[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 136 (Wednesday, October 16, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10578-S10582]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. BIDEN (for himself, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Domenici, Mrs. Clinton, 
        Mr. Gregg, and Mr. Schumer):
  S. 3121. A bill to authorize the Secretary of State to undertake 
measures in support of international programs to detect and prevent 
acts of nuclear or radiological terrorism, to authorize appropriations 
to the Department of State to carry out those measures, and for other 
purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing the ``Nuclear and 
Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002.'' This is a bill 
to strengthen the efforts of the world community to gain control over 
the vast amounts of radioactive materials that, left uncontrolled, 
could cause economic disruption and sow terror in American cities.
  In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearing on March 6 of 
this year, experts testified that an amount of ground up radioactive 
cobalt-60 the size of the ball in your ball point pen could contaminate 
an area of Manhattan greater than the footprint of the World Trade 
Center. The damage and risk would be so great that buildings in the 
affected area might have to be abandoned, destroyed, and trucked away 
as radioactive waste.
  We learned that if a terrorist dispersed a few hundred curies of 
radioactive material, the resulting public panic could make much of 
downtown Washington, DC uninhabitable without a difficult and expensive 
clean-up. Decontamination is a serious and poorly understood problem 
because many of the radioactive isotopes a terrorist might choose will 
bind chemically to construction materials such as marble and stone used 
in our most precious buildings.
  One curie of radioactive cesium-137, strontium-90, cobalt-60 or 
iridium-192 poses a significant risk. But sources as strong as several 
hundred curies are used every day in world-wide commerce. They serve to 
estimate the oil in active oil wells, to provide a compact and 
convenient source of x-rays to check the quality of welds in the field, 
and to provide pencil beams of radiation to measure the amount of soda 
or beer in an aluminum can.
  Hospitals, primarily in poorer countries, but also in the United 
States, use cesium-137 or cobalt-60 sources as strong as several 
thousand curies to provide radiation therapy in cancer treatment. Some 
of these sources are used in Southern California in mobile treatment 
centers mounted in trucks. These rolling radioactive sources move on 
the highways and through the streets of our country and perhaps of 
other countries, where they are vulnerable to accident or foul play.
  Each year many radioactive sources, world wide, are abandoned or 
stolen and leak out of the existing control system. They become 
``orphan'' sources, unwanted and with nobody to care for them or keep 
them out of trouble. Sometimes industrial sources are abandoned in 
place when their owners go out of business. They can then find their 
way into the scrap metal pool, and may arrive on the doorstep of a 
steel mill.
  That happened shortly before our March 6 hearing. A 2-curie cesium-
137 source turned up on the conveyor belt of the Nucor Steel Mill in 
Hertford, NC. Caught just before it would have gone into the furnace, 
it was identified, removed, and taken into safe custody by the North 
Carolina radiation protection authorities. Where did it come from? A 
bankrupt chemical company in the Baltimore area whose equipment was 
sold for scrap. But when the records were traced it was found that the 
company had bought not one, but four, such sources. Fortunately, two 
more were traced and recovered, but one of those ``gauge sources'' 
still is missing.
  If the source found at Nucor had gone into the molten steel, the 
clean-up would have cost the company millions of dollars. If it had 
gotten into the

[[Page S10579]]

hands of a terrorist who could disperse it with high explosives, it 
could have contaminated many square blocks of an American city and the 
recovery might have run into the billions.
  Far more intense radioactive sources turn up in strange places from 
time to time.
  In 1987, two junk collectors in Brazil broke open an abandoned gamma 
ray cancer treatment machine containing 1,400 curies of Cesium-137. 
Inside they found about 2/3 of an ounce of softly glowing powder. 
Several people were delighted at the idea of glowing in the dark and 
they rubbed the powder on their bodies. They contaminated not only 
themselves, but their homes and families. The toll: 5 people dead, 21 
requiring intensive care, 49 requiring some hospitalization, 249 
contaminated, and 111,800 people tested in improvised medical 
facilities at a local soccer stadium.
  And that was an accident. A deliberate attack using the same 20 grams 
of material could have had far greater consequences, as our witnesses 
told the Committee.
  ``Dirty bombs'' do not even need to explode. Murders have been 
committed by the simple act of inserting a small radioactive source in 
the victim's desk chair and simply waiting until radiation sickness and 
death followed. If a terrorist is willing to die, he could merely fling 
finely powdered material from the window of a tall building and allow 
the wind to spread his poison.
  Finally, I worry that other terrorist groups, not just Al Qaeda, 
could make a radiological dispersion device. Radioactive material is 
out there for the taking, especially in the former Soviet Union.
  In January of this year, three hunters gathering firewood in a forest 
in the former Soviet republic of Georgia found two abandoned cans of 
strontium-90, each containing 40,000 curies of material. Because the 
heat from these sources melted the snow for yards around, the hunters 
were delighted to find free warmth for their tent. They picked up and 
carried off the sources in their backpacks. All three woodsmen were 
critically injured, but since they did not break open the two cans, 
environmental contamination was limited.
  A team from the government of Georgia, assisted by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, recovered the sources, but several more are 
apparently missing and unaccounted for. The nuclear industry of the 
former Soviet Union made hundreds of similar devices.
  In fact, 40,000 curies of strontium-90 represents a small source by 
Soviet standards. A string of 131 arctic sites in Russia is powered by 
radioisotope thermal generators--portable power plants that draw energy 
from the heat liberated by the decay of radioactive nuclei. Each site 
uses a 300,000-curie source. That raises the maximum damage that a 
terrorist dirty bomb could do by a factor of ten beyond anything the 
Committee heard at our March hearing.
  There once were 136 sites in this chain, but the Norwegian government 
replaced five with solar-powered installations. The remaining 131 
should be replaced as soon as possible so as to remove a potential 
source of truly destructive dirty bombs.
  We must, and we can, raise significant and sensible barriers to 
protect against terrorists who would use the power of the atom to do us 
harm. To that end, Senators Lugar, Domenici, Clinton, Gregg and Schumer 
join me today in introducing the ``Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism 
Threat Reduction Act of 2002.''
  The bill's principal cosponsors, Senators Lugar and Domenici, have 
been among the Senate's long-time leaders in the causes of non-
proliferation, threat reduction and counter-terrorism, and I welcome 
their support. Senator Gregg's position on the Appropriations Committee 
has sensitized him to the need to protect our embassies. And both of 
the Senators from New York, Mr. Schumer and Mrs. Clinton, attended the 
Foreign Relations Committee's classified session where we learned some 
of the specifics regarding the threat of nuclear and radiological 
terrorism.
  Our bill takes the initiative in several significant areas:
  One, it creates a new program to establish a network of five regional 
shelters around the globe to provide secure, temporary storage of 
unwanted, unused, obsolete and orphaned radioactive sources. The bill 
authorizes $5 million to get started in Fiscal Year 2003, and up to $20 
million a year for construction and operation of the facilities in the 
future. We envision accomplishing our goals through bilateral 
negotiations with the host nations or, when advantageous to the United 
States, through special contributions to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, the IAEA. Regional storage facilities can remove some of 
the most dangerous material from circulation.
  Two, to round up the sources to be stored in the regional facilities, 
we propose an accelerated program--in cooperation with the IAEA--to 
discover, inventory, and recover unwanted radioactive material from 
around the world. This would be similar to the Department of Energy's 
Off-site Source Recovery Program, but aimed at material outside our 
borders. This bill will make a modest start by authorizing $5 million a 
year in special voluntary contributions to the IAEA.
  Three, recognizing the threat posed by the very intense radioactive 
sources packaged by the former Soviet Union to provide electric power 
to very remote locations, such as lighthouses, weather stations, 
communications nets, and other measuring equipment, the bill authorizes 
funding to replace that equipment with non-nuclear technologies. We 
believe that $10 million a year over the next three years should not 
merely make a dent in this problem; it should largely solve it.
  Four, other bills this year have provided funding to train American 
first responders to handle a radiological emergency. The bill we 
introduce today authorizes $5 million a year for the next three years 
to train responders abroad. This is a matter of self-protection for the 
United States: we have diplomatic missions at risk around the world, 
and we will be funding the construction and operation of temporary 
storage sites for radioactive material. Should accidents or incidents 
occur, we would like to be able to rely upon competent responses by our 
host countries.
  Five, this bill requires the Secretary of State to conduct a global 
assessment of the radiological threat to U.S. missions overseas and to 
provide the results to the appropriate committees of the Congress in an 
unclassified form, but with a classified annex giving details if he 
deems necessary. We hope the Secretary will take into account the 
locations of the interim storage facilities and also the results of 
this threat assessment in choosing where first to provide the overseas 
first responder training authorized by this bill.
  Six, the Customs Service is charged with preventing illicit shipments 
of radioactive material and fissile material from reaching our shores. 
Inspection of today's large cargo containers for fissile material, in 
particular, is a technologically challenging task, one performed most 
safely and easily before the containers are loaded aboard ship. Customs 
has agreements to permit U.S. inspectors to do their jobs in ports of 
embarkation. In order to assist the Service, the Nuclear and 
Radiological Threat Prevention Act establishes a special representative 
with the rank of ambassador within the State Department for negotiation 
of international agreements that ensure inspection of cargoes of 
nuclear material at ports of embarkation. This special representative 
will work in close cooperation with the Customs Service to make certain 
that the agreements meet the Service's needs.
  Seven, we could diminish the threat of Dirty bombs by reducing use of 
radioactive material where other technologies could be substituted. 
This bill mandates a study by the National Academy of Sciences to tell 
us how and where safe sources of radiation can replace dangerous ones. 
Some substitutions are well known: for many applications, X-ray 
machines powered by the electric grid are almost as convenient as the 
gamma ray ``cameras'' that use intense iridium-178 sources. Powered 
radiation sources can replace radioactive sources in some oil well 
logging work. Linear accelerators are replacing radioactive cobalt and 
cesium in cancer therapy. All of the substitute sources have one thing 
in common: a switch. When that switch is turned ``off,'' the radiation 
source is safe. There may be many more applications

[[Page S10580]]

in which a switchable source can replace a radioactive one and be at 
least as economical, particularly when the risks of dirty bombs are 
accounted for properly.
  Fissile material is the indispensable element of a true nuclear 
weapon. At our March 6, 2002, hearing experts from the Department of 
Energy weapons laboratories told the Committee that terrorists in 
possession of highly enriched uranium or plutonium could assemble a 
crude ``improvised nuclear device'' with a yield large enough to smash 
Washington from the White House to the Capitol. Such an improvised 
nuclear device would not require a Manhattan Project. In a study done 
in the 1970s, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment wrote 
that a group of two or three technically competent individuals in 
possession of enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium could 
probably build a one-kiloton device in a few months.
  For that reason, one provision of this bill deals specifically with 
developing the tools to guard against illicit traffic in highly 
enriched uranium and plutonium.
  Last summer, a meeting in Washington to discuss ``nuclear science and 
Homeland Security'' was sponsored by the Department of Energy, the 
National Science Foundation, NSF, and other Federal science funding 
agencies. It brought together some of the best scientists in our 
universities and colleges, all of whom were willing to put aside their 
normal research to help strengthen our security at home. But few of 
those scientists can use the research money they already have for this 
work. Research support given for one purpose usually may not be 
channeled into other uses.
  Therefore, this bill establishes a small program within the NSF to 
support researchers at colleges and universities who will work on the 
detection of fissile materials--the hardest and most critical task or 
on real-time identification of radioisotopes and decontamination of 
buildings after a dirty bomb goes off.
  The Department of Energy has a special role to play in this program: 
we expect that Department and its national laboratories to work in 
cooperation with NSF to transition laboratory apparatus into field-
ready operational hardware. This bill authorizes $10 million a year for 
research funded by the NSF and an additional $5 million a year for the 
Department of Energy to accomplish the transition.
  The threat of radiological terrorism, and even of true nuclear terror 
attacks, is real. We know that most radiological attacks will kill few 
Americans, but there is little doubt they will lead to economic crimes 
of the greatest consequence. The radioactive source that killed only a 
few people in Brazil cost hundreds of millions of dollars to clean up. 
And nobody tried to cause that destruction.
  We must do something to head off the nuclear and radiological 
terrorist threat where it will most likely first appear: in foreign 
countries.
  The ``Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act'' gives 
us a good start at doing just that.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 3121

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear and Radiological 
     Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) It is feasible for terrorists to obtain and to 
     disseminate radioactive material using a radiological 
     dispersion device (RDD), or by emplacing discrete radioactive 
     sources in major public places.
       (2) It is not difficult for terrorists to improvise a 
     nuclear explosive device of significant yield once they have 
     acquired the fissile material, highly enriched uranium, or 
     plutonium, to fuel the weapon.
       (3) An attack by terrorists using a radiological dispersion 
     device, lumped radioactive sources, an improvised nuclear 
     device (IND), or a stolen nuclear weapon is a plausible 
     event.
       (4) Such an attack could cause catastrophic economic and 
     social damage and could kill large numbers of Americans.
       (5) The first line of defense against both nuclear and 
     radiological terrorism is preventing the acquisition of 
     radioactive sources, special nuclear material, or nuclear 
     weapons by terrorists.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
     International Relations of the House of Representatives.
       (2) Byproduct material.--The term ``byproduct material'' 
     has the same meaning given the term in section 11 e. of the 
     Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(e)).
       (3) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency.
       (4) Independent states of the former soviet union.--The 
     term ``independent states of the former Soviet Union'' has 
     the meaning given the term in section 3 of the FREEDOM 
     Support Act (22 U.S.C. 5801).
       (5) Nuclear explosive device.--The term ``nuclear explosive 
     device'' means any device, whether assembled or disassembled, 
     that is designed to produce an instantaneous release of an 
     amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear material that 
     is greater than the amount of energy that would be released 
     from the detonation of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT).
       (6) Radiological dispersion device.--The term 
     ``radiological dispersion device'' is any device meant to 
     spread or disperse radioactive material by the use of 
     explosives or otherwise.
       (7) Radioactive material.--The term ``radioactive 
     material'' means--
       (A) source material and special nuclear material, but does 
     not include natural or depleted uranium;
       (B) nuclear by-product material;
       (C) material made radioactive by bombardment in an 
     accelerator; and
       (D) all refined isotopes of radium.
       (8) Radioactive source.--The term ``radioactive source'' 
     means radioactive material that is permanently sealed in a 
     capsule or closely bonded and includes any radioactive 
     material released if the source is leaking or stolen, but 
     does not include any material within the nuclear fuel cycle 
     of a research or power reactor.
       (9) Radioisotope thermal generator.--The term 
     ``radioisotope thermal generator'' or ``RTG'' means an 
     electrical generator which derives its power from the heat 
     produced by the decay of a radioactive source by the emission 
     of alpha, beta, or gamma radiation. The term does not include 
     nuclear reactors deriving their energy from the fission or 
     fusion of atomic nuclei.
       (10) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
     of State.
       (11) Source material.--The term ``source material'' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 11 z. of the Atomic Energy 
     Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(z)).
       (12) Special nuclear material.--The term ``special nuclear 
     material'' has the meaning given that term in section 11 aa. 
     of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(aa)).

     SEC. 4. INTERNATIONAL REPOSITORIES.

       (a) Authority.--The Secretary, acting through the United 
     States Permanent Representative to the IAEA, is authorized to 
     propose that the IAEA conclude agreements with up to five 
     countries under which each country would provide temporary 
     secure storage for orphaned, unused, surplus, or other 
     radioactive sources other than special nuclear material, 
     nuclear fuel, or spent nuclear fuel.
       (b) Voluntary Contributions Authorized.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary is authorized to make a 
     voluntary contribution to the IAEA to fund the United States 
     share of the program authorized by subsection (a) if the IAEA 
     agrees to protect sources under the standards of the United 
     States or IAEA code of conduct, whichever is stricter.
       (2) Fiscal year 2003.--The United States share of the costs 
     of the program described in subsection (a) is authorized to 
     be 100 percent for fiscal year 2003.
       (c) Technical Assistance.--The Secretary is authorized to 
     provide the IAEA, through contracts with the Department of 
     Energy or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with technical 
     assistance to carry out the program described in subsection 
     (a).
       (d) Nonapplicability of NEPA.--The National Environmental 
     Policy Act shall not apply to any activity conducted under 
     this section.
       (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated 
     for the Department of State $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2003 
     and $20,000,000 for each fiscal year thereafter to carry out 
     this section.
       (2) Availability of funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant 
     to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until 
     expended.

     SEC. 5. RADIOACTIVE SOURCE DISCOVERY, INVENTORY, AND 
                   RECOVERY.

       (a) Authority.--The Secretary is authorized to make United 
     States voluntary contributions to the IAEA to support a 
     program to promote radioactive source discovery, inventory, 
     and recovery.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to 
     the Department of State $5,000,000 for each of the fiscal 
     years 2003 through 2012 to carry out subsection (a).
       (2) Availability of funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant 
     to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until 
     expended.

[[Page S10581]]

     SEC. 6. RADIOISOTOPE THERMAL GENERATOR-POWERED FACILITIES IN 
                   THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET 
                   UNION.

       (a) RTG power units.--The Secretary is authorized to assist 
     the Government of the Russian Federation to substitute solar 
     (or other non-nuclear) power sources to replace RTG power 
     units operated by the Russian Federation and other 
     independent states of the former Soviet Union in applications 
     such as lighthouses in the Arctic, remote weather stations, 
     unattended sensors, and for providing electricity in remote 
     locations. Any replacement shall, to the maximum extent 
     practicable, be based upon tested technologies that have 
     operated for at least one full year in the environment where 
     the replacement will be used.
       (b) Allocation of Funds.--Of the funds made available to 
     carry out this section, the Secretary may use not more than 
     20 percent of the funds in any fiscal year to replace 
     dangerous RTG facilities that are similar to those described 
     in subsection (a) in countries other than the independent 
     states of the former Soviet Union.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to 
     the Department of State $10,000,000 for each of the fiscal 
     years 2003, 2004, and 2005 to carry out this section.
       (2) Availability of funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant 
     to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until 
     expended.

     SEC. 7. FOREIGN FIRST RESPONDERS.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary is authorized to conclude an 
     agreement with a foreign country, or, acting through the 
     United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA, to 
     propose that the IAEA conclude an agreement with that 
     country, under which that country will carry out a program to 
     train first responders to--
       (1) detect, identify, and characterize radioactive 
     material;
       (2) understand the hazards posed by radioactive 
     contamination;
       (3) understand the risks encountered at various dose rates;
       (4) enter contaminated areas safely and speedily; and
       (5) evacuate persons within a contaminated area.
       (b) United States Participation.--The Department of State 
     is hereby designated as the lead Federal entity for 
     cooperation with the IAEA in implementing subsection (a) 
     within the United States. In carrying out activities under 
     this subsection the Secretary of State shall take into 
     account the findings of the threat assessment report required 
     by section 8 and the location of the interim storage 
     facilities under section 4.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to 
     the Department of State $2,000,000 for fiscal year 2003, 
     $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2004, and $5,000,000 for fiscal 
     year 2005 to carry out this section.
       (2) Availability of funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant 
     to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until 
     expended.

     SEC. 8. THREAT ASSESSMENT REPORT.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary 
     of State shall submit a report to the appropriate 
     congressional committees--
       (1) detailing the preparations made at United States 
     diplomatic missions abroad to detect and mitigate a 
     radiological attack on United States missions and other 
     United States facilities under the control of the Secretary; 
     and
       (2) setting forth a rank-ordered list of the Secretary's 
     priorities for improving radiological security and 
     consequence management at United States missions, including a 
     rank-ordered list of the missions where such improvement is 
     most important.
       (b) Budget Request.--The report shall also include a 
     proposed budget for the improvements described in subsection 
     (a)(2).
       (c) Form of Submission.--The report shall be unclassified 
     with a classified annex if necessary.

     SEC. 9. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR INSPECTIONS OF NUCLEAR AND 
                   RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS.

       Section 1 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 
     1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(h) Special Representative for Inspections of Nuclear and 
     Radiological Materials.--
       ``(1) Establishment of position.--There shall be within the 
     Bureau of the Department of State primarily responsible for 
     nonproliferation matters a Special Representative for 
     Inspections of Nuclear and Radiological Materials (in this 
     subsection referred to as the `Special Representative'), who 
     shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
     and consent of the Senate. The Special Representative shall 
     have the rank and status of ambassador.
       ``(2) Responsibilities.--The Special Representative shall 
     have the primary responsibility within the Department of 
     State for assisting the Secretary of State in negotiating 
     international agreements that ensure inspection of cargoes of 
     nuclear and radiological materials destined for the United 
     States at ports of embarkation, and such other agreements as 
     may control radioactive materials.
       ``(3) Cooperation with united states customs service.--In 
     carrying out the negotiations described in paragraph (2), the 
     Special Representative shall cooperate with, and accept the 
     assistance and participation of, appropriate officials of the 
     United States Customs Service.''.

     SEC. 10. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT GRANTS.

       (a) In General.--Subject to the availability of 
     appropriations, there is established a program under which 
     the Director of the National Science Foundation shall award 
     grants for university-based research into the detection of 
     fissile materials, identification of radioactive isotopes in 
     real time, the protection of sites from attack by 
     radiological dispersion device, mitigation of consequences of 
     such an attack, and attribution of materials used in attacks 
     by radiological dispersion device or by improvised nuclear 
     devices. Such grants shall be available only to investigators 
     at baccalaureate and doctoral degree granting academic 
     institutions. In carrying out the program, the Director of 
     the National Science Foundation shall consult about this 
     program with the Secretary of Energy in order to minimize 
     duplication and increase synergies. The consultation shall 
     also include consideration of the use of the Department of 
     Energy to develop promising basic ideas into field-ready 
     hardware. The Secretary of Energy shall work with the 
     national laboratories and industry to develop field-ready 
     prototype detectors.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to 
     the National Science Foundation $10,000,000, and to the 
     Department of Energy $5,000,000, to carry out this section in 
     fiscal years 2003 through 2008.
       (2) Availability of funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant 
     to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until 
     expended.

     SEC. 11. STUDY AND REPORTS BY THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
                   SCIENCES.

       (a) Study.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with 
     the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, acting 
     through a contract with the National Academy of Sciences, 
     shall conduct a study of the use of radioactive sources in 
     industry and of potential substitutes for those sources.
       (b) Reports.--Not later than six months after entry into 
     the contract referred to in subsection (a), the National 
     Academy of Sciences shall submit an initial report to the 
     Secretary and the appropriate congressional committees and, 
     not later than three months after submission of the initial 
     report, shall submit to the Secretary and those committees a 
     final report.

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I'm pleased to join Senator Biden and 
Senator Lugar in sponsoring the Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism 
Threat Reduction Act of 2002.
  Only a few months ago, I introduced the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act 
of 2002 with these same Senators and many others as co-sponsors. It's 
being called the Domenici-Biden-Lugar bill. I am pleased to learn that 
most provisions of that Act are being incorporated in the Conference on 
the Armed Services bill.
  The current bill and the Domenici-Biden-Lugar bill are highly 
complementary. The first bill focused entirely on the contributions 
that the Department of Energy should be authorized to make to minimize 
risks of nuclear and radiological risks to our citizens. The current 
bill focuses on the contributions that the Department of State should 
make in that same arena. And in both cases, there is careful 
recognition of the importance of a tight partnership between those two 
Departments in accomplishing this vital mission.
  I'm particularly pleased with this bill's focus on assisting in the 
creation of a number of international repositories that can be used to 
store radioactive sources safely, while ensuring that they don't become 
``orphaned'' sources that might fuel a terrorist's dirty bomb. Other 
provisions to assist the IAEA in promoting source inventory and 
recovery are also critical.
  One important application of this new bill must be to help the 
Russian Federation address the large number of Radio-isotope Thermal 
Generators that rely on large quantities of radioactive material to 
power many remote installations, especially lighthouses. These large 
radioactive sources, in isolated locations, are very vulnerable to 
compromise. With this bill, we can assist other nations, like Norway, 
in shifting the power for these lighthouses away from radioactive 
materials to other means of power.
  Another important aspect of the bill involves the authorization for 
the State Department to help other nations in developing their own 
First Responder program for response to dirty bomb or nuclear threats. 
In this country, we now have a First Responder program that grows 
stronger each year, thanks to the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici bill that created 
the effort. Now we need to share the lessons we have been learning with 
others.

[[Page S10582]]

  This new bill is another important contribution to our nation's 
efforts to ensure that terrorists will never threaten the United States 
or other nations with radiological or nuclear weapons.
                                 ______