penalties.--
       (1) Penalty orders.--If the amount of a civil penalty 
     determined under subsection (a) does not exceed $125,000, the 
     penalty may be assessed in an order issued by the 
     Administrator.
       (2) Notice and hearing.--Before issuing an order described 
     in paragraph (1), the Administrator shall provide to the 
     person against which the penalty is to be assessed--
       (A) written notice of the proposed order; and
       (B) the opportunity to request, not later than 30 days 
     after the date on which the notice is received by the person, 
     a hearing on the proposed order.

     SEC. 8. NO EFFECT ON REQUIREMENTS UNDER OTHER LAW.

       Nothing in this Act affects any duty or other requirement 
     imposed under any other Federal or State law.

     SEC. 9. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are 
     necessary to carry out this Act.
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