[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 148 (Friday, November 15, 2002)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2061-E2063]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    CHINA'S BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. BOB SCHAFFER

                              of colorado

                    in the house of representatives

                      Thursday, November 14, 2002

  Mr. SCHAFFER. Mr. Speaker, as we prepare to invade Iraq and ponder 
North Korea's secret nuclear weapons program, America must not overlook 
the greater threat posed by China and the transformation of the 
People's Liberation Army into a modern technological force capable of 
lightning attacks.
  Similar to how Germany used blitzkrieg or lightning warfare in World 
War II to demoralize its opponents, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
is ready to unleash a new form of warfare using advances in accurate 
ballistic missiles, high-energy lasers, and information warfare.
  This transformation of the PLA has more than the capture of Taiwan in 
view. In December 1999 China's Defense Minister, General Chi Haotian, 
declared war between China and the United States ``is inevitable.'' He 
noted, ``The issue is that the Chinese armed forces must control the 
initiative in this war.''
  To control the initiative, the PLA plans to mount a surprise attack, 
counting on the weight of its initial blow to stun an opponent into 
submission. Ballistic missile strikes, high energy lasers used against 
satellites, and information warfare provide the means by which the PLA 
can launch a surprise attack with little or no warning.
  Do we need to remind ourselves of the congressionally funded U.S.-
China Security Review Commission that declared in August 2002, 
``Despite overwhelming U.S. military and technological superiority, 
China can still defeat the United States by transforming its weakness 
into strength and exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities through asymmetric 
warfare . . . deception, surprise and preemptive strikes''.
  China's mild reaction to our plans to invade Iraq may indicate 
deception, laying the groundwork for a surprise attack. Even as we 
engage China in diplomacy to call a halt to North Korea's nuclear 
weapons program, we deceive ourselves as to the role China played in 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology 
to North Korea, where Pakistan served as an intermediary by assisting 
North Korea in its nuclear weapons program in exchange for North Korean 
assistance with its ballistic missile program.
  Even our efforts to seek China's assistance in the war on terrorism 
contain an element of self-deception. We overlook how China supported 
the Taliban, signing a memorandum of understanding with Taliban 
leadership on September 11, 2001. Do we note how PLA military doctrine 
described in Unrestricted Warfare extolled Osama bin Laden as a new 
type of warrior to emulate?
  We deceive ourselves if we believe the PLA is not capable of mounting 
a powerful blow at our armed forces. Our satellites are vulnerable to 
laser attacks and information warfare--a fact carefully noted by Donald 
Rumsfeld before he became Secretary of Defense while serving as 
Chairman of the Space Commission. Our forces and military bases are 
vulnerable to ballistic missile strikes--we have no defense against 
ballistic missiles except for the short-range Patriot.


                                 Taiwan

  A picture of our vulnerability may be seen in Taiwan. For example, a 
Taiwanese defense ministry report concluded a PLA attack using 
ballistic missiles and cruise missiles supplemented by long-range 
artillery and other weapons aimed at nearly one hundred key targets 
such as airports, harbors, important highways, bridges and military 
command centers, missile bases and barracks would be successful within 
a very short time. Several dozen ballistic missiles could destroy over 
half its navy concentrated at the naval base of Tsuoying.

[[Page E2062]]

  In 2002 computerized war simulations in Taiwan's Han Kuang Number 18 
military exercise showed it could lose much of its air force in the 
first wave of ballistic missile strikes. The launch of hundreds of 
ballistic missiles aimed at major air bases around Taiwan would damage 
75 percent of its air force fighters on the ground.
  Furthermore, China has obtained technical information on the improved 
Patriot-2, enabling it to devise tactics for overwhelming the two 
hundred Patriot missiles guarding Taipei and its environs.


                             Transformation

  Transformation is a result of new strategy and new weapons that can 
convey a sense of overwhelming defeat, enabling conventional military 
forces to conduct mopping-up operations against a demoralized enemy. In 
other words, while the bulk of PLA forces are not as technologically 
sophisticated as U.S. forces, if PLA laser and ballistic missile forces 
can create a sense of overwhelming defeat, the once vaunted 
technological superiority of U.S. forces would be swept aside.
  Similar to Taiwan, China's intermediate and long-range ballistic 
missiles could be used in a preemptive strike against U.S. air and 
naval forces, particularly in the Pacific. Indeed, China's 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles were developed for attacking U.S. 
forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The effect would be the same 
as an attack on Taiwan. U.S. air and naval strength would be 
devastated.
  The PLA is aware of the vulnerability of U.S. forces to ballistic 
missiles. The inability of U.S. forces to defend themselves against 
ballistic missiles can create a condition for intense psychological 
defeat, a feeling of utter helplessness against a foe that can strike 
at will. This is called asymmetric warfare--attacking an opponent's 
weakness.
  We will find our weapons, doctrine, and leadership outdated. For 
example, we have no weapons to counter a high-energy laser used to 
attack our DSP early warning satellites, which could otherwise warn of 
a PLA ballistic missile strike. Other key military satellites, upon 
which depends our Revolution in Military Affairs, are at risk.
  Our generals do not practice for war against an opponent that uses 
accurate ballistic missiles in a preemptive strike. China has developed 
accurate ballistic missiles. Its short-range M-11, which uses GPS 
guidance, is accurate to about 5 meters. Its DF-21 (CSS-5) 
intermediate-range ballistic missile is equipped with terminal, 
precision guidance and possibly GPS. China has the option of using 
ballistic missiles armed with non-nuclear warheads in a precision, 
long-distance strike.
  Our navy has no defense against a DF-31 ICBM that could be fired at a 
naval battle group shortly after leaving Pearl Harbor. The PLA large-
scale exercise called Liberation 2 simulated landing on Taiwan and 
attacking U.S. aircraft carriers, including strikes by DF-31 nuclear-
capable ICBMS.
  Our nuclear missiles are no defense against a preemptive ballistic-
missile strike. The threat of retaliation under the doctrine of Mutual 
Assured Destruction is empty. Even though we possess a larger number of 
ICBMS, we have no defense against the PLA holding American cities 
hostage using a small number of missiles.
  Unlike the Cold War where Soviet ballistic missile forces were 
targeted at U.S. ballistic missile forces as well as other defense 
installations and military bases, China has targeted U.S. conventional 
forces and bases, trusting that a small arsenal of ICBMs pointed at 
American cities could deter a U.S. nuclear retaliation.
  Not only are U.S. forces undefended from ballistic missile attack, 
the use of air power in retaliation or suppression would be slower in 
comparison to another ballistic missile strike. Air power alone is not 
decisive in the age of missiles.


                                Evidence

  Evidence of the PLA's transformation may be seen in the double-digit 
increases to its announced defense spending for over a decade; its 
purchase of advanced Russian arms such as Sovremenny destroyers, Kilo 
submarines, S-300 air defense missiles, supersonic cruise missiles, Su-
27 and Su-30 aircraft; and, its buildup of ballistic missiles and new 
doctrine.
  Once an army of peasants, the PLA has become an army of the 
technologically equipped with advanced degrees in science and 
engineering. To foster its acquisition of new weapons, the PLA has 
shrunk in numbers from approximately 3.5 million to 2.5 million while 
defense spending has increased. It has the world's second largest 
defense budget, amplified by the relatively low wages it pays.


                         U.S. Force Disposition

  The concentration of U.S. forces in the Middle East and Persian Gulf 
is creating a condition for strategic attack and maneuver by the PLA. 
After a surprise attack using lasers, ballistic missiles, and 
information warfare directed at U.S. satellites and air and naval 
forces, a PLA force as small as 50,000 well equipped troops could 
create havoc. U.S. forces rely heavily on air power.
  Following a surprise attack there would be little to stop the PLA 
from invading other countries, including Taiwan and the island nations 
of the Pacific. PLA invasion forces against these tiny Pacific nations 
would not need to be large. The fractured nature of Indonesia could 
lead the PLA to extend its initiative to larger nations, perhaps 
focusing on oil and gas reserves. Guam and Hawaii would be at risk.
  While the Navy should be commended for basing three attack submarines 
on Guam, have we considered the defense of that island from the PLA, 
which has extended its grasp into the Spratly Islands and South China 
Sea?
  Guam is a strategic position for reinforcing U.S. defense commitments 
to Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and the other 
island nations of the Pacific. Its use against the PLA as a base for 
the projection of air and naval power would call for a concentration of 
military strength.
  This concentration of military strength on Guam should include 
theater missile defenses that can intercept intermediate-range 
ballistic missiles. Unfortunately, we have no theater missile defenses 
to deploy, although THAAD achieved successful interceptions several 
years ago. Yet Guam's strategic value would call for reinforcement, 
even with land forces presumably armed with tanks and mobile artillery 
such as the cancelled Crusader. The use of artillery has been proven in 
hundreds of years of warfare and should not be neglected against a 
heavily armed opponent such as the PLA.
  Hawaii, the crossroads of the Pacific, has been a key U.S. military 
base for nearly a century. Considering how China plans to engulf the 
Pacific in island chains that would extend to the Aleutians and 
Hawaiian Islands, Hawaii's defense and use as a base for projecting air 
and naval power should be considered essential. What steps have we 
taken to reinforce that key position, including the deployment of 
ballistic missile defenses capable of intercepting ICBMS?
  Preparation is key to a strong defense. Just as the PLA has engaged 
in an extensive and far-reaching military buildup for nearly fifteen 
years, we need to prepare and reinforce our defenses, especially 
against the PLA's weapon of choice, the ballistic missile. Without 
preparation in advance, the transportation of reinforcements may 
suffer, as well as the construction of defenses.
  The buildup of forces in the Persian Gulf should not blind us to the 
need for defensive preparations against the PLA. Such preparations may 
include a buildup of naval forces to counterbalance China's acquisition 
of Russian Kilo submarines, Sovremenny destroyers, and cruise missiles 
in addition to its buildup of ballistic missiles. Ballistic missile 
defenses would play a key role, especially space-based and naval 
defenses that can provide widespread, flexible coverage over the 
Pacific. Our preparations may include new weapons and defenses against 
to offset the PLA's acquisition of supersonic cruise missiles, Shkval 
rocket torpedoes, and wake homing torpedoes.


                            Central America

  In preparing defenses to counter the PLA, the southern approach to 
the continental United States from Central America, Mexico, Cuba, or 
other Caribbean nations deserves our attention. To be of military 
significance, our planning should include the deployment of U.S. ground 
forces in the event of a PLA intrusion through our southern border or 
through ports such as Houston or Mobile.
  However unlikely it may seem to be, the southern approach is 
vulnerable, especially given the extensive nature of Chinese shipping 
interests. Commercial shipping could be used for the transport of 
military forces in the form of a Trojan horse. The PLA has conducted 
military exercises using freighters armed with artillery, similar to 
the German Q-ships used in World War II. While a small PLA invasion 
force would hardly be expected to conquer the United States, neither 
should we overlook the disruption and consternation that even a small 
PLA invasion force could cause.
  With its commercial influence at the ports of San Cristobal and Colon 
in Panama and friendship with the Marxist learning President of 
Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, China's reach could well include our southern 
approach. Yet an opportunity could arise to renew our relationship with 
Panama, including the stationing of military forces along the Panama 
Canal, as a number of Panamanians would like to see the Yankees return.
  This planning would need to include a sentry line and reserves. These 
reserves would need to be stationed within the United States, not the 
Middle East or Persian Gulf Reserves are for reserves. It is 
unreasonable to use Reserves and National Guard units in place of the 
regular armed forces, whether in scattered peacekeeping missions or the 
buildup for Iraq.


                                Summary

  The PLA has developed similar attack capabilities to Germany's 
lightning warfare, using surprise as the key for a sudden and powerful 
launch. The tools the PLA will use in the

[[Page E2063]]

spearhead of its attack--ballistic missiles, high-energy lasers, and 
information warfare--are tools against which the United States have 
virtually no defense. For these reasons I wish to note for the record 
that we are woefully unprepared for a more serious and eminent war. I 
cannot stress enough the issues relating to the PLA's war threat. We 
must come to recognize the significant role our current actions in the 
Middle East play into China's aggressive military intentions. To 
further illustrate my points, I will offer subsequent remarks detailing 
the present danger China poses elsewhere in the Record.

                          ____________________