[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 137 (Thursday, October 17, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10666-S10667]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                   REALITY CHECK ON BALLISTIC IMAGING

  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, the Washington, DC, area is in the midst of 
a terrible crisis. As we all know too well, a murderer has gunned down 
nine people in cold blood during the past two weeks. Two other victims, 
including a child, have by the grace of God survived these sick and 
senseless attacks. Our thoughts and prayers go out to the bereaved, 
even as we try to comfort and reassure our own families and 
communities.
  I am confident that the deranged person or persons causing all this 
suffering will be caught. The attempt to hold this area hostage to fear 
and intimidation will fail, and law enforcement officers will bring the 
guilty to justice.
  As investigators are running down tips and testing forensic evidence, 
a sudden cry has gone up in some quarters demanding the dramatic 
expansion of a process known as ``ballistic imaging.'' This technology 
is a tool employed to assist law enforcement in the analysis of crimes 
committed with a firearm.
  I would like to take a moment to talk about this technology and make 
sure all our colleagues understand its benefits and limitations. It is 
easy for good people in the heat and emotion of these troubled times to 
be swept away by apparently easy solutions to enormously complex 
problems, and I believe that before we begin to think about expanding 
ballistic imaging in the United States, we should first take stock of 
what we do know.
  Ballistic imaging technology can be a useful tool in the 
investigation of crimes committed with firearms. As currently used, 
forensic experts are able to electronically scan into a database a 
shell casing recovered from a crime scene to determine if that case 
matches those from other crime scenes. The technology can serve as a 
starting point in assisting law enforcement in determining if the same 
firearm was involved in multiple crimes.
  The Federal Government has worked for nearly 10 years on developing 
an imaging network. The National Integrated Ballistic Information 
Network, NIBIN, administered by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms, BATF, provides Federal, State, and local law enforcement 
officials with critical ballistics information on crimes committed with 
a firearm. This system matches shell casings recovered from crime 
scenes to ascertain if a firearm has been used in multiple assaults. By 
focusing strictly on cases recovered from crime scenes, NIBIN cannot be 
used to build a database of firearm owners, thereby guaranteeing the 
security and legal rights of millions of Americans who are law-abiding 
gun owners.
  How does it work? When a firearm is discharged, both the shell casing 
and the bullet traveling down the barrel of the gun are imprinted with 
distinctive marks. The bullet takes on marks from the barrel's rifling, 
and the casing is marked by the gun's breech face, firing pin and shell 
ejector mechanism. Some guns, such as revolvers or single-shot rifles, 
might not leave ejection marks. These imprints are distinctive to a 
firearm. A ballistic imaging program can run a casing through its 
database and select those that offer a close match. A final 
identification is made visually by a highly trained ballistic examiner. 
This process does not lend itself to examining bullets from a firearm. 
Often, bullets are severely damaged on impact. Bullets recovered are 
usually examined visually by experts.
  It is critically important to understand that this is not ``ballistic 
DNA'' or ``ballistic fingerprinting.'' Unlike DNA or fingerprints that 
do not change over time, the unique marks that can identify a 
particular bullet or shell casing can change because of a number of 
environmental and use factors. Barrels and operating parts of firearms 
change with use and wear and tear over time. Moreover, a person can, 
within minutes, use a file to scratch marks in a barrel or breech face, 
or replace a firing pin, extractor, and barrel thereby giving a firearm 
a completely ``new'' ballistic identity. In other words, imaging 
remains a tool, but not a silver bullet, in criminal investigations.
  Legitimate concerns have been raised about creating a national 
database that would store ballistic images from all firearms sold. We 
know that such a database would involve huge costs to the government, 
firearms manufacturers, and customers. Furthermore, it raises questions 
about a legal ``chain of evidence,'' i.e., how to handle and store 
hundreds of millions of bullets or shell casings without exposing all 
such evidence to attack by defense lawyers. It could also break 
existing law by creating a database of law-abiding firearms owners and 
prove much less effective than NIBIN.
  A recent study completed by the California Department of Forensic 
Services on creating a ballistic imaging network merely on a statewide 
level stated: ``When applying this technology to the concept of mass 
sampling of manufactured firearms, a huge inventory of potential 
candidates will be generated for manual review. This study indicates 
that the number of candidate cases will be so large as to be 
impractical and will likely create logistic complications so great that 
they cannot be effectively addressed.'' The study pointed out that when 
expanding the database of spent shell casings, the system will generate 
so many ``hits'' that could be potential matches, it would not be of 
any use to forensic examiners. Other problems included guns making 
different markings on casings from different ammunition manufacturers; 
the shipping, handling, and storage of spent shell casings; the fact 
that some firearms do not leave marks that can be traced back to that 
particular firearm; and the requirement of highly-trained personnel for 
proper operation.
  What about the success rate of statewide systems already in 
operation? Maryland introduced its own ballistic imaging system in 
2000. Every new handgun that is sold in the State must be accompanied 
by spent shell casings for input into the imaging network. According to 
Maryland budget figures, approximately $5 million has been spent on the 
system. According to Maryland law enforcement officials, it contains 
over 11,000 imaged cartridges, has been queried a total of 155 times 
and has not been responsible for solving any crimes. Meanwhile, in New 
York, there have been thousands of cartridges entered into their 
database

[[Page S10667]]

and, according to reports, no traces have resulted in criminal 
prosecutions.
  Let me raise one more concern. It is clear that any ballistic imaging 
network would only be as good as the records it contains. While all the 
proposals put forward deal with compiling information from new 
firearms, today in the United States, it is estimated that there are 
more than 200 million firearms in private hands. It would be impossible 
to retrieve these firearms for ballistics documentation without 
violating the constitutional rights of millions of law abiding firearms 
owners.
  All of these considerations should be food for thought to anyone 
seriously contemplating a national ballistic imaging network. At the 
very least, they support the conclusion that we should look, and look 
carefully, before we leap into this system. President Bush is calling 
for a study of the ballistic imaging technology, and so are some 
members of Congress. For example, the Ballistic Imaging Evaluation and 
Study Act, introduced in both the House and Senate by the bipartisan, 
bicameral team of Representative Melissa Hart and Senator Zell Miller, 
would order the Department of Justice to contract for a study by the 
National Academy of Sciences, which would examine the many questions 
surrounding imaging technology and provide a list of recommendations to 
policymakers and Congress. Enacting legislation to begin a study of 
this technology should be a priority. The proper allocation of dollars 
to fight crime is critical to ensuring safe communities, and we should 
obtain firm scientific conclusions on which to base decisions on how 
best to deploy this technology.

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