[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 147 (Thursday, November 14, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10974-S10993]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




    MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT OF 2002--CONFERENCE REPORT

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the 
Senate will now proceed to the consideration of the conference report 
to accompany S. 1214, which the clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the 
     two Houses on the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 
     1214), to amend the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, to establish a 
     program to ensure greater security for United States 
     seaports, and for other purposes, having met, have agreed 
     that the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment 
     of the House and agree to the same with an amendment and the 
     House agree to the same, signed by all conferees on the part 
     of both Houses.

  The Senate proceeded to the consideration of the conference report.
  (The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the 
Record of November 13, 2002.)
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, there 
will be 60 minutes for debate on the conference report, with the time 
to be equally divided and controlled between the chairman and ranking 
member of the Commerce Committee.
  The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, first, I ask for the yeas and nays on 
the conference report.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, the American public is most familiar 
with airline, highway and rail transportation. But perhaps the most 
vulnerable link in our transportation system is the component that few 
Americans ever see: our major seaports.
  Our 361 sea and river ports handle 95 percent of U.S. international 
trade. These ports annually transfer more than 2 billion tons of 
freight--often in huge containers from ships that discharge directly 
onto trucks and railcars that immediately head onto our highways and 
rail systems. But less than 2 percent of those 5 million containers are 
ever checked by customs or law enforcement officials.
  That is a gaping hole in our national security that must be fixed. 
That is why the Senate passed The Port and Maritime Security Act of 
2001 in December of 2001 and the House and Senate have filed the 
conference report on the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.
  Before discussing the specifics of this conference report, I want to 
discuss the vulnerabilities at America's seaports:
  Lloyd's List International reported that a NATO country's 
intelligence service has identified 20 merchant vessels believed to be 
linked to Osama bin Laden. Those vessels are now subject to seizure in 
ports all over the world. Some of the vessels are thought to be owned 
outright by bin Laden's business interests, while others are on long-
term charter. The Times of London reported that bin Laden used his 
ships to import into Kenya the explosives used to destroy the U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
  A suspected member of the al-Quida terrorist network was arrested in 
Italy after he tried to stow-away in a shipping container heading to 
Toronto. The container was furnished with a bed, a toilet, and its own 
power source to operate the heater and recharge batteries. According to 
the Toronto Sun, the man also had a global satellite telephone, a 
laptop computer, an airline mechanics certificate, and security passes 
for airports in Canada, Thailand and Egypt.
  In October, a French-flagged tanker was attacked by terrorists in a 
manner very similar to the speed boat attack on the USS Cole in 2000. 
The attack caused 60,000 tons of oil to be released into the waters off 
Yemen and killed one crew member.
  These stories really bring home this issue of seaport security. 
Except for those of us who live in port cities like Charleston, people 
often do not think about their ports--the ports that load industrial 
and consumer goods onto trucks and railroad cars heading directly to 
their hometowns. But making these ports more secure is vital to 
protecting our national security. The destruction that can be 
accomplished through security holes at our seaports potentially exceed 
any other mode of transportation. And yet we have failed to make 
seaport security a priority.
  Most Americans would be surprised to discover that until the 
provisions in this bill there has been no unified federal plan for 
overseeing the security of the international borders at our seaports. 
And that's what seaports are: international borders that must be 
protected as well as our land borders with Canada and Mexico.
  The U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs Service are doing an 
outstanding job, but they are outgunned. In the year 2000, we imported 
5.5 million trailer truckloads of cargo. Due to that volume, the U.S. 
Customs Service is only able to inspect between 1 to 2 percent of 
containers. In other words, potential terrorists and drug smugglers 
have a 98 percent chance of randomly importing illegal and dangerous 
materials.
  Senator Bob Graham a few years ago convinced President Clinton to 
appoint a commission to look at seaport security. At the time, the main 
focus of port security was stopping illegal drugs, the smuggling of 
people, and cargo theft. While those problems still exist, the new--and 
very real--threat of terrorism strikes right at the heart of our 
national defense.
  The Interagency Commission on Crime and Security at U.S. Seaports 
issued a report a year ago that said security at U.S. seaports ``ranges 
from poor to fair.'' Let me repeat that: 17 federal agencies reviewed 
our port security system and found it in poor shape.

[[Page S10975]]

  According to the Commission:

       Control of access to the seaport or sensitive areas within 
     the seaports is often lacking. Practices to restrict or 
     control the access of vehicles to vessels, cargo receipt and 
     delivery operations, and passenger processing operations at 
     seaports are either not present or not consistently enforced, 
     increasing the risk that violators could quickly remove cargo 
     or contraband. Many ports do not have identification cards 
     issued to personnel to restrict access to vehicles, cargo 
     receipt and delivery operations, and passenger processing 
     operations.

  The report said:

       At many seaports, the carrying of firearms is to 
     restricted, and thus internal conspirators and other 
     criminals are allowed armed access to cargo vessels and 
     cruise line terminals. In addition, many seaports rely on 
     private security personnel who lack the crime prevention and 
     law enforcement training and capability of regular police 
     officers.

  The report also found that port-related businesses did not know where 
to report cargo theft and other crimes, and that federal, state and 
local law enforcement agencies responsible for a port's security rarely 
meet to coordinate their work.
  That is what our legislation does--it creates mechanisms to integrate 
all these different security agencies and their efforts to improve the 
security of our seaports, and the railways and highways that converge 
at our seaports. Our seaport security bill also directly funds more 
security officers, more screening equipment, and the building of 
important security infrastructure.

  Each agency is good at what they do individually. But they will be 
even stronger working together, sharing information and tactics, and 
coordinating security coverage at our seaports. More teamwork between 
these federal, state and local agencies--along with our security 
partners in the private sector--will produce a more secure seaport 
environment that is stronger than the sum of each agency's individual 
efforts. To foster that teamwork, our bill sets up a National Maritime 
Security Advisory Committee responsible for coordinating programs to 
enhance the security and safety of U.S. seaports.
  Most important in the bill are the requirements to implement security 
plans that will provide for efficient, coordinated and effective action 
to deter and minimize damage from a transportation security incident. 
The plans will be developed as a national plan, a regional area plan, 
and facility and vessel plans. The National and Area Security Plans 
will be developed by the Coast Guard and will be adequate to deter a 
transportation security incident to the maximum extent possible. The 
facility and vessel plans are for the individual waterfront facilities 
and vessels and must be consistent with the federal and area plans. The 
Secretary of Transportation will conduct an initial assessment of 
vessels and facilities on and near the water. The assessment will 
identify those facilities and vessel types that pose a high risk of 
being involved in a transportation security incident. These assessments 
will identify the vulnerable assets and infrastructure as well as the 
threats to those assets and infrastructure.
  Within a year the initial assessments will be made, interim security 
measures will be implemented, and more detailed assessments will be 
conducted, from which vessel and facility security plans will be 
devised. These plans will be based on the Coast Guard vulnerability 
assessments and security recommendations. The plans will be submitted 
to the Coast Guard by port authorities, waterfront facilities, and 
vessel operators. All ports, waterfront facilities and vessels are 
required to operate under approved security plans that are consistent 
with the Federal and Area Security Plans.
  To further enhance law enforcement cooperation, we will require the 
establishment of Area Security Advisory Committees at each port to 
coordinate security plans among all the involved agencies: law 
enforcement, intelligence agencies, Customs, Coast Guard, Immigration, 
port authorities, shipping companies, and port workers. The bill also 
creates new programs to professionally train port security personnel. 
Certification and training of maritime security personnel will be 
crucial in increasing the professionalism of our federal, state, local, 
and private sector security personnel.
  To address the immediate risk of terrorist activities at or through 
our seaports, the bill directs the Secretary of Transportation to 
immediately establish domestic maritime safety and security teams to 
respond to terrorist activity, criminal activity, or other threats. The 
units will be composed of officers trained in anti-terrorism, drug 
interdiction, navigation assistance, and facilitating response to 
security threats. I would like to thank Senator Edwards for his work on 
this provision. The bill also creates a Sea Marshal program to more 
specifically authorize the Coast Guard to board vessels in order to 
deter, prevent, or respond to acts of terrorism. These Sea Marshals 
will ride along aboard some vessels entering U.S. ports as a deterrent 
against hijacking or other criminal activity. I would like to thank 
Senator John Kerry and Senator John Breaux for working on the Sea 
Marshal initiative. I also commend Senator Breaux for all his work on 
seaport security. He is the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Surface 
Transportation and Merchant Marine, he has toured throughout the nation 
reviewing security at our seaports and has done a yeoman's job helping 
to pass this bill.
  The bill will require ports to limit access to security-sensitive 
areas. Ports also will be required to limit cars and trucks, coordinate 
with local and private law enforcement, and develop an evacuation plan. 
Port areas will have increased security with specific area within the 
port being designated as controlled access where only those with the 
appropriate credentials will be allowed. The bill also will require 
criminal background checks of employees with access to ocean manifests 
or access-controlled areas of a port or terminal. These background 
checks are designed to ensure that individuals with access to our 
terminals and cargo facilities are not a terrorism security threat. A 
system of appeals and waivers will be provided to ensure that port 
workers are given full and adequate opportunity to explain mitigating 
factors justifying any waiver requests.
  This bill will require for the first time that we know more in 
advance about the cargo and crew members coming into the United States. 
The more we know about a ship's cargo--and where it originated--the 
better our Customs agents and other law enforcement officers can target 
the most suspicious containers and passengers. I am also pleased that 
we established performance standards for the locking and sealing of 
containers. It is vitally important that we ensure that shipping 
containers are adequately designed and constructed and that we check 
that they are securely locked for shipment.
  The bill modifies a rulemaking requirement for advanced cargo 
information. The original requirement was included in the Senate passed 
version of the bill. The rulemaking was then included in the Trade Act, 
and S. 1214 makes modifications to the Trade Act to incorporate 
additional changes. I would like to thank the Finance Committee for 
their cooperative spirit in our effort to enhance cargo security.
  Perhaps most importantly, we will give port authorities and local 
entities support in implementing and paying the costs of addressing 
Coast Guard identified vulnerabilities. We are dealing with an issue of 
national security--and we will treat it as such. It would be great if 
we could simply declare our ports to be more secure. But it takes money 
to make sure these international borders at our seaports are fully 
staffed with customs, law enforcement, and immigration personnel. It 
takes money to make sure they have modern security equipment, including 
the newest scanners to check cargo for the most dangerous materials. 
And it takes money to build the physical infrastructure of a secure 
port.
  For seaport security infrastructure, the bill directly authorizes 
amounts sufficient to upgrade security infrastructure such as gates and 
fencing, security-related lighting systems, and remote surveillance 
systems, equipment such as security vessels and screening equipment. I 
had hoped that we would have an agreement on a dedicated funding 
mechanism to ensure that state, local and private sector entities that 
are required to comply with federal security mandates would have the 
necessary funds to aggressively pursue compliance with security 
requirements. Unfortunately, I was not able to

[[Page S10976]]

convince all of the conferees that this was the proper course of 
action. I was happy that we did reach an agreement to have the 
Administration report on how to pay for the federal portion of the 
seaport security responsibility. I will be following this very closely 
to ensure that we have some sort of agreement to allow for the 
aggressive pursuit of a new system of seaport security.
  U.S. Customs officers must be able to screen more than just 2 percent 
of the cargo coming into our seaports. We cannot expect to screen every 
marine container entering the United States, but there must be some 
expectation of inspection to deter cargo smugglers. While we spend 
billions of dollars on an anti-ballistic missile defense system, we 
fail to see perhaps even a greater threat to our national security 
coming through our ports. A cargo container can be delivered to 
anywhere in the United States for less than $5,000. The enemies of 
America can afford $5,000 to import a container of explosive or 
hazardous materials much more easily than millions of dollars to launch 
a rocket.
  Investing in new screening technologies will help human screeners 
inspect more cargo, and detect the most dangerous shipments. To 
increase the amount of cargo screened, the bill directly grants and 
authorizes $90 million in research and development grants to be awarded 
to develop methods to increase the ability of the U.S. Customs Service 
to inspect merchandise carried on any vessel that will arrive in the 
United States; develop equipment to detect nuclear materials; improving 
the tags and seals used on shipping containers, including smart sensors 
for tracking shipments; and tools to mitigate the consequences of 
terrorist attack. The research and development funds are intended to 
fund any enhancements that are necessary to enhance technology at U.S. 
Seaports.
  The destruction that can be accomplished through security holes at 
our seaports potentially exceeds any other mode of transportation. We 
all know the damage that can be caused by one truck bomb. But one ship 
can carry thousands of truck-sized containers filled with hazardous 
materials. A hijacked tanker holding 32 million gallons of oil or other 
explosive material that is rammed into a port city like Boston, New 
York, Miami, Los Angeles or Seattle could potentially kill thousands of 
people and destroy many city blocks.
  That vulnerability is magnified by the type of facilities along our 
coasts and rivers. There are 68 nuclear power plants located along U.S. 
waterways. Along the 52-mile Houston Ship Channel, there are 150 
chemical plants, storage facilities and oil refineries. The Baltimore 
Sun reported that ``within a mile of the Inner Harbor of Baltimore is a 
major East Coast import and export hub for a broad range of dry and 
liquid chemicals. If ignited, many are capable of producing ferocious 
fires, explosions and clouds of noxious fumes--immediately adjacent to 
such densely populated row house neighborhoods as Locust Point, 
Highlandtown, and Canton.''
  Most of the security procedures and infrastructure improvements 
contained in our bill have long been practiced at our airports and land 
border crossings. But, for some unfathomable reason, we don't take 
these preventive steps at our seaports--where most of our cargo 
arrives, and where we are most vulnerable.
  Our agents at the Mexican border near Tijuana will tear the seats out 
of a car to search for drugs--while a crane just up the coast in Los 
Angeles lifts thousands of truck-sized cargo containers onto the dock 
with no inspection at all.
  For the first time we will require federal approval of seaport 
security plans, better coordination and training of law enforcement, 
more information about cargo, and directly fund more Coast Guard 
personnel, U.S. Customs agents and security screening equipment to 
protect against crime and terrorism threats.
  Prior to September 11, 2001 we already faced security problems at our 
seaports related to smuggling, drugs, and cargo theft. But now we face 
the even greater threat of terrorism--a threat that requires us to 
immediately tighten security at our seaports, the most vulnerable part 
of our international border, in the defense of our nation.
  This landmark bill also incorporates a Coast Guard authorization 
bill--the first Coast Guard authorization bill that has passed Congress 
since 1998. The Coast Guard provisions in the bill reflect the 
provisions of S. 951, the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2001, which 
was reported out of the Commerce Committee last year.
  The bill provides increased authorization levels for appropriations 
in fiscal year 2003, as well as increased personnel. The bill 
authorizes approximately $6 billion for the Coast Guard's total budget 
for fiscal year 2003. This is approximately $1 billion higher than the 
amount appropriated in the FY 2002 Transportation Appropriations bill, 
and is approximately $200 million higher than the $5.8 billion of total 
enacted amounts in FY 2002, which includes two supplemental 
appropriations.
  The bill also increases the maximum end-of-year strength to 45,500 
active duty military personnel, up from about 35,500, and includes 
personnel incentives.
  The authorizations of appropriations in this bill include 
$725,000,000 for capital investments, to ensure that the multi-year 
Deepwater program and the overhaul of the National Distress and 
Response System (NDS), or ``Maritime 911,'' are adequately funded in 
2003.
  Ensuring that the Coast Guard has sufficient personnel and capital 
resources could not come at a more important time. Since the tragic 
events of September 11, far greater demands have been placed on the 
Coast Guard in the area of homeland security. Traditionally, the Coast 
Guard invested only 2 percent of its operating budget into seaport 
security; this climbed to over 50 percent of its total operating budget 
after September 11. Now, approximately 22 percent of the budget is 
envisioned for seaport security.
  The Coast Guard has unique missions not covered by any other federal 
agency. It has the primary responsibility of enforcing U.S. fisheries 
laws, carrying out drug interdiction at sea, search and rescue 
operations, and protecting the marine environment against pollution.
  With the new responsibilities for port security, combined with the 
traditional role the Coast Guard plays in other mission areas, it is 
critically important that the Coast Guard has a vision for how to 
achieve the ``new normalcy,'' wherein it carries out all of its 
traditional and new missions, as well as the means to ensure its 
ability to carry out such functions.
  This bill requires the Coast Guard to examine and report to Congress 
its expenditures by mission area before and after September 11, and the 
level of funding need to fulfill the Coast Guard's additional 
responsibilities. The bill also requires the Coast Guard to provide a 
strategic plan to Congress identifying mission targets for 2003, 2004 
and 2005 and the specific steps necessary to achieve those targets.
  Even prior to 9/11, there were serious concerns about the Coast 
Guard's ability to carry out its core missions. For example, the Coast 
Guard's 30-year-old National Distress and Response System (NDS), also 
known as ``Maritime 911,'' is breaking down, and has 88 gaps in its 
geographical area of coverage. Failure to retain experienced crew has 
plagued the Coast Guard for years. The lack of experienced personnel 
has resulted in tragedy, with unanswered calls for help leading to the 
loss of lives at sea. In 1997, all four passengers of the sailboat 
Morning Dew, three of them children, drowned outside of Charleston 
Harbor as a result of a failed search and rescue system.
  The bill requires the Coast Guard to establish and implement 
standards for the safe operation of all search and rescue facilities. 
These include standards for the length of time an individual may serve 
on watch, and acquisition of equipment to achieve safety in the 
interim, as the entire system is upgraded.
  Since the events of September 11, our demands on the Coast Guard have 
risen dramatically. We must ensure that the Coast Guard is equipped 
with all of the tools and resources that it needs to protect our 
seaports, and to carry out all of its traditional missions. I am 
pleased that we have reached a successful result in the Conference with 
the House, and that by enacting a Port Security bill, we will at the 
same time be

[[Page S10977]]

passing a Coast Guard authorization bill this year.
  Mr. President, the morning news reports that Osama bin Laden is alive 
and well and al-Qaida operates. Four years ago, we started working on 
this measure, because it was just prior to that time that one of al-
Qaida's tankers pulled into Mombassa, the port at Kenya, and the 
terrorist crew jumped off and blew up the embassy at Nairobi and then 
Dar Es Salaam's embassy in Tanzania. Lloyds of London reports Osama bin 
Laden has actual ownership of some 10 oil tankers, and he has control 
of some other 10 cargo tankers.
  I point this out because it is the real threat. Yes, we have maybe a 
hijacking threat, but the real threat now, as we see it develop, is 
with respect to our seaports. That is why we started in the committee, 
some 4 years ago, with respect to seaport security.
  Only, last year in Italy we found a suspected al-Qaida terrorist 
network was operating, coming in through containers. There are some 5 
million containers that come into the United States of America each 
year with 2 billion tons of freight. Only 2 percent of those containers 
are inspected at this time.
  But that one particular suspected terrorist had a bed and a toilet; 
he had his own power source and everything else like that ready to 
operate. He could just as easily have come, and may have, unbeknownst 
to us, into the United States of America.
  But let's go right to just last month, the oil tanker off of Yemen, 
the French tanker with some 60,000 tons of oil. As they blew up the USS 
Cole, they blew up this particular tanker. One can easily foresee that 
a regular tanker could come up the Delaware River with a suicidal al-
Qaida group in operation or in control, where they throw the captain 
overboard and run it right into an oil tank farm there in Philadelphia, 
blowing the whole thing up, closing down the eastern seaboard.
  So we worked very hard on this legislation. I commend the Senate 
itself because it was last year at this time, and both sides of the 
aisle, under the leadership and working with my distinguished 
colleague, Senator McCain--the soon-to-be chairman again--we worked and 
unanimously reported out a port security bill from our Commerce 
Committee. We passed it in the Senate 100 to 0.
  It languished on the House side for some months. And it was in June 
that they finally passed it. And we have been with the staff.
  I must emphasize the outstanding work of our staff in this particular 
regard. We worked all summer long. We thank particularly our colleague 
Mr. Oberstar who worked with us as diligently as he could. In any 
event, now we have the conference report. It is not complete in the 
sense that it is not funded. We provide in here certain sums as is 
necessary to be reported to us in the Congress within 6 months.
  We tried to get funding. The Senate had approved a user fee. They 
called it a tax, and we had some effort over the summer working it out 
to make sure it was a user fee. Then they said it was an origination 
problem. Thereupon we said: All right. Just take the conference report. 
You introduce it. We are not proud of its origin particularly. And you 
put it in, and we will approve it on the Senate side. So that caused a 
great delay, but now it's ready to go.
  The Maritime Transportation Security Act will provide for the first 
time a national system for securing our maritime borders. Heretofore, 
we have known every plane that approaches the continental limits of the 
United States. They have transponders. We have the radar. We track 
them. But we couldn't tell what ship was coming, when it was coming, or 
how. We moved some weather satellites to repair that particular 
deficiency. We now know, with the Coast Guard working overtime, of the 
ships approaching. But we now have a secure system for our maritime 
borders.
  We have to first ask that the Secretary of Transportation conduct an 
assessment of all vessels and facilities on or near the water and 
identify the risks of being involved in an incident. Then we develop a 
port and area security plan.
  Let me emphasize, you have the Coast Guard. You have Customs. You 
have DEA. You have local law enforcement. You have the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service. When everybody is in charge, nobody is in 
charge. Under the present law, the captain of the port is in charge. We 
haven't changed that, but we have given him assistance.
  We have the Coast Guard authorization bill also in this particular 
conference report, increasing the Coast Guard amounts and 
authorizations some $1 billion this fiscal year 2003 over 2002. So we 
are beginning now to upgrade the wherewithal of the Coast Guard itself 
that has been doing an outstanding job.
  The plans are based on the Coast Guard security recommendations, 
which they will make within 1 year, of all ports, facilities, and 
vessels determined to be vulnerable. They then have the local port 
security committees, which will coordinate the Federal, State, and 
local and private enforcement efforts.
  We have been doing this, I know in the ports of Charleston and 
several others on the eastern seaboard. They have just been awaiting 
this legislation to make sure we are working in lockstep with the 
Federal requirements. But then when I say they have to have the private 
efforts, think about it. If you went down to the Rio Grande, to the 
border, and to the State of Arizona and told a rancher down there: Wait 
a minute, there are some illegal immigrants coming across the border in 
the nighttime, and what you have to do is not only put a barbed wire 
enclosure around your particular ranch, but you have to turn the lights 
on at night and everything else like that, this is a private ranch, he 
would look at you and laugh. He would say: What are you talking about?
  That is what we are doing with respect to many of the ports that are 
operated privately. The Danes operate the Port of New York; the Chinese 
operate the Long Beach Port; the union operates the Seattle Port; the 
State of South Carolina operates our ports. So you can see this 
particular task has to be a comprehensive and coordinated effort.

  We then develop secure areas in the ports as part of the security 
plans. That is approved by the Department of Transportation. There is a 
grant program here of allocations to the different ports authority, the 
size, the threat, and whatever else is there. There is $90 million in 
research grants to be awarded to develop the methods to increase the 
ability of the U.S. Customs to inspect the merchandise. There is a $33 
million program intended for the development of security training.
  There is an established maritime intelligence system to work with 
this new Department of Homeland Security. They have to take all of this 
information, not just from the FBI, CIA, NSA, and Secret Service, but 
the DEA in large measure furnishes intelligence.
  We will have transponders on the various vessels coming in. Within 
that year, we will have a certified system of transportation that is a 
secure system of transportation allowing for secure maritime borders. 
They will have to be screened prior to entry.
  The transportation oversight board will establish a security program 
to develop the secure areas as well as the standards. People working in 
those secure areas will be required to have background checks. Not 
everybody coming there delivering the Cokes for the Coke machine or 
whatever will need it, but there will be secure areas, and people 
working in them will have to have background checks. We have 
established a sea marshal program that the maritime folks have wanted 
for quite a while.
  We have an assessment of the foreign antiterrorism measure. And let 
me commend Mr. Bonner, the Director of Customs, who has already gone 
overseas and coordinated this. What we are doing is establishing 
assessment and check methods and secure methods for the ports of the 
cargo being loaded into the containers before they leave, let's say, 
the Port of London. We are going to have to do the same things to 
facilitate delivery when it comes into the United States.
  I emphasize the Coast Guard authorization bill. We haven't had one 
since 1998. We have been struggling with that. But now everybody has in 
their minds front and center the Coast Guard, the magnificent job it 
has been doing, even as it has been understaffed and underfunded. We 
are going to build that up.

[[Page S10978]]

  I yield such time as is necessary to the distinguished Senator from 
Arizona.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, let me start by, once again, thanking 
Chairman Hollings for his leadership in addressing identified safety 
and security problems at our Nation's seaports. I applaud his 
leadership and steadfastness as we finally bring this important piece 
of legislation to completion.
  The conference report we are considering today is an important step 
forward and will provide both the guidance and funding authorization 
needed to improve maritime and port security. It is past time to send 
this legislation to the President for his signature.
  The old adage, ``a chain is only as strong as its weakest link,'' is 
very true when it comes to securing our homeland. Today, our Nation's 
seaports remain a weak link in border security. This conference 
agreement will go a long way in strengthening that link.
  Both the Hart-Rudman Report on Homeland Security and the Interagency 
Commission on Crime and Seaport Security found our seaports to be 
vulnerable to crime and terrorism. While there is no way to make our 
Nation's seaports completely crime free and impenetrable to terrorist 
attacks, this conference report will undoubtably advance port security 
and help strengthen overall national security.
  The report by the Interagency Commission on Crime and Seaport 
Security, also known as the Graham Commission, in recognition of 
Senator Graham's efforts to establish such a commission,was a catalyst 
2 years ago for the Commerce Committee's initial efforts to address 
crime and security issues at our Nation's seaports.
  The committee held a number of hearings in Washington focused on 
seaport security issues and the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation 
and Merchant Marine also held field hearings on the west coast in 
Seattle, WA, and Portland, OR, and on the southeast and gulf coast in 
Port Everglades, FL, New Orleans, LA, Houston, TX, and Charleston, SC. 
The input from numerous witnesses contributed significantly to the 
development of this agreement.
  As I have mentioned many times during the past year, it is widely 
reported that transportation systems are the target of 40 percent of 
terrorist attacks worldwide. This conference agreement would provide 
for increased security at our Nation's seaports, helping to reduce 
crime and protect vessels and vital transportation infrastructure from 
terrorist attacks.
  The conference agreement includes a number of important provisions. 
It requires coordination among the many entities that play a role in 
security at our Nation's seaports and on our navigable waterways, 
including the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the many other 
Federal, State, local, and private agencies. It directs these entities 
to work together to establish security plans aimed at decreasing 
vulnerabilities and reducing threats to our ports and maritime 
transportation system. These plans will help define specific 
responsibilities and secure our seaports.
  The conference agreement also requires the Secretary to establish 
incident response plans that explain the role of each agency and how 
their efforts are to be coordinated in the event of an attack on our 
Nation's maritime transportation system. In addition to providing 
guidance on how to respond in the event of an attack, it is expected 
the detailed planning called for in the agreement will help deter 
terrorist attacks and other criminal acts aimed at our seaports.
  The conference agreement further requires the Secretary to establish 
a grant program to provide much needed funding to ports and facilities 
to help defray the compliance costs associated with both area and 
facility security plans. The Secretary will also be required to 
establish a program to provide grants to look at new and existing 
technologies that can be used to better secure and protect our Nation's 
maritime transportation system.
  The conference agreement takes into account not only the wide range 
of threats and crimes surrounding our seaports, but also the unique 
nature of our ports. A ``one-size-fits-all'' approach will not work. 
The planning process established in the conference agreement requires 
the Secretary to consider the fact that our Nation's seaports are 
complex and diverse in both geography and infrastructure.
  While there are still many questions regarding how far we must go to 
secure our ports and waterways, I am confident that the compromise 
reached with our House colleagues will create a safer and more secure 
maritime transportation system in the United States and allow the flow 
of commerce to continue.
  Mr. President, this conference agreement also includes the provisions 
from our Coast Guard authorization. The Coast Guard has been operating 
without an authorization since 1998, and the resources and personnel 
benefits provided in this measure for the men and women serving in the 
Coast Guard are long overdue.
  This agreement authorizes funding for the Coast Guard for fiscal year 
2003 at the levels requested by the President for six accounts: one, 
operation and maintenance expenses; two, acquisition, construction, and 
improvement of facilities and equipment, AC&I three, research, 
development, testing, and evaluation, RDT&E four, retirement pay; 
five, environmental compliance and restoration; and six, alteration or 
removal of bridges. It also authorizes end-of-year military strength 
and training loads to ensure that the Coast Guard will have the 
flexibility to respond to its ever growing missions.
  The provisions from the Coast Guard authorization bill include 
numerous measures which will improve the Coast Guard's ability to 
recruit, reward, and retain high-quality personnel. The conference 
agreement addresses various Coast Guard personnel management issues 
such as promotions, retention, housing authorities, and education, 
along with measures that grant the Coast Guard parity with its 
Department of Defense counterparts.
  Additionally, this legislation provides a number of changes to U.S. 
maritime laws and Coast Guard authorities such as extending the time 
for recreational vessel recalls, and increasing penalties for negligent 
vessel operations. This bill also provides much needed advance funding 
authority for the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund which will allow the 
Coast Guard to better respond to the ever increasing costs of 
environmental cleanups.
  In closing, Mr. President, I want to commend the conferees for their 
work to reach a compromise on this important legislation. I urge my 
colleagues to support final passage of this legislation.
  Again, I thank Senator Hollings for his dedicated and deeply involved 
work on this legislation, including conduct of field hearings 
throughout the United States, including the important port of 
Charleston, SC.
  Mr. President, I know the Senator from Texas, Mrs. Hutchison, wishes 
to speak on the conference report. I yield the floor.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Momentarily our distinguished colleague from Florida 
will speak. It was Senator Graham of Florida who persuaded President 
Clinton to appoint the investigating commission with respect to seaport 
security.
  I wish to add a couple comments with respect to the Coast Guard 
authorization. As I have stated, it is the first authorization since 
1998, and it increases the Coast Guard budget $1 billion, with 10,000 
additional active duty military personnel. They have been understaffed. 
I know of a tragic situation of search and rescue that did not work in 
Charleston, SC, my backyard. There are provisions in this legislation 
so we have adequate personnel manpower there.
  The Coast Guard is to examine and report to Congress its expenditures 
and missions by September of next year. We want to get in lockstep as 
they increase their effort from 2 percent of the budget to some 22 
percent of the budget with respect to seaport security.
  I can point out many other provisions, but I will yield such time as 
is necessary to the distinguished Senator from Florida.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Florida is 
recognized.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, first, I wish to extend my congratulations 
to the Senator from South Carolina and the Senator from Arizona, who 
have

[[Page S10979]]

been working on this issue for many months and have carried the 
position of the Senate in the conference committee. I commend you for 
the success we have achieved today and for the battles we both 
recognize will be required in the future in order to fully realize the 
goals of this legislation.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I am very pleased to rise in support of 
the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.
  This legislation will secure one of our Nation's greatest 
vulnerabilities, our seaports.
  This bill not only ensures that our ports remain a driving force in 
the American economy, it also commences the closing of the floodgates 
of vulnerability to the terrorist threat to American seaports.
  Mr. President, there is much work that remains to be done.
  For this legislation to be effective, it must have a predictable and 
sustained funding source for the agencies tasked with maintaining the 
security of our maritime borders.
  It was in December of 2001, almost a year ago, that the Senate 
unanimously passed a comprehensive seaport security bill. The House of 
Representatives passed its own version in June of 2002. This 
legislation has been in conference for 4 months. Valuable time has been 
passing while an important part of our homeland economy, as well as our 
homeland security and the Nation's 360 seaports, have remained 
extremely vulnerable.
  I am pleased a final agreement has been reached and the bill is 
completed and it will soon go to the President for his signature.
  To quote the Florida Ports Council:

       Seaport security must be addressed in a comprehensive, 
     intelligent, practical manner by the Federal Government--now, 
     not in 2004 or 2006, or 2008.
       The security of our borders is a national responsibility. 
     No matter how good our State processes and practices are--
     without the Federal Government requiring realistic security 
     plans and standards--the public domain will remain at risk.
  I am pleased we are doing that today and starting to fulfill our 
Federal responsibilities.
  We live not only in a democracy but also in a nation that allows its 
citizens and visitors the freedom to travel throughout our great 
country.
  The United States thrives on global trade and global travel.
  But support for democracy and freedom must go hand-in-hand with 
strong protection of our maritime borders.
  Fortunately, our seaports have not yet been attacked. Fortunately, as 
of today, one of those container cargoes, 16,000 of which arrive at 
America's seaports every day, has not been used as the means by which a 
weapon of mass destruction will be delivered within the United States.
  This means instead of looking at the security of America's seaports 
through the rearview mirror, as we have been doing since the events 
affecting airlines and airports as a result of September 11, 2001, we 
are looking at seaport security through the windshield, albeit a foggy 
windshield. We not only have a responsibility but an opportunity to 
take steps to avoid the head-on collision at America's seaports that 
has not yet occurred.
  Since September 11, there has been a lot of discussion about 
connecting the dots, what could have been pieced together, the things 
we should have seen before that tragic day. And, like 9/11, information 
about our seaports presents a disturbing array of dots. But from these, 
there is a clear pattern of vulnerability at our seaports and the cargo 
containers which they deliver.
  Many of these dots are available only in classified form, which are 
not disclosed for national security reasons. But there are many 
instances of security breaches at seaports that have been publicly 
disclosed--in open sources--that paint a stunning portrait of our 
maritime vulnerabilities. Weekly, I read newspaper accounts of 
stowaways and narcotics arriving in our country, and of security lapses 
at our ports.
  I have several articles I would like to bring to the attention of my 
colleagues, and I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in their 
entirety in the Record immediately following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. GRAHAM. On May 13, 2001, Fox News and the Associated Press 
reported that 25 Islamic extremists, hidden on commercial freighters as 
stowaways, illegally entered the United States. These individuals 
reportedly entered the United States through four seaports in Miami; 
Port Everglades, Fort Lauderdale; Savannah; and Long Beach. Where have 
these men gone and, more importantly, what are their intentions?
  The Washington Times, in a January 22, 2002, article entitled 
``Seaports Seen as Terrorist Target,'' reported al-Qaida ``shipped arms 
and bomb-making materials via Osama bin Laden's covertly owned 
freighters.'' These explosives were later used to blow up the U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
  What if these ships were making port calls at a port in the United 
States of America?
  Further, in a front page article dated February 26, 2002, USA Today 
reported that in October of 2001, a month after 9/11, port authorities 
in Italy opened a suspicious container and found an Egyptian-born 
Canadian person, equipped with a satellite phone, laptop, false credit 
cards, and security passes for airports in Egypt, Thailand, and Canada. 
What if this container and person made a successful, undetected entry 
into the United States?
  On June 16, 2002, the Washington Post reported that three men 
captured by CIA and Morrocan authorities told interrogators they 
escaped Afghanistan and came to Morocco on a mission to use bomb-laden 
speedboats for suicide attacks on U.S. and British warcrafts in the 
Strait of Gibraltar.
  On October 6, 2002, the French-flagged supertanker Limberg was 
attacked and holed by a small boat packed with explosives, possibly a 
remote-controlled boat, off the coast of Yemen. This attack is now 
widely believed to be the work of al-Qaida operatives.

  Yemen is, of course, the same location as the USS Cole bombing of 2 
years earlier.
  On October 29, 2002, as seen on national television, a 50-foot 
coastal freighter with 234 Haitians and 2 Dominicans landed close to 
Miami, in Biscayne Bay, Florida. How did this boat manage to get so 
close to a major American city? This vessel was not detected by the 
Coast Guard until the last few hours of its voyage.
  Finally, less than 2 weeks ago, November 4, 2002, The Houston 
Chronicle reported 23 stowaways to Honduras who were captured at the 
port, 16 on the barge and 7 more who had tried to swim ashore.
  Mr. President, the current assessment from the U.S. intelligence 
community is that 19 of the 35 State Department-designated foreign 
terrorist organizations have access to maritime conveyances, or are 
directly associated with maritime terrorism.
  Since 1991, there have been 131 maritime attacks. This includes 19 
ship hijackings, bombings, armed attacks, or kidnappings in the 4-year 
period between January 1996 and December of 2000.
  Clearly, both our seaports and maritime borders and their 
vulnerability to terrorists remain a primary U.S. security concern.
  In 1998, I asked former President Bill Clinton to establish a Federal 
commission to evaluate both the nature and extent of crime in our 
seaports. I have become aware of the extensive and expanding use of 
seaports for a variety of criminal activities.
  In response to this request, President Clinton established the 
Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports on April 
27, 1999.
  The three distinguished cochairs of the commission were Raymond 
Kelly, then commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service, now head of the 
New York City police department; James Robinson, then assistant 
Attorney General; and Clyde Hart, then administrator of the Maritime 
Administration.
  In October of 2000, the commission issued its final report. This 
report outlined many of the common security problems that were 
unearthed at U.S. seaports. The commission made 20 findings and 
included recommendations to respond to these threats. Our seaport 
security bill addresses many of them directly.
  For example; the Commission reported a ``need for a more 
comprehensive and definitive statement of the

[[Page S10980]]

specific federal responsibilities,'' including the ``lead agencies'' of 
Customs for international cargo and Coast Guard for seaport security.
  Our seaport security bill provides new authorities for both of these 
agencies.
  The Commission also noted that:

       Comprehensive interagency crime threat assessments * * * 
     currently are not conducted at seaports and that the federal 
     government should establish baseline vulnerability and threat 
     assessments for terrorism at U.S. seaports.

  The seaport security bill requires the Coast Guard to survey all 
ports, prioritize them, and then conduct detailed port and vessel type 
vulnerability assessments.
  The Commission called for a ``comprehensive initiative to improve 
cargo import procedures,'' noting that ``vessel manifest information, 
import and export, is sometimes deficient'' and ``is more easily 
utilized * * * if it is received in electronic data formats before the 
arrival of the vessel.''
  The seaport security bill requires vessel and cargo data to be 
submitted in advance and in a format to be prescribed by the Secretary 
of Transportation.
  The Commission was concerned that ``no minimum security standards or 
guidelines exist for seaports and their facilities.''
  The seaport security bill would require security standards and 
provide federal grants for these improvements.
  These are but a few of the many vital provisions in this seaport 
security bill.
  On September 11, 2001, four commercial airliners were hijacked and 
turned into weapons of mass destruction, crashing into three symbols of 
American strength. The fourth airliner was destined for yet another 
symbol of American strength but for the courageous passengers and crew 
who intervened. We were not able to prevent these hijackings before 
they happened.
  After that tragic day, Congress quickly responded and introduced the 
Aviation Security Act on September 24. It was signed into law on 
November 19, 2001. This law requires safer cockpits, air marshals, 
Federal oversight of all the airport security operations, advanced 
anti-hijacking training for all flight crews, establishment of a 
security fee, and background checks for flight school students.
  On September 21, 2001, 10 days after the attack, Congress approved a 
relief package for the airline industry. This included $5 billion of 
immediate cash infusion for U.S. air carriers and $10 billion in loan 
guarantees.
  We responded because we had been hit. The challenge of this 
legislation is: Are we prepared to respond before we are assaulted?
  I believe we are beginning to answer that question in the affirmative 
with the adoption of this legislation.
  The threat to our seaports is urgent and real. When a cargo container 
arrives on our shores, it is quickly loaded into a truck or a train, 
leaving all Americans, not just those who are located close to a 
seaport, vulnerable to a security lapse which occurs at the seaport 
because the seaport is the last point at which that container can 
reasonably be checked and evaluated to determine if it represents a 
threat to the American people.
  While our bill is a step in the right direction, we must fully commit 
to our seaports as we have to our airports, which includes a steady 
stream of funding.
  As my colleagues may be aware, the primary reason this seaport 
security bill was in conference for 4 months was the inability of 
Members to reach agreement on how to fund these security measures. So 
what we are passing today is essentially an authorization bill. We are 
providing the basic architecture of the security, but the challenge to 
provide the plumbing and the electrical systems that will bring this 
architecture to life is yet to be faced.
  My preference was to pass a bill which would have contained that 
plumbing and electrical system in the form of user fees, as we have 
already done for airports and airlines, giving our ports an immediate 
influx of money to quickly address the security lapses that have been 
identified.
  Why is this so important? If we do not have a dedicated stream of 
user-generated revenue, our commitment to seaport security may be 
viewed as temporary and piecemeal.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time reserved for the Senator from South 
Carolina has expired. The Senator from Arizona controls the balance of 
the time.
  The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eighteen and a half minutes.
  Mr. GRAHAM. I ask the Senator from Arizona for a minute to close.
  Mr. McCAIN. Certainly. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Florida.
  Mr. GRAHAM. As chairman of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, over the past 2 years, I have worked with the committee 
on a 5-year plan of enhancing technology and human skills within the 
intelligence community.
  It is our expectation that these investments will yield rich 
dividends in the intelligence community, to understand the terrorist 
threat to our Nation, better inform decisionmakers on policies that can 
defend against these threats, and take direct action against the 
terrorists.
  It should be no different at our Nation's seaports. Investing in 
security along our maritime borders is as vital as investing in our 
intelligence capabilities or our Nation's airports. But I am troubled 
by the prospects. The administration has shown no willingness to 
request any funding for our seaports.
  The administration's fiscal year 2002 and 2003 budgets contained no 
funding for seaport security. To date, all funding for enhancing 
security at our seaports has been as a result of congressional action 
on supplemental appropriation bills.
  Illustrative of this gap between congressional funding and the 
administration's funding is the fact that only $93 million was 
available from the Transportation Security Administration for over $700 
million of seaport security grant requests.
  While this funding has aided some ports, comprehensive security 
improvements for all ports will cost significantly more.
  Based on a survey of just 52 large ports by the American Association 
of Port Authorities, the improvement costs totaled over $2.2 billion.
  In addition, the United States needs a consistent policy on how much 
of the additional security costs are the responsibility of the 
Government and how much by industry and its consumers. We need to 
fairly apply this policy across all parts of the industries and 
economy.
  Ultimately, it should be similar to our approach, and response to, 
the aviation industry. Undoubtedly, funding security improvements at 
our ports must be a major task and priority for the 108th Congress.
  Seaports are an important economic engine. They are the major gateway 
to America for cargo and consumer goods.
  Annually, the U.S. marine transportation system handles 2 billion 
tons of freight, 3 billion tons of oil, and 7 million cruise ship 
passengers. Over 800 ships make more than 22,000 port visits per year 
in the United States.
  One terrorist incident at a seaport could impact an entire coast or 
the entire economy of the United States. The financial impact of the 
closing of our seaports would be devastating.
  As reported last September in USA Today and numerous other 
publications, the closure of 29 seaports on the west coast due to labor 
issues reportedly cost $1 billion a day.
  I ask my colleagues, what would happen if we had to close all of our 
361 seaports? Factories and plants would quickly be out of parts and be 
forced to shut down. Commodity hoarding would begin and prices would 
rise. The stock market would undoubtedly be shaken. Energy and oil 
prices would rocket upwards.
  On April 1, 2002, Business Week magazine observed that ``if a 
disruption at one of the country's 361 ports leads the U.S. Government 
to shut them down the way it grounded air traffic in September, it 
would bring some $2 billion a day in seaborne trade to a dead stop and 
instantly cripple the domestic economy.''
  The issue of seaport security is not going away.
  Foreign trade accounts for over one-fourth of the total U.S. gross 
domestic product.
  According to the U.S. Coast Guard, by 2020, one-third of all 
container ships

[[Page S10981]]

will be massive vessels termed ``mega-ships,'' oil imports will 
increase to two-thirds of our consumption, and liquefied natural gas 
imports will increase by nine-fold.
  The Customs Service estimates that by 2020 the volume of imported 
cargo will more than double.
  While we have passed this important bill, we now have a 
responsibility to finding funding for these need security improvements.
  I urge my colleagues to make the security of our ports a priority and 
to pass, and later fund, this legislation.
  We must not leave our maritime industry vulnerable to the potential 
use by a terrorist organization. The possibilities are horrific: The 
possibility of major loss of life, the possibility of major economic 
damage, or the possibility of the delivery of a weapon of mass 
destruction.
  We have take the first steps forward in aviation. Why would we leave 
our seaports and the maritime industry behind? The action that we take 
today is a beginning.
  For this beginning to realize its promise of substantially enhanced 
security at America's seaports, within the flood tide of cargo 
containers that arrive each day, further action is required.
  Working with the House of Representatives, it is my hope that, early 
in 2003, we will take the next step, providing a permanent and 
sufficient funding source for today's legislation.
  An appropriate place to start the discussion is using the model of 
airports and aviation security, where funding is provided by the 
industry and its customers and the general public.
  The President will recommend in his budget for 2004 what he considers 
the appropriate level for seaport security.
  I urge him to be more forthcoming than in the last two budget 
submissions.
  With the President's level of general revenue support, the Congress 
will be in a better position to determine what level of user fee will 
give Americans assurance of security at our Nation's seaports.
  We understand the threat and the horrible outcomes from terrorism so 
much better than 1 year ago.
  After the terrorist attacks, Congress took quick action to 
restructure our aviation security program, in order to better protect 
our country and prevent another attack.
  We need to strengthen our seaports, with the same intensity 
demonstrated at our airports. We must guard our maritime borders 
against obvious weaknesses and their potential use as a terrorist 
target.
  Our seaports are a vital national asset.
  I close by saying we have work to do, and the primary focus of that 
work is going to be to arrive at a sustainable, reliable funding source 
for these important security measures. We will have an early indication 
of what portion of this the President is going to recommend be paid 
through general tax revenue when we see his budget for the year 2004.
  This legislation also requires the President, within 6 months of 
enactment, to submit a funding proposal on a permanent basis to the 
Congress. It is my hope that funding proposal will use as its starting 
point what we have already done for the airline industry where we have 
made some decisions as to how much of the security costs should be 
borne by general taxpayers and how much should be borne by the users 
and the industry. It seems to me we should strive to have a parity and 
balance of allocation of financial responsibility across our 
transportation systems. If we are committed, as the action today 
indicates, to providing security for our seaports before they are 
attacked and will not await a 9/11 to arrive at a city in the United 
States through a cargo container with a weapon of mass destruction, 
which 48 hours earlier had come through a seaport, if we are committed 
to security without having to be awakened through an assault, then we 
should also be committed to recognize this is not going to be cheap and 
it is not going to be a temporary commitment. It will be expensive and 
it will be sustained and we should provide the revenue to meet those 
realities.

                               Exhibit 1

                    [From USA Today, Feb. 26, 2002]

             Shipping Containers Could Hide Threat to U.S.

                            (By Fred Bayles)

       Charleston, S.C.--The odd noises that came from the 40-foot 
     shipping container at Gioia Tauro, Italy, harbor in October 
     demonstrated the danger facing officials at ports around the 
     world. When port authorities opened the suspect container, 
     they found Amir, Farid Rizk, 43, an Egyptian-born Canadian 
     equipped with satellite phone, laptop, false credit cards and 
     security passes for airports in Egypt, Thailand and Canada.
       Officials charged Rizk with terrorism but later released 
     him after his lawyers argued he was fleeing religious and 
     legal persecution in Egypt and was not a terrorist.
       Rizk's choice of transportation highlighted a security 
     problem that has troubled U.S. officials since well before 
     Sept. 11.
       More than 6 million shipping containers arrive here at 
     Wando Welch yards in Charleston and other U.S. ports 
     annually. Only 2% are inspected. The rest remain sealed as 
     they are shipped throughout the country. It would be easy, 
     some fear, to take a container, stuff it with explosives, a 
     chemical weapon or a nuclear device and inject it into the 
     nation's economic bloodstream. Security experts had thought 
     about the massive flow of unchecked containers before the 
     attacks on New York and Washington. In the November 2000 
     issue of Foreign Affairs, Coast Guard Cmdr. Stephen Flynn, a 
     security expert with the Council on Foreign Relations, 
     offered this scenario.
       Suppose, he wrote, Osama bin Laden loaded a biological 
     weapon into a container and shipped it through foreign ports 
     to the USA. The container, unnoticed in the day-to-day bustle 
     of trade, could then be put on a rail car at Long Beach 
     destined for Newark, N.J. Somewhere along the 2,800-mile 
     route, it is detonated.
       As bad as the destruction such an attack might cause, the 
     chaos that would follow could devastate the nation's economy.
       The nation's shipping system could shut down, as airports 
     did after Sept. 11. ``The economic damage would be 
     incalculable,'' Flynn says. ``It would accomplish what a 
     terrorist group wants to do, which is to disrupt this 
     country's economic structure.''
       So what can be done? Looking inside each of the 6 million 
     containers from abroad would disrupt the flow of goods. 
     Technological solutions, including x-ray machines, are 
     costly, expensive and not infallible. The answer may lie in 
     better surveillance at the container's point of origin. 
     Instead of inspecting every container upon arrival, 
     sophisticated computer and intelligence systems are being 
     established to identify suspicious containers before they 
     leave foreign ports.
       ``You want to do something that doesn't wait until the 
     container is offloaded here,'' U.S. Customs Commissioner 
     Robert Bonner says. ``The big idea is to think about how to 
     push the border back.''


                              wando welch

       In South Carolina, the blur of movement at the port of 
     Charleston's Wando Welch Terminal vividly shows the shipping 
     business's need for speed. Massive cranes lift cargo 
     containers off merchant ships arriving from around the world. 
     The containers are stacked like giant Lego pieces across the 
     237-acre facility.
       The activity at this, the nation's third-busiest, container 
     facility is a tribute to the efficiency of the ``intermodal'' 
     transportation system, which makes possible the quick 
     transfer of seaborne containers to railcars and trucks 
     without unloading and reloading their contents. The system 
     touches every facet of the economy. Each state receives goods 
     from an average 15 different ports every day, according to 
     the American Association of Port Authorities.
       That is why the industry balks at inspecting every 
     container coming into the country. Several members of 
     Congress, including Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., have 
     proposed such steps.
       At the Wando yards, the time a Customs inspector needs to 
     examine a single container illustrates the challenge. One 
     container, singled out because its manifest listed a cargo of 
     ``human aids,'' turns out to have been filled with bundles of 
     used clothing bound from Italy to Bolivia. It took the 
     inspector and a civilian crew most of the day to offload and 
     inspect the bundles, then reload the container and send it 
     back to the shipping yards.
       ``It would be very difficult to search every container 
     without severely disrupting the flow of goods,'' Bonner says.
       A glimpse of that kind of disruption came in late 1999. The 
     nation's Western rail system slowed dramatically as it 
     adjusted to a merger of two railroads, a booming economy and 
     other factors.
       The slowdown created havoc for weeks. Christmas items did 
     not arrive to stores on time. Perishable goods rotted. 
     Factories closed because needed parts were delayed.
       ``It was only temporary, but it created big headaches,'' 
     says John Foertsch, the Southeast operations manager for OOCL 
     (Orient Overseas Container Line), a major container shipper 
     based in Hong Kong. ``It's hard to imagine the chaos that 
     would come if delays like that became the routine.''


                          technology solutions

       Some look to technology as a solution. Last summer, Customs 
     agents at busier ports began using drive-through mobile X-ray 
     units that can scan containers as they are driven past a 
     checkpoint, much like luggage through an airport screening 
     station.

[[Page S10982]]

       Sitting in the cab of such a unit on the Charleston docks, 
     Customs Inspector Eddie Basham peers at a computer screen 
     displaying the shadowy interiors of passing containers. 
     ``Tires,'' he says, pointing to a stack of spirals filling 
     one container. On the next, he notices a dark, irregular 
     shape and sends it to the side for inspection.
       Occasionally, the equipment hits immediate pay dirt. 
     ``There's a few times I've seen people standing in the inside 
     of a container,'' Basham says. Police took the illegal 
     immigrants into custody.
       Other screening devices are being tested and deployed. In 
     Norfolk, Va., Virginia International Terminals is installing 
     radiation detectors on cranes, which will screen each 
     container as it is offloaded. As of now, Customs agents use 
     pager-sized radiation monitors that warn of excessive 
     radiation as they walk by rows of containers. Some estimates 
     put the cost of equipping all major ports with large scanners 
     at $5 billion.


                          better intelligence

       Some say the solution would be to inspect all U.S.-bound 
     containers before they leave a foreign port. But the 
     difficulty of doing that may be too great.
       ``No one can argue against vetting cargo before it is 
     shipped, but you need the political will and resources to do 
     it,'' says John Hyde, general manager for security with 
     Maersk Sealand, one of the world's largest shipping 
     companies. ``When you're talking about putting requirements 
     on other sovereign nations, you can never be sure of what the 
     reaction will be.''
       Many in industry and government, argue that there is no 
     need to check each of the thousands of containers that arrive 
     daily. They note that only 1,000 < less than 1% < of the 
     450,000 shippers who send cargo to the USA, account for 
     nearly 60% of all containers shipped to this country. A 
     majority of containers come from well-known and trusted 
     companies that make regular weekly runs to U.S. ports. ``It 
     is impossible to inspect everything, but you don't need to 
     inspect everything,''Bonner says. ``We are pretty good at 
     being able to sort out what needs to be inspected.''
       To that end, the Coast Guard has joined with Customs, the 
     Immigration and Naturalization Service and several 
     intelligence agencies to begin sorting out information about 
     containers before they arrive. After Sept. 11, the Coast 
     Guard initiated the Ship Arrival Notification System, the 
     nation's first centralized database on the movement of cargo 
     ships.
       Before this system, the Coast Guard captain in charge of 
     security at each port only had to be notified of a shipment 
     24 hours before a cargo ship was due to arrive. Now that same 
     information arrives 96 hours in advance at the Coast Guard's 
     computer center in West Virginia. Information about the ship, 
     its containers and crew is entered into a database that can 
     be cross-referenced with immigration, FBI and Customs data.
       The database allows many agencies to track the movement of 
     cargo around the world. Officials hope it will help zero in 
     on unknown shipping companies or a sudden shift in business 
     practices or cargoes that makes no sense. ``If a ship leaves 
     Genoa, Italy with palm oil bound for a port that normally 
     doesn't import palm oil, you might take a closer look,'' says 
     Capt. Tony Regalbutto, the Coast Guard's director of port 
     security.
       Flynn sees this as the first step to a system that will 
     track individual containers as they are loaded overseas and 
     sent to U.S. ports. ``People have compared this to a needle 
     in a haystack problem,'' he says. ``But if you develop good 
     intelligence about what is a threat and what isn't, you get 
     the information down to a manageable number of targets. ''
                                  ____


                   [From Business Week, Apr. 1, 2002]

            Commentary: Freight Transport: Safe From Terror?

                         (By Lorraine Woellert)

       With its heavy traffic and massive chemical-storage tanks, 
     the Port of Houston would seem a tempting target for 
     terrorists. Touring the site in January, Senator John Breaux 
     (D-La.) asked what had been done to protect the 25-mile-long 
     seaway. A Coast Guard official assured him that the harbor 
     had been declared a security zone. Breaux was unimpressed. 
     ``That's like putting a `No Trespassing' sign on a nuclear 
     reactor,'' he said.
       In the wake of the September 11 attacks, Washington 
     scrambled to shore up aviation security with tough new 
     passenger- and baggage-screening laws and criminal-background 
     checks on airport workers. But half a year later, U.S. land 
     and sea borders remain almost as vulnerable as ever. 
     Lawmakers hot to jump on the homeland-security bandwagon a 
     few months ago have succumbed to inertia, leaving the 
     nation's most at-risk transportation systems unprotected. 
     ``There has been a gross lack of focus,'' says Edward 
     Wytkind, executive director of the AFL-CIO's transportation-
     trades division.
       Altogether, trains, trucks, and ships move more than $1 
     trillion worth of freight--about 99% of all U.S. cargo--into 
     the country every year. Seaports, which handle some $700 
     billion of that cargo, are the first line of vulnerability. 
     If a disruption at one of the country's 361 ports leads the 
     U.S. government to shut them down the way it grounded air 
     traffic in September, it would bring some $2 billion a day in 
     seaborne trade to a dead stop and instantly cripple the 
     domestic economy.
       Today, port ``security'' means little more than a few miles 
     of fencing and the occasional container search. Despite 
     stepped-up patrols by Coast Guard and Customs agents after 
     September 11, ships sail freely in and out of the nation's 
     inland and coastal ports. The network relies on an honor 
     system: It's up to carriers to announce their arrivals and 
     disclose their hauls. Federal agents search only about 2% of 
     the 11 million containers that make their way through the 
     U.S. maritime system each year--double the pre-September 11 
     rate but still frighteningly low. ``You have a ship with 
     7,000 containers on it, and what do we do? Check the 
     manifest,'' laments Representative Don Young (R-Ala.), 
     chair of the House Transportation & Infrastructure 
     Committee, which is working on a port-security bill. 
     ``We're taking containers from Pakistan, and we don't know 
     what's in them.''
       Lawmakers may be indignant, but their efforts to plug 
     security gaps have been few and ill-fated. In December, the 
     Senate, led by Commerce Committee Chairman Earnest F. 
     Hollings (D-S.C.), passed a $4 billion wish list of grants 
     and loans to buy equipment to search more incoming cargo 
     containers. Hollings' bill also would toughen hiring 
     standards by requiring maritime workers to pass a criminal-
     background check similar to one imposed on nearly all airport 
     workers.
       However, the idea of eliminating felons from the workforce, 
     a provision that sailed through Congress as part of an 
     aviation-security bill last year, has come under fire from 
     labor, including the Teamsters and the AFL-CIO-affiliated 
     longshoremen. They say requiring no felony convictions as a 
     prerequisite to holding a job amounts to double jeopardy for 
     workers who have already paid their dues to society.
       Industry has its own problems with the idea. As a major 
     player at U.S. ports, the American Trucking Assn. supports 
     criminal-background checks but fears its members could be 
     sued by disgruntled job applicants denied work because of 
     something that showed up on their record. The ATA wants 
     protection from liability. It also worries that a background 
     check involving multiple agencies will prove time-consuming 
     and costly.
       In the House, Young has labeled the Hollings measure 
     ``stupid'' because it puts the onus on the U.S. government to 
     search every incoming vessel instead of forcing overseas 
     transportation centers such as China and Panama to boost 
     their own security. But Young's vision has problems of its 
     own. He is seeking to establish an entirely new cargo-
     information tracking system under the Transportation Dept., 
     duplicating work already being done by Customs and adding 
     another layer to the multi-agency bureaucracy that now 
     regulates container traffic. ``Neither shippers, carriers, 
     nor the government would be served by competing cargo-
     information systems,'' says Christopher L. Koch, president 
     and CEO of the World Shipping Council in Washington.
       Lawmakers--lacking the attention span or the willpower 
     necessary to sort out freight's complexities--seem inclined 
     to settle on politically expedient legislation that 
     emphasizes high-tech gadgetry, spot container searches, and 
     other piecemeal fixes. Such an approach could derail 
     container-traffic flow as dramatically as a terrorist attack. 
     ``It would grind the U.S. economy to a halt,'' says Jonathan 
     Gold, trade-policy director at the International Mass 
     Retailers Assn.
       As Congress treads water, the next-best option is emerging 
     in the U.N., where the Coast Guard is pushing new 
     international standards for container inspection, worker 
     licensing, sea marshals, and a long-overdue system for 
     tracking ships at sea. It's an ambitious goal, and one that 
     requires U.S. cooperation. ``If we ask these foreign ports to 
     put security measures in place, then we have to be prepared 
     to do the same thing here,'' Fold says. Whether it's 
     motivated by fear or by shame, Congress must push harder for 
     secure transportation systems.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. It is my understanding from leadership that the vote is 
now going to take place at 11:15. I ask unanimous consent that the 
remaining time be equally divided between now and 11:15.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Alaska such 
time as he may consume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the Aviation Security Act of 2001 came in 
the immediate wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and we may 
soon send to the President for his signature the bill creating the 
Department of Homeland Security. The Maritime and Transportation 
Security Act of 2002 is another important piece of national security 
legislation that will provide the organizational structure, 
coordination and planning needed to safeguard our Nation's ports. I 
thank Senator Hollings, Senator McCain and Congressman Don Young for 
their tireless efforts to move this legislation through Congress.

[[Page S10983]]

  Under the Act, initial vulnerability assessments will be made to 
determine vessels and ports that pose a high risk of being involved in 
a marine transportation security incident. Attention will be given to 
deterring and responding to such incidents, and an overall evaluation 
will be provided on the potential threat level of maritime terrorist 
attacks.
  This port security assessment is imperative for our State of Alaska, 
which has roughly one-half the coastline in the United States. Alaska's 
economy and quality of life are directly related to the functionality 
of it's numerous ports. The majority of our Alaskan communities, 
including Juneau our State Capital, are not on the road system and 
depend almost exclusively on marine trade for the delivery of basic 
goods. A terrorist attack at a port in Alaska, or anywhere on the West 
Coast, would cause significant interruptions in maritime service to our 
State, greatly affecting our way of life.
  In addition, there are several other ports in Alaska vital to Alaska 
and the rest of the Nation. This is especially true of the Port of 
Valdez, which is the southern terminus of the 800 mile long Trans-
Alaska oil pipeline. Valdez is an important off-loading terminal for 
our Nation's domestic energy supply. A terrorist incident here would 
impact U.S. oil production, without any question, and have a 
devastating effect on Alaska's fisheries. Dutch Harbor is consistently 
the top commercial fishing port in America, processing and shipping 
product to the rest of the world. Kodiak has the largest Coast Guard 
presence in the Nation and the Island of Kodiak has launch facilities 
that make it an important staging area for future military and NASA 
operations that are vital to our Nation's national missile defense 
system.
  The Maritime and Transportation Security Act of 2002 also includes 
Coast Guard authorization for fiscal year 2003. This is extremely 
important for the continued success of the Coast Guard in its ever 
evolving and expanding role in securing our Nation's coastal 
boundaries.
  I commend the chairman and the future chairman of the Commerce 
Committee for bringing this bill to the floor, and I support its 
immediate passage.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. REID. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Yes.
  Mr. REID. For purposes of notifying Members of the Senate, there has 
been a train accident. I hope it is not serious, but we have a couple 
of people on the train. We are now in the process of working out a 
unanimous consent agreement to have the vote maybe 45 minutes later 
than scheduled.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. We scheduled the vote for 11 a.m.
  Mr. McCAIN. Actually, 11:15.
  Mr. REID. It may be later than that.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I yield such time as he may consume to the 
distinguished Senator from Louisiana.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana is recognized.
  Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished chairman of the 
Commerce Committee for his involvement and his leadership in bringing 
this legislation to the floor, as well as the ranking member of the 
Commerce Committee, the Senator from Arizona, and everyone really who 
has been involved in this legislation.
  Suffice it to say, the conditions in the world, and in the United 
States in particular, have changed dramatically since the events of 9/
11. Things we took for granted, things we did not pay a great deal of 
attention to, are no longer the status quo. The Commerce Committee, to 
the credit of the leadership of our committee and Senator Hollings, had 
taken up the concept of making sure our ports were more secure even 
before 9/11.
  The Commerce Committee in August of 2001, before 9/11, passed a 
seaport security bill by a unanimous vote. The committee was clearly on 
top of potential problems before 9/11. But certainly after the events 
of 9/11 it became clear we needed to do more even than we originally 
had done in the legislation.
  I have the privilege of chairing, under the Commerce Committee, the 
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation. At the suggestion of the 
chairman, it was determined we should have field hearings around the 
United States. We had field hearings in six different port cities in 
the country. We had hearings in the chairman's hometown of Charleston, 
SC, and the home of the Senator from Texas, the Port of Houston. We had 
hearings in the Port of New Orleans. We had hearings in Fort 
Lauderdale. We had hearings on the west coast. We had hearings on the 
gulf, Atlantic, and Pacific, to learn the conditions of the ports of 
the United States regarding security.
  We found when everyone is in charge, no one is in charge. In a number 
of ports, the sheriff's department was involved in security. In some 
ports they had port security police partially in charge. In some areas 
they depended totally on the U.S. Coast Guard to do all the work--which 
they cannot do. Some had very lax security on the perimeter, on the 
shore surrounding the ports.
  Every day, literally thousands and thousands of men and women drive 
trucks loaded with containers into port facilities. We need to know who 
they are. We need to know what their purpose in being there is. We need 
to know as much as we can about who comes and who exits these 
international ports.
  It is very interesting how commerce works. One container can carry as 
much as 60,000 pounds of whatever you want to put in it. There are 
ships entering our ports and laying alongside the docks containing as 
much as 3,000 separate containers on one ship. Each container carried 
as much as 60,000 pounds of whatever someone wants to put in them.
  The USS Cole had a small vessel pull alongside of it and blow a hole 
in the side of it, killing American sailors; one relatively small boat 
pulled right alongside the USS Cole, a military naval warship. At the 
same time, remember what happened in Oklahoma City. Approximately 
15,000 pounds of explosives blew down the Federal Building with drastic 
consequences to human life and to the stability of that city, shaking 
the confidence of this Nation. One person with 15,000 pounds of 
explosives knocked down an entire Federal building.
  One container has 60,000 pounds of product that can be put into a 
ship that may have 3,000 containers. The potential for damage if a 
terrorist wants to target one of the ports of this country by placing 
explosives in one of these containers is great.
  We had the example of one Egyptian who took a container and 
practically made an apartment out of it. He got a container in the 
Middle East, had himself equipped with a cell phone, food, a bunk to 
sleep in, and literally was transported from the Middle East, through 
Italy, destined for Canada, and ultimately to the United States. Who 
knows what he was intent on doing? Again, one ship, with 3,000 
containers; how do we determine what is in each container?
  Some of our large container vessels pull alongside our ports. We saw 
in Houston, in the Port of New Orleans at the hearings we held, the 
Port of south Louisiana, the Port of Baton Rouge--there are miles and 
miles of ports--some of these ports have, right alongside them, a 
liquefied natural gas facility. Next to the liquefied natural gas 
facility there could be an oil and gas refinery. Imagine the damage 
that could occur with one container loaded with explosives in a ship 
docked alongside an LNG facility, which is next to an oil and gas 
refinery, which may be followed by several other chemical plants. One 
container exploding could set off a chain reaction with a great deal of 
damage and a great loss of life.

  Some of our ports are located in urban areas. The Port of Houston, 
the Port of New Orleans, the Port of New York, the Port of New Jersey, 
the Port of Fort Lauderdale, the Port of Savannah, the Port of 
Charleston they are all located in urban areas. There is a grave 
potential for damage.
  The point I make is that things have changed since 9/11. A port 
manager was asked: How do you secure vessels pulling alongside these 
LNG facilities? How do you assure they know what they are doing? How do 
you secure the area? This individual said: Well, we have a sign posted 
that says ``No Trespassing.'' I doubt a person intent on blowing up a 
city or doing grave damage to one of our ports will be deterred by a 
sign that says ``No Trespassing.'' They will not pay any attention to 
it.

[[Page S10984]]

  The fact is we have to have people involved in security. We have to 
have people in a chain of command, people who know what they are doing, 
who is doing it, and what is the responsibility of each particular 
segment of law enforcement operations.
  This legislation will help do that. This legislation for the first 
time will say every port in the United States of America will have to 
develop a comprehensive port security plan. Some of them have plans in 
place now, but I don't think they are as comprehensive as they need to 
be, and some have almost nothing. A comprehensive port security plan 
under the U.S. Coast Guard, working with the local port and local law 
enforcement officials, can design a plan that fits a particular port. 
What may be necessary in the Port of Savannah may not be necessary in 
the Port of Houston. What is necessary in the Port of Houston may not 
fit in the Port of Charleston. Each port has to have a plan designed to 
meet the needs of that particular area.
  Not only do the operations along the water's edge have to be better 
secured, the entire facility has to be secured. As I said, we have 
literally thousands of incoming and outgoing trucks loaded with 
containers. We need to know who those people are bringing in the 
containers, what their purpose is. No longer can a port be a tourist 
attraction. No longer can someone say let's go to the port and see the 
ships. Unfortunately, times have changed. We need better security, 
better perimeter protection, better knowledge about the cargo on the 
ships, better knowledge of the crew on the ships.
  We have transponders on airplanes. We have GPS systems in 
automobiles. There is no reason every ship that comes into an American 
port will not have a GPS system on it, an identification system on it, 
an automatic identification signal that can transport to the port 
authorities where that ship is at all times--not just when it comes in, 
but when it actually reaches the floor, while it is in port.
  Senator Graham, who has been instrumental in helping pass this 
legislation, raised at the press conference yesterday the concern about 
the vessel that came in from Haiti. That vessel did not just come close 
to the U.S. shores, it actually landed on the beaches of Key Biscayne, 
FL. As Senator Graham has pointed out, instead of being a group of 
refugees, suppose it was a same-sized vessel, loaded with explosives, 
with a terrorist who was willing to commit suicide, who instead of 
dropping off several hundred refugees had pulled alongside one of the 
large buildings in the Port of Miami, or pulled alongside one of the 
cruise vessels loaded with passengers, and blew up his vessel and the 
vessels surrounding his vessel. That cannot be allowed to happen.
  This legislation will help the ports do the job they need to do. 
Unfortunately, we do not have any funding other than a grant program to 
the local ports. Most of the cost will have to be borne by the U.S. 
Coast Guard. I say to Senator Hollings and those on the Appropriations 
Committee, it is going to be their great task to make sure we 
adequately fund the Coast Guard to carry out those plans, because they 
are going to cost more. We have to do a better job. It is going to cost 
money. What about the local ports? We talked about a user fee, which I 
thought was a better idea, to spread the cost across society. It would 
be very small if we did it that way, but that's not part of this bill. 
There are local grants that ports can apply for, because it is going to 
cost to do the security they need. I am hopeful that program will be 
sufficient in order to allow our ports to do the work that is needed.

  This is a good piece of legislation. It can go a long way toward 
securing U.S. ports, which today are very vulnerable, which today, I 
would add, are potential targets. This legislation, when in place, will 
go a long way to providing the security of which we can all be proud.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I would first like to thank Senator 
Hollings and Senator McCain for helping us get this bill through the 
committee. Senator Breaux's remarks were right on target. I hosted 
Senator Breaux's hearing in Houston. He toured the Port of Houston with 
me. We saw firsthand what some of the problems are.
  I have to say, I was very impressed with what the Port of Houston is 
doing on its own. Using its own resources, it has beefed up its patrols 
and its security guards. Certainly, the Coast Guard is more involved in 
checking manifests and the ships that come into the Port of Houston. 
But the fact is, the Port of Houston is the largest port in America in 
terms of foreign tonnage. It handles more than half of the Nation's 
petrochemical capacity. We certainly need Federal funding and support 
to make sure a port like this one, which is vulnerable, and presents 
such a risk, has a fully implemented security system.
  I thank Senator Breaux for coming to see firsthand this great port in 
my State, for looking at what they are doing on their own, and then 
realizing the need to give them added help through this port security 
bill. I am very pleased that we are taking this first step.
  Due to the volume of hazardous materials, a terrorist attack in the 
Port of Houston could result in the loss of millions of lives. Of 
course, it would also interrupt our Nation's energy supplies, 
delivering a huge blow to our economy at a time when we certainly 
cannot afford any more economic disturbances. However, there are other 
ports as well in my State, and smaller ports throughout our Nation.

  In my State of Texas we have Corpus Christi, Brownsville, Port 
Lavaca, Galveston, Freeport, and Texas City. They each have different 
challenges. Some have to safeguard cruise ships. Cruise ships are a 
new, burgeoning tourist industry that is working particularly in 
Galveston. We are very happy about this, but it means we have to 
safeguard these cruise ships by taking similar security measures.
  Texas City, on the other hand, faces the security challenge of 
screening cargo containers and shipping vessels on a shoestring budget. 
We have Brownsville and Corpus Christi that are becoming very important 
ports for Central and South American goods coming in. We are very 
pleased about that, but they too need security.
  So this is a compromise bill. It lays the foundation for a port 
security system under the Transportation Security Administration. It 
requires security plans for every port, background checks for employees 
with access to secure areas, and improved identification technology for 
both individuals and vessels traveling in United States waters. The 
proposed Homeland Security Department would also be tasked to assess 
potential threats presented by security practices at foreign ports, so 
that we are able to find out if a foreign port is particularly lax. 
Then we would have to take extra steps for ships coming into the United 
States from that port, whether it is the port of origin or whether it 
is a through-port.
  I think those are the steps we need to take. I support this 
compromise because certainly it is important to take these immediate 
first steps. However, I do not think the bill goes far enough. I am an 
original cosponsor, with Senator Feinstein, of the Comprehensive 
Seaport and Container Security Act that would provide more resources 
and greater emphasis on port security. Our bill requires profiling of 
cargo containers and scrutiny of high-risk shippers.
  We are not closing the book on port security with the passage of this 
compromise bill, but we are taking a major first step. I look forward 
to working with Senator McCain, Senator Hollings, Senator Breaux, and 
others who are very concerned about the whole port security issue. In 
the next session, I look forward to really addressing the container 
cargo and other high-risk port needs, and to assure we do not have a 
void in our port areas. Senator Stevens was saying the other night that 
50 percent of the American people live within 50 miles of a port. That 
is a very important statistic. We have to check our ports, our people, 
and the goods coming into this country.
  I am very pleased we have taken this first step, because what we have 
done in aviation certainly has been a huge improvement. Are we finished 
with aviation? No, we are not. But are our airports safer today than 
they were on 9/10/01? Yes, they are.

[[Page S10985]]

  I travel as much as anybody in America, commuting back and forth to 
my home State every week. I see a significant difference in the quality 
of screening with the new Transportation Authority personnel. They are 
trained. They are polite. They are doing their jobs in a professional 
way and I am very proud of that. We need to do more and, hopefully, we 
are going to address some of the other aviation needs in the very near 
future. But right now we are addressing a major area of responsibility 
for our country and that is the security of our ports, the people, and 
the cargo that comes through our ports.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be brief. I came over from my 
committee meeting for two reasons. One is to compliment the chairman, 
the Senator from South Carolina. Frankly, were it not for his 
consistent and persistent efforts on security--port security and, I 
might add, rail security--we would not be standing here today. There is 
much to say about this legislation and I am not going to take the time 
now.
  I do want to add one other point. I am sorry many more of my 
colleagues, understandably, are in committee meetings right now and are 
not here to hear this. We are taking the action that is necessary to 
deal with a legitimate and real security concern for America's ports. I 
might add there is more traffic up and down the Delaware River into 
Philadelphia, with oil traffic in particular, than I think almost any 
other place in the country. There are a number of refineries in my 
State and in the neighboring State of Pennsylvania and ports in New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania and Delaware. So this is very important to us.
  But equally important to us is rail security. My friend, the 
Presiding Officer, a former Governor, knows about security, what the 
CIA indicated. I can publicly indicate it. They indicated the most 
likely target is going to be rail. Since 9/11, my friend from South 
Carolina passed out very significant rail security legislation--$1.2 
billion. It is a clearly documented need and an overwhelming concern, 
listed by the CIA as a likely target for terrorists--and we have done 
nothing on it. We have done nothing.
  I realize it is a bit of a broken record. I have been on the floor 
many times speaking to this. But I just say we are going to rue the day 
we failed to take the action that has been documented which we need to 
take to enhance the security of our rail system.
  Let me give you again two examples. Then I will cease. But I want the 
Record to show every day we wait, we are putting thousands of lives in 
jeopardy. When you say thousands of lives, what are you talking about, 
Senator? Right now, as we speak, there are more people in a tunnel on a 
train under New York City--at this moment--than there are on five full 
747 aircraft. Those tunnels were built at the turn of the century. They 
have no escape. They have no lighting. They have no ventilation. 
Immediately after the Civil War, the Baltimore tunnel was built for 
freight and passengers.
  You may remember that a little over a year ago there was a fire in 
the Baltimore tunnel--just a regular old fire--no terrorist act. It 
shut down Baltimore. In that tunnel, there is nothing. It was cut 
through granite in 1869. Nothing has been done to that tunnel. Even its 
signal systems are not adequate. We know this. Contracts have already 
been let. We already have the design. There is no need for design work. 
It has already been done. We could literally start tomorrow.
  My friend from South Carolina has documented all of this in his 
hearings. He has laid it out in spades. He has made it clear to 
everybody. But somehow we just think, OK, rail transportation is not 
very much. It is the ultimate stepchild, both in terms of our 
transportation network and in terms of security.
  It has been over a year since my friend from South Carolina reported 
out a $1.2 billion piece of legislation on security. I am not even 
talking about Amtrak--just basic security needs. We don't even have 
dogs available to sniff luggage in cars. There is nothing. There is 
virtually nothing at all.
  I just want to say I am not going to be here saying I told you so, 
because that would be unfair. But we are making a serious mistake, 
totally ignoring what the CIA has publicly pointed out is a targeting 
concern, and what everybody knows; that is, the threat of terror and 
the richness of the targets available on the rail system.
  I am all for this port security bill. I think it is a very positive 
step forward. But I just say to my friends we are making a tragic 
mistake having held up now for the better part of a year the rail 
security legislation that was passed out of committee and for which I 
think there is a consensus. We can't get a vote on it. I think it is a 
tragic mistake.
  Again, this is not in any way suggesting my State is very much 
impacted by this port security legislation. We have thousands upon 
thousands of containers coming into my little State. We have major 
export and import of automobiles coming in the Port of Wilmington. We 
are within the shadow of the Port of Philadelphia in Camden. More oil 
comes up the Delaware River than I think any other estuary, taking care 
of the Delaware Valley where there are over 10 million people.
  I am in no way suggesting we shouldn't be doing what we are doing. I 
am suggesting we are making a tragic mistake by not acting on rail 
security.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may take.

  I am very surprised by the comments made by the Senator from 
Delaware. The fact is we did pass out a rail security bill. The Senator 
from Delaware wanted to add on billions of dollars for all kinds of 
assistance to railroads, which has had very little to do with security. 
I am all for security. But the Senator from Delaware and I are known 
for our differences of opinion about Amtrak and how much of American 
tax dollars should be spent on Amtrak. In fact, it has been about $20 
billion to $30 billion in the last few years. We are still subsidizing 
rail routes to the tune of $200 to $300 per passenger.
  But the fact is the reason we don't have a rail security bill is 
because of the desire to add on the bill billions and billions that 
have nothing to do with rail security.
  If the Senator from Delaware wants to pass our version of the bill 
which has nothing to do with the additional billions that are the 
subject of debate on the transportation bill and other bills, that is 
fine. But the reason we are making a tragic mistake here is because we 
didn't move forward just rail security. There was a strong desire by 
supporters of Amtrak to lard onto it billions of dollars of additional 
spending having nothing to do with rail security.
  I look forward to working with the Senator from Delaware. They should 
be separated. Subsidization forever of Amtrak is not something this 
Senator will ever support when we subsidize rail routes, in the case of 
a line in Wisconsin--recently terminated, thank God--at $2,000 per 
passenger. There is something wrong with the way Amtrak is being 
subsidized.
  I look forward to working with the Senator from Delaware. But let us 
have no doubt as to why rail security didn't pass this floor with this 
Senator's endorsement, which is because of the additional billions of 
dollars that were going to be added onto it.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, that has nothing to do with rail security. 
And as incoming chairman of the committee, I will be glad to review 
this issue of Amtrak. We will get the GAO up again, and the GAO will 
talk about the incredible subsidization of Amtrak which costs American 
taxpayers billions and billions of dollars per passenger. That is the 
subject of another day of debate.
  But to come on this floor and say that we are making a ``tragic 
mistake,'' in the words of the Senator from Delaware, by not passing 
the rail security bill, I say it is a tragic mistake to add billions of 
dollars of pork onto rail security when rail security should have been 
the primary and only focus of a rail security bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I agree this is not the moment for debate 
on that. Let me respond very briefly.
  The bill was $1.2 billion and $900 million was for the tunnels, 
period. I don't know where the additional billions of

[[Page S10986]]

dollars come from. OK, $1.2 billion. Subtract $900 million. You are 
then talking about $300 million. Of that, the money went to a lot of 
things that relate to dogs, sniffers, and a whole range of additional 
Amtrak police. We can argue about rail signal systems and other things, 
which I think are essential. Let us get the numbers straight. We are 
talking about $1.2 billion. Usually what we do when we have billions 
like this is we disagree. We at least bring them up and debate them on 
the floor. We can't even get the bill brought up and debated on the 
floor.
  If my friend from Arizona--and he is my friend--is correct about 
billions of dollars of subsidization to Amtrak, then I am sure he will 
prevail when we talk about a security bill. But I respectfully suggest 
that is not the case.
  No. 2, this really is for another day. I will just take 2 minutes.
  We talk about, for example, the Wisconsin line. We do airports. We 
pay $150 million a year. I think we added another $100 million--don't 
hold me to that--to go into something like 350 cities where nobody 
wants to fly, nobody wants to go. We pay the airlines. We subsidize 
them to go into Bemidji, MN. I don't know where they go--places that no 
one wants to fly into or out of. We subsidize them with 150 million 
bucks. We do that. We just roll over. That is no problem.
  At any rate, that is for another day. But in the meantime, I hope we 
will at least be able to get to the point where we can debate on the 
floor here the rail security legislation and not prevent it from being 
discussed on the floor unless we have what individual Members want in a 
bill before it even gets to the floor.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader is recognized.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I would like to briefly speak in support of 
this legislation.
  I come from a coastal area. When I was in the House of 
Representatives, I served on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
Committee and was a member of the Commerce Committee. I pay close 
attention to the maritime industry and what is happening with our ports 
and our ships and shipping industry.
  I am very pleased to see this legislation has been brought to the 
floor. I commend the chairman of the committee, Senator Hollings, and 
the ranking member, Senator McCain, as well as others who were involved 
in working through some of the difficulties to produce results. Senator 
Stevens was involved in that, and Congressman Young on the House side. 
I had more than one conversation with Senator Thomas and Senators 
Baucus and Grassley.
  A lot of people worked to help make the production of this 
legislation possible. I must say, I am amazed it took that kind of a 
heave because this is such necessary legislation. We probably could 
have and should have done it last summer. There is no use reviewing all 
of what went into that, but there is no doubt in my mind that we need 
to pay attention to port security. That is a place where we could have 
vulnerability.
  I believe we are making progress in using sophisticated technology to 
begin to address those threats, but, still, we need to pay attention to 
this area and make sure we are doing all we can to protect the American 
people from terrorist attack or exploitation in our ports.
  The vast majority of the U.S. international trade flows through our 
ports. And I have worried that some enterprising terrorist could put 
some very devastating material on a tramp steamer or a boat that would 
come into South Carolina, New York, Baltimore, or Pascagoula, MS, and 
have a devastating impact on those communities. So we need to think 
through this.
  Over the past few decades, international and domestic port 
transportation systems have responded to ever-increasing volumes of 
two-way trade by increasing their efficiency at moving cargo. The 
challenge before us, though, is to take steps to find out what is on 
those ships, what is in that cargo. We have to look at the port of 
demarcation. How do we deal with them on the high seas? How do we make 
sure a threat is properly checked into or assessed? What do we do once 
they get into the ports?
  So this is important legislation. It is not to diminish the threat in 
all the areas of transportation. We have to think about and review all 
of them: aviation, trucking, automobiles, points of entry on land. But 
this is one area in which we need to take action, and that is what the 
legislation does.
  The administration took immediate steps to increase the security for 
our maritime transportation system. The Coast Guard dedicated 
increasing resources to protecting our ports. The Customs Service 
initiated programs to improve its awareness of all cargo movements into 
the United States and to push its inbound cargo screening efforts out 
to foreign ports.
  The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, that we are 
considering now, provides new direction to the administration and 
additional authority so we can deal with this area in a comprehensive 
manner.
  The bill establishes a system of national, area, port, and waterfront 
facility and vessel security and response planning and involves the 
State officials, local officials, and Federal officials and industry 
representatives.
  The bill improves the authority for the Customs Service to collect 
cargo information. It promotes the sharing of intelligence information 
among agencies involved in maritime transportation security and close 
coordination of security planning and operations among those agencies.
  To me, it is unfathomable that they could not do that anyway; that 
is, exchange information and get information. This bill will make sure 
that authority is there.
  The bill establishes a national transportation security card system 
to control personnel access to secure maritime terminal areas, 
including performing background checks on applicants. Again, I cannot 
believe we actually did not already have a system such as this in 
place. I hope the administration will, and I urge them to, work closely 
with the maritime industry, especially in those sectors with frequent 
personnel turnover, such as the inland waterway towing vessel industry, 
to address their needs for quick approval of employee access to these 
secure areas. We do not want to become another bureaucratic nightmare 
and maze of delay, but this system needs to be put in place.

  So I do believe this bill will help us to assess the effectiveness of 
our antiterrorism measures at foreign ports and to work with those 
ports to improve those measures. It will provide additional funds in 
this area. It will give the Coast Guard more authority and authorizes 
more assistance as they deal with marine safety and the maritime policy 
improvements.
  So this bill is a good achievement. I am glad we are getting it done. 
It may wind up being one of only four or five conference reports on 
which we do complete action before we leave at the end of this session, 
but this is one of which we should be proud.
  I commend the chairman, once again, for being willing to take my 
calls and sit down and say: Can't we just work together? We did and we 
got the results. So I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LOTT. I yield to the Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I was asked at a news conference yesterday, did we 
capitulate on account of the elections? I said no. Under Senator Lott's 
leadership, we capitulated before the election. You got us together, 
and I really thank the Senator on behalf of all of us.
  Mr. LOTT. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I yield such time as is necessary to the 
Senator from New York.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I thank our distinguished chairman, our 
distinguished now minority leader, and our distinguished ranking member 
for this legislation of vital importance to my community of New York, 
one of the largest ports in the world.
  We all know what the bill does. And all of these things are good 
steps forward. I particularly thank Chairman Hollings for his 
steadfastness on this bill.
  All of us probably would have wanted a little more in this bill, and 
in a

[[Page S10987]]

minute I am going to talk about one particular area of importance to 
me. But one of our jobs here is not to let the perfect be the enemy of 
the good.
  We need to do so much in our ports, and this is a good first step. 
The idea of assessing what our problems are, the idea of having a 
security identification card, background checks, and all of these other 
things I think are extremely important in terms of getting the needed 
technology because the terrorists are going to look for our most 
vulnerable pressure points.
  We are doing the job on tightening up air security. I flew in from 
New York this morning. I saw the new Federal people there. It is 
better. I do not know if it is good enough yet, but it is better. But 
with our ports, we have virtually done nothing. This bill is a very 
good first step. And, again, I thank our chairman.
  I want to talk about one area, and that is, the authorizing language 
is in the bill we worked on, but, unfortunately, not all the money is 
there to do it. I will try to alert my colleagues to this.

  My great nightmare, as I think of how the terrorists would come back 
and strike us again--it might be al-Qaida; it might be Iraq; but who 
knows, it could be someone else, Chechens, East Timorese--but someone 
takes a nuclear weapon and smuggles it into one of the containers that 
come into one of our ports over our northern or southern borders and 
then detonates it in a huge population area. As horrible as 9/11 was--
and, believe me, I know that horror--this would be much worse.
  So we should be doing everything we can to make sure our ports are 
secure and to prevent nuclear weapons from being smuggled into our 
country, particularly in one of the large containers that come, by the 
thousands, to our ports on the east coast and west coast and the 
containers that come over our borders.
  I have talked to experts, and they have said there is good news. The 
good news is that every nuclear device emits gamma rays, and gamma rays 
go through almost everything, so they are detectable. Only lead can 
stop it. And that can be dealt with by having an x-ray detector there 
as well.
  The good news, in addition, was that at our national energy labs, 
such as Brookhaven and Argonne Forest, have such detection devices that 
work 50 or 60 feet away. Unfortunately, the bad news is the only 
practical commercial device is a Geiger counter. A Geiger counter works 
from 2 or 3 feet away. And it is virtually impossible for us to send 
personnel on to every container that comes to our ports or across our 
borders and hold that Geiger counter a couple of inches from each of 
the scores of crates that are on each container.
  As I talked further to these experts, they said, for a relatively 
small sum, they could take the radiation detectors that now exist in 
our cyclotrons and can detect radiation 50 or 60 feet away and make 
them practical; namely, they have to make them smaller because they are 
very large, and they have to make them less delicate because they could 
bounce around. But imagine if we had such detectors. We could put them 
on every crane that loads or unloads a container. We could put them on 
every tollbooth that a truck, over the Mexican border or Canadian 
border, drives by and prevent a nuclear weapon from coming in. And even 
if these terrorists were so sophisticated that they surrounded the bomb 
in lead, we put an x ray next to it, and the x ray could detect the 
lead, and we know something is up, and we inspect the crate.
  I brought this to the attention of my friend from Virginia, Senator 
Warner, and we introduced legislation that would do just this. We 
worked long and hard to try to get it as part of the homeland security 
bill, but that did not happen. But the knight on the white horse in 
this area was the chairman from South Carolina because he put the 
language that we devised, with some suggestions by the Senator from 
Arizona and some by his own folks, in this bill.
  We are now authorized to do research to figure out a way to detect 
nuclear devices from 50 or 60 or 70 feet away to prevent--God forbid--
somebody from bringing in a device.
  There is only one problem. I regret to bring this up, but it is true. 
The Senator from South Carolina has made the fight. We need about $250 
million to come up with such a device. Unfortunately, only $90 million 
is authorized for the entire research and development section of this 
bill. This is not a frivolous expenditure. This is not pork. This is 
vital to our security.
  I am supportive of this bill. I am grateful to the chairman. He made 
the fight. I don't care if the Government or the private sector pays 
for this; somebody should be paying for this research because we don't 
want to wake up one morning and find a device smuggled into our country 
when we can stop it. That is the frustrating thing. We can stop it. 
This is not one of those things like cancer where we can put billions 
of dollars in and hope and pray that research finds a cure and stops 
the disease.
  We know if we put in the money, these devices, which already exist, 
can be practicalized so they can be put on every crane and on every 
toll booth where a truck with a container comes over our borders.
  I hope when we come back next year--this is hardly a partisan issue; 
as I said, it was the Senator from Virginia and myself who spearheaded 
this--that we will put new effort into authorizing and appropriating a 
few more dollars so the research that needs to be done to make us 
nuclear secure is done.
  I supported our President's motion for the war on Iraq. One of the 
reasons I did was I was afraid that Iraq would develop nuclear weapons 
down the road, and we couldn't allow them to do that because they might 
be smuggled in here. It is not going to be just Iraq. In our brave new 
world, our post-9/11 world, other groups can come up with these 
devices. It is our solemn obligation to do everything we can to prevent 
them from being smuggled in.
  The bill the chairman has sponsored is a great first step. I hope 
with his leadership and that of the Senator from Arizona, who made many 
suggestions to this part of our bill, that next year we will move 
forward to appropriate the necessary dollars to get this done quickly 
and make our country safe.
  I yield back the time to the Senator from South Carolina.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act of 2002.
  I applaud Senator Hollings, Chairman of the Commerce Committee, 
Senator McCain, the Ranking Member, and other members of the Port 
Security Conference Committee for their efforts, but I believe this 
legislation can best be summed up as ``too little, too late.''
  The Senate passed Port Security Legislation last December, yet only 
now, almost a year later, is the Congress sending this bill to the 
President. Moreover, once this legislation passes, it will be years 
before the Department of Transportation and the Department of Homeland 
Security implement effective security measures at our 361 seaports.
  I would have preferred seeing the Conferees embrace other ideas to 
improve port security such as the legislation I introduced with 
Senators Kyl, Snowe, and Hutchison. Instead, the Conferees rejected 
many proposals on port security and slimmed down the Senate Bill so 
that it is now one part security and three parts Coast Guard 
authorization language that has nothing to do with security.
  I believe Congress ``missed the boat'' with this legislation and 
squandered an opportunity to take aggressive action to erect a 
formidable barrier at our seaports.
  We know ports present optimal targets to terrorists. And we know al-
Qaida operatives are coming after us. As CIA director George Tenet said 
recently before the Intelligence Committee, of which I am a member: 
``al-Qaida is in an execution phase and intends to strike us both here 
and overseas; that's unambiguous as far as I am concerned.''
  And this week we learned of a new tape that seems to be by Osama bin 
Laden, which made clear al-Qaida intends to go after us again soon.
  The October 2002 report by Gary Hart and Warren Rudman demonstrates 
that our ports remain especially vulnerable even more than a year after 
September 11. The report points out, ``Only the tiniest percentage of 
containers, ships, trucks, and trains that enter the United States each 
day are subject to

[[Page S10988]]

examination, and a weapon of mass destruction could well be hidden 
among this cargo.''
  The Hart-Rudman report recommends revising transportation security 
because ``the vulnerabilities are greater and the stakes are higher in 
the sea and land modes than in commercial aviation. Systems such as 
those used in the aviation sector, which start from the assumption that 
every passenger and every bag of luggage poses an equal risk, must give 
way to more intelligence-driven and layered security approaches that 
emphasize prescreening and monitoring based on risk-criteria.''
  Since we cannot inspect every ship and every container, I introduced 
the ``Comprehensive Seaport and Container Security Act'' earlier this 
year to establish a system for container profiling. The Feinstein-Kyl-
Snowe-Hutchison Port Security Bill would also push U.S. security 
scrutiny beyond our Nation's borders to intercept cargo before it 
arrives near America's shores.
  This complements the strategy Customs Commissioner Robert C. Bonner 
is in the process of implementing. To prevent a weapon of mass 
destruction from getting to the U.S. in the first place, Customs has 
entered into formal agreements with a handful of foreign governments to 
station U.S. inspectors at ports overseas to profile high risk cargo 
and target suspicious shipments for inspection.
  The Customs Service is working to put groups of U.S. experts at the 
top 20 ports as soon as possible and they are moving at an impressive 
pace.
  Hitting the 20 port threshold is essential because together, these 
ports account for approximately 70 percent of the 5.7 million 
containers shipped by sea to the U.S. annually.
  We have known for a long time that America's ports needed an 
extensive security strategy and upgrade. In the fall of 2000, a 
comprehensive report was issued by the ``Interagency Commission on 
Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports.'' I testified before the 
Commission and I believe the group's report serves as a very thorough 
primer on seaport security issues.
  While often out of the public eye, ports across the United States are 
our nation's economic gateways. Every year U.S. ports handle over 800 
million tons of cargo valued at approximately $600 billion. Excluding 
trade with Mexico and Canada, America's ports handle 95 percent of U.S. 
trade. Two of the busiest ports in the nation are in California, at Los 
Angeles / Long Beach and at Oakland.
  S. 1214, the Senate-passed bill written by Chairman Hollings and 
members of the Commerce Committee, was drafted before the September 11 
terrorist attacks to incorporate the recommendations made by the 
Interagency Commission into law. While changes were made to this 
legislation before the Senate passed it in December of 2001 to focus 
more on antiterrorism, I believe the Conferees could have taken more 
aggressive action to improve the bill.
  I would like to cite a few examples to show how this Conference 
Report is weaker than the Comprehensive Seaport and Container Security 
Act I have introduced.
  The Feinstein-Kyl-Snowe-Hutchison port security bill establishes a 
comprehensive risk profiling plan for the Customs Service to focus 
their limited inspection capabilities on high-risk cargo containers.
  However, the only mention of such a plan in the Maritime Security Act 
conference report is this paragraph of report language: ``A vessel 
screening system which provides shipping intelligence and analysis can 
be utilized to identify those vessels requiring close inspection by the 
Coast Guard and other agencies. We urge the Coast Guard and port 
authorities to include vessel risk profiling in their enhanced security 
procedures.''
  The Feinstein-Kyl-Snowe-Hutchison port security bill strengthens U.S. 
security scrutiny beyond our Nation's borders to monitor and inspect 
cargo and containers before they arrive on America's shores.
  However, the conferees of this Maritime Transportation Security Act 
only required foreign ports to be evaluated and authorized a program 
for U.S. officials to train foreign security officers abroad.
  The Feinstein-Kyl-Snowe-Hutchison port security bill imposes steep 
monetary sanctions and criminal penalties for incorrect cargo manifest 
information or failure to comply with filing requirements.
  However, the conferees of this Maritime Transportation Security Act 
only authorized civil penalties of up to $25,000 for a violation.
  The Feinstein-Kyl-Snowe-Hutchison port security bill requires the 
Transportation Security Administration to set standards to ensure each 
port has a secure perimeter, secure parking facilities, controlled 
points of access into the port, sufficient lighting, buildings with 
secure doors and windows and an alarm.
  However, the conferees of this Maritime Transportation Security Act 
only required vulnerability assessments and a National Maritime 
Transportation Security Plan.
  The Feinstein-Kyl-Snowe-Hutchison port security bill requires the use 
of high security seals and electronic tags on all containers coming 
into the U.S. and requires empty containers destined for U.S. ports to 
be sealed.
  However, the conferees of this Maritime Transportation Security Act 
only mandated the development of performance standards for seals and 
locks on cargo containers.
  I have pointed out several areas where I believe the Conferees could 
have taken more aggressive steps, but I do want to endorse many of the 
security measures in this conference report such as the requirement for 
all workers in a secure area of the port to have a transportation 
security card and I support the $15 million annual authorization for 5 
years to fund research and development efforts.
  I thank Senator Hollings, Senator McCain, and other members of the 
Commerce Committee for the work they have done on this important issue.
  I look forward to continue to work with the chairman and ranking 
member of the Commerce Committee to address the threats to our ports. I 
believe additional legislation will be essential to follow up on this 
security bill. We must be better prepared for a terrorist attack than 
we were last year.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to 
congratulate Senator Hollings and Senator McCain the Chairman and 
Ranking Member of the Commerce Committee for reaching an agreement with 
the House on the Maritime Transportation and Security Act of 2002, S. 
1214. I am proud to have served as a conferee on this very important 
legislation that will significantly improve security in our Nations 
seaports. In addition the bill would reauthorize the Coast Guard, a 
major component in improving security in our ports and harbors.
  As Chairman of the Oceans, Fisheries and Atmosphere Subcommittee, I 
had the opportunity to chair an oversight hearing on the Coast Guard's 
role in improving maritime security after the terrible attacks of 
September 11. As Senators Hollings and McCain well know, even before 
September 11, our maritime and port security was in sorry shape.
  I wish to thank Chairman Hollings for including three provisions from 
S. 1587, the Port Threat and Security Act, which I introduced last year 
in order to improve safety and security in our nations ports.
  The first provision requires an annual report to the Congress that 
would list those nations whose vessels the Coast Guard has found would 
pose a risk to our ports, or that have presented our government with 
false, partial, or fraudulent information concerning cargo manifests, 
crew identity, or registration of the vessel. In addition the report 
would identify nations that do not exercise adequate control over their 
vessel registration and ownership procedures, particularly with respect 
to security issues. We need hard information like this if we are to 
force ``flag of convenience'' nations from providing cover to criminals 
and terrorists. This is very important as Osama bin Laden has used 
flags of convenience to hide his ownership in various international 
shipping interests. In 1998, one of bin Laden's cargo freighters 
unloaded supplies in Kenya for the suicide bombers who later destroyed 
the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
  Also included from S. 1587, was my proposal on Sea Marshals. Sea 
Marshals would be authorized to be used on

[[Page S10989]]

vessels as well as shore facilities both private and public to ensure 
safe transportation of high interest vessels into our ports, such as 
liquefied natural gas tankers and cruise ships. In Boston we have an 
LNG facility in the middle of Boston Harbor. Obviously we need 
increased security each time an LNG tanker offloads natural gas. Prior 
to September 11 these vessels were escorted by Coast Guard vessels into 
the port but no armed guards were present on the vessel. I strongly 
believe that having armed personnel, such as sea marshals, on these 
high interest vessels is very important and will considerably increase 
security in our Nation's ports, including Boston. The ability of 
terrorists to board a vessel and cause a deliberate release of LNG or 
gasoline for that matter is very real. Sea marshals will make it much 
more difficult for this to happen. In addition, this legislation would 
require a feasibility study to determine the potential to use other 
Federal, State or local law enforcement personnel as well as documented 
United States Merchant Marine personnel as sea marshals in the future.
  Finally, this legislation includes a provision that would require the 
administration to begin a vigorous foreign port threat assessment 
program. Inspectors would evaluate the effectiveness of security 
practices in both cargo and passenger terminals around the world. This 
legislation allows the United States to prohibit any vessel from 
entering the United States if the vessel has embarked passengers or 
cargo from foreign ports that do not have adequate security measures as 
determined by our port threat assessment teams. Last year, inspectors 
in Italy checking a container bound for Canada discovered a member of 
the al-Qaida terrorist organization hiding in a shipping container 
equipped with a bed and makeshift bathroom. The suspect, an Egyptian in 
a business suit, had with him a Canadian passport, a laptop computer, 
two cell phones, airport maps, security passes for airports in three 
countries and a certificate proclaiming him an airplane mechanic. We 
simply cannot allow any country to have such poor security such that 
terrorists can stow away in a shipping container.
  As I mentioned earlier this bill would also reauthorize the Coast 
Guard. The events of September 11 resulted in a new normalcy for the 
Coast Guard as port security and homeland defense missions rose to the 
forefront and our country realized the security shortcomings in our 
ports. This legislation recognizes this fact and authorizes nearly $6 
billion for the Coast Guard in 2003. Obviously this country needs a 
viable and robust Coast Guard to safeguard our ports, and to ensure 
that commerce and trade can continue to occur in our ports, safely, 
efficiently and most importantly without terrorist incident.
  At the same time, the Coast Guard also has unique missions not 
covered by any other federal agency. It is the only U.S. military 
service with domestic law enforcement authority. It has the primary 
responsibility of enforcing U.S. fisheries laws, carrying out drug 
interdiction at sea, and protecting the marine environment against 
pollution. I want to make it clear that all of these missions are 
important. And these traditional missions are suffering from resource 
constraints.
  This bill would also increase authorization for Coast Guard personnel 
from approximately 35,000 today, which is roughly the size of the New 
York City Police Department to 45,500 by the end of this fiscal year.
  This bill would authorize $4.3 billion for operating expenses in 
FY2003. Operating expenses cover all of the various activities of the 
Coast Guard, from boater safety and drug interdiction to port security, 
and adequate authorization is necessary to ensure that all of these 
Coast Guard operations can be carried out effectively.
  This bill would also authorize $725 million in FY2003 for 
acquisition, construction, and improvement of equipment and facilities. 
Most of this funding will be used to fund the Deepwater Project, a long 
overdue modernization of the Coast Guard's Deepwater assets. The Coast 
Guard is the world's 7th largest navy yet they operate a fleet of ships 
that rank 39th in age out of the world's 41 maritime fleets. The Coast 
Guard is operating World War II-era cutters in the deepwater 
environment to perform crucial environmental protection, national 
defense, and law enforcement missions. In addition, Coast Guard 
aircraft, which are operated in a maintenance-intensive salt water 
environment, are reaching the end of their useful lives as well. 
Besides high operating costs, these assets are technologically and 
operationally obsolete. The Deepwater program will not only reduce 
operational and maintenance costs, but will significantly improve upon 
current command and control capabilities in the deepwater environment. 
I am delighted to see this program moving forward.
  Every day on average, the Coast Guard saves 14 lives, seizes 209 
pounds of marijuana and 170 pounds of cocaine, and saves $2.5 million 
in property. Through boater safety programs and maintenance of an 
extensive network of aids to navigation, the Coast Guard protects 
thousands of other people engaged in coastwise trade, commercial 
fishing activities, and recreational boating. In addition, the Coast 
Guard has a role to play in Homeland Defense. It is vitally important 
that we adequately fund and staff all of the missions of the Coast 
Guard. This legislation, while not as generous as many of us would 
like, is a step in the right direction.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the legislation 
before the Senate which is designed to overhaul port security in this 
Nation. Port security is a national imperative in the wake of September 
11. Frankly, I think it is regrettable that it has taken us this long 
to get to this point. After all, like aviation security, port security 
is national security, and it must now be viewed as such. We have to 
assume that every facet of our transportation system remains a target 
for terrorism. Last year, we moved swiftly in an effort to close many 
of the gaps in our aviation security system, but we still have a long 
way to go on port and maritime security.
  We cannot underestimate the importance of this issue. A terrorist 
attack at a major port could cost countless lives and have a 
devastating impact on the national and global economy. As U.S. Customs 
Service Commissioner Robert Bonner said recently, ``if terrorists used 
a sea container to conceal a weapon of mass destruction and detonated 
it on arrival at a port, the impact on global trade and the global 
economy could be immediate and devastating--all nations would be 
affected.'' At the same time, the 2000 interagency commission report 
found the state of security in U.S. seaports generally ranges from poor 
to fair.
  Remember, our ports link us to the world. They serve a crucial 
purpose. They give us access to global markets. Ships carry goods 
totaling 95 percent of our foreign trade, excluding that with Canada 
and Mexico. Furthermore, the volume of goods passing through our ports 
is expected to double in the next 20 years. United States waters also 
sustain a $24 billion commercial fishing industry and a $71 billion 
recreational and tourism industry.
  As a member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation and the port security conference committee, I am aware 
of the important responsibility we have to turn this situation around. 
And we can only achieve this with a comprehensive, exhaustive approach 
that recognizes that the entire system is only as strong as its weakest 
link.
  The conference report before us today represents a multifaceted 
approach that runs the gamut and sets the stage for a complete 
reevaluation of port security from the ground up. We have an incredible 
amount of collective talent and experience in this country, and I hope 
that it can all be brought together to effect the kind of changes we 
need to fix the deficiencies brought tragically home by 9/11.
  First and foremost, it is vital that we ensure that the sum total of 
the knowledge and resources of Federal, State, and local governments 
are brought to bear to both prevent disasters and respond to them. In 
that light, coordination is critical, and the measure before us today 
provides for greater coordination in this regard. In the wake of the 
September 11 attacks, we saw outstanding responses at the local level, 
but these actions were ad hoc--there were no national, standardized 
directives that could have been quickly disseminated and uniformly 
understood

[[Page S10990]]

and applied--in contrast to the FAA directive to ground all planes, 
which was enormously successful.
  Well, I do not think there is any doubt we can no longer afford such 
a piecemeal approach--if we are talking about our national security, 
which we are, we are talking about the need to establish a national 
response.
  To confront the challenge of terrorism aimed at our maritime sector, 
we need better information, better information sharing, and more 
coordination. We need to enhance our ability to track cargo, and know 
what is being moved, with more inspectors, and improved technology. And 
we need stringent international standards, so we stop terrorist plots 
before they reach our shores.
  Security coordination between Federal, State, and local authorities 
has been one of my top priorities in the aftermath of September 11, and 
I am pleased that the conference report greatly enhances coordination 
with respect to port security. The bill requires comprehensive security 
and incident response plans for the Nation's 361 commercial seaports. 
It also establishes a national maritime security committee and local 
maritime security committees at each local port to better coordinate 
efforts and share critical information and intelligence.
  I am particularly pleased that the conference report includes 
provisions that build on legislation I introduced last fall to require 
ships to electronically send their cargo manifests to a port before 
gaining clearance to enter. The port security conference report expands 
on cargo security measures contained in the Trade Act of 2002 by 
requiring that cargo and crew member information be relayed to port 
security authorities prior to a cargo carrier's arrival in the United 
States. The U.S. Customs Service would determine how far in advance to 
require such pre-arrival information.
  The bill will also provide grants to local port security authorities, 
as well as $15 million annually during fiscal years 2003 through 2008 
for research and development grants for port security. I have seen 
firsthand how important these port security grants are. In my home 
State of Maine, the city of Portland recently received a Federal grant 
of $175,000 for port security upgrades. However, the fact is that ports 
in Maine and across the country still need additional security-related 
funding.

  The conference report also addresses the complex issue of access to 
secure areas of a port by requiring the Secretary of Transportation to 
design a comprehensive credentialing process for port workers. The bill 
establishes a national standard for biometric security cards for 
transportation workers, and would allow the Secretary to determine 
whether an individual posed enough of a security risk to be denied an 
identification card.
  Finally, as ranking member of the commerce Committee's Subcommittee 
on Oceans, Atmosphere, and Fisheries, I am please that this conference 
agreement includes provisions from my Coast Guard authorization bill. 
The conference report will provide the Coast Guard with the funding and 
personnel authorization levels it needs as well as over 30 other 
provisions important to the Coast Guard and the maritime community. 
This is the first time the Coast Guard has had an authorization bill 
since 1998 and it was drafted to provide the Coast Guard with the tools 
it needs to operate in our post-September 11 reality.
  The legislation provides a 1-year authorization for the Coast Guard 
to reflect the agency's changing priorities since September 11, 
including authorization for $1 billion in new funding, as President 
Bush proposed in Portland, ME in February, and the authority to hire 
5,500 new personnel to meet both its new homeland security needs as 
well as carry out its other traditional missions.
  This bill also includes numerous measures which will improve the 
Coast Guard's ability to recruit, reward, and retain high-quality 
personnel. It addresses various Coast Guard personnel management and 
quality of life issues such as promotions, retention, housing 
authorities, and education.
  Last year alone, the Coast Guard responded to over 40,000 calls for 
assistance, assisted $1.4 billion in property, and saved 3,355 lives. 
These brave men and women risk their lives to defend our borders from 
drugs, illegal immigrants, and other national security threats. In 
2001, the Coast Guard seized a record 132,920 pounds of cocaine and 
50,000 pounds of marijuana, preventing these substances from reaching 
our streets and playgrounds. they also stopped 4,210 illegal migrants 
from reaching our shores. They conducted patrols to protect our vital 
fisheries stocks and they responded to over 11,000 pollution incidents.
  And in the wake of September 11, the men and women of the Coast Guard 
have been working harder than ever in the service's largest peacetime 
port security operation since World War II. These operations are all 
critical to defending our country, protecting our borders, preserving 
our environment, saving lives, and ensuring commerce moves safely 
through our waters.
  As a conferee on this bill, I am proud of the work we have done, and 
that we are sending a strong and meaningful port security bill to the 
President. We know full well that the world has changed, and seaport 
security cannot be taken for granted. We also know that our 
transportation system must be secure if we are to move the Nation 
forward, and also ensure that we are in a position of strength to be 
able to wage the kind of war necessary to eradicate terrorism.
  So I urge all my colleagues to offer a strong show up support for 
this important legislation.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I rise to express my strong support for the 
important agreement that my fellow conferees and I achieved in the 
conference on the Port and Maritime Security bill. For many months, our 
staffs have worked tirelessly to help us reach an agreement that meets 
the needs of security while allowing commerce to flourish. This 
bipartisan legislation strikes a good balance between security and 
trade, and I'm glad to see that it will be headed for the President's 
desk.
  This legislation, of which I am an original cosponsor, aims to 
protect U.S. ports against terrorist attacks. The safer Oregon's ports 
are, the more prosperous they will be. I am also pleased to see that 
many programs important to Oregon will continue to thrive. These 
programs play a critical role in supporting Oregon's commerce and 
ports, which support 1 in 7 jobs in the State. The Maritime Fire Safety 
Association on the Lower Columbia will continue its important work 
along with the important Coast Guard stations that maintain safety and 
manage fisheries for communities on the Columbia River and along 
Oregon's coast.
  In addition to safeguards for Oregon businesses, I am also pleased 
that the agreement recognizes the important environmental laws that 
help maintain our State's environmental treasures and will continue to 
protect Oregon's ocean and coastal environment.
  I especially want to commend Chairman Hollings for his perseverance 
on this legislation, and I thank my fellow conferees for their hard 
work on this important bill.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today, the Senate will consider and approve 
a final agreement on maritime and seaport security. This important 
legislation will address critical security issues at America's 
seaports, and I rise to applaud the efforts of Chairman Hollings and my 
other colleagues who served on the conference committee that brokered 
this historic agreement.
  Conference negotiations always involve a delicate dance of give-and-
take. In this case, the conferees have been true to the intent and 
spirit of the originally passed legislation. They have retained 
important improvements, including a requirement that ports develop 
terrorism response plans; the creation of a coordinated maritime 
intelligence system; and a mandate that the U.S. Department of 
Transportation conduct background checks of port workers and require 
worker identification cards. As important, the agreement reflects some 
of the priorities I advanced in my own port security legislation--
including enhanced requirements for the electronic submission of cargo 
information and the development of a uniform system for securing 
containers destined for the United States. This legislation, while not 
a cure-all, constitutes a substantial improvement over the current 
security situation at many of our Nation's ports, and I proudly cast my 
vote in favor of it.

[[Page S10991]]

  That said, passage of this legislation should not lessen our resolve 
to remain vigilant in our efforts to protect America's seaports. Each 
year, an estimated 11 million containers worldwide are loaded and 
unloaded at least 10 times. The U.S. marine transportation system alone 
moves more than 2 billion tons of domestic and international freight 
and imports 3.3 billion tons of oil. Surprisingly, notwithstanding the 
magnitude of cargo transported by sea, there exists no uniform or 
mandatory standards for security at leading facilities, no uniform or 
mandatory system of sealing containers, and no independent checks to 
ensure that basic safeguards are undertaken.
  In order to remedy these gaps in our current security scheme, there 
remains much work to be done. As I have suggested, we should 
recalibrate our transportation agenda to focus more sequarely on 
threats to sea and land. We should adopt stiffer criminal penalties, 
including enhanced penalties for noncompliance with certain reporting 
requirements; continue to explore policies and technologies that will 
ensure container security--shockingly, as an independent task force 
recently observed, most containers are now seated with a 50-cent lead 
tag--make sure that border agents are trained and equipped to detect 
threats like nuclear devices, which would easily be concealed in the 
mass of uninspected cargo that enters the United States each day; work 
in partnership with the trade community to ensure appropriate data 
security; and provide for proper data collection and reporting systems 
that capture the magnitude of serious crime at seaports and related 
facilities.

  Let there be no doubt about it: this legislation provides no reprieve 
from our obligation to safeguard the homeland. The task will be 
difficult and requires dogged perseverance, but the building blocks are 
before us. Moreover, we know what we must do: first, we must have solid 
intelligence to identify and track our enemies; second, we must erect 
the proper barriers and preventive strategies to keep weapons and other 
instruments of destruction out of their hands; third, if those 
strategies fail, we must be prepared and able to stop any threat before 
it arrives on our shores; and fourth, as a fail-stop measure, we must 
have the capacity to detect and destroy any threat that makes its way 
to our borders. No matter what your political stripe or special 
interest, those basic principles must guide our fundamental strategy. 
And this legislation moves us substantially in that direction. I am 
committed to continuing to work aggressively on these issues in the 
108th Congress and invite my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to 
join me.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I rise in support of the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. Of all of the important 
legislation we have worked on this year to protect our Nation from 
further acts of terrorism, I consider this bill to be one of utmost 
importance.
  Most terrorist attacks around the world target transportation, and 
the Nation's 361 seaports, 14 of which are in Florida, are especially 
vulnerable. Our seaports are open and exposed to acts of terrorism as 
well as to drug trafficking, cargo theft, and especially important to 
Florida, the smuggling of illegal immigrants. The fact that many of our 
ports are located in and around large urban areas makes the security of 
the seaports of paramount importance. The extreme vulnerability of the 
urban areas in and around seaports was underscored recently by the 
fishing boat that eluded Coast Guard interdiction and arrived just off 
the shores of Key Biscayne, FL, carrying a large number of Haitian 
immigrants. Had this boat carried terrorists or dangerous cargo, a 
tragedy might have occurred.
  A terrorist attack at our seaports would produce devastating effects 
both in terms of loss of life and in economic disruption. Florida's 
seaports play a critical role in our national, State, and local 
economies. Florida's seaports are major gateways of commerce for the 
flow of goods and passengers along the Nation's and Florida's 
transportation corridors of commerce. Florida ranks fourth in the 
Nation's total container movements, and is home to four of the major 
container ports in the country.
  Florida has the top three busiest cruise ports in the world. 
Approximately twelve million passengers embarked or disembarked at 
Florida seaports during 2001 and approximately 80 percent of those 
passengers were U.S. citizens. The security of the Nation's seaports is 
crucial to the future of the cruise tourism industry.
  Although Florida has the largest international water border in the 
continental U.S., and thus the largest Federal maritime domain of any 
State in the continental U.S., Florida's seaports receive very limited 
Federal law enforcement resources, and no Federal funding for security 
infrastructure to provide the security controls necessary to protect 
themselves from threats of large-scale terrorism, cargo theft, drug 
trafficking, and the smuggling of contraband and aliens. The increased 
threat of terrorism at our borders demands that action be taken 
immediately.
  This legislation lays out important security measures that must be 
taken to ensure the safety and security of our seaports. It 
significantly increases funding for the Coast Guard to $6 billion in 
fiscal year 2003. It also authorizes $90 million in research and 
development grants to improve our ability to screen cargo for dangerous 
contraband, to detect unauthorized people or goods from entering 
through seaports, and to secure access to sensitive areas of our ports. 
This bill also mandates the development of standards for training 
Federal, State, and private security professionals and provides funding 
to carry out that training and education. It also mandates for the 
first time, the development by ports, facilities, and vessels, of 
comprehensive security and incident response plans.
  Unfortunately, the final version of this legislation does not include 
a dedicated funding source necessary to carry out the needed security 
measures. The grant program it establishes will help fund some of the 
security enhancements, but there must be more funding allocated to 
individual seaports. Florida has already spent more than $7 million 
securing our 14 deepwater seaports. Florida needs more Federal funding 
to comply with the mandated security measures of this bill. We must 
also ensure that ports that have already spent substantial amounts of 
funding on security measures are reimbursed for those improvements. 
Without a dedicated funding source, it is hard to see how we will 
achieve the high level of security at our seaports envisioned by this 
bill.
  No one deserves more credit for the passage of this important 
legislation than my good friend and colleague Senator Bob Graham. It is 
an important step forward to securing our seaports and making our 
nation safer. But, as Senator Bob Graham has said, we have much more to 
do. I look forward to working with him and my colleagues on the 
Commerce Committee to take the next steps in making our seaports safe.
  Mr. McCAIN. How much time remains on both sides?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bingaman). The Senator from South Carolina 
controls 17 minutes; the Senator from Arizona, 11\1/2\.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am glad to yield some of my time to the 
Senator from South Carolina, if he needs it.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I appreciate it.
  Let me thank the distinguished Senator from New York. He is right as 
rain. We did not get adequate funds. That was a struggle over on the 
House side. That was the Gordian knot broken by our distinguished 
minority leader, Senator Trent Lott. But we are going to have to find 
not only the money for the research, we will have to find about $4 
billion at least to implement this measure.
  I thank the Senator from New York. I particularly thank the Senator 
and chairman of our subcommittee, Senator Breaux. We had those six 
field hearings. We had the Director of Customs there. We had the 
Commandant of the Coast Guard. They were very comprehensive hearings 
with limited time. I can tell you now, we saw at one particular port a 
Ford pickup truck back out of that container, and another container 
that we happened upon had a bunch of mahogany desks from Mexico that we 
didn't see at the particular time. But later on up in Delaware, the 
Philadelphia area, it was opened up. It was all full of cocaine. So we 
made a good raid at one of those hearings.

[[Page S10992]]

  Otherwise, the chairman on the House side, Mr. Don Young, and his 
ranking member, Jim Oberstar, worked around the clock. They had to feel 
like we had over on the Senate side to take care of this with the user 
fee. But we just couldn't get the support on the House side. We are 
only here on account of the leadership of Chairman Young and 
Congressman Oberstar. We had Senator Ted Stevens reconciling a good bit 
of the differences from time to time. And in the financial area, we had 
Senator Bob Graham and Chairman Chuck Grassley of the Finance Committee 
who worked with us.
  I think we ought to understand that this, for the first time, 
requires a national maritime security plan. As part of the plan, each 
regional area would be required to have a security plan. It requires 
for the first time ever that all waterfront facilities and vessels have 
a security plan that would have to be reviewed and approved by the 
Coast Guard. It requires for the first time ever that the Government 
will do assessments of security at our ports, and these reports would 
be the basis for port security planners. The security requirements will 
be implemented instantly after review by the Coast Guard, and the act 
would be fully implemented within 1 year.

  We have background checks on all of the employees. We have the 
development of technology for seaport security, the maritime 
intelligence system; that requires tracking of vessels through 
satellite legal authority over territorial waters, advanced reporting 
requirements for vessels and cargo. And one final word: We did work 
with the unions in this particular measure. The White House, the 
unions, the Republicans, the Democrats, the House, the Senate worked 
out those background checks on union employees. So when we got together 
and much has been said that on the homeland security bill that was the 
holdup--we worked out a very comprehensive system that was approved by 
all and will give security to our port facilities.
  I thank the distinguished Senator from Arizona for his courtesy in 
yielding and his leadership on this particular measure.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona controls the 
remainder of the time.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I want to go back for a moment to the 
discussion I had with the Senator from Delware concerning rail 
security.
  First of all, I agree with the Senator from Delaware. We need 
absolutely to pass that legislation, particularly now that we have 
acted on airport and port security. Rail security is obviously a very 
critical item. My point was that there are two bills: One is S. 1550, 
the rail security bill, which provides $1.7 billion, $515 million for 
Amtrak systemwide security, and then $998 million for tunnel life 
safety projects in New York, Baltimore, and Washington, DC, which comes 
up to $998 million, and $254 million for safety and security 
improvements.
  That bill I supported and worked through the committee and would 
support it, even though over 50 percent of it goes for just three 
areas: New York, Baltimore, and Washington, DC. But that is where 
tunnels that need work are located.
  I was referring also to S. 1991, which is the Amtrak reauthorization, 
which calls for $4 billion annually and also includes the provisions of 
S. 1550. Holds were put on S. 1550. I do not support S. 1991 because it 
authorizes as much as $4 billion annually.
  The Senator from Delaware always talks about the fact that we 
subsidize aviation projects. We do. We do primarily through user fees. 
There are no user fees that are imposed on the railways of America and 
Amtrak.
  I am pleased with some of the actions that have been taken by the new 
regime over at Amtrak. The new chairman is doing a much better job in 
making some very tough decisions.
  I look forward to working with the Senators from Delaware. The junior 
Senator from Delaware, Mr. Carper, has been very committed and involved 
in the project. I look forward to working with him and Senator 
Hollings. A top priority will be, in my view, rail security; we should 
pass it.
  I want to make it clear I don't believe other extraneous projects 
should be associated with it. The Amtrak reauthorization should be 
taken up on its merits or demerits. But I hope we can move forward with 
S. 1550, the rail security bill. Holds have been put on the bill. It 
has received my support, as well as that of the distinguished chairman 
of the committee.
  The issue of Amtrak rail security is of prime importance. The issue 
of the future of Amtrak is also of significant importance--not as 
important as that of rail security. I look forward to working with 
Senator Hollings and the Senators from Delaware and the members of the 
committee, including Senator Breaux, as we try to work through this 
whole issue of the future of Amtrak. There are a number of different 
kinds of proposals, and Mr. Ken Mead of GAO, under whose 
responsibilities Amtrak lies, is one to whom all of us pay a great deal 
of attention.
  Finally, I again thank Senator Hollings for his leadership on this 
very important legislation. I don't think there is any doubt in the 
minds of most safety and security experts that port security is an area 
of significant vulnerability. We hold no illusions there will be 
immediate confidence that we can have security in the airports of 
America, but I am confident that the implementation of this 
legislation, over time, will provide Americans, to a large extent, with 
the security and safety that is necessary in the ports of America.
  In some ways, you can argue that the way the ports operate in 
America, the challenges are even greater than at the airports, or even 
rail security, given the hundreds of thousands of containers that come 
through these ports on a daily basis, and how vital they are to the 
economy of the United States, as we found out in the slowdown/strike in 
the west coast ports recently.
  So I again thank all involved. I also thank our friends in the other 
body, the House, and also for the involvement of the administration.
  Mr. President, I yield whatever remaining time I have to the Senator 
from South Carolina.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I thank the distinguished Senator from Arizona. I am 
glad to hear him say we are going to work together on port security and 
the reauthorization of Amtrak because that is vital. I think if the 
leader here, the Senator from Nevada, and the other side are ready, we 
can yield back time and proceed to the vote. I yield back any time I 
may have. I thank the Senator from Arizona.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. The Senator from Arizona and the Senator from South 
Carolina yielded back their time. I think it is appropriate to start 
the vote a couple minutes early.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If all time is yielded back, the question is 
on agreeing to the conference report. The yeas and nays have been 
ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Inouye), the 
Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy), the Senator from Louisiana 
(Ms. Landrieu), and the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Torricelli) are 
necessarily absent.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. 
Helms) is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Carper). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 95, nays 0, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 243 Leg.]

                                YEAS--95

     Akaka
     Allard
     Allen
     Barkley
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Cantwell
     Carnahan
     Carper
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     Dayton
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)

[[Page S10993]]


     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Helms
     Inouye
     Kennedy
     Landrieu
     Torricelli
  The conference report was agreed to.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. BYRD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.

                          ____________________