[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 147 (Thursday, November 14, 2002)]
[House]
[Pages H8742-H8757]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




    WAIVING POINTS OF ORDER AGAINST CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 333, 
    BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2002

  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I 
call up House Resolution 606 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 606

       Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be 
     in order to consider the conference report to accompany the 
     bill (H.R. 333) to amend title 11, United States Code, and 
     for other purposes. All points of order against the 
     conference report and against its consideration are waived.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions) is 
recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield 
the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Frost), 
pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During 
consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose 
of debate only.
  Mr. Speaker, the resolution provides the standard rule under which we 
consider conference reports and waives all points of order against the 
conference report and its consideration.
  Mr. Speaker, I am exceedingly pleased that today we will finally 
consider the conference report for much-needed bankruptcy reform 
legislation. I am proud of the tireless efforts of many of the staff 
members and the Members who have put countless hours towards the 
passage of this important legislation. Their efforts allow each of us 
to ensure that our bankruptcy laws operate fairly, efficiently, and 
free of abuse. We must end the days when debtors who are able to repay 
some portion of their debts are allowed to game the system. This bill 
is crafted to ensure the debtor's rights to a fresh start while 
protecting the system from flagrant abuses by those who are able to pay 
their bills. The result is a carefully crafted package that balances 
and protects Americans from all walks of life and provides access to 
bankruptcy for all Americans who have a legitimate need.
  I urge my colleagues to support this rule and the underlying 
legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. FROST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this conference report 
and urge my colleagues to support this rule so that the House may 
proceed to the consideration of the conference agreement. The House 
has, in the past two Congresses, consistently supported bankruptcy 
reform. In the 107th Congress, the House passed its version of the bill 
by a vote of 306 to 108. This agreement, which is the product of months 
of negotiations, makes sensible changes in the law that will save 
American consumers millions of dollars a year. This conference 
agreement adheres to the principle that if an individual has the 
capacity to repay a substantial portion of their debt, then that debtor 
should have an obligation to repay. This conference agreement will rein 
in abuse of the system and ensure that those debtors who cannot pay are 
given the fresh start they need.
  Mr. Speaker, I commend the conferees for their hard work on this 
issue and for bringing the House a conference report that is worthy of 
support.
  I would point out, Mr. Speaker, that there are Members on our side of 
the aisle who strongly object to this conference report, and we will be 
hearing from them in the course of this debate.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
New Jersey (Mr. Smith), the chairman of the Committee on Veterans' 
Affairs.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I thank my friend for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this rule. Some of my 
colleagues were not here back in 1993 and 1994 when we debated the 
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, which penalized pro-lifers 
in a way that was totally unfair and discriminatory, mandating ruinous 
lawsuits, criminal penalties and the like, for doing the same thing 
that some other nonviolent civil disobedient person might do. If you 
stood in front of an abortion clinic, you could have the book literally 
thrown at you, and do the same thing in front of NIH or somewhere else 
and have a whole different set of penalties. Today we are dealing with 
the same thing but an extension of that very, very wrongheaded and 
misguided piece of legislation.
  In 1994, Chairman Sensenbrenner said this about the same language we 
are debating today:
  ``Political protest has been at the forefront of social change. From 
the Boston Tea Party to the abolitionist movement, from the antiwar 
protests to the activism of the civil rights movement, civil 
disobedience has been an intimate part of our history. This is perhaps 
the first time in our Nation's history''--this is the second, today--
``that those in the power have so openly sought to use the authority of 
government to broadly suppress the legitimate actions of a movement 
with which they do not agree. The legislation, FACE,'' which this makes 
it worse, you cannot discharge a civil complaint that has been brought 
against you, the penalty, ``sweeps with broad and heavy hand to target 
peaceful, nonviolent, constitutionally protected activities on the same 
terms as violent or forceful acts.''
  Chairman Sensenbrenner had it right then. He went on to say that this 
was McCarthyism. What we are dealing with today, with all due respect, 
is McCarthyism. Much has been made about the Starr memo. Let me say 
this: The difference is if you are from PETA or some other organization 
where sit-ins and civil, nonviolent disobedience, where you get 
arrested, is part of the intent of what you want to do to bring a 
focus, and Martin Luther King certainly had intent when he protested 
and got arrested more than a dozen times or so. The fundamental issue 
here is that pro-lifers are treated differently. Under the FACE bill, 
ruinous lawsuits, extreme penalties are leveled against nonviolent 
protestors.
  I urge a no on the rule.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Boucher).
  (Mr. BOUCHER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Texas for 
yielding me this time. I am pleased to rise in support of the rule for 
consideration in the House of the conference report to accompany the 
bankruptcy reform legislation. I urge approval both of the rule and of 
the conference report.
  The reform of the Nation's bankruptcy laws, which our actions today 
will accomplish, is well justified. This reform is strongly in the 
interest of consumers. It will significantly reduce the annual hidden 
tax of approximately $400 that the typical consumer pays because others 
are misusing the bankruptcy laws. That amount represents the increased 
cost of credit and the increased price of consumer goods and services 
occasioned by bankruptcy law misuse. This reform will lower that hidden 
tax.
  The reform also helps consumers by requiring clearer disclosures of 
the cost of credit on credit card statements. And the reform will be a 
major benefit to single parents who receive alimony or child support. 
That person today is fifth in priority for the receipt of payment under 
the bankruptcy laws. The reform before us today elevates the spouse-
support recipient to number one in priority.
  This reform proceeds from a basic premise that people who can afford 
to repay a substantial part of the debt that they owe should do so. The 
bill requires that repayment while allowing the discharge in bankruptcy 
of the debts that cannot be repaid and in so doing responds to the 
broad misuse of chapter 7's complete liquidation provisions that we 
have observed in recent years.
  The reform measure sets a threshold for the use of chapter 7. Debtors 
who

[[Page H8743]]

can make little or no repayment can use its provisions without 
limitation and can discharge all of their debts. Debtors whose annual 
income is below the national mean of about $50,000 per year are also 
untouched by the provisions of this reform. They can make full use of 
chapter 7 and discharge all of their debts even if they could afford to 
make a substantial debt repayment.
  And so, Mr. Speaker, the financially unfortunate and middle-income 
consumers are not affected at all by this reform. They can continue to 
use the bankruptcy laws as they can under current law. But upper-income 
consumers who can make substantial repayments will be expected to enter 
into court-supervised repayment plans under chapter 13. This modest 
requirement of personal financial responsibility is appropriate, and I 
am pleased today to urge approval of this well-justified reform which 
is contained within the conference agreement.
  Mr. Speaker, I am pleased today to urge approval of the rule that 
brings that conference agreement to the floor as well as the conference 
agreement itself.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Pitts).
  (Mr. PITTS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. PITTS. Mr. Speaker, I want to rise in opposition to this rule and 
make it clear that I support bankruptcy reform laws very much. But not 
this version, not with these words that have been inserted by the 
conference. They did take the reference to the FACE Act, standing for 
Free Access to Clinic Entrances, meaning an abortion clinic, that was 
passed in 1994; and we have the FACE language here in white and the 
identical words are in the bankruptcy reform bill. They did change 
``reproductive health services'' to ``lawful goods or services.'' That 
is the one change. The key words are ``interferes with'' or ``physical 
obstruction.'' Under FACE, peaceful pro-life protesters are being 
arrested and sentenced to jail for just praying on a sidewalk outside 
an abortion clinic, or handing a leaflet to a woman as an alternative. 
One man was even successfully sued for leaving his business card on the 
clinic's door.
  Mr. Speaker, under FACE, people are being fined hundreds of thousands 
of dollars. What we are doing in this bill is taking the identical 
language and putting it in the bankruptcy bill so now they cannot even 
file for bankruptcy, unfair bankruptcy. So we are condemning peaceful, 
innocent people who have a conscience to protest just to try to save 
the life of an unborn to a life of financial ruin.
  I have a couple of letters, one from Harvard law professor Mary Ann 
Glendon, a good analysis of the bill, but let me just read the last 
paragraph:
  ``A large and nondischargeable debt, beyond one's capacity to pay, 
especially in the hands of a hostile and motivated creditor, is a 
financial death sentence. That is what even peaceful pro-life 
protesters have to fear if the proposed language is added to the 
existing aggressive judicial interpretation of FACE and similar laws.''
  Mr. Speaker, I will submit the other letter from the Catholic Bishops 
for the Record.

                 Bankruptcy Conference Report H.R. 333:

       SEC. 330. Nondischargibility of debts incurred through 
     violations of law relating to the provision of lawful goods 
     and services
       (a) Debts incurred through violations of law relating to 
     the provision of lawful goods and services.--Section 523(a) 
     of title 11, United States Code, as amended by section 224, 
     is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (18) by striking ``or'' at the end;
       (2) in paragraph (19) by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; or''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(20) that results from any judgment, order, consent 
     order, or decree entered in any Federal or State court, or 
     contained in any settlement agreement entered into by the 
     debtor (including any court-ordered damages, fine, penalty, 
     or attorney fee or cost owned by the debtor), that arises 
     from--
       ``(A) the violation by the debtor of any Federal or State 
     statutory law, including but not limited to violations of 
     title 18, that results from intentional actions of the debtor 
     that--
       ``(i) by force or threat of force or by physical 
     obstruction, intentionally injure, intimidate, or interfere 
     with or attempt to injure, intimidate or interfere with any 
     person because that person is or has been, or in order to 
     intimidate such person or any other person or any class of 
     persons from, obtaining or providing lawful goods or 
     services;
       ``(ii) by force or threat of force or by physical 
     obstruction, intentionally injure, intimidate, or interfere 
     with or attempt to injure, intimidate or interfere with any 
     person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First 
     Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of religious 
     worship; or
       ``(iii) intentionally damage or destroy the property of a 
     facility, or attempt to do so, because such facility provides 
     lawful goods or services, or intentionally damage or destroy 
     the property of a place of religious worship; or
       ``(B) a violation of a court order or injunction that 
     protects access to a facility that or a person who provides 
     lawful goods or services or the provision of lawful goods or 
     services if--
       ``(i) such violation is intentional or knowing; or
       ``(ii) such violation occurs after a court has found that 
     the debtor previously violated--
       ``(I) such court order or such injunction; or
       ``(II) any other court order or injunction that protects 
     access to the same facility or the same person; except that 
     nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to affect any 
     expressive conduct (including peaceful picketing, peaceful 
     prayer, or other peaceful demonstration) protected from legal 
     prohibition by the first amendment to the Constitution of the 
     United States.''.
       (b) Restitution.--Section 523(a)(13) of title 11, United 
     States Code, is amended by inserting ``or under the criminal 
     law of a State'' after ``title 18''.
                                  ____


                                  FACE

           (Freedom of access to [abortion] clinic entrances)

 Signed by President Clinton in 1994--Introduced in the House by Rep. 
                          Chuck Schumer (D-NY)

       Roll Call: http://clerkweb.house.gov/cgibin/vote.exe?year-
1994&rollnumber-70
       18 USC Sec. 248

     SEC. 248. FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINIC ENTRANCES.

       (a) Prohibited Activities.--Whoever--
       (1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, 
     intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or 
     attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person 
     because that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate 
     such person or any other person or any class of persons from, 
     obtaining or providing reproductive health services;
       (2) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, 
     intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or 
     attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person 
     lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First 
     Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of religious 
     worship; or
       (3) intentionally damages or destroys the property of a 
     facility, or attempts to do so, because such facility 
     provides reproductive health services, or intentionally 
     damages or destroys the property of a place of religious 
     worship,
       (d) Nothing in this section shall be construed--(1) to 
     prohibit any expressive conduct (including peaceful picketing 
     or other peaceful demonstration) protected from legal 
     prohibition by the First Amendment to the Constitution;
                                  ____



                                           Harvard Law School,

                                 Cambridge, MA, November 12, 2002.
     Hon. Christopher Smith,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman Smith: I am taking the liberty of writing 
     to you today because I am deeply concerned about the 
     application of H.R. 333 to peaceful pro-life protestors. I 
     hope the following opinion letter will be helpful to you.
       The proposed legislation would create a new 11 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 523(a)(20), denying discharge for and judgments under 
     the Freedom of Access of Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 248 (2000), or under similar state laws, or under 
     injunctions restricting protest at abortion clinics.
       The impact of the provision on peaceful pro-life protestors 
     would be grave. Existing law substantially restricts protest 
     at abortion clinics, and in their zeal to eliminate violent 
     protests and obstruction protests, courts and legislators 
     have forbidden much protest that is peaceful and 
     nonobstructive. Proposed Sec. 523(a)(20) would add an 
     additional sanction to all this existing law: money judgments 
     for abortions protest would follow protestors to the ends of 
     their lives. No matter their financial circumstances, no 
     matter the size of the judgment or the nature of the protest, 
     these judgments could never be discharged in bankruptcy.


        1. The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE)

       Proposed Sec. 523(a)(20)(A) precisely tracks the key 
     substantive language of FACE. FACE prohibits conduct that: 
     ``by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, 
     intentionally injuries, intimidates or interferes with'' 
     access to ``reproductive health services,'' or attempts to do 
     so. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 248(a)(1) (2000).
       Proposed Sec. 523(a)(20) denies discharge for any judgment 
     arising from actions of the debtor that: ``by force or threat 
     of force or

[[Page H8744]]

     by physical obstruction, intentionally injure, intimidate, or 
     interfere with'' access to lawful goods or services. The key 
     language in the two block quotes is obviously identical save 
     for the difference between singular and plural verbs 
     (``whoever'' is the subject in FACE; the debtor's ``actions'' 
     is the subject in proposed Sec. 523(a)(2)).
        Because the proposed language is substantively identical 
     to FACE, it will be read in light of existing decisions under 
     FACE. Existing interpretations of FACE will almost certainly 
     be read into Sec. 523(a)(20). Worse, abortion clinics and 
     their supports will likely argue that by re-enacting the same 
     statutory language, Congress has approved existing decisions 
     and thus confirmed their status as valid and appropriate 
     interpretations of FACE itself. This is a critical point, 
     because existing interpretations of FACE in the lower courts, 
     extraordinarily favorable to the abortion clinics and their 
     supporters, have not yet been accepted or rejected by the 
     Supreme Court of the United States. Congressional passage of 
     proposed Sec. 523(a)(20) could figure prominently in eventual 
     Supreme Court arguments on the interpretation of FACE, 
     lending plausible support to the worst interpretations of the 
     statute.
       I will not consider in this opinion letter the 
     interpretations of ``force or threat of force,'' 
     ``intentionally injure,'' or ``intimidate.'' Some 
     interpretations of those provisions have been surprisingly 
     expansive, but those forms of protest are not the issue for 
     most protestors. The real work of FACE, and of proposed 
     Sec. 523(a)(20), is in the provisions that target anyone who 
     ``by physical obstruction * * * interferes with * * * or 
     attempt to * * * interfere with'' access to a clinic. Each of 
     these terms has been construed or defined to mean more than 
     first appears. No actual interference, and no actual physical 
     obstruction is required for a violation. Courts have found 
     violations in peaceful protest that did not actually prevent 
     access to clinics.
       ``Physical obstruction'' is defined in 18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 248(e)(4) to mean making ingress or egress ``impassable 
     * * * or unreasonably difficult or hazardous.'' What is 
     ``unreasonably difficult'' has, in the lower federal courts, 
     sometimes turned out to be remote from physical obstruction.
       Thus in, United States v. Mahoney, 247 F.3d 270 (D.C. Cir. 
     2001), the court found physical obstruction and interference 
     with access from a single protestor kneeling in prayer 
     outside a locked door to an abortion clinic. Id. at 283-84. 
     The door was a ``rarely used'' emergency exit. The court said 
     that someone might have used the door, and that the law does 
     not distinguish frequently and infrequently used doors. More 
     remarkable still, the court held that a single person keeling 
     in prayer rendered use of that door ``unreasonably 
     difficult'' and forced patients to use a difference entrance. 
     Id. at 284.
       Mahoney also held that six other defendants physically 
     obstructed and interfered with access to another door. The 
     court of appeals' entire discussion of this holding is that 
     five protestors ``knelt or sat within five feet of the front 
     door,'' that the sixth defendant ``was pacing just behind 
     them,'' and that they ``offered passive resistance and had 
     to be carried away.'' Id. at 283. The court does not even 
     say whether they were arrayed across the sidewalk or along 
     the sidewalk, whether they left a passage open, or any 
     other fact that might go to a plain meaning understanding 
     of ``physical obstruction'' or to preserving a reasonable 
     right to protest. It was enough for a violation that they 
     were near the door.
       Both FACE and proposed Sec. 523(a)(20) are limited to 
     ``intentional'' violations, but mahoney shows that protection 
     to be illusory. The court found specific intent to interfere 
     with access to the clinic, even in the case of the lone 
     protestor praying before the locked door. It relied on the 
     fact that the protestor prayed that women approaching the 
     clinic would change their minds about getting an abortion; 
     the court quoted his prayer as evidence of criminal intent. 
     247 F.3d at 283-84. To similar effect is United States v. 
     Gregg, 32 F. Supp. 2d 151, 157 (D.N.J. 1998), aff'd 226 F.3d 
     253 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 971 (2001). Gregg 
     had much more evidence of actual obstruction than Mahoney. 
     Even so, the Gregg court relied on defendants' ``anti-
     abortion statements, including imploring women not to go into 
     the clinic or not to kill their babies,'' and on the fact 
     that defendants ``carried anti-abortion signs,'' as evidence 
     of forbidden intent. The government in these cases has 
     offered evidence of opposition to abortion as evidence of 
     specific intent to obstruct access, and the courts have 
     relied on this evidence for that purpose. Clinics and their 
     supporters would of course argue that Congress has codified 
     these holdings if it enacts proposed Sec. 523(a)(20).
       Courts have emphasized that FACE plaintiffs need not prove 
     actual obstruction. ``It is not necessary to show that a 
     clinic was shut down, that people could not get into a clinic 
     at all for a period of time, or that anyone was actually 
     denied medical services.'' People v. Kraeger, 160 F.Supp. 2d 
     360, 373 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). Plaintiffs need not ``show that any 
     particular person was interfered with by the defendants' 
     obstruction.'' United States v. Wilson, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 
     1171 n.1 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd as United States v. Balint, 201 
     F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000).
       To sum up, proposed Sec. 523(a)(20) would re-enact 
     statutory language that has been interpreted not to require 
     actual obstruction, has been interpreted to prohibit a single 
     protestor kneeling in prayer near an unused exit, and has 
     been interpreted to treat anti-abortion statements as 
     evidence of criminal intent. These interpretations would 
     almost certainly be read into Sec. 523(a)(20), and there 
     would be a serious argument that Congress had confirmed these 
     interpretations in FACE itself.


                             2. injunctions

       Proposed Sec. 523(a)(20)(B) makes nondischargeable any debt 
     arising from violation of an ``injunction that protects 
     access to'' a facility that provides lawful goods or 
     services. Nothing in proposed Sec. 523(a)(20)(B) even 
     purports to confine this subsection to violent or obstructive 
     protest.
       Under FACE and under other sources of law, courts have 
     issued injunctions establishing buffer zones and bubble 
     zones, forbidding protestors from coming within stated 
     distances of the property line of abortion clinics or within 
     stated distances of persons approaching abortion clinics. 
     In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,  512 U.S. 753 
     (1994), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
     an injunction forbidding protestors to step onto clinic 
     property, or onto public property within 36 feet of the 
     clinic's property line. The effect was to confine 
     protestors to the other side of the street. The Court also 
     affirmed an injunction against making any noise audible 
     within the clinic. In Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 
     U.S. 357 (1997), the Court upheld an injunction against 
     any defendant ``demonstrating within fifteen feet'' of any 
     doorway or driveway at any abortion clinic in the Western 
     District of New York. The injunction in that case also 
     prohibited any defendant from ``trespassing'' on any 
     clinic's parking lot. (The injunction is set out id. at 
     366 n.2.)
       Since Madsen, the lower courts have become more aggressive 
     about issuing buffer zone injunctions without first 
     attempting to control alleged obstruction with less intrusive 
     means. Examples include the buffer zone injunction issued on 
     remand after the limited violations in United States v. 
     Mahoney, under the case name United States v. Alaw, 180 F. 
     Supp. 2d 197 (D.D.C. 2002), and the preliminary injunction 
     confining a single protestor to the other side of the street 
     in United States v. McMillan, 946 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Miss. 
     1995).
       Many forms of protest inside such buffer zones would not 
     obstruct or interfere with anything. A single picketer with a 
     pro-life sign, held in contempt of court for standing quietly 
     inside a buffer zone, would be covered by proposed 
     Sec. 523(a)(20)(B), and any fines, compensation, or 
     attorneys' fees awarded would be nondischargeable. The 
     protection for peaceful protest in proposed 
     Sec. 523(a)(20)(B) is supposed to come from the clause 
     excluding protest protected by the First Amendment. But given 
     Madsen and Schenck, this protection means little; much 
     protest that is peaceful and nonobstructive is not protected 
     by current interpretations of the First Amendment.


                             3. State Laws

       Proposed Sec. 523(a)(20)(A) also denies discharge for 
     judgments arising from violation of state laws protecting 
     access to clinics if the violation includes actions that by 
     ``force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, 
     intentionally injure, intimidate, or interfere with'' clinic 
     access, or attempt to do so. Certainly this includes statutes 
     like the New York Clinic Access and Anti-Stalking Act, which 
     substantially tracks FACE. (This law is codified as N.Y. 
     Penal Law Sec. Sec. 240.70 and 240.71 (McKinney Supp. 2002), 
     and N.Y. Civil Rights Law Sec. 79-m (McKinney Supp. 2002)).
       It will be a matter of interpretation and litigation 
     whether Sec. 523(a)(20)(A) denies discharge for other state 
     laws imposing more expansive restrictions on pro-life 
     protest. For example, in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 
     (2000), the Supreme Court upheld Colo. Rev. Stat. Sec. 18-9-
     122(3) (West 1999), which makes it illegal to approach within 
     eight feet of another person without that person's consent, 
     for any form of ``protest, education, or counseling'' within 
     one hundred feet of the entrance to a health care facility. 
     The Court relied in part on the state's interest in 
     ``unimpeded access to health care facilities.'' 530 U.S. at 
     715.
       Now consider a pro-life protestor who approaches a person 
     outside an abortion clinic and offers a leaflet. Plainly this 
     protestor would be violating the statutory eight-foot 
     bubble zone. The statute currently authorizes compensatory 
     damages for this violation, Colo. Rev. Stat. Sec. 18-9-
     122(6) (West 1999) and Colo. Rev. Stat. Sec. 13-21-106.7 
     (West 1997), and it could easily be amended to add 
     liquidated damages or civil penalties on the model of 
     FACE. In discharge litigation under proposed 
     Sec. 523(a)(20), abortion clinics and their supporters 
     would argue that the statute was a reasonable prophylactic 
     means to prevent physical obstruction that interferes with 
     clinic access, and that any violation of the statute 
     amounts to such physical obstruction and interference. 
     Prospective patients would prefer to enter the clinic 
     without being offered a leaflet, and they may think the 
     proffer of the leaflet made their entrance unreasonably 
     difficult. If any of these arguments were accepted, 
     judgments for violating state bubble-zone statutes would 
     be nondischargeable under proposed Sec. 523(a)(20).
       I do not think that would be a correct interpretation of 
     proposed Sec. 523(a)(20). But after examining judicial 
     interpretations of FACE, I think there is a substantial risk 
     that some courts would reach this interpretation. If

[[Page H8745]]

     judgments for violating buffer-zone and bubble-zone 
     injunctions are nondischargeable, it would likely seem a 
     small step to hold that judgments for violating bubble-zone 
     statutes are also nondischargeable.


         4. The Magnitude and Nature of the Judgments at Issue

       Proposed Sec. 523(a)(20) is not confined to compensatory 
     damages. The statutes at issue authorize punitive damages, 
     liquidated statutory damages, civil penalties, attorneys' 
     fees, expert witness fees, and criminal fines. Their purpose 
     is to deter and punish, not just--or even principally--to 
     compensate for any harm done. In fact, awards of actual 
     compensatory damages are quite rare. The plaintiffs' 
     preference for liquidated damages and penalties is most 
     important in those cases in which there is no obstruction in 
     the ordinary meaning of the word, or only brief and marginal 
     obstruction. In such cases, there is little or no actual 
     damage, but there still be can substantial monetary 
     judgments.
       FACE authorizes $5,000 per violation in statutory damages, 
     at the election of plaintiffs, either private or 
     governmental. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 248(c)(1)(B) (2000). In actions 
     by the United States or by any State, it authorizes a civil 
     penalty of $10,000 per protestor for the first non-violent 
     physical obstruction, and $15,000 per protestor for each 
     subsequent non-violent physical obstruction. 18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. Sec. 248(c)(2)(B) and 248(c)(3)(B) (2000).
       The lower federal courts have held that the statutory 
     damages are per violation, not per protestor. So if ten 
     people combine to block a clinic entrance, a single judgment 
     of $5,000 in statutory damages (plus costs and attorneys' 
     fees) may be entered jointly and severely against them. 
     United State v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 257-60 (3d Cir. 2000), 
     cert. denied, 523 U.S. 971 (2001).
       But this ``per violation'' protection does not prevent 
     multiple awards for multiple violations, and each alleged act 
     of interference may be parsed as a separate violation. 
     Moreover, civil penalties may be awarded against each 
     protestor, and civil penalties and statutory damages may be 
     awarded in the same case for the same violation. Thus a 
     federal court has entered $80,200 in judgments against 
     four members of a single family, for ten separate 
     violations, none of them violent and none of them creating 
     anything like an effective ``blockade'' of the clinic. 
     People v. Kraeger, 160 F. Supp. 2d 360, 377-80 (N.D.N.Y. 
     2001). And of course there is no federal limit on the 
     damage and penalty provisions that states might enact for 
     judgments that would be nondischargeable under 
     Sec. 523(a)(20).


                 5. The Effect of Withholding Discharge

       I am not an expert on bankruptcy law or debtor-creditor 
     law, and I have not done extensive research on the options 
     available to the protestor with a nondischargeable judgment 
     beyond his capacity to pay. But the basics are clear enough 
     to anyone with credit cards and a mortgage. If you are unable 
     to pay, the creditors first threatens your credit rating, 
     then your possessions; eventually, if there is enough at 
     stake, the creditor sends the sheriff to seize your 
     possessions. If you are unable to pay and unable to discharge 
     the debt in bankruptcy, the threats and seizures would never 
     end.
       For the rest of his life, the protestor subject to a 
     nondischargeable judgment would find it difficult or 
     impossible to get credit. He could not get a mortgage; he 
     could not get a loan for a new car. The creditor might be an 
     abortion clinic motivated to make examples of pro-life 
     protestors; such a creditor could make vigorous and 
     continuing efforts to collect for as long as the protestor 
     lived. In most states, the protestor's home could be seized, 
     his wages could be garnished, his financial accounts could be 
     emptied. In some states, even his furniture could be seized. 
     All or part of everything the protestor ever earned or 
     acquired for the rest of his life could be seized by the 
     abortion clinic creditor, until and unless the judgment was 
     paid in full, with interest.
       A large and nondischargeable debt, beyond one's capacity to 
     pay, especially in the hands of a hostile and motivated 
     creditor, is a financial death sentence. That is what even 
     peaceful pro-life protestors have to fear if proposed 
     Sec. 523(a)(20) is added to the existing aggressive judicial 
     interpretation of FACE and similar laws. I believe that any 
     more optimistic interpretation of the bill is wishful 
     thinking.
           Very truly yours,
                                                 Mary Ann Glendon,
     Harvard Law Professor.
                                  ____



                          Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities,

                                 Washington DC, November 13, 2002.
       Dear Member of Congress:
       Disagreements have arisen in Congress over the conference 
     report on the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
     Protection Act, particularly over Section 330 on the 
     dischargeability of debts arising from sit-ins at abortion 
     clinics. A legal analysis of this provision by our Office of 
     General Counsel is enclosed. Based on this analysis, we have 
     a serious concern about the form in which the bankruptcy bill 
     is being presented for final passage.
       The bishops' conference has always strongly condemned any 
     resort to violence in the pro-life struggle. We have never 
     endorsed, or taken a position on, the practice of conducting 
     sit-ins or other forms of nonviolent civil disobedience at 
     abortion clinics. However, we have strongly opposed the 
     Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) as a 
     discriminatory and ideologically motivated attack on the 
     rights of peaceful pro-life demonstrators. The current 
     language on protesters in the bankruptcy bill closely 
     parallels the language of FACE, and will be used to impose 
     another layer of penalties upon protesters whose only offense 
     was to place their bodies in the path of those who take 
     innocent children's lives.
       The discriminatory nature of this provision seems clear. It 
     could be used to take away the savings, homes and other 
     property of low- or middle-income peaceful protesters to pay 
     fines and the attorneys' fees of their opponents--a form of 
     punishment now reserved chiefly for those who are guilty of 
     inflicting willful and malicious injury upon others. This 
     penalty would apply even if the protesters caused no harm to 
     person or property but only ``interfered'' with abortions.
       We hope the House will reject the Rule on the Conference 
     Report so this unfair and discriminatory provision can be 
     removed.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Gail Quinn,
     Executive Director.
                                  ____



                                Office of the General Counsel,

                               Washington, DC, September 12, 2002.

                               MEMORANDUM

       We have been asked for an analysis of the Schumer amendment 
     to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
     Act, H.R. 333.


                                Summary

       Under existing law, a pro-life demonstrator seeking 
     bankruptcy protection may not discharge a debt for a judgment 
     arising from injuries he or she intentionally causes. The 
     Schumer amendment would expand the law by preventing a 
     demonstrator from discharging a debt (a) based on lesser 
     degrees of cupability, i.e., when the debtor did not intend 
     or cause injury to person or property, and (b) when the 
     demonstrator, regardless of his or her state of mind, commits 
     a second violation of a court order protecting a clinic, even 
     if the violation was not intended to, and did not, interfere 
     with clinical access.
       An exception in the amendment for expressive conduct 
     protected from legal prohibition by the First Amendment does 
     not change this analysis. Obviously, with or without the 
     exception, Congress lacks the power to prohibit by the First 
     Amendment does not change this analysis. Obviously, with or 
     without the exception, Congress lacks the power to prohibit 
     conduct protected from prohibition by the First Amendment.
       The amendment is not limited to violent or even crimical 
     conduct. For reasons discussed below, it seems likely that 
     the amendment will have a disproportinate impact on pro-life 
     demonstrators.


                                Analysis

       Among the debts that may not be discharged in bankruptcy is 
     any debt ``for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to 
     another entity or to the property of another entity.'' 11 
     U.S.C.Sec. 523(a)(6). The word ``willful'' in section 
     523(a)(6) ``modifies the word `injury,' indicating that 
     nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, 
     not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to 
     injury.'' Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998) 
     (original emphasis). ``[D]ebts arising from recklessly or 
     negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the compass 
     of Sec. 523(a)(6).'' Id. at 64. Debts arising from actions 
     that cause no injury at all are likewise outside the scope of 
     section 523(a)(6).
       Section 523(a)(6) bars the discharge of debts resulting 
     from judgments against pro-life activists arising from 
     deliberate or intentional injuries that they cause. In re 
     Treshman, 258 B.R. 613 (Bankr. D. Md. 2001) (debt for 
     intentional injury resulting from violation of Freedom of 
     Access to Clinic Entrances Act was not dischargeable in 
     bankruptcy); In re Bray, 256 B.R. 708 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000) 
     (debt for intentional injury resulting from violation of FACE 
     was not dischargeable in bankruptcy); In re Behn, 242 B.R. 
     229 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1999) (debt for intentinal injury 
     resulting from pro-life demonstrator's violation of temporary 
     restraining order was not dischargeable in bankruptcy). There 
     is some authority that an injury is ipso facto intentional 
     when it results from violation of a court order directed 
     specifically at the particular debtor, Behn, 242 B.R. at 238, 
     but the same court left ``to another day the question of the 
     applicability of Sec. 523(a)(6) in other fact patterns, such 
     as if there had been no court order directed specifically at 
     the debtor, and instead the debt arose out of a judgement for 
     trespass or menacing.'' Id. at 239 n. 6. Criminal trepass 
     statutes generally do not require injury in the sense of 
     actual damage to property or an intent to cause such damage; 
     unauthorized entry or remaining unlawfully on property is 
     usually sufficient. See 75 Am.Jur.2d Trespass Sec. 164.
       The Schumer amendment can be divided into three parts. It 
     prevents the discharge in bankrupty of any debt from a 
     judgment, order, consence order, decree, or settlement 
     agreement arising from--
       (1) The debtors violation of any Federal or State resulting 
     from intentional actions of the debtor that by force, threat 
     of force, or physical obstruction, does any of the 
     following--
       Intentionally injures any person;
       Intentionally intimidates any person;
       Intentionally interferes with any person;
       Attempts to injure, intimidate, or interfere with any 
     person for any of the following reasons--

[[Page H8746]]

       Because that person is or has been obtaining or providing 
     lawful goods or services;
       To intimidate that person from obtaining or providing 
     lawful goods or services; or
       To intimidate any other person or class of persons from 
     obtaining or providing lawful goods or services.
       (2) the debtor's violation of any Federal or State statute 
     resulting from intentional actions of the debtor that--
       Intentionally damage or destroy the property of a facility 
     because it provides lawful goods or services, or
       Attempts to damage or destroy the property of a facility 
     because it provides lawful goods or services.
       (3) a violation of a court order protecting access to a 
     facility or person that provides lawful goods or services, or 
     that protects the provision of such goods or services, if--
       The violation is intentional or knowing, or
       The violation occurs after a court has found that the 
     debtor previously violated such a court order, or any other 
     court order protecting access to the facility or person.
       The Schumer amendment does not require an intentional 
     injury. Parts 1 and 2, dealing with violation of federal or 
     state law, require only an intentional act. The phrase 
     ``intentionally injure, intimidate, or interfere with'' does 
     not require intentional injury because the word ``or'' is 
     used. Part 3 requires only an intentional or knowing 
     violation of a court order, or a second violation of a court 
     order, intended or not. The amendment would therefore expand 
     existing law by stripping pro-life demonstrators of 
     bankruptcy protection for injuries they did not intend, or 
     only attempted but did not cause. Indeed, the amendment does 
     not even require any injury in the sense of actual damage to 
     person or property. It would remove bankruptcy protection in 
     cases where there is neither damage to person or property nor 
     any intent or attempt to cause such damage.
       The amendment is not limited to violent crime. Physical 
     obstruction or violation of a court order is sufficient to 
     trigger the amendment. No crime is necessary, only violation 
     of some federal or state statute (not necessarily a criminal 
     statute) or court order.
       It seems likely that the amendment will have a 
     disproportionate impact on pro-life demonstrators and be 
     invoked most frequently against them. Though broader in its 
     current form, the amendment is based on FACE and 
     substantially tracks it. For the most part, other federal 
     crimes are not implicated. The amendment uses the phrase 
     ``physical obstruction,'' for example, which appears nowhere 
     in the federal criminal code except in FACE. Words like 
     ``intimidate'' appear elsewhere in the code, but usually not 
     in reference to the receipt or provision of goods or 
     services. Most federal crimes do not carry a civil remedy; 
     FACE does. Thus, the Schumer amendment is carefully designed 
     to impact demonstrators. There may be other instances in 
     which the amendment would be theoretically applicable (e.g., 
     environmental protestors who disrupt logging operations), but 
     abortion seems the most common instance in which the targets 
     of protest regularly allege interference with their business 
     and often seek large judgments against their adversaries.
       The amendment seems unfair not only because it has the 
     practical effect of singling out demonstrators, but because 
     those demonstrators, like others, are presently subject to 
     the nondischargeability of debts for intentional injuries. 
     Present exceptions to dischargeability for particular crimes 
     generally involve intentional financial wrongdoing or conduct 
     in which the debtor created a grave and unjustifiable risk to 
     human life. Had Congress intended to remove bankruptcy 
     protection for debt from some broader category of injury or 
     conduct, it is unclear why that penalty should assume a form, 
     as this amendment does, that in practical terms will be used 
     only or primarily to deprive demonstrators, not others, of 
     bankruptcy protection--unless, of course, the intent were to 
     punish or chill speech, which is constitutionally 
     impermissible.
       To say that a demonstrator can avoid the problem by not 
     violating an order or statute misses the point. The point is 
     not to absolve unlawful conduct, but to fashion criminal and 
     bankruptcy penalties that are proportionate to the gravity of 
     the offense and the degree of injury and culpability--
     precisely what the law has traditionally done when assessing 
     penalties. A minor or technical violation of a trespass 
     statute resulting in no actual harm to person or property 
     would hardly seem the sort of conduct that should trigger the 
     severe nondischargeability penalty that this amendment would 
     impose.
       Perhaps even more significant is the risk that the 
     amendment will chill lawful conduct. The amendment includes 
     an exception for expressive conduct protected from legal 
     prohibition by the First Amendment, but that does not change 
     what the bill does or its likely chilling effect on 
     protesters. Congress already lacks the power to prohibit 
     conduct that is protected from prohibition by the First 
     Amendment, and no bill can change that, yet anecdotally we 
     hear of instances in which people decline to participate in 
     legitimate pro-life demonstrations because of concerns about 
     liability. Those concerns are not exaggerated give present 
     misuse of the federal racketeering statute. People should not 
     have to fear putting their assets at risk simply by doing 
     what the Constitution permits. The amendment, in my view, is 
     likely to heighten that fear and further deter legitimate and 
     lawful protest.
                                                 Michael F. Moses,
                                        Associate General Counsel.

  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Nadler).
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to this rule. For 
my colleagues on both sides of the aisle who have profound concerns 
about this bill, I hope that you will realize that the crucial vote 
will be on the rule, not the bill. Because the rule is where it will 
have real effect.
  There are many reasons to oppose this bill. This bill is opposed by 
almost all bankruptcy professionals, people who know anything about 
bankruptcy. It is opposed by organized labor, by almost every women's 
group, by children's advocates, by every consumer group, by civil 
rights organizations, and by most bankruptcy scholars. It is supported 
and is being pressed forward by a coalition of banks, credit card 
companies and other business interests who want to profit exorbitantly 
at the expense of families and small businesses at a time of crisis.
  It is shocking that at a time when the American people are rightly 
outraged at the illegal and unethical machinations of many in corporate 
America, at a time when thousands of Americans are losing their jobs, 
at a time when many businesses large and small are in bankruptcy trying 
to stay alive and reorganize and preserve jobs, it is shocking that we 
would even be considering this kind of a special interest bill that 
will enrich lenders at the expense of families, jobs and small 
businesses and will force many businesses into liquidation and job 
destruction instead of reorganization and survival. Whatever Members 
may have thought of this legislation in the past, I hope they will take 
a very careful look at the bill we have before us today and think about 
what has happened since this bill was first proposed 5 years ago and 
since it was really debated on the floor at great length and people may 
have made up their minds.
  We know that the lenders who have been demanding this bill, the big 
credit card companies and the big banks, are highly profitable. They 
are making big money off our constituents with high interest rates that 
have not come down with drops in bankruptcy or the prime rate. The 
prime rate is the lowest it has ever been. Have credit card interest 
rates come down?
  My colleague from the State of Virginia says that there is a hidden 
tax of $400 per family because of deadbeats who do not pay. That is 
nonsense. What he is really saying is that the credit card companies 
would lower their interest rates if this bill passed. The prime rate 
has gone down by 8 or 9 points. Have the credit card companies lowered 
their interest rates? Credit card companies will never lower their 
interest rates because it is an oligopolistic business and they gouge 
from the people what they can gouge.
  We know that many large banks have played a role in some of the more 
egregious financial scandals that have robbed workers and investors of 
their life's savings and their jobs. We know that this bill which 
serves their interests and their interests only will make it easier for 
these same large institutions to squeeze small debtors even more, to 
squeeze small businesses even more, to place outrageous and undue 
pressure on people to give up their right to a fresh start, and to make 
even larger profits at the expense of the most vulnerable.

                              {time}  1530

  We know that the millionaires exemption, the unlimited homestead 
exemption in six States, will not be changed, will not be capped. The 
bill will only limit that outrageous loophole that allows one to put 
all of one's money into one's mansion, go bankrupt, and still have $10 
million in the mansion, and this bill will limit that only if a wealthy 
debtor manages to get found guilty of a specific type of fraud or of a 
limited number of crimes or the most extreme torts resulting in serious 
physical injury or death. It does nothing, let me say that again, this 
bill does nothing about a multi-millionaire who wants to shield 
millions of dollars in assets from creditors in a mansion, whether 
those creditors are small businesses or other lenders or in some cases 
the taxpayers. But the small debtor, him we will get.
  What this bill will do is squeeze the more than 1\1/2\ million 
Americans who

[[Page H8747]]

each year get in over their heads and need to reorder their finances, 
pay off as much of their debts as they can and then start over. These 
small debtors, the ones who do not have huge mansions in Texas or 
Florida, will be squeezed beyond the breaking point by the draconian 
provisions of this bill.
  Let me repeat that statistic. Last year there were a million and a 
half individual bankruptcies. The proponents of this bill will tell us 
that that is a sign that we need to change the system and allow the 
banks and the credit card companies to squeeze families even harder so 
fewer people will go into bankruptcy. But there is another way to look 
at this. These million and a half Americans every year who file for 
bankruptcy are not crooks. Ninety percent of the people who filed for 
bankruptcy did it either because they were laid off from their job, 
they got divorced, or they had a medical emergency. They are in 
bankruptcy because they lost jobs, because Congress failed to enact an 
adequate national health care insurance program, because Congress 
failed to provide a prescription drug benefit program, because people 
lost their retirement savings because they invested in Enron, because 
Congress allowed their unemployment insurance to run out, because 
Congress voted to ship their jobs overseas, or for a variety of other 
misfortunes. Yet our answer to them is not to give them a helping hand 
in crises but to make things even harder for them. Is that what we are 
going to offer them? Is that going to be our answer? That is 
unconscionable.
  The so-called means test in this bill would hold people to what the 
IRS says they would need to live on even if their actual expenses are 
higher. That test was so draconian that Congress told the IRS they 
should not use it on tax cheats, but now we are going to let the big 
credit card companies do what we have told the IRS it cannot do.
  This bill would require the courts to assume that the income of a 
family in bankruptcy is what it received in the 6 months preceding the 
bankruptcy filing. So if someone got laid off, if they are 55 years old 
and got laid off from their $75,000-a-year middle management job at IBM 
and will never make $75,000 again, it does not matter. Their income 
must be assumed to be $75,000 even though they are now only making 
$25,000. It does not matter what the future holds. If someone once made 
$75,000, they will forever make $75,000 says the income test that in 
this bill, and the judge has no discretion about that. It ignores the 
facts in reality. Many people in this economic climate will be in 
bankruptcy precisely because they lost the jobs that used to pay them a 
good income. Even still, if a family in crisis is found to be able on 
the basis of this ridiculous means test to pay as little as $100 a 
month for the next 5 years, they will be denied chapter 7 relief. They 
will be branded by the law as abusers of the bankruptcy system.

  We will be told that this bill does not affect families with incomes 
below the median income. That is not true. Read the bill. It still 
allows landlords to evict people below the median income more easily. 
It still allows creditors to bring abusive and coercive motions against 
people below the median income more easily. It still exempts many 
creditors from the application of the bankruptcy rule that prohibits 
abusive and coercive motions even against people below the median 
income. It still makes it harder to save the family car in bankruptcy, 
and it will make it easier to force many small businesses into 
liquidation and thus cost jobs instead of allowing those businesses to 
reorganize and survive. If my colleagues think this will not hurt 
families at all income levels, I have a few bridges I want to sell 
them.
  I want to remind my colleagues that chapter 7 is no walk in the park. 
It requires a debtor to liquidate all his or her assets and repay as 
much of their debts as they can. A secured loan such as a home and a 
car must still be paid off or the debtor loses the property. Bankruptcy 
never relieves one of that obligation, and the bankruptcy stays in 
their credit report for years and impacts their ability to borrow money 
in the future and their ability to get a job or rent an apartment. Even 
a debtor witness called by supporters of this bill complained that she 
had these problems after she filed for chapter 7.
  And the bill rewrites chapter 13. Even though two-thirds of the 
people who voluntarily go into chapter 13 and had promised to repay a 
portion of their debts failed to do so. They cannot make the goals of 
the plan. This will throw millions of people into chapter 13 
involuntarily, and because it will be written the way it is written, we 
will have many, many debtors who are judged too rich for chapter 7 but 
they cannot meet the requirements of the bill for chapter 13. They do 
not have enough money under the means test; so they are too poor for 
chapter 13. Too rich for chapter 7, too poor for chapter 13. They 
cannot get any relief. They cannot go bankrupt. That is absurd.
  The bill will make it harder for businesses to reorganize. Think 
about the large retail chains that are now in bankruptcy. Landlords 
will be able to shut down the reorganizations and have an absolute veto 
power over the planning process. Chains like K-Mart or the various 
cinema chains would have to close hundreds of stores and eliminate 
thousands of jobs instead of reorganizing.
  What this bill does not do is protect workers who lose their wages or 
their retirement savings or their jobs because of corporate malfeasance 
and bankruptcy. There have been a number of proposals by the 
distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt), the lead 
sponsor of this bill, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas), by 
the junior Senator from Missouri and the junior Senator from Iowa to do 
this, yet there is nothing in this bill to protect workers from 
corporate wrongdoing. And if they are victims of corporate wrongdoing, 
we are going to sock them in the teeth with this bill. They have to 
take a number behind the crooks and behind the banks and the law firms.
  This bill is part of the trifecta that we are giving businesses to 
make up for the accounting reform that was passed because of public 
outrage. We should not sacrifice our constituents to the special 
interests at a time when they are hurting worse than at any time in a 
decade. I urge a no vote on the rule. I urge a no vote on the 
conference report. And with a no vote on the rule we would have a 
chance of taking a fresh look in, I might remind my colleagues, a 
Republican House and Senate next January, a fresh look at this bill and 
see if we really want to say to the low income people and the middle 
income people in this country we are going to sock them in the teeth. I 
urge a no vote on this rule, and I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Pence).
  (Mr. PENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. PENCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise with a very heavy heart today to 
oppose this rule, and I must confess to being a bit befuddled to this 
very hour. I am a Member of this institution, like many, who supported 
the outstanding work that this Chamber did on bankruptcy reform, and it 
was politicized in the conference committee by the efforts of a Senator 
that I should not name and whose actions I dare not characterize into 
what has now become a debate over abortion in a bankruptcy bill. But 
since it has become that and more to the point, Mr. Speaker, it has 
become a debate over the freedom of speech, I must rise to oppose this 
rule because I would offer today that the freedom of speech and freedom 
to peacefully protest in the United States of America is more urgent 
and more important than any individual legislation will ever be, and I 
am not alone in thinking of this.
  Professor Mary Ann Glendon, the Learned Hand Professor of Law at 
Harvard University, supports the view that this legislation will 
provide a chilling effect on the exercise of pro-life protestors in 
America. She is joined also in her opinion by the United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops that argues ``The current language on 
protestors in the bankruptcy bill will be used to impose another layer 
of penalties upon protestors whose only offense was to place their 
bodies in the path of those who take innocent children's lives,'' 
saying that the intent of the provision is clear. And even the Family 
Research Council, calling that provision morally bankrupt, said it was 
``plainly an attempt to silence by intimidation those who would 
participate in legitimate nonviolent protest.''

[[Page H8748]]

  Where the first amendment is concerned, prudence dictates caution, 
Mr. Speaker, and I urge a no vote.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Missouri (Mr. Akin).
  (Mr. AKIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks, and include extraneous material.)
  Mr. AKIN. Mr. Speaker, America does not have many home grown 
terrorists, and that is because we have a first amendment. 
Unfortunately this bill before us does terrible damage to the first 
amendment that our forefathers and all of us have stood so bravely for 
in the past. In summary, a Harvard law professor says that this is the 
financial death sentence for peaceful protestors.
  I recall so many years ago on a cold street standing with a sign and 
I recall this woman that was going in to consider getting an abortion 
or not, and I felt completely inadequate but I told her that we would 
help her with services if she decided to keep her child. Today that 
child is probably now trying to practice to get a driver's license.
  I can never support a rule or a bill on this floor which would have 
effectively imposed a financial death sentence on somebody who is 
merely standing on a sidewalk trying to help save a life.

             [From The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 15, 2002]

                      Bankruptcy and Abortion--II

       We've written before about Senator Charles Schumer's not-
     so-magnificent obsession with abortion and bankruptcy. He's 
     at it again. The New York Democrat continues to play abortion 
     politics with a promising bankruptcy bill.
       The legislation in question passed both the House and 
     Senate in 1998 with bipartisan, veto-proof majorities. The 
     bill would make it more difficult for borrowers to file for 
     bankruptcy and thus evade debts that they can afford to pay. 
     Banks, which lose millions of dollars each year to these 
     Chapter 7 filers, favor the measure for obvious reasons. But 
     consumers also stand to benefit from a crackdown, since 
     they're the ones burdened with higher fees and interest rates 
     to compensate lenders for revenue lost through defaults.
       Congress passed the latest version early last year and it 
     would be law today save for Mr. Schumer, whose agenda-laced 
     rider on abortion has mired the bill in conference ever 
     since. His amendment would prevent pro-life activists, and 
     only them, from using bankruptcy to avoid paying fines. The 
     provision, said Mr. Schumer, ``ensures those who use violence 
     to close clinics can't use bankruptcy as a shield.''
       But no anti-abortion protestor has every succeeded in doing 
     such a thing. Current law, which already prevents people from 
     using bankruptcy to avoid paying fines related to violence, 
     makes the Schumer rider redundant. The Senator's real targets 
     aren't violent protestors of abortion but peaceful ones. And 
     the unspecific language in his proposal--``physical 
     obstruction,'' ``force or the threat of force'' and other 
     pliable expressions for enterprising litigators--is a bald 
     attempt to blur any legal distinction between the two. As 
     it's written, vigils, sit-ins, picketing and other nonviolent 
     activities could be interpreted as federal offenses.
       We've seen this strategy from Mr. Schumer before. As a 
     Congressman back in 1994, he successfully navigated into law 
     the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act. Like his 
     current proposal, FACE uses vague terminology to group 
     together violent and peaceful protests for purposes of meting 
     out federal punishment. Under FACE, a first-time offender 
     convicted of ``interfering with'' or ``intimidating'' a 
     clinic patron is subject to a $10,000 fine and six months in 
     jail. No doubt, when civil rights protestors occupied 
     segregated lunch counters, they intimated many. Still, the 
     law managed to distinguish between civil disobedience and 
     militancy.
       All their talk about deterring violence notwithstanding, 
     the Senator and his supporters are well aware that someone 
     lunatic enough to bomb a building is unlikely to change his 
     mind due to adjustments in the bankruptcy code. But someone 
     planning to distribute adoption pamphlets outside a clinic, 
     or participate in a prayer vigil on a public sidewalk, might 
     very well have second thoughts if a civil fine could cost him 
     his home.
       Congress is set to revisit the issue when it returns next 
     month. Mr. Schumer insists that he ``is wholly committed to 
     passing a bankruptcy bill.'' Don't believe it. If he were 
     true to his word, he would removed his amendment, allow the 
     bankruptcy bill to pass, and reintroduce his abortion 
     provision as a separate piece of legislation.
       But Democrats know that it's Republicans who are more 
     likely to be blamed if bankruptcy reform dies. Watch for Mr. 
     Schumer to keep his poison pill in place right through 
     November and continue presenting his obstructionism as ``a 
     victory for women.'' It certainly won't hurt his fund 
     raising.
       Republicans, nonetheless, would be wise to wait him out. 
     The issue here is not abortion so much as free speech. Using 
     violent extremists as straw men, liberals are hoping to 
     snatch a formidable tool of protest from the opposition. 
     Their efforts should be resisted on principle.

  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas), a champion of this bill.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  When we began this odyssey on bankruptcy reform some 5 years ago, we 
began with two staunch principles guiding our pathway. One was to 
guarantee that those who are so overburdened, so swamped, so flooded 
with financial obligations that they could no longer make their way 
into our society's ways that they would be given the ample opportunity 
for a fresh start. That is what bankruptcy is all about. We guaranteed 
it and expanded it. As a matter of fact, it can be said that someone 
seeking a fresh start today under the bankruptcy reform that we want to 
put into the law would have an easier time than the current law. So for 
that purpose alone we should be supporting this legislation.
  The other principle was and is that those who do approach the 
possibility of repaying some of the debt should be accorded a mechanism 
by which they can repay some of that debt over a period of years. Mind, 
we said, not all the debt; mind, we said, over a period of years, but 
yet the opportunity to regain some of the losses that the general 
public would encounter if this individual were allowed not to pay 
anything back. So those two principles have guided us right down to 
this moment here on this floor.
  The other point that has to be made in support of the rule and the 
bankruptcy reform measure that underlies the rule is the fact, as was 
mentioned by both gentlemen from Texas in their opening remarks, that 
this measure over 5 years has enjoyed tremendous bipartisan support, 
gaining over 300 votes each and every time that it has come to the 
floor. Three hundred votes by any magician's count can determine 
through that number by itself that this was a bipartisan approval of 
the legislation, and it also is bicameral in different stages at 
different times, but by the time we came to this floor today it was 
bipartisan in nature.
  I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  (Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texax asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend her remarks.)

                              {time}  1545

  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, just a couple of weeks ago, an 
unspeakable tragedy hit not only this Congress, but it hit this Nation. 
That was the loss of Senator Paul Wellstone, his wife and daughter, 
staff and others who traveled with him on that fateful day. We lost a 
warrior who was not afraid to speak for the voiceless and those that 
could not be heard.
  So I stand here today unabashedly opposed to this conference report 
and this rule; and I believe Senator Wellstone would not mind me 
standing in respect and admiration for his fight, for it was his 
unrelenting work in the other body that caused this issue to remain in 
the forefront, that although the representation of this legislation is 
what many of us would have wanted it to be, a respect for consumer 
interests as well as fiscal responsibility, it is a stomping out of the 
rights of the poor who cannot speak.
  For anyone to say that people go happily into the bankruptcy court, I 
take issue, for the facts will prove out that those who file 
bankruptcy, the bulk of Americans who file bankruptcy, are faced with 
catastrophic illnesses; or the elderly, who have fallen upon hard times 
because of their illness; divorcees; single parents; individuals who 
have been laid off and now face the economic hard times of this Nation, 
the very people right now who are now facing 5 and 6 percent 
unemployment; the airline industry employees who lost their jobs after 
9-11; the small business owners who collapsed in New York after 9-11. 
Those are who file bankruptcy. Yet we have determined that these are 
the very individuals that

[[Page H8749]]

we are going to knock outside of the boundaries of having access to the 
bankruptcy court.
  Let me tell you why. We have tried over and over again. Professor 
Warren at Harvard University, a specialist in bankruptcy law, for the 
past 5 years has said the means test is what it is, mean. It does not 
help my good friends in the credit union, because what it does is it 
puts a barrier, it closes the door, it puts the finger in the dike, if 
you will, for innocent, hard-working Americans who simply want to get 
themselves in order. It puts a means test in front of those who seek to 
enter the bankruptcy court; and as well, if you want to fight the 
issue, you must take monies that you do not have and go into a Federal 
Court to go and be able to dismantle that particular means test.
  It argues against the mindset to support our children, for it 
promotes credit card debts and other debts over the ability to pay your 
child support payments. We have argued over and over about this, and it 
has not been fixed.
  This is a bill that does not address the tragedy that I had in my 
community, Mr. Speaker, and that is the collapse of Enron. This bill 
does not address the tragedy of Cathy Peterson and her husband. I have 
committed to fight until the end so that Cathy Peterson's fight can be 
heard around the Nation.
  What happened to Cathy Peterson? Her husband worked for Enron. While 
he worked for Enron, he was felled, if you will, with a catastrophic 
illness, terrible deadly cancer. And while Enron was engaged in its 
malfeasance, of course, you realize that Enron filed for bankruptcy, 
and within 24 hours 5,000 people were laid off or fired. Cathy 
Peterson's husband was one of those.
  They had to pay their COBRA insurance. They lost their home, Mr. 
Speaker. They lost their home. He was suffering from an enormous tragic 
illness. They lost their home. He was fired. While Enron filed 
bankruptcy, while a corporate structure was allowed to stand, the 
Petersons were knocked off their feet.
  So Cathy Peterson has asked us to put a provision in that disallows 
those who are filing bankruptcy, large corporations, from firing those 
who are off on the basis of catastrophic illnesses. We did not address 
that issue. So in Cathy Peterson's name, this bill should not go 
forward.
  We must recognize that in the name of those Enron employees who were 
laid off, 5,000 of them, who would not have been able to secure a dime 
of recovery had it not been for the fight of the AFL-CIO, for the fight 
that I engaged in, for the fight that the Wall Street and Rainbow Push 
engaged in, that we were able through the court process to get each of 
them $13,500. Some of them still have not recovered, laid off, children 
coming out of school.
  This bankruptcy bill does not address the needs of Americans who have 
fallen on hard times, who are sincere; and it does not address my good 
friends in the credit union industry, because those are the consumers 
who come every day to utilize those resources.
  So in the name of women and children and hard-working Americans, 
taxpayers, this bill should not go forward. In the name of my dear 
friend and our friend, Senator Paul Wellstone, who stood in the other 
body, standing on behalf of those who could not speak, I am committed 
to say whatever happens, that we will fight to ensure that the 
bankruptcy laws of this Nation do not stand as a barrier to those who 
have worked and upon whose shoulders we have stood and built this 
economy.
  I can stand and say with all emotion that anyone who views these 
passionate words as ones that cause them great discomfort, that is the 
purpose of these words, because the voiceless cannot speak today.
  The issue of bankruptcy reform has been a heated topic of debate in 
this body since the first session of the 105th Congress, when shortly 
before the National Bankruptcy Review Commission issued its report 
recommending changes to the current bankruptcy laws; legislation was 
introduced to dramatically change the way in which consumer 
bankruptcies are administered under the U.S. Code, 11 U.S.C. sec. 101 
et seq. We have battled with this issue until now and we see that the 
leadership of the House, with a renewed vigor, will force a vote on 
legislation for some of its favorite companies before the irons of the 
last election have even cooled and a day before we adjourn for the 
year.
  Mr. and Ms. America, today is a preview of things to come. Today is 
the beginning of a time when corporate interests, in this case the 
interests of large creditors, will reign supreme and the interests of 
the little guy will slip further down to the bottom of the barrel.
  I have consistently said that the greatest challenge before us in the 
bankruptcy reform efforts is solving the widely recognized inadequacies 
of the law in the area of consumer bankruptcy. As it has always been in 
the Congress, the key to this process, is, of course, successfully 
balancing the priorities of creditors, who desire a general reduction 
in the amount of debtor filing fraud, and debtors, who desire fair and 
simple access to bankruptcy protections when they need them. H.R. 333 
does not accomplish this goal. Instead it runs the interest of 
consumers into the ground.
  The bill before us today, will break the backs of working women, 
disappoints children, and discourages people who are struggling to do 
the right thing to get their lives back in order. This is a measure 
that unfairly subverts the interests of consumers to the interest of 
creditors--many whoms marketing strategies target individuals with 
questionable means of paying back the debt they incur.
  During prior consideration of this bill I pointed out the unruly 
conduct of credit card companies that target college students with no 
income knowing that they are vulnerable and likely to charge up 
significant debts often without the knowledge and guidance of their 
parents. ``An analysis [by Nellie Mae], a leading provider of student 
loans, of students who applied for credit-based loans with Nellie Mae 
in calendar year 2000 showed that 78 percent of undergraduate students 
(aged 18-25) have at least one credit card. This is up from the 67 
percent of undergraduates included in a similar study by Nellie Mae in 
1998. In years past, these same students would not have been given 
credit cards, certainly not without a co-signer.'' This is continued 
evidence that the credit card industry continues to prey on the lack of 
wisdom that many of our nation's youth have about the burdens of 
accumulating massive amounts of debt. This bill gives them license to 
continue to do so.
  This bill also uses an unrealistic inflexible formula to determine 
who is eligible for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief. The measure uses 
Internal Revenue Service guidelines to determine what expenses a 
consumer has as opposed to using the debtors actual living expenses. 
The effect of this is to render many debtors ineligible for relief 
under Chapter 7 bankruptcy by estimating their living expenses as much 
less than they actually are. The formula also uses the debtors prior 
six months income to calculate what the debtor will have available to 
pay creditors even if that income is no longer available. The only way 
for the debtor to change these assumptions is to go into court. Let me 
ask you Mr. and Ms. America, what person seeking bankruptcy can afford 
to go to court and litigate the matter. The prospect of this expense 
alone is enough to force consumers to take extreme measures in order to 
satisfy their debts.
  H.R. 333, also places the interests of creditor over the interest of 
children. By allowing a greater number of non-child support debts to 
survive bankruptcy, the measure diverts more money to creditors and 
away from parents paying and receiving child support. The bill sets up 
a competition for scarce resources between parents and children 
benefitting from child support both during and after the bankruptcy. 
Single parents facing financial crises brought on by divorce, 
nonpayment of support, the loss of a job, uninsured medical expenses or 
domestic violence will find it harder to regain economic stability 
through the bankruptcy process.
  Many women find themselves as single parents and the primary 
providers for their children. As a result women are the fastest growing 
and largest group filing bankruptcy today. In 1999, over half a million 
women filed for bankruptcy by themselves--more than men filing by 
themselves or married couples. Of this number, over 200,000 women who 
filed for bankruptcy in 1999 tried to collect child support or alimony. 
The domestic support provisions of H.R. 333 does not solve the problems 
faced by women in bankruptcy and does nothing to address the additional 
problems it would cause to the hundreds of thousands of women forced 
into bankruptcy each year, including the single mothers forced into 
bankruptcy because they are unable to collect child support.
  While women, children, students and the average working person in 
America are forced to make more available for creditors to seize in the 
event of financial difficulty, the bill makes minimal changes to that 
which the wealthy will be forced to part with in the same circumstance. 
Although the bill contains some new limits on the once unlimited 
homestead exemption, the so-called ``millionaires' loophole,'' it still 
allows some rich debtors (those who have not been found to have 
committed certain types of wrongdoing, or those who

[[Page H8750]]

have owned their home in the state longer than 40 months) to protect an 
unlimited amount of value in their residences. The wealthy should not 
be permitted to walk away from their debts and pocket millions, while 
working Americans get squeezed by a stringent and inflexible new rule.
  I am for bankruptcy reform, but I believe that it must be equitable 
and fair to all interested parties. I am for bankruptcy reform that 
recognizes the financial interest at stake for the debtor, his or her 
family and the creditors. As elected officials for the American people 
we must protect America's families. In this time when corporations like 
Enron and Worldcomm have laid off thousands of employees, we should at 
least consider granting them the priority status they deserve. Under a 
bill that I had proposed, H.R. 5110, the omnibus Corporate Reform and 
Restoration Act, we would have raised the bankruptcy claim for workers 
from $4000 to $15,000. This would have ensured that they receive 
compensation as priority creditors for the corrupt actions of corporate 
malfeasance.
  Financial hardship is a serious matter that deserves legislative 
reform that is the product of a deliberative process. This bill, is an 
extreme bill undertaken at the behest of special interest groups. We 
must protect working--class families. We must work to find a viable 
solution that deters abuse of the bankruptcy system while preserving 
the fresh start for debtors whose debts have been discharged. It is 
ironic that the consumer lending industry actively solicits consumers 
with promises of easy access to credit. We all know the pitches: ``buy-
now, pay later;'' ``No interest expenses for the first six months/year 
etc;'' ``No credit check, your job is your credit.'' Then, after 
addicting debtors to this ``financial crack'' lenders come to us 
begging for reform. Surely lenders bare some culpability for these 
beguiling and misleading advertising blitzes which entice individuals 
who might not otherwise qualify or apply for credit. Surely they have 
some roll to play in the unprecedented levels of American debt.
  Congress has a time honored tradition of careful consideration of 
bankruptcy laws dating back 100 years. In the past members of this body 
have elected to carefully preserve an insolvency system that provides 
for a fresh start for honest, hard working debtors, protects small 
businesses and jobs, and fairly balances the rights of debtors against 
the rights of creditors. This measure is an unfortunate departure from 
this tradition and places the financial well being of the American 
people in harms way. I oppose this legislation and urge my colleagues 
to do the same.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Tennessee (Mr. Jenkins).
  Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule. This 
legislation appears to me to be a compromise that is filled with 
positive aspects of the give and take of the legislative process and 
saturated with the element of common sense that both sides to this 
controversy say that they strive to achieve.
  In one aspect that has already been mentioned, it penalizes the 
adjudicated intentional violator of the law and the intentional tort 
feasor and precludes him from escaping the consequences of his act by 
hiding behind the provisions of the bankruptcy act. I think this is 
entirely proper, because the bankruptcy act was never intended to 
protect anyone in this situation.
  At the same time, it protects the innocent who are simply exercising 
their constitutional rights, who are lawfully assembled or expressing 
their freedom of speech.
  I urge my colleagues to vote for the rule and to vote for the 
conference report.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Arizona (Mr. Shadegg).
  Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in reluctant, but adamant, opposition to this 
rule. I say to my colleagues, make no mistake about it. The issue 
before us is not abortion, and the issue before us is not bankruptcy. 
The issue before us today is very important. It is the constitutional 
right of free speech and peaceful protest.
  Mr. Speaker, this rule is an unprecedented and shameful attack on the 
right of free speech and peaceful protest. It does not matter where you 
stand on abortion; you should oppose this rule and you should oppose 
this legislation. If we pass this legislation, what we will be doing is 
for the first time in American history creating two categories of free 
speech, two categories of peaceful protest: one protected by our laws 
and one not protected. We will be saying that, based on content of your 
protest, you are either protected by our law or not protected.
  It does not matter where you stand on the abortion law. If you care 
about the right of peaceful protest, if you believe in the right of 
people to exercise their constitutional first amendment rights, you 
must defeat this rule and we must go back and do this legislation 
again. Those who honor the right of free speech, those who honor the 
right of peaceable protest must understand this is a fundamental 
assault on the Constitution of the United States.
  I urge the defeat of both the rule and the underlying legislation.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/6\ minute to the gentlewoman 
from Pennsylvania (Ms. Hart).
  Ms. HART. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule for bankruptcy 
reform. This Congress and prior Congresses have been very dedicated to 
making sure that this country benefits from bankruptcy reform and these 
attempts have been made to draw up a very good bill. Now we finally 
have the opportunity to finish the job.
  Congress has a responsibility to pass this legislation now and to 
stop the bankruptcy system's abusers, those who have actually the 
ability to repay these debts but use the current bankruptcy system as a 
financial planning tool. This gaming of the system carries too high a 
cost to consumers, by raising costs at an extremely critical time for 
our economy.
  Our economy needs all the help it can get. Consumer spending and 
consumer credit are key elements of any plan for economic growth, and 
bankruptcy abuse is having such a horrific effect on consumers' 
finances that if current practices continue, approximately one out of 
seven households will have filed for bankruptcy within the past decade.
  Bankruptcy legislation has been debated. It has been refined; it has 
been revised and amended for years. It is now time for action.
  Unfortunately, much of this debate has been focused on the abortion 
provisions in this bill. I ask my colleagues to look at the real 
effects of those provisions. They are not effective. They will not harm 
lawful protesters. I urge my colleagues to support the rule.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Souder).
  (Mr. SOUDER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks, and include extraneous material.)
  Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Speaker, I rise deeply disappointed. I am a strong 
supporter of bankruptcy reform. I was a former retailer and business 
person, and many of my supporters are in support of this. I cannot 
believe that we are here on the floor debating this today and that this 
bill has been brought up.
  We are likely to hear in the closing remarks from some of our 
leadership that this does not apply to pro-lifers and it does not sit 
on free speech. I think they are terribly wrong, and they put many of 
us in deep conflict in trying to defend civil liberties and, at the 
same time, reform bankruptcy; and many of us are deeply disappointed in 
our leadership that this bill has come forth.
  I think many Americans around the country, as nearly every pro-family 
and pro-life group in America, has stood arm in arm against this bill. 
National Right to Life, which does not take positions on issues such as 
this, is about the only one, and it does not mean that they favor the 
bill; it just means they are silent.
  This is going to be double-scored if the rule passes, and many 
Members are going to have their ratings go down among conservative 
groups, as well as liberal groups, permanently, because they have not 
listened to their constituents at the grassroots level and the 
organizations that represent them.
  We are going to hear probably quoted from a memo by Kenneth Starr, 
who has been hired by the business interests to advocate a position 
that is manifestly inaccurate in his memo. He, for example, tries to 
address the question and correctly points out that ``willful'' and 
``intentional'' are the same. But that memo is silent on ``malicious,'' 
and that is a critical, critical point on this. He does not have 
anything in there on ``malicious.''

[[Page H8751]]

  The FACE Act makes it a tie; it ties the two together and makes pro-
lifers liable in a way that others are not. PETA is not liable. They do 
not have a FACE Act. This law focuses on pro-life demonstrators. Yes, 
it can reach many other demonstrators, possibly even anti-war 
demonstrators if they protest in front of a factory that produces 
weapons.
  Peaceful protestors. The Mahoney case, one protester, kneeling in 
prayer, was in front of a locked door, was found guilty by the D.C. 
Circuit Court. One kneeling Christian, silently protesting abortion, 
has had the force of law thrown at them. Where are we going in America?
  Also in the Starr memo there is another false assumption, and that is 
that somehow the courts are going to interpret this separate from the 
same-as-additional law. The courts never interpret a new law as 
redundant. They assume that we have a purpose. Senator Schumer is 
correct in saying there is a congressional intent with this law. The 
courts will rule that.
  This is, in fact, a broad expansion of the government potentially 
restricting civil liberties in all parts of protest, but particularly 
those of us who were very pro-business, are first and foremost deeply 
motivated by defending the most innocent of life, the little children. 
We are not talking about violent protests. We tried to compromise. We 
definitely favor it for violent, but peaceful, kneeling prayer should 
never be deprived from civil liberties.
  I urge my colleagues to carefully consider those commands from Mary 
Ann Gloran of the Harvard Law School.
  Because the proposed language is substantively identical to FACE, it 
will be read in light of existing decisions under FACE. Existing 
interpretations of FACE will almost certainly be read into 
Sec. 523(a)(20). Worse, abortion clinics and their supporters will 
likely argue that by re-enacting the same statutory language, Congress 
has approved existing decisions and those confirmed their status as 
valid and appropriate interpretations of FACE itself. This is a 
critical point, because existing interpretations of FACE in the lower 
courts, extraordinarily favorable to the abortion clinics and their 
supporters, have not yet been accepted or rejected by the Supreme Court 
of the United States. Congressional passage of proposed Sec. 523(a)(20) 
could figure prominently in eventual Supreme Court arguments on the 
interpretation of FACE, lending plausible support to the worst 
interpretations of that statute.
  I will not consider in this opinion letter the interpretations of 
``force or threat of force,'' ``intentionally injure,'' or 
``intimidate.'' Some interpretations of those provisions have been 
surprisingly expansive, but those forms of protest are not the issue 
for most protestors. The real work of FACE, and of proposed 
Sec. 523(a)(20), is in the provisions that target anyone who ``by 
physical obstruction . . . interferes with . . . or attempts to . . . 
interfere with' interfere with'' access to a clinic. Each of these 
terms has been construed or defined to mean more than first appears. No 
actual interference, and no actual physical obstruction, is required 
for a violation. Courts have found violations in peaceful protest that 
did not actually prevent access to clinics.
  ``Physical obstruction'' is defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 248(e)(4) to 
mean making ingress or egress ``impassable . . . or unreasonably 
difficult or hazardous.'' What is ``unreasonably difficult'' has, in 
the lower federal courts, sometimes turned out to be remote from 
physical obstruction.
  Thus, in United States v. Mahoney, 247 F.3d 279 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the 
court found physical obstruction and interference with access from a 
single protestor kneeling in prayer outside a locked door to an 
abortion clinic. Id. at 283-84. The door was a ``rarely used'' 
emergency exit. The court said that someone might have used the door, 
and that the law does not distinguish frequently and infrequently used 
doors. More remarkable still, the court held that a single person 
kneeling in prayer rendered use of that door ``unreasonably difficult'' 
and forced patients to use a different entrance. Id. at 284.
  Mahoney also held that six other defendants physically obstructed and 
interfered with access to another door. The court of appeals' entire 
discussion of this holding is that five protestors ``knelt or sat 
within five feet of the front door,'' that the sixth defendant ``was 
pacing just behind them,'' and that they ``offered passive resistance 
and had to be carried away.'' Id. at 283. The court does not even say 
whether they were arrayed across the sidewalk or along the sidewalk, 
whether they left a passage open, or any other fact that might to a 
plain meaning understanding of ``physical obstruction'' or to 
preserving a reasonable right to protest. It was enough for a violation 
that they were near the door.

  Both FACE and proposed Sec. 523(a)(20) are limited to ``intentional'' 
violations, but Mahoney shows that protection to be illusory. The court 
found specific intent to interfere with access to the clinic, even in 
the case of the lone protestor praying before the locked door. It 
relied on the fact that the protestor prayed that women approaching the 
clinic would change their mind about getting an abortion; the court 
quoted his prayer as evidence of criminal intent. 247 F.3d at 283-84. 
To similar effect is United States v. Gregg, 32 F. Supp. 2d 151, 157 
(D.N.J. 1998), aff'd, 226 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 523 
U.S. 971 (2001). Gregg had much more evidence of actual obstruction 
than Mahoney. Even so, the Gregg court relied on defendants' ``anti-
abortion statements, including imploring women not to go into the 
clinic or not to kill their babies,'' and on the fact that defendants 
``carried anti-abortion signs,'' as evidence of forbidden intent. The 
government in these cases has offered evidence of opposition to 
abortion as evidence of specific intent to obstruct access, and the 
courts have relied on this evidence for that purpose. Clinics and their 
supporters would of course argue that Congress has codified these 
holdings if it enacts proposed Sec. 523(a)(20).
  Courts have emphasized that FACE plaintiffs need not prove actual 
obstruction. ``It is not necessary to show that a clinic was shut down, 
that people could not get into a clinic at all for a period of time, or 
that anyone was actually denied medical services.'' People v. Kraeger, 
160 F. Supp. 2d 360, 373 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). Plaintiffs need not ``show 
that any particular person was interfered with by the defendants' 
obstruction.'' United States v. Wilson, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171 n.1 
(E.D. Wis.), aff'd as United States v. Balint, 201 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 
2000).
  To sum up, proposed Sec. 523(a)(20) would re-enact statutory language 
that has been interpreted not to require actual obstruction, has been 
interpreted to prohibit a single protestor kneeling in prayer near an 
unused exit, and has been interpreted to treat anti-abortion statements 
as evidence of criminal intent. These interpretations would almost 
certainly be read into Sec. 523(a)(20), and there would be a serious 
argument that Congress had confirmed these interpretations in FACE 
itself.

                              {time}  1600

  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Utah (Mr. Cannon).
  (Mr. CANNON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H. Res. 606, the 
rule providing for consideration of the Bankruptcy Abuse, Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act Conference Report. Congress has been 
working on balanced bankruptcy reform legislation for nearly 5 years. 
The conference report on H.R. 333 reflects countless hours of 
bipartisan efforts.
  This conference report does not penalize any lawful behavior. It only 
applies when a person violates the law; second, a court then enters an 
award against that person; third, the person later files a bankruptcy 
other than a chapter 13 bankruptcy or liquidation bankruptcy; and 
fourth, that person thereafter seeks to discharge a debt based on fines 
or penalties assessed because of the unlawful protest activity.
  This provision is written in an evenhanded, neutral way. It does not 
single out abortion-related protests, but it targets any violent 
protestors of providers of any lawful goods or services. It would 
equally apply to the anti-IMF/World Bank protestors who threw rocks 
through the window of the bank and attempted to impede delegates from 
entering the World Bank's headquarters. It could also apply to similar 
protests by animal rights activists, environmentalists, and unions.
  As a committed pro-life Member of Congress, I am satisfied that the 
compromise does not impose unconstitutional or discriminatory burden 
upon peaceful pro-life protestors. I want to thank the chairman, the 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) for his leadership on this 
issue, and I urge my colleagues to support the rule and the underlying 
bill.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
New Jersey (Mr. Smith).
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, again, I want to reiterate, I rise in very strong 
opposition to this rule and to the underlying bill that will follow it 
if the rule does pass.
  Let me again point out that this bankruptcy reform conference report

[[Page H8752]]

contains an unrelated provision that was not included in the bill that 
passed out of this body that discriminates against peaceful, pro-life 
protestors, and that is why I oppose this.
  Mary Ann Glendon wrote an incisive analysis that every Member should 
read. The Catholic Conference has put out a very strong statement 
pointing out how unjust this language is. This takes the FACE bill 
passed back in 1994 over the opposition of my good friend, the 
distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, the gentleman 
from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) and myself, and makes it even worse 
by making civil fines that are levied nondischargeable.
  Much has been made about the Starr memo, which I would respectfully 
submit misses the point by a mile and is unworthy of Ken Starr. He 
argues, for example, and the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Cannon) made this 
point a moment ago, that rigorous intent requirements; i.e. law-
breaking, are included in the conference report. Martin Luther King was 
an intentional law breaker. We rightly honor him with a national 
holiday. A tremendous man who went to prison--served short prison 
sentences--and faced modest and proportionate penalties in his quest 
for social justice. For Dr. King, law breaking was a means to an end.
  Pro-lifers, on the other hand, are subjected to ruinous penalties for 
the same acts of civil disobedience. Nonviolent civil disobedience, 
obstruction, getting in the way, as was mentioned by one of my 
colleagues, kneeling in front of a door, praying at an abortion clinic, 
is construed to be a violation of the FACE Act and then, when the 
penalties are levied, the pro-lifers cannot discharge the ruinous 
judgements imposed on them.
  Mr. Starr also says that section 330 is evenhanded. That, I say to my 
colleagues, is unmitigated nonsense, it is misleading, and it is false. 
Section 330 only has the appearance of evenhandedness. Other activists, 
labor activists, antiwar, PETA, all the groups that use civil 
disobedience as a means of bringing attention to their cause get a slap 
on the wrist, a 30-buck fine, they are out of jail the next day. Not so 
for pro-life protestors. They are under the FACE Act and are 
discriminated against and singled out for ruinous monetary penalties 
and criminal penalties and, again, we are talking about nonviolent 
activities.
  Back in 1994 I would remind my colleagues I offered the substitute 
amendment to FACE on the floor that said for those who throw bombs or 
kill at abortion clinics, are jailed and appropriately fined. But for 
peaceful protestors, those men and women whose only motive is to try to 
deter an abortion, another act of violence, to say there is another 
way, so they have a sit-in. Perhaps they sit in front of a door or they 
have a pray-in. These things happen all the time. A successful 
complaint made by the abortion clinic, for example, would be 
nondischargeable under this legislation.
  So to say section 330 is evenhanded when the underlying statute is 
applied unevenly to pro-lifers versus all other activists is 
unmitigated nonsense, and again I am very discouraged that Mr. Starr 
would put out such a misleading memo.
  Vote ``no'' on the rule.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), the chairman of the Committee on the 
Judiciary.
  (Mr. SENSENBRENNER asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, before I begin my remarks, let me 
insert for the Record the memo written on October 4, 2002 by the 
Honorable Kenneth Starr addressed to Mr. Bartlett of the Financial 
Services Roundtable, since the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) 
has repeatedly referred to it.
                                  Washington, DC, October 4, 2002.
     Hon. Steve Bartlett,
     President, the Financial Services Roundtable, Washington, DC
       Dear Mr. Bartlett: This letter responds to your request for 
     my views with respect to Section 330 of the Conference Report 
     on H.R. 333, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
     Protection Act of 2002. In particular, you requested my view 
     concerning two aspects of Section 330: the effect it will 
     have on anti-abortion protests, be they lawful or unlawful; 
     and the effect it will have on other types of protests, 
     including the recent IMF/World Bank protests.
       In my view, Section 330 will have very little practical 
     effect. Importantly, the provision does not penalize any 
     lawful behavior. To the contrary, it applies only if (i) a 
     person violates the law; (ii) a court then enters an award 
     against that person or the person settles the charges; (iii) 
     the person later files a bankruptcy other than a Chapter 13 
     bankruptcy; (iv) the person thereafter seeks to discharge a 
     debt based on fines, damage awards, or other penalties 
     assessed because of the unlawful protest activity; and (v) 
     the creditor continues to pursue the matter. Even then, 
     Section 330 overlaps almost entirely with Bankruptcy Code 
     Sec. 523(a), which already prohibits the discharge of fines 
     payable to the government and civil damages resulting from 
     intentional injury to others. As a result, Section 330 will 
     have at most minimal practical effect. What is more, the 
     Conference version of Section 330 contains rigorous intent 
     requirements that should prevent any innocent protesters from 
     being swept up in its provisions. Thus, even if Section 330 
     does have some limited practical effect, that effect should 
     be felt only by the intentional lawbreakers it expressly 
     targets.
       In answer to your second question, Section 330 is written 
     in an evenhanded, neutral fashion. It applies not only to 
     abortion-related protests, but also to unlawful protests 
     targeted at the providers of any lawful goods or services. By 
     its express terms, Section 330 applies--with no exceptions--
     to all those who unlawfully intimidate or interfere with a 
     person by physical obstruction or threat of force if those 
     actions were motivated by the person's obtaining or providing 
     of any lawful goods or services. Thus, it would apply, for 
     example, to the anti-IMF/World Bank protesters who apparently 
     threw rocks through the window of a bank and attempted to 
     impede delegates from entering or departing the World 
     Bank's headquarters. So too, it would apply to similar 
     protests by animal rights activists, environmentalists, 
     and unions.
       It bears emphasis that the Conference compromise bill 
     represents a substantial improvement over the original Senate 
     bill. Under the Senate bill, debt related to an unproven 
     allegation of ``harassment,'' or an unintentional violation 
     of a court order, could have been nondischargeable. In 
     contrast, under the Conference compromise, there must have 
     been an actual and intentional ``violation'' of either the 
     federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 248 (``FACE''), or a court order. These significant 
     improvements over the now-replaced Senate version are some of 
     the reasons that Section 330 will not have significant 
     practical or legal effect in light of the state of existing 
     law.
     Section 330 is primarily a restatement of existing law
       Section 330 is primarily a restatement of existing law. The 
     Bankruptcy Code has long provided that any debt ``for a fine, 
     penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a 
     governmental unit'' is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 11 
     U.S.C. Sec. 523(a)(7). As a result, criminal fines and civil 
     penalties payable to the government are already 
     nondischargeable.
       The Bankruptcy Code further provides that civil damages 
     payable to private parties are nondischargeable if they 
     result from ``willful and malicious injury by the debtor to 
     another entity or to the property of another entity.'' 11 
     U.S.C. Sec. 523(a)(6). The courts have interpreted this 
     language broadly to include injuries to intangible personal 
     or property rights. See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy para. 
     523.12[2] (15th ed. rev. 2002). As a result, the pivotal 
     limitation on this provision is the intent element--a debt is 
     nondischargeable in bankruptcy only if the debtor 
     intentionally caused the injury. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 
     U.S. 57, 61 (1998).
       Our research has revealed that, to date, three courts have 
     issued published decisions on the question whether debtors' 
     abortion protest-related debts were dischargeable in 
     bankruptcy. Each held the debts to be nondischargeable under 
     Section 523(a)(6). See In re Treshman, 258 B.R. 613 (Bankr. 
     D. Md. 2001); In re Bray, 256 B.R. 708 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000); 
     In re Behn, 242 B.R. 229 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1999). As one court 
     explained, the debt was not dischargeable because the debtor 
     had acted ``with the specific intent to interfere with or 
     intimidate the plaintiffs from engaging in legal medical 
     practices and procedures.'' Bray, 256 B.R. at 711. Each court 
     also noted that the conduct at issue, which included apparent 
     death threats, was unlawful and unprotected by the First 
     Amendment.
       Of course, the ultimate issue of dischargeability 
     necessarily depends on the facts of each case. But Section 
     330 is drafted in such a way that it overlaps with Section 
     523(a)(6). Under Section 330, a debt is nondischargeable only 
     if the debtor violated either FACE or a pre-existing court 
     order or injunction.
       Under the first of those circumstances, a debt is 
     nondischargeable only if the debtor: (i) intentionally 
     injured, intimidated, or interfered with a person, (ii) by 
     force, threat of force, or physical obstruction, (iii) 
     because the person was obtaining or providing any lawful 
     goods or services (such as fur products or banking services). 
     Because the injury, intimidation, or interference must be 
     intentional, any such debt would likely satisfy the existing 
     criteria for

[[Page H8753]]

     nondischargeability under Section 523(a)(6). One might argue 
     that Section 523(a)(6) erects a higher standard than Section 
     330 because it requires ``willful and malicious'' (as opposed 
     to intentional) injury, but the terms ``intentional,'' 
     ``willful,'' and ``malicious'' have similar meanings in the 
     law. The Supreme Court has held, for example, that 
     ``willful'' means ``deliberate or intentional'' in Section 
     523(a)(6). Geiger, 523 U.S. at 61. Thus, the Section 330 and 
     523(a)(6) standards appear to be very similar.
       The second circumstance under which Section 330 renders 
     debt nondischargeable is when (i) the debtor violated a court 
     order or injunction that complies with the First Amendment 
     and protects the provision of lawful goods or services, and 
     (ii) either the debtor's violation was ``intentional or 
     knowing,'' or the violation occurred after the debtor had 
     previously been found to have violated the same court order 
     or another order protecting access to the same facility or 
     person. This provision of Section 330 might expand somewhat 
     on Section 523(a)(6), because a debtor might argue that 
     although he meant to violate an injunction (such as an 
     injunction prohibiting him from approaching within 8 feet of 
     a clinic entrance), he had no intent to intimidate or impede 
     anyone while within the restricted area. Thus far, however, 
     the courts have held that damages attributable to violation 
     of a court injunction against abortion-related protest 
     activity are ``ipso facto the result of a `willful and 
     malicious injury''' for purposes of Section 523(a)(6), in 
     part because the violation reflects an ``intention to cause 
     the very harm to the protected persons that [the] order was 
     designed to prevent.'' Behn, 242 B.R. at 238. While I find 
     this rationale questionable, it reflects the fact that courts 
     to date have already used Section 523(a)(6) for the same 
     purpose that Section 330 would serve. Thus, Section 330 
     represents either a restatement of existing law or, at most, 
     a modest extension of that law.
     Even if section 330 were interpreted more broadly than the 
         existing nondischargeability provisions of the bankruptcy 
         code, it would still have no effect on lawful protest and 
         little effect on unlawful protest
       Even if courts were to interpret Section 330 more broadly 
     than Section 523, the practical consequences would be 
     minimal. Section 330 does not affect lawful protest at all. 
     Even with respect to unlawful protest, it applies only if: a 
     person committed an intentional violation of the federal FACE 
     statute or a pre-existing court order or injunction; a court 
     entered an award against that person, or the person settled 
     the charges; the person later filed bankruptcy other a 
     Chapter 13 bankruptcy; the person would otherwise be entitled 
     to discharge a protest-related debt in bankruptcy, 
     notwithstanding Section 523(a) and the Bankruptcy Code's 
     other existing limitations on dischargeability; and the 
     creditor continued to pursue the matter. It would appear that 
     very few, if any, people will fall into this category. As 
     noted above, we have found only three reported cases in which 
     people challenged the dischargeability of abortion protest-
     related debt, and in each instance the court held the debt 
     was nondischargeable under existing law. Thus, Section 330 
     would have had no effect in any of the reported cases to 
     date.
       Even if a small number of protesters are affected by 
     Section 330, the Conference version of the bill seeks to 
     ensure that ``innocent'' protestors will not be affected. As 
     explained above, Section 330 applies only to those who either 
     (1) intentionally injure, intimidate, or interfere with a 
     person by force, threat of force, or physical obstruction; or 
     (ii) intentionally or repeatedly violate a court order that 
     complies with the First Amendment. While some such conduct 
     can be ``peaceful,'' it is nonetheless intentional conduct 
     that has a physical element to it (in the case of the FACE 
     statute) or that has already been judicially determined to 
     thwart legitimate state interests (in the case of an existing 
     injunction). Moreover, peaceful of ``innocent'' conduct is 
     not likely to lead to substantial damage awards that a debtor 
     would need to discharge in bankruptcy. Instead, the reported 
     cases to date have involved much more provocative, highly 
     aggressive behavior, including perceived death threats, 
     ``wanted'' posters, and the like. For these reasons, it is 
     unlikely that anyone other than intentional and determined 
     lawbreakers, no matter how sincere the may be, will be 
     affected.
     Section 330 is non-discriminatory
       In any event, neutrality of operation is the order of the 
     day. Section 330, as I indicated above, applies by its 
     express terms to all those who unlawfully intimidate or 
     interfere with a person by physical obstruction or threat of 
     force if their actions were motivated by the victim's 
     obtaining or providing of any lawful goods or services. Thus, 
     it applies equally and neutrally to unlawful activity 
     directed toward the providers or recipients of all lawful 
     goods or services, not only abortion-related services.
       The recent IMF/World Bank protests provide a useful example 
     of Section 330's intended neutrality. Many protestors, it 
     appears, attempted to interfere, by physical obstruction, 
     with the ability of the IMF/World Bank delegates to attend or 
     leave meetings because they disapproved of lawful services 
     provided by the IMF and World Bank. Other protestors 
     reportedly threw rocks through a window of a bank. All of 
     this behavior is covered by the plain language of Section 
     330. Also protected are similar protests by animal-rights 
     activists against stores that lawfully sell fur products and 
     the like; environmentalists that target oil and other 
     companies; and some unlawful union strike activity. As long 
     as an unlawful protest satisfies the Section 330 criteria, it 
     is covered to the same extent as an anti-abortion protest.
     Conclusion
       In sum, as modified in conference, Section 330 is primarily 
     a restatement of existing law. It targets only intentional 
     unlawful activity, and even then is not likely to have 
     significant practical effect. To the extent that it does have 
     such effect, Section 330 will apply neutrally and 
     evenhandedly to anti-abortion protests and other protests 
     aimed at business establishments.
       While there is, to be sure, some risk that a court might 
     construe the statute unreasonably, the conference minimized 
     that risk by drafting the statute clearly. To provide further 
     protection, however, one of the sponsors of the legislation 
     (or another Representative) might consider making a statement 
     of intent on the House floor. While courts vary in their 
     treatment of such statements, some judges give consideration 
     to floor statements, especially those made by a sponsor of 
     the legislation. As a result, a suggested floor statement is 
     attached to this letter, for such consideration as may be 
     deemed appropriate.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Kenneth W. Starr.

  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule and the underlying bill. 
This is essential bankruptcy reform which will help revive our economy.
  In 1998, $40 billion of debt was written off, and that amounts to a 
hidden tax of $400 for every family in this country who pays their 
bills on time and is agreed upon, and that tax hits the poor people 
hardest because that type of a tax is regressive.
  We need to pass this legislation to prevent bankruptcy from being 
used as a financial planning tool.
  Now, my friends over here on my right claim that this is going to 
hurt poor people. That is absolutely not true, because people who are 
genuinely unable to repay their bills will be able to get their 
discharge through chapter 7. But where there is a possibility of people 
repaying their bills over a 5-year period of time, or some of their 
bills, then they have to go through a reorganization, so that the money 
is recouped and not passed on to the consumers.
  I would point out that if this legislation goes down, either on the 
vote on the rule or the vote on the conference report, the current 
homestead exemption which is unlimited in places like Texas and Florida 
will end up still being the law and the corporate crooks will be able 
to put millions in their mansions and shield them from bankruptcy. 
There is a partial plug to prevent people who defraud the public from 
being able to do that, notwithstanding State law. So voting down the 
rule gives the corporate crooks a get-out-of-bankruptcy-free card.
  Now, to my friends over here on my left, we have heard an awful lot 
of allegations that this bankruptcy provision that was negotiated 
between Senator Schumer and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) is 
an outrageous attempt to financially ruin pro-life protestors. There is 
not a person in this Chamber that has given his life more to the pro-
life movement than the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), and he 
negotiated this and he signed off on this agreement, and I think that 
we ought to respect his work for this pro-life movement.
  We have heard that section 330 of the bill is an outrageous trampling 
of first amendment rights. Let me read it for my colleagues.
  It says, ``Except that nothing in this paragraph shall be construed 
to affect any expressive conduct, including peaceful picketing, 
peaceful prayer, or other peaceful demonstration protected from legal 
prohibition by the first amendment of the Constitution.''
  Read the bill. It does not affect first amendment rights. They are 
protected by the Constitution, and the black and white text of this 
provision protects things that are protected by the first amendment.
  We have heard about the infamous Starr memorandum. A part of that 
says that section 330 does not affect lawful protest at all. What it 
does do is affect unlawful protest. And you are on the side of people 
who break the law, who want to break the law. What we do here is we 
protect people who want to abide by the law.
  Now, in order for section 330 to come into play, there have to be 
nine steps that are done by the person whose debt

[[Page H8754]]

is to be declared nondischargeable, and I want to go through them.
  First, there must be a violation of Federal or State statutory law. 
Second, the violation must result in some type of monetary liability 
such as civil or statutory damages. Third, the monetary liability must 
be based on a Federal or State court order or from a settlement 
agreement entered into by the debtor. Fourth, the violation of the law 
must result from an intentional act by the debtor. This does not apply 
to unintentional violations of the law and, thus, it would not apply to 
innocent protestors. Fifth, the intentional act must involve force, the 
threat of force, or physical obstruction. Sixth, the intentional act 
must result in intentional injury, intimidation, or interference, or 
intentional damage or destruction of property. Seventh, the debtor must 
have injured, intimidated, or interfered with a person because such 
person obtained or provided lawful goods or services or because a 
facility provides lawful goods or services. Eighth, the debtor must 
file for bankruptcy relief; and ninth, the party holding the monetary 
judgment against the debtor must bring an action in the bankruptcy 
court for the purpose of having the court determine whether the 
debtor's liability for the judgment is nondischargeable under section 
330.
  They have to do all nine of these things to get a debt 
nondischargeable.
  Now, if the opponents of this bill and the opponents of the rule are 
successful, the current bankruptcy law which would stand makes all 
fines and forfeitures nondischargeable, including those that arise 
under the FACE Act. So defeating a necessary bankruptcy reform is not 
going to accomplish this purpose. The rule and the bill ought to pass.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, at this time we are nearing the end of the 
speakers that we have and I would welcome an opportunity for the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Frost) to close, and then it would be my 
intent to briefly speak and then yield to our final speaker.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, as we have heard, there is controversy on this rule. 
This matter has been pending for some time. I personally support the 
rule and the bill, and I urge adoption of the rule.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  This has been a vigorous debate today, one which has I think allowed 
the opportunity for both sides of our conference to speak forthrightly 
about the issues and the ideas which they see on this bankruptcy bill. 
I will tell my colleagues that I believe that this is an economic 
development package, part of the plan that we have from the Republican 
Conference to help consumers and to help make sure the economy moves 
properly. So I support not only this rule, but the underlying 
legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Armey) 
to close.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, let me begin by thanking the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas), the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. 
Sensenbrenner), the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), and the 
Committee on the Judiciary for the extraordinarily long and hard years 
of dedicated work that they have attended to this subject.
  Mr. Speaker, let me make another statement fairly clear. I believe it 
is safe to say that if it were not for my personal insistence this bill 
would not be on the floor today. Therefore, I think it is safe to 
conclude that it is I that put this bill on the floor. Why would I do 
that? Why would I put a bill on the floor that gives even myself a 
conflict of visions?
  There are two great values that are addressed in this bill, two 
values that I hold dear in my heart and high in my hopes and dreams for 
this great Nation: The one that precious lives will be saved, and the 
other that they will be taught how to live precious lives.
  Mr. Speaker, a good nation has a government that honors the goodness 
of its people. A good nation is a nation that has law that knows the 
goodness of its people and reflects and encourages them.

                              {time}  1615

  A good Nation will have a law that honors what we teach our children, 
so that in the law itself our children are encouraged to those 
teachings which we pray into their lives will make their lives 
successful in their own right and a blessing in the lives of others.
  One of those things we teach our children is to be careful what 
obligations we make in our lives, and to fulfill our obligations, and 
default only as a last resort and as a matter of personal 
embarrassment.
  Our existing bankruptcy laws do not reflect that teaching. Our 
existing bankruptcy laws belie our teaching when we are parents at our 
best, instructing our children on the hopes that are our highest, about 
their personal responsibilities. In short, Mr. Speaker, our existing 
bankruptcy law says to our very same children: little darling, you are 
a fool if you do not file. It is wrong, Mr. Speaker.
  This bill is not here about the money. To think this bill is about 
who gets the money or who keeps the money is too shallow an 
understanding. This bill is about the character of a Nation and the 
character of that Nation's law, and it is important. It is critical.
  In this and in other ways, we must strive to have a government that 
knows the goodness of its own people and has the decency to expect it 
and to reflect it. That is why we are here with bankruptcy reform. That 
is what we are about.
  And yes, because of a provision that was put into this bill in the 
other body, we are forced, and I, as deeply in my heart as any Member 
in this Chamber, am forced to find myself in conflict with another, 
perhaps even higher value, the right to present myself in encouragement 
to others to not do this thing that would destroy this life, and to do 
so without fear of punishment in our courts under a misguided law that 
has no respect for our very own Bill of Rights, and that is the FACE 
Act. It is a sabotage, we know that.
  But bless his heart, our first, best champion for the life of the 
unborn, the gentleman from Illinois (Chairman Hyde), fought this demon 
to a draw to the best of his ability. We have people now who say to the 
gentleman from Illinois (Chairman Hyde), that is not good enough. I am 
not sorry, I say to the gentleman from Illinois (Chairman Hyde). I 
thank the gentleman from Illinois. He is, in this case, as he has 
always been, for the precious life of our precious babies, a good, 
true, and faithful servant. He did his best. I love the gentleman for 
his commitment. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) is to be 
respected for what he did here to help our cause.
  How do we save our precious allies and friends and neighbors and 
devoted servants that go out there at risk already from the terror, the 
economic terror of the FACE Act? We do not do it by changing this law. 
The chairman of the committee has made that clear. There is no 
protection under FACE by defeating this bill.
  If FACE is the evil, a trespass against our Bill of Rights, a 
trespass against our desire to save the unborn that we say it is, then 
let us not fight this mock battle; let us fight the real battle. The 
assault should be on FACE.
  I believe I am correct in saying that those who find life precious on 
both sides of the aisle are the majority in this body, and the majority 
of this body drawn from both sides of the aisle can defeat FACE. That 
is what we ought to be doing.
  So I say to my friends, save what we can; do not lose what we can 
over the hope that is without substance. Do not sacrifice the gains in 
the instruction of our children over the failed effort to protect those 
who would try to save our children. Vote for this rule; vote for this 
bill. Give our children a better break and a better understanding, and 
honor their parents as they teach their babies. Then come back, if you 
will, with a vengeance and defeat this atrocity against our basic human 
liberties called FACE. Get the villain and save the children.
  Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule for the 
consideration of H.R. 333, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act.
  This legislation appears to be a compromise that is filled with 
positive aspects of the give and take involved in the legislative 
process and saturated with the element of comment sense that both sides 
to this controversy say that they strive to achieve.

[[Page H8755]]

  Today, I rise to discuss one aspect that has been mentioned 
frequently on the floor today. The compromise language agreed to be the 
conference committee penalizes the adjudicated intentional violator of 
the law and the intentional tortfeasor and precludes him from escaping 
the consequences of this act by hiding behind the provisions of the 
bankruptcy act. This is entirely proper because the bankruptcy act was 
never intended to protect anyone in this situation.
  At the same time, it protects the innocent who are simply exercising 
their constitutional rights--who are lawfully assembled or exercising 
their freedom of speech.
  We should remember that this legislation is the product of years of 
hard work by the Judiciary Committee in both the House and Senate. This 
legislation answers a plea from across our land to address a serious 
weakness that exists in our system of providing relief to those who are 
overwhelmed by financial burdens.
  I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the rule.
  Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support for the rule 
providing consideration for H.R. 333, the Bankruptcy Reform Conference 
Report, because this issue boils down to two words: personal 
responsibility. If a person assumes a debt, they are obligated to do 
everything in their power to pay it off. Creditors should be made 
whole, if possible. However, a safety net must remain for those who 
legitimately cannot pay their debts.
  Some of my colleagues are trying to paint the word creditors to mean 
faceless financial institutions who are tricking consumers into 
assuming debt. They specifically speak of credit card debt. They 
unfortunately fail to note that credit card debt in the United States 
amounts to only three point eight percent of all household debt. 
Furthermore, only one percent of credit card accounts end up in 
bankruptcy. Of that one percent it is estimated that fifteen percent of 
those accounts can afford to repay some or all of their debt.
  The people who are truly being hurt by our current bankruptcy system 
are Americans who play by the rules and pay off their debts. Bankruptcy 
costs the average American family about $400 a year.
  Needs-based bankruptcy reform is well overdue, and that is what this 
Bankruptcy Conference Report delivers. It is the people who game the 
system that we need to stop.
  I listened to my colleague from Virginia (Mr. Moran). He stated that 
more people filed for bankruptcy than graduated from college. That is a 
staggering fact. It's a transference of cost from those who overspend 
to those who carefully manage their money.

  I support the Bankruptcy Conference Reports provisions which 
strengthen Code protections for ex-spouses and children. They have to 
be supported. In the current bankruptcy law, child support and alimony 
are placed seventh behind attorney fees as debt obligations. If 
enacted, this bill would move child support and alimony payments to 
first on the list of debt obligations.
  Also under current law, some debtors use the automatic stay to avoid 
paying child support payments after they file for bankruptcy. The 
Bankruptcy Conference Report ensures less delay in the proper payment 
of child support. I vehemently oppose any legislation that would reduce 
the ability of women and children to receive support payments.
  This Conference Report is a good legislation that moves us in the 
right direction, and I ask my colleagues from both sides of the aisle 
to join me in support of this reasonable reform by voting in favor of 
the rule providing for consideration of this Conference Report.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member rises today to express his 
support for the rule on the conference report for the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 333). This Member is an 
original cosponsor of H.R. 333, which the House first passed on March 
1, 2001, by a vote of 306-108. This Member is pleased that the House 
and Senate conferees have finally reached an agreement on bankruptcy 
reform which President George W. Bush is expected to sign. It is 
important to note that bankruptcy reform bills passed both the House 
and the Senate in the 105th and 106th Congresses. In the 105th 
Congress, the House passed a bankruptcy reform conference report, while 
the Senate failed to pass the conference report. In the 106th Congress, 
former President Bill Clinton pocket vetoed a bankruptcy reform 
conference report. During this Congress, the Conference Report was 
delayed for too long over of all things, a tenuous connection drawn to 
the subject of abortion clinics by conferees from the other body.
  First, this Member would thank the distinguished gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Gegas], for introducing the original House bankruptcy 
legislation, H.R. 333. This Member would also like to express his 
appreciation to the distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. 
Sensenbrenner], the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, for his 
efforts in bringing this conference report to the House Floor for 
consideration.
  This Member supports the conference report for the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act for numerous reasons; however, 
the most important reasons include the following:
  First, this Member supports the provision in the conference report 
for H.R. 333 which provides for a means testing, needs-based, formula 
when determining whether an individual should file for Chapter 7 or 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Chapter 7 bankruptcy allows a debtor to be 
discharged of his personal liability for many unsecured debts. In 
addition, there is no requirement that a Chapter 7 filer repay many of 
his or her debts. However, Chapter 13 bankruptcy filers commit to repay 
some portion of his or her debts under a repayment plan.
  Some Chapter 7 filers actually have the capacity to repay some 
of what they owe, but they choose Chapter 7 bankruptcy and are able to 
walk away from these debts. For example, the stories in which an 
individual filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and then proceeds to take a 
nice vacation and/or buys a new car are too common. Moreover, the 
status quo is costing the average American individual and family 
increased costs for consumer goods and credit because of the amount of 
debt which is never repaid to creditors.

  As a response to these concerns, the needs-based test of the 
conference report of H.R. 333 will help ensure that high income filers, 
who could repay some of what they owe, are required to file Chapter 13 
bankruptcy as compared to Chapter 7. This needs-based system takes a 
debtor's income, expenses, obligations and any special circumstances 
into account to determine whether he or she has the capacity to repay a 
portion of their debts.
  Second, this Member supports the additional monthly expense items 
that are exempted from consideration under the needs-based test which 
determines, under the conference report of H.R. 333, whether a person 
can file either a Chapter 7 or 13 version of bankruptcy. These expenses 
include the following: reasonable expenses incurred to maintain the 
safety of the debtor and debtor's family from domestic violence; an 
additional food and clothing allowance if demonstrated to be reasonable 
and necessary; and actual expenses for the care and support of an 
elderly, chronically ill, or disabled member of the debtor's household 
or immediate family.
  Third, this Member supports the permanent extension of Chapter 12 
bankruptcy in the conference report of H.R. 333 since it allows family 
farmers to reorganize their debts as compared to liquidating their 
assets. Using the Chapter 12 bankruptcy provision has been an important 
and necessary option for family farmers throughout the nation. It has 
allowed family farmers to reorganize their assets in a manner which 
balances the interests of creditors and the future success of the 
involved farmer.
  If Chapter 12 bankruptcy provisions are not permanently extended for 
family farmers, its expiration on January 1, 2003, would be another 
very painful blow to an agricultural sector already reeling from low 
commodity prices. Not only will many family farmers have no viable 
option but to end their operations, it likely will also cause land 
values to plunge. Such a decrease in value of farmland will affect the 
ability of family farmers to obtain adequate credit to maintain a 
viable farm operation. It will impact the manner in which banks conduct 
their agricultural lending activities. Furthermore, this Member has 
received many contracts from his constituents supporting the extension 
of Chapter 12 bankruptcy because of the situation now being faced by 
our nation's farm families. It is clear that the agricultural sector is 
hurting and by a permanent extension of the Chapter 12 authorization, 
Congress can avoid one more negative possibility.
  Lastly, this Member supports the provision in the conference report 
of H.R. 333 which requires that people convicted of a felony or who owe 
a debt from a securities fraud violation in the five years before 
filing for bankruptcy cannot claim an unlimited homestead exemption. 
Currently, there are only six states, including Texas and Florida, 
which provide unlimited bankruptcy protection for a person's home. 
Nebraska is not one of those six states as it has a maximum homestead 
exemption of $12,500. This Member believes that this provision in the 
conference report is imperative in light of the recent corporate 
scandals at Enron and WorldCom. For example, this provision would apply 
to the $7 million penthouse in Houston of Kenneth Lay, the former 
chairman of Enron, if he both files for personal bankruptcy in the 
future and owes a debt due to any conviction of securities fraud. In 
addition, this provision may also be relevant to Scott D. Sullivan, the 
former chief financial officer of WorldCom, who is building a $15 
million mansion in Boca Raton, Florida.
  In closing, for these aforementioned reasons and many others, this 
Member urges his colleagues to support the conference report of H.R. 
333.

[[Page H8756]]

  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I support the Bankruptcy Conference 
Report. I know there has been deliberation about the effect of section 
330 of the bill on anti-abortion protests. But I believe section 330 
will have little practical effect. And the rest of this bill will an 
overwhelmingly positive impact on the bankruptcy system.
  Section 330 does not penalize any lawful behavior. It will apply only 
if a person violates the law, a court enters an award against that 
person, the person later files a non-chapter 13 bankruptcy and seeks to 
discharge a debt based on their unlawful activity, and the creditor 
pursues the matter.
  It does not apply only to abortion-related protests, but also to 
unlawful protests aimed at the providers of any lawful good or service.
  The compromise reached in conference on this issue also contains very 
stringent requirements that should prevent any innocent protesters from 
being included in these provisions.
  Moreover, this bill will curb bankruptcy abuse and protect consumers. 
It will also address the loophole in current law that allows debtors in 
certain states with unlimited homestead exemptions to shield an almost 
unlimited value of their homes from their creditors.
  In order to game the system, some debtors move to a state with an 
unlimited homestead exemption just before they file for bankruptcy in 
order to take advantage of that state's more generous homestead 
protections.
  H.R. 333 closes this loophole by requiring a debtor to reside in a 
state for at least two years before that debtor can claim the state's 
homestead exemption. In addition, a debtor must own the homestead for 
at least forty months before they can claim the state's homestead 
exemption protections.
  H.R. 333 will stop corporate thieves from hiding their homestead 
assets from those whom they have defrauded. It will cap a debtor's 
homestead exemption at $125,000 if the debtor was convicted of a 
felony, if the debtor violated a securities law, or if they engaged in 
any criminal act, intentional tort, or reckless misconduct that caused 
serious physical injury or death to another individual.
  Homeownership strengthens the fabric of our society. It's the 
American dream--and over 70% of Americans are living it. Owning a house 
gives individuals and families a place to call home, where they can 
arise their children and become active participants in their 
neighborhoods and communities.
  Since 1867, federal lawmakers have recognized the role of the states 
in determining appropriate homestead exemptions.
  States are in a much better position to determine an appropriate 
exemption--they can more closely examine the factors that differ from 
state to state, such as property values, real estate inflation, and 
even demographics.
  The balance between states' rights and the federal government is 
important. Any abuses of the homestead exemption can and should be 
addressed by the individual states themselves.
  In Texas, the homestead exemption is embedded in the state 
constitution to prevent the sale of one's home to repay debts, except 
in three specific cases: when there is a debt for the purchase of a 
home, a debt to finance the improvements to the home, or a debt for 
property taxes or federal income and estate taxes.
  The homestead exemption provisions were among the most contentious in 
the conference and I am pleased we were able to reach a compromise on 
this issue. The compromise we reached will prevent `bad actors' from 
abusing the homestead exemption without punishing those who 
legitimately belong in bankruptcy.
  The overwhelming majority of people who declare bankruptcy do so 
because they have no other choice. Bankruptcy law is intended to give 
debtors a fresh start, not to punish them. Less than one percent of 
bankruptcy debtors abuse the bankruptcy press. This bill will address 
those `bad actors' while retaining the goal of giving sincere debtors a 
fresh start.
  I strongly support this conference report and I urge my colleagues to 
support it, as well.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gutknecht). The question is on the 
resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 172, 
nays 243, not voting 17, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 478]

                               YEAS--172

     Armey
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Barton
     Bass
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berry
     Biggert
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Burr
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carson (OK)
     Castle
     Chabot
     Clement
     Coble
     Collins
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Culberson
     Davis (FL)
     Deal
     DeLay
     Dicks
     Dooley
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Emerson
     English
     Etheridge
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Goss
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Hansen
     Hart
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Herger
     Hill
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Horn
     Hulshof
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Israel
     Issa
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Lampson
     Larsen (WA)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Linder
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Matheson
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     Meeks (NY)
     Miller, Dan
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Nussle
     Ose
     Oxley
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Platts
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rivers
     Rogers (KY)
     Rohrabacher
     Rothman
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Sweeney
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Upton
     Walden
     Walsh
     Watkins (OK)
     Weller
     Wilson (NM)
     Wu
     Wynn
     Young (AK)

                               NAYS--243

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett
     Bartlett
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Boozman
     Borski
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Burton
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson (IN)
     Chambliss
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cubin
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Ehlers
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Everett
     Farr
     Fattah
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Flake
     Forbes
     Frank
     Gephardt
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Graham
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hostettler
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Inslee
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kerns
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Lynch
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Menendez
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Miller, Jeff
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Norwood
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Otter
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Portman
     Putnam
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Rehberg
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogers (MI)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schaffer
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Solis
     Souder
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Sununu
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Terry
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Wamp
     Waters
     Watson (CA)
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--17

     Blagojevich
     Boyd
     Callahan
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooksey
     Davis, Tom
     Diaz-Balart
     Doolittle

[[Page H8757]]


     Ehrlich
     Grucci
     Hooley
     Houghton
     McKinney
     Roukema
     Stump
     Toomey

                              {time}  1717

  Messrs. SHUSTER, GRAHAM, BARR of Georgia and ROGERS of Michigan, Mrs. 
CUBIN, Messrs. EVERETT, REHBERG, BURTON of Indiana, OTTER, OSBORNE, 
MICA, TERRY, KENNEDY of Minnesota, NORWOOD, GOODLATTE, CHAMBLISS, 
PUTNAM, PORTMAN, POMBO, LEWIS of Kentucky, SAXTON, TIAHRT, LoBIONDO, 
SHAW, WILSON of South Carolina and SUNUNU, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, and 
Messrs. WHITFIELD, HOYER, McKEON, MENENDEZ, KERNS, BOOZMAN, THORNBERRY, 
LEWIS of California, FERGUSON, LaHOOD, YOUNG of Florida and JOHNSON of 
Illinois changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia, Mr. STENHOLM, Ms. RIVERS, Ms. EDDIE BERNICE 
JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. MEEKS of New York, Mrs. MYRICK, and Messrs. 
SPRATT, FOSSELLA, BROWN of South Carolina, CANTOR and EDWARDS changed 
their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the resolution was not agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________