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House of Representatives

The House met at 9 a.m.

The Reverend Won Sang Lee, the Korean Central Presbyterian Church, Vienna, Virginia, offered the following prayer:

Heavenly Father, creator of the heavens and the earth, You are the sovereign Lord over all.

We thank You for blessing us with our lives, our loves and all our pursuits of happiness. We thank You for forming us as "one Nation under God." And, Lord, we thank You for calling these men and women to be, for this Nation, faithful and true representatives.

Heavenly Father, may You now enable these men and women of our Congress to lead our country with integrity, zeal and compassion.

Help them to embrace and realize their diversity to strengthen our country and keep it indivisible. Give them supernatural courage and determination to oppose any who threaten our liberty. Fill them with wisdom and impartiality to mete out justice for all.

For Your glory and honor, we pray all these things in Jesus' name. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

The SPEAKER. Will the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. GREEN) come forward and lead the House in the Pledge of Allegiance.

Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin led the Pledge of Allegiance as follows:

I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Wisconsin will be recognized for 1 minute. All other 1-minutes will be at the end of today's business.

WELCOMING THE REVEREND WON SANG LEE

(Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, it is my honor today to introduce our guest chaplain this morning, Reverend Won Sang Lee, senior pastor of the Korean Presbyterian Church in Vienna, Virginia. I do this on behalf of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. TOM DAVIS).

Reverend Lee has been a spiritual leader in the 11th District of Virginia for over 25 years and he has spearheaded his church's efforts towards community outreach both locally and internationally. Reverend Lee is president of Seed International, a mission agency which provides support to missions around the world, including the United States and Korea. He is also Moderator for the Coalition of the Korean Churches in the Presbyterian Church in America, and cochairs the Korean World Mission Council for Christ.

Reverend Lee earned his B.A. in Philosophy from KeiMyung University and an M.A. in Philosophy from KyungBook University in Korea. He has also earned a Theological Master in the Old Testament from the Dallas Theological Seminary and a Master of Arts in Near Eastern Studies from the University of Pennsylvania.

In November 2001, Reverend Lee received the Virginia Governor's Award for "Outstanding Religious Institution" in Richmond, Virginia. This award was granted for his work in the Korean Central Senior Center, where he has served as Chairman of the Board

of Directors since 1994. Earlier this year, Reverend Lee was asked to lead the Virginia State House of Delegates with opening prayer in Richmond, Virginia.

I ask my colleagues in the House to join myself and the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. TOM DAVIS) in welcoming Reverend Lee to this Chamber.

AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BONILLA). Pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution 574, proceedings will now resume on the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 114) to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq.

The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. When proceedings were postponed on the legislative day of Wednesday, October 9, 2002, all time for debate on the joint resolution, as amended, under section 1 of House Resolution 574 had expired.

It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House Report 107-724.

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE NO. 1 OFFERED BY MS. LEE

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment in the nature of a substitute.

The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows:

Amendment in the nature of a substitute No. 1 offered by Ms. LEE:

Strike the preamble and insert in lieu thereof the matter preceding the resolved clause, below, and strike the text and insert in lieu thereof the matter following the resolved clause, below:

Whereas on April 6, 1991, during the Persian Gulf War, Iraq accepted the provisions

This symbol represents the time of day during the House proceedings, e.g., 1407 is 2:07 p.m.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.



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of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991) bringing a formal cease-fire into effect;

Whereas, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq unconditionally accepted the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of "all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities related thereto", and "all ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometers, and related major parts and repair and production facilities";

Whereas, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq unconditionally agreed not to acquire or develop any nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapons-usable material, nuclear-related subsystems or components, or nuclear-related research, development, support, or manufacturing facilities;

Whereas Security Council Resolution 687 calls for the creation of a United Nations special commission to "carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical, and missile capabilities" and to assist and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency in carrying out the "destruction, removal or rendering harmless" of all nuclear-related items and in developing a plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance;

Whereas United Nations weapons inspectors (UNSCOM) between 1991 and 1998 successfully uncovered and destroyed large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and production facilities, nuclear weapons research and development facilities, and Scud missiles, despite the fact that the Government of Iraq sought to obstruct their work in numerous ways;

Whereas in 1998, UNSCOM weapons inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq and have not returned since;

Whereas Iraq is not in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1154, and additional United Nations resolutions on inspections, and this noncompliance violates international law and Iraq's ceasefire obligations and potentially endangers United States and regional security interests;

Whereas the true extent of Iraq's continued development of weapons of mass destruction and the threat posed by such development to the United States and allies in the region are unknown and cannot be known without inspections;

Whereas the United Nations was established for the purpose of preventing war and resolving disputes between nations through peaceful means, including "by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional arrangements, or other peaceful means";

Whereas the United Nations remains seized of this matter;

Whereas the President has called upon the United Nations to take responsibility to assure that Iraq fulfills its obligations to the United Nations under existing United Nations Security Council resolutions;

Whereas war with Iraq would place the lives of tens of thousands of people at risk, including members of the United States armed forces, Iraqi civilian non-combatants, and civilian populations in neighboring countries;

Whereas unilateral United States military action against Iraq may undermine cooperative international efforts to reduce international terrorism and to bring to justice those responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001;

Whereas unilateral United States military action against Iraq may also undermine

United States diplomatic relations with countries throughout the Arab and Muslim world and with many other allies;

Whereas a preemptive unilateral United States first strike could both set a dangerous international precedent and significantly weaken the United Nations as an institution; and

Whereas the short-term and long-term costs of unilateral United States military action against Iraq and subsequent occupation may be significant in terms of United States casualties, the cost to the United States treasury, and harm to United States diplomatic relations with other countries: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States should work through the United Nations to seek to resolve the matter of ensuring that Iraq is not developing weapons of mass destruction, through mechanisms such as the resumption of weapons inspections, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, regional arrangements, and other peaceful means.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 574, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. LEE) and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California (Ms. LEE).

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Ms. LEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, today our Nation is debating the very profound question of war and peace and the structure and nature of international relations in the 21st century.

Before us today is the serious and fundamental question of life and death: whether or not this Congress will give the President authority to commit this Nation to war.

Always a question of the greatest importance, our decision today is further weighted by the fact that we are being asked to sanction a new foreign policy doctrine that gives the President the power to launch a unilateral and preemptive first strike against Iraq before we have utilized our diplomatic options.

My amendment provides an option and the time to pursue it. Its goal is to give the United Nations inspections process a chance to work. It provides an option short of war with the objective of protecting the American people and the world from any threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

The amendment urges the United States to reengage the diplomatic process, and it stresses our government's commitment to eliminating any Iraqi weapons of mass destruction through United Nations inspections and enhanced containment.

It emphasizes the potentially dangerous and disastrous long-term consequences for the United States of codifying the President's announced doctrine of preemption.

The administration's resolution forecloses alternatives to war before we have even tried to pursue them.

We do not need to rush to war, and we should not rush to war. If what we

are worried about is the defense of the United States and its people, we do not need this resolution.

If the United States truly faced an imminent attack from anywhere, the President has all of the authority in the world to ensure our defense based on the Constitution, the War Powers Act and the United Nations Charter.

Our own intelligence agencies report that there is currently little chance of chemical and biological attack from Saddam Hussein on U.S. forces or territories. But they emphasize that an attack could become much more likely if Iraq believes that it is about to be attacked. This is a frightening and dangerous potential consequence that requires sober thought and careful reflection.

President Bush's doctrine of preemption violates international law, the United Nations Charter and our own long-term security interests. It will set a precedent that could come back to haunt us.

Do we want to see our claim to preemption echoed by other countries maintaining that they perceive similar threats? India or Pakistan? China or Taiwan? Russia or Georgia?

I would submit that we would have little moral authority to urge other countries to resist launching preemptive strikes themselves. This approach threatens to destabilize the Middle East, unleash new forces of terrorism and instability and completely derail any prospects for peace in the region.

Unilateralism is not the answer. Iraqi weapons of mass destruction are a problem to the world community, and we must confront it and we should do so through the United Nations. Multilateralism and steadfast commitment to international law should be the guiding principle as we move into the 21st century.

As I said, the purpose of my amendment is to let the United Nations do its work. Let us give inspections and other containment mechanisms a chance to succeed once again. Inspections did make real progress in eliminating weapons of mass destruction in the 1990s despite Saddam Hussein's best effort at obstruction and deceit. U.N. inspectors destroyed large stockpiles of chemical weapons, missiles and weapons of mass destruction. We can and should renew and expand this process.

In addition to inspections, we should improve border monitoring through an enhanced containment system to prevent shipments of nuclear materials or other weapons to Iraq. And we should install surveillance technology on the border to detect such materials.

As part of enhanced containment, we should work with the countries bordering Iraq and with regional seaports to ensure that United Nations Security Council resolutions are enforced, and we should plug holes in the current arms embargo blanket. We should also work on nonproliferation efforts globally to secure weapons materials.

All of these are diplomatic options that we can and should undertake and which can lead to success.

What we are doing today is building the framework for 21st century international relations. It will either be a framework of unilateralism and insecurity or multilateral cooperation and security. It is our choice.

During the Cold War, the words "first strike" filled us with fear. They still should.

I am really appalled that a democracy, our democracy, is contemplating taking such a fearsome step and really setting such a terrible international precedent that could be devastating for global stability and for our own moral authority.

We are contemplating sending our young men and women to war where they will be doing the killing and the dying. And we, as representatives of the American people, have no idea where this action will take us, where it will end and what price we will pay in terms of lives and resources. This too should cause us to pause. We have choices, however, and we have an obligation to pursue them, to give U.N. inspections and enhanced containment a chance to work.

What this resolution does state very clearly and firmly is that the United States will work to disarm Iraq through United Nations inspections and other diplomatic tools. It states that we reject the doctrine of preemption, and it reaffirms our commitment to our own security and national interests through multilateral diplomacy, not unilateral attack.

I urge you to protect our national interests by giving the United Nations a chance by supporting this amendment.

It does not foreclose any future options.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in strong opposition to the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the gentlewoman from California. I certainly do not mean to offend her. She is one of the very good Members of the House Committee on International Relations, but I think her amendment suffers from terminal anemia. It is like slipping someone an aspirin who has just been hit by a freight train.

Let us review Saddam Hussein's pattern of lawlessness. He is employing the vast wealth of his country and a legion of capable scientists and technicians to develop biological, chemical and nuclear weapons at the expense of food and medicine for the women and children of Iraq. He invades neighboring countries, and continues his support for some of the world's most notorious terrorists and the groups that support them.

In the mid 1990s, U.N. inspectors unearthed detailed drawings for constructing a nuclear device. In 1998, the International Atomic Energy Agency

began dismantling nuclear weapons facilities in Iraq, including three uranium enrichment plants. Over the past decade, he subjected tens of thousands of political opponents to arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, starvation, mutilation and rape.

On Monday night, President Bush announced that Saddam possesses a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disburse his stockpile of chemical and biological weapons across broad areas.

While Saddam repeatedly violates the myriad of U.N. Security Council resolutions passed since 1991, the world watches, the world waits and the world does nothing.

So how do supporters of the Lee substitute propose to respond to Saddam's continuing affront to international law and norms? With conciliation and negotiation.

For 11 years, the international community has attempted to do just that. Weapons inspectors have been banned from Iraq since 1998. During the 7 years inspectors were permitted in the country, their efforts were undermined by Iraqi coercion and cover-up.

The gentlewoman is certainly correct that the United States should work to build an international consensus to ferret out and destroy Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. And as we speak, the Bush administration is engaging the United Nations to employ arms to force Saddam to comply with Security Council resolutions. But in the last analysis, the security of the United States cannot be held hostage to a failure by the United Nations to act because of a threat of a Security Council veto by Russia, China or France.

The Lee substitute essentially advocates the futile policies of the previous decade and fails to recognize the United States as a sovereign Nation with an absolute right of self-defense, a right clearly recognized by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

Without a strongly worded Congressional resolution that gives the President the flexibility he needs, the Iraqi regime will have no incentive to comply with existing or new U.N. resolutions. Only clear and direct action of this Congress will send the essential message to the United Nations that the current stalemate must end. Only resolute action by this Congress can ensure the peace that all of us claim as a goal.

The Lee substitute is a well-intentioned but perilous receipt for inaction, based on wishful thinking, and that is what makes it so dangerous. We have had more than a decade of obfuscation by Saddam Hussein. At what point do the United States and the international community say enough? Enough lies, enough evasions, enough duplicity, enough fraud, enough deception. Enough.

I think the time has now come. I urge a no vote on this amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DEFAZIO).

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, this resolution represents neither conciliation nor negotiation. It is a resolution for continued containment, deterrence, that would be bolstered by intrusive, effective, forced, unfettered inspections. They worked before. They can work again. The most dispositive report on how effective those inspections were came from Tony Blair to the Parliament, and Saddam Hussein did not cooperate. He tried to hide the stuff. He could not hide it.

These inspections worked. There was the destruction of 40,000 munitions for chemical weapons, 2,610 tons of chemical precursors, dismantling of their prime chemical weapons development and production complex at al-Muthanna, the destruction of 48 SCUD-type missiles, the removal and destruction of the infrastructure for the nuclear weapons program, including the al-Athir weaponization/testing facility.

Intrusive, unfettered inspections with our allies will work. This cowboy, go-it-alone, to-heck-with-our-allies, to-heck-with-the-rest-of-the-world principle with an attack before we try this alternative is wrong.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. LINDER).

Mr. LINDER. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California. Let us contemplate for a moment the ramifications of substituting this amendment for the underlying Hastert-Gephardt resolution. If next February Saddam Hussein limits the ability of U.N. inspectors to check for weapons of mass destruction, the Lee amendment says let's talk. If next April Saddam Hussein kills several thousand innocent Iraqi men, women and children using biological agents, the Lee amendment says again, let's talk. If next June a terrorist attempts to use a crude nuclear device facilitated by Iraq against a major U.S. city, the Lee amendment says, let's talk.

Mr. Speaker, the lack of enforcement contained in this amendment is a bit like a senior citizen trying to stop a mugging by suggesting they dance the polka. Supporters of this amendment say, let's support the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq. We have done that. They say, let's go to the U.N. for a solution. We have done that. They say, let's engage our allies in this effort. I say again, we have done that.

Mr. Speaker, what cannot be disputed today is that peace and freedom are the ends to which we now seek our means. President Bush has demonstrated the courage to lead and to draw a line in the sand. Now is the time for Congress to support his leadership. I am proud to join a broad bipartisan coalition of Members by standing up to tyranny and oppression and opposition to freedom by voting no on this amendment. By rejecting this spurious amendment we will ensure that America's promise to uphold the rule of law

and to protect the peace-loving people of the world actually has meaning.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Michigan (Ms. KILPATRICK).

Ms. KILPATRICK. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Lee amendment and as a cosponsor of the amendment. The amendment asks what the American people want. They want us to work through the United Nations, work through that process, and I want to report and you all know the United Nations has said yes, we will work with you, we will go in, we will have unfettered inspections and we will work and come back. It is not an "if" kind of situation, it is an "is." And the "is" is that the American people want the United Nations involved and they want the inspections to go forward and at a date determined to come back and report. Our CIA, our intelligence agency, has reported to this Congress and this Nation that there is no imminent threat that Saddam Hussein will attack America. He does not have the capability. Let the U.N. process work, and that is what the Lee amendment asks.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. OBERSTAR).

(Mr. OBERSTAR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, our Constitution entrusts to Congress alone the power to declare war, a power we should invoke with great care on evidence of a clear and present danger to our country.

President Bush has asked Congress to cede that power to him to be wielded against Iraq at a time of his choosing, with or without United Nations support, in a unilateral, preemptive strike of his own determination of the level of threat Iraq poses to our national security.

I will not surrender our constitutional authority. I will not vote for the committee resolution which confers upon the President fast-track war-making power. The President should first win U.N. Security Council approval of a new, more rigorous round of arms inspections in Iraq.

If Iraq resists the international inspectors and the mandated inspections fail, the President should then obtain a Security Council authorization of force, as was done in 1990, following which he should ask Congress for approval to wage war against Iraq. The resolution offered by the gentlewoman from California respects the Constitution and the American people and will give renewed diplomacy a chance.

The Committee Resolution grants the President a new foreign policy and national security tool that charts us on a fundamental departure from historic U.S. foreign policy toward a dangerous precedent of first strike military authority for future Presidents. Once established, this resolution has enormous global consequences and will set the standard for other nations to attack preemptively, without restraint.

This policy is contrary to our entire national tradition. The United States did not pursue a policy of first strike military authority against the Soviet Union during the Cold War when the Soviets had nuclear weapons directed at U.S. cities and military targets. Nor did the United States strike first against Iraq in 1990–1991.

For most U.S. citizens, the real threat to the nation is our deteriorating domestic security: unemployment, the loss of retirement income, access to affordable prescription drugs, and corporate misfeasance and malfeasance that are eroding workers' retirement and health care security.

Our domestic economy is in serious decline. Congress and the President should, as our top priority, mobilize investments in infrastructure and job training to put the unemployed back to work. We have to mount new strategies to counter unfairly-traded imports that undermine our national security through loss of jobs and income.

Earlier this year, the President made important recommendations in this Section 201 Steel Remedy plan. Since then, however, he has backtracked, granting numerous exemptions to allow significant subsidized steel imports to pour into our nation undermining our domestic steel and iron ore industries. These are essential national security issues.

Our national security begins with domestic security, expressed in a living wage, job security, livable communities, investments in education, health care, and transportation that will ensure a better future for our nation.

The Administration's obsession with Iraq has deflected our national energies from the need to shore up domestic security. We must not allow the pursuit of terrorists at home and abroad, nor vigilance over the threat from Iraq divert our attention from critically urgent domestic priorities.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. HONDA).

Mr. HONDA. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Lee amendment. In effect, the Lee amendment says that if there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, we must work to seek and destroy these weapons with our allies in the United Nations.

The amendment further indicates that we will not provide our stamp of approval for a unilateral, preemptive strike unless the administration can verify an imminent threat to our Nation.

Why should we change our national policy from being defenders of freedom and democracy to that of first-strike aggressors?

This amendment does not prevent the President from performing his constitutional duties. He is still the commander in chief of this great Nation. However, it is our constitutional duty to declare war. We must not delegate our authority to declare war to the executive branch.

Support the Lee amendment.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. GREEN).

Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, with due respect to the authority of this amendment and the preceding speakers, I really believe that adopting this amendment would be worse for America than taking no action at all. Adopting this amendment would sanction and legitimize the shameful gamesmanship that Saddam Hussein has shown for 11 years. Saddam views diplomacy without force as his personal game without rules.

We cannot, we dare not ignore his history.

Remember, the world builds an Oil for Food program and Saddam Hussein turns it into a way to rebuild his military and to amass personal wealth. The world builds a no-fly zone to protect innocents from Iraqi aggression. Yet Iraqi forces have fired on coalition planes hundreds of times this year alone.

The world demands and Saddam agrees to destroy his biological and chemical weapons. Yet every objective observer says he still has them and he is building more.

The world demands and Iraq agrees to bring in international weapons inspectors, but when they arrive, they are told that thousands of buildings are off limits. They are delayed, they are hassled until they go home in frustration.

Finally, Saddam declares with a smile that he does not support terrorism. Yet every day, including today, we learn more and more about the training, the resources, the protection that Saddam gives al Qaeda and others.

Mr. Speaker, this amendment, with its ambiguous references to negotiation and resumption of weapons inspections, would continue that game. In fact, it would have this House legitimize that game.

The gentlewoman from California speaks of the dangers of war, and she is right. War is very dangerous. But the last 11 years have shown that giving Saddam Hussein diplomatic cover to build weaponry, terrible weaponry, is even more dangerous.

There is a middle path: diplomacy with teeth. It is the underlying resolution that I support. Let us show that we have learned our lessons. As many have said here today and yesterday, and will say later today, the American people are watching what we do. So is the world.

Mr. Speaker, I would suggest to you, so is Saddam Hussein. Let us show Saddam Hussein that the games are over. They will go on no more.

Let us vote against and reject the Lee amendment.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. MCDERMOTT).

(Mr. MCDERMOTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MCDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, we should support the Lee amendment by giving unfettered, unconditional support for U.N. inspections for disarmament.

Our government has a history of undermining the United Nations and has been particularly bad regarding Iraq. In 1990, we bribed and threatened and punished the Security Council to force a vote endorsing our war. We bribed poor countries with cheap Saudi oil. We bribed China with diplomatic rehabilitation and new development aid.

And we told Yemen, the only Arab country on the Council, that its vote against our war would be "the most expensive vote you ever cast." And then we punished Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab world, with a cutoff of our entire \$70 million aid package.

As we try to impose our war again on a reluctant United Nations, I fear that the Yemen precedent is being recalled at the U.N. today. I hope that our friends and our allies who might be considering a different approach in the U.N. will not be intimidated by our unilateral abuse of this multilateral institution.

The President can always call us back, if he is ready. He says he is not ready. He says war is not imminent. So why are we giving him such an order?

Mr. Speaker, I include for the RECORD an article from The Guardian entitled "The U.S. Has Been Seeking to Prevent a Resolution of the Iraq Crisis for the Past 8 Years."

[From the Guardian, Oct. 8, 2002]

THE U.S. HAS BEEN SEEKING TO PREVENT A RESOLUTION OF THE IRAQ CRISIS FOR THE PAST EIGHT YEARS

(By George Monbiot)

There is little that those of us who oppose the coming war with Iraq can now do to prevent it. George Bush has staked his credibility on the project; he has mid-term elections to consider, oil supplies to secure and a flagging war on terror to revive. Our voices are as little heeded in the White House as the singing of the birds.

Our role is now, perhaps, confined to the modest but necessary task of demonstrating the withdrawal of our consent, while seeking to undermine the moral confidence which could turn the attack on Iraq into a war against all those states perceived to offend US strategic interests. No task is more urgent than to expose the two astonishing lies contained in George Bush's radio address on Saturday, namely that "the United States does not desire military conflict, because we know the awful nature of war" and "we hope that Iraq complies with the world's demands". Mr. Bush appears to have done everything in his power to prevent Iraq from complying with the world's demands, while ensuring that military conflict becomes inevitable.

On July 4 this year, Kofi Annan, the secretary-general of the United Nations, began negotiating with Iraq over the return of UN weapons inspectors. Iraq had resisted UN inspections for three and a half years, but now it felt the screw turning, and appeared to be on the point of capitulation. On July 5, the Pentagon leaked its war plan to the New York Times. The US, a Pentagon official revealed, was preparing "a major air campaign and land invasion" to "topple President Saddam Hussein". The talks immediately collapsed.

Ten days ago, they were about to resume. Hans Blix, the head of the UN inspections body, was due to meet Iraqi officials in Vienna, to discuss the practicalities of re-en-

tering the country. The US Airforce launched bombing raids on Basra, in southern Iraq, destroying a radar system. As the Russian government pointed out, the attack could scarcely have been better designed to scupper the talks. But this time the Iraqis, mindful of the consequences of excluding he inspectors, kept talking. Last Tuesday, they agreed to let the UN back in. The State Department immediately announced, with more candor than elegance, that it would "go into thwart mode".

It wasn't bluffing. The following day, it leaked the draft resolution on inspections it was placing before the UN Security Council. This resembles nothing so much as a plan for unopposed invasion. The decision about which sites should be "inspected" would no longer be made by the UN alone, but also by "any permanent member of the security council", such as the United States. The people inspecting these sites could also be chosen by the US, and they would enjoy "unrestricted rights to free, unrestricted and immediate movement" within Iraq, "including unrestricted access to presidential sites". They would be permitted to establish "regional bases and operating bases throughout Iraq", where they would be "accompanied . . . by sufficient U.S. security forces to protect them". They would have the right to declare exclusion zones, no-fly zones and "ground and air transit corridors". They would be allowed to fly and land as many planes, helicopters and surveillance drones in Iraq as they want, to set up "encrypted communication" networks and to seize "any equipment" they choose to lay hands on.

The resolution, in other words, could not have failed to remind Iraq of the alleged infiltration of the U.N. team in 1996. Both the Iraqi government and the former inspector Scott Ritter maintain that the weapons inspectors were joined that year by CIA covert operations specialists, who used the U.N.'s special access to collect information and encourage the republican guard to launch a coup. On Thursday, Britain and the United States instructed the weapons inspectors not to enter Iraq until the new resolution has been adopted.

As Milan Rai's new book War Plan Iraq documents, the U.S. has been undermining disarmament for years. The U.N.'s principal means of persuasion was paragraph 22 of the security council's resolution 687, which promised that economic sanctions would be lifted once Iraq ceased to possess weapons of mass destruction. But in April 1994, Warren Christopher, the U.S. secretary of state, unilaterally withdrew this promise, removing Iraq's main incentive to comply. Three years later his successor, Madeleine Albright, insisted that sanctions would not be lifted while Saddam remained in power.

The U.S. government maintains that Saddam Hussein expelled the U.N. inspectors from Iraq in 1998, but this is not true. On October 30, 1998, the U.N. rejected a new U.N. proposal by again refusing to lift the oil embargo if Iraq disarmed. On the following day, the Iraqi government announced that it would cease to cooperate with the inspectors. In fact it permitted them to continue working, and over the next six weeks they completed around 300 operations.

On December 14, Richard Butler, the head of the inspection team, published a curiously contradictory report. The body of the report recorded that over the past month "the majority of the inspections of facilities and sites under the ongoing monitoring system were carried out with Iraq's cooperation", but his well-publicized conclusion was that "no progress" has been made. Russia and China accused Butler of bias. On December 15, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. warned him that his team should leave Iraq for its

own safety. Butler pulled out, and on the following day the U.S. started bombing Iraq.

From that point on, Saddam Hussein refused to allow U.N. inspectors to return. At the end of last year, Jose Bustani, the head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, proposed a means of resolving the crisis. His organization had not been involved in the messy business of 1998, so he offered to send in his own inspectors, and complete the job the U.N. had almost finished. The U.S. responded by demanding Bustani's dismissal. The other member states agreed to depose him only after the United States threatened to destroy the organization if he stayed. Now Hans Blix, the head of the new U.N. inspectorate, may also be feeling the heat. On Tuesday he insisted that he would take his orders only from the security council. On Thursday, after an hour-long meeting with U.S. officials, he agreed with the Americans that there should be no inspections until a new resolution had been approved.

For the past eight years the U.S., with Britain's help, appears to have been seeking to prevent a resolution of the crisis in Iraq. It is almost as if Iraq has been kept on ice, as a necessary enemy to be warmed up whenever the occasion demands. Today, as the economy slides and Bin Laden's latest mocking message suggests that the war on terrorism has so far failed, an enemy which can be located and bombed is more necessary than ever. A just war can be pursued only when all peaceful means have been exhausted. In this case, the peaceful means have been averted.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Michigan (Ms. RIVERS).

Ms. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution for several reasons.

First, it retains Congress' constitutional authority and obligation to publicly act on any commitment of American troops or resources to military action. Unlike the other two resolutions before us, it does not endow the President with powers that do not exist in the Constitution.

Secondly, it promotes a multilateral solution to the world's problems. It repudiates the administration's recently announced preemptive doctrine, which would change the United States from a worldwide defender of democracy into a first-strike aggressor on the world stage.

Lastly and most importantly, it does not preclude any further action by Congress, should circumstances change, despite the hand-wringing that has gone on about our inability to deal with future instances.

Of course, the President is free to come back and ask the Congress for action. This is best of the three resolutions before us, and I hope my colleagues will support it.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. WATT).

Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Lee amendment and encourage my colleagues to support the amendment.

I have been very disappointed with a number of my colleagues who have suggested to me that the Lee amendment is not viable. I submit to them that

they must not have read what the Lee amendment says.

It simply says that we resolve that the United States should work through the United Nations to seek to resolve the matter of ensuring that Iraq is not developing weapons of mass destruction through mechanisms such as the resumption of weapons inspections, negotiation, inquiry, mediation, regional arrangements and other peaceful means.

This is a peace resolution, a desire to do everything that is reasonably possible through peaceful means before we resort to what is really an unviable option, and that unviable option is war.

I encourage my colleagues to support the amendment to this resolution.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. JACKSON-LEE).

(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, let me thank the distinguished gentlewoman from California for yielding time and express the reason that I come to this floor because it is with a heavy heart. I remind my colleagues, as I know all of them are very conscious of, it is a question of life and death. That is why I rise to support the Lee amendment, because I believe it does not preclude the constitutional duties that this Congress has, and that is the singular duty to declare war.

Might I note in her amendment that she specifically notes that Iraq is not in compliance with the United Nations Security Council resolution. She acknowledges that the additional United Nations resolutions on inspections, that they are in noncompliance and that they violate international law. Iraq cease-fire obligations potentially endanger the United States and regional security interests.

We know the dangers of Iraq. But what we also say to this body is that the President of the United States has every authority to be able to protect the United States upon the basis of imminent danger, of immediate danger. But what the President does not have, what we are seeking to do is to give him authority for a first strike without the constitutional obligation of Congress to declare war. I rise to support the Lee amendment.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. WOOLSEY).

(Ms. WOOLSEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Lee amendment because it recognizes that in this time of crisis we have the opportunity to pursue a new vision for the world. This vision affirms the character of our Nation and refutes mistaken attempts to use violence to bring about peace. We have been down that road before. It is time to choose a new way. My constituents understand this. They are overwhelm-

ingly opposed to the war. In fact, they wish I had more than one vote today.

A woman from Santa Rosa wrote to a local paper asking, and I quote, what would war with Iraq accomplish? U.S. aggression would only create more homeless and victimized refugees, more hatred of the United States by the rest of the world, and the death of our sons and daughters in the military. She continues: Violence only creates more violence. The United States is the greatest, the most powerful country in the world. We have the opportunity to be leaders of peace.

Mr. Speaker, that is why I support the Lee resolution and oppose authorizing force in Iraq.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. FILNER).

Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, the gentlewoman from California is a woman of courage, a woman of peace. We thank her for her leadership.

I heard the gentleman from Illinois, the chairman, earlier worry about our status as a sovereign Nation if this motion passes. This is a motion which makes our sovereign Nation safer. In the 21st century, the wars against terrorism, those wars require and will require international cooperation. We cannot go it alone in the 21st century. We cannot go it alone in a war against terrorism. We must have the world community with us.

We will be less safe if we do not pass this resolution. America will be less safe if we pass the resolution that the President wants. We dilute our war against terrorism, we increase the possibility of terrorists getting weapons of mass destruction. The al Qaeda I would think would be cheering the passage of the underlying resolution because the instability of the area, for example, in Pakistan would more likely give them a nuclear weapon. Let us work with the international community. Let us work with the United Nations. Let us follow the path of peace. Let us support the Lee amendment.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS), the distinguished ranking member of the Committee on International Relations.

Mr. LANTOS. I want to thank my friend, chairman of the committee, for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I first want to commend my friend and colleague from California for her active and valuable contribution to the work of the Committee on International Relations and to the work of this House. I appreciate the views of my colleague from California and I share her view that we must exhaust all diplomatic and peaceful means for disarming Saddam Hussein, and we all agree that war can be only our very last resort. Indeed, Mr. Speaker, the joint resolution before us supports the diplomatic process at the United Nations and it requires the President to exhaust all peaceful means before resorting to war. Our dis-

tinguished Secretary of State, Colin Powell, is working nonstop at the United Nations to move towards a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of this crisis, and I fully support Secretary Powell's efforts.

However, Mr. Speaker, I strongly believe that our diplomacy will achieve its purpose only if the Iraqi regime knows that a sword of Damocles hangs over its head. Our joint bipartisan resolution represents that statement of resolve.

I am also concerned that my friend's amendment disregards the very serious threat posed by Iraqi sponsorship of international terrorism, clearly a serious danger to the security and safety of the United States.

I am convinced, Mr. Speaker, that the bipartisan and bicameral agreement reached with the White House is approaching a final decision in both the House and the Senate. Our chances of obtaining the support of friends and allies will be dramatically increased by our show of decisiveness and unity in this House. This is not the time to unravel an agreement that is on the verge of ratification. It is for these and many other reasons that I regretfully and respectfully oppose the gentlewoman's amendment.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. STARK).

(Mr. STARK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to rise in support of the resolution, the amendment by my distinguished colleague and neighbor, the gentlewoman from California. The reason we should support her amendment is very simple. There is absolutely no evidence that any thinking person could give that says we are in any danger from Saddam Hussein today. You are in more danger from the snipers running around in Prince Georges County that we cannot find.

If you vote against the Lee substitute, you are automatically sentencing, some of you old men who have never been in service or never worn a uniform like the last speaker, thousands of Americans to sure death. You know that the President wants blood. He wants to go to war. That is why we are going through this. And so you are giving an inexperienced, desperate young man in the White House the execution lever to kill thousands of Americans. Some of you did that and you could look at the 50,000 names on the wall down on the Mall. And is Vietnam still in business? The last time I looked. Don't do it again. Support the Lee amendment.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3½ minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. KINGSTON).

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time and wanted to say there is a curious suggestion here that the people in the U.N. care more about American

citizens than their own representatives. That seems to be a theme that I am hearing over and over again. Yet, Mr. Speaker, as we debate this, there is also a second suggestion, that this resolution today, well thought of, well debated not just during the course of the summer and the previous months but in fact going back to 1990, that this is something new, that suddenly we have decided that Iraq is a problem.

Mr. Speaker, the Congressional action on Iraq goes back to 1990, to the 101st Congress, the 102nd Congress, 103rd, 104th, 105th, 106th and now 107th, and there are resolutions after resolutions of instruction, of threat, of demands against Iraq and the people because of the repression they had. That is just the United States Congress, Mr. Speaker. Then let us go to the U.N. itself.

Keep in mind America is a sovereign Nation. Unlike the supporters of this amendment, I do not believe that we need to have the U.N.'s permission to defend our own national interests. That is what nations do. We cannot get mad at Germany or France if they do not stand up for something that is not in their national interest. But I do not think the U.N. should interfere with something that is in our national interest, because this attack, this terrorist attack that we are suffering from, 9-11, happened in the United States of America.

But, Mr. Speaker, let us also think about Kosovo. This Congress agreed for President Clinton to bomb Kosovo because of repression of the Muslim population by the largely Christian population, and we in America sided with the Muslims. And President Clinton, I do not know how the supporters of this amendment voted on that, but he did not sit around and say, "I'd like to take some action in Kosovo. Gee whiz, what would the U.N. say?" I did not hear that cry and hue from the supporters of this amendment at that time. But if we were to go to the U.N., going back to U.N. Resolution 660, violated; U.N. Resolution 678 on November 1990; Resolution 686 in March 1991; Resolution 687, April 1991; Resolution 688, April 1991; Resolution 707, August 15, 1991; October 11, 1991, Resolution 715.

Mr. Speaker, the list goes on and on and on. I would like to submit these for the RECORD. But the reality is that the U.N. has been calling for Iraq to act and to comply and to discontinue certain activities which they have flagrantly ignored. It is not time to go back to the U.N. for one more resolution. If the U.N. was going to act, they would have done it. They have had countless opportunities since 1991.

Mr. Speaker, we have not had weapons inspectors in Iraq since 1998. The minimum agreement here between the hawks and the doves, if you will, is that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons and is near nuclear capability. The minimum agreement is they are anti-American, they are dangerous, they are a barbaric regime. The min-

imum agreement, they have violated 16 U.N. resolutions.

Mr. Speaker, the time to act is now, not waiting on the U.N.

Mr. Speaker, I include the following material for the RECORD:

[From the Congressional Research Service, Oct. 1, 2002]

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON IRAQ 1990-2002: A COMPILATION OF LEGISLATION
(By Jeremy M. Sharp)

SUMMARY

This report is a compilation of legislation on Iraq from 1990 to the present. The list is composed of resolutions and public laws relating to military action and/or diplomatic pressure to be taken against Iraq. The list does not include foreign aid appropriations bills passed since FY 1994 that deny U.S. funds to any nation in violation of the United Nations sanctions regime against Iraq. Also, measures that were not passed only in either the House or the Senate are not included (with the exception of the proposals in the 107th Congress). For a more in-depth analysis of U.S. action against Iraq, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq, Compliance, Sanctions and U.S. Policy. This report will be updated as developments unfold.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON IRAQ 1990-2002
101st Congress

House

H. Con. Res. 382: Expressed the sense of the Congress that the crisis created by Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait must be addressed and resolved on its own terms separately from other conflicts in the region. Passed in the House: October 23, 1990.

H. J. Res. 658: Supported the actions taken by the President with respect to Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and confirmed United States resolve. Passed in the House: October 1, 1990.

Senate

S. Res. 318: Commended the President for his actions taken against Iraq and called for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the freezing of Iraqi assets, the cessation of all arms shipments to Iraq, and the imposition of sanctions against Iraq. Passed in the Senate: August 2, 1990.

Public Laws

P.L. 101-509: (H.R. 5241). Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act FY 1991 (Section 630). Urged the President to ensure that coalition allies were sharing the burden of collective defense and contributing financially to the war effort. Became public law: November 5, 1990.

P.L. 101-510: (H.R. 4739). Defense Authorization Act FY 1991 (Section 1458). Empowered the President to prohibit any and all products of a foreign nation which has violated the economic sanctions against Iraq. Became public law: November 5, 1990.

P.L. 101-513: (H.R. 5114). The Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586). Imposed a trade embargo on Iraq and called for the imposition and enforcement of multilateral sanctions in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Became public law: November 5, 1990.

P.L. 101-515: (H.R. 5021). Department of Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations Act FY 1991 (Section 608 a & b). Restricted the use of funds to approve the licensing for export of any supercomputer to any country whose government is assisting Iraq develop its ballistic missile program, or chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons capability. Became public law: November 5, 1990.

102nd Congress

Public Laws

P.L. 102-1: (H.J. Res. 77). Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolu-

tion. Gave Congressional authorization to expel Iraq from Kuwait in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, which called for the implementation of eleven previous Security Council Resolutions. Became public law: January 12, 1991.

P.L. 102-138: (H.R. 1415). The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 1992 (Section 301). Stated that the President should propose to the Security Council that members of the Iraqi regime be put on trial for war crimes. Became public law: October 28, 1991.

P.L. 102-190: (H.R. 2100). Defense Authorization Act for FY1992 (Section 1095). Supported the use of "all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (P.L. 102-1)." Became public law: December 5, 1991.

103rd Congress

Public Laws

P.L. 103-160: (H.R. 2401). Defense Authorization Act FY 1994 (Section 1164). Denied defectors of the Iraqi military entry into the United States unless those persons had assisted U.S. or coalition forces and had not committed any war crimes. Became public law: November 30, 1993.

P.L. 103-236: (H.R. 2333). Foreign Relations Authorization Act FY 1994, 1995 (Section 507). Expressed the sense of Congress that the United States should continue to advocate the maintenance of Iraq's territorial integrity and the transition to a unified, democratic Iraq. Became public law: April 30, 1994.

104th Congress

House

H. Res. 120: Urged the President to take "all appropriate action" to secure the release and safe exit from Iraq of American citizens William Barloon and David Daliberti, who had mistakenly crossed Iraq's border and were detained. Passed in the House: April 3, 1995.

Senate

S. Res. 288: Commended the military action taken by the United States following U.S. air strikes in northern Iraq against Iraqi radar and air defense installations. This action was taken during the brief Kurdish civil war in 1996. Passed in the Senate: September 5, 1996.

105th Congress

House

H. Res. 322: Supported the pursuit of peaceful and diplomatic efforts in seeking Iraqi compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding the destruction of Iraq's capability to deliver and produce weapons of mass destruction. However, if such efforts fail, "multilateral military action or unilateral military action should be taken." Passed in the House: November 13, 1997.

H. Res. 612: Reaffirmed that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime. Passed in the House: December 17, 1998.

H. Con. Res. 137: Expressed concern for the urgent need of a criminal tribunal to try members of the Iraqi regime for war crimes. Passed in the House: January 27, 1998.

Senate

S. Con. Res. 78: Called for the indictment of Saddam Hussein for war crimes. Passed in the Senate: March 13, 1998.

Public Laws

P.L. 105-174: (H.R. 3579). 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act (Section 17). Expressed the sense of Congress that none of the funds appropriated or otherwise

made available by this act be used for the conduct of offensive operations by the United States Armed Forces against Iraq for the purpose of enforcing compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions, unless such operations are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the enactment of this act. Became public law: May 1, 1998.

P.L. 105-235: (S.J. Res. 54). Iraqi Breach of International Obligations. Declared that by evicting weapons inspectors, Iraq was in "material breach" of its cease-fire agreement. Urged the President to take "appropriate action in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations." Became public law: August 14, 1998.

P.L. 105-338 (H.R. 4655): Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Section 586). Declared that it should be the policy of the United States to "support efforts" to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and replace him with a democratic government. Authorized the President to provide the Iraqi democratic opposition with assistance for radio and television broadcasting, defense articles and military training, and humanitarian assistance. Became public law: October 31, 1998.

107th Congress

House

H.J. Res. 75: Stated that Iraq's refusal to allow weapons inspectors was a material breach of its international obligations and constituted "a mounting threat to the United States, its friends and allies, and international peace and security." Passed in the House: December 20, 2001.

Senate

S. 1170 (H.R. 4): Would prohibit the direct or indirect importation of Iraqi-origin petroleum into the United States, notwithstanding action by the Committee established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 authorizing the export of petroleum products from Iraq in exchange for humanitarian assistance. Last major action: July 12, 2001 (Referred to Senate Committee on Finance).

S. Con. Res. 133: Expresses the sense of Congress that "the United States should not use force against Iraq, outside of the existing rules of engagement, without specific statutory authorization or a declaration of war under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution of the United States." Last major action: July 30, 2002 (Referred to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations).

S.J. Res. 41: Calls for the "consideration and vote on a resolution for the use of force of the United States against Iraq before such force is deployed." Last major action: July 18, 2002 (Referred to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations).

UNSCR 678—NOVEMBER 29, 1990—VIOLATED!

Iraq must comply fully with UNSCR 660 (regarding Iraq's illegal invasion of Kuwait) "and all subsequent relevant resolutions."

Authorizes UN Member States "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."

UNSCR 686—MARCH 3, 1991—VIOLATED!

Iraq must release prisoners detained during the Gulf War.

Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War.

Iraq must accept liability under international law for damages from its illegal invasion of Kuwait.

UNSCR 687—APRIL 3, 1991—VIOLATED!

Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless

"under international supervision" of all "chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities."

Iraq must "unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material" or any research, development or manufacturing facilities.

Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all "ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 KM and related major parts and repair and production facilities."

Iraq must not "use, develop, construct or acquire" any weapons of mass destruction.

Iraq must reaffirm its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Creates the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to verify the elimination of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs and mandated that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verify elimination of Iraq's nuclear weapons program.

Iraq must declare fully its weapons of mass destruction programs.

Iraq must not commit or support terrorism, or allow terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq.

Iraq must cooperate in accounting for the missing and dead Kuwaitis and others.

Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War.

UNSCR 688—APRIL 5, 1991—VIOLATED!

"Condemns" repression of Iraqi civilian population, "the consequences of which threaten international peace and security."

Iraq must immediately end repression of its civilian population.

Iraq must allow immediate access to international humanitarian organizations to those in need of assistance.

UNSCR 707—AUGUST 15, 1991—VIOLATED!

"Condemns" Iraq's "serious violation" of UNSCR 687.

"Further condemns" Iraq's noncompliance with IAEA and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Iraq must halt nuclear activities of all kinds until the Security Council deems Iraq in full compliance.

Iraq must make a full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction and missile programs.

Iraq must allow UN and IAEA inspectors immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

Iraq must cease attempts to conceal or move weapons of mass destruction, and related materials and facilities.

Iraq must allow U.N. and IAEA inspectors to conduct inspection flights throughout Iraq.

Iraq must provide transportation, medical and logistical support for U.N. and IAEA inspectors.

UNSCR 715—OCTOBER 11, 1991—VIOLATED!

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. and IAEA inspectors.

UNSCR 949—OCTOBER 15, 1994—VIOLATED!

"Condemns" Iraq's recent military deployments toward Kuwait.

Iraq must not utilize its military or other forces in a hostile manner to threaten its neighbors or U.N. operations in Iraq.

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. weapons inspectors.

Iraq must not enhance its military capability in southern Iraq.

UNSCR 1051—MARCH 27, 1996—VIOLATED!

Iraq must report shipments of dual-use items related to weapons of mass destruction to the U.N. and IAEA.

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. and IAEA inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

UNSCR 1060—JUNE 12, 1996—VIOLATED!

"Deplores" Iraq's refusal to allow access to U.N. inspectors and Iraq's "clear violations" of previous U.N. resolutions.

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

UNSCR 1115—JUNE 21, 1997—VIOLATED!

"Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to U.N. inspectors, which constitutes a "clear and flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom U.N. inspectors want to interview.

UNSCR 1134—OCTOBER 23, 1997—VIOLATED!

"Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to U.N. inspectors, which constitutes a "flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom U.N. inspectors want to interview.

UNSCR 1137—NOVEMBER 12, 1997—VIOLATED!

"Condemns the continued violations by Iraq" of previous U.N. resolutions, including its "implicit threat to the safety of" aircraft operated by U.N. inspectors and its tampering with U.N. inspector monitoring equipment.

Reaffirms Iraq's responsibility to ensure the safety of U.N. inspectors.

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

UNSCR 1154—MARCH 2, 1998—VIOLATED!

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. and IAEA weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, and notes that any violation would have the "severest consequences for Iraq."

UNSCR 1194—SEPTEMBER 9, 1998—VIOLATED!

"Condemns the decision by Iraq of 5 August 1998 to suspend cooperation with" U.N. and IAEA inspectors, which constitutes "a totally unacceptable contravention" of its obligations under UNSCR 687, 707, 715, 1060, 1115, and 1154.

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. and IAEA weapons inspectors, and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

UNSCR 1205—NOVEMBER 5, 1998—VIOLATED!

"Condemns the decision by Iraq of 31 October 1998 to cease cooperation" with U.N. inspectors as "a flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687 and other resolutions.

Iraq must provide "immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation" with U.N. and IAEA inspectors.

UNSCR 1284—DECEMBER 17, 1999—VIOLATED!

Created the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace previous weapon inspection team (UNSCOM).

Iraq must allow UNMOVIC "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access" to Iraqi officials and facilities.

Iraq must fulfill its commitment to return Gulf War prisoners.

Calls on Iraq to distribute humanitarian goods and medical supplies to its people and address the needs of vulnerable Iraqis without discrimination.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PAYNE).

(Mr. PAYNE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, give the United Nations inspectors a chance. That is what the Lee amendment asks.

What does it do? It sets out the potential threat posed by Iraq. She says that there are dangers and that we must eliminate these weapons of mass destruction. But it gives the United Nations inspectors a process to go through diplomatically. It rejects the idea, though, of a unilateral, preemptive first strike in the absence of a verified imminent threat to the United States.

What it does not do, it does not limit the President's authority if we are in danger of a verified, imminent threat. It does not preclude pursuing other paths such as those proposed by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT).

Let us make it clear, the Lee amendment simply says, let us push for peace, let us destroy those weapons of mass destruction if they are there; and we think they are, but let us give diplomacy a chance. Let us not be preemptive. Let us not use first strike. Let us try to see if, with our power, we can have peace through power.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mrs. CLAYTON).

(Mrs. CLAYTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. CLAYTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the amendment being offered by the gentleman from California entitled *The Alternative to War*. It could not be more aptly named. It seeks to commit the United States to fully engaging the diplomatic processes and to work multilaterally through the United Nations to achieve unfettered inspections of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons capabilities, disarm and, indeed, dismantle.

There is no one in this Chamber who does not believe that the world would be better off without Saddam Hussein. But the President has not made a convincing case that the Hussein regime in Iraq indeed poses an immediate threat. In fact, our own intelligence experts tell us that the most likely threat of the use of such weapons of mass destruction by Iraq would occur if the United States invaded Iraq.

What that suggests is that we should not be authorizing the President to act unilaterally, sending our brave young men and women into harm's way. Indeed, the President has most recently said that war should be the last resort.

This amendment certainly puts peace first and puts war as a last resort. Support this amendment to the resolution.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Cox).

Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, it will reward us to read the resolution we are being

asked to vote upon. It is self-refuting. This resolution would have this Congress find that Iraq and Saddam Hussein unconditionally accepted U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, their obligation to destroy their chemical and biological weapons. That was unconditional.

The resolution has us find that Iraq unconditionally accepted its obligation not to proceed with the development of nuclear weapons. The resolution has us find that Iraq agreed to immediate and unconditional inspections.

The resolution goes on to have us find that Iraq has failed to comply with these obligations over a period of more than a decade. The resolution has us find that Iraq obstructed the inspectors and ultimately expelled them in 1998.

Finally, the resolution has us find that this noncompliance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions, including specifically Resolution 687, quote, "endangers U.S. security."

That is the preamble in this resolution. That is the predicate. Then what would the resolution have us do? Pass yet one more U.N. resolution which, by its terms, lacks enforcement. Only a U.N. resolution that lacks enforcement would be acceptable if we were to pass the resolution that is before us.

What have we learned in 11 years? Surely, without at least the threat of military force, we will get exactly the same result that we have had 16 times in a row. There is a cost, indeed a much heavier cost of doing nothing, of temporizing, of adding a 17th, toothless U.N. resolution to the 16 that Saddam Hussein has already violated.

And to the charge that what we are doing is unilateral, we must say, we have already earned the cooperation of Britain, Turkey, Canada, Poland, Romania, Israel, Bulgaria, Australia, Singapore, Japan and others. If we vote to deny the President of the United States the backing of this Congress at this moment and think that then he can win the support of other nations, we are delusional.

All of us must surely hope that the United Nations passes its next resolution, that Saddam Hussein will, this time, finally see reason and disarm. But as the proverb says, He who lives only by hope will die in despair.

My colleagues, let us unite hope with reason and practicality and a willingness to act. Let us defeat this resolution.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. JACKSON).

(Mr. JACKSON of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. JACKSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Lee amendment.

What is our goal? Our goal is to end the threat of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction through comprehensive and unfettered inspections and disable their ability to develop or deliver them.

How do we get there? Until the Lee amendment, most suggested, with a military stick. I think a carrot is more likely to succeed.

What carrot? The carrot of lifting economic sanctions on Iraq in exchange for comprehensive and unfettered inspections. Offering to lift economic sanctions in exchange for unfettered inspections will rally support within Iraq and among our allies.

This positive incentive to get Iraq to comply has not and is currently not being offered by the Congress of the United States. But until we make this overture and change our policy of only lifting economic sanctions after a regime change, we will not have exhausted all peaceful means and alternatives to force.

Give peace a chance, Mr. Speaker. Nonviolence, negotiations and inspections deserve a chance. Lift economic sanctions on the people of Iraq in exchange for unfettered inspections in Iraq. It will gain support within Iraq and amongst our allies.

I thank the gentlewoman for offering the amendment.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 seconds to the gentleman from the Virgin Islands (Mrs. CHRISTENSEN).

(Mrs. CHRISTENSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Lee amendment which would give the U.N. inspections process and multilateral diplomacy time and opportunity to work.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. HINCHEY).

Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Speaker, the resolution before the House without the Lee amendment takes this country and the world on a dangerous and potentially tragic course.

It is so, first of all, because the resolution violates our own Constitution because it devolves war-making authority from the Congress to the executive branch. It also puts us in violation of our commitments to the United Nations.

But fundamentally it puts us on a dangerous and potentially tragic course because if we follow the resolution, if that resolution is prosecuted by the administration and attacks Iraq unilaterally, that action will galvanize the most fundamental, radical elements of Islam.

It strengthens Wahhabism and it will bring to their cause tens of thousands of new recruits who are prepared to wage war against this country in the way it was waged on September 11 of last year. That will be the end result of the passage and prosecution of the resolution, absent the Lee amendment.

We must pass this amendment.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WELDON).

(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this amendment. I rise as an educator, a teacher who for 7 years spent my time in the schools of Pennsylvania, someone who desperately does not want to see war occur.

But I also understand, Mr. Speaker, that contrary to what we are hearing on the other side, there are times when you have to stand up and you have to be bold and you have to lay down a marker.

The reason I ran for public office in the first place was that my hometown of 5,000 people had become overwhelmed by the Pagans motorcycle gang. Sixty-five of them lived in my neighborhood; all of their drug dealing was controlled from my town. If I listened to the other side, maybe to solve the problem, I should have got them all in a circle, held hands and we should have sang Kum Bay Yah. The problem is, the Pagans do not want to sing Kum Bay Yah. The Pagans do not deal in reality. The Pagans were only concerned with harming people and selling their drugs.

□ 1000

Saddam Hussein is a pagan. Saddam Hussein does not want to deal in realistic terms. We need to give the President the authority to rally the world opinion and the U.N. to follow through on not just the inspections but on disarming weapons of mass destruction.

I would say to my colleagues on the other side where were they during the 1990s when 37 times, 37 times, we had evidence of technology being transferred from Russia and China to Iraq and Iran? Where were they when the administration then only imposed sanctions four times? Where were they when nine times we saw chemical and biological technology being transferred into Iraq and Iran and we sat on our hands? Where were they?

Where were they in 1995 when we caught these going from Russia to Iraq? These are guidance systems for missiles, a violation of the NTCR. Because Clinton did not want to embarrass Yeltsin we never imposed the required sanctions.

Mr. Speaker, this did not just happen. This technology has been flowing for years. Now we have Saddam equipped with chemical and biological and potentially nuclear capability. He has missiles which he has now enhanced, the same missile that sent 28 young Americans home in body bags in 1991.

Mr. Speaker, everyone wants peace. No one wants war, but there are times where we have to stand up and we have to lay down a marker and back it up with force just as I had to do as a teacher when I ran for mayor and became mayor of my hometown. The pagans did not want to listen to reason. The pagans did not want to respond to what was in the best interests of the citizens. If I had listened to the other side, somehow I would come together

and somehow convince them to change their ways, and that did not happen. We fought them with force and we won, and today my hometown is prospering because the pagans no longer have their residence there.

We have to stand together and show the world with the support of this President that we will stand up to the aggression of Saddam, we will stand up to his use of chemical agents on his people, we will stand up to his potential use of biological weapons, and we will lay the foundation for a more peaceful world where the Iraqi people can enjoy the benefits of a new government.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. OWENS).

(Mr. OWENS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Speaker, this alternative offers a nonviolent and diplomatic way to wage the peace. We should be serious about this process of waging the peace with U.N. inspections. We should not take a bargain basement approach to U.N. inspections. We are willing to talk casually about spending billions of dollars for war. Let us spend what we need to have these U.N. inspections be credible.

I refer my colleagues to Nightline of last night, Wednesday, October 9, where the inspection process was presented in a way which ridiculed it and showed that a handful of inspectors, scientists and college professors were bullied and harassed and we sent the wrong signal to Saddam Hussein about inspections. Let us have inspections, let us pursue the diplomatic and the nonviolent alternative with the same vigor and seriousness that we will pursue a violent alternative.

Let us have full administrative support, full logistical support, transportation, everything the inspectors need to go in and conduct large numbers of inspections all over Iraq at the same time and have a chain of command that goes right to the Security Council.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Ohio (Mrs. JONES).

(Mrs. JONES of Ohio asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. JONES of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, first of all, I want to compliment the gentlewoman from California for all of her leadership on this issue.

One of the prior speakers asked where we were in 1991 and pulled out all these examples of what war was all about. I do not know where he was in 1991, but in 1991 I was back being a prosecutor in Cuyahoga County, but had I been here I would have said let us push and continue to push to reach a resolution and a peaceful resolution.

I am not going to down anybody for their religion. I happen to be Baptist. I happen to be a Protestant, but whatever it is people are we all are a part of

this world, and in this United States we talk about freedom of religion and our entitlement to be whoever we are, but all of us want peace, and if we are the big bully, if we are the big dog on the street, then we can afford to be the big dog and sit back and say come on to the table, let us use all of our resources.

I question whether or not the United States has, in fact, in many instances, put all of its power to the U.N. to allow the U.N. to be as strong as it should be. Support the Lee amendment.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. BROWN).

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from California for yielding me the time.

For 40 years our policy was to contain and deter Joseph Stalin and the Soviets, to detain and deter Fidel Castro and the Cubans, to detain and deter and restrain Communist aggression by the Chinese, always without invasion. We were able to detain and deter the Soviets and the Chinese and the Communists in Cuba without invasion, but if we go first strike into Iraq the message to the world and to Putin is he can go into Georgia and chase down the Chechnyan rebels and the message to China is they can go into Taiwan and they can come down harder on Tibet and the message to the Pakistanis and the Indians is they can go into Kashmir, maybe even with their nuclear weapons.

Mr. President, go slow. Mr. President, we need aggressive, unfettered inspections in Iraq, complete, thorough, aggressive, unfettered inspections. Then go back to the United Nations. War should be a last resort.

Mr. Speaker, I support the Lee amendment.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BONILLA). The Chair reminds Members to address the Chair in their remarks and not directly the President when addressing the House.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. LEWIS).

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my colleague yielding me the time.

Mr. Speaker, last evening we completed the work on the Defense appropriations bill. That measure is designed to provide the funding whereby America is able to carry forward its responsibility in the world as the force for peace in our world. I am very pleased with the results of that bill, and while we were not discussing this with the other body yesterday, I could not help but from time to time watch the discussions of this measure on the floor.

This resolution is a very, very important statement by the American Congress. It has been crafted by some of the most capable people in both of our bodies, and I want to congratulate the chairman, as well as others who have been so involved.

I could not help but come to the floor as I watched this discussion begin regarding some substitutes for this resolution. I must say, Mr. Speaker, it is most important that we reject those alternatives for the resolution is designed simply to give our Commander-in-Chief some flexibility as he goes forward in projecting our responsibilities for peace in the world.

Indeed, there are those who presume that this automatically means a war in Iraq. This resolution does not automatically take us to war. As a matter of fact, it is a tool for the Commander-in-Chief to indeed go forth with those efforts that are most important in terms of our future hopes for peace.

There is little doubt that America focused again upon the importance of our strength as a result of 9/11 just 1 year ago. There is little doubt that the world understands that a strong America is very important for peace.

I would suggest to my colleagues that the one thing that we could do to undermine that strength is to pass a resolution like this one that is before us at this moment. Indeed, my colleagues, there is much discussion about what the Commander-in-Chief has not done. In the past, there was a lot of discussion about the fact that perhaps his advisers were not as good as some would like.

We look at the Vice President, we look at the Secretary of State, we look at the Secretary of Defense. The community not so long ago was amazed at how great their strength might be. Do we presume that they have not been giving advice and counsel to the Commander-in-Chief?

Indeed, I believe they have a plan that will strengthen our ability to be a force in the world for the good.

Resolutions like this will take us exactly in the opposite direction. Let us not by actions today undermine the President's ability to lead.

At the same time, let me say that most of my colleagues know that I am a strong believer in a bipartisan force in this House. Let us not as a result of these votes today have one of our parties be the party working with the President for peace and have the other party be the party of the United Nations.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. GEORGE MILLER).

(Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Lee amendment and commend my colleague from California for all of her work on behalf of this peaceful effort to resolve this issue.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. DAVIS).

(Mr. DAVIS of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I have been told that he who lives by the sword shall eventually die by the sword.

The first call that I got this morning was from a woman named Barbara Mullarkey who said, "Danny, vote for peace."

I rise in strong support of the Lee amendment because it gives me the opportunity to vote the will of the people in my Congressional district who do not believe that we have made the case to go to war. The President has all of the flexibility that he needs to protect us. What he does not have is the flexibility to declare war. That flexibility is left to this Congress.

Vote for the Lee amendment. Vote for peace.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. FARR).

Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me the time.

I rise in support of the Lee amendment, and I am really surprised after listening to the debate for the last 17 hours why anybody would attack it. Indeed, the Lee amendment and the Lee resolution is the same as what the President has in his resolution if we see in section 2 where the President urges the support of the United States diplomatic efforts to strictly enforce through the United Nations, to obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council in the United Nations, that essentially this is the same thing that the Lee amendment does.

It seems to me that anybody who can support the President's amendment ought to support the Lee amendment. What the Lee amendment does not do is it does not leap before it looks. It says look before we leap into war, and I think the message here is very strong, that if the United States is going to leap into war before it looks. What kind of trust are we going to have with the rest of the arrangements around the world with the agreements we have had on treaties and trade treaties? What is going to happen to people who are traveling in the country? Is anybody going to be able to trust our country because we can say, well, if we do not like something we can go it alone?

It is very wise to support the Lee amendment. It is a good look before we leap.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry. I understand the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE) has the right to close?

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BONILLA). That is correct.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining time.

My alternative gives the United Nations a chance to do its job while we think through the ramifications of our actions, how many lives would be lost, what will this cost our economy. It provides a very pragmatic opportunity

to step back and explain to the American people the implications of authorizing a war. It will give us an opportunity to explain to the American people what our own intelligence agency means, and let me quote this, "Our intelligence agency says should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred, the probability would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist action."

Our action today could cause a reaction of catastrophic proportions, not only in terms of Saddam Hussein but in the destabilization of the Middle East and the setting of a dangerous precedent.

I plead with my colleagues to oppose this rush to war. It is morally wrong, it is financially irresponsible, and it is not in our national security interest. We must wait, we must ask these questions, we must know what the economic impact is. We must know what this does in terms of the loss of lives of our young men and women.

This is a day that we must urge reflection. We must urge this body to become attentive to the unanswered questions that are out there. If our own intelligence agencies say to us that authorizing the President's resolution to go to war; that is, supporting that effort to wage war, could be a provocative act against our country, that it could destabilize the region, that it could lead to possible terrorist action, that is very terrifying, Mr. Speaker.

□ 1015

I believe that the House of Representatives must say no to establishing this dangerous precedent. We must not rush to war. We must give the United Nations time to do its work. Inspections worked in the 1990s. We must use the time that the United Nations needs, use that time for us to think through, to debate, and to be truthful to the American people. They deserve it. We need to be truthful with them as to what the cost of this rush to war would mean.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield the balance of my time to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BUYER).

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the Lee amendment. This amendment is another abdication of the United States' leadership in the world. It is tantamount to saying that Congress should contract out decisions on national security to foreign governments: Paris, Beijing, Damascus.

The United Nations is not an autonomous authority. It is a place to conduct diplomacy between nations. Our Nation's security and sovereignty are inextricably intertwined. We do not subrogate our sovereignty to the United Nations. The United States, as the sole remaining superpower, must have a policy of restraint to international conflict management, but we

never give up our ability to act unilaterally in the world if we must move into a region to bring stability.

This amendment ties the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. We should never, ever do that. The President has spoken prudently, talking about bilateral action, meaning bringing other nations with us. Those who have been speaking here for the last hour in support of this amendment have been talking as if the United States is somehow wanting to unilaterally march off to war. They use the phrase "give peace a chance."

Mr. Speaker, we are the peaceful Nation. We want to work cooperatively with other nations around the world, and that is what the President is going to do. So when my colleagues say "give peace a chance," it has been 10 years. We have these 16 U.N. resolutions. Let us go back into this regime of the United Nations and weapons inspections. When we look at that, the U.N. was and is hesitant to back up the violations of these 16 U.N. resolutions. Their response has been tepid.

Also, I would ask my colleagues to look with regard to how the inspectors were undermined, as Iraq would appeal directly to the sympathetic Council members and to the Secretary General. Iraq worked consistently to erode the credibility and the positions of these U.N. inspectors over the last 10 years. They would complain to the Security Council, and then the challenges of the claims of the weapons inspectors would suffice. Unfettered access was strictly a myth. Respect for Iraqi concerns relating to national security, sovereignty and dignity took precedence over the findings and destroying of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programs. Effectively, the actions of the Secretary General, when he intervened, made the Iraqis and the inspectors equal in presenting their case before the Security Council.

With regard to Saddam Hussein's motive for having weapons of mass destruction, he believes that they are vital to his power. The regime has two experiences in which it feels its very survival is linked to the possession of weapons of mass destruction. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz pointed out that hitting cities deep in Iran during the Iran-Iraq war with long-range missiles and countering human wave attacks with the massive use of chemical munitions saved Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war. Moreover, Baghdad believes that its possession of biological and chemical weapons during the 1991 Gulf War helped deter the United States from marching on to Baghdad.

Now, that is their dimension. That is their understanding. So Saddam will do everything he possibly can to maintain a stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. So this thing about give peace a chance, well, we have given peace a chance. The President has also used words of saying that military force will be the means of last resort.

So I think the President has been very clear. We will show the United

States has the resolve and power to stand up against Iraq, seek their compliance, force their word in their violations of the cease-fire; but if they do not, then the world will act and disarm Saddam Hussein and change the regime, if necessary, to bring peace and stability to the Middle East as a region.

We should vote down the Lee amendment and support the sovereignty and national dignity of this country.

Ms. BROWN of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I stand in strong support today of the Lee substitute, which I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of. I wholeheartedly support the principles of this substitute, and believe they contain a much more humane answer to the grave issue of Iraq.

Like Congresswoman BARBARA LEE I urge the United States to re-engage in the diplomatic process of diplomacy. I also would like to urge our country to remain committed to the UN inspector process. I am also in complete agreement with the Lee substitute's premise that there will likely be horrific consequences of our actions if the United States delivers a first strike against Iraq, particularly without the support of the United Nations.

Like Congresswoman LEE and many of my colleagues in the Congressional Black Caucus, I stand in strong opposition to a unilateral first strike by the U.S. without a clearly demonstrated and imminent threat of attack on the United States. I would also like to emphasize that I categorically believe that we must not declare war until every diplomatic option is completely exhausted. The Bush Resolution authorizes the potential use of force immediately, long before diplomatic options have been exhausted or even fully explored. Furthermore, a unilateral first-strike would undermine the moral authority of the United States, result in substantial loss of life, destabilize the Mideast region and undermine the ability of our nation to address unmet domestic priorities.

The President is asking Congress to give him a blank check. And I say today Mr. President, that your account, has come back overdrawn. This blank check gives him too much power. A blank check that forces Congress to waive its constitutional duty to declare war. A blank check that lets the President declare war, and not consult Congress until 48 hours after the attack has begun.

Not only has the President economically taken us to deficit, but there is deficit in his arguments. Why Iraq, and why today??

You know, in my 10 years of serving in Congress, this is the most serious vote I've taken. And I have to say, the Resolution on Iraq the White House drafted is intentionally misleading. It misleads the American public, the international community, and yes, even the United States Congress.

This is a sad day. Almost as sad as it was 627 days ago when the Supreme Court selected George W. Bush as the President. You know, the White House talks about dictators, but we haven't done anything to correct what has happened right here in the United States. It amazes me that we question other governments, when in our own country, we did not have a fair election.

I recently traveled to Russia, China, and South Korea, and believe it would be most unfortunate to damage the good will our nation

was receiving after September 11th because of the Bush Administration's reckless actions. We are on our own; NO ONE in the international community is behind us.

I have not seen any new information demonstrating that Iraq poses a threat to our country any more now than it did ten years ago, and certainly am without reason to believe we should attack unilaterally, without the support of the U.N.

In fact, recent poll numbers released suggest that many Americans do not support the way the President is handling the situation with Iraq either. Indeed, polls indicate what I imagined all along; namely, that a majority of Americans believe President Bush and Congress are spending too much time discussing Iraq, while neglecting domestic problems like health care and education. Many also said that they did not want the United States to act without support from allies and by a two to one margin, did not want the U.S. to act before U.N. weapons inspectors had an opportunity to enter Iraq and conduct further investigations.

Although the Administration is attempting to convince the American public otherwise, they have shown me little evidence of a connection between Iraq and 9-11. And little evidence that Iraq poses an immediate threat to our country.

Iraq's government is not democratic, but neither are many other countries listed on the State Department's terrorist list: like Iran, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Sudan.

I reiterate my opposition to this Resolution, and to this war.

To my colleagues, it is in your hands. I do believe the world has good and evil, and what you are about to do here today, will tilt it in a negative direction. It will set us on a course, and I hope I'm wrong, but it could set us on a course, that our children's children, will pay for. That the entire world will pay for. And that will put thousands of American soldiers in harm's way.

Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. CHRISTENSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Lee amendment.

I am particularly supportive of this amendment because it would place the emphasis where it ought to be—which is in multinational diplomacy and within the context of a strong commitment to the U.N. inspection process—in this important campaign to disarm Iraq and protect our allies national security.

Questions have been raised about our ability to do unfettered and complete inspections, and whether or not we were able to find anything that Sadaam Hussein did not want us to find the first time around.

Mr. Speaker, I would say, that if we have not learned from past experience with Iraq, and if we do not have the technology to search out, find and destroy biological or chemical weapons, or weapons of mass destruction, then we are also not prepared to go to war with Iraq.

Many of us have spoken over the past week about the dangerous precedent that would be set by the United States employing a unilateral first strike against Iraq. The other grave concern of many which was supported by the recently released CIA report, is that whatever weapons Sadaam had would be deployed in desperate retaliation bringing unimaginable death and destruction to us and our allies.

Mr. Speaker and colleagues. We must not set such a dangerous precedent, or commit our young men and women to an unjustified conflict. We must use our resources to strengthen our economy, and to invest in the needs of people here at home, and devote more effort to creating the kind of society that will increase U.S. moral authority and the respect of our world. And we must not weaken our democracy by ceding our authority to the executive branch.

Vote against H.J. Res. 114, and vote aye on the Lee amendment.

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, this amendment recognizes that diplomacy is an option that is not yet exhausted. The Administration's Resolution makes a number of assertions that are questionable at best; the clauses in this Amendment, on the other hand, are indisputable. Surely, we can get the United Nations to reinstate newly-empowered weapons inspectors, who can keep a step ahead of Baghdad—inspectors that are allowed to inspect Saddam's presidential sites without notice. We must build a coalition of nations with the support of the United Nations, a coalition similar to that formed by the former President Bush.

It is the duty of responsible nations to give a convincing case to the world before embarking on any military action on another country. And the world is not convinced. War is a last resort, and is recognized as such by Democrat and Republican alike. Because we are not yet at that point, I support the Lee amendment.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BONILLA). All debate time on this amendment has expired.

The question is on the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. LEE).

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 72, nays 355, not voting 4, as follows:

[Roll No. 452]

YEAS—72

Abercrombie Gutierrez Napolitano
 Baldwin Hastings (FL) Oberstar
 Becerra Hilliard Owens
 Blumenauer Hinchey Payne
 Bonior Honda Pelosi
 Brown (FL) Jackson (IL) Rahall
 Brown (OH) Jackson-Lee Rangel
 Capps (TX) Rivers
 Capuano Johnson, E. B. Roybal-Allard
 Carson (IN) Jones (OH) Rush
 Clayton Kilpatrick Sabo
 Clyburn Kucinich Sanchez
 Condit Lee Sanders
 Conyers Lewis (GA) Schakowsky
 Coyne McDermott Scott
 Cummings McGovern Serrano
 Davis (IL) McKinney Solis
 DeFazio Meek (FL) Stark
 Delahunt Meeks (NY) Tauscher
 Doggett Millender Thompson (MS)
 Farr McDonald
 Fattah Miller, George Towns
 Filner Morella Udall (NM)

Velazquez
 Waters

 Watson (CA)
 Watt (NC)

 NAYS—355

Ackerman Etheridge Leach
 Aderholt Evans Levin
 Akin Everett Lewis (CA)
 Allen Ferguson Lewis (KY)
 Andrews Flake Linder
 Arney Fletcher Lipinski
 Baca Foley LoBiondo
 Bachus Forbes Lofgren
 Baird Ford Lowey
 Baker Fossella Lucas (KY)
 Baldacci Frank Lucas (OK)
 Ballenger Frelinghuysen Luther
 Barcia Frost Lynch
 Barr Gallegly Maloney (CT)
 Barrett Ganske Maloney (NY)
 Bartlett Gekas Manullo
 Barton Gephardt Markey
 Bass Gibbons Mascara
 Bentsen Gilchrest Matheson
 Bereuter Gillmor Matsui
 Berkley Gilman McCarthy (MO)
 Berman Gonzalez McCarthy (NY)
 Berry Goode McCollum
 Biggart Goodlatte McCrery
 Bilirakis Gordon McHugh
 Bishop Goss McInnis
 Blagojevich Graham McIntyre
 Blunt Granger McKeon
 Boehlert Graves McNulty
 Boehner Green (TX) Meehan
 Bonilla Green (WI) Menendez
 Bono Greenwood Mica
 Boozman Grucci Miller, Dan
 Borski Gutknecht Miller, Gary
 Boswell Hall (TX) Miller, Jeff
 Boucher Hansen Mollohan
 Boyd Harman Moore
 Brady (PA) Hart Moran (KS)
 Brady (TX) Hastings (WA) Moran (VA)
 Brown (SC) Hayes Murtha
 Bryant Hayworth Myrick
 Burr Hefley Nadler
 Burton Herger Neal
 Buyer Hill Nethercutt
 Callahan Hilleary Ney
 Calvert Hinojosa Northrup
 Camp Hobson Norwood
 Cannon Hoeffel Nussie
 Cantor Hoekstra Obey
 Capito Holden Olver
 Cardin Holt Ortiz
 Carson (OK) Hooley Osborne
 Castle Horn Ose
 Chabot Hostettler Otter
 Chambliss Houghton Oxley
 Clement Hoyer Pallone
 Coble Hulshof Pascarell
 Collins Hunter Pastor
 Combest Hyde Paul
 Cooksey Inslee Pence
 Costello Isakson Peterson (MN)
 Cox Israel Peterson (PA)
 Cramer Issa Petri
 Crane Istook Phelps
 Crenshaw Jefferson Pickering
 Crowley Jenkins Pitts
 Cubin John Platts
 Culberson Johnson (CT) Pombo
 Cunningham Johnson (IL) Pomeroy
 Davis (CA) Johnson, Sam Portman
 Davis (FL) Jones (NC) Price (NC)
 Davis, Jo Ann Kanjorski Pryce (OH)
 Davis, Tom Kaptur Putnam
 Deal Keller Quinn
 DeGette Kelly Radanovich
 DeLauro Kennedy (MN) Ramstad
 DeLay Kennedy (RI) Regula
 DeMint Kerns Rehberg
 Deutsch Kildee Reyes
 Diaz-Balart Kind (WI) Reynolds
 Dicks King (NY) Riley
 Dingell Kingston Rodriguez
 Dooley Kirk Roemer
 Doolittle Kleczka Rogers (KY)
 Doyle Knollenberg Rogers (MI)
 Dreier Kolbe Rohrabacher
 Duncan LaFalce Ros-Lehtinen
 Dunn LaHood Ross
 Edwards Lampson Rothman
 Ehlers Langevin Royce
 Ehrlich Lantos Ryan (WI)
 Emerson Larsen (WA) Ryun (KS)
 Engel Larson (CT) Sawyer
 English Latham Saxton
 Eshoo LaTourette Schaffer

Schiff Stearns Upton
 Schrock Stenholm Visclosky
 Sensenbrenner Strickland Vitter
 Sessions Stupak Walden
 Shadegg Sullivan Walsh
 Shaw Sununu Wamp
 Shays Sweeney Watkins (OK)
 Sherman Tancredo Watts (OK)
 Sherwood Tanner Waxman
 Shimkus Tauzin Weiner
 Shows Taylor (MS) Weldon (FL)
 Shuster Taylor (NC) Weldon (PA)
 Simmons Terry Weller
 Simpson Thomas Wexler
 Skeen Thompson (CA) Whitfield
 Skelton Thornberry Wicker
 Slaughter Thune Wilson (NM)
 Smith (MI) Thurman Wilson (SC)
 Smith (NJ) Tiahrt Wolf
 Smith (TX) Tiberi Wu
 Smith (WA) Tierney Young (AK)
 Snyder Toomey Young (FL)
 Souder Turner
 Spratt Udall (CO)

NOT VOTING—4

Clay Sandlin
 Roukema Stump

 □ 1047

Messrs. SMITH of Texas, KELLER, GRAVES, Ms. CUBIN, Messrs. GREENWOOD, EHLERS, GRAHAM, BARTON of Texas, BOYD, DOOLEY of California, WALSH, WATKINS of Oklahoma, NETHERCUTT and Mrs. MYRICK changed their vote from "yea" to "nay."

Ms. SANCHEZ and Mr. WYNN changed their vote from "nay" to "yea."

So the amendment in the nature of a substitute was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BONILLA). It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed in House Report 107-724.

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE NO. 2 OFFERED BY MR. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute which is next made in order by the rule.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment in the nature of a substitute.

The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows:

Amendment in the nature of substitute offered by Mr. SPRATT:

Strike the preamble and insert in lieu thereof the matter preceding the resolved clause, below, and strike the text and insert in lieu thereof the matter following the resolved clause, below:

Whereas the Government of Iraq, without cause or provocation, invaded and occupied the country of Kuwait on August 2, 1990;

Whereas, in reaction to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, President George H. W. Bush assembled a coalition of nations to liberate Kuwait and to enforce a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions adopted in opposition to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait;

Whereas the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 660, condemning the invasion of Kuwait and demanding Iraq's immediate withdrawal, and thereafter passed Resolutions 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 670, 674, and 677, further demanding that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait;

Whereas the Government of Iraq defied the United Nations, flouting and violating each of these resolutions;

Whereas Iraq's defiance resulted in the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 which authorized the use of all means necessary to repel Iraq from Kuwait and to compel its compliance with the above-referenced resolutions;

Whereas allied forces, led by the United States, attacked Iraqi forces on January 16, 1991, and drove them out of Kuwait;

Whereas, after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq entered into a cease-fire agreement sponsored by the United Nations, pursuant to which Iraq agreed—

(1) to destroy, remove, or render harmless all chemical and biological weapons and stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support, and manufacturing facilities related thereto;

(2) to destroy, remove, or render harmless all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, and related major parts and production facilities;

(3) not to acquire or develop any nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapons-usable material, nuclear-related subsystems or components, or nuclear-related research, development, support, or manufacturing facilities; and

(4) to permit immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical, and missile capabilities, and assist the International Atomic Energy Agency in carrying out the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all nuclear-related items and in developing a plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance;

Whereas, in flagrant violation of the cease-fire agreement, Iraq sought to thwart the efforts of arms inspectors to uncover and destroy Iraq's stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles, and the means of producing such weapons and missiles;

Whereas, because of Iraq's demonstrated will to attack neighboring countries and arm itself with weapons of mass destruction, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolutions 687, 707, 715, 1051, 1060, 1115, 1134, 1137, 1154, 1194, and 1205, demanding that Iraq destroy all weapons of mass destruction, cease further development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, stop the acquisition of ballistic missiles with a range exceeding 150 kilometers, and end its support of terrorism;

Whereas Iraq has continued to defy resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and to develop weapons of mass destruction, has not stopped its support of terrorism, has refused to cooperate with arms inspectors of the United Nations, and since December 1998 has barred and denied all such inspectors any access to Iraq;

Whereas Iraq has materially breached its international obligations by retaining and continuing to develop chemical and biological weapons, by actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability and ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometers, and by supporting international terrorism;

Whereas the attacks of September 11, 2001, underscores the extent of the threat posed by international terrorist organizations, and makes clear the gravity of the threat if they obtain access to weapons of mass destruction;

Whereas the House of Representatives (in H. J. Res. 658 of the 101st Congress and H. Res. 322 in the 105th Congress) and the Senate (in S. Con. Res. 147 of the 101st Congress and S. J. Res. 54 in the 105th Congress) have declared support for international action to halt Iraq's defiance of the United Nations;

Whereas in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), Congress called upon "the President [to] consult closely with the partners of the United States in the Desert

Storm coalition and with the members of the United Nations Security Council in order to present a united front of opposition to Iraq's continuing noncompliance with Security Council Resolution 687";

Whereas in H. Res. 322 of the 105th Congress, the House of Representatives affirmed that the "current crisis regarding Iraq should be resolved peacefully through diplomatic means, but in a manner which assures full compliance by Iraq with United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding the destruction of Iraq's capability to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction";

Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the United States to "work with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common challenge" posed by Iraq and to "work for the necessary resolutions", while making clear that "the Security Council resolutions will be enforced, and the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable"; and

Whereas Congress supports the efforts by the President to enforce through the Security Council the United Nations Security Council resolutions referenced above: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the "Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction from Iraq Resolution".

SEC. 2. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the President should be commended for calling upon the United Nations to address the threat to international peace and security posed by Iraq's refusal to meet its disarmament obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions;

(2) the President should persist in his efforts to obtain approval of the Security Council for any actions taken against Iraq; and

(3) the President should continue to seek, and the Security Council should approve, a resolution that—

(A) demands full and unconditional compliance by the Government of Iraq with all disarmament requirements imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 687, 707, 715, 1051, 1060, 1115, 1134, 1154, 1194, and 1205;

(B) mandates the immediate return to Iraq of United Nations arms inspection teams, empowered with increased staff and resources and unconditional access to all sites they deem necessary to uncover and destroy weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometers, and the means of producing such weapons and missiles, without regard to any objections or conditions that Iraq may seek to impose; and

(C) authorizes, if the President deems advisable, a military force, formed under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council but commanded by the United States, to protect and support arms inspectors and make force available in the event that Iraq impedes, resists, or in any way interferes with such inspection teams;

(4) if the United Nations Security Council fails to pass a resolution that satisfies the conditions of paragraph (3), and if the President determines that use of the United States Armed Forces is necessary to compel Iraq to comply with all such disarmament requirements, the President should seek authorization from Congress to use military force to compel such compliance by invoking the expedited procedures set forth in section 5;

(5) if the United States must resort to force, the President should endeavor to form

a coalition of allies as broadly based as practicable to support and participate with United States Armed Forces, and should also seek multilateral cooperation and assistance, specifically including Arab and Islamic countries, in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq; and

(6) if the United States resorts to force, Congress will provide all possible support to the members of the United States Armed Forces and their families.

SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION TO USE FORCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH NEW UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

The President is authorized to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to any resolution of the United Nations Security Council adopted after September 12, 2002, that provides for the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometers, and the means of producing such weapons and missiles. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be construed to prevent or otherwise limit the authority of the Armed Forces to use all appropriate force for self defense and enforcement purposes.

SEC. 4. PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATIONS.

In the event that the United Nations Security Council does not adopt a resolution as described in section 3, or in the event that such a resolution is adopted but does not sanction the use of force sufficient to compel Iraq's compliance, and if the President determines that use of the United States Armed Forces is necessary for such compliance, the President should seek authorization from Congress to use military force to compel such compliance by invoking the expedited procedures set forth in section 5 after the President submits to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate a certification that—

(1)(A) the United States has sought passage by the United Nations Security Council of a resolution described in section 3, and the Security Council has failed to pass such a resolution, and no other action taken by the United Nations Security Council has been sufficient to compel Iraq to comply with the Security Council resolutions referred to in section 2; or

(B) the United Nations Security Council has passed a resolution that does not sanction the use of force sufficient to compel compliance, and—

(i) the United Nations Security Council is unlikely to take further action that will result in Iraq's compliance with such resolution; and

(ii) the use of military force against Iraq is necessary to compel compliance;

(2) the use of military force against Iraq will not impair international cooperation in the fight against terrorism or participation in United States military actions undertaken pursuant to Public Law 107-40; and

(3) the United States is in the process of establishing, or has established, a coalition of other countries as broadly based as practicable to support and participate with the United States in whatever action is taken against Iraq.

SEC. 5. EXPEDITED CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING USE OF FORCE.

(a) QUALIFYING RESOLUTION.—(1) This section applies with respect to a joint resolution of the Senate or House of Representatives—

(A) that is a qualifying resolution as described in paragraph (2); and

(B) that is introduced (by request) by a qualifying Member not later than the next legislative day after the date of receipt by the Speaker of the House of Representatives

and the President pro tempore of the Senate of a certification by the President under section 4.

(2) For purposes of this section, a qualifying resolution is a joint resolution—

(A) that does not have a preamble;

(B) the title of which is the following: "Joint resolution authorizing the President to use all necessary means, including the Armed Forces of the United States, to compel the Government of Iraq to comply with certain United Nations Security Council resolutions." and

(C) the text of which is as follows: "The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate means, including the Armed Forces of the United States, to compel the Government of Iraq to comply with the disarmament provisions in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 687, 707, 715, 1051, 1060, 1115, 1134, 1154, 1194, and 1205 and with any other resolution of the United Nations Security Council adopted after September 12, 2002, that requires the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometers, and the means of producing such weapons and missiles."

(3) For purposes of this subsection, a qualifying Member is—

(A) in the case of the House of Representatives, the majority leader or minority leader of the House of Representatives; and

(B) in the case of the Senate, the majority leader or minority leader of the Senate.

(b) PLACEMENT ON CALENDAR.—Upon introduction in either House of a resolution described in subsection (a), the resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.

(c) CONSIDERATION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.—(1) A resolution described in subsection (a) shall be considered in the House of Representatives in accordance with the provisions of this subsection.

(2) On or after the first legislative day after the day on which such a resolution is introduced, it is in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the House of Representatives to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution. All points of order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. Such a motion is privileged and is not debatable. An amendment to the motion is not in order. It shall not be in order to move to postpone the motion or to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the House of Representatives shall immediately proceed to consideration of the resolution without intervening motion, and the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the House of Representatives until disposed of.

(3) Debate on the resolution shall be limited to not more than a total of 20 hours, which shall be divided equally between the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees. A motion to further limit debate is not debatable. An amendment to, or motion to recommit, the resolution is not in order.

(6) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on the resolution, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur.

(7) A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.

(d) CONSIDERATION IN SENATE.—(1) A resolution described in subsection (a) shall be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of this subsection.

(2) On or after the first legislative day after the day on which such a resolution is

introduced, such a resolution, it is in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the Senate to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution. All points of order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. The motion is privileged and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the Senate shall immediately proceed to consideration of the resolution without intervening motion, order, or other business, and the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the Senate until disposed of.

(3) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than a total of 20 hours, which shall be divided equally between the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees. A motion to further limit debate is not debatable. An amendment to, or motion to recommit, the resolution is not in order.

(6) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a resolution and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the Senate, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur.

(7) A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.

(8) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate to the procedure relating to a resolution described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate.

(e) ACTION ON MEASURE FROM OTHER HOUSE.—(1) If, before the passage by one House of a resolution of that House described in subsection (a), that House receives from the other House a resolution described in subsection (a), then the following procedures shall apply:

(A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee and may not be considered in the House receiving it except as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii).

(B) With respect to a resolution described in subsection (a) of the House receiving the resolution—

(i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no resolution had been received from the other House; but

(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution of the other House.

(2) Upon disposition pursuant to paragraph (1)(B)(ii) of a resolution described in subsection (a) that is received by one House from the other House, it shall no longer be in order to consider such a resolution that was introduced in the receiving House.

(f) LEGISLATIVE DAY DEFINED.—For the purposes of this section, with respect to either House of Congress, a legislative day is a calendar day on which that House is in session.

(g) SECTION ENACTED AS EXERCISE OF RULEMAKING POWER OF THE TWO HOUSES.—The provisions of this section (other than subsection (h)) are enacted by the Congress—

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and, as such, shall be considered as part of the rules of either House and shall supersede other rules only to the extent they are inconsistent therewith; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as they relate to the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same man-

ner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

(h) PRESIDENTIAL RECALL OF CONGRESS.—In the event that Congress is not in session upon submission of a Presidential certification under section 4, the President is authorized to convene a special session of the Congress to allow consideration of a joint resolution under this section.

SEC. 6. WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.

(a) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION.—Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that—

(1) section 3 of this joint resolution is intended to constitute specific authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution; and

(2) if a joint resolution described in section 5(a)(2) is enacted into law, such resolution is intended to constitute specific authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

(b) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.

SEC. 7. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

At least once every 60 days, the President shall transmit to Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution. The President shall include in such report an estimate of expenditures by the United States and allied nations to compel Iraq's compliance with the above referenced United Nations Security Council resolutions and any reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including those actions described in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338; 22 U.S.C. 2151 note).

SEC. 8. INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE.

Nothing in this joint resolution is intended to derogate or otherwise limit the authority of the President to use military force in self-defense pursuant to the Constitution of the United States and the War Powers Resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 574, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT) and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 4 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, on grave occasions like this when we pass a war powers resolution, surely, surely one of the things we should seek is a broad base of support. The amendment I propose in the nature of a substitute seeks to broaden the base for this resolution. If we adopt it, I believe that H.J. Res. 114 will gain votes and pass this House by an even bigger majority.

I want to make it clear that we have not broadened the appeal of this resolution by watering it down. My substitute unflinchingly supports the President's campaign and the Security Council for beefing up arms inspection and backing them up with force, and if the Iraqis defy the new inspectors and the Security Council responds with military action, as it should, it authorizes the use of our Armed Forces. It empowers President Bush to use our Armed Forces just as his father did in 1991 in the Persian Gulf War in a military action sanctioned by the Security

Council. If on the other hand the Iraqis defy the inspectors and the Security Council fails to take action, fails to respond, the U.S. will be faced with going it alone.

In these dramatically different circumstances my amendment calls for a second vote by the Congress to approve an attack of the use of force, but it ensures the President a fast track for its consideration. There are various differences between these two resolutions. The preamble is different, but this is the key difference, and it is an important difference.

I want to make clear, however, that there is no difference with respect to our assessment of Saddam Hussein. Those of us who support this substitute see him as a menace and a threat. We agree with the President in demanding that the Security Council enforce its resolution and allow him no quarter. But for several reasons we do not want to see the United States act alone, and this is not just our concern. Over the last several weeks we have spent days talking to retired general officers who have experience in this field, to General Hoar and General Zinni, former commanders of Central Command, to General Clark and General Boyd, former Commanders of Europe, and they have agreed on this much. If we act alone, they told us, instead of being the United Nations versus Iraq, any war that happens, instead of being a war legitimated by the U.N. Charter, this will be the United States versus Iraq and in some quarters the U.S. versus the Arab and Muslim world. That is why one general officer told us "I fear if we go it alone we may pay a terrible price."

Point number two, in any conceivable military confrontation with Iraq with or without allies, the United States will win. But having allies, especially allies in the region, could be a big tactical advantage, like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and it will make it easier to achieve victory and less costly in money and, most importantly, less costly in human life.

Three, the outcome after the conflict is actually going to be the hardest part, and it is far less certain. We do not want to win this war only to lose the peace and swell the ranks of terrorists who hate us. A broad-based coalition will raise our chances of success even more in the post-war period.

I know that some will say this is an imposition on the President's power, a second vote, but in truth it is nothing more than the age-old system of checks and balances built in our Constitution. It is one way that Congress can say what we believe, that any action against Iraq should have the sanction of the Security Council and the support of a broad-based coalition, and if it does not, we should have a further say on it.

Others will say that this resolution relies too heavily on the Security Council, but let me say, Mr. Speaker, the precedent it follows was the prece-

dent set by President Bush in 1991. He turned to the United Nations first. He secured a series of resolutions from the Security Council that culminated in Resolution 678. He did not threaten not to go elsewhere, he went straight to the Security Council. The end was a successful military action and I think a model worth emulating. My substitute does just that. I urge my colleagues to follow the precedent set by President Bush in 1991 and support my substitute amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I oppose the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the gentleman from South Carolina. First and foremost, this substitute neither recognizes nor protects American sovereignty. It clearly yields to the United Nations the right and obligation to protect America. It relies on the U.N. first as a trigger mechanism. The President must wait until the U.N. acts or if it does not act or if it does not act properly, and God only knows how long that will take, then the President must return to Congress for further authorization for the use of force. And then once authorization is obtained, the use of force is limited to dealing with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threats, but what about other threats to the U.S. national security such as the use of conventional weapons or Iraqi terrorism?

Iraq is a terrorist nation. Evidence exists that Iraqi operatives met with al Qaeda terrorists. This amendment does not allow the President to use force now even if an immediate or imminent terrorist threat is present. When the U.N. fails to act or does not act properly, the President must come back to Congress and seek authorization to use military force, but first he must certify to Congress that the U.N. has failed to pass a resolution or the U.N. has passed an insufficient resolution and the use of military force against Iraq "will not impair international cooperation in the fight against terrorism." In other words, if a Nation, say Iran, North Korea or Syria, maintains that it will no longer cooperate in the war against terrorism, then international cooperation has been impaired. How can the President make such a certification? At that point is he unable to ask Congress for the authorization to use force? Why would we want to have these types of roadblocks impeding our President at a time when he is trying to defend the national security of the United States? This amendment imposes a steep chase on the President with one hurdle after another.

In conclusion, this substitute amendment would strike the bipartisan agreement that we have worked so hard to bring about and which is reflected in House Joint Resolution 114. Its primary focus is on approval of the U.N. before any military action can be

taken against Iraq. It does not recognize the sovereignty of the United States, and it fails to acknowledge the President's warning in his speech on Monday that the danger from the Iraqi regime is an imminent and urgent threat to the United States. I do not propose that we subordinate our foreign policy to the Security Council whose permanent members include France, China, and Russia, and I urge a no on this amendment in the nature of a substitute.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

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Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to myself to read what the text of the resolution would provide: "The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate means, including the Armed Forces of the United States, to compel Iraq to comply with the disarmament provisions of the U.N.," and it cites those, "and any other resolution to require the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles and the means of producing such weapons."

That is pretty sufficient language.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON), the ranking member of the House Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to rise in support of the proposal by my friend and colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT).

Several weeks ago the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT) and I drafted a resolution for the use of the minority leader, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GEPHARDT) in negotiations with the White House. That draft contained a number of important principles, focusing on the role of the United Nations, on more narrowly defining the threat posed by Iraq as to its weapons of mass destruction, and on planning for what will be needed after the conflict, if military action should be taken.

These principles do not undermine, rather, they strengthen, American national security. Many of these principles have now been included in the resolution offered by the Speaker and the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GEPHARDT).

On Tuesday night, I expressed my support for that resolution as it represents a significant improvement over the original draft submitted by the White House. But the Spratt substitute perfects a number of the principles contained in the base bill.

It connects American efforts more strongly to those of the United Nations. This resolution urges the President to work with the United Nations to enforce Iraqi compliance with its disarmament obligations. If the United Nations authorizes the use of force to achieve these goals, the Spratt resolution provides immediate congressional

authorization. But if the United Nations cannot, or will not, act, then this Congress must consider the benefits of unilateral action under a second resolution using expedited procedures.

The Spratt resolution does not tie the President's hands. U.S. national security will be protected. This resolution sends a strong message to Iraq that the Congress insists that it comply with its obligations.

It also sends a strong message to the United Nations and to our friends and to our allies all around the world that we are committed to acting with them to the greatest extent possible to meet this threat. In these ways, the Spratt substitute improves the resolution already before us.

I urge my colleagues to vote with me to support it.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. BLUNT).

Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise with some concern in my opposition to this resolution, because I have such high regard for my friend, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON), who just spoke in favor of the resolution. But I have read the resolution carefully, and I think this is a step backward in all of our actions. It really restricts, rather than broadens, the use of force against Iraq that already is authorized under current law.

Section 3 is even narrower than Public Law 102-1, which already authorizes the United States to use force to restore international peace and security. We are already authorized to stop Iraq from supporting terrorism. We are already authorized to prevent Iraq from threatening its neighbors. We have already authorized the United States to protect Iraq's own civilian population.

I believe you can read this resolution clearly. All of those things would no longer be authorized. I think you cannot even continue to enforce the no-fly zone under this resolution.

Section 3 would require the United States to wait for the United Nations Security Council to act before the President could take action to protect our national security interests against the dangers of weapons of mass destruction posed by Iraq. Even the United Nations Security Council approval of section 3 would not authorize the United States to act. We would have to have United Nations action, and then we would have to have a second vote in this Congress.

The vote in the Congress is restricted by the substitute.

This is a step backward. It sends a muddy signal about our resolve. It completely replaces the Gephardt-Hastert resolution that is before us, and really postpones a critical question to another day.

We have put this question off too long already. This resolution asks us to put it off yet longer. I encourage my colleagues to join me in rejecting this

Spratt substitute resolution and moving forward to pass the Hastert-Gephardt resolution later today.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. PASTOR).

(Mr. PASTOR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PASTOR. Mr. Speaker, I support the Spratt amendment because I believe that we should not rush into war without seeking the support of our allies. We should not send American troops into combat before making a good-faith effort to put U.N. inspectors back into Iraq under a more forceful resolution. We should not turn to a policy of preemptive attack without first providing a limited time option for peaceful resolution of the threat.

This amendment would authorize the use of U.S. forces in support of a new U.N. resolution mandating the elimination by force, if necessary, of all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. If the Security Council does not pass such a resolution, the amendment calls on the President to then seek authorization for unilateral military action.

The Spratt amendment demonstrates our preference for a peaceful solution and coalition support without ruling out unilateral military force if it becomes necessary.

America has long stood behind the principle of exhausting diplomacy before resorting to war, and at times like this, we must lead by example.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS).

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman of the Committee on International Relations for yielding me time.

First, Mr. Speaker, I want to commend my good friend from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT), one of the most valued of this House, on a very thoughtful and creative amendment. I believe, however, that the amendment would weaken the hand of our Secretary of State in international negotiations that are occurring as we speak.

Every Member of this body prefers a diplomatic and peaceful solution. Every Member of this body prefers to have as many nations, friends, allies and others come with us as possible. But to enhance the prospects for a peaceful solution, both the Security Council and Saddam Hussein must perceive that diplomatic failure will lead to military action. This amendment fails to convey that critical message.

Mr. Speaker, the Spratt amendment requires the President to certify "that the use of military force against Iraq will not impair international cooperation in the fight against terrorism." This amendment effectively asks the President of the United States to certify the unknowable.

The initial impact of action in Iraq on international cooperation is uncertain. It may be argued that it will di-

minish it or it will enhance it. But one thing we are all certain of: Once Iraq is disarmed, international cooperation against terrorism will skyrocket, and international terrorism itself will have been dealt a severe blow.

While the principles behind the amendment and the underlying text have some similarities, I must oppose the amendment, Mr. Speaker, because I believe at this stage we must support the bipartisan-bicameral agreement reached with the White House.

I strongly urge my colleagues to reject this well-intentioned amendment. It would unravel the agreement which is on the verge of ratification, and it would undermine our goal of speaking with a strong and united voice.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. NADLER).

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, the Spratt resolution would permit the use of military force, but only to eliminate the real danger we face, Iraq's possession of nuclear or chemical or biological weapons. The President's resolution would allow the administration to use military force to seek regime change in Iraq, a very dangerous course of action.

It is one thing to say to Saddam Hussein, we are going to disarm you of your weapons of mass destruction. It is another thing to say, we are going to kill you, which is what regime change means. Faced with that threat, with that assurance, there would be nothing to deter Saddam Hussein from deciding, like Sampson in the Philistine temple, that he might as well pull down the world around him. Why should he not go down in history as an Arab hero by attacking Israel with chemical or biological weapons? Israel may then feel well to retaliate, and no one can calculate the course of escalation from there.

Just the other day the Director of the CIA, George Tenet, warned the Senate that "if Saddam Hussein concluded the survival of his regime were threatened, he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist action."

The Spratt substitute is the most effective way to go about disarming Saddam Hussein, while avoiding tactics that could very well end up in regional conflagration. It grants more limited, but still sufficient, power to the administration to meet the threat posed by Iraq's weapons program. It allows for the President to use force in conjunction with the U.N. if it becomes necessary.

It does not, however, grant the President a blank check, on the model of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, as the main resolution before us does.

I am proud to support this resolution. It maximizes the chances we will disarm Saddam Hussein and eliminate the real danger, without getting into a major conflagration.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. OXLEY).

(Mr. OXLEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Speaker, let me first say to my friend, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE), and to all of the participants in this historic debate how much I appreciate their leadership and their ability to debate this issue in a very courteous and effective manner.

One hundred thirty-eight Members of this House were present back when we debated the original Gulf resolution. Those of us who were here at the time, including myself, remember that as one of the historic times in this Chamber. We return today in many ways to debate some of the very same issues we debated so many years ago.

All of us, I think, feel a tremendous sense of honor to have an opportunity to debate these issues before us. But ultimately the substitute offered by my friend from South Carolina fails to put us in a position to be as effective as we were back in 1991. Indeed, it probably takes us a step backward.

If you look at the U.N. resolutions, 16 resolutions ultimately in that language, there is the ability of the world to go after Saddam without another U.N. resolution, without another resolution passed by the Congress. Yet the President came to the leadership of our body and requested that the Congress give this kind of authority. That is exactly what our leadership did.

My hat is off to the Speaker and to the minority leader, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GEPHARDT), for coming together and putting together a bipartisan resolution that should be supported.

This is a serious matter, that Saddam Hussein has continued to resist our efforts. Let us reject this substitute, pass the underlying resolution, stand firm, as we did back some 11 years ago, and send a signal that the United States and our allies will perform adequately.

□ 1115

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LIPINSKI).

(Mr. LIPINSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Spratt alternative resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of Congressman SPRATT's alternative to this resolution authorizing military force against Iraq. First of all, I would like to say that there is no question that Saddam Hussein is evil personified. He is Adolph Hitler and Joseph Stalin rolled into one reprehensible dictator. This world would no doubt be a better place without him.

But this record of cruelty does not give a lawful reason to attack Iraq without proof that their activities pose an imminent threat to the security of the United States. So I must ask: Why must we pass this resolution now? I still have not received a clear, convincing answer to that question.

I have asked it, and many other questions of those who support this resolution, including the Secretary of State. They have failed to make an effective case as to why Congress should authorize a historic shift in policy from containment and deterrence to that of pre-emptive attacks.

As far as I know Saddam Hussein has committed no new evil acts, since President Bush was sworn into office almost two years ago. Why didn't the President ask for this resolution at that time? During his campaign, President Bush himself said that the United States should not be the "world's policeman." Why the shift in policy? When the President first started talking about using military force against Iraq, it was said that Saddam Hussein was linked with September 11th, but then British and U.S. intelligence revealed that wasn't true. Also, when the President first started talking about removing Saddam Hussein, he claimed that he had the authority to do so under a 1998 resolution. However, now we are here considering the authorization of military forces at the President's request. Furthermore, the President was prepared to go it alone, and then he decided to ask for the support of as many allies as possible, including the United Nations. These are just some examples of the mixed messages from the Administration. The President's approach to the Iraq situation has had numerous changes in a short span of time.

Due to the President's disjointed approach, the lack of answers to many questions that various colleagues and I have, and the fact that containment of Saddam Hussein has worked for the past decade, I cannot support this resolution.

I have tried very hard to support the President and this resolution because I believe the President is sincere and truly thinks that military force is the only way to deal with Saddam Hussein. Perhaps he is right, but I cannot in good conscience support military force until we first seek U.N. weapons inspections and the support of the international community. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting Congressman SPRATT's substitute resolution.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to respond to the arguments made on the other side. First, they claim that this bill somehow, even though there is not a word in it, supplants Public Law 102-1, which has the authority to go after terrorists, which is not true, and then they say that we are wrong in saying to the President, we do not want to dilute the focus on terrorism; we want you to certify to us that if we go to war in Iraq, it will in no way impair our first priority, and that is to get al Qaeda. We have to decide which way we want to go.

We say, that is still the law of the land, 102-1. We backed it then, we support it now, and we want to make al Qaeda our first priority.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. REYES), a Vietnam veteran and a member of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

I rise this morning in strong support of this substitute. As I said yesterday,

many of us know that there is a better way, and the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT) has focused our efforts with his leadership and with his guidance. He has led the way to a carefully constructed and well thought out resolution, one that takes into account the dynamic and the potentially dangerous situation in which we find ourselves today.

Unilateral action, Mr. Speaker, would cost billions of dollars and possibly thousands of lives. Carelessly stepping into a conflict is not something that should be undertaken lightly. I do not think that the administration, as I said yesterday, has made the case for this type of action. This appropriate resolution supports the President's request of the Security Council for arms inspections that is backed by force. This resolution authorizes President Bush to use the same Armed Forces of the United States as his father did in the Persian Gulf War in military action that is sanctioned by the Security Council. If the Iraqis defy the inspectors and the U.N. will not authorize force, this Congress will expedite a vote for a new resolution to authorize that force.

Saddam Hussein and his regime are a menace to our security, and I agree with the President that the Security Council should enforce resolutions and put a stop to his system of "cheat and retreat." The Security Council should compel Iraq to destroy its weapons of mass destruction and its means of producing such weapons, and if armed force is necessary, it should be with their concurrence as well.

This bill sets the stage for a prudent process to accomplish these objectives. More importantly, it emphasizes the tenet that war should be a last resort and not a first resort.

Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. ROHRBACHER).

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this amendment.

Let us remember those words, and as I hear this debate they come back to me: "Gentlemen may cry 'peace,' 'peace,' but there is no peace. The war has actually begun."

Those are the words, of course, of Patrick Henry, who spurred on our people to fight for their liberty and fight for our country's security. And when all is said and done, America's security and our freedom is in the hands of our people. We do not choose to put the future of this country and the security of this country into the hands of the United Nations. As we debate this amendment, which again puts even more responsibility in the hands of the United Nations, let us take a brutal look at that organization and what this amendment accomplishes.

This amendment requires the United States to have the permission of the Communist Chinese and gangsters of other regimes to do what is necessary

for our own security. That is ridiculous. Quit idealizing the United Nations for what it is not. It is not an international body that is run by saints. Instead, it is run by ordinary democratic countries, but also by despicable regimes which terrorize their own population.

Requiring the President, our President to get permission from the United Nations means we are requiring our President to make deals with governments like the Communist Chinese before doing what is necessary for our own security. No wonder the repressed people of China, like the Falun Gong, who had their demonstration here yesterday, like the people of Tibet, like the people of East Turkistan are afraid that our President may well make an agreement with the bosses in Beijing who terrorize them at the expense of those people who long for freedom.

We should not be relying on the United Nations. No, we should be relying on our strength and our commitment to those ideals that our Founding Fathers set forth so many years ago and have been fought for so many times by Americans. Let us remember what George Washington told us: "Put only Americans on guard tonight."

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Maine (Mr. ALLEN).

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

I wish to respond to some of the comments made just now by the gentleman from California (Mr. ROHRBACHER) and earlier by the distinguished chairman of the Committee on International Relations, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE).

It is true that this resolution seeks to have the United States first act in a multilateral basis through the U.N., but we are not transferring the job of protecting Americans to the United Nations. In section 8 of this resolution it says, "inherent right to self-defense." Nothing in this joint resolution, the Spratt substitute, is intended to derogate or otherwise limit the authority of the President to use military force and self-defense pursuant to the Constitution of the United States and the War Powers resolution.

But there is a reason why we need to act on a multilateral basis. It is because if we act against Saddam's weapons of mass destruction together with allies, we are less likely to provoke an Islamic fundamentalist uprising in the Middle East. We are more likely to diminish the number of recruits to Osama bin Laden, not to accentuate the number of recruits to terrorist causes.

Insofar as people have suggested this is a steeple chase or they are roadblocks to getting the second resolution passed, it is a week-long proposition. Come back, we have the resolution laid out in this substitute, there are no amendments, no points of order, it comes to the floor, we will have a debate of 20 hours, and it will be done.

This is critical. This is as important a vote as the vote on final passage, and I urge Members to support the Spratt substitute.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. BOEHNER).

Mr. BOEHNER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Illinois for yielding me this time.

I rise today in strong opposition to the amendment offered by our friend, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT). The amendment in the nature of a substitute basically puts us in a position of having to go to the U.N. and get a resolution of support or, if the U.N. cannot act or will not act, requires the Congress to come back and to have another vote.

I think one of the points that is missing in this debate is that it seems as though people think the President is not acting in a unilateral way.

We are the only superpower on the face of the Earth. We as a Nation, as a result, have a responsibility to lead. I think that the underlying resolution does, in fact, strengthen the President's hand to lead and to continue to build multilateral support. I believe that the amendment offered today basically undercuts the President's ability to continue to lead us and to build a multilateral action.

Secondly, the President is being very deliberate about this. This effort has been under way for the last 8 weeks. The President continues to consult with Members of Congress in both bodies, continues to work with our allies, continues to work with the U.N., and I think all of us would agree that the President made a forceful case for action because he was at the U.N.

Again, the amendment that we have before us handcuffs the President in terms of his ability to continue to bring about positive action at the United Nations.

Now, we have 16 amendments passed by the United Nations over the last 11 years dealing with chemical and biological weapons. What makes us believe that Saddam Hussein or anyone else who is going to act, if in fact the U.N. would ever act? But more importantly, why would we want to put the security and the freedom of the people of our country at risk or put them in the hands of the U.N. Security Council in hoping, maybe, that they will act.

The fact is in 1991 during the Gulf War we had a debate here and we kept hearing the same thing we are hearing now: wait, wait, wait. If we had waited any longer in 1991, the Iraqi regime would have been into Saudi Arabia and we would have had a much larger crisis than we have. The fact is that we have waited for a long time to bring this regime to a halt and to take away their threat, and I believe the underlying resolution done by the majority leader and the Speaker, along with the minority leader, gives the President the strongest hand possible in terms of building a multilateral coalition and,

most importantly, protecting the American people whom we are sent here to represent.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Maine (Mr. BALDACC).

(Mr. BALDACC asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BALDACC. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Spratt amendment as the right way to security; not having to go it alone, but with the help of our allies.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today with a heavy heart. The decision whether or not to send our young men and women into war is the most difficult one a Member of Congress can face. In considering this matter, I have done considerable research, been briefed by the White House, talked with my colleagues and listened to the voices of the people of Maine.

It is clear that Saddam Hussein is a dangerous dictator. He has not hesitated to attack his neighbors, and even his own people. Since weapons inspectors were forced out of Iraq in 1998, we know that Hussein has taken steps to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons production capability. We have strong evidence that he is beginning to rebuild his nuclear program. Based on all that we have seen, in the past and in the present, it is clear that the Iraqi regime is a threat to international peace and security.

I am convinced that it is in the best interests of our Nation and our world that we eliminate these weapons of mass destruction. If Hussein does not use them directly, I believe there is a good chance that he will provide them to other terrorists who will. This situation cannot stand.

The question now before us is how to achieve our common goal of disarming Saddam Hussein. I am not supportive of a unilateral pre-emptive strike. As President Bush said on Tuesday night, force must be our last resort, not our first. I am convinced that we will be strongest if we address this situation with the support of a multilateral coalition.

For that reason, I will be supporting Representative SPRATT's substitute that calls for just such a multilateral approach. This resolution echoes the President's speech in which we urged the adoption of a new U.N. resolution that seeks to disarm Hussein, and if that resolution proves ineffective, calls for a coalition to disarm him. This substitute supports the President's intention to exhaust diplomatic approaches to disarming Iraq while still ensuring that he will be able to take action against Iraq if these methods prove ineffective.

To me, the most significant difference between Mr. SPRATT's approach and that of the administration is that Mr. SPRATT keeps Congress closely involved as the decision-making process moves forward, as is consistent with our Constitutional duty. Under the substitute, the administration will be required to return to Congress when and if it determines that diplomatic avenues have been pursued and have failed. At that time, expedited procedures will be in place to authorize military action if necessary.

When we are dealing with issues of this magnitude, I believe that there needs to be true consultation between the Congress and the administration. Simple notification is not enough. I agree that we need to speak with

one voice, and this substitute gives us the tools to do that.

The bottom line is that yes, we must take action to protect our Nation and, indeed, the world from the weapons of mass destruction that Saddam Hussein has developed and continues to pursue. However, unilateral action is not, in my opinion, the most effective approach. I believe a multilateral approach offers the best chance to effectively disarm Saddam Hussein and put an end to his chemical and biological weapons programs. It's important for our government to work with other nations, and ensure that all non-military avenues have been exhausted, before taking action on our own. We should work with the world community and the United Nations Security Council. If these efforts fail, I support using force in concert with our allies.

I opposed the President's original resolution, and I commend my colleagues who have worked so hard to improve it. The underlying resolution has come a long way in addressing my concerns. However, I still believe that the Spratt approach is the best one at this time. It is a workable resolution, which neither ties the President's hands nor promotes unilateral action by the United States. I urge my colleagues to support this responsible approach.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. SNYDER), also a Vietnam veteran and a member of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. SNYDER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Those of us that support this amendment do not believe that we are undercutting the President or somehow placing handcuffs on him. What, in fact, we believe we are doing is responding to the great common sense of the American people, the kind of discussions we all have at home and Americans are having all over the country in which they see a difference in the factual situations between America going in as an international body in cooperation with the United Nations versus America having to go it alone because the international community does not want to be with us. There are differences in those two scenarios, and the differences have different ramifications for the future of America's national security.

In fact, what the Spratt amendment does is give additional powers to the President not in the Constitution. It gives him the power to schedule this vote through an expedited process.

I think the Spratt amendment in fact is the kind of approach that the American people want us to take, to act in concert with the international community and, if that is not successful, to come back and expedite a way for a reevaluation by their elected representatives as expected by the Constitution.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. Speaker, when you retire from Congress and the great summing up comes with your great-grandchildren or great-great-grandchildren, and people say, "What did you do in Congress," you say, "Well, I voted to yield

sovereignty to the United Nations. I voted to have the decision to defend the United States national interests to the Security Council, which is composed of five members, three of which are France, China, and Russia."

What a precedent, to condition our taking action by getting approval and by getting a new resolution. What is that, Resolution No. 7,842? No, it is only about the seventeenth resolution. A new resolution authorizing the United States to defend its national interests?

This is not a preemptive strike. The shooting has never stopped from Desert Storm. There was a cease-fire, not a peace treaty, in February of 1991 and, after that, every day they shoot at us in the sky.

So this is not preemptive, it is just finishing what should have been finished several years ago.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE).

□ 1130

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this amendment.

It is clear to me that most Members hope that the administration wins support at the United Nations for a robust weapons inspection regime. I am one who wishes this. That is the outcome that I think the gentleman's amendment aims for, but it does this, however, in a way that I believe sets the administration up for failure.

This amendment expedites congressional consideration of an authorization to act against Saddam Hussein should the administration be unable to secure an acceptable U.N. inspections resolution. That is its second step, but let us think a ways down the road.

Does this Congress really want to be in the position of spotlighting our possible failure at the U.N.? The story line for the second congressional deliberation on Iraq this amendment mandates would be "Failing at the U.N., Administration Forced to Try Congress Again." I have a hard time seeing how our Nation could possibly be strengthened by that.

In considering this amendment, we cannot afford wishful thinking about the U.N. The fact, often lost in this debate, is that the United Nations is a grouping of Nations with often differing political interests, some that share our values, others that do not. This is one of the reasons that, while working with the Security Council, we must always guard against its compromising our national security policy.

This amendment, in practice, gives the edge to the U.N. Security Council over our administration in facing the threat of Saddam. The negotiating hand of other Council members would surely be strengthened against the administration if they knew that our President would be forced to return to Congress if he could not strike a Security Council weapons inspections deal. Neither outcome, a weak weapons in-

spection resolution nor if the administration must walk away, a perceived and universally noted failure by our country to win at the U.N., is one we should be setting our administration up for.

Secretary of State Powell told the Committee on International Relations that his hand at the U.N. would be strengthened by a strong congressional authorization for action against Iraq, one, in his words, that was not watered down. I know that Secretary Powell has been working hard to gain support at the U.N. To kick the congressional authorization he seeks down the road, to grant it or even not grant it, based upon the U.N. Security Council's schedule and political landscape, is a big watering down.

It is the judgment of the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE), the chairman, and the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS), the ranking member, and the majority of Committee on International Relations members that the bipartisan resolution we are considering this week is the one Secretary Powell needs. That is why I urge the rejection of this amendment.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. MORAN).

Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, let me say to my very good friends on the other side, this amendment builds on the lessons of leadership from our success in the Persian Gulf War. Virtually no American lives lost and our specific mission accomplished.

We want to do just what we did in 1991. President Bush waited until after the congressional midterm elections. He secured the United Nations Security Council authorization to use international force. We had the support of Iraq's Arab neighbors. We did not position this country as a target for vengeance from Arab and Muslim extremists, and for a decade, we have contained and sanctioned Saddam.

We are fighting another war today, a war on terrorism, and our intelligence agencies tell us these are separate wars. This amendment focuses on winning both wars and securing our deserved position as the unparalleled leader and inspiration of the free world.

The rest of the free world is no less determined to protect their families and individual liberties. Let us make this war and the war on terrorism an international and definitive success.

Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORAN of Virginia. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, some of our friends today, in debate, have suggested that somehow adoption of the Spratt resolution would yield American sovereignty to the U.N. or, as one speaker put it, would subordinate foreign policy to the Security Council.

Is it not true that under the Spratt resolution the decision of the United

States to back up U.N. inspections, to back up U.N. enforcement actions, would be ours to make and that, moreover, those troops would remain under U.S. command? Is there any ground for treating this as some kind of abdication of sovereignty?

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, my friend from North Carolina is absolutely right. This amendment strengthens the position, the leadership role of the United States. It builds on the lesson of 10 years ago that was a success then and should be a success today.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. GOODLATTE).

(Mr. GOODLATTE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the Chairman for yielding me the time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the Spratt substitute. I have great respect for the gentleman from South Carolina, but believe that this resolution is very misguided. It divides, or bifurcates, American foreign policy instead of speaking with one voice.

Nothing in the resolution put forth by the committee, led by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE) and the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS), prevents the very course of action outlined by the gentleman from South Carolina, but I fear that if this resolution offered by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT) were adopted, it would have the opposite effect of that intended by the gentleman; and that is because it sends the message that the President, in his efforts to get strong United Nations action and support from our allies, does not have the support of our own Congress.

Between the votes on the two resolutions contemplated by the gentleman and while the President seeks international support, we will in effect be a cacophony of voices rather than speaking with one voice.

Many Members of Congress have differing opinions on what the U.N. resolution should be. It is time to speak to the U.N. with one voice. Politics must end at the water's edge.

In dealing with other Nations and especially with the United Nations, the President must have a strong hand. He must be able to say what he is authorized to do, if necessary, to push the U.N. to do the right thing itself. On the other hand, the Spratt substitute sends the message to Saddam Hussein that we are talk without action. He has relied upon that state of affairs for the past 12 years.

This resolution is little different than the 16 U.N. resolutions, all without consequences. This resolution demands the truth, but removes the consequences. This resolution prevents the President of the United States from taking action to protect our national security interests. It ties his hands, even to do the limited things we are already doing.

The Congress needs to speak with one voice. The Congress needs to speak now, not later, and the Congress needs to place into the hands of the President the necessary tools to implement a unified and effective foreign policy.

I urge my colleagues to reject this substitute.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Missouri (Mrs. MCCARTHY).

(Mrs. MCCARTHY of Missouri asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. MCCARTHY of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this measure. The Spratt-Moran substitute charts the right and responsible course.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Spratt-Moran Substitute to H.J. Res. 114. I join the sponsors in commending the President for calling upon the United Nations to enforce existing Security Council resolutions eliminating weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, as well as his seeking approval of a new resolution establishing tougher arms inspections. Should force be necessary, this substitute encourages the President to make every effort to obtain U.N. Security Council approval. It is essential that we execute a multilateral approach to Iraq by uniting with our allies as we did this past year in Afghanistan, and which we also did in prosecuting Desert Storm with a minimal loss of American lives. Indeed, mobilizing a broad coalition of nations to join us in Desert Storm helped avoid destabilizing the Middle East, something which we may be powerless to prevent if we act unilaterally now. It is important to acknowledge that, as with our responsibility to nurture and support the effort to democratize and help stabilize Afghanistan, it is also in our national interest to make a long term commitment to assist in the transition to a new and stable democratic government in Iraq. This is the way to build a collective security throughout the region and enhance the prospects for a lasting peace.

I concur with the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops that "the use of massive military force to remove the current government of Iraq could have incalculable consequences for a civilian population that has suffered so much from war, repression, and a debilitating embargo." In addition to concern for the people of Iraq who have been subjugated by Saddam Hussein and his evil regime, we must fully understand that an attack on Iraq, particularly without support from the world community, may have unintended, negative consequences to our global war on terrorism. We must not lose sight of the fact that it is the worldwide terrorist network which poses the most immediate danger to the people of the United States. We have the support of the world in combating terrorism. If we go it alone in Iraq, we risk destroying that support and impeding our ability to win the war against terrorism.

That is reason enough for making a strong and diligent effort to obtain support of the U.N. Security Council for an aggressive and immediate program of widespread on-site inspections for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The Spratt-Moran Substitute allows the President to use our troops to assist the U.N. inspections. Such inspections must be executed unrelentingly and must lead to the immediate disarmament of Iraq.

Mr. Speaker, historian Robert Dallek recently noted that during the Presidency of Harry Truman our defense policy was one of containment and deterrence quite unlike the policy proposed by the current administration. President Truman felt that the best way to preserve the peace following World War II was to contain our adversaries. Truman said, "There is nothing more foolish than to think that war can be stopped by war. You don't 'prevent' anything by war except peace." Mr. Dallek assessed the current administration's policy as "prevention" by removing a head of state who has the power to do harm to us. Such a unilateral act must be justified with facts that convince the American people to go it alone. The Spratt-Moran Substitute calls upon the President to justify that such force is the only option left available, and mandates that the President seek a second vote of the Congress to authorize use of our military might if the President determines a regime change in Iraq is the goal. I commend my fellow Missourian, Mr. SKELTON for his efforts to assure that we adhere to our Constitution by requiring this second vote.

Mr. Speaker, we are united in our desire to achieve peace and stability in this region. One of the strengths of our country is our right to express our views freely and not have our patriotism questioned if we disagree with a particular administration or policy. I realize my view may not be the prevailing opinion of this body or this administration, but I truly believe it represents the view of a majority of my constituents given the information that is available to us.

I recognize the tremendous sacrifices of the armed forces in this endeavor and I fully support them. The question before us is when and how they should be engaged. I support the multilateral approach stipulated in the substitute and the call for a vigorous, all encompassing inspection program by the U.N., and urge my colleagues to adopt the substitute. As anthropologist Margaret Meade wisely noted: "We must devise a system in which peace is more rewarding than war." The Spratt-Moran Substitute charts the right and responsible course.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. FATTAH).

(Mr. FATTAH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Spratt amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Spratt Substitute for the Use of Force Against Iraq Resolution.

The Spratt substitute authorizes the use of U.S. armed forces to support any new U.N. Security Council resolution that mandates the elimination, by force if necessary, of all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, long-range ballistic missiles, and the means of producing such weapons and missiles. The substitute also calls on the president to seek authorization from Congress in the absence of a U.N. Security Council resolution sufficient to eliminate by force, if necessary, all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

If we go to war with Iraq, we must do so with the approval of the U.N. Security Council, and the general cooperation and support of the United Nations. We risk damaging the

U.N. Security Council's legitimacy as an authoritative body in international law if the United States acts unilaterally. If the argument for involvement in Iraq is that we lead by example, then we signal to the rest of the world that it is okay to ignore the concerns voiced by the international community. This will only lead to further future conflict. If the United Nations is to impose sanctions, restore order, and be an effective international institution, it must have the respect and cooperation of the most powerful country in the world.

Rather than initiating a war with Iraq, let's make an effort to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East between Israel and the Palestinians.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. INSLEE).

(Mr. INSLEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. INSLEE. Mr. Speaker, America is a great Nation because it always at times of toil and tumble has followed great principles.

We have always matched the might of our Armed Forces with the force of our great principles, and it is a great American principle that at times of international trouble, we work with the international community, not without it. It is a great American principle that we do not launch unilateral first strikes without the support of the international community and the vote of the U.S. Congress.

The Spratt resolution follows and upholds those great American principles, and the underlying resolution violates them. No Congress should give any President a blank check to start a unilateral first strike for any reason, anytime, with or without any allies.

This Nation gave the world the great principles of freedom of speech and freedom of religion and ought to lead the Nation in the concept of going forward on the arc of human history which is working together for mutual security rather than backwards to the law of the jungle.

I do not want to vote to make it the legacy of this generation of American leaders to send us backwards where a strong nation devours the weak, and we do not work with the international community.

There is a practical reason for doing this. As General Hoar, or Zinni, I cannot remember which one, said, why would we supercharge Osama bin Laden's recruiting efforts with a unilateral first strike?

The Spratt resolution imbues great American principles. We should follow it is the American way.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. LARSON).

(Mr. LARSON of Connecticut asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous material.)

Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I rise to unite this body and the Nation behind the Spratt resolution of which I am a proud cosponsor.

The Spratt resolution both strengthens the President's hand and demonstrates national resolve. It preserves the constitutional authority that resides with this Congress and does not abdicate our role to the United Nations.

Many have stepped forward, including many notable Republicans, Mr. Scowcroft, Mr. Eagleburger, Mr. Baker, and several others, who understand the deep importance and abiding concern that many of us on this aisle share with not only them, but people all across this Nation.

Thomas Friedman spoke at a recent book tour about the consequences of our doctrine, long term, and its effect, and he was struck by the one man in the audience who came up to him and reached into his wallet and produced but a picture of his children. It spoke volumes. We need say nothing else.

Support the Spratt alternative.

DICK CHENEY'S SONG OF AMERICA

(By David Armstrong)

Few writers are more ambitious than the writers of government policy papers, and few policy papers are more ambitious than Dick Cheney's masterwork. It has taken several forms over the last decade and is in fact the product of several ghostwriters (notably Paul Wolfowitz and Colin Powell), but Cheney has been consistent in his dedication to the ideas in the documents that bear his name, and he has maintained a close association with the ideologues behind them. Let us, therefore, call Cheney the author, and this series of documents the Plan.

The Plan was published in unclassified form most recently under the title of Defense Strategy for the 1990s, as Cheney ended his term as secretary of defense under the elder George Bush in early 1993, but it is, like "Leaves of Grass," a perpetually evolving work. It was the controversial Defense Planning Guidance draft of 1992—from which Cheney, unconvincingly, tried to distance himself—and it was the somewhat less aggressive revised draft of that same year. This June it was a presidential lecture in the form of a commencement address at West Point, and in July it was leaked to the press as yet another Defense Planning Guidance (this time under the pen name of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld). It will take its ultimate form, though, as America's new national security strategy—and Cheney et al. will experience what few writers have even dared dream: their words will become our reality.

The Plan is for the United States to rule the world. The overt theme is unilateralism, but it is ultimately a story of domination. It calls for the United States to maintain its overwhelming military superiority and prevent new rivals from rising up to challenge it on the world stage. It calls for dominion over friends and enemies alike. It says not that the United States must be more powerful, or most powerful, but that it must be absolutely powerful.

The Plan is disturbing in many ways, and ultimately unworkable. Yet it is being sold now as an answer to the "new realities" of the post-September 11 world, even as it was sold previously as the answer to the new realities of the post-Cold War world. For Cheney, the Plan has always been the right answer, no matter how different the questions.

Cheney's unwavering adherence to the Plan would be amusing, and maybe a little sad, except that it is now our plan. In its pages are the ideas that we now act upon

every day with the full might of the United States military. Strangely, few critics have noted that Cheney's work has a long history, or that it was once quite unpopular, or that it was created in reaction to circumstances that are far removed from the ones we now face. But Cheney is a well-known action man. One has to admire, in a way, the Babe Ruth-like sureness of his political work. He pointed to center field ten years ago, and now the ball is sailing over the fence.

Before the Plan was about domination it was about money. It took shape in late 1989, when the Soviet threat was clearly on the decline, and, with it, public support for a large military establishment. Cheney seemed unable to come to terms with either new reality. He remained deeply suspicious of the Soviets and strongly resisted all efforts to reduce military spending. Democrats in Congress jeered his lack of strategic vision, and a few within the Bush Administration were whispering that Cheney had become an irrelevant factor in structuring a response to the revolutionary changes taking place in the world.

More adaptable was the up-and-coming General Colin Powell, the newly appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As Ronald Reagan's national security adviser, Powell had seen the changes taking place in the Soviet Union firsthand and was convinced that the ongoing transformation was irreversible. Like Cheney, he wanted to avoid military cuts, but he knew they were inevitable. The best he could do was minimize them, and the best way to do that would be to offer a new security structure that would preserve American military capabilities despite reduced resources.

Powell and his staff believed that a weakened Soviet Union would result in shifting alliances and regional conflict. The United States was the only nation capable of managing the forces at play in the world; it would have to remain the preeminent military power in order to ensure the peace and shape the emerging order in accordance with American interests. U.S. military strategy, therefore, would have to shift from global containment to managing less-well-defined regional struggles and unforeseen contingencies. To do this, the United States would have to project a military "forward presence" around the world; there would be fewer troops but in more places. This plan still would not be cheap, but through careful restructuring and superior technology, the job could be done with 25 percent fewer troops. Powell insisted that maintaining superpower status must be the first priority of the U.S. military. "We have to put a shingle outside our door saying, 'Superpower Lives Here,' no matter what the Soviets do," he said at the time. He also insisted that the troop levels be proposed were the bare minimum necessary to do so. This concept would come to be known as the "Base Force."

Powell's work on the subject proved timely. The Berlin Wall fell on November 9, 1989, and five days later Powell had his new strategy ready to present to Cheney. Even as decades of repression were ending in Eastern Europe, however, Cheney still could not abide even the force and budget reductions Powell proposed. Yet he knew that cuts were unavoidable. Having no alternative of his own to offer, therefore, he reluctantly encouraged Powell to present his ideas to the president. Powell did so the next day; Bush made no promises but encouraged him to keep at it.

Less encouraging was the reaction of Paul Wolfowitz, the undersecretary of defense for policy. A lifelong proponent of the unilateralist, maximum-force approach, he shared Cheney's skepticism about the Eastern Bloc and so put his own staff to work on

a competing plan that would somehow accommodate the possibility of Soviet backsliding.

As Powell and Wolfowitz worked out their strategies, Congress was losing patience. New calls went up for large cuts in defense spending in light of the new global environment. The harshest critique of Pentagon planning came from a usually dependable ally of the military establishment, Georgia Democrat Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services committee. Nunn told fellow senators in March 1990 that there was a "threat blank" in the administration's proposed \$295 billion defense budget and that the Pentagon's "basic assessment of the overall threat to our national security" was "rooted in the past." The world had changed and yet the "development of a new military strategy that responds to the changes in the threat has not yet occurred." Without that response, no dollars would be forthcoming.

Nunn's message was clear. Powell and Wolfowitz began filling in the blanks. Powell started promoting a Zen-like new rationale for his Base Force approach. With the Soviets rapidly becoming irrelevant, Powell argued, the United States could no longer assess its military needs on the basis of known threats. Instead, the Pentagon should focus on maintaining the ability to address a wide variety of new and unknown challenges. This shift from a "threat based" assessment of military requirements to a "capability based" assessment would become a key theme of the Plan. The United States would move from countering Soviet attempts at dominance to ensuring its own dominance. Again, this project would not be cheap.

Powell's argument, circular though it may have been, proved sufficient to hold off Congress. Winning support among his own colleagues, however, proved more difficult. Cheney remained deeply skeptical about the Soviets, and Wolfowitz was only slowly coming around. To account for future uncertainties, Wolfowitz recommended drawing down U.S. forces to roughly the levels proposed by Powell, but doing so at a much slower pace; seven years as opposed to the four Powell suggested. He also built in a "crisis response/reconstitution" clause that would allow for reversing the process if events in the Soviet Union, or elsewhere, turned ugly.

With these new elements in place, Cheney saw something that might work. By combining Powell's concepts with those of Wolfowitz, he could counter congressional criticism that his proposed defense budget was out of line with the new strategic reality, while leaving the door open for future force increases. In late June, Wolfowitz, Powell, and Cheney presented their plan to the president, and within a few weeks Bush was unveiling the new strategy.

Bush laid out the rationale for the Plan in a speech in Aspen, Colorado, on August 2, 1990. He explained that since the danger of global war had substantially receded, the principal threats to American security would emerge in unexpected quarters. To counter those threats, he said, the United States would increasingly base the size and structure of its forces on the need to respond to "regional contingencies" and maintain a peacetime military presence overseas. Meeting that need would require maintaining the capability to quickly deliver American forces to any "corner of the globe," and that would mean retaining many major weapons systems then under attack in Congress as overly costly and unnecessary, including the "Star Wars" missile-defense program. Despite those massive outlays, Bush insisted that the proposed restructuring would allow the United States to draw down its active forces by 25 percent in the years ahead, the same figure Powell had projected ten months earlier.

The Plan's debut was well timed. By a remarkable coincidence, Bush revealed it the very day Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait.

The Gulf War temporarily reduced the pressure to cut military spending. It also diverted attention from some of the Plan's less appealing aspects. In addition, it inspired what would become one of the Plan's key features: the use of "overwhelming force" to quickly defeat enemies, a concept since dubbed the Powell Doctrine.

Once the Iraqi threat was "contained," Wolfowitz returned to his obsession with the Soviets, planning various scenarios involved possible Soviet intervention in regional conflicts. The failure of the hard-liner coup against Gorbachev in August 1991, however, made it apparent that such planning might be unnecessary. Then, in late December, just as the Pentagon was preparing to put the Plan in place, the Soviet Union collapsed.

With the Soviet Union gone, the United States had a choice. It could capitalize on the euphoria of the moment by nurturing cooperative relations and developing multilateral structures to help guide the global realignment then taking place; or it could consolidate its power and pursue a strategy of unilateralism and global dominance. It chose the latter course.

In early 1992, as Powell and Cheney campaigned to win congressional support for their augmented Base Force plan, a new logic entered into their appeals. The United States, Powell told members of the House Armed Services Committee, required "sufficient power" to "deter any challenger from ever dreaming of challenging us on the world stage." To emphasize the point, he cast the United States in the role of street thug. "I want to be the bully on the block," he said, implanting in the mind of potential opponents that "there is no future in trying to challenge the armed forces of the United States."

As Powell and Cheney were making this new argument in their congressional rounds, Wolfowitz was busy expanding the concept and working to have it incorporated into U.S. policy. During the early months of 1992, Wolfowitz supervised the preparation of an internal Pentagon policy statement used to guide military officials in the preparation of their forces, budgets, and strategies. The classified document, known as the Defense Planning Guidance, depicted a world dominated by the United States, which would maintain its superpower status through a combination of positive guidance and overwhelming military might, the image was one of a heavily armed City on a Hill.

The DPG stated that the "first objective" of U.S. defense strategy was "to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival." Achieving this objective required that the United States "prevent any hostile power from dominating a region" of strategic significance. America's new mission would be to convince allies and enemies alike "that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests."

Another new theme was the use of preemptive military force. The options, the DPG noted, ranged from taking preemptive military action to head off a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack to "punishing" or "threatening punishment of" aggressors "through a variety of means," including strikes against weapons-manufacturing facilities.

The DPG also envisioned maintaining a substantial U.S. nuclear arsenal while discouraging the development of nuclear programs in other countries. It depicted a "U.S.-led system of collective security" that implicitly precluded the need for rearmament

of any kind by countries such as Germany and Japan. And it called for the "early introduction" of a global missile-defense system that would presumably render all missile-launched weapons, including those of the United States, obsolete. (The United States would, of course, remain the world's dominant military power on the strength of its other weapons systems.)

The story, in short, was dominance by way of unilateral action and military superiority. While coalitions—such as the one formed during the Gulf War—held "considerable promise for promoting collective action," the draft DPG stated, the United States should expect future alliances to be "ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond the crisis being confronted, and in many cases carrying only general agreement over the objectives to be accomplished." It was essential to create "the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the U.S." and essential that America position itself "to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated" or in crisis situation requiring immediate action. "While the U.S. cannot become the world's policeman," the document said, "we will retain the preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends." Among the interests the draft indicated the United States would defend in this manner were "access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, [and] threats to U.S. citizens from terrorism."

The DPG was leaked to the New York Times in March 1992. Critics on both the left and the right attacked it immediately. Then-presidential candidate Pat Buchanan portrayed candidate a "blank check" to America's allies by suggesting the United States would "go to war to defend their interests." Bill Clinton's deputy campaign manager, George Stephanopoulos, characterized it as an attempt by Pentagon officials to "find an excuse for big defense budgets instead of downsizing." Delaware Senator Joseph Biden criticized the Plan's vision of a "Pax Americana, a global security system where threats to stability are suppressed or destroyed by U.S. military power." Even those who found the document's stated goals commendable feared that its chauvinistic tone could alienate many allies. Cheney responded by attempting to distance himself from the Plan. The Pentagon's spokesman dismissed the leaked document as a "low-level draft" and claimed that Cheney had not seen it. Yet a fifteen-page section opened by proclaiming that it constituted "definitive guidance from the Secretary of Defense."

Powell took a more forthright approach to dealing with the flap: he publicly embraced the DPG's core concept. In a TV interview, he said he believed it was "just fine" that the United States reign as the world's dominant military power. "I don't think we should apologize for that," he said. Despite bad reviews in the foreign press, Powell insisted that America's European allies were "not afraid" of U.S. military might because it was "power that could be trusted" and "will not be misused."

Mindful that the draft DPG's overt expression of U.S. dominance might not fly, Powell in the same interview also trotted out a new rationale for the original Base Force plan. He argued that in a post-Soviet world, filled with new dangers, the United States needed the ability to fight on more than one front at a time. "One of the most destabilizing things we could do," he said, "is to cut our forces so much that if we're tied up in one area of the world . . . and we are not seen to have the ability to influence another area of

the world, we might invite just the sort of crisis we're trying to deter." This two-war strategy provided a possible answer to Nunn's "threat blank." One unknown enemy wasn't enough to justify lavish defense budgets, but two unknown enemies might do the trick.

Within a few weeks the Pentagon had come up with a more comprehensive response to the DPG furor. A revised version was leaked to the press that was significantly less strident in tone, though only slightly less strident in fact. While calling for the United States to prevent "any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests," the new draft stressed that America would act in concert with its allies—when possible. It also suggested the United Nations might take an expanded role in future political, economic, and security matters, a concept conspicuously absent from the original draft.

The controversy died down, and, with a presidential campaign under way, the Pentagon did nothing to stir it up again. Following Bush's defeat, however, the Plan re-emerged. In January 1993, in his very last days in office, Cheney released a final version. The newly titled Defense Strategy for the 1990s retained the soft touch of the revised draft DPG as well as its darker themes. The goal remained to preclude "hostile competitors from challenging our critical interests" and preventing the rise of a new super-power. Although it expressed a "preference" for collective responses in meeting such challenges, it made clear that the United States would play the lead role in any alliance. Moreover, it noted that collective action would "not always be timely." Therefore, the United States needed to retain the ability to "act independently, if necessary." To do so would require that the United States maintain its massive military superiority. Others were not encouraged to follow suit. It was kinder, gentler dominance, but it was dominance all the same. And it was this thesis that Cheney and company nailed to the door on their way out.

The new administration tacitly rejected the heavy-handed, unilateral approach to U.S. primacy favored by Powell, Cheney, and Wolfowitz. Taking office in the relative calm of the early post-Cold War era, Clinton sought to maximize America's existing position of strength and promote its interests through economic diplomacy, multilateral institutions (dominated by the United States), greater international free trade, and the development of allied coalitions, including American-led collective military action. American policy, in short, shifted from global dominance to globalism.

Clinton also failed to prosecute military campaigns with sufficient vigor to satisfy the defense strategists of the previous administration. Wolfowitz found Clinton's Iraq policy especially infuriating. During the Gulf War, Wolfowitz harshly criticized the decision—endorsed by Powell and Cheney—to end the war once the U.N. mandate of driving Saddam's forces from Kuwait had been fulfilled, leaving the Iraqi dictator in office. He called on the Clinton Administration to finish the job by arming Iraqi opposition forces and sending U.S. ground troops to defense a base of operation for them in the southern region of the country. In a 1996 editorial, Wolfowitz raised the prospect of launching a preemptive attack against Iraq. "Should we sit idly by," he wrote, "with our passive containment policy and our inept cover operations, and wait until a tyrant possessing large quantities of weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated delivery systems strikes out at us?" Wolfowitz suggested it was "necessary" to "go beyond the containment strategy."

Wolfowitz's objections to Clinton's military tactics were not limited to Iraq. Wolfowitz had endorsed President Bush's decision in late 1992 to intervene in Somalia on a limited humanitarian basis. Clinton later expanded the mission into a broader peace-keeping effort, a move that ended in disaster. With perfect twenty-twenty hindsight, Wolfowitz decried Clinton's decision to send U.S. troops into combat "where there is no significant U.S. national interest." He took a similar stance on Clinton's ill-fated democracy-building effort in Haiti, chastising the president for engaging "American military prestige" on an issue "of the little or no importance" to U.S. interests. Bosnia presented a more complicated mix of posturing and ideologues. While running for president, Clinton had scolded the Bush Administration for failing to take action to stem the flow of blood in the Balkans. Once in office, however, and chastened by their early misadventures in Somalia and Haiti, Clinton and his advisers struggled to articulate a coherent Bosnia policy. Wolfowitz complained in 1994 of the administration's failure to "develop an effective course of action." He personally advocated arming the Bosnian Muslims in their fight against the Serbs. Powell, on the other hand, publicly cautioned against intervention. In 1995 a U.S.-led NATO bombing campaign, combined with a Croat-Muslim ground offensive, forced the Serbs into negotiations, leading to the Dayton Peace Accords. In 1999, as Clinton rounded up support for joint U.S.-NATO action in Kosovo, Wolfowitz hectored the president for failing to act quickly enough.

After eight years of what Cheney et al. regarded as wrong-headed military adventures and pinprick retaliatory strikes, the Clinton Administration—mercifully, in their view—came to an end. With the ascension of George W. Bush to the presidency, the authors of the Plan returned to government, ready to pick up where they had left off. Cheney of course, became vice president, Powell became secretary of state, and Wolfowitz moved into the number two slot at the Pentagon, as Donald Rumsfeld's deputy. Other contributors also returned: Two prominent members of the Wolfowitz team that crafted the original DPG took up posts on Cheney's staff. I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, who served as Wolfowitz's deputy during Bush I, became the vice president's chief of staff and national security adviser. And Eric Edelman, an assistant deputy undersecretary of defense in the first Bush Administration, became a top foreign policy adviser to Cheney.

Cheney and company had not changed their minds during the Clinton interlude about the correct course for U.S. policy, but they did not initially appear bent on resurrecting the Plan. Rather than present a unified vision of foreign policy to the world, in the early going the administration focused on promoting a series of seemingly unrelated initiatives. Notable among these were missile defense and space-based weaponry, longstanding conservative causes. In addition, a distinct tone of unilateralism emerged as the new administration announced its intent to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia in order to pursue missile defense; its opposition to U.S. ratification of an international nuclear-test-ban pact; and its refusal to become a party to an International Criminal Court. It also raised the prospect of ending the self-imposed U.S. moratorium on nuclear testing initiated by the President's father during the 1992 presidential campaign. Moreover, the administration adopted a much tougher diplomatic posture, as evidenced, most notably, by a distinct hardening of relations with both China and North Korea. While none of this was inconsistent with the concept of U.S. domi-

nance, these early actions did not, at the time, seem to add up to a coherent strategy.

It was only after September 11 that the Plan emerged in full. Within days of the attacks, Wolfowitz and Libby began calling for unilateral military action against Iraq, on the shaky premise that Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network could not have pulled off the assaults without Saddam Hussein's assistance. At the time, Bush rejected such appeals, but Wolfowitz kept pushing and the President soon came around. In his State of the Union address in January, Bush labeled Iraq, Iran, and North Korea an "axis of evil," and warned that he would "not wait on events" to prevent them from using weapons of mass destruction against the United States. He reiterated his commitment to preemption in his West Point speech in June. "If we wait for threats to fully materialize we will have waited too long," he said. "We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge." Although it was less noted, Bush in that same speech also reintroduced the Plan's central theme. He declared that the United States would prevent the emergence of a rival power by maintaining "military strengths beyond the challenge." With that, the President effectively adopted a strategy his father's administration had developed ten years earlier to ensure that the United States would remain the world's preeminent power. While the headlines screamed "preemption," no one noticed the declaration of the dominance strategy.

In case there was any doubt about the administration's intentions, the Pentagon's new DPG lays them out. Signed by Wolfowitz's new boss, Donald Rumsfeld, in May and leaked to the Los Angeles Times in July, it contains all the key elements of the original Plan and adds several complementary features. The preemptive strikes envisioned in the original draft DPG are now "unwarned attacks." The old Powell-Cheney notion of military "forward presence" is now "forwarded deterrence." The use of overwhelming force to defeat an enemy called for in the Powell Doctrine is now labeled an "effects based" approach.

Some of the names have stayed the same. Missile defense is back, stronger than ever, and the call goes up again for a shift from a "threat based" structure to a "capabilities based" approach. The new DPG also emphasizes the need to replace the so-called Cold War strategy of preparing to fight two major conflicts simultaneously with what the Los Angeles Times refers to as "a more complex approach aimed at dominating air and space on several fronts." This, despite the fact that Powell had originally conceived—and the first Bush Administration had adopted—the two-war strategy as a means of filling the "threat blank" left by the end of the Cold War.

Rumsfeld's version adds a few new ideas, most impressively the concept of preemptive strikes with nuclear weapons. These would be earth-penetrating nuclear weapons used for attacking "hardened and deeply buried targets," such as command-and-control bunkers, missile silos, and heavily fortified underground facilities used to build and store weapons of mass destruction. The concept emerged earlier this year when the administration's Nuclear Posture Review leaked out. At the time, arms-control experts warned that adopting the NPR's recommendations would undercut existing arms-control treaties, do serious harm to nonproliferation efforts, set off new rounds of testing, and dramatically increase the prospect of nuclear weapons being used in combat. Despite these concerns, the administration appears intent on developing the weapons. In a final flourish, the DPG also directs the military to develop cyber-, laser-,

and electronic-warfare capabilities to ensure U.S. dominion over the heavens.

Rumsfeld spelled out these strategies in Foreign affairs earlier this year, and it is there that he articulated the remaining elements of the Plan: unilateralism and global dominance. Like the revised DPG of 1992, Rumsfeld feigns interest in collective action but ultimately rejects it as impractical. "Wars can benefit from coalitions," he writes, "but they should not be fought by committee." And coalitions, he adds, "must not determine the mission." The implication is the United States will determine the missions and lead the fights. Finally, Rumsfeld expresses the key concept of the Plan: preventing the emergence of rival powers. Like the original draft DPG of 1992, he states that America's goal is to develop and maintain the military strength necessary to "dissuade" rivals or adversaries from "competing" with no challengers, and a proposed defense budget of \$379 billion for next year, the United States would reign over all its surveys.

Reaction to the latest edition of the Plan has, thus far, focused on preemption. Commentators parrot the administration's line, portraying the concept of preemptory strikes as a "new" strategy aimed at combating terrorism. In an op-ed piece for the Washington Post following Bush's West Point address, former Clinton adviser William Galston described preemption as part of a "brand-new security doctrine," and warned of possible negative diplomatic consequences. Others found the concept more appealing. Loren Thompson of the conservative Lexington Institute hailed the "Bush Doctrine" as "a necessary response to the new dangers that America faces" and declared it "the biggest shift in strategic thinking in two generations." Wall Street Journal editor Robert Bartley echoed that sentiment, writing that "no talk of this ilk has been heard from American leaders since John Foster Dulles talked of rolling back the Iron Curtain."

Preemption, of course, is just part of the Plan, and the Plan is hardly new. It is a warmed-over version of the strategy Cheney and his coauthors rolled out in 1992 as the answer to the end of the Cold War. Then the goal was global dominance, and it met with bad reviews. Now it is the answer to terrorism. The emphasis is on preemption, and the reviews are generally enthusiastic. Through all of this, the dominance motif remains, though largely undetected.

This country once rejected "unwarned" attacks such as Pearl Harbor as barbarous and unworthy of a civilized nation. Today many cheer the prospect of conducting sneak attacks—potentially with nuclear weapons—on piddling powers run by tin-pot despots.

We also once denounced those who tried to rule the world. Our primary objection (at least officially) to the Soviet Union as its quest for global domination. Through the successful employment of the tools of containment, deterrence, collective security, and diplomacy—the very methods we now reject—we rid ourselves and the world of the Evil Empire. Having done so, we now pursue the very thing for which we opposed it. And now that the Soviet Union is gone, there appears to be no one left to stop us.

Perhaps, however, there is. The Bush Administration and its loyal opposition seem not to grasp that the quests for dominance generate backlash. Those threatened with preemption may themselves launch preemptory strikes. And even those who are successfully "preempted" or dominated may object and find means to strike back. Pursuing such strategies may, paradoxically, result in greater factionalism and rivalry, precisely the things we seek to end.

Not all Americans share Colin Powell's desire to be "the bully on the block." In fact,

some believe that by following a different path the United States has an opportunity to establish a more lasting security environment. As Dartmouth professors Stephen Brooks and William Woblforth wrote recently in Foreign Affairs, "Unipolarity makes it possible to be the global bully—but it also offers the United States the luxury of being able to look beyond its immediate needs to its own, and the world's, long-term interests. . . . Magnanimity and restraint in the face of temptation are tenets of successful statecraft that have proved their worth." Perhaps, in short, we can achieve our desired ends by means other than global domination.

[From the Wall Street Journal, Aug. 15, 2002]

DON'T ATTACK SADDAM—IT WOULD
UNDERMINE OUR ANTITERROR EFFORTS
(By Brent Scowcroft)

Our nation is presently engaged in a debate about whether to launch a war against Iraq. Leaks of various strategies for an attack on Iraq appear with regularity. The Bush administration vows regime change, but states that no decision has been made whether, much less when, to launch an invasion.

It is beyond dispute that Saddam Hussein is a menace. He terrorizes and brutalizes his own people. He has launched war on two of his neighbors. He devotes enormous effort to rebuilding his military forces and equipping them with weapons of mass destruction. We will all be better off when he is gone.

That said, we need to think through this issue very carefully. We need to analyze the relationship between Iraq and our other pressing priorities—notably the war on terrorism—as well as the best strategy and tactics available were we to move to change the regime in Baghdad.

Saddam's strategic objective appears to be to dominate the Persian Gulf, to control oil from the region, or both.

That clearly poses a real threat to key U.S. interests. But there is scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the Sept. 11 attacks. Indeed Saddam's goals have little in common with the terrorists who threaten us, and there is little incentive for him to make common cause with them.

He is unlikely to risk his investment in weapons of mass destruction, much less his country, by handing such weapons to terrorists who would use them for their own purposes and leave Baghdad as the return address. Threatening to use these weapons for blackmail—much less their actual use—would open him and his entire regime to a devastating response by the U.S. While Saddam is thoroughly evil, he is above all a power-hungry survivor.

Saddam is a familiar dictatorial aggressor, with traditional goals for his aggression. There is little evidence to indicate that the United States itself is an object of his aggression. Rather, Saddam's problem with the U.S. appears to be that we stand in the way of his ambitions. He seeks weapons of mass destruction not to arm terrorists, but to deter us from intervening to block his aggressive designs.

Given Saddam's aggressive regional ambitions, as well as his ruthlessness and unpredictability, it may at some point be wise to remove him from power. Whether and when that point should come ought to depend on overall U.S. national security priorities. Our pre-eminent security priority—underscored repeatedly by the president—is the war on terrorism. An attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the global counterterrorist campaign we have undertaken.

The United States could certainly defeat the Iraqi military and destroy Saddam's re-

gime. But it would not be a cakewalk. On the contrary, it undoubtedly would be very expensive—with serious consequences for the U.S. and global economy—and could as well be bloody. In fact, Saddam would be likely to conclude he had nothing left to lose, leading him to unleash whatever weapons of mass destruction he possesses.

Israel would have to expect to be the first casualty, as in 1991 when Saddam sought to bring Israel into the Gulf conflict. This time, using weapons of mass destruction, he might succeed, provoking Israel to respond, perhaps with nuclear weapons, unleashing an Armageddon in the Middle East. Finally, if we are to achieve our strategic objectives in Iraq, a military campaign very likely would have to be followed by a large-scale, long-term military occupation.

But the central point is that any campaign against Iraq, whatever the strategy, cost and risks, is certain to divert us for some indefinite period from our war on terrorism. Worse, there is a virtual consensus in the world against an attack on Iraq at this time. So long as that sentiment persists, it would require the U.S. to pursue a virtual go-it-alone strategy against Iraq, making any military operations correspondingly more difficult and expensive. The most serious cost, however, would be to the war on terrorism. Ignoring that clear sentiment would result in a serious degradation in international cooperation with us against terrorism. And make no mistake, we simply cannot win that war without enthusiastic international cooperation, especially on intelligence.

Possibly the most dire consequences would be the effect in the region. The shared view in the region is that Iraq is principally an obsession of the U.S. The obsession of the region, however, is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If we were seen to be turning our backs on that bitter conflict—which the region, rightly or wrongly, perceives to clearly within our power to resolve—in order to go after Iraq, there would be an explosion of outrage against us. We would be seen as ignoring a key interest of the Muslim world in order to satisfy what is seen to be a narrow American interest.

Even without Israeli involvement, the results could well destabilize Arab regimes in the region, ironically facilitating one of Saddam's strategic objectives. At a minimum, it would stifle any cooperation on terrorism, and could even swell the ranks of the terrorists. Conversely, the more progress we make in the war on terrorism, and the more we are seen to be committed to resolving the Israel-Palestinian issue, the greater will be the international support for going after Saddam.

If we are truly serious about the war on terrorism, it must remain our top priority. However, should Saddam Hussein be found to be clearly implicated in the events of Sept. 11, that could make him a key counterterrorist target, rather than a competing priority, and significantly shift world opinion toward support for regime change.

In any event, we should be pressing the United Nations Security Council to insist on an effective no-notice inspection regime for Iraq—any time, anywhere, no permission required. On this point, senior administration officials have opined that Saddam Hussein would never agree to such an inspection regime. But if he did, inspections would serve to keep him off balance and under close observation, even if all his weapons of mass destruction capabilities were not uncovered. And if he refused, his rejection could provide the persuasive *casus belli* which many claim we do not now have. Compelling evidence that Saddam had acquired nuclear-weapons capability could have a similar effect.

In sum, if we will act in full awareness of the intimate interrelationship of the key issues in the region, keeping counterterrorism as our foremost priority, there is much potential for success across the entire range of our security interests—including Iraq. If we reject a comprehensive perspective, however, we put at risk our campaign against terrorism as well as stability and security in a vital region of the world.

[From the New York Times, Aug. 25, 2002]

THE RIGHT WAY TO CHANGE A REGIME

(By James A. Baker III)

PINEDALE, WYO.—While there may be little evidence that Iraq has ties to Al Qaeda or to the attacks of Sept. 11, there is no question that its present government, under Saddam Hussein, is an outlaw regime, is in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions, is embarked upon a program of developing weapons of mass destruction and is a threat to peace and stability, both in the Middle East and, because of the risk of proliferation of these weapons, in other parts of the globe. Peace-loving nations have a moral responsibility to fight against the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by rogues like Saddam Hussein. We owe it to our children and grandchildren to do so, and leading that fight is, and must continue to be, an important foreign policy priority for America.

And thus regime change in Iraq is the policy of the current administration, just as it was the policy of its predecessor. That being the case, the issue for policymakers to resolve is not whether to use military force to achieve this, but how to go about it.

Covert action has been tried before and failed every time, Iraqi opposition groups are not strong enough to get the job done. It will not happen through internal revolt, either of the army or the civilian population. We would have to be extremely lucky to take out the top leadership through insertion into Iraq of a small rapid-strike force. And this last approach carries significant political risks for the administration, as President Jimmy Carter found out in April 1980.

The only realistic way to effect regime change in Iraq is through the application of military force, including sufficient ground troops to occupy the country (including Baghdad), depose the current leadership and install a successor government. Anyone who thinks we can effect regime change in Iraq with anything less than this is simply not realistic. It cannot be done on the cheap. It will require substantial forces and substantial time to put those forces in place to move. We had over 500,000 Americans, and more soldiers from our many allies, for the Persian Gulf war. There will be casualties, probably quite a few more than in that war, since the Iraqis will be fighting to defend their homeland. Sadly, there also will be civilian deaths. We will face the problem of how long to occupy and administer a big, fractious country and what type of government or administration should follow. Finding Saddam Hussein and his top associates will be difficult. It took us two weeks to locate Manuel Noriega in Panama, a small country where we had military bases.

Unless we do it in the right way, there will be costs to other Americans foreign policy interests, including our relationships with practically all other Arab countries (and even many of our customary allies in Europe and elsewhere) and perhaps even to our top foreign policy priority, the war on terrorism.

Finally, there will be the cost to the American taxpayer of a military undertaking of this magnitude. The Persian Gulf war cost somewhere in the range of \$60 billion, but we

were able to convince our many allies in that effort to bear the brunt of the costs.

So how should we proceed to effect regime change in Iraq?

Although the United States could certainly succeed, we should try our best not to go it alone, and the president should reject the advice of those who counsel doing so. The costs in all areas will be much greater, as will the political risks, both domestic and international, if we end up going it alone or with only one or two other countries.

The president should do his best to stop his advisers and their surrogates from playing out their differences publicly and try to get everybody on the same page.

The United States should advocate the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of a simple and straightforward resolution that Iraq submit to intrusive inspections anytime, anywhere, with no exceptions, and authorizing all necessary means to enforce it. Although it is technically true that the United Nations already has sufficient legal authority to deal with Iraq, the failure to act when Saddam Hussein ejected the inspectors has weakened that authority. Seeking new authorization now is necessary, politically and practically, and will help build international support.

Some will argue, as was done in 1990, that going for United Nations authority and not getting it will weaken our case. I disagree. By proposing to proceed in such a way, we will be doing the right thing, both politically and substantively. We will occupy the moral high ground and put the burden of supporting an outlaw regime and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on any countries that vote no. History will be an unkind judge for those who prefer to do business rather than to do the right thing. And even if the administration fails in the Security Council, it is still free—citing Iraq's flouting of the international community's resolutions and perhaps Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which guarantees a nation's right to self-defense—to weigh the costs versus the benefit of going forward alone.

Others will argue that this approach would give Saddam Hussein a way out because he might agree and then begin the "cheat-and-retreat" tactics he used during the first inspection regime. And so we must not be deterred. The first time he resorts to these tactics, we should apply whatever means are necessary to change the regime. And the international community must know during the Security Council debate that this will be our policy.

We should frankly recognize that our problem in accomplishing regime change in Iraq is made more difficult by the way our policy on the Arab-Israeli dispute is perceived around the world. Sadly, in international politics, as in domestic politics, perception is sometimes more important than reality. We cannot allow our policy toward Iraq to be linked to the Arab-Israeli dispute, as Saddam Hussein will cynically demand, just as he did in 1990 and 1991. But to avoid that, we need to move affirmatively, aggressively, and in a fair and balanced way to implement the president's vision for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, as laid out in his June speech. That means, of course, reform by Palestinians and an end to terror tactics. But it also means withdrawal by Israeli forces to positions occupied before September 2000 and an immediate end to settlement activity.

If we are to change the regime in Iraq, we will have to occupy the country militarily. The costs of doing so, politically, economically and in terms of casualties, could be great. They will be lessened if the president brings together an international coalition behind the effort. Doing so would also help in

achieving the continuing support of the American people, a necessary prerequisite for any successful foreign policy.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MARKEY).

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, the Spratt approach is the correct approach. It says that the President, should go to the United Nations, go to Kofi Annan and tell him that we authorize President Bush to use all of the Armed Forces necessary to eliminate the chemical, the biological and the nuclear weapons of Saddam Hussein; and if Kofi Annan and the U.N. say, "no, we will not authorize that," then it says that the President can come back to the United States Congress immediately, and then we would authorize the President to go in to Iraq with any other Nation in the world that would want to join us, and we will ensure that the chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of Saddam Hussein are taken from his possession.

This is the way to go. If the U.N. says no, then we can say "yes" but the President has an obligation to go to the United Nations first and to find out if Kofi Annan and the U.N. we will not forcibly ensure that these weapons of mass destruction are confiscated.

Vote yes on Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. TAUSCHER).

Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding me the time.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to state my strong support for the gentleman from South Carolina's (Mr. SPRATT) substitute.

As a member of the Committee on Armed Services, I am deeply concerned by the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, but I also strongly believe that the United States has a responsibility as the world's only superpower to set a standard for international behavior. We must consider every peaceable alternative and contemplate every possible outcome before we turn to force.

The gentleman from South Carolina's (Mr. SPRATT) amendment is invaluable because it strengthens America's position at the United Nations in support of new Security Council resolutions that Secretary Powell is negotiating as we speak.

The gentleman from South Carolina's (Mr. SPRATT) amendment sends a strong signal to our allies and to Saddam that the United States is committed to defeating the threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

It ensures that our actions have international legitimacy and that, just like in 1991, we share the cost of war with our allies instead of putting the burden solely on the American people.

If we are unable to secure resolution at the U.N., it provides for expedited congressional consideration of a joint resolution authorizing the use of force.

I encourage my colleagues to vote for the Spratt amendment.

□ 1145

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. CLYBURN), my colleague.

Mr. CLYBURN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from my home State for yielding me this time and for his leadership on this and many other issues in this body.

Mr. Speaker, there is not a single Member of this body who does not believe Saddam Hussein is a tyrant who has murdered his own people, violated U.N. sanctions, and thumbed his nose at the world community. However, this body and our Nation are deeply divided as to the proper course of action at this juncture.

My cosponsorship of the Spratt amendment reflects that uncertainty among my constituents. The American people and our allies around the world have placed calls to my office expressing overwhelming lack of support for preemptive military action. Shoot now and ask questions later has never been the American way and it should not be it now.

It is an awesome responsibility to have the power to set events in motion that could forever alter another country, an entire region, not to mention our Nation's future relationships in the world community. We should not put the lives of our youth at risk and further fuel the fervor of terrorist actions against our homeland. We should not duck our responsibilities as Members of Congress. I believe this substitute is the best action to take at this particular juncture.

Many of us lived through Vietnam and saw its wretched effects on our Nation. This is not the time to commit to an unpopular unilateral act of aggression, especially one with such great potential for devastating consequences.

Mr. Speaker, just because we can do it does not mean we should.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

History is an exciting adventure. On April 28, 1999, in this very Chamber, right where we are now, this House voted to allow the President, President Clinton, without any U.N. resolution, to take military action: Bombing in Kosovo. And among those who voted to allow the President to do this, without a U.N. resolution, but to go ahead, gung ho, was virtually everybody that has spoken on that side of the Chamber.

Absolutely, I applaud them. I do not know what changed them, why they now demand we process this through the U.N., but they did not feel that way back then, in April of 1999, and I have the rollcall if anybody cares to see it. But everybody voted to bomb Kosovo. Now, is that because that was President Clinton? There must be some explanation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. COX).

Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong agreement with all of the essential premises of the Spratt resolution

and urge a "no" vote because of its conclusion. The Spratt resolution, like the Lee resolution before it, spells out precisely all of the reasons that we are here today; that Saddam Hussein and Iraq have unconditionally agreed to destroy all chemical and biological weapons there, ballistic missiles, to stop the development and the seeking of nuclear weapons; that Iraq unconditionally agreed to immediate inspections.

The Spratt resolution goes on to say, and would have this Congress find, that Iraq and Saddam Hussein have "flagrantly violated these unconditional terms." The Spratt resolution goes on to say that Saddam Hussein and Iraq are currently supporting international terrorism and continuing to develop chemical and biological weapons and actively seeking nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles to deliver them. But here, unlike the Lee resolution before it, the Spratt resolution does not denounce the use of force but rather says that at this time we should have a U.N. resolution that expressly authorizes the use of force; and, if such a U.N. resolution is adopted, then, by section 3 of this Spratt resolution, the Congress today would have anticipatorily authorized the use of force, expressly authorized President Bush to use military force to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

It even provides an expedited procedure for the President to get Congressional authority for war if the U.N. does not act. In short, this resolution, an alternative resolution that we are now considering, accepts every single premise of House Joint Resolution 114 that is supported by President Bush, the Speaker of the House, the Democratic leader of the House, the Republican leader of the Senate, and, as of today, the Democratic leader of the Senate.

The Spratt resolution accepts the operative conclusion of House Joint Resolution 114 that the authorization of military force is essential. It is essential if this time we are to succeed where 16 past U.N. resolutions have failed. So the only real difference is that this different way of going after all of the same objectives, based on all of the same premises, this Rube Goldberg mechanism that we have set up, will scuttle the broad agreement that has been reached among the House, the Senate, and the executive and legislative branches, this consensus that America will stand as one.

This resolution will jeopardize, in fact, passage of the very U.N. resolution that it purports to support.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. LEVIN).

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from California (Mr. COX) is right, there are similarities in the two resolutions. The issue, though, is whether we are going to emphasize going together or going it alone. The difference is whether we are going to emphasize collective action, trying the

U.N. first, or whether we are going to give to this President now the right to act unilaterally, without going back to this Congress.

We will strengthen the voice of the American people and we will speak with one voice more under the Spratt resolution because there is a division in this House under the resolution that has been brought forth on the majority side. If we want to speak with one voice, let us say try collective action. If it works, we will have acted together, as we did in Bosnia through NATO. If it does not, Mr. President, come back here on an expedited basis and we will act. That is the best chance for one voice.

A very vital vote here today will be on the Spratt resolution. I think it is the wise way to go and is consonant with where the American people are.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. PELOSI).

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time and for his extraordinary leadership in presenting this option to the House of Representatives. I also want to commend him for his leadership as a person who speaks for our Armed Services in this Congress, his commitment to provide for the common defense, as provided for in the Preamble of our Constitution. Today, we are all benefiting from his wisdom.

The Spratt substitute, Mr. Speaker, captures many of the concerns of the American people who overwhelmingly support a multilateral approach to dealing with Saddam Hussein. The Spratt substitute also honors the Constitution when it says that Congress shall declare war.

Some who have opposed the Spratt substitute have done so on the basis that we do not have time to come back to the Congress. This is simply not true. As called for in the Spratt substitute, should the Security Council fail to act in a satisfactory way, we come back to the Congress.

I want to speak to the issue of time by quoting what is now declassified but is contained in a letter from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the chairman of the Senate Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, this letter, signed by George Tenet. When asked if Saddam did not feel threatened, is it likely he would initiate an attack using a weapon of mass destruction, the Director of Central Intelligence responds in this letter and says, "My judgment would be that the probability of him," Saddam, "initiating an attack, let me put a time frame on it, in the foreseeable future, given the conditions we understand now, the likelihood I think would be low."

This is the Director of Central Intelligence saying the likelihood of Saddam initiating an attack using weapons of mass destruction, the likelihood, would be low. So it is not about time. It is about the Constitution. It is about

this Congress asserting its right to declare war when we are fully aware of what the challenges are to us, and it is about respecting the United Nations and a multilateral approach, which is safer for our troops.

Force protection. I have been on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for 10 years, longer than anyone. My service there is coming to an end. But in the time that I have been there, force protection is one of our top priorities, to protect the men and women in uniform.

This letter goes on to say, "If we initiate an attack," if he felt he was threatened, "if we initiate an attack and he thought he was in extremis or otherwise, what is the likelihood in response to our attack that he would use chemical and biological weapons?" The response, "Pretty high."

We are placing our young people in harm's way in a way that can be avoided by taking a multilateral approach first. I commend the gentleman from South Carolina for his leadership. I will support this with great pride, and I thank him for giving us that opportunity.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, could I inquire of the Chair how much time I have remaining?

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LAHOOD). The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT) has 4 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE) has 4 minutes remaining.

Mr. SPRATT. And the gentleman from Illinois has the right to close, or do I have the right to close?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE) has the right to close.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to respond to some arguments that have been raised. Let me go back to Public Law 102-1; the allegation that somehow, somewhere this bill supplants it.

Far from supplanting that bill, which was the Afghan War Powers Act, we reassert in this legislation the primacy of our policy, and that is to go after al Qaeda. We do that by saying to the President, before we go off in pursuit of another armed objective, military objective, we want you to tell us that this is not going to divert our focus from the primary objective, which is to get the guys that did what they did in New York on 9/11. We do not want to divert or dilute our focus from that at all. That is in the centerpiece of this particular bill.

My good friend, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE), has said that many of us on this side of the aisle voted for action in Kosovo. I did. And I am proud of it because we stopped another butchery in the backyard of Europe by doing so. We did not go to the U.N. then, and the gentleman knows why. Because the Russians are on the Security Council and they would have blocked us.

Politics and diplomacy is a pragmatic thing. That is why we did not go

there. But it was multilateral, because it was an undertaking by NATO, and we tried to use collective defense in that particular case. It simply proves the points.

Now, let me say something else that I said at the outset because it is important. A lot of good people have argued that we are relying too much, too heavily on the U.N., and specifically on the Security Council, because that is really the body that applies here. But I was here in 1991, and when President Bush asked for a vote to go to war in the Persian Gulf, I was one of 86 on this side of the aisle who said you have got my support, Mr. President.

□ 1200

But remember what he did then, just days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, President Bush said this invasion will not stand, but he also declared his vision was nothing less than a new world order. His words, a new world order.

He turned first to the United Nations and went to the Security Council and got the first in a series of resolutions that culminated in Resolution 678 which authorized the use of force. President Bush obtained all those Security Council resolutions, with our support, but without an express war powers resolution until literally days before the war began.

Rather than asserting that he could go it alone, stiffing the Security Council, he sought the Security Council approval. He sought allies to stand with us and cover approximately \$62 billion out of the \$66 billion total cost of the war. The result, a successful military action, a successful diplomacy, and I think a model worth emulating. And that is exactly what this resolution does.

Where does this resolution come from? A couple of weeks ago, we had one of the last of the general officers who testified before our committee who has experience in this area, Wes Clarke, whom I greatly respect. He is certainly no warrior who shrinks from a fight. He was always advocating force in Bosnia to straighten out that situation there and in the Balkans.

Here is what he told us. He said, First of all, time is on your side right now. Make the maximum advantage of it. First go for beefed-up arms inspections, a more truthful inspections program. This will have a couple of benefits. It will constrain Saddam, and it will give you legitimacy when he ultimately bucks you.

Secondly, he said, our diplomacy will be further strengthened if we have an act adopted by Congress expressing our resolve to use force if necessary. But he said the resolution need not at this point authorize the use of force. It need simply agree on the intent to authorize the use of force if other measures fail.

Mr. Speaker, that is exactly what we have done, both of those things.

Finally, he said, If efforts to resolve the problems by the United Nations fail, seek the broadest possible coalition to bring force to bear.

We have done what General Clark has recommended. It is embodied in this resolution. It follows the precedent set by President Bush. It is worthy of every Member's support, and I hope Members will vote for it.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. GRAHAM).

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LAHOOD). The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. GRAHAM) is recognized for 4 minutes.

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Speaker, this is a very worthy, appropriate debate and could not be more serious.

The gentleman from Connecticut, a very good friend of mine whom I admire greatly, indicated that, in his opinion, the Spratt resolution would strengthen the hand of the President.

Here is what the President believes. He rejects that. He does not believe that the Spratt resolution strengthens his hand.

He asked us Monday night to come together and speak with one voice. What has happened over the last few weeks is amazing, and the American public should rejoice in it. The Speaker of the House, the minority leader, a group of bipartisan Senators, MCCAIN and LIEBERMAN and others, have sat down with the White House and have structured a resolution that gives a one-voice approach to a very serious problem for our country.

I am not here to tell Members that they should follow blindly their President or their leadership. God knows, I have never been accused of that. But in matters such as this, we must try to achieve consensus because so much is at stake.

Many watch what we say and do here. Please do not believe otherwise. We will either be stronger, or weaker, in our ability to negotiate and to make the world safer. There is strength in HASTERT, GEPHARDT, HYDE and LANTOS. The strength comes from the Speaker, the minority leader, committee chairmen and ranking members and the President reaching consensus. No disrespect to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT), but that is strength. The Spratt resolution would show weakness.

It would be a defeat for the House leadership. It would be a defeat for our President. Other Members can write the headlines tomorrow. I choose not to write that headline because our enemies are watching, and they read.

The Spratt resolution, I think, is ill-advised and ill-structured. To suggest that our President is not working with the United Nations would be wrong. The Speaker, the minority leader, and a bipartisan group of Senators believe he is; and the facts are clear that he is. He is working with our allies. He is trying to find a way to disarm this terrible, evil person before he does more damage.

The resolution that the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT) is asking us to adopt not only would be a

rejection of this consensus, but it would mandate by U.S. law that the United Nations act before the President can act.

I speak again. The U.S. Congress would be telling the President he must go to the U.N. and he must win their political game. We would be making our President win a political game that I do not want to put him in.

I believe the resolution is clear on what would be required of the President before he could act. U.N. politics takes a dominance in the Spratt amendment, not the one we are trying to support here today.

If he loses the U.N. political battle, the President comes back to this body, and just imagine the frenzy. Write those headlines. The President comes back a loser in U.N. politics, and the forces in this world will seize upon that, and we will be weaker, not stronger, more division, a horrible scenario. Please reject it. I know many Members want to vote yes/yes. That may be good politics, but it would be bad for the country.

Mr. Speaker, there are forces for good in this world, none greater than the U.S. Congress. Use our powers wisely. The world is watching.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair must remind Members that positions of Senators may not be characterized beyond identifying a Senator as a sponsor of a measure.

Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Spratt amendment to H.J. Res. 114. I applaud the respected gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. SPRATT, for his hard work and good sense on this amendment.

This proposal is not perfect. I also question whether this amendment will, in practice, serve as an adequate check on the Administration's rush to act unilaterally in Iraq.

But this Amendment is by far the best option we have on the floor today. It recognizes what the other two options on the floor do not: that while the U.S. may ultimately need to act alone to disarm Iraq, we should do so only if it is absolutely necessary.

The Spratt Amendment authorizes the use of the U.S. armed forces to support any new U.N. Security Council resolution that mandates the elimination, by force if necessary, of all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

If, in the absence of a satisfactory U.N. Security Council resolution, the President determines it is necessary to proceed with force, it calls on the President to seek the authorization of Congress and provides expedited consideration for authorization.

I firmly believe that military force should not be used until after the U.N. inspections. Force should not be used until all diplomatic channels have been exercised. And we should clearly understand what will be required for rebuilding the country. There are several good aspects of the Spratt Resolution worth emphasizing: it discusses force in the context of disarming Saddam Hussein, not as regime change; it places the burden of enforcing U.N. resolutions on the U.N. Security Council; and it allows the U.S. to act if the Security Council does not adequately fulfill its responsibility.

This is a reasoned approach that rejects the use of unilateral action, of preemptive action,

and preserves the checks and balances that are required of our government.

I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am supporting the Spratt amendment because it provides many safeguards to war—it authorizes the use of force through a new UN Security Council Resolution; however, should the UN not adopt a resolution sanctioning the use of force or not take any action at all, the amendment would allow the President, if he deemed the UN Security Council's action insufficient, to come to Congress to obtain authorization to use the United States Armed Forces against Iraq. Most importantly, the Spratt amendment allows Congress to retain its rightful role in the constitutional process as the body having the authority to declare war.

The Spratt amendment is an especially important safeguard—because it would give the United Nations, essentially, the World, time to examine the threat that Hussein poses and then, in a sobering fashion, make a determination as to whether a new resolution regarding the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction should be adopted or whether to use of force is the appropriate response to the threat that Saddam Hussein poses.

We must not move hastily to the sobering decision to use force against another country. As it was discovered yesterday, it is now known that the CIA has concluded Saddam Hussein is unlikely to initiate a chemical or biological attack against the United States. Based on this CIA assessment, an attack on Iraq could provide the very thing the President claims he is trying to forestall—the use of chemical or biological weapons by Saddam.

I believe it is extremely important that exhaust all avenues of peace, make use of all safeguards prior to sending our troops into battle. We cannot be injudicious, premature or inaccurate in our decision to go to war. The Spratt amendment makes the possibility of a unilateral attack on Iraq the last option—not the first. Let's give the UN and the U.S. a greater ability work towards a peaceful resolution of our concerns with Saddam Hussein.

Mr. CAPUANO. Mr. Speaker, the substitute amendment introduced by Mr. SPRATT improves on the base resolution, H.J. Res. 114, because it requires that the United States continue working with the United Nations to enforce existing Security Council Resolutions and to craft stronger resolutions addressing concerns over weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Instead of simply handing the President a blank check to wage war, this amendment urges the President to continue working with the UN Security Council.

I will vote for the Spratt amendment because I believe it is a better alternative than the base resolution. I do not believe that the amendment will pass. If it does, however, I will vote No on final passage because I do not believe that the Spratt amendment does enough to explore all options resorting to war.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, we face today one of the most important questions that can ever come before us as Members of Congress: whether to authorize the use of force, and commit the men and women of our armed forces to defend liberty and to protect the United States, at the possible cost of their lives—and the lives of many in a country far from our shores.

It is an issue Americans care deeply about. I have received hundreds of calls during the

past few weeks, and many of my constituents are raising similar and very serious concerns.

They are suspicious of the timing of this debate. They see political overtones to it, and question whether this vote is being used as political purposes.

Many are worried about the precedent of a preemptive and unilateral attack, and how that precedent might be used by other countries looking to justify aggressive and hostile acts.

Others have expressed doubts about the Bush Administration's handling of foreign policy. They point to the Administration's abysmal record on a series of international efforts, including the Kyoto Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia. The Administration has created its own credibility problem by consistently going its own way instead of being the leader of a world coalition.

Many callers have told me they don't see evidence that Saddam Hussein poses a current threat to the United States. They think terrorism by Al Qaeda is a greater and more immediate danger, and that Iraq is a diversion from our failure to capture Osama bin Laden.

And over and over I've been told that war should be a last resort. Unfortunately, to many of my constituents, the Administration has created the perception that war with Iraq is our first and only resort.

All of those concerns have been on my mind as I've deliberated on this vote. I've spent the good part of these last few weeks listening to experts from this Administration, from the Clinton Administration, and from non-partisan, independent organizations. I've tried to sort out what we know to be true and what we just suspect to be true. And I've tried to evaluate our best course when faced with the uncertain but potentially catastrophic threat that Saddam poses and the unpredictable horror a war can bring.

Eleven years ago, in the face of Saddam's aggression against Kuwait, I voted reluctantly to oppose the use of force. I thought then that more time should be given to diplomacy, and to the enforcement of sanctions against Iraq. But once Congress acted, there was no question of the commitment of all of us to the success of Desert Storm. The liberation of Kuwait was effected; our casualties were thankfully quite small; and stability was, for an extended period of time, restored to the region.

To be certain, many of us thought, and fervently hoped, that the crushing military defeat suffered by Saddam would result in his overthrow. Other monstrous dictators—such as Milosevic in Serbia—have crumbled in the face of far less of an onslaught. It is a mark of Saddam's cunning and ruthlessness that he survived the upheavals in his country that did unfold after the Gulf War, that he is still in power, and that he is still able to oppress his people.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with the Administration's policy towards Iraq, I don't think there can be any question about Saddam's conduct. He has systematically violated, over the course of the past 11 years, every significant U.N. resolution that has demanded that he disarm and destroy his chemical and biological weapons, and any nuclear capacity. This he has refused to do. He lies and cheats; he snubs the mandate and authority of international weapons inspectors; and he games the system to keep buying time against enforcement of the just and legitimate

demands of the United Nations, the Security Council, the United States and our allies. Those are simply the facts.

And now, time has run out. It has been four long years since the last U.N. weapons inspectors were effectively ejected from Iraq because of Saddam's willful noncompliance with an effective inspection regime.

What Saddam has done in the interim is not known for certain—but there is every evidence, from the dossier prepared by the Prime Minister of Britain, to President Bush's speech at the United Nations, that Saddam has rebuilt substantial chemical and biological weapons stocks, and that he is determined to obtain the means necessary to produce nuclear weapons. He has ballistic missiles, and more are on order. He traffics with other evil people in this world, intent on harming the United States, Israel, other nations in the Middle East, and our friends across the globe.

We know Saddam quite well. We know he kills a lot of people, even in his own family. We know when he gives his word it cannot be trusted. We know he is a shameless propagandist. We recall that he held women and children hostage for a time in Baghdad as human shields in 1990 to try to deter armed attack to liberate Kuwait. We know what he does to his own people in the north and south of his country and what he did to his neighbors in Iran and Kuwait.

We also know that Saddam is the patron saint of the homicide bombers in Israel. He pays their families when their youth go to kingdom-come from the streets of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. And Iraq, under Saddam, is one of only seven nations designated as a state sponsor of terrorism because of his aid and training of terrorists, according to the U.S. State Department.

Wehther he is tied in with al-Qaeda is still subject to debate, but they share an intense hatred for the United States, Israel, and our allies, and in their willingness to attack civilians to achieve their purposes.

In a perfect world the Iraqi people would have been able to seize their destiny and liberate their country. In a perfect world the U.N. resolutions calling for Saddam's disarmament would have been properly enforced.

But this is not a perfect world, and so today we struggle with how best to achieve that disarmament. That is our objective—our debate today is over the right means to that necessary end.

Eleven years ago, the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution calling for the liberation of Kuwait, and the disarmament of Saddam. This occurred before we voted in Congress to authorize the use of force against Iraq in January 1991.

Eleven years ago, in other words, we in Congress were voting to endorse the consensus reached in the United Nations over what the world should do to repel Saddam's aggression in the region and provide the basis for an Iraq that could not threaten its neighbors via war or weapons of mass destruction.

Today, the order is reversed and it is the Congress that is voting first on a resolution of war. And that is being done in the hope that it will help force a consensus in the United Nations so that the world—not just the United States—can pursue these issues on the soundest possible basis, with the strongest degree of support from as many nations as possible.

This is why we have to get this resolution right. And this is why I strongly support the substitute, which emphasizes action by the UN and the international community. It outlines the importance of working with a coalition, and before American lives are placed at risk, exhausting all other options through diplomacy and unfettered inspections. We should do all we can to secure a Security Council endorsement for an invasion of Iraq, and possibly to avoid a war by forcing Saddam to abide by the UN requirements for disarmament.

War must always be a last resort. In my view, Saddam has nearly brought us to that point. We have tried containment and sanctions over the last ten years, and both have failed. Sanctions hurt the people of Iraq and Saddam did not care about them. Inspections have failed because he has frustrated the inspectors and eventually forced them out of his country four years ago.

We've tried surgical strikes on his facilities and no fly zones over large parts of his territory. He has responded by continuing to try to obtain weapons of mass destruction. He has turned the humanitarian efforts to allow oil sales for food into a \$2 billion pot of money for weapons.

In light of all this, if the UN does not act, it not only leaves Saddam unchecked but it undermines, perhaps fatally, the purpose of having or supporting a UN in the first place.

If the UN does not or cannot act, the substitute does nothing to compromise the ability of the Congress to authorize the use of force to protect America's interests—unilaterally if necessary—if we believe it necessary at a later time.

Under the substitute, we sacrifice none of our sovereignty—none—and maximize every opportunity for diplomacy and consensus. The substitute correctly recognizes that should we reach the point of last resort, that is the time for Congress to declare war.

For all those reasons, I urge the House of Representatives to adopt the substitute and hope it will be the course we follow. It is the better choice and is the one most of my constituents and other Americans support.

It is possible, however, that the substitute will be defeated. The question, then, is whether to support the Resolution President Bush has sent us, as modified through negotiations with Representative RICHARD GEPHARDT, the House Democratic Leader.

Although I disagree deeply with much of President Bush's domestic policies and some aspects of his foreign policy, I agree with his conclusion that we cannot leave Saddam to continue on his present course. No one doubts that he is trying to build a nuclear device, and when he does, his potential for blackmail to dominate the Persian Gulf and Middle East will be enormous, and our efforts to deal with him be even more difficult and perilous. The risks of inaction clearly outweigh the risks of action.

Despite my misgivings about the President's approach, I believe it's essential that Congress send the strongest bipartisan signal of unity possible so the U.N. will act. Some have even suggested that taking the threat of force out of the equation might undermine that result.

In a post September 11 world, it is important we speak with one voice and send one message—particularly when the lives of our men and women in the armed forces are at stake.

And it is important that we not send a confused signal to Iraq, so that there be no doubt about our resolve.

Mr. Speaker, the goal I want is decisive U.N. action and the effective disarmament of Iraq. The substitute achieves that goal and should be approved. But if it is defeated, I believe supporting the President's proposal brings us closer to realizing that goal than defeating the Resolution.

For that reason, Mr. Speaker, I will support the President's resolution if it is before us.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from South Carolina for yielding me this time, and for his important leadership on this critical issue and so many others.

I support the Spratt substitute because it is simply the right resolution for this House to adopt.

It is not soft on Iraq.

It requires that Saddam's weapons of mass destruction be destroyed.

It places the decisions Congress must make in their proper order.

It strengthens the role of the United States to build consensus and lead the international community through the U.N. Security Council.

Most importantly, the Spratt substitute ensures that war, if needed, is the last option exercised, not the first.

And should Congress need to act on a resolution to authorize military force, we would at least have the benefit of debating a well-defined mission for our troops.

Unlike the current resolution that provides no clues as to what we are actually committing our troops to do, the Spratt substitute ensures that we in the United States Congress remain accountable to the American people and our Constitutionally-mandated responsibilities.

The Spratt amendment reflects the successful model used by then-President Bush in 1991.

It is a model worth following.

I ask all my colleagues to support the Spratt substitute.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, the United States is both blessed and burdened with enormous power. We have a responsibility to our constituents, to our country, and to the world, to ensure that the United States wields this power wisely.

That's why I rise today in support of an amendment offered by Representative SPRATT of South Carolina, which recognizes the threat posed by Iraq and ensures that Congress deals with this threat appropriately. This amendment challenges the United Nations to live up to its responsibilities by forcing Iraq to abide by its commitments to the international community. It places value in multilateral action, but also recognizes the reality that sometimes the United States must be prepared to act alone. This is an amendment that each of us can support with a clear conscience.

The amendment encourages the President to continue working with the U.N. to craft a tough Security Council Resolution that leaves no room for Saddam Hussein to delay or impede weapons inspections on his territory, under the threat of immediate multilateral force.

Should the U.N. shirk or fail in its duty, Congress should then consider, in an expedited fashion, the authorization of force to be used against Iraq. That way, we will vote with the full knowledge that all diplomatic efforts have indeed failed. It is at that time and at that time alone, that we, as Members of Congress entrusted with the solemn and terrible duty to

send our young men and women to war, should be called upon to cast that vote. In short, Congress should vote to authorize force when and only when there is no other option.

We are fortunate to have before us the opportunity to craft a sensible and responsible policy for the United States, one that reflects, I believe, the very reasonable view of the majority of Americans. Americans are not hungry for war. We do not seek conflict, but neither do we shrink from our responsibilities. We will go to war only when we must—but not a moment before.

But now Congress is faced with a vote on a resolution that asks us to authorize a war that may not be necessary at this particular time. That's not how Congress has dealt with issues of war and peace in the past, and there's no reason to violate that precedent now. A premature authorization of force is inconsistent with the traditions of the Congress and the character of this nation.

Mr. Speaker, we can and must act to deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. But Congress should not grant this authority prematurely, nor should we seek to do so. The Spratt amendment treats this matter with the gravity and circumspection it deserves. I urge my colleagues to consider carefully the alternatives before them, to vote yes for the Spratt amendment, and no on the majority resolution.

The question is on the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT).

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 155, nays 270, not voting 6, as follows:

[Roll No. 453]

YEAS—155

Allen	Dingell	LaTourette
Baca	Doggett	Levin
Baird	Doyle	Lipinski
Baldacci	Engel	Logren
Baldwin	Eshoo	Luther
Barcia	Etheridge	Lynch
Barrett	Evans	Maloney (CT)
Bartlett	Fattah	Maloney (NY)
Becerra	Filner	Markey
Bentsen	Ford	Mascara
Berry	Frank	Matsui
Bishop	Gonzalez	McCarthy (MO)
Blagojevich	Gutierrez	McCarthy (NY)
Blumenauer	Hastings (FL)	McCollum
Borski	Hill	McGovern
Boucher	Hilliard	McIntyre
Boyd	Hinchee	Meehan
Brady (PA)	Hinojosa	Meek (FL)
Brown (FL)	Hoeffel	Meeks (NY)
Brown (OH)	Holt	Menendez
Capps	Hooley	Millender
Capuano	Hoyer	McDonald
Cardin	Hulshof	Miller, George
Carson (IN)	Inslee	Mollohan
Clay	Jackson-Lee	Moran (VA)
Clayton	(TX)	Morella
Clyburn	Jefferson	Nadler
Condit	Johnson, E. B.	Napolitano
Conyers	Jones (NC)	Neal
Costello	Kaptur	Obey
Coyne	Kildee	Olver
Crowley	Kilpatrick	Pallone
Cummings	Kind (WI)	Pascrell
Davis (CA)	Kleczka	Pastor
Davis (FL)	LaFalce	Paul
DeFazio	Lampson	Payne
DeGette	Langevin	Pelosi
Delahunt	Larsen (WA)	Peterson (MN)
DeLauro	Larson (CT)	Price (NC)

Rahall	Skelton
Reyes	Slaughter
Rodriguez	Smith (WA)
Roybal-Allard	Snyder
Sabo	Solis
Sanchez	Spratt
Sanders	Stark
Sandlin	Strickland
Sawyer	Stupak
Schakowsky	Tanner
Schiff	Tauscher
Scott	Thompson (CA)
Sherman	Thompson (MS)
Simmons	Thurman

NAYS—270

Abercrombie	Gibbons
Ackerman	Gilchrest
Aderholt	Gillmor
Akin	Gilman
Andrews	Goode
Armey	Goodlatte
Bachus	Gordon
Baker	Goss
Balleger	Graham
Barton	Granger
Bass	Graves
Bereuter	Green (TX)
Berkley	Green (WI)
Berman	Greenwood
Biggart	Grucci
Bilirakis	Gutknecht
Blunt	Hall (TX)
Boehlert	Hansen
Boehner	Harman
Bonilla	Hart
Bonior	Hastings (WA)
Bono	Hayes
Boozman	Hayworth
Boswell	Hefley
Brady (TX)	Herger
Brown (SC)	Hilleary
Bryant	Hobson
Burr	Hoekstra
Burton	Holden
Buyer	Honda
Callahan	Horn
Calvert	Hostettler
Camp	Houghton
Cannon	Hunter
Cantor	Hyde
Capito	Isakson
Carson (OK)	Israel
Castle	Issa
Chabot	Istook
Chambliss	Jackson (IL)
Clement	Jenkins
Coble	John
Collins	Johnson (CT)
Combest	Johnson (IL)
Cox	Johnson, Sam
Cramer	Jones (OH)
Crane	Kanjorski
Crenshaw	Keller
Cubin	Kelly
Culbertson	Kennedy (MN)
Cunningham	Kennedy (RI)
Davis (IL)	Kerns
Davis, Jo Ann	King (NY)
Davis, Tom	Kingston
Deal	Kirk
DeLay	Knollenberg
DeMint	Kolbe
Deutsch	Kucinich
Diaz-Balart	LaHood
Dicks	Lantos
Dooley	Latham
Doolittle	Leach
Dreier	Lee
Duncan	Lewis (CA)
Dunn	Lewis (GA)
Edwards	Lewis (KY)
Ehlers	Linder
Ehrlich	LoBiondo
Emerson	Lowe
English	Lucas (KY)
Everett	Lucas (OK)
Farr	Manzullo
Ferguson	Matheson
Flake	McCrery
Foley	McDermott
Forbes	McHugh
Fossella	McInnis
Frelinghuysen	McKeon
Frost	McKinney
Galleghy	McNulty
Ganske	Mica
Gekas	Miller, Dan
Gephardt	Miller, Gary

Tierney	Turner
Udall (CO)	Upton
Udall (NM)	Velazquez
Visclosky	Vitter
Walters	Walden
Watson (CA)	Waller
Watt (NC)	Walsh
Waxman	
Weiner	
Wexler	
Wu	
Wynn	

Towns	Wamp	Wicker
Turner	Watkins (OK)	Wilson (NM)
Upton	Watts (OK)	Wilson (SC)
Velazquez	Weldon (FL)	Wolf
Vitter	Weldon (PA)	Woolsey
Walden	Weller	Young (AK)
Walsh	Whitfield	Young (FL)

NOT VOTING—6

Barr	Fletcher	Roukema
Cooksey	Ortiz	Stump

□ 1228

Messrs. BAKER, FLAKE, RUSH, SCHAFFER, and Ms. VELÁZQUEZ changed their vote from “yea” to “nay.”

So the amendment in the nature of a substitute was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

□ 1230

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LAHOOD). It is now in order to proceed to a final period of debate on the joint resolution, as amended.

The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE) and the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. FLAKE).

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. EHLERS).

(Mr. EHLERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Speaker, casting a vote over whether to authorize military action may be the most difficult decision a member of Congress is asked to make. It certainly is for me. No matter who the opponent or what the circumstances, the consequences of a collective “yes” vote likely will be the loss of life. But failure to act holds the potential of even more terrible outcomes. Such a vote presents an excruciating moral dilemma.

For the past year, our nation has been engaged in a great civic debate. How do we protect our nation from those who would do us harm? How can we ensure the safety of our children and grandchildren here and around the world? Should we take action against potentially hostile nations? These are questions without simple answers.

President George W. Bush asked Congress to grant him the authority to take military action against Saddam Hussein and his regime in Iraq as part of our war on terrorism. No member of Congress takes such a request lightly. We may have different views and concerns, but each of us deals with this issue very seriously and solemnly.

On such issues, persons are often characterized as hawks or doves. I am neither. Instead, I seek to be wise as an owl. I listened to the concerns voiced by many of my constituents. I wrote President Bush informing him of their concerns and seeking answers to their questions and mine. I studied Saddam Hussein and his past actions. I sought and received extensive briefings from

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the Central Intelligence Agency and others. And, because of my scientific background, I also received a detailed scientific briefing from civilian officials at the Pentagon about Saddam Hussein's weapons capabilities.

This information has convinced me of several things. Saddam Hussein continues to have dangerous, warlike ambitions. He is Hitler-like in his methods of repression, especially in gassing his own people. He has thumbed his nose at the United Nations by evicting inspectors and using the UN's "oil-for-food" program to fund weapons rather than feed his impoverished people.

Saddam Hussein continues, in violation of the U.N.'s sanctions and the peace agreement he signed, to develop and produce chemical and biological weapons for war and terror. Most troubling, he continues to develop nuclear weapons and may be as little as a year or two away from success. As a nuclear physicist, I know the destructive force of nuclear weapons. If a weapon of the type he is developing was detonated over Calder Plaza, the blast would devastate all of Grand Rapids and the near suburbs, a firestorm would consume the rest of the suburbs and a lethal dose of radiation would envelop much of the downwind area. All told, upwards of 300,000 people would be killed. Saddam Hussein's regime poses a very real threat to the safety of the United States, the safety of his own people and, indeed, the safety of the rest of the world.

Early in this debate, I thought President Bush and his advisers were seeking to strike Iraq preemptively. But I found they view that as a final alternative, not a first step. The Bush Administration continues to work with the U.N. and our allies to build a coalition and seek a peaceful end to this situation through inspections and disarmament. However, we must grant the President the power to take action against Iraq because Hussein will not acquiesce until he faces a superior force. We may have to put troops on Iraq's border before he will comply, but I hope, along with many others in Congress and the Administration, that military action ultimately will not be necessary.

I abhor the idea of the U.S. making a preemptive strike. Our philosophy has always been to take the first punch before we act. But when the first punch can destroy a city and kill hundreds of thousands of people, we must consider ways to stop that first punch.

I commend President Bush for his recent speeches in which he more clearly stated his intentions and reasons for requesting this resolution. I also commend him for working with Congress to craft a resolution that is not as broad as his original proposal and meets many of the concerns raised by Congress and our constituents. The legislative process has worked in structuring

the approach and limiting action to only Iraq.

And so, after many days and weeks of thoughtful and prayerful consideration, I've decided to support this resolution. In this case, I've concluded not acting is more dangerous than acting.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to yield 2 minutes to my dear friend, the gentleman from New York (Mr. RANGEL), the ranking member of the Committee on Ways and Means.

(Mr. RANGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, in June of 2000, President Clinton allowed me the great honor to take some veterans back to Korea in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Korean War. They were all members of the Second Infantry Division. We left Fort Lewis, Washington, in July and August of 1950, and we had left more men behind dead than came home.

The raggedy group of veterans that went back, all black because we were in a segregated infantry unit, most had not gone to college, and, like myself, some had not even finished high school, we thought then that we were fighting for our country. But the more education I got, the more sophisticated I got, I realized we were fighting for the United Nations.

Then when I became a Member of Congress and I led this same group of tattered veterans back to the same battlefields, they asked, why did Congress send them to South Korea and expose them to North Korean and Chinese warfare? And I had to tell them that this Congress never did send them there. No vote was ever taken in this Congress to say that they were at war with the people of North Korea or the People's Republic of China.

I made a vow to them, and I am keeping it today, that never will I delegate the responsibility of considering the dangers of war. I will not leave it to the President, unless he brings me evidence that we are in danger. I will not give it to the United Nations, because I do not believe that this sacred responsibility should be transferred. And I do believe that each and every one of those veterans, if they thought our beloved country was in trouble, would be the first to stand up to salute the flag and be prepared to destroy what enemy we had, preemptive or not.

I am against this resolution.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. GILLMOR).

(Mr. GILLMOR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILLMOR. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution.

I rise today in strong support of this resolution, authorizing the use of the United States Armed Forces against Iraq and the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein. Our President needs the assurance of this body that it will support his actions to keep our nation and the global community safe, from the current Iraqi

government and its demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction.

As the Administration continues its negotiations with members of the United Nations Security Council, to compel Iraqi compliance with current U.N. resolutions, the rest of the world must know that we stand united in our actions. The United States government can not allow Saddam Hussein's continued development of chemical and biological agents and weapons of mass destruction. These actions are in direct violation of Iraq's obligations under the 1991 cease-fire agreement that brought an end to the Gulf War.

I was a member of this body during the 102nd Congress and do not consider lightly any congressional action that may lead to the loss of American Servicemen's lives, or those of innocent civilians. Let us be clear about what we are communicating with this resolution here today. Because it is vital to United States' national security, we are supporting the President's efforts through the UN Security Council "to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance and promptly and strictly" abides by all relevant Security Council resolutions. We are calling for war.

President Bush has made clear his commitment to work with the United Nations to address the common threat posed by the Iraqi regime but we can not restrict his options for protecting the American people. I have full confidence in our President and Administration to continue productive negotiations; and, if the decision is made necessary, lead this country in effective military action to bring an end to this clear and present danger.

I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this resolution.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, with great pleasure, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from Wyoming (Mrs. CUBIN)

Mrs. CUBIN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, as I have traveled through Wyoming, my fellow citizens have made their feelings very clear on the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, the threat posed by his weapons of mass destruction and the threat posed by his support of terrorism.

They support the President's actions to ensure that Saddam Hussein's arsenal of chemical and biological weapons is totally dismantled, his ties to terrorist organizations are severed and the people of Iraq are given a chance to emerge from Saddam's oppressive shadow. The people of Wyoming hope and pray for peace, but they will not accept peace at the price of fear.

Wyoming has a proud history of defending our Nation, from the Peacekeeper and the Minuteman missile silos based in our State that helped win the Cold War, to our many sons and daughters who made the ultimate sacrifice in the defense of liberty.

One of the first casualties in our war on terror was a young man from Cheyenne, Wyoming. His name was John Edmunds. Should we let this threat build and tell John Edmunds' widow and his parents, Donn and Mary, that his death was in vain, that it did not

mean anything? How would we explain that we lacked the will to finish what we started? By explaining that the U.N. was not ready?

Saddam Hussein has long been an enemy of humanity and freedom. He has murdered his own people with poison gas. He has attempted to assassinate an American president. He heaps praise on homicide bombers and rewards their families. Right now, as we debate in this Chamber, agents work to provide him with nuclear weapons. Should we wait a little longer to see if he gets it right this time?

I understand that some in Congress are concerned about international support of his actions. But our first obligation is not to European governments like Paris or Berlin. It is to the safety and the security of the people of the United States of America.

In an ideal world, we would not have to go it alone, and I believe we will not have to go it alone. But thanks to the likes of Saddam Hussein, this is not an ideal world. Saddam has made it clear to the world where he stands. Now Congress must let the world know where we stand, against him and with our President.

Mr. Speaker, I end with a final question: Ask yourselves, why does Saddam Hussein seek an atom bomb? The people of Wyoming know. I know. I believe we all know.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to my good friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. BERMAN), a distinguished member of the Committee on International Relations.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I was a fervent opponent of the Vietnam War and a strong supporter of sensible detente with the Soviet Union. But under today's circumstances, the best way to give peace a chance and to save the most lives, American and Iraqi, is for America to stand united and for Congress to authorize the President to use force if Saddam does not give up his weapons of mass destruction. Confront Saddam now, or pay a much heavier price later.

We dismissed the first World Trade Center bombing as an isolated incident. When two embassies were bombed, we failed to see the broader implication of those acts. When the USS *Cole* was attacked, still we did not read the handwriting on the wall. It was irrational, we thought, that madmen would grow bold enough to attack America on her own shores. We wanted to give peace a chance.

But then came 9/11, and it is time to say "no more." The Democratic leader, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GEPHARDT), and many of my colleagues have told us why a yes vote is necessary.

We have brought key members of the Clinton national security team to the Hill, architects of our past policy to contain Saddam. These foreign policy experts from the Democratic Party have told us to a person that contain-

ment will no longer do the job and that the policy we are asked to endorse today is the right one for a peace-loving people.

On the issue of Saddam Hussein, I have some experience. I begged both the Reagan and first Bush administrations to stop selling Iraq materials and technology that could be used for weapons of mass destruction, to put Iraq on the terrorist list, to impose economic sanctions. Saddam, with a nuclear weapon, is too horrifying to contemplate, too terrifying to tolerate.

As one who has watched this man for 20 years, let me pose an analogy. It is just an analogy, because I reject the unproven efforts to tie Saddam to the events of 9/11.

We are on an airplane, and we know that a few passengers have smuggled box cutters on board. We know these passengers have taken courses to learn how to fly a jumbo jet. We know that their friends have already flown a small plane into a building, killing hundreds of their own neighbors. But those armed passengers have not yet lunged for the cockpit.

What should a peace loving people do? We know that people sitting near these dangerous passengers could be hurt if we take aggressive action. Should we wait until they kill the pilot and take over the airplane before we act? Of course not. We admire those with the courage to surround the armed passengers and demand that they give up their weapons under threat of force. That is what this resolution does.

Is the threat imminent? Well, surely Saddam has box cutters, Saddam has a history of using them, Saddam is in the process of upgrading the box cutters, Saddam has boarded the plane with the box cutters.

Confront Saddam now, or pay a much heavier price later.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 7 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. WATTS), the Chairman of our Conference.

Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I rise to support the resolution before the House today. Our Nation and our military may very well need to right the wrongs being perpetrated from an evil dictatorship in Iraq. Saddam Hussein poses a long-term threat that could jeopardize the freedoms and the way of life enjoyed by Americans from coast to coast, from border to border, a threat that grows more menacing over time.

I have listened to some of the debate over the last several hours, over the last 24 hours. It has been said time and time again that there is no evidence that Saddam Hussein is an imminent threat.

□ 1245

Mr. Speaker, I would say to all that would say that, if you want evidence, look no further than September 11, 2001.

I am pleased the President has sought congressional approval for possible military action and has worked diligently with Congress to craft a resolution that is both appropriate and constitutional. There are very few things Congress is explicitly given the sole authority to execute; to declare war is one of them. Article I, section 8 is very clear on that point.

These 24 hours, 24-plus hours reserved for debate on this question is more than we debated Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo combined. President Bush should be commended for acknowledging Congress's authority with regard to any military action in Iraq.

Mr. Speaker, this leads us to the merits of authorizing such a serious action. Putting our Armed Forces into harm's way should never be an easy decision for anyone. As one who represents a district with two significant Air Force bases and a large Army post, I have talked with countless active duty personnel and military families during my service here in Congress. The pilots, the airmen, soldiers, and other highly trained heroes at Tinker Air Force Base, Altus Air Force Base, Fort Sill Army Post are my friends, my neighbors, they are my constituents. I care deeply for these brave Americans.

They understand, like so many across this country, that freedom is not free, liberty is not easy, and keeping the peace often requires sacrifice. America did not become the leader of the Free World by looking the other way to heinous atrocities and unspeakable evils.

The President told the Nation this past Monday that Iraq has a massive stockpile of chemical and biological weapons that has never been accounted for, that is capable of killing millions and millions of people. Surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities it used to produce chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

Mark my words on the latter form of destruction. The moment Saddam Hussein acquires a nuclear weapon is the moment the world will be in even more danger, grave danger. I hope my colleagues will reflect deeply on this chilling possibility.

Some people have pondered whether a military strike in Iraq would be just. Will the action of our government constitute a just war? Saint Augustine, the father of just war theory said, "A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or State has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly."

This Congress must decide whether the situation in Iraq warrants military response. I am with the President. I believe this vote supports the just war theory when Saint Augustine wrote, "We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace."

Saddam Hussein has murdered his own people. His record on human rights is abysmal. He has aided and abetted terrorists. He hates America, he hates freedom, he hates independence, he hates our allies. He hates us.

Mr. Speaker, at this very hour, we know a tyrant in Iraq is devising great evil. We know harm is inevitable if nuclear weapons are indeed acquired by Saddam Hussein. As testimony by a former Iraqi scientist before the Committee on Armed Services said, as he revealed last week, Saddam is on a break-neck pace to acquire those very weapons. I hope my colleagues put their trust and confidence in our military, America's sons and daughters, who love freedom and love liberty, to wage a worthy and just cause.

Military options are the President's last choice. But we must give him the prerogative if the situation in Iraq requires the use of force. I urge the House to pass this legislation to support the President, support our Armed Forces, and support freedom throughout the world. We will prevail. As the President said, we must prevail. Vote "yes" on this resolution.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to my good friend, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DOGGETT), the ranking member, distinguished senior member of the Committee on Ways and Means.

Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, to the occasional charge of "hand-wringing" and "weakness" leveled at the many of us who are voting today against this resolution, perhaps the same could be said of this statement: "Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq . . . would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. . . . Had we gone the invasion route, the United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically different—and perhaps barren—outcome."

But this statement comes from American patriots, our first President Bush and his National Security Adviser General Scowcroft, in explaining why they rejected the approach some urge today.

As most Democrats today vote against launching a ground invasion of Iraq, we must candidly recognize that some of the most insightful arguments supporting our position were advanced by Republicans and military leaders like Scowcroft, Schwarzkopf, and Zinni.

Party affiliations will not be chiseled on the gravestones of young Americans who die to win this war, nor on those of the American families jeopardized by diverting precious resources from the real war on terrorism, nor those harmed by new terrorists provoked by what too many will view as a new crusade against Islam.

Why in the face of overwhelming support do so many of us vote "no" today? We respond not just to those we rep-

resent but, most of all, because individually we must answer to the face we see each day in the mirror. We must answer to history. We must answer to our children and our grandchildren.

When more than one of every four members of this House cast our vote against this ill-considered resolution, we vote not against President Bush, who deserves our support and respect, but aware of the conflicting advice he is still receiving we say: listen to the voices of your better nature. The prudent remains—first, attempt holding Iraq accountable through effective, comprehensive international inspections.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1½ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. HUNTER).

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, in 1991 when we went into Iraq, we thought, our best projection was that he was 3 to 5 years away from having a nuclear device. We found out when we got there that he was actually only 6 months to a year away from having a nuclear device. To have waited at that time, as many folks proposed, would have been disastrous.

Now, the Committee on Armed Services, Democrats and Republicans, have held now three classified briefings inviting every Member of the House to participate to see and to understand the weapons of mass destruction program that is ongoing and robust and working toward completion right now in Iraq with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological systems. My own opinion is that there are going to be nuclear devices manufactured in Iraq within 24 months.

To have waited in 1991 would have been disastrous. To wait today would be disastrous. We have got one leader, one person elected by all the people, our President, who is now our Commander in Chief. It is time for us, having been informed, having understood the problem, to rally behind him and take up this burden. Let us support this resolution.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to my good friend, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. FROST), our distinguished chairman of the Democratic Caucus.

(Mr. FROST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this bipartisan resolution. It provides the best opportunity for a peaceful resolution by giving the President the discretion to use force if Iraq does not permit full and comprehensive inspections of all sites that could be used to develop biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons.

I hope, as do the American people, that the President will use this discretion wisely and that Saddam Hussein will understand that the community of nations will not permit him to develop and maintain weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Speaker, today's vote is a difficult one. Many House Members have worn their country's uniform in time of war and have seen the horror of battle firsthand. We all understand the sacrifices that we may be asking our brave young men and women to make in the months to come.

As chairman of the Democratic Caucus, I have presided over numerous meetings on this subject. I have listened carefully to my colleagues and to policy experts who have followed Saddam Hussein's activities over the years.

In the end, I have come to the conclusion that the course set out in this resolution is the wisest path for our Nation.

The resolution makes clear that our first preference is for the President to work through the United Nations to obtain multilateral support for a tough regime of weapons inspections. It requires the President to report back to Congress and to consult with us on an ongoing basis. But in the end, it gives the President the authority to commit U.S. troops if all diplomatic efforts fail.

Mr. Speaker, giving the President this discretion is highly appropriate. In so doing, we make clear to Saddam Hussein that it is in his interests to permit the inspectors full and unfettered access now. Should he fail to do so, he will face the full might of the United States military, the strongest and finest fighting force in the world today.

Mr. Speaker, no one wants war. We all want peace, and peace is best achieved from a position of strength.

So I want to personally recognize the work of our Democratic leader, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GEPHARDT), in narrowing and improving the resolution originally offered by the administration. We vote today on a better, more focused approach because of the hours he spent negotiating with the White House over the final product.

I want to say a word about the role of the minority in our system of government. Some suggest that the minority's role is to automatically oppose everything sought by the President. I disagree. The minority can play a constructive role by working to improve a Presidential proposal and, therefore, helping achieve a national consensus. That is particularly true in matters of foreign policy.

So I urge all of my colleagues, regardless of how my colleagues voted on the Spratt or Lee substitutes, to join Democrats and Republicans in voting for this bipartisan resolution.

Mr. Speaker, this bipartisan resolution will send a strong, clear signal that America is committed to ending the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the world through democracy, if he will allow it, but through military action if he refuses.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to my good friend, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.

KUCINICH), a respected member of our caucus.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, more than two millennia ago, the world began a shift from the philosophy of an eye for an eye. We were taught a new gospel of compassion of doing unto others as you would have them do unto you. It is that teaching, that faith and compassion that has sustained the human heart and this Nation.

I believe, as did Washington and Lincoln, that America has been favored by divine providence. But what if we lose our connection to our source by an abuse of power?

We are at a dangerous moment in human history when 20 centuries of moral teachings are about to be turned upside down. Instead of adherence to the Golden Rule, we are being moved toward the rule of liquid gold: do unto others before they do unto you.

No longer are we justified by our faith; we are now justified by our fear. Iraq was not responsible for 9-11, but some fear it was. There is no proof Iraq worked with al Qaeda to cause 9-11, but some fear it did.

It is fear which leads us to war. It is fear which leads us to believe that we must kill or be killed, fear which leads us to attack those who have not attacked us, fear which leads us to ring our Nation and the very heavens with weapons of mass destruction.

The American people need the attention of their government today. People who have worked a lifetime are finding the American dream slipping away. People who have saved, who have invested wisely are suffering because of corruption on Wall Street, the failing economy, and the declining stock market.

□ 1300

People have lost their homes, they have lost their jobs, they have lost their chances for a good education for their children. The American dream is slipping away, and all the people hear from Washington, D.C., is war talk, so loud as to drown out the voices of the American people calling for help.

Seventy years ago, Franklin Roosevelt said, "We have nothing to fear but fear itself," calling America to a domestic agenda, a New Deal for America. Faith in our country calls us to that again. Faith in our country calls us to work with the world community to create peace through inspection, not destruction. Faith in our country calls us to use our talents and abilities to address the urgent concerns of America today.

Let us not fear our ability to create a new, more peaceful world through the science of human relations. Faith, America; courage, America; peace, America.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from South Dakota (Mr. THUNE).

Mr. THUNE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, today Congress faces a momentous decision. We have had a

spirited and vigorous debate about an issue of the utmost importance to this institution, to our government, and to our Nation. In the end, each of us must decide for our constituents and for ourselves whether or not to support authorizing President Bush to use force against Iraq.

President Bush has called for an end to the international appeasement of Saddam Hussein. He has challenged the world to face up to its responsibilities and stop this evil man with his evil designs.

Clearly, Mr. Speaker, we would all prefer that diplomacy could solve this problem. At the same time, we must understand that diplomacy has not worked with Iraq. We have been patient over this last decade, yet Iraq continues to defy the world community. Saddam has had his opportunity. The United States must now determine for itself how we should protect our Nation and our citizens.

It is we, Members of Congress, the President, and the American people who should determine the fate of our Nation. Members of Congress have the difficult decision of determining whether or not the Nation should go to war. As a Member of Congress, I accept my responsibilities to weigh the evidence and to vote yea or nay, knowing full well what the consequences may be. I take this job seriously, and am willing to do my part to protect our Nation and ensure that Americans, both at home and abroad, are safe.

I have concluded that, to protect the lives and safety of our country and our people, we must act. Mr. Speaker, it is time to give the President the authority he has requested to deal with the imminent threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States and to the world. I hope that diplomacy will work and that Saddam will finally yield unconditionally to international inspections for weapons of mass destruction. I also hope that the United Nations will join the United States in this effort.

However, we cannot, as a Nation, make our national security dependent upon any other institution, no matter how well-intentioned it may be. In the end, the growing coalition of countries supporting our efforts will see the overwhelming bipartisan support in the vote today as a symbol of the unity and commitment of this Nation to disarming Saddam Hussein.

In the end, our actions today, Mr. Speaker, will be seen as the correct course for our Nation and for our world.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this resolution and in support of our President as we cast our votes today.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to my good friend, the gentleman from Maine (Mr. ALLEN), a senior member of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution. Saddam Hussein is a tyrant to his own people and a threat to ourselves and to others. If this were simply a referendum on him, the vote today would be unanimous.

But the resolution before us raises two questions of fundamental importance, questions that are agonizing for Members of this body: First, how do we diminish the threat from Iraq without empowering Islamic fundamentalism and creating new recruits for terrorist groups; and, second, how do we avoid setting a dangerous global precedent for other nations to launch unilateral preemptive attacks as a legitimate tool of national policy?

The resolution negotiated between the President and House leadership is still a blank check. The Spratt substitute, in its essence, said that we are not willing to provide a blank check now for unilateral military action, though we are willing to provide or authorize military force multilaterally.

This resolution unwisely justifies action against Iraq under the Bush administration's new doctrine of preemption and regime change. This justification has the potential to create precedents that will come back to haunt us if adopted by our Nation or by others.

Under the Constitution, the President and Congress share warmaking powers. Yet, the underlying resolution represents an abdication of Congress' historic role. We cannot look into the future. If we act unilaterally, we do not know today what support we might have from some allies, how many troops it would take, what the President has in mind. A decision to use unilateral force should be postponed to a later date.

In the war on terrorism, we need more friends and allies and fewer enemies. We will get to that place if we first make a commitment to working with our allies, and only later, if necessary, authorize the use of unilateral force.

I urge my colleagues not to give our rights away in this Congress, and to reject the resolution.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1½ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. KIRK).

Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman and my colleague, the gentleman from Illinois, for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, we have seen this movie before: The Inter-Allied Control Commission of inspectors were granted full freedom of movement, all necessary facilities, documents, and designs. Three hundred thirty-seven weapons inspectors were deployed in 11 districts.

They reported that they destroyed 33,384 cannons, 37,211,551 artillery shells, 87,000 machine guns, and 920 tons of poison gas. In sum, they reported 97 percent of artillery and 98 percent of men under arms were rendered ineffective.

These reports were not about Iraq, they were about post World War I Germany, and told us not to worry. When

the Commission finally started reporting on German violations on inspections, the leading French diplomat wrote to President Wilson the following:

“Elements in each of the nations of the League will be quite naturally inclined to deny reports disturbing to their peace of mind and more or less consciously espouse the cause of the German government which will deny the said reports. We must recall the opposition of these elements at the time when Germany armed to the teeth and openly made ready the aggression of 1870 and 1914.

“To sum up, the Germans will deny, their government will discuss, and, meanwhile, public opinion will be divided, alarmed, and nervous.”

In the end, Germany rearmed under the eyes of 300 international inspectors. As evidence of violations mounted, the international community lost its nerve to impose the will of international law.

This resolution offers the best hope that Secretary Powell will get inspectors, real inspectors, back to Iraq.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to my good friend, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON), the distinguished ranking member of our Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, today I speak of duty. This is the third time that I have stood at this podium with the question of military action in the balance. There is no more serious vote nor more sacred duty than this, deciding to ask those who serve this great country to go into harm's way.

So it is a decision that must be taken soberly and deliberately. It must be taken mindful of the regional implications, and it must balance the risks of not acting with those of not acting prudently.

Winston Churchill's book “The Gathering Storm” details the world's slide into holocaust. I point out, Mr. Speaker, that his book is subtitled “How the English-Speaking Peoples, Through Their Unwisdom, Carelessness, and Good Nature, Allowed the Wicked to Rearm.” Many of us saw firsthand the consequence of that rearmament. Never again, Mr. Speaker, never again.

The issue of Iraq was never whether evil should be confronted, but how. My own questioning began in a letter to the President on September 4. My concerns were to emphasize multilateral action, understanding the implications of using military force for the United States' role in the world.

We must have a plan for the rebuilding of the Iraqi government and society if the worst comes to pass and armed conflict is necessary. We must ensure that America's commitments to the war on terrorism and to other missions throughout the globe will be upheld.

In short, to paraphrase the great military strategist, Carl von Clausewitz, we must not take the first step in this conflict without considering the last.

This resolution, while not perfect, is a vast improvement from that originally sent by the White House. To my mind, this resolution makes clear Congress's intention that America achieve its goals multilaterally if possible. As importantly, it announces our determination to stay the course and deal with the aftermath if military action is taken.

Having achieved these clarifications, the question before the House is this: Shall we stay the hand of the miscreant, or permit the world's worst government to brandish the world's worst weapons?

I believe that, Mr. Speaker, difficult as it is, there can be only one answer. I support the resolution.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. COX).

Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, as was so horribly demonstrated on September 11, the greatest threat to our country today comes not from the world's greatest powers but, rather, from unstable and dangerous individuals scattered across much of the world with nothing more in common than their hatred of the United States.

Some of these individuals are itinerant phantoms, like Osama bin Laden. A very few control territory and governments, like Mullah Omar and Saddam Hussein.

It is for this reason that we are forced to deal with Iraq. It is not merely that Iraq's brutal and ruthless dictatorship is hostile to America, or that it has given comfort to the al Qaeda terrorists, or even that it possesses the most gruesome weapons of mass murder.

Beyond all of this, Iraq's barbaric dictator, like the al Qaeda fanatics whom he supports, is unstable and a proven killer. We cannot deal with him or the territory that he controls by terror as if it were a nation state like any other. It is not. Saddam Hussein does not merely possess chemical weapons; he has used them. He does not merely mouth hatred for the United States; it is well known that he attempted to assassinate our President. He does not merely tolerate global terrorism; he is one of its main incubators.

We must ask, however, is confronting Saddam Hussein worth the cost that we will surely have to bear if we are required to make good on our threat of force? To that we must answer that there is potentially an even heavier cost of temporizing, of doing nothing, of adding a 17th toothless U.N. resolution to the 16 that Saddam Hussein that is already violated.

What we learned on September 11 is that turning a blind eye to the metastasizing of cancer cells, of terrorist cells, is the costliest choice we can make.

What of our friends and sometime allies, such as, for example, France and Russia, who have accused us of going it alone? If we approve this resolution today without their prior agreement,

will we not simply display to Saddam Hussein that the world lacks the international agreement that is necessary to win the war on terror?

To that I am afraid we must answer that if even such great nations as France and Russia cannot be convinced to see their own self-interest in protecting the civilized world from the likes of Saddam Hussein, then, in fact, the war on terrorism will indeed be compromised.

But this is not the end, it is the beginning. Just as Saddam Hussein must know that America is serious, so, too, must our friends and allies. If we vote to deny the President the backing of this Congress and think that then he can win the support of additional nations, we are delusional.

Mr. Speaker, our purpose is a good one; and we must lead. To save a nation from terrorist rule, as with Mullah Omar and Saddam Hussein, protects not only the citizens of those countries but our own country and the entire world. All of us must hope that when the United Nations passes its resolution, Saddam Hussein will this time finally see reason and disarm.

□ 1315

But as the proverb says, he who lives only by hope will die in despair. I ask my colleagues to unite hope with reason and practicality and willingness to act. Let us support this resolution.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to my good friend, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. LUTHER).

(Mr. LUTHER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LUTHER. Mr. Speaker, the language of the resolution has been improved significantly. I will vote to give this administration authority, and I ask that this authority be exercised judiciously and morally.

Mr. Speaker, the intense debate we are having is what the American people deserve on a subject as serious as the matter before us.

Like most Americans, I believe Saddam Hussein has chemical and biological weapons and that he has stepped up his nuclear program. Left unchecked, these activities are a serious threat to Iraq's neighbors and to the United States.

While this alone may not justify military action, we are living in a changed world today. The new challenges we face require a new way of thinking, and our country's leaders must make every effort to anticipate and prevent future attacks on the people of our country.

I will therefore support the resolution to use force, if necessary, to disarm Saddam Hussein. I am concerned that the administration initially approached the situation in Iraq in a hasty and simplistic manner. While the administration is now pursuing a more responsible course of action that could over time unify the American people and the world community, I remain concerned about the timing, ultimate objectives, international effects, long-term consequences and human cost of any large-scale invasion of Iraq.

Nevertheless, the language of the resolution has been improved significantly since proposed by the administration and Congress will have additional opportunities to consult and work with the President in the future. In supporting this resolution it is my hope and expectation that the President will use his authority in a thoughtful, measured and responsible way consistent with the moral leadership America needs to provide the world.

First, the Administration should work in concert with the global community, including our allies in the Middle East, to build an international coalition in support of our goals, as was successfully shown by the first President Bush in the Gulf War. Any plan to go it alone has the potential to inflame global mistrust of the United States and increase the possibility of renewed terrorist activity.

Second, our country must get its fiscal house in order as the war on terrorism continues. Military action is very costly and common sense dictates that our allies and other nations that benefit from ridding the world of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction should also share the financial burden.

Third, it is important to have a clear plan and commitment on how to ensure stability in the region after our goals in Iraq are achieved. Disarming Iraq and removing Saddam Hussein from power without a concrete plan to ensure a stable and less hostile new regime would be a mistake.

Finally, the administration must continue to engage the American people, Congress, the United Nations and our international allies to build support for the disarmament of Iraq. This course is our best hope for achieving our goals without war.

Since coming to Congress in 1994, I have consistently supported an activist role for the United States in the world community. I have supported giving the administration, regardless of political party and despite intense criticism at times, the necessary military authority and resources to combat threats to our national security and to promote human rights and American values around the globe. I strongly supported our country's attacks during the 1990's on military targets in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Sudan, and I wholeheartedly supported our country's efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo long before the tragedy of September 11th.

I will vote to give this administration similar authority and I ask that this authority be exercised judiciously and morally.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my good friend, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. MORAN), a distinguished member of the Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend from California (Mr. LANTOS) for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, there are compelling, fundamental reasons why this body should oppose this resolution. With great power comes great responsibility, great responsibility to conduct our foreign policy in a manner worthy of our world leadership, consistent with the international standards of conduct that we have worked so hard to establish for the better part of the 20th century. The United States must continue to act in a manner that serves as an example to the rest of the world.

Mr. Speaker, this Congress is the people's body. That is why before we offer up the lives of our sons and daughters in the cause of war, we must have the final say. The amendment that just failed was about upholding the integrity of this institution and the U.S. Constitution that must guide all our actions. We should be making Saddam Hussein irrelevant, not marginalizing the United States Congress. We make him irrelevant by disarming him, discovering and destroying all of his weapons of mass destruction and his means of delivering them.

We can accomplish that objective without leaving our allies on the sidelines or further inflaming the passions of people, especially in the Arab and Muslim world, who do not understand or trust our noble intent.

We are not the only people prepared to sacrifice our lives for the family security and individual freedoms that motivate the human race.

We oppose this resolution for the same reasons the first President Bush delayed a comparable debate until after the midterm congressional elections a decade ago, why he pressed so hard and successfully for the United Nations Security Council's support, and why he successfully achieved the support of Iraq's Arab neighbors.

Mr. Speaker, we do not need a new national security strategy that, with a policy of unilateral preemption, tramples the foundation of the international rules of law that has been this generation's legacy to this small planet. We should be standing on the shoulders of the great leaders who have preceded us in this body and who are the true authors of our existing national security strategy that remains the best hope of peace and progress for all of mankind.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 4 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I wish to end my part in this great debate as I began in tribute to the patriotism of every Member of this body and with special thanks to my dear friend and distinguished counterpart on the Republican side, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE), a combat veteran of World War II.

Over the course of the last 2 days, my colleagues have expressed many different views, but all have affirmed their commitment to safeguard our national security, to pursue peace and to wage war only as a very last resort. The depth and dignity of the debate is worthy of this great subject and of our great democracy.

At the outset, Mr. Speaker, I wish to commend our Democratic leader, my good friend, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GEPHARDT). In the proud tradition of that great Republican Senator, Arthur Vandenberg, half a century ago, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GEPHARDT) transcends parties and politics to craft and champion a bipartisan resolution that best serves the interest of our Nation. His leadership has been a true profile in courage.

Mr. Speaker, as our debate has shown, none deny the danger posed by Saddam Hussein. We differ only in the means of addressing this mounting threat; and in doing so, we grapple with two paradoxes. The first is the paradox of peace: Faced with an implacable and belligerent foe, how do we avert war? The answer, as our resolution affirms, lies not in disavowing the use of force, but in authorizing it. It is only when the Iraqi dictator is certain of our willingness to wage war, if necessary, that peace becomes possible. Saddam, like his mentor, Stalin, and all dictators, recoils before strength and pounces on weakness.

The second paradox, Mr. Speaker, is the paradox of leadership. Faced with skepticism from some friends and timid bystanders, how do we form the broadest possible coalition to confront Saddam? Publicly, few nations have responded to our call to arms against Iraq. Privately, as I have learned in innumerable meetings with heads of state, foreign ministers and ambassadors from the Arab world and beyond, the United States enjoys strong support. Bridging the divide between public opposition and private support requires that the United States assert leadership. Our joint resolution will demonstrate to the world our steadfast resolve. It will convince others that joining us is the best hope for securing peace. If we show the courage to lead, others will follow.

To preserve peace, we must authorize force. To build support, we must be prepared to lead. Our resolution resolves these paradoxes and represents the best means of averting war and of marshaling international cooperation. It is for these reasons that I urge support for our bipartisan resolution.

Mr. Speaker, in moments we will be casting our vote and we will make history. In so doing, we dare not repeat the history of the last century, a history characterized too often by appeasement and inaction in the face of tyranny. It is a history that should haunt all of us. Let us cast a vote in favor of this resolution. It will be a vote for American leadership. It will be a vote for peace.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. KENNEDY).

(Mr. KENNEDY of Minnesota asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KENNEDY of Minnesota. Mr. Speaker, I believe history tells us that supporting this resolution and empowering the President for peace is the surest chance to removing the threat to America without conflict and giving the authority to defend America and freedom, if necessary.

Mr. Speaker, I would quote Theodore Roosevelt, from a speech he gave in 1916 while the rest of the world was engaged in the Great War, "The belief that international public opinion, unbacked by force, has the slightest effect in restraining a powerful military nation in any course of action has been shown to be a pathetic fallacy."

Mr. Speaker, in the weeks since the Iraq policy debate came to the forefront of the national agenda, I have thought long and hard about how I would vote if it became my responsibility. This vote is the most important vote I will cast since I was elected to serve in Congress.

As Members of this august body, the people's house, it is the essence of our constitutional oath to defend America against all enemies foreign and domestic.

It is at times like these that I reflect on the words of a man who inspired me to the cause of public service, John F. Kennedy: "I do not shrink from this responsibility, I welcome it."

Mr. Speaker, in framing my thoughts on this momentous debate, I looked to history as a guide. I am unable to escape its harsher lessons.

I think of that lone voice in the House of Commons in the 1930s, who tried to alert his country to a growing danger. Winston Churchill warned against making agreements with an aggressor who had no intention of honoring them, all in the name of "peace." Others' reluctance to confront a growing evil resulted in countless deaths and untold suffering.

More recently, Ronald Reagan challenged America and the rest of the free world to remember its historical roots and stand up to Soviet expansionism. With the simple words, "Evil Empire," he succinctly characterized the nature of our adversary in the decades-old standoff between East and West. Man in the international community believed Ronald Reagan's abandonment of détente for his policy of peace through strength would bring war. Instead, the Soviet Union collapsed and because of the bold stand of an American president, countless millions were liberated without a shot being fired and the bright light of freedom was able to shine anew.

The age-old struggle of freedom against tyranny has entered a new century. Yet when faced with the choice of negotiating with an aggressor in the name of peace, or confronting aggression before it is too late, history's lesson is clear.

Mr. Speaker, it has been our tradition to fight for freedom and prosperity, going back to our Republic's infancy and America's lonely fight against the Barbary Pirates on the shores of Tripoli.

It is this chapter of our history that brought to mind the undesirable possibility that America would again have to confront evil on its own.

I am relieved that this is not the case in our struggle with Iraq with friends and allies like Britain, Italy, Spain, Norway, Denmark, Australia, and Qatar publicly stating their support for our efforts to rid the world of this great danger.

Yet, as we now ask the United Nations to act in the name of its own relevancy, Mr. Speaker, I think we should ask ourselves, should America's ability to defend her citizens be held hostage to countries that have more to lose, because of strong commercial ties, and less to gain from the liberation of Iraq?

We should ask ourselves, would Paris or Moscow or Beijing be in Saddam Hussein's crosshairs or would it be New York or Washington?

I have thought seriously about the concerns that dealing with Iraq would prove to be a distraction from the War on Terror.

But it's integral to the war on terror to remove one of the foremost sponsors of terrorist

activity in the world. It is well known that this is a man who subsidizes suicide bombers, providing support to those who stand in the way of progress toward Mideast peace.

The War on Terror's central tenet is, if you stand with the terrorists, you will be treated as one.

Many are rightfully concerned about a long-term American commitment in Iraq. But, Mr. Speaker, we are already committed to the region and to Iraq. We have stationed a large military force in the region for more than a decade. We have maintained a military force throughout the Gulf region to keep the peace and enforce no-fly zones. We can and must nurture an open and democratic Iraq.

Some of those whose voices are loudest in protest of an American-led liberation of Iraq may themselves fear it will undermine their own authoritarian regimes. Is the real fear of Iran's mullahs instability or a free Iraq next door?

What excuses will be left to the leaders of a failed Palestinian state once the Saddam regime joins the tyrannies of the 20th century on the ash heap of history?

I have an 18-year-old son I took to college a little over a month ago. It never leaves my thoughts what a war means in human terms, but no member of this body should forget the consequences of inaction.

As Theodore Roosevelt said, "Wars are, of course, as a rule to be avoided; but they are far better than certain kinds of peace."

For all these reasons, I will pray for peace. But at the same time, Mr. Speaker, I will vote to give President Bush the authority to needs to defend America, to defend freedom, and keep our people safe. I pray that by following history's guide, we will again find peace and freedom without using force.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. PORTMAN).

Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE) for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, as we reach the conclusion of this historic and dignified debate, now is the appropriate time to review the facts that compel the United States to act in self-defense and in defense of the civilized world.

The fact, Mr. Speaker, is that the Iraqi regime is employing the vast wealth of his country to develop biological, chemical and nuclear weapons in direct violations of the 1991 cease-fire agreement and in violation of numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The fact is that the Iraqi regime is responsible for two wars against its neighbors resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands.

The fact is that the regime's abuse of the U.N. administered Oil For Food Program is creating catastrophic shortages of food and medicine for thousands of Iraqi women and children.

The fact is that the regime's association with terrorists undermines stability in the Middle East and threatens the security of the United States of America.

The fact is that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of someone who sanctions the wholesale murder, star-

vation, rape and mutilation of ethnic Kurds, Shiite Muslims and other opponents is a clear and present danger to the security of the world.

Does the discovery by U.N. inspectors of detailed drawings for constructing a small nuclear device in Saddam's three as-yet-undismantled uranium enrichment facilities not sufficiently reveal the dangerous ambitions of this dictator?

Time and time again over the course of this debate, Mr. Speaker, these facts have been acknowledged by all of those who have spoken. And yet opponents of this resolution continue to resist what I believe is the obvious conclusion.

Yes, the President should continue the diplomacy, should work with the United Nations to fashion stronger sanctions and a regime of coercive inspections. That work is under way as I speak. But what incentive does the Iraqi regime have to honor its international obligations if Congress fails to give the President the tools he needs to compel them to do so? What incentive is there for the United Nations to act with courage and conviction if Congress fails to do so?

Mr. Speaker, we cannot wish this problem away. We must save ourselves. We must act. I support the resolution.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to my good friend, the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. JACKSON-LEE).

(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, because I believe the debate on this resolution is a matter of life or death for hundreds of thousands of Americans and other innocent persons and believe that it should only be done on a declaration of war by this constitutionally constituted body, this Congress, I rise to oppose this resolution.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. PELOSI), my San Francisco neighbor and dear friend, our distinguished whip, a person of extraordinary talents and qualifications.

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished ranking member for his recognition and his kind words.

First, I wish to congratulate all of the Members of the House of Representatives for the patriotism that has been demonstrated on this floor in the last 2 days. I think the American people saw something very special. They saw what we show every day, that people here love our country, are committed to its value, and are committed to and respect our men and women in uniform.

I come to this debate, Mr. Speaker, as one at the end of 10 years in office on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, where stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was one of my top priorities. I applaud the President on focusing on this issue and on taking the lead to disarm Saddam Hussein.

From that perspective, though, of 10 years on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I rise in opposition to the resolution on national security grounds. The clear and present danger that our country faces is terrorism. I say flat out that unilateral use of force without first exhausting every diplomatic remedy and other remedies and making a case to the American people will be harmful to our war on terrorism.

For the past 13 months, it will be 13 months tomorrow, we have stood shoulder to shoulder with President Bush to remove the threat of terrorism posed by the al Qaeda. Our work is not done. Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar and the other al Qaeda terrorist leaders have not been accounted for. We have unfinished business. We are risking the cooperation that we have from over 60 nations of having their intelligence and their cooperation in fighting this war on terrorism.

□ 1330

There are many, many costs involved in this war, and one of them is the cost to the war on terrorism. We cannot let this coalition unravel.

Others have talked about this threat that is posed by Saddam Hussein. Yes, he has chemical weapons, he has biological weapons, he is trying to get nuclear weapons. This is a threat not only from him but from other countries of concern in the past.

I want to call to the attention of my colleagues a statement about Saddam's use of chemical and biological weapons that was just declassified and sent to the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The question is: If we initiate an attack and he thought he was an extremist or otherwise, what is the likelihood in response to our attack that Saddam Hussein would use chemical and biological weapons? This is a letter from George Tenet, the head of the CIA to the committee. The response: Pretty high, if we initiate the attack.

Force protection is our top priority on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. We must protect our men and women in uniform. They are courageous. They risk their lives for our freedom, for our country. We cannot put them in harm's way unless we take every measure possible to protect them. So another cost is not only the cost on the war on terrorism but in the cost of human lives of our young people by making Saddam Hussein the person who determines their fates.

Another cost is to our economy. The markets do not like war. They do not like the uncertainty of war. Our economy is fragile as it is. The President has spoken. In his speech the other night, he talked about rebuilding Iraq's economy after our invasion. We have problems with our own economy. We must focus on building our own economy before we worry about Iraq's economy after we invade Iraq.

So let us do what is proportionate, what is appropriate, which mitigates the risk for our young people.

Another cost in addition to human lives, the cost of terrorism, cost to our economy, another cost is to our budget. This cost can be unlimited, unlimited. There is no political solution on the ground in Iraq. Let us not be fooled by that. So when we go in, the occupation, which is now being called liberation, could be interminable and so could the amount of money, unlimited that it will cost, \$100-, \$200 billion. We will pay any prices to protect the American people, but is this the right way to go, to jeopardize in a serious way our young people when that can be avoided?

We respect the judgments of our military leaders. It is a civilian decision to go to war, but the military leaders present us with options which they know are to be a last resort.

These costs to the war on terrorism, the loss of life, the cost to our economy, the cost in dollars to our budget, these costs must be answered for. If we go in, certainly we can show our power to Saddam Hussein. If we resolve this issue diplomatically, we can show our strength as a great country, as a great country.

Let us show our greatness. Vote no on this resolution.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 8 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. DELAY).

Mr. DELAY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding me the time, and I commend the chairman and the ranking member for the work that they have done, not just on this but the whole issue of the war on terror.

Mr. Speaker, Americans have always had to summon courage to disregard the timid counsel of those who would mortgage our security to the false promises of wishful thinking and appeasement. The perils of complacency were driven home to us in September of last year. We saw in tragic detail that evil is far more than some abstract concept. No longer should America allow dangers to gather and multiply. No longer should we stand idle as terrorists and terrorist states plot to murder our citizens.

As a free society, we have to defeat dangers before they ripen. The war on terrorism will be fought here at home, unless we summon the will to confront evil before it attacks.

President Bush certainly understands this imperative for action. The President is demonstrating the strong, moral leadership to find and defeat threats to the United States before they strike. Because once a madman like Saddam Hussein is able to deliver his arsenal, whether it is chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, there is no telling when an American city will be attacked at his direction or with his support.

A nuclear armed Iraq would soon become the world's largest safe haven and refuge for the world's terrorist organizations. Waiting to act until after Saddam has nuclear weapons will leave free nations with an awful dilemma.

Will they, on the one hand, risk nuclear annihilation by confronting terrorists in Iraq or will they give in to fear by failing to confront these terrorist groups?

For that reason, regime change in Iraq is a central goal of the war on terror. It is vital because a war on terrorism that leaves the world's leading purveyor and practitioner of terror in power would be a bald failure.

Some call Hussein a diversion, but far from being a diversion, confronting Saddam Hussein is a defining measure of whether we still wage the war on terror fully and effectively. It is the difference between aggressive action and misguided passivity.

The question we face today is not whether to go to war, for war was thrust upon us. Our only choice is between victory or defeat.

And let us just be clear about it. In the war on terror, victory cannot be secured at a bargaining table.

Iraq's vile dictator is a central power of the axis of evil. President Bush and this Congress are committed to removing the threat from Saddam Hussein's terrorist state. Only regime change in Iraq can accomplish that objective. Only regime change can remove the danger from Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. Only by taking them out of his hands and destroying them can we be certain that terror weapons will not wind up in the hands of the terrorists.

Saddam Hussein is seeking the means to murder millions in just a single moment. He is trying to spread that grip of fear beyond his own borders, and he is consumed with hatred for America.

But I am not here today to offer that definitive indictment of Iraq's tyrant. That has already been very clearly documented and well-established in this debate.

In the wicked litany of crimes against humanity, Saddam Hussein has composed a scarlet chapter of terror. Our only responsible option is to confront this threat before Americans die. Time works to the advantage of our enemies, not ours.

Under our Constitution, America speaks through the United States Constitution; and our resolution is very, very clear. The enemies of a free and a moral people will find no safe harbor in this world.

Today, the free world chooses strength over temporizing and timidity. Terrorists and tyrants will see that the fruits of their evil will be certain destruction by the forces of democracy.

Now we seek broad support, but I am telling my colleagues that fighting this war on terrorism by committee or consensus is a certain prescription for defeat. We will defend our country by defeating terrorists wherever they may flee around the world.

None of us take the gravity of this vote and its ramifications lightly, but history informs us that the dangers of complacency and inaction far outweigh the calculated risks of confronting evil.

In the fullness of time, America will be proud that in our hour of testing we chose the bold path of action, not the hollow comfort of appeasement.

So let us just take this stand today against tyranny. Let us take this stand against terror. Let us take this stand against fear. Let us stand with the President of the United States.

I say to my colleagues, just trust the cherished principles on which we were founded. Put faith in freedom and raise our voices and send this message to the world: The forces of freedom are on the march and terrorists will find no safe harbor in this world.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, it is with great pride in his judgment, wisdom and statesmanlike leadership that I yield the balance of our time to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GEPHARDT), the Democratic leader.

(Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, 26 years ago, I was fortunate to be elected by my constituents to serve in this House, and I represent today the district in which I was born. I am proud that the people of my district trust me to try to represent them every day. It is an honor that I feel every day that I walk into this building, that I am carrying the hopes and wishes of over a half a million people in Missouri, and I know today is a moment of sacred responsibility.

We come into this building hundreds of times during the year to cast very important votes, but on days like today, when we consider how we will protect our Nation, our people, the districts we come from and represent, these are the days when we must look deep inside and make sure that what we are doing is right.

Our gravest responsibility as legislators is authorizing the President to use military force. Part of the majesty of our democracy is that we do not entrust this power to one human being, the President, but we share it with a co-equal branch of this government; and in a democracy, the decision to put American lives on the line or perhaps go to war is ultimately a decision of the American people through their elected representatives.

No one wants to go to war. No one wants to put our young men and women in harm's way, and I know we hope that our actions today will avert war. But our decision is not so simple, because we must weigh the dangers of sending our young people into hostilities against the threat presented by Iraq to our citizens' safety.

Every Member of Congress must make their own decision on the level of the threat posed by Iraq and what to do to respond to that threat. I have said many times to my colleagues that each Member should be guided by his or her conscience, free from others trying to politicize the issue or questioning others' motives.

This is an issue of life and death, and the preoccupation by some to ascribe

political motives to the conclusion of each of us demeans all of us and what we are here to do.

Let me say to my colleagues and my constituents in Missouri why I have decided to vote for this resolution.

First, September 11 has made all the difference. The events of that tragic day jolted us to the enduring reality that terrorists not only seek to attack our interests abroad but also to strike us here at home. We have clear evidence now that they even desire to use weapons of mass destruction against us.

Before 9/11, we experienced the terrorist attacks on Khobar Towers, the USS *Cole*, on two embassies in Africa, but we did not believe it would happen here. On 9/11, it did happen here; and it can happen again.

September 11 was the ultimate wake-up call. We must now do everything in our power to prevent further terrorist attacks and ensure that an attack with a weapon of mass destruction cannot happen. The consequences of such an attack are unimaginable. We spent 50 years in a Cold War and trillions of dollars deterring a weapon of mass destruction attack on the United States by another country. Now we must prevent such an attack by terrorists who, unlike our previous adversaries, are willing to die.

□ 1345

In these new circumstances, deterrence well may not work. With these new dangers, prevention must work.

If my colleagues worry about terrorists getting weapons of mass destruction or their components from countries, the first candidate we must worry about is Iraq. The 12-year history of the U.N. effort to disarm Iraq convinces me that Iraq is a problem that must be dealt with diplomatically if we can, militarily if we must.

I did not come to this view overnight. It has, instead, evolved over time, as we have learned the facts about the Iraqi regime with clarity. As you know, I opposed the use of force against Iran in 1991 in favor of giving sanctions more time to work. Others supported force, but thought that by dislodging Iraq from Kuwait we would neutralize the threat. In hindsight, both of these assessments were wrong.

In 1991, no one knew the extent to which Saddam Hussein would sacrifice the needs of his people in order to sustain his hold on power, deceive the international community in order to preserve his weapons of mass destruction programs, or take hostile actions against U.S. interests in the region.

Saddam Hussein's track record is too compelling to ignore, and we know that he continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear devices; and he may soon have the ability to use nuclear weapons against other nations. I believe we have an obligation to protect the United States by preventing him from getting these weapons and either using them himself

or passing them or their components on to terrorists who share his destructive intent.

As I stated in a speech in June, I believe we must confront the threat posed by the current Iraqi regime directly. But given the stakes involved, and the potential risks to our security and the region, we must proceed carefully and deliberately. That is why I felt it was essential to engage in negotiations in order to craft an effective and responsible authorization for the use of force, if necessary, so we can defend our Nation and enforce U.N. resolutions pertaining to Iraq.

At the insistence of many of us, the resolution includes a provision urging President Bush to continue his efforts to get the U.N. to effectively enforce its own resolutions against Iraq. I have told the President directly, on numerous occasions, that in my view, and in the view of a lot of us, he must do everything he possibly can to achieve our objectives with the support of the United Nations. His speech to the U.N. on September 12 was an excellent beginning to this effort.

Exhausting all efforts at the U.N. is essential. But let us remember why. We started the U.N. over 50 years ago. We remain the greatest advocate of the rule of law, both domestically and internationally. We must do everything we can to get the U.N. to succeed. It is in our own self-interest to do that. In 1945, Harry Truman told the Senate that the creation of the U.N. constituted, in his words, an expression of national necessity. He said the U.N. points down the only road to enduring peace. He said let us not hesitate to start down that road, with God's help, and with firm resolve that we can and will reach our goal: peace and security for all Americans.

Completely bypassing the U.N. would set a dangerous precedent that would undoubtedly be used by other countries in the future to our and the world's detriment. It is too high a price to pay. I am glad the President said in his speech Monday that diplomacy is the first choice for resolving this matter.

This resolution also limits the scope and duration of the President's authority to use force. It requires Presidential determinations before our Armed Forces may be used against Iraq, including assurances to Congress that he has pursued all diplomatic means to address this threat and that any military action will not undermine our ongoing efforts against terrorism.

Finally, the bill provides for regular consultation with and reporting to Congress on the administration's diplomatic and military efforts and, of great importance to all Americans, the planning for assistance, reconstruction, and regional stabilization efforts in a postconflict Iraq.

The efforts we must undertake in a postconflict Iraq could be the most enduring challenge we face in this entire endeavor, which is another reason for doing everything humanly possible to

work through the U.N. to reach our goals.

Now a word on what this resolution, in my view, is not. In my view, it is not an endorsement or an acceptance of the President's new policy of preemption. Iraq is unique, and this resolution is a unique response. A full discussion of the President's new preemption policy must come at another time. But the acceptance of such a momentous change in policy must not be inferred from the language of this resolution.

It is also important to say that, thus far, the President's predominant response to 9-11 has been the use of military power. Obviously, self-defense requires the use of effective military force. But the exercise of military power is not a foreign policy. It is one means of implementing foreign policy. In the post-9-11 world, we must motivate and inform our citizens about how we construct a foreign policy that promotes universal values, improves living standards, increases freedom in all countries and, ultimately, prevents thousands and thousands of young people across this world from deciding to become terrorists. We will never defeat terrorism by dealing with its symptoms. We must get to its root causes.

In anticipation of the serious debate and vote that we have finally reached today, I have had many conversations with my colleagues and friends in this body, friends and colleagues that I respect deeply. I know for many of you this resolution is not what you want, and it is true for Democrats and some Republicans. And in some ways it is true for me. Many of my colleagues have had compelling arguments and important differences with this language. These differences do not diminish my respect or my trust for my colleagues as the true representatives of the people in this great Nation.

I believe, as a whole, the resolution incorporates the key notion that we want to give diplomacy the best possible opportunity to resolve this conflict, but we are prepared to take further steps, if necessary, to protect our Nation. I have heard in this debate some Members say they love America. I love America. I think every Member of this body loves America. That is not the issue. The issue is how to best protect America, and I believe this resolution does that.

I want to say a final word to those watching beyond our borders. To our friends around the world, I say thank you for standing with us in our time of trial. Your support strengthens the bonds of friendship between our people and the people of the world.

To our enemies, who watch this democratic debate and wonder if America speaks with one voice, I say have no doubt. We are united as a people in defending ourselves and we debate the best means for doing that. Do not mistake our resolve. Do not underestimate our determination. Do not misunderstand that we stand here today not as arguing Republicans and Democrats

but as Americans, using the sacred right of free speech and thought and freedom to determine our collective course.

Finally, I thank God for those who have gone before us and used their freedom wisely, for those who have died to protect it and have created a stronger Nation and a better world because of their bravery. I pray that we may act today as wisely and courageously as those who have gone before. God bless this House. God bless America.

Mr. Speaker, as a co-author of H.J. Res. 114, I would like to take this opportunity to address certain elements of the joint resolution in order to clarify their intent.

As I stated in a speech I delivered in June, I believe we must confront the threat posed by the current Iraqi regime directly. But given the stakes involved and the potential risks to our security and the region, we must proceed carefully and deliberately.

That's why I felt it was essential to engage in negotiations in order to craft an effective and responsible authorization for the use of force if necessary—so we can defend our nation and enforce U.N. resolutions pertaining to Iraq.

At the insistence of many of us, the resolution includes provisions urging President Bush to continue his efforts to get the U.N. to effectively enforce its resolution against Iraq. I have told the President directly, on numerous occasions, that in my view of a lot of us, he must do everything he possibly can to achieve our objectives with the support of the United Nations. His speech to the U.N. on September 12 was an excellent beginning to this effort. Exhausting all efforts at the U.N. is essential.

Completely bypassing the U.N. would set a dangerous precedent that would undoubtedly be used by other countries in the future to our and the world's detriment. That is too high a price to pay. I am glad the President said in his speech Monday that diplomacy is the first choice for resolving this critical matter.

This resolution also limits the scope and duration of the President's authority to use force, unlike the Administrations original proposal. The resolution and its accompanying report define the threat posed by Iraq as consisting primarily of its weapons of mass destruction programs and its support for international terrorism. They also note that we should continue to press for Iraqi compliance with all outstanding U.N. resolutions, but suggest that we only contemplate using force to implement those that are relevant to our nation's security.

As for the duration of this authorization, this resolution confines it to the continuing threat posed by Iraq; that is, its current and ongoing weapons programs and support for terrorists. We do not want Congress to provide this or subsequent Presidents with open-ended authority to use force against any future threats that Iraq might pose to the United States that are not related to its current weapons of mass destruction programs and support for international terrorism. The President would need to seek a new authorization from Congress to respond to any such future threats.

Third, this resolution requires important presidential determinations to Congress before our Armed Forces are used against Iraq. These include assurances by the President that he has pursued all diplomatic and other peaceful means to address the continuing

threat posed by Iraq, and that any military action against Iraq will not undermine our ongoing efforts against terrorism. These determinations ensure that the Executive Branch remains accountable to Congress if it resorts to military force, and stays focused on the broader war on terrorism that must remain of highest priority.

Finally, the bill provides for regular consultation with and reporting to Congress on the Administration's diplomatic and military efforts and, of great importance to all Americans, on the planning for assistance, reconstruction and regional stabilization efforts in a post-conflict Iraq. The efforts we must undertake in a post-conflict Iraq could be the most enduring challenge we face in this entire endeavor, which is another reason for doing everything humanly possible to work through the U.N. to reach our goals.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ARMEY), the majority leader.

Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Illinois for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, let me just take a moment to appreciate this body. I had resolved to cherish my last days in this body by being as attentive as I could to everything that I had the privilege of experiencing.

For the past 2 days, I have watched my friends in this body, from both sides of the aisle, from both sides of the issue, conduct what has to be regarded as one of the greatest debates we have seen in this body during my tenure here. I have been struck in the last 2 days with the sobriety, the thoughtfulness, the eloquence, and the respect with which the countervailing positions have been presented. And I would like to say thank you to my colleagues for letting me be part of this debate.

The distinguished minority leader, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GEPHARDT), had a sentence in his speech we heard just a minute ago where he said we had to see the facts with clarity. To see the facts with clarity. This is not an ideological debate. This is not a debate about philosophy. This is a debate about the sober business of safety in the face of danger, honor in the face of fear, responsibility in the face of timidity. We must turn to the facts when we face issues of this gravity, and we have done that.

Intensely, for the last month or so, most of us have been looking at the facts that we hoped we would never have to pay attention to. Let me just relate some of my travels in this past month through the facts.

Is Saddam evil? Who could doubt it? The evils that this man perpetrates, as described on this floor by our young colleague, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. RYAN), from a book he read from, strike terror in the heart of the worst that we have ever seen before.

This man is evil. It is an evil that this world should never have to observe and that the poor victims, particularly those in Iraq, should not have to live with on a daily basis. The atrocities

are beyond belief, beyond tolerance. And those poor people in Iraq live with it each day, afraid to leave their home, afraid to speak at their own dinner table, frightened for their children who might be tortured in order to punish the parents' careless moment.

□ 1400

Saddam is evil. That is a fact.

Does he have dangerous assets? More so than we thought, more so than we ever wanted to believe. And does he have an ongoing, consistent program and plan to acquire, to enhance those evil assets that are described by the term weapons of mass destruction, beyond what any of us imagined?

The acquisition of the weaponry, the resources, the resourcefulness, the ability to put together the device that would destroy hundreds of thousands in a fell swoop has never been even mitigated against by the commitments he made to the U.N. 11 years ago.

Can he strike our interests, our citizens, our land, and our responsibilities with them? Irrefutably, yes. Through the conventional means that we recognize and fear, things like SCUD missiles, yes. American people, American citizens, American resources in his immediate area, through the insidious means that would be deployed by his ongoing working relationship with a myriad of evil terrorist organizations, yes. Through simple-looking, innocent-looking little suitcases left in a train depot, a service station, an airport in Chicago, Illinois. Yes, he can strike us, our interests and our responsibilities. I know no other way to put that.

America is the most unique Nation ever in the history of the world. We have accepted responsibility for freedom, safety, and dignity of people other than ourselves. Those proud nations with those brave people that live as islands of freedom and hope within seas of threat and terror look for and understand they can depend upon the protection of the United States. That is who we are, that is who we have been, our heroes, our parents.

They spent their heroism, they spent their life all too often on foreign, distant lands fighting for the freedom of people other than themselves. No other nation has ever done that like we have done.

A nation such as Israel, not exclusively Israel, but right now in the world today, at a level of danger that is unparalleled by any other nation of the world, Israel struggles for its freedom, safety and dignity; and it is in imminent, immediate danger by a strike from Saddam Hussein. And that represents a responsibility we have, not only to what role we have played in the world, not only to our heroes who have acted it out and sacrificed, but to the character of this Nation that we cherish and protect.

I have said it as clearly as I can. To me, an attack on Israel is an attack on America; and it is imminently in danger.

Will he do so? Who can doubt that? He has a record of having done so that is deplorable in the most evil and insidious ways. The question is when will he do so; not will he do so.

Why does one violate one's own commitments to the world, to the United Nations accord with resolve, and consistently acquire these resources if you have no intent to use them? Why do you deny your own citizens the resources for food and shelter and clothing and health care in order to divert that to the expenditure on weapons of mass destruction and instruments of horror if you do not intend to use them? Why would he deny his own clear volitions in actions past if he had the resources to strike? Saddam will strike.

Is action against Saddam compliant with the character of our great Nation? I struggled with this. It was a hurdle for me for a long time. It all gets involved with this question of preemptive strike.

First of all, it is not a preemptive strike. This is a man who has consistently been in violation of his own commitments to the world for 11 years. As I put it, this snake is out of his hole. We are not striking an innocent here, we are correcting an error of complacency. So it is not a question of a new doctrine.

But even if we were to examine the doctrine of preemptive strike, let us not forget the Cuban missile crisis. An embargo on the high seas is an act of war, and the threat to us I would submit was not as dangerous as it was at that time, and it was certainly not so insidious as it is today.

There have been other instances in our history. When necessary, America does what it needs to do to keep America safe. America does have a pride which is exhibited in movies like "13 Days" for the courage that was displayed when the action was necessary.

There is an argument that this is a diversion from the war on terrorism. If we are going to conduct a war on terrorism, then we must stop that person who is most likely and most able to arm the terrorists with those things which will frighten us the most. A strike on Saddam is an integral part, a necessary part, of the war on terrorism.

Now we turn to questions about our ability. Can we be swift and decisive and conduct this operation with minimal risk to the brave men and women that we ask to carry it out?

It is possible. We saw that in Desert Storm. It is even more possible now. It will be a difficult operation, and our people will be at risk. But we have the resources and the resourcefulness, and we have the ability to plan and execute an operation that rids the world of this scourge conducted by our young men and women and their allies in such a manner to keep them at minimal risk.

That is all we can do, the moral imperative that we have, when we ask our brave young men and women who have

volunteered to serve this Nation and the world in the cause of freedom, to take the field of danger, we have an obligation, and we can say we can construct the plan, outfit you in such a way, support you in such a manner that you can carry out this deed with minimal risk. We can do that. We will do that. We have an administration. We have a Secretary of Defense that respects our people.

Should we vote this resolution that says in effect that we, the Congress of the United States, the representation of the people of the United States, say, Mr. President, we trust you and we rely on you in a dangerous time to be our Commander-in-Chief and to use the resources we place at your disposal? Yes, even by two bills we will vote on later today, to protect freedom? The answer is, yes.

Mr. President, we are about to give you a great trust. Those brave young men and women who have volunteered in our Nation's military services of their own free will to take their place in history alongside the American heroes of the past deserve our respect and our support, Mr. President. We trust that you will plan for them, use them, care for them, and be guided by your own notion of tender mercies.

But we also have an obligation to the parents, the children, the siblings, the grandparents of those brave young men and women. We lend our children to the cause of liberty. I have said so many times. I do not care if he is 240 pounds of solid muscle, the brightest kid in the class, when he puts on that uniform, he is my baby and I have fear, and I demand that you treat him properly as his Commander-in-Chief.

We all have that right to expect. Can we expect that from this President? I would say so.

Mr. Speaker, I was speaking yesterday with the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BUYER), who remembered embarking for Desert Storm, saying good-bye to his family. At the last moment, he approached his father, proud veteran of the Korean War with his veteran's hat. His proud father put his hands on Steve's shoulder and looked at him and said, "You are the best I have to give."

Mr. President, we trust to you the best we have to give. Use them well so they can come home and say to our grandchildren, Sleep safely, my baby.

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, the President has asked this Congress to support action that foresees the possibility of sending our loved ones—our sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, friends and neighbors—into combat in a foreign land. No more serious a decision ever faces Congress.

The threat that we confront is Saddam Hussein. Saddam is in a category of his own. No other head-of-state has been the subject of an 11-year international campaign to disarm and sanction him. He has invaded two of his neighbors, assassinated 16 of his own family members, tried to assassinate former President Bush, lied about his weapons buildup, fired missiles at Israel, and gassed his own people. The prospect that such a despot has

biological and chemical weapons—anthrax, sarin gas, smallpox—and is nearing nuclear capability is a looming threat to millions.

We as a nation have the responsibility to stop him.

I would have preferred that we proceed in the manner outlined in the Spratt substitute, which would have given the President all the authority needed at this time to disarm Saddam. The Spratt substitute would have allowed the UN to proceed with tough “anytime-anywhere” inspections, given the UN the military backing to make those inspections work, and ensured that Saddam Hussein lost his capacity to threaten the world.

Unfortunately, the Spratt substitute failed, and we are now faced with a vote, up or down, on the broader resolution negotiated between the White House, Minority Leader GEPHARDT, and others.

This too would accomplish the goal of giving the President sufficient authority to enforce UN resolutions regarding Iraq, particularly those that address the continuing threat posed by Iraq’s possession and development of chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities.

Although this is a broader resolution than the Spratt resolution, I will vote for it because it represents the best remaining hope of disarming Saddam. While the resolution does not require it, the President has said that it is his intention to continue to work towards a new UN resolution that can make the inspections program effective.

The President initially resisted going to the UN, but he changed course. He initially resisted coming to Congress to explain his purpose and to seek our support, but he changed course. We should respect the distance he has traveled towards a multilateral, measured process that includes the UN. We should support him as long as he remains on that course.

I do so today knowing full well this administration’s record on the issue of nonproliferation, arms control and multilateral treaties has often been incomprehensible. At times he has spoken and acted as if he would prefer to act without allies and without the UN. Several weeks ago, the President announced a strategic doctrine that embraces the “preemptive use of force” as its touchstone. This new Bush Doctrine is dangerous and destabilizing in its own right. It makes it harder to hold together the fragile international coalition on which we rely for success in the ongoing war on terror.

The contradictions and double-standards that define his non-proliferation policy are particularly troubling. His “Axis of Evil” speech, for example, lumped together Iraq, Iran and North Korea in a turn of the phrase that is hard to untie. They have all been accused of attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Yet our response in Iran is not to use force, but to complain to the Russians about their sale of reactors to Iran that could facilitate the acquisition of nuclear weapons. And in North Korea, our response is to make our own sale of nuclear reactors to that country. The President has also failed to seek Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban, pursued new nuclear weapons like the earth penetrating warheads, and turned his back on the biological weapons convention. This makes no sense and belies a lack of any coherent policy at all.

It is certainly true that George W. Bush is not the first president to be self-contradictory

regarding weapons of mass destruction. I have spent considerable effort during the last 26 years working to prevent the constant undermining of nonproliferation policy by both Democratic and Republican administrations. The Carter Administration shipped nuclear fuel to India notwithstanding that countries’ ongoing undeclared nuclear weapons program. The Reagan Administration condemned Israel in the UN for destroying Saddam’s Osirak nuclear reactor. The same administration promoted nuclear trade with the apartheid regime in South Africa. Both President Reagan and President Clinton allowed trade with Communist China to trump efforts to stop China from retransferring nuclear materials and technology to Pakistan.

Now it is the Bush administration that fails to connect the dots of weapons proliferation. When he promotes nuclear reprocessing, or tritium production for bombs in commercial reactors, he undermines nonproliferation. When he allows the export of sensitive nuclear technology, discards the comprehensive test ban treaty, or fails to negotiate progressive measures leading to global disarmament—as mandated by Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—he strengthens the proliferators.

These decisions come back to haunt us when, as now, we find that diplomatic options are exhausted and the use of force appears necessary.

But even as our overall nonproliferation policy keeps lurching from side to side, the United States and the international community have, in the particular case of Iraq, remained focused for more than a decade on the very real menace of Saddam’s drive to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction against his perceived enemies.

Now, after 11 years of insufficient inspections and sanctions, we cannot stand idle. Something has to change. We have nearly exhausted the non-violent alternatives. The sanctions are contributing to a significant loss of innocent life daily. Saddam has built up his chemical and biological weapons capacities during this period and he has missiles to deliver a nuclear payload and the money to buy it. It is apparent that but for our demonstration of resolve to follow through the UN-sponsored goal of disarming him, Saddam Hussein intends to make good on his pledge to acquire nuclear weapons.

I wish the resort to force were unnecessary and, if the inspections can be made effective, armed conflict can still be avoided. But while force is a last resort, is an option that cannot be ruled out if we intend to deal effectively with Saddam Hussein.

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Mr. Speaker, like my colleagues of both parties and in both chambers, the national debate on whether or not to go to war with Iraq, and under what circumstances, has weighed heavily on my mind and heart.

For, clearly, sending the young men and women of our armed forces into harm’s way is one of the most serious and far reaching decisions a member of Congress will ever have to make.

Like all Americans, I take pride in the fact that we are a peaceful nation, but one that will defend itself if needed against real and imminent dangers.

Like all Americans, I take very seriously our responsibility as the world’s global super-

power, and realize how our words and actions can have huge repercussions throughout the world.

For that reason, I attended briefings and studied the materials provided us. I have listened to the administration, my constituents, my colleagues on both sides of the issue, both sides of the aisle, and both sides of this Congress, and I remain deeply concerned about our march to war without a supportive coalition, nor a clear and moral justification.

Before making a final decision on how to cast my vote, I also asked myself, as a mother, what would I want our nation’s leaders to do before sending my son, my daughter or any loved one to war.

While I support our President’s efforts to keep our nation and the world safe, I firmly believe that the President has not made the case for granting him the far-reaching power to declare preemptive and unilateral war against Iraq.

There is no question that Saddam Hussein is a dangerous and unconscionable dictator with little regard for human life. And, there is no question that he must be disarmed and removed from power.

The facts presented thus far however, do not support the premise that Saddam is an immediate danger to our country. For that reason, I believe it is in the best interest of our nation and our American troops to make every possible effort to prevent war by exhausting diplomatic efforts, by giving United Nations weapons inspectors the resources and opportunity to perform their work, and by establishing a United Nations Security Council multilateral coalition to use force if necessary.

If this fails, the President can then bring his case to Congress on the need to initiate a unilateral pre-emptive strike against Iraq because a blank check authorization for military force at this time is unacceptable. I cannot in good conscience support the administration’s request for near ‘carte blanche’ authority to wage war when the case to do so has not been justified.

I will, however, support the resolutions of my colleagues Representative BARBARA LEE and Representative JOHN SPRATT. The Lee resolution urges congress to work with the United Nations using all peaceful means possible to resolve the issue of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. The Spratt resolution includes similar requirements with regard to the United Nations, but also authorizes the use of force if the United Nations efforts fail.

The Spratt resolution brings responsibility and accountability to our effort to protect our country against Saddam Hussein, and makes the Administration and the Congress joint partners in any military action against Iraq. The Spratt proposal honors our nation’s fundamental system of checks and balances.

And, makes it possible for me to say to my constituents, and our sons and daughters: “I did everything in my power to keep you from harm’s way.”

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, on behalf of the people of Guam, I would like to express my support for President Bush and the international community in forcefully addressing the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his regime in Iraq. In this regard, I strongly support the efforts of the President to seek and secure unconditional Iraqi compliance with full-fledged arms inspections. His seeking United Nations renewal and approval of these efforts

is to be commended and supported by this Congress. However, while I believe that the United States must act to disarm Iraq, I hope that we do not do so alone. I support efforts to gain as much international backing as possible to meet our disarmament objective. We must act alone only if absolutely necessary and only after the international community has been given the full opportunity to support this important cause.

In the course of debate on this important issue, I believe that I must also express my concerns about the impact that an impending armed conflict in the Middle East will have on my home island of Guam. As the Member of Congress representing a district located closest to the area of concern and to the theater of operation that our Armed Forces may be increasingly engaged in as a result of this resolution, I remain acutely aware of the challenges we find ourselves confronted with today. As I indicated on the House floor last week, these challenges do not affect all communities around the country in the same way. The people of Guam will undoubtedly feel the effects of a decision to use force against Iraq in many disproportionate ways. History proves this to be the case.

Servicemen and women from Guam will likely find themselves contributing to the war effort in higher numbers per capita than most other U.S. jurisdictions. Sadly, this may result in higher casualties for our service members than it would for other communities. During each major war of the last century, World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War, Guam endured disproportionate military casualties of native sons per capita in the United States. Today, our people serve disproportionately in high numbers in the armed services. While this demonstrates our support for the nation's military, it also underscores our vulnerability to war's disproportionate effects on our community.

Although, we would inevitably witness a build-up in military activity on our island, the economy of Guam would be adversely impacted by any decision to go to war. We are directly economically challenged by this impending armed conflict because our economy is primarily based on tourism. Eighty percent of our visitors come from Japan and nothing is more disconcerting to Japanese tourists than the prospect of war and conflict. If the situation which occurred in Guam immediately after the Gulf War crisis or immediately after September 11 of last year again unfolds as a result of an armed conflict with Iraq, we will see a dramatic downturn in visitor arrivals which in turn will further weaken our struggling economy.

However, despite these probable disproportionate effects, for which we will prepare to cope with, I stand in strong support to the use of force should Saddam Hussein continue to pose an imminent threat to regional and world peace and security. His efforts to produce weapons of mass destruction are just as troubling to us in Guam as they are for the rest of the country. His weapons of mass destruction stockpile and capability must be permanently eliminated. His threatening and deplorable behavior must be confronted and stopped. His flagrant violation of international law must be directly dealt with and his disarmament obligation must be compelled. As a member of the House Armed Services Committee, I understand, through voluminous testi-

mony that has been presented to the committee over the past few weeks, that this is a matter of serious importance that demands our immediate action.

Guam has time and time again done its part to support the foreign and military policy of the United States in the Western Pacific region. In 1975, more than 115,000 evacuees from the fall of Vietnam were repatriated via Guam as part of Operation New Life. In 1996, 6,600 Kurdish refugees who feared retaliation by Saddam Hussein were housed and comforted on Guam as part of Operation Pacific Haven. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Guam has served as a vital part of our national effort to protect our homeland and an essential military base in the war against terrorism. Combat aircraft capable of intercepting and diverting any unauthorized or threatening aircraft that would approach the continental United States from the Pacific, was quickly positioned on Guam as part of Operational Noble Eagle. Andersen Air Force Base has served as a critical air bridge for airlift in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Here again, we find ourselves ready to support the nation during this urgent situation, ready to do our part in the effort to further rid the world of terror.

As our country prepares to address the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his regime, I want to reiterate the people of Guam's support for our troops and Guam's role to assist our nation in our national security needs in the Western Pacific region.

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, thank you for the opportunity to offer my support for Mr. SPRATT's Amendment to the proposed Joint resolution. Its emphasis—on international action, the role of the United Nations and diplomatic means to achieve full compliance with multinational efforts to destroy Iraq's capability to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction—is exactly right.

This amendment includes key elements of the proposal for compulsory arms inspections put forward by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to the House International Relations Committee. I was impressed with the wisdom of that third approach then, and I am now.

This Amendment recognizes and honors Congress' role in the initiation of war and in monitoring its conduct. It rightly places our actions within a broader multi-lateral framework and calls on the international community, particularly Arab and Islamic countries, to work with the United States in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq.

For all these reasons, I urge adoption of the Amendment offered by the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, the more one hears of this debate in Congress and among the American people, the more puzzling it is that the approach in the Spratt resolution was not adopted.

The Spratt Resolution states clearly the need to act to totally disarm Saddam Hussein of his weapons of mass destruction.

It authorized the Use of U.S. Armed Forces within the framework of international collective action as embodied in U.N. Security Council resolutions seeking to disarm Iraq and providing for force by member states to ensure compliance.

If that collective international effort fails, the Spratt resolution spelled out an expedited pro-

cedure for the President to seek the authorization to proceed unilaterally in a war against Iraq.

So, why not the Spratt resolution?

It would have far more effectively achieved the goal of the President that we speak today with one voice.

The approach in the Spratt resolution would have maximized the chances of success in disarming Saddam Hussein and minimized the potential adverse consequences for the U.S. in going it alone, in terms of reactions throughout the world, stability in the region, cooperation in the war against terrorism and in broad participation in the aftermath of a war in Iraq.

It would keep the pressure on the U.N. to act, avoiding the inconsistency in the Administration's approach of saying to the U.N. "act," "be relevant," "hold Iraq to account" but potentially taking it off the hook in advance because the U.S. will go it alone.

While emphasizing collective action, the Spratt alternative explicitly did not bind the U.S. to whatever is done by the U.N., but leaves the U.S. what it must have, final say over its policies and actions. We are not ceding to the U.N. We are leading the world as the remaining superpower.

So why not Spratt?

Because its emphasis is on achieving collective action rather than proceeding unilaterally. The resistance of the Administration to that approach is consistent with the general strategy laid out in its new doctrine stated a few weeks ago, our use of pre-emptive first strikes in situations short of imminent danger with only cursory effort to proceed collectively. It is that very backdrop for the Administration's approach on Iraq that should make us all pause.

Or, because Spratt does state clearly the objective is total disarmament of all weapons of mass destruction. While sometimes implying otherwise, the President's speech earlier this week make clear that the Administration sine qua non is regime change, whatever the success in disarming Saddam Hussein. That also must give us pause.

We should not blur these important differences.

These are the reasons that I voted for the Spratt resolution and opposed the Administration's resolution.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, today I rise in support of the bipartisan resolution to authorize the use of military force against Iraq.

When President Bush addressed the nation following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, he made it entirely clear that the United States would not tolerate nations that harbor terrorists. Like the President, I believe a nation that provides a safe-haven for the likes of al-Qaeda is no different than the terrorist themselves. We know Saddam Hussein harbors terrorists in Iraq, funds terrorist training camps, and supports the families of suicide bombers.

He possesses and continues to develop biological and chemical weapons and seeks to build a nuclear bomb. We know he will try to use this bomb against the United States or our allies if he gets his hands on one. He already has unleashed biological and chemical weapons upon his own people, killing thousands. What more do we need to know? We must stand ready to take action before it is too late.

I want to make clear to every American, especially the folks in my home state of Louisiana, that this decision to possibly send our

young service men and women into harms way is not about settling unfinished business. Nor is it about oil or taking control of Iraqi oil fields. This is about a grave and present threat against our people, today.

Saddam Hussein is a tyrannical dictator who hates America and who will use any means possible to attack us if given the opportunity. We cannot allow Saddam that opportunity. Our only option is to take every precaution to ensure the safety of our citizens.

Whether the next direct threat against the United States comes in the form of retaliation from Iraq or from any other terrorist entity, we must be prepared for the possibility of a biological or chemical attack against Americans, here or abroad. Today, I can say with confidence that America's public health emergency system is better prepared to respond to such an attack as a result of the comprehensive bioterrorism preparedness bill that I worked hard to help write and enact.

This sweeping legislation, signed into law by the President in June, dramatically improves our nation's ability to respond swiftly and effectively to new and emerging terrorist threats. This major milestone covers everything from public health preparedness and improvements, to enhancing controls on deadly biological agents, to protecting our food, drug, and drinking water supplies and improving communications between all levels of government, public health officials, first responders and health providers.

Mr. Speaker, this threat to our national security is one we can conquer. We have the means, and I believe as the President does that "we must act now before waiting for final proof—the smoking gun—that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud."

Mr. OSE. Mr. Speaker, my greatest responsibility as a Member of Congress is to protect America against all enemies, foreign and domestic. This responsibility includes taking preemptive action, if necessary, to protect our homeland and national security interests. On September 14, 2001, Congress adopted a resolution that authorized the President to take such action.

Iraq must follow the terms it agreed to at the end of the Gulf War, cease its attacks on U.S. and other peacekeepers in the region, end its promotion of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and end its persecution of its own people. Should Iraq continue to ignore the 12 U.N. Resolutions and the agreements he made at the end of the Gulf War, I will support President Bush in the actions he sees necessary to ensure the safety of our citizens, as well as our allies and interests abroad. The vote today makes clear to Saddam Hussein that time for Iraq to finally meet the requirements of the international community has run out.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I want to take just a few minutes to outline my thoughts on the Resolution before the House today and the reasons why I have decided I must vote in its favor.

Throughout the past few months, I have been supportive of efforts that would allow our nation to first pursue Iraq's compliance with existing U.N. resolutions and eventually engage our allies in a united effort to force a regime change in Iraq. Early discussions and versions of the Congressional Resolution on which we are about to vote had very broad authorities for the President associated with

the threat posed by Iraq—something that caused concern for me and many of my colleagues on both sides of the political aisle.

As more evidence of Iraq's growing ability to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction has emerged, I think it is clear that the patience required to avoid armed conflict must be balanced against the severe and catastrophic consequences of waiting too long to act. We simply cannot wait to act, either with the United Nations or unilaterally, until Iraq actually uses its weapons of mass destruction against its enemies or completes its development of a working nuclear weapon. I believe a recent dossier on Iraq, written by the British Government, clearly illustrates the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Among its findings were the following:

Iraq has continued to develop chemical and biological weapons, including anthrax, mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, and VX nerve gas;

Iraq has military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, some of which are deployable within 45 minutes;

Iraq has developed mobile laboratories for the production of biological weapons;

Iraq has tried to covertly acquire technology and materials for use in the production of nuclear weapons;

Iraq has sought uranium from South Africa despite having no active civil nuclear power program that might need it;

Iraq is in various stages of development and deployment of a number of missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction over vast distances; and

Iraq has learned a great deal from past experiences with weapons inspections and has undertaken an aggressive program to conceal sensitive equipment and documentation in the event weapons inspectors return in the future.

To even the most cynical critic of armed conflict, these realities have to represent a clear and present danger to the security of the middle-east and an undeniable threat to the security interests of the United States.

I think it is also important to note that the development and possession of these weapons of mass destruction by Iraq are in direct violation of international law. Iraq, under a variety of U.N. resolutions, is required to destroy its vast inventory of these weapons under the supervision of the United Nations. Sadly, this is not the only way in which Iraq has violated its international obligations. In 2002 alone, Iraqi forces have fired on U.S. and British pilots 406 times and continue this hostility every day. In addition, recently released classified photos shows Iraq rebuilding its weapons factories and U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice recently revealed that Iraq provided training to al-Qaida in chemical weapons development and trained terrorists—information corroborated in the British Dossier.

I want to commend President Bush and leaders of both parties of Congress, including House Speaker DENNIS J. HASTERT and House Minority Leader RICHARD GEPHARDT, for working together, setting political differences aside, and drafting the Resolution before us today. I firmly believe this Resolution provides the President the authority he needs to protect the American people and the rest of the world from Saddam Hussein's growing appetite for weapons of mass destruction—including nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Resolution leaves open the possibility for a peaceful end to this international crisis and places the

responsibility for avoiding armed conflict directly on Saddam Hussein. His actions over the coming weeks will determine whether the United States, Great Britain, and a number of our allies are forced to act to protect the world from his own aggression.

Specifically, the Resolution:

Authorizes the President to defend the U.S. by military force against threats from Iraq, and enforce existing U.N. Security Council resolutions;

Requires the President to determine that further diplomacy initiatives will not adequately protect our national security;

Requires a report to Congress at least every 60 days on the status of efforts to protect the U.S.;

Authorizes action by the President consistent with the War Powers Resolution; and

Contains a sense of Congress resolution supporting the President's efforts to obtain a U.N. Security Council resolution to ensure that Iraq immediately complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

I want to report that this Resolution is not the blank check for war that some of its opponents are portraying it to be. In fact, this Resolution leaves plenty of room for a peaceful resolution to this conflict, urges cooperation with the United Nations and our allies, and ensures Congress's constitutional role is protected.

While I have been a proponent of seeking the participation of our allies in any action we might take against Iraq, I think it is important to remember that we have the right to act unilaterally in the defense of our nation and its interests. This resolution protects that right while recognizing the importance of securing the cooperation of the international community.

Although I feel it is regrettable that we are now at a point where we must consider armed conflict with Iraq to protect the world from its aggression, it is impossible to ignore any longer the devastating risks of continued inaction. Saddam Hussein is solely responsible for bringing the United States and the international community to this point. While I remain hopeful we can find a peaceful resolution to this dispute, the overwhelming body of evidence points to only one conclusion—Saddam Hussein must be disarmed immediately through either his actions or our own.

For that reason, Mr. Speaker, I will vote in support of the Resolution before us today and stand behind President Bush in his efforts to protect our nation from the horrors Saddam Hussein seems committed to unleashing on his enemies and the world.

Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, this past Sunday during a pancake breakfast at a firehouse in my hometown, one of my constituents sat down with me. "Why have we gotten into this headlong rush into war," he asked? Why haven't we first exhausted all the other possibilities for dealing with Saddam?" His questions reflected both my feelings and those of so many other Americans: Where is the pressing need to send our Nation, our servicemen and women, into a potentially bloody, costly war that could threaten rather than strengthen our national security?

I will vote "no" on this resolution.

It is true that Saddam Hussein has for years presented a threat to his own people, to the Middle East, to the world. His relentless pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is unconscionable. We have a legal and a moral obligation to hold him accountable for his flagrant

violation of international law and his maniacal disregard for human decency.

I applaud the President for refocusing international attention on the Iraqi threat. This is something that I have followed with concern since I worked in the State Department 15 years ago on nuclear nonproliferation. However, I believe it is at the least premature, and more likely contrary to our national interest, for Congress to authorize military action against Iraq now.

As I reviewed the arguments for and against this resolution, I found myself returning repeatedly to some basic questions. Would unilateral American military action against Iraq reduce the threat that Saddam Hussein poses? In other words, would a Saddam facing certain destruction be less likely or more likely to unleash his weapons of mass destruction on his neighbors, his own people, or on Americans? Will an attack against Iraq strengthen or weaken our more pressing effort to combat al Qaeda and global terrorism? Will it bolster our ability to promote our many other national security interests around the world and make Americans more secure? I believe the answer to all of these questions is a resounding no.

Why should we undertake action that makes more likely the very thing we want to prevent? A cornered Saddam Hussein could release his arsenal of chemical, biological, and possible nuclear weapons on American soldiers or on his neighbors in the region, including Israel. The CIA recently reported that Iraq is more likely to initiate a chemical or biological attack on the United States if Saddam concludes that a U.S.-led invasion can no longer be deterred.

In addition, I am also concerned that a unilateral American invasion of Iraq would send a destabilizing shockwave throughout the Middle East and ignite violent anti-Americanism, giving rise to future threats to our national security. While I have no doubt that we can successfully depose Saddam Hussein, I am concerned that the act of extinguishing Saddam would inflame, rather than diminish, the terrorist threat to the United States. And the ensuing anti-American sentiment could reinvigorate the terrorists' pursuit of the loose nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union—a greater threat than Iraq, I might add, one that American has largely neglected.

The Administration has tried and failed to prove that Saddam's regime is a grave and immediate threat to American security. It has also simply failed to explain to the American public what our responsibilities would be in a post-Saddam Iraq. How will we guarantee the security of our soldiers and the Iraqi people? How will we guarantee the success of a democratic transition? How many hundreds of billions of dollars would it cost to rebuild Iraq?

This resolution would give the President a blank check, in the words of many of my constituents, and would allow him to use Iraq to launch a new military and diplomatic doctrine. By taking unilateral, preemptive military action against Iraq, we would set a dangerous precedent that would threaten the international order.

Instead, we can and should take the lead in eliminating the threat posed by Saddam Hussein not by taking unilateral military action. If we consult actively with our allies in the region, with NATO, with the U.N. Security Council, we will be able to undertake effective inspections and end Saddam's threat. I do not believe that we need the permission of our al-

lies to take action, but I do believe that we need their partnership to be successful in the long run.

As the world's leading power, we should use the full diplomatic force at our disposal to work with our allies to get inspectors back into Iraq without any preconditions—including access to Saddam's presidential palaces. We can and we will disarm Iraq and end Saddam's threat. The United Nations and the international community may recognize the need to take military action. The American people will understand and be prepared for that possibility. Now, they are not. Now, they are saying that, for the United States, war should and must always be our last resort.

Mr. MALONEY of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Spratt substitute to H.J. Res. 114, the Hastert/Gephardt resolution authorizing military action against Iraq. Nearly all of us agree that Saddam Hussein is a mass murderer who is in control of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction—and reaching for nuclear weapons as well. The Spratt substitute recognizes the grave threat that Saddam Hussein poses to security in the Middle East and around the world. The Spratt substitute authorizes the use of force through a prudent multinational approach. In contrast, the Hastert/Gephardt resolution, which I will oppose, authorizes unilateral military action on the part of the United States without first making sure that all possible steps have been taken to organize multinational, world-wide support against Saddam Hussein.

I also note that I am opposed to the substitute amendment offered by Representative LEE of California, but for the opposite reason. That resolution does not re-enforce our commitment to wage the critically important War on Terrorism, nor does it set out any path that would require Saddam Hussein to rid his regime of weapons of mass destruction. While it is clearly a mistake to act in haste, it would be an even worse mistake to not act at all.

As Connecticut's senior member on the House Armed Services Committee, as well as a member of the Committee's Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, I want to share my deep concern regarding four key issues relating to the Hastert/Gephardt resolution on Iraq.

First, it would be a fundamental abdication of American leadership if, before taking action against Iraq, we don't make every effort to bring the family of nations with us, just as we did in the first Gulf War, and have done in the War on Terrorism. Unilateral action by this nation against Iraq raises very disturbing issues, including the reaction of other Arab states, which could further destabilize the Middle East, incite further terrorist hatred against us, and even potentially metastasize the Middle East conflict into the ongoing nuclear standoff between Pakistan and India. Only a cohesive multinational approach, most preferably under the authority of the United Nations, would minimize these risks.

Second, it seems unlikely that unilateral war with Iraq can be carried out without an adverse impact on the War on Terrorism. America certainly has the ability to do militarily almost anything it wants. The issue is prudence not capability. As President Abraham Lincoln said during the middle of the American Civil War, when England was looking to pick a fight with the United States, it is best to fight "One war at a time." We have successfully built a global coalition to fight terrorism. Many na-

tions, some even traditionally hostile to our interests, have assisted in our efforts to destroy the al Qaeda network, and bring to justice the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks. This work should remain the first priority of national security. A unilateral attack on Iraq will destroy that coalition, and make it much more difficult—perhaps even impossible—for us to complete our anti-terrorism efforts. Many Arab nations would break with our coalition, and nations like Russia and China, even France, might well follow suit.

Third, a less than fully multinational approach increases the chance that Saddam Hussein will use weapons of mass destruction against us. In a letter dated October 7, 2002, to the Senate Intelligence Committee, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency said, "Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting Islamist terrorists in conducting a WMD attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him." Should we act unilaterally, the United States would expose ourselves to the greatly increased likelihood of a weapons of mass destruction attack. Saddam Hussein cannot achieve the same kind of "vengeance" in attacking a coalition that includes fellow Arab states. We can best mitigate the threat of Saddam Hussein using weapons of mass destruction against us by having our actions endorsed by the U.N. Security Council and by operating in cooperation with the nations of the region. That is also the strategy that appears to be most likely to produce a resolution of the matter without Saddam Hussein using force of any kind. Saddam Hussein, facing a united, determined opposition coalition of nations would be more likely to assent to real inspections and disarmament if his only alternative was total defeat, including his being stripped of the ability to single out the United States for vengeance.

Fourth, and finally, we need a clear exit strategy for any military engagement. The commitment to disarm Iraq and oust Saddam Hussein brings with it, according to the best military estimates, at least a decade of occupation and engagement in the stability and security of that country. I have great pride and confidence in our military and its capabilities, but there is a large danger in devoting them to such a huge task while other major threats still persist around the world, including North Korea and Iran, the other two nations of the "Axis of Evil." Operating in conjunction with the United Nations will provide our forces with such a clear exit strategy. Specifically, U.N. peacekeeping forces will be put in place following the liberation of Iraq. The U.N. can then help bring Iraq back into the community of law-abiding nations, which is a task properly and fully within its mission.

I have based these decisions on the series of briefings I have attended as a member of the House Armed Services Committee, numerous conversations with constituents and my colleagues, and my own best judgment of what is patriotically both in the long and short-term interests of our country. I have listened intently to all sides in the debate, most recently meeting this morning with Secretary Rumsfeld at the Pentagon.

Having carried out the due consideration that this issue demands, I conclude that I cannot support the Hastert/Gephardt resolution that would allow a pre-emptive unilateral attack without requiring that every effort at a

multinational approach had been exhausted. I therefore urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the strong, but prudent and responsible, Spratt substitute that authorizes the use of force, but assures that such force (1) is carried out in concurrence with the community of nations, or (2) failing to secure such concurrence, is specifically authorized in the cold light of a future day reserved for that purpose. Any more open-ended resolution, including that offered by Speaker HASTERT and Leader GEPHARDT, does not provide the thorough, specific review and deliberation that the authorization of war demands of the Congress of the United States.

I conclude by expressing my heartfelt appreciation, shared by my colleagues on all sides of this debate, for our men and women in uniform. Whatever the decision made today, I stand in full support of our dedicated and courageous service men and women who may well soon find themselves in harm's way. As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I re-affirm to them, and all Americans, my commitment to make sure that they continue to be the best trained, best equipped, and best led military force in the world. I pray them God's speed and protection in all that they do.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Mr. Speaker, this is an important—no, a critical debate. It is right that we have it. I stand here as one who enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1994, voted for Desert Storm, and has always believed that the first federal dollar spent each year should go to the military. These men and women provide for our ultimately security.

However, I am prepared to vote against this particular resolution. It will not be a happy vote. I will be in the minority. I sadly will not stand with my President, a man I admire so much. Yet as with literally the thousands of votes cast in this chamber, I've found that following one's instinct is the most honest, if not always the most politically popular, approach.

What we're discussing is all unknown territory. We're talking about the future—and that talk, out of necessity, means guesses, estimates, and personal interpretation. The one thing we do know is that since September 11, 2001, we are living in a new world. It's an unsettling world requiring different defenses—secrecy, stealth operations, armies without uniforms—but maybe of greatest importance, an adhesive-like working relationship with our friends.

Following 9/11 we were told that the enemy was terrorism in all its forms. The al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden would be hunted down, Afghanistan was to be stabilized and rebuilt, and we were to work closely with our allies and near-allies. We could not go it alone.

Now we hear that priorities have changed. Iraq is the prime target. Saddam Hussein is a heinous criminal, with frightening weapons. And I believe all that. But the question remains: what does this have to do with terrorism, our original objective? There is little evidence that Iraq had anything to do with 9/11.

I happen to be a hawk on Iraq. Saddam Hussein is a disturbed, dangerous leader. We should deal with him. But absent any immediate threat, our eye ought to be on the security of the American people. The fight is against terrorism in all the emerging subtle forms and that has little to do with Saddam Hussein. So without finishing what we started and with no sure knowledge that he is near

producing nuclear weapons, why is it that within the last few months we recalibrate our objectives? War would be hugely costly. We already are in deep deficit. We are not backed by the essential allies, and we could easily unleash additional terrorism.

Last weekend I spent a whole day with Jewish and Palestinian representatives. One Arab comment was, "The Iraqis hate Saddam Hussein, but remember they hate the United States more."

Iraq is one of the few secular countries in the Middle East. Unleashing, without careful ground work, the hatred of two mortal internal enemies—the Sunnis and the Shi'ites—could produce another angry fundamentalist state.

The bill in front of us says, "The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate . . ."

I have the greatest respect for the President. And you know what? He may be right. But I am given the opportunity to express my opinion and to cast my vote. I feel uncertain at this time, in this place, sanctioning that authority.

Unilateralism scares me. We haven't shown a lot of patience since the President's speech to the U.N. Our historic rule of thumb has been to bring people together, not divide them. This war will not be a cake walk. People fight differently in defense of their homeland, their families. I worry about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and our lack of attention to it.

I think we've got the cart before the horse. Let the U.N. first work its will.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, a right decision at the wrong time is a wrong decision. Why don't we win the war against terrorism before we start another fight?

Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, during this Congress I have been honored to serve as Vice Chairman of the Government Reform Committee's Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations. Under Chairman SHAYS' leadership our Subcommittee has conducted at least 14 hearings and briefings, many of them well before September 11, 2001, which addressed in some measure the threat from the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

Congress has recently conducted hearings on who missed the signals leading to 9/11. The signals of the potential for an even greater catastrophe have been writ large before our subcommittee over the past two years of testimony. These hearings provided ample evidence establishing that Iraq is one of the premier consumers—if not the—premier consumer of the components and precursors of weapons of mass destruction. This unprecedented build-up serves no positive purpose, but rather demonstrates an attempt to dominate the region and threaten our peaceful interests. Let me share with you just a few examples:

1. Iraq is seeking to purchase chemical weapons agent precursors and applicable production equipment, and is making an effort to hide activities at the Fallujah plant, which was one of Iraq's chemical weapons production facilities before the Gulf War.

2. At Fallujah and three other plants, Iraq now has chlorine production capacity far higher than any civilian need for water treatment, and the evidence indicates that some of its chlorine imports are being diverted for military purposes.

3. Saddam Hussein is continuing to seek and develop biological weapons. In 2001, an Iraqi defector, Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, said he had visited twenty secret facilities for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Mr. Saeed, a civil engineer, supported his claims with stacks of Iraqi government contracts, complete with technical specifications.

4. Saddam Hussein is continuing to seek and develop nuclear weapons. A new report released on September 9, 2002, from the International Institute for Strategic Studies—an independent research organization—concludes that Saddam Hussein could build a nuclear bomb within months if he were able to obtain fissile material.

5. Saddam Hussein is continuing to seek and develop prohibited long-range, ballistic missiles. Iraq is believed to be developing ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers—as prohibited by the U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. Discrepancies identified by UNSCOM in Saddam Hussein's declarations suggest that Iraq retains a small force of Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of launchers and warheads.

6. There is ample evidence that Saddam Hussein is using his Presidential palace sites to hide prohibited WMD and missile technologies. In December 1997 Richard Butler reported to the U.N. Security Council that Iraq had created a new category of sites, "Presidential" and "sovereign" from which it claimed that UNSCOM inspectors would henceforth be barred. The terms of the ceasefire in 1991 foresaw no such limitations. However, Iraq consistently refused to allow UNSCOM inspectors access to any of these eight Presidential sites. Many of these so-called "palaces" are in fact large compounds, which are an integral part of Iraqi counter-measures designed to hide prohibited weapons and material.

7. To implement the agreement that ended the gulf war the United Nations Security Council passed a number of resolutions demanding that President Saddam Hussein stop pursuing weapons of mass destruction and allow inspectors total access to his country to verify his compliance. In 1998 Saddam Hussein suspended cooperation with the U.N. inspectors. The U.N. General Assembly has subsequently failed to enforce the sixteen (16) existing Security Council Resolutions that Iraq has violated. While the United States is working with our allies to craft yet another resolution for consideration by the Security Council, it should be noted that the Saddam Hussein regime has already rejected this proposal before it has even been brought before the Security Council.

Mr. Speaker, this is a particularly difficult decision for me, because I recognize that it is largely the men and women of my generation, those in their twenties or younger, who will fight this war—if war comes. Today, Marine Lance Cpl. Antonio J. Sledd, 20 rests in honor under our flag somewhere between Kuwait and his home in Hillsborough County, Florida. We would be remiss in our responsibilities if we do not acknowledge that there will be a cost, and there is a price being paid this very day, by America's young defenders and their families.

Opponents of military action against Iraq argue that until it is clear that Iraq poses an imminent threat, the United States should continue to contain and deter Saddam Hussein. Our hearings have demonstrated that Saddam

Hussein is not deterred, and that the threat posed by his regime's continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology is in fact imminent. Today, we are at the point, very much as the democracies of the world once were in their great confrontation with Hitler, where we have a choice to confront or appease an aggressor. I intend to vote in favor of House Joint Resolution 114 and support President Bush in his decision to confront Saddam Hussein and end the threat to the United States, and the world, posed by Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. HILLEARY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Hastert-Gephardt Iraq resolution, in opposition to the Spratt and Lee amendments, and in strong support of our President.

I do not take this action lightly. No one enjoys the idea of placing sons and daughters of America in harm's way. Twelve years ago, while serving as an Air Force C-130 navigator, I was one of those troops on the receiving end of a resolution like this one. I know it was an agonizing decision for many members of Congress. I know many members are struggling with this resolution here today. And I have received phone calls, letters, and emails from many concerned Tennesseans on both sides of this issue.

To all of them, I would offer the advice Margaret Thatcher gave President George H.W. Bush in 1990: "Now is no time to get wobbly." The resolution Congress passed before Desert Storm was right, both for America and for the world. This one is too.

The Spratt amendment and the Lee amendment would each tie the President's hands, subjecting U.S. foreign policy to the dictates of the U.N. Security Council. United Nations opposition to removing the corrupt Iraqi regime in 1991 is a major reason why we're here today. I am not comfortable with China, Russia, and France having a veto on American security decisions. America is a peaceful nation, but when our freedom and security have been challenged in the past, we have consistently done whatever it took to protect our way of life. We are challenged again today, and America must take the lead against this tyranny.

I take issue with those who call any action in Iraq "a preemptive strike". It is surely not. For Saddam, the gulf war has never ended. In the past two years, forces at his command have fired over 1,600 times at American and British planes patrolling the no-fly zone Saddam agreed to at the end of the gulf war. They've fired at our pilots more than 60 times since September 18th, the day Saddam promised to "allow the return of United Nations inspectors without conditions."

By using chemical weapons to kill thousands of his own people, Saddam has proven his ruthlessness. In invading Iran and Kuwait, he has shown his inclination toward aggression and his ambition for dominating the region. In violating 16 United Nations resolutions, he has consistently lied to the world and refused to allow the Iraqi people to join the ranks of civilized nations.

Now, financed by his immense oil wealth, Saddam has relentlessly pursued building nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These weapons in the hands of a ruthless tyrant like Saddam Hussein present a direct threat we cannot ignore. He could launch an attack on

Israel that plunges many nations into war. He could also use them as blackmail as he pursues domination of the Middle East. But his main threat to America is as a supplier.

Intelligence reports have indicated that Saddam's people have been in contact with al-Qaeda operatives. We know they share a common interest in harming America and the West. If Saddam provides al-Qaeda with the weapons of mass destruction they desire but cannot make themselves, they will find a way to transport those weapons into this country. And the magnitude of the subsequent attack and its casualties would rival or exceed anything we experienced on September 11th, December 7th, or any other tragic date in our history.

Remember President Bush's words from his State of the Union speech earlier this year. "America will do what is necessary to ensure our Nation's security. We will be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."

President Bush and his national security team may find a way short of war that may force Saddam to disarm. An overwhelming vote for this resolution could actually help the President avoid war while protecting our citizens, by making it clear to Saddam that we are united and complete disarmament is his only way out. During his speech in Cincinnati this past Monday, President Bush made clear that war is not his first option, but his last. But given Saddam's history, that last option may be the only way to avoid the greater danger of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons falling into the hands of those who will use them against America.

The situation we face is not all that unlike the situation Europe faced with the rise of another previously defeated enemy, Germany. Winston Churchill's pleas throughout the 1930's that Europe deal with Hitler early fell on deaf ears. Western Europe's negligence was followed by fear, appeasement, and eventually, the most destructive war in history.

This President is determined not to allow history to repeat itself. The American people now face a clear choice—whether to put our head in the sand—or draw a line in it. We will choose action over fear. The President is right—in this battle, time is not on our side. But freedom is. And in the end, victory will be as well. I strongly support this resolution, and I will encourage all Americans to do the same. My God bless our country, our President, and our men and women in uniform at this critical time.

Mr. PLATTS. Mr. Speaker, just off the rotunda of the U.S. Capitol building stands a statue of a fellow Pennsylvanian by the name of John Muhlenberg. In early 1776, this 29 year-old Lutheran Minister gave a sermon in Woodstock, Virginia in which he called upon the men of his congregation to join him in fighting for our Nation's independence. Quoting the Book of Ecclesiastes, Pastor Muhlenberg said: "There is an appointed time for everything. And there is a time for every event under heaven . . . A time for war and a time for peace." Contending that the time for war had arrived, Pastor Muhlenberg then concluded his sermon by casting off his clerical

robes to reveal the uniform of a Continental Army officer. Pastor Muhlenberg went on to serve as a general in the Continental Army.

More than a century and a half later, in an address at Chautauqua, New York in 1936, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt stated, "I hate war." Yet, after Pearl Harbor roused our nation from a slumbering isolationism, President Roosevelt knew that the time for war had come. The actions of Pastor Muhlenberg and President Roosevelt remind us that, from the very beginning of our great Nation to modern times, war is always regrettable, but sometimes necessary to protect the lives of our citizens and to secure the important principles for which our Nation stands.

As our Nation now seeks to address the very serious and immediate threat that Saddam Hussein's regime poses to American lives, both abroad and here at home, it remains to be seen whether war will be a necessary part of our Nation's efforts. I certainly hope and pray that it will not. Unfortunately, however, Saddam Hussein's actions, past and present, do not provide much reason to believe that my hopes and prayers will be fulfilled.

If diplomacy is to have any chance of success, Saddam Hussein must fully and unequivocally understand that, if necessary, the United States and other peace-loving nations will no longer stand idly by while he further enhances his chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and aggressively pursues the production of nuclear weapons. Saddam Hussein must understand that, if necessary, we will use military force to eliminate the threat that his weapons pose to our citizens.

It is thus imperative for the United States Congress to pass legislation authorizing President George Bush to use military force to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq" and to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq." I therefore join my Republican and Democrat colleagues in voting in favor of this legislation, House Joint Resolution 114. Importantly, H.R. Res. 114 requires that, prior to using military force against Saddam Hussein's regime, President Bush must officially determine that further reliance on "diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either will not adequately protect the national security of the United States" or will not likely "lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq." Such determination must be shared with the House and Senate.

My decision to support H.J. Res. 114 followed much deliberation and was the product of countless hours of careful review of information from many sources. I have fully considered the views and concerns of hundreds of 19th District residents. As a member of the House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, I have participated in numerous classified briefings with various Administration officials, including Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency John McLaughlin. I have also met overseas and in Washington with leaders of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a coalition of Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurdish Iraqi dissidents seeking to liberate

their people from Saddam Hussein's oppressive rule. Although very diverse in their backgrounds, they are united in a common belief that Saddam Hussein's military regime must be replaced with a more humane government. My interactions with the INC representatives leads me to believe that the removal of Saddam Hussein will be embraced enthusiastically by the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people—just as the people of Afghanistan embraced their liberation from the Taliban.

My challenge is to fully explain my support for H.J. Res. 114 when much of the most important factual basis for this extremely serious decision is classified information. While I cannot legally share such classified material publicly, I can frankly and honestly state that my review of said material has wholly convinced me that Saddam Hussein's military regime poses a grave threat to the safety and security of American citizens, including here at home. There is compelling evidence of Iraq's biological and chemical capabilities and Saddam Hussein's intended use of such weapons. There is also strong evidence of his pursuit of nuclear weapons. Of significant concern is Iraq's growing fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are capable of dispensing biological or chemical weapons. As President Bush stated in his recent address to the Nation, our intelligence information indicates that Saddam Hussein is "exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States."

Please allow me to address various actions by Iraq over the past 11 years that are in the public domain. First, Iraq has a long record of abetting terrorist groups. For example, Hussein has regularly praised Palestinian suicide bombers who have taken the lives of countless innocent civilians, including American citizens. He has also financially rewarded the families of said suicide bombers. Although no direct Iraqi involvement in the September 11 attacks has been proven, there is also strong evidence that Iraq is serving as a safe harbor for al Qaeda terrorists since the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

Second, as part of the United Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement following the liberation of Kuwait, Iraq agreed to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and allow inspections to ensure its compliance with the agreement. Iraq has been in continuous violation of the cease-fire terms, playing "cat-and-mouse" games with United Nations inspectors while continuing to develop WMD. Since weapons inspectors were effectively expelled in 1998, Iraq has been completely free to continue its pursuit of developing WMD and the means to deliver them. Saddam Hussein has used chemical WMD in the past against a neighboring country, Iran, as well as against his own people, including innocent children.

Third, Saddam Hussein has demonstrated his continuing hostility towards the United States by attempting to assassinate former President George Bush in 1993 and firing regularly on U.S. aircraft attempting to enforce United Nations-sanctioned "no fly zones" in northern and southern Iraq, the only protection that the persecuted people in those regions possess. In fact, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. and other allied aircraft enforcing the "no fly zones" have been fired upon several thousand times by Iraqi military units.

Fourth, Saddam Hussein has engaged in heinous human rights violations against his

own people. He has intimidated political opponents by ordering the systematic rape of wives and mothers of said opponents and he has forced parents to watch their children be tortured as a means of political coercion.

"Finally, it is important to note that "regime change" in Iraq is not a new policy adopted by the Bush Administration. Rather, the Iraq Liberation Act, which states that it is the policy of the United States government "to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime," was enacted in 1998. Sponsored by Congressman BEN GILMAN in the House and Senators TRENT LOTT and JOSEPH LIEBERMAN in the Senate, the Iraq Liberation Act passed the House by a vote of 360-38 and the Senate unanimously. President Bill Clinton signed this act into law on October 31, 1998.

If the use of military force against Saddam Hussein's regime does prove to be necessary to protect our Nation's security, such military action must be carefully designed to minimize the risk of injury and death to Iraqi civilians and American military personnel. The enemy is the regime of Saddam Hussein, not the Iraqi people.

Ideally, President Bush, working hand-in-hand with our allies and the United Nations Security Council, will be successful in fully addressing the threat that Saddam Hussein and his military regime pose to world peace and to our Nation's security without having to resort to military force. But if diplomatic efforts fail to truly eliminate this grave threat to American lives, then we must be prepared to act decisively, just as our forefathers did during the Revolutionary War and World War II.

President Bush well captured the challenge before us when he stated, "As Americans, we want peace. We work and sacrifice for peace. But there can be no peace if our security depends on the will and whims of a ruthless and aggressive dictator."

Mr. OTTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my support for House Joint Resolution 114, authorizing the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq. After careful consideration of the information provided by the President it is clear that the threat posed by the current Iraqi regime can no longer be tolerated.

Thousands of my constituents have contacted me about this resolution, and many have expressed the earnest hope that war can be avoided. I share that hope, and urge our President to use every means short of war to persuade Iraq to end their violations of Security Council resolutions, to stop developing weapons of mass destruction, and to allow their people to live in peace and freedom. Unfortunately, the current regime has shown no willingness to do any of these things.

The Iraqi regime, controlled by Saddam Hussein and his family, is unique in its level of violence, both against its own people and its neighbors. Since Mr. Hussein came to power he has invaded both Iran and Kuwait. He has fired ballistic missiles against Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Israel. He has sponsored terrorist attacks against American citizens and Iraqi dissidents abroad.

The Hussein regime is also unique in its unquenched thirst for weapons of mass destruction. Iraq has used chemical weapons against its own people and Iran. It has developed bio-

logical weapons. Most disturbingly, Iraq seeks to acquire nuclear weapons.

Some have said that the Iraqi weapons problem can be solved by inspections, but Iraq consistently hindered international inspections when they allowed them, and since 1998 has not permitted them at all. Meanwhile they go ahead with their research program funded by illegal oil smuggling.

An Iraq armed with nuclear armed ballistic missiles would not only be the dominant military power of the Middle East, but it would be the natural ally of all states and groups that oppose the United States. We cannot allow unbridled power into the hands of such an unscrupulous regime. America's future cannot be made dependent on a regime armed with the ultimate weapon.

The Iraqi regime led by Saddam Hussein is based on the ruthless use of force, and only responds to the use of force by those it threatens. If force must be used to resolve this crisis, we must ask ourselves: Should we use it now to defend peace and freedom, or later to avenge the murder of innocent men, women, and children by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. I believe that the answer to this question is clear and that our President is correct. I urge my colleagues to join me in voting for House Joint Resolution 114.

I am grateful for those allies such as the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, and others who are standing with us, and remain hopeful that other nations will join our cause. I ask our President to seek the support of as many nations and international organizations as possible, and to make available whatever additional intelligence or security they need. I also must reiterate that our quarrel is with the Iraqi regime, not its people. As we move forward I urge my fellow Americans to remain tolerant of their neighbors and to avoid any action based on the ethnicity or religious persuasion of others. I also urge all Americans, and all sides in this debate, to support our troops who may be called upon to enforce this resolution and defend their country.

Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, we are standing at the abyss of a horrifying war. President Bush himself told us Monday night that this war was neither "imminent nor unavoidable." And yet we are pushing, hurrying, racing against time to give the President our approval of a future war, a war without limits or boundaries, a war waged because the President thinks diplomacy has failed.

I do not believe diplomacy has failed. And I do not believe we have to go to war. President Bush's speech was designed to frighten the American people, and to intimidate the United Nations. It wasn't address to us, the Congress, because President Bush and his advisers already believe that they have our backing. But they don't have the backing of the American people. The polls tell us that. Our constituents tell us that. The phone calls and faxes and emails and letters to our offices, running 100 to one, 500 to one against this war, all tell us that. I, for one, am not afraid. And I do not think my colleagues in the House and in the Senate should be afraid either. We should not be afraid of standing up to an unnecessary war. We should not be afraid to stand up to a President when he is wrong. We should not be afraid of the American people; they are right.

President Bush tells us how important it is, for his campaign to win support in the United

Nations, that we here in the United States speak with one voice. But we do not have only one voice; we cannot and will not lend our voices to support a war that we know is wrong. When my colleagues and I went to Iraq, we went to tell the Iraqis that they must allow free and unfettered U.N. inspections. We went to investigate the situation facing Iraqi civilians after 12 years of crippling economic sanctions. And we went knowing that our democracy is strengthened when we see, and hear, and learn and debate all sides. We didn't have to go to Iraq to know why we're against going to war against Iraq. There are plenty of reasons back home to oppose this juggernaut towards a unilateral preemptive strike on Iraq.

The first reason is that disarmament should be on top of our Iraq agenda. And getting the United Nations inspectors back in should be the first step towards accomplishing that task. The U.N. must be allowed to take the lead; their inspectors were already close to finishing work on the technical arrangements so they could get to work right away. Iraq had proposed the inspection team arrive as early as October 16th.

Initial meetings between Iraqi and U.N. officials were held in March of this year to begin discussions about the return of inspectors to Iraq after they had been excluded for almost four years. Further meetings were held in May and again on the 4th of July. That July meeting was particularly useful, coming in the context of growing international pressure on Iraq and seeming to set the stage for the serious possibility of inspectors returning to Baghdad. But the next day, July 5th, the Pentagon leaked its latest provocative war plan to the New York Times, calling for a major air attack and land invasion to "topple Saddam Hussein." The Iraqis pulled back.

But pressure continued to build, and in August the Iraqi Parliament invited members of Congress to come to Baghdad with inspectors of our choosing and to look for ourselves. On September 13th I went to New York to meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, and told him I would accept his invitation to Iraq with the understanding that the inspectors I would choose to accompany me would be the UNMOVIC inspectors themselves. We talked about the absolute necessity of the U.N. resuming unfettered inspections in Iraq, and he said they were ready for such inspections, and they understood that if no weapons were found the Security Council would lift the economic sanctions. I made no promises except to say I would come. Forty-eight hours later, on September 16, Sabri told Kofi Annan that Iraq was prepared to accept the inspectors back into Iraq.

Unfortunately, instead of welcoming this development, it became clear that the Bush administration was not prepared to take Iraq's "yes" for an answer. The State Department's answer to the long-delayed Iraqi acquiescence was to announce that it was now in "thwart mode," determined to prevent the inspections from going forward.

There has been no solid information regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction since UNSCOM and IAEA arms inspectors left Iraq in December 1998 in advance of the U.S. Desert Fox bombing operation. Prior to leaving, the last report (November 1998) of the UNSCOM chief Richard Butler stated explicitly that although they had been hindered by Iraqi

non-compliance in carrying out a small number of inspections, "the majority of the inspections of facilities and sites under the ongoing monitoring system were carried out with Iraq's cooperation." the IAEA report was unequivocal that Iraq no longer had a viable nuclear program. The UNSCOM report was less definitive, but months earlier, in March 1998, UNSCOM Chief Richard Butler said that his team was satisfied there was no longer any nuclear or long-range missile capability in Iraq, and that UNSCOM was "very close" to completing the chemical and biological phases.

Since that time, there have been no verifiable report regarding Iraq's WMD programs. It is important to get inspectors back into Iraq, but U.S. threats for years made that virtually impossible by setting a "negative incentive" in place. This pattern has been underway for years. It began when then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced in April 1994 that the U.S. was no longer bound by the U.N. resolution's language promising an end to sanctions when disarmament of Iraq's WMD programs was complete. Similarly, in 1997 Christopher's successor, Madeleine Albright, affirmed that economic sanctions would remain as long as Saddam Hussein was in power—regardless of the U.N. position linking sanctions only to the WMD programs. So Baghdad was told that sanctions would remain regardless of Iraqi compliance with U.N. disarmament requirements. Similarly, the U.S. message today is that a U.S. military strike will likely take place regardless of Iraq's compliance with U.N. resolutions regarding inspections, so they have no reason to implement their own obligations. If the United States refuses to abide by the requirements of U.N. resolutions and the rule of international law, why are we surprised when an embattled and tyrannical government does the same thing?

Inspections remain vitally important. Throughout the 1980s the U.S. sent to Baghdad a lethal assortment of high-quality germ seed stock for anthrax, botulism, E. coli, and a host of other deadly diseases. It is certainly possible that scraps of Iraq's earlier biological and chemical weapons programs remain in existence, but their shelf life is likely only three or four years. More significantly, since it is also possible (though we have seen no evidence) that Iraq has manufactured additional chemical or biological weapons material, Iraq has no delivery system capable of using them against the U.S. or U.S. allies. The notion that the U.S. must go to war against Iraq because of the existence of tiny amounts of biological material, insufficient for use in missiles or other strategic weapons and which the U.S. itself provided during the years of the U.S.-Iraq alliance in the 1980s, is simply unacceptable.

Regarding the nuclear level threat, the IAEA confirmed in 1998 that Iraq had no viable nuclear weapons program. Despite constant allegations, we still have seen no clear evidence that Iraq is anywhere close to being able to manufacture a nuclear weapon. The breathless claim that "if it obtained sufficient missile material and massive external assistance" Iraq could manufacture a nuclear weapon in one year is simply spurious. The same statement could be said for Cameroon or Vanuatu—that's why we have military sanctions and that's why we ought to hold the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other disarmament treaties in much higher regard.

Pretty much the whole world believes that inspections and disarmament should be our goal—not the overthrow of the government in Iraq. The Bush administration knows it is isolated in the world on this issue: to say that the U.S. goal is regime overthrow, rather than disarmament would violate the UN Charter.

The second reason we should oppose this war has to do with its impact on our relations with allies all over the world. There is virtually no international support, at the governmental or public level, for a U.S. attack on Iraq. Our closest allies throughout Europe, in Canada, and elsewhere, have made clear their opposition to a military invasion. While they recognize the Iraqi regime as a brutal, undemocratic regime, they do not support a unilateral preemptive military assault as an appropriate response to that regime. Our European friends are pleading with us not to go to war, reminding us that disarmament, starting with inspections, is their goal. Russia and China say the same thing. Are we to simply ignore our friends' opinions and go it alone?

Throughout the Middle East, the Arab states, including our closest allies, have made unequivocal their opposition to an invasion of Iraq. Even Kuwait, once the target of Iraqi military occupation and ostensibly the most vulnerable to Iraqi threats, has moved to normalize its relations with Baghdad. The Arab League-sponsored rapprochement between Iraq and Kuwait at the March 2002 Arab Summit is now underway, including such long-overdue moves as the return of Kuwait's national archives. Iraq has now repaired its relation with every Arab country, and not a single one of Iraq's neighbors publicly supports a U.S. war. Turkey has refused to publicly announce its agreement to allow use of its air bases, and Jordan and other Arab countries have made clear their urgent plea for the U.S. to abjure a military attack on Iraq.

Again, it is certain unlikely that a single government in the region would ultimately stand against a U.S. demand for base rights, use of airspace or overflight rights, or access to any other facilities. The question we must answer therefore is not whether our allies will ultimately accede to our wishes, but just how high a price are we prepared to exact from our allies? Virtually every Arab government, especially those most closely tied to the U.S. (Jordan and Egypt, perhaps even Saudi Arabia) will face dramatically escalated popular opposition. The existing crisis of legitimacy faced by these non-representative regimes, absolute monarchies and president-for-life style democrats, will be seriously exacerbated by a U.S. invasion of Iraq. Region-wide instability may be expected to result, and some of those governments might even face the possibility of being overthrown.

In the entire Middle East region, only Israel supports the U.S. build-up to war in Iraq. Prime Minister Sharon has made no secret of his view that the chaos caused by a U.S. attack on Iraq might well provide him with the opportunity for a large-scale escalation against the Palestinians.

When President Bush repeats his mantra that "you are either with us or with the terrorists," no government in the world wants to stand defiant. But a foreign policy based on international coercion and our allies' fear of retaliation for noncompliance, is not a policy that will protect Americans and our place in the world.

Still another reason to oppose this has to do with the human toll. During the Vietnam war, I was lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy Medical Corps. My job, as a psychiatrist, was to treat young soldiers who returned from that war terribly damaged by what they saw and what they suffered. I carry those memories with me still.

While official estimates of casualties among U.S. service personnel are not public, we can be certain they will be much higher than in the current war in Afghanistan. We do know, from Pentagon estimates of two years ago, the likely death toll among Iraqi civilians: about 10,000 Iraqi civilians would be killed.

The most recent leaked military plan for invading Iraq, the so-called "inside-out" plan based on a relatively small contingent of U.S. ground troops with heavy reliance on air strikes, would focus first and primarily on Baghdad. In fact, all of the leaked military plans begin with air assaults on Baghdad. The Iraqi capital is described as being ringed with Saddam Hussein's crack troops and studded with anti-aircraft batteries. Those charges may or may not be true. But what is never mentioned in the military planning documents is the inconvenient fact that Baghdad is also a crowded city of five million or more people; a heavy air bombardment would cause the equivalent human catastrophe of—and look very similar to—a heavy air bombardment of Los Angeles.

And it is here that my trip to Iraq taught me a great deal. It reminded me again of the costs of war. I remembered again what Iraqis would suffer with this war. My colleagues and I visited hospitals, where we saw young cancer patients dying before their mothers eyes from lack of chemotherapy drugs.

Further, the destruction of civilian infrastructure such as water, electrical and communications equipment, would lead to tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of more civilian deaths, particularly among children, the aged and others of the most vulnerable sectors. We can anticipate that such targeted attacks would be justified by claims of "dual use." But if we look back to the last U.S. war with Iraq, we know that the Pentagon planned and carried out studies ahead of time, documenting the likely impact on civilians of specific attacks. In one case, Pentagon planners anticipated that striking Iraq's civilian infrastructure would cause "Increased incidence of diseases [that] will be attributable to degradation of normal preventive medicine, waste disposal, water purification/distribution, electricity, and decreased ability to control disease outbreaks. . . ." The Defense Intelligence Agency's document (posted on the Pentagon's Gulfink website), is titled "Disease Information—Subject: Effects of Bombing on Disease Occurrence in Baghdad" and is dated 22 January 1991, just six days after the war began. It itemized the likely outbreaks of diseases to include: "acute diarrhea" brought on by bacteria such as *E. coli*, *shigella*, and *salmonella*, or by protozoa such as *giardia*, which will affect "particularly children," or by rotavirus, which will also affect "particularly children." And despite this advance knowledge, the bombing of the water treatment systems proceeded, and indeed, according to UNICEF figures, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, "particularly children," died from the effects of dirty water. Just as predicted.

I traveled with my colleagues to the southern city of Basra, where we heard from phys-

cians that the first question new mothers ask after giving birth is not whether the baby is a boy or a girl, but whether it is normal or not—because the rates of birth defects are so high. Many think those high rates of birth defects, skyrocketing rates of leukemia and other cancers, have something to do with the depleted uranium weapons our military used so efficiently during the war 12 years ago.

Many of our own Gulf War veterans—and their children—are also suffering higher than normal rates of cancers and birth defects. And the Veterans Administration medical care budget has just been slashed. Do we want to go to war again, a war that will cost perhaps \$60 to \$100 billion, and create a whole new generation of wounded veterans, along with too many who will not come home at all? We have not yet heard an answer from the Pentagon to the question of how they plan to protect our men and women in uniform—as well as vulnerable Iraqi civilians—from the danger of depleted uranium weapons. So far the Pentagon has still not conducted the full-scale scientific study of the impact of DU on the human body. We should not go to war to use our troops as guinea pigs again.

I oppose this war because it is a war of empire, not of legitimate self-defense. We claim to be a nation of laws. But too often we are prepared to put aside the requirements of international law and the United Nations Charter to which we hold other nations appropriately accountable.

When it comes to policy on Iraq, the U.S. has a history of sidelining the central role that should be played by the United Nations. This increasingly unilateralist trajectory is one of the main reasons for the growing international antagonism towards the U.S. By imposing its will on the Security Council—insisting on the continuation of economic sanctions when virtually every other country wants to lift them, announcing its intention to ignore the UN in deciding whether to go to war against Iraq—the U.S. isolates us from our allies, antagonizes our friends, and sets our nation apart from the international systems of laws that govern the rest of the world. This does not help, but rather undermines, our long-term security interests.

International law does not allow for preemptive military strikes, except in the case of extreme emergency to prevent an immediate attack. President Bush himself told us on October 7th that war with Iraq is "neither imminent nor unavoidable." Therefore it does not qualify as self-defense under the UN Charter. We simply do not have the right—no country does—to launch a war against another country that has not attacked us. If the Pentagon had been able to scramble a jet to take down the second plane flying into the World Trade Center last September, that would be a legal use of preemptive self defense. An attack on Iraq—which does not have the capacity, and has not for a decade or more shown any specific intention or plan or effort to attack the U.S.—violates international law and the UN Charter.

The Charter, in Article 51, outlines the terms under which a Member State of the United Nations may use force in self-defense. That Article acknowledges a nation's "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense *if an armed attack occurs* against a member of the United Nations, *until* the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." [Emphasis

added.] The Charter does not allow military force to be used absent an armed attack having occurred.

Some administration spokespeople are fond of a sound bit that says "the UN Charter is not a suicide pact." Others like to remind us that Iraq (and other nations) routinely violate the Charter. Both statements are true. But the United States has not been attacked by Iraq, and no evidence has been brought forward that Iraq is anywhere close to being able to carry out such an attack. The U.S. is the strongest international power—in terms of global military reach, economic, cultural, diplomatic and political power—that has ever existed throughout history. If the United States—with such massive global power—does not recognize the UN Charter and international law as the foundation of global security and hold ourselves accountable to them, how can we expect others to do so?

President Bush's October 7th speech was clearly designed to frighten the American people. Once again that speech disingenuously linked the true horror and legitimate fear of the September 11th attacks with an implied connection to Iraq. The events of September 11 must never happen again, the president proclaims, and we will go to war against Iraq to make sure that they don't.

Few of us in the Congress, and too few journalists and pundits, stood to challenge that claim, to remind the American people that no link has been shown between Iraq and the events of September 11th. That there is a war against terrorism that has so far failed to find the perpetrators of those events. That of all the four thousand or more people killed in Afghanistan, not one of them was named Osama bin Laden.

It is now clear that (despite intensive investigative efforts) there is simply no evidence as yet of any Iraqi involvement in the terror attacks of September 11. The most popular theory, of a Prague-based collaboration between one of the 9/11 terrorists and an Iraqi official, has collapsed. On July 17th, the Prague Post quoted the director general of the Czech foreign intelligence service UZSI (Office of Foreign Relations and Information), Frantisek Bublan, denying the much-touted meeting between Mohamed Atta, one of the 9/11 hijackers, and an Iraqi agent. The Czech Republic simply had no evidence that such a meeting ever took place, he said.

More significantly, the Iraqi regime's brutal treatment of its own population has generally not extended to international terrorist attacks. The State Department's own compilation of terrorist activity in its 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism, released May 2002, does not document a single serious act of international terrorism by Iraq. Almost all references are to political statements.

We are told that we must go to war preemptively against Iraq because Baghdad might, some time in the future, succeed in crafting a dangerous weapon and might, some time in the future, give that weapon to a terrorist group—maybe Osama bin Laden—who might, some time in the future, use that weapon against the U.S. The problem with this analysis, aside from the fact that preemptive strikes are illegal under international law, is that it ignores the widely known historic antagonism between Iraq and bin Laden. According to the New York Times, "shortly after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in 1990, Osama bin

Laden approached Prince Sultan bin Abdelaziz al-Saud, the Saudi defense minister, with an unusual proposition. . . . Arriving with maps and many diagrams, Mr. bin Laden told Prince Sultan that the kingdom could avoid the indignity of allowing an army of American unbelievers to enter the kingdom to repel Iraq from Kuwait. He could lead the fight himself, he said, at the head of a group of former mujahideen that he said could number 100,000 men."² Even if bin Laden's claim to be able to provide those troops was clearly false, bin Laden's hostility towards the ruthlessly secular Iraq remained evident. There is no evidence that that has changed.

Ironically, an attack on Iraq would increase the threat to U.S. citizens throughout the Middle East and beyond, as another generation of young Iraqis come to identify Americans only as the pilots of high-flying jet bombers and as troops occupying their country. While today American citizens face no problems from ordinary people in the streets of Baghdad or elsewhere in Iraq, as I found during my visit to Iraq in September 2002, that situation would likely change in the wake of a U.S. attack on Iraq. In other countries throughout the Middle East, already palpable anger directed at U.S. threats would dramatically escalate and would provide a new recruiting tool for extremist elements bent on harm to U.S. interests or U.S. citizens. It would become far more risky for U.S. citizens to travel abroad.

Many accusations have been made regarding the role of oil in this war. What is clear is that the public statements of some in the private sector match the undenied whispers of others, such as administration figures themselves. Those statements include the intention to render null and void all existing oil exploration contracts signed between Iraq and various national oil companies, particularly those of France and Russia, when the current Iraqi regime is replaced after a U.S. war. I do not want to support a war partly designed to re-draft the global oil markets in the interest of undermining French or Russian oil companies and privileging our own.

Any of us who are serious about opposing this war must also be serious about alternatives to war. We must take seriously the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Disarmament must be on top of our agenda. We must support the weapons inspection team, not undermining it. We must support the United Nations, not threatening it with irrelevance if its member states don't agree with our war.

And we should go beyond the existing efforts to get serious about military sanctions. Denying Iraq access to weapons is not sufficient, nor can it be maintained as long as Iraq is surrounded by some of the most over-armed states in the world. U.S. weapons shipments to all countries in the region aggravate this situation and, as the biggest arms exporter in the world, the U.S. can change it.

We can expand the application of military sanctions as defined in UN Resolution 687. Military sanctions against Iraq should be tightened—by expanding them to a system of regional military sanctions, thus lowering the volatility of this already arms-glutted region. Article 14 of resolution 687—the same resolution that calls for sanctions, inspections and destruction of Iraq's WMD programs—points the way. It recognizes that the disarmament of Iraq should be seen as a step towards "the

goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons.

We are told we must attack Iraq preemptively so that it can never obtain nuclear weapons. While we know from IAEA inspectors that Iraq's nuclear program was destroyed by the end of 1998, we do not know what has developed since. We do know, however, a few things. We know that nuclear facilities are of necessity large, visible to surveillance satellites, and detectable by a host of telltale chemical and radiological footprints. Such facilities cannot be mounted on the back of a pick-up truck. Our intelligence indicates that Iraq does not have access to fissile material, without which any nuclear program is a hollow shell. And we know where fissile material is. Protection of all nuclear material, including insuring continuity of the funding for protection of Russian nuclear material, must be an ongoing priority.

We should note that U.S. officials are threatening a war against Iraq, a country known not to possess nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, the administration is continuing appropriate negotiations with North Korea, which does have something much closer to nuclear weapons capacity. Backed by IAEA inspections, the model of negotiations and inspections is exactly what the U.S. should be proposing for Iraq.

And what about "the day after"? There is no democratic opposition ready to take over in Iraq. Far more likely than the creation of an indigenous, popularly-supported democratic Iraqi government, would be the replacement of the current regime with one virtually indistinguishable from it except for the man at the top. In February 2002 Newsweek magazine profiled the five leaders said to be on Washington's short list of candidates to replace Saddam Hussein. The Administration has not publicly issued such a list of its own, but it certainly typifies the model the U.S. has in mind. All five of the candidates were high-ranking officials within the Iraqi military until the mid-1990s. All five have been linked to the use of chemical weapons by the military; at least one admits it. The legitimacy of going to war against a country to replace a brutal military leader with another brutal leader must be challenged.

And whoever is installed in Baghdad by victorious U.S. troops, it is certain that a long and possibly bloody occupation would follow. The price would be high; Iraqis know better than we do how their government has systematically denied them civil and political rights. But they hold us responsible for stripping them of their economic and social rights—the right to sufficient food, clear water, education, medical care—that together form the other side of the human rights equation. Economic sanctions have devastated Iraqi society. After twelve years those in Washington who believe that Iraqis accept the popular inside-the-Beltway mantra that "sanctions aren't responsible, Saddam Hussein is responsible" for hunger and deprivation in Iraq, are engaged in wishful thinking. The notion that everyone in Iraq will welcome as "liberators" those whom most Iraqis hold responsible for 12 years of crippling sanctions is simply naive. Basing military strategy on such wishful speculation becomes very dangerous—in particular for U.S. troops themselves.

An U.S. invasion of Iraq would risk the lives of U.S. military personnel and kill potentially thousands of Iraqi civilians, it is not surprising that many U.S. military officers, including some within the Joint Chief's of Staff, are publicly opposed to a new war against Iraq. Such an attack would violate international law and the UN Charter, and isolate us from our friends and allies around the world. An invasion would complicate the return of UN arms inspectors, and will cost billions of dollars urgently needed at home. And at the end of the day, an invasion will not insure stability, let alone democracy, in Iraq or the rest of the volatile Middle East region. Rather, it will put American civilians at greater risk than they are today.

We need disarmament, not a war for empire, oil, or "regime change." We need the UN inspectors to go in and finish their work. Until they do, we simply don't know what weapons Iraq has or doesn't have.

Let us not go to war, in pursuit of oil or the blandishments of empire. War is too important and its consequences too disastrous.

Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island. Mr. Speaker, the resolution before us requires us to make an enormously difficult decision. There are many cases to be made against Iraq and Saddam Hussein, but the only one that justifies this debate is the danger Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and particularly its nuclear program, pose to the United States. Recognizing this danger, however, does not inform the appropriate response, and in this extremely complex situation, finding the right response is not easy.

A GRAVE DECISION

There is no greater responsibility for a Member of Congress than voting whether to initiate war. This is a responsibility I take very seriously. For the last several weeks I have immersed myself in the details of the situation with Iraq. I have consulted with experts and people whose opinions I value. I have spoken with Rhode Island veterans and have considered the opinions of the more than 1,100 constituents who have contacted me on this matter. I have received a number of security and intelligence briefings from Administration officials, the National Security Advisor, the Director of Central Intelligence, Defense Department officials and military leaders. I have been carefully deliberating, weighing the potential risks of a war with Iraq against the inevitable danger of a nuclear-armed Iraq.

In considering the options, I have paid careful attention to the position of President Bush, to his speech this week and his other statement on Iraq. Since September 11, I have consistently supported the President's efforts to safeguard our national security and eliminate the threat of terrorism. I believe he deserves great credit for rallying the American people to a new challenge and building strength from tragedy.

While giving special consideration to the request of the Commander-in-Chief, I must also exercise my own judgment on this most critical life and death question of war. One of the great strengths of a democracy is that decisions that emerge from the marketplace of ideas tend to be stronger, for they have been challenged and questioned. If we do not question and do not challenge, if we do not carefully deliberate, we weaken rather than strengthen our nation's purpose.

It is for this reason that the Framers of our Constitution, in their wisdom, gave the power

to declare war to Congress. Congress represents the voice of the people, and it is only the people of a democracy who should have the power to send their sons and daughters to war. I therefore feel that it is incumbent upon every Member of Congress, indeed on every citizen, to carefully weigh the factors counseling for and against war with Iraq and make a decision accordingly.

After much deliberation, I have concluded that the dangers of an Iraq armed with nuclear weapons are so significant that we have no choice but to act. At the same time, I recognize that a U.S. war with Iraq could complicate our struggle against terrorism and create new, serious risks. It is therefore clear that we must make every effort to enlist the United Nations in our effort to disarm Iraq and address that threat. Whether we accomplish our goals through diplomacy or by arms, our course will be less dangerous if the world community is with us. I will support the bipartisan resolution negotiated by President Bush and House leaders because I believe it represents our best hope for delivering the multilateral coalition we seek to eliminate the threat posed by Iraq's nuclear weapons program.

THE THREAT POSED BY IRAQ

In his address to the nation this week, his speech to the United Nations, and his other statements, President Bush has clearly and forcefully articulated Iraq's threat to U.S. security. Saddam Hussein unquestionably is one of the world's most detestable tyrants. He harbors a deep hostility towards the United States and an unquenchable thirst for conquest and power. He has demonstrated that he does not view weapons of mass destruction merely as deterrents, but rather as offensive weapons to be used to further his quest for power and give him leverage over the United States.

Given this record, it is a national security imperative that he not develop a nuclear weapon. Nuclear non-proliferation is a long-standing objective of this country, but nowhere is it more critical than Iraq. Saddam Hussein has made clear that he believes a nuclear weapon would give him the ability to act with impunity. The experts I have spoken with from former Middle East envoy Dennis Ross to former Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke to members of the current Administration believe that the risk of terrorism would increase substantially after Iraq obtained nuclear capability. Iraq would then be more apt to provide shelter, technology, and weapons to terrorists targeting the U.S. The large chemical and biological weapons stockpiles would pose a much greater risk to our security at that point than they do now. A nuclear Iraq would be an enormous danger to the U.S. and be a major setback in our war on terrorism.

Not only would the direct threat to the U.S. be intolerable, but acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iraq would roil an already volatile region. Saddam Hussein's hegemonic ambitions for the Gulf region virtually ensure that he would resume his military adventurism if he believed he had a deterrent to U.S. action. Hussein said after the Gulf War that his greatest regret was not waiting to invade Kuwait until after he had acquired a nuclear weapon.

Experts like Jim Steinberg, former Deputy National Security Advisor to President Clinton, have predicted an arms race in the Middle East in response to the threat of a resurgent Iraq. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and

Turkey would feel a need to counter Iraq's new strategic advantage.

In a region as unstable as the Middle East, the prospects of a nuclear arms race should make us all shudder.

Of course, the most ominous threat is that Iraq would pass nuclear technology to terrorists. September 11th showed us that there are people willing to do the unspeakable. The spectre of nuclear terrorism, which previously seemed remote and only theoretically frightening, has suddenly become a real and horrible possibility. We can no longer count on those Cold War limits that we assumed even our enemies shared. With this new, visceral understanding, who is willing to take the risk that a nuclear-armed Iraq will not share its weapons? The degree of cooperation between Iraq and al Qaeda, and other terrorists targeting the U.S. is unclear, but if we wait for that unholy alliance to form, we will have waited too long.

Unfortunately, the possibility that Iraq might develop a nuclear weapon is not remote. Its nuclear program has been disrupted but never fully dismantled. Current intelligence suggests that Iraq could have a functional bomb within a year of acquiring a sufficient quantity of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Given the potential of acquiring these materials from the crumbling infrastructure of the former Soviet Union's arsenal, we cannot assume that a willing buyer will find no seller.

The people with whom I have spoken who know the region best, from the current Administration, from the Clinton Administration, and those who have spent lifetimes studying the Middle East, are nearly unanimous in concluding that we simply cannot allow Iraq to acquire nuclear capability. The risks of nuclear terrorism, of the potentially catastrophic destabilization of a Middle East arms race, and of future nuclear war in the region are all too real. Our national security will be severely compromised if we do not prevent Iraq's development of nuclear weapons.

Many have asked, why now? For eleven years we have relied on containment and deterrence to respond to Iraq. But Kenneth Pollack, a former CIA analyst of Iraq, has explained that Saddam Hussein's history suggests a streak of irrationality that makes these policies unreliable given the stakes. Whether because he is sheltered from the facts by underlings who tell him what he wants to hear or simply unbalanced, Hussein has repeatedly and dramatically misjudged the reactions his actions would generate. From his 1974 attack on Iranian-supported Kurds that provoked a military response by Iran leading to Iraqi territorial concessions, to his ill-fated war with Iran in 1980, to the invasion of Kuwait, he has consistently miscalculated. Deterrence is predicated on rational actors operating with similar sets of assumptions. These examples raise serious questions about whether we can expect Hussein to make rational choices, and that is a risk we cannot take when the use of nuclear weapons hang in the balance.

President Bush has convincingly articulated the danger that Saddam Hussein poses and his long history of undermining security in the Middle East and throughout the world cannot be denied. We must act to disarm Iraq, and we must act soon, before he acquires nuclear weapons and before he writes the next chapter in a long history of irrational and highly destructive aggression. The question is how we act.

FREEDOM IS NOT FREE

The first choice is, of course, a diplomatic solution. The goal is a new U.N. resolution that will convince Saddam Hussein that he cannot avoid complying with international law. We must appreciate, however, that given Hussein's history, this process may well end in confrontation. And so we also need to understand the many implications of a war in Iraq.

We know, as is inscribed at the Korean War Memorial, that freedom is not free. There are times that we are called upon to sacrifice to protect our values, our homeland, and our way of life. When our national security is at stake, we will not hesitate to make the necessary sacrifice. But we know from painful experience the consequences of launching a war without first establishing the political will to see it through, and the American people have to know what sacrifices they may be called upon to make.

Obviously, the risks of war would be most directly borne by the courageous men and women who were our Nation's uniform. I know that they stand prepared to go and fight wherever their Commander-in-Chief sends them. I have made it a priority during my eight years in Congress to ensure that they are the best-trained, best-equipped, most effective fighting force in the history of the world, so that if we have to send them into harm's way, we know they will be victorious.

Regarding a war with Iraq, we have not been told what to expect in the way of call-ups, casualties, length of combat, and the like. Some experts predict that the Iraqi military will overthrow Hussein rather than face destruction and possible war crimes prosecutions. It is my greatest hope that they prove correct. But we need to be prepared for the possibility of combat involving chemical or biological attacks. We may face block-by-block, building-by-building combat in Iraqi cities that, in the words of General Joseph P. Hoar, the former commander-in-chief of the U.S. Central Command whose area of responsibility includes Iraq, could resemble the last fifteen minutes of "Saving Private Ryan." Planning conservatively, we have to assume that we may face a months-long guerrilla campaign and that casualties may be far higher than in the Gulf War.

Our armed forces are unquestionably prepared to carry out this and any mission they might be given. Should they be called upon, they will have my unconditional support for the duration of any armed conflict. I will do my utmost to give the men and women who put their lives on the line to defend our nation whatever they need to accomplish their mission. We should not send them into battle, however, until the American people have been fully prepared for the cost in American lives that we may pay for victory.

The American people must also be better prepared for the long-term consequences of action in Iraq. Even if the war goes quickly and the worst-case scenarios do not play out, there is a consensus that an extended American presence in Iraq will be required to maintain stability in that ethnically and politically divided country. It is critical that a centralized, unified Iraq emerge, and we cannot leave that outcome to chance. If we win the war but do not win the peace, the great risks we take and blood we shed will be for naught.

American troops will, at least initially, be responsible for protecting Iraq's borders with

Iran and Syria, governing tinder-boxes on the brink of civil war, like the city of Kirkuk, and preventing revenge-induced massacres in the Shiite south. The economic costs will be high and the risks to our troops serious. Although specifics may vary depending on the breadth and impact of the war, under virtually any scenario we face the prospect of a major, long-term reconstitution of Iraq in dollars, energy, attention, and most importantly, lives.

I know that we are capable of meeting the challenge of rebuilding Iraq, just as we are capable of meeting the military challenges. Like possible economic and budgetary implications, these are not considerations which will deter us from acting to protect our national security, but they are consequences of war that we must be prepared to realize.

WAR IN IRAQ AND THE IMPACT ON ANTI-TERRORISM EFFORTS

As great a danger as Iraq represents, we should not pursue military action there without considering its impact on the wider war on terrorism that we are currently fighting. As many thoughtful commentators have noted, a war in Iraq carries its own dangers above and beyond the immediate risks to our soldiers, sailors, and airmen.

The fight against Al Qaeda is not only a military engagement at this point, but even more so, a law enforcement and intelligence operation. Unilateral war with Iraq runs the risk of drying up critical support in the war on terrorism. We need the cooperation of foreign governments in countries like Yemen and Pakistan to find and detain Al Qaeda's leadership. The arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh in Pakistan last month is the perfect example. A suspected ringleader in the planning of the September 11th attacks, he is now providing us with valuable intelligence. If what is perceived to be an American imperialistic attack on Iraq costs us allies in our struggle against terrorism, it could become much more difficult for us to thwart future terrorist attacks.

While an Iraqi war could cause some governments to stop working as closely with us, more troubling is the prospect that I could cause massive destabilization in the Middle East and surrounding areas. The first President Bush's National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, and others have cautioned that a war in Iraq could metastasize into a regional war. If Iraq attacks Israel and Israel responds as promised, the smoldering Israeli-Arab conflict could explode. Turkey, Syria, and Iran all have substantial Kurdish populations and could be drawn into war.

A geopolitical nightmare scenario is President Musharraf's government in Pakistan toppling and a radical Islamic regime taking control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Experts have said his grip on power is somewhat shaky. Could an American attack on Iraq prompt large street demonstrations in Pakistan? Could that in turn lead to Musharraf's downfall?

Middle East experts are even more concerned about the impact of a war on the moderate government of Jordan's King Abdullah. Not only could a change of governments there cost us a reliable ally in the fight against terrorism, but it could lead to a cataclysm whose ripple effects would harm us in other ways. Jordan is one of the few countries that has signed a peace treaty with Israel. But half of its population is made up of Palestinian refugees. If Jordan were to fall into the hands of

a radical government, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could explode into a multi-front war. An Arab-Israeli war is the surest way to inflame Islamic militants.

Even without a deterioration of the Israeli-Palestinian situation, General Wesley Clark, the former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, warned the Senate Armed Services Committee that a unilateral war by the United States on Iraq would "supercharge" Al Qaeda's recruitment. There are a billion Muslims in the world, some of whom unfortunately harbor a great distrust of the United States. Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda and their sympathizers would portray a U.S. attack on Iraq as an attack on Islam, and many would view it that way.

We can assume that in the event of war, Hussein will place anti-aircraft guns and other military targets in mosques, schools, hospitals, and residential neighborhoods. In order to win, the U.S. military will be forced to strike these sites, and al-Jazeera would likely broadcast daily images of U.S. bombs destroying important cultural, religious, and other apparently civilian buildings. Military victory could well come at the cost of an enormous public relations defeat, one which make us an army of new enemies willing to take their own lives to inflict pain on Americans.

It is also far from clear that war with Iraq will reduce the threat of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons being used against Americans or our allies. A newly released CIA report details the danger that an attack on Iraq could lead Hussein to aid terrorists in chemical or biological attack as a way to exact a last measure of revenge.

We know that Iraq has mobile labs producing these potentially devastating weapons. Can we be sure that our troops would eliminate them before he had a chance to launch weapons at Israel or put them in the hands of terrorists? For that matter, can we be sure they are not already in the hands of Iraqi agents or other terrorists outside of Iraq, awaiting a signal to use them? When you corner a dangerous animal, you have to expect it to lash out. A war to disarm Hussein may paradoxically increase rather than decrease Americans' vulnerability to those very weapons.

If there is one lesson of warfare that has been true throughout human history, it is that wars have unintended consequences. Writing 2400 years ago, the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu, called this uncertainty the "fog of war." We ignore this timeless truth of warfare at our peril. It would be the hubris of the world's lone superpower to assume that our plans will be carried out exactly as we foresee them.

MINIMIZING THREATS IN IRAQ AND ELSEWHERE

While these dangers are real and caution us against war, inaction still leaves us with the prospect of a nuclear Iraq in the relatively near future. Through no choice of our own we have entered a minefield. On one side lies the danger of Iraq with nuclear weapons. On the other, an unfinished war against fanatics who hide in shadows and who may be inadvertently strengthened by our actions in Iraq. We need to pick our way carefully through this minefield, making every effort to minimize the risks on both sides.

Obviously, our best option is to disarm Iraq without resort to war. This outcome can only happen if the world unites in pressuring Iraq to

comply with UN resolutions. For this reason, I am pleased that the President has brought our case to the United Nations and has been aggressively pursuing a new, forceful resolution in the Security Council. The Security Council should pass a new resolution, giving weapons inspectors truly unfettered access to any site in Iraq at any time with no conditions. I believe any new resolution should be backed up with the realistic threat of force.

But it must act quickly. If the UN is to remain a credible international agent of stability, it must, as the President has insisted, begin disarming Iraq in a matter of days and weeks not months and years. Sandy Berger, President Clinton's National Security Advisor, has told me that we can expect an inspections and disarmament regime to take several years. Given the timeline for Iraq's development of a nuclear weapon, the window for diplomatic action is therefore very small. If we want a peaceful option to prevail, we must set down that road immediately.

We can hope that Saddam Hussein will recognize that he has lost the battle for world opinion and will capitulate to international law by giving up his weapons of mass destruction. Even if diplomacy fails, however, our national security would be much better protected if we forcibly disarm Iraq at the head of a multilateral coalition rather than on our own.

As the first President Bush realized, perceptions are critically important in global diplomacy. A number of the dangers war poses to our efforts against terrorism are exacerbated by a perception, warranted or not, that the United States is using its military dominance to bully Arabs or Muslims. If, on the other hand, the U.S. is seen exhausting diplomatic efforts and any conflict is between Iraq and the community of nations rather than just the sole superpower, a war at that point is less likely to undermine American efforts to combat terrorism.

A multilateral war with Iraq would do less to diminish the support we have received from Muslim nations in the war on terrorism. It would be less risky to our fragile allies in the region. It would be harder for the terrorists and anti-American propagandists to use to inflame young Muslims to attack the United States.

We seek the auspices of the United Nations not because we must, but because doing so is in the nation's best interest. As President Kennedy said forty years ago during the Cuban Missile Crisis, "This nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum—in the Organization of American States, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful—without limiting our freedom of action."

We will not defer decisions of our national security to the United Nations, but where it is useful we should take advantage of the international structures that our nation was instrumental in creating. In this case, it is in the overwhelming best interest of the United States to push the UN to disarm Iraq, and I therefore stand foursquare behind President Bush's efforts to push the Security Council to address Iraq's lawlessness.

THE DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

These are the considerations I have been weighing over the past several weeks and upon which I will cast my vote in Congress. My decision is based on grave concerns about the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iraq and

equally serious fears that a war with Iraq will create new, highly dangerous risks of terrorism. I will vote for the resolution I feel is most likely to lead to a multilateral disarmament of Iraq, which is the best route to safeguard our national security.

I was troubled by the first draft of the resolution sent to Congress because it was an extremely broad mandate that authorized any action not only to disarm Iraq and enforce UN resolutions, but to "restore peace and stability in the region." The process of deliberation has worked, however, Bipartisan, bicameral negotiations have subsequently improved the resolution and led to a more thorough discussion of the complex factors that must inform this decision.

The new resolution now requires the President to exhaust diplomatic efforts before resorting to force. Equally important, it authorizes the use of force in Iraq only upon certification by the President that such action will not undermine the international war on terrorism. We walk a fine line between the risks of a rogue Iraq on one side and hindering our war on terrorism on the other. These two features of the new resolution ensure that our Iraq policy walks that line if at all possible.

President Bush has made it clear that his preferred option is to lead the United Nations in enforcing its own resolutions. Secretary of State Colin Powell and others in the Administration are working to convince a reluctant Security Council that a new resolution with teeth, authorizing unconditional access by inspectors to any site in Iraq is the surest way to avoid armed conflict. Secretary Powell, his predecessor, Madeleine Albright, the U.S. ambassador to the UN in the Clinton Administration, Richard Holbrooke, and others have told me that to persuade the international community to follow us, the President needs as strong a hand as possible.

Those of us who strongly believe that America's safest path among the dangers that confront us is a multilateral approach and who want to avoid war must show the world that our nation is resolute in its determination to respond to the threat in Iraq. We know that Saddam Hussein will capitulate only if he senses that the only alternative is destruction. A clear declaration of our unity and our determination to eliminate the Iraqi threat to our own security and that of the community of nations is the best way to the multilateral, diplomatic solution that we seek.

I remain convinced that a unilateral attack by the United States on Iraq creates grave threats to the security of our people, even while it eliminates others. But I also agree with the President that a failure to confront Saddam Hussein now, before he has nuclear capabilities, would be a colossal mistake. To maximize our national security, we must balance these two dangerous and uncertain possibilities. The resolution before the United States Congress ensures that, to as great an extent possible, that precarious balance is struck. Through its focus on diplomacy, its concern for the broader war on terrorism, and the resolve it communicates to the rest of the world, it is the most likely vehicle to the multilateral, diplomatic disarmament of Iraq that I and most Americans seek. I will, therefore, vote for the resolution in the most fervent hope that the force it authorizes should never have to be used.

Mr. WELLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution to Authorize the Use of the

United States Armed Forces Against Iraq. This resolution grants to the President all the authority he needs to protect U.S. national security interests—including the use of military force if necessary—against the threat posed by Iraq.

After more than a decade of deception and defiance since the end of the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein poses a new and growing threat to the world. He has deceived and defied the will and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council through many means including; continuing to seek and develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons; brutalizing the Iraqi people, using chemical weapons against his own people and committing gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity; and supporting international terrorism.

Saddam Hussein's evil regime wields a massive stockpile of chemical and biological weapons that remains unaccounted for and is capable of killing millions of innocent people. Evidence also reveals that Iraq is rebuilding facilities that it has used to produce chemical and biological weapons—and to develop nuclear weapons technology.

The facts are clear—Saddam Hussein desperately wants a nuclear weapon—and the wretched history of his evil regime demonstrates that he will use it.

This threat grows more dangerous with the knowledge of ties between Hussein and Al-Qaida. Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network share a common enemy—the United States of America and its allies in the War on Terror. After September 11th, Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America. But Saddam Hussein doesn't limit his involvement in the death of innocents to merely cheering from the sidelines. In April 2002, Saddam Hussein increased from \$10,000 to \$25,000 his regime's payment to families of Palestinian homicide bombers. He continues to encourage violence in the Middle East and hopes his funding will help the violence to continue.

I urge my colleagues to speak with one voice in support of this bipartisan resolution. While use of military force should be used as a last resort we must support the President and speak with one voice. History has taught us that we can not wait. We must act now.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.J. Res. 114, to provide authorization for the use of military force against Iraq. While I hope and pray President Bush does not have to commit our troops to such action, I believe that he must have the authority he needs to protect U.S. national security interests.

The events of September 11th showed us that we are not protected from an attack on our homeland. A first strike made with weapons of mass destruction can result in millions dead, and the U.S. must be prepared to act preemptively.

I did not reach this conclusion easily, Mr. Speaker. But in a world with biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, a first strike capability carries with it the possibility that it will be the last strike, with millions left dead in its wake.

There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein possesses and continues to cultivate weapons of mass destruction; the U.N. weapons inspectors were thrown out of Iraq four years ago for a reason. In addition, we know that he is violating the U.N.'s oil-for-food pro-

gram to the tune of several billion dollars a year; rather than feeding innocent Iraqi citizens, this is money that is undoubtedly being spent on the development of weapons of mass destruction. And we know that if he is able to buy a softball-sized amount of plutonium on the black market, he will have a nuclear weapon within a year.

Some of my colleagues ask why we must act against this threat in particular, when there are many other threats of a grave and serious nature confronting us as we wage a global war against terror. The answer is that this threat is unique; an evil dictator has gathered together the most serious dangers of our time in one place. In Iraq we see Saddam stockpiling weapons of mass destruction, and I trust I need not remind anyone that he has used such weapons already, against his own people. In addition, he has tried to dominate the Middle East, 2nd has struck other nations in the region, including our ally Israel, without warning.

Some of my colleagues have suggested that disarming Hussein will dilute the war against al-Qaeda, but I believe that the opposite is true; these dual goals are inextricably linked. We know that Saddam has harbored and trained high-level al-Qaeda who fled to Iraq after we invaded Afghanistan. Indeed, there can be no doubt that Saddam and al-Qaeda share a common enemy: The United States of America, and the freedom we represent. And let me be clear: either could attack us at any time.

Keeping this in mind, it seems to me that we, as guardians of freedom, have an awesome responsibility to act to ensure that Saddam Hussein cannot carry out such a first strike against the United States or our allies.

Mr. Speaker, some of my colleagues object to this Resolution because we do not have a groundswell of international support for military intervention. The distinguished Chairman of the international Relations Committee has highlighted the key question as regards this issue: on whom does the final responsibility for protecting ourselves rest? Is it ours or do we share it with others?

While there is no doubt that unqualified support from the United Nations is preferable, we must be prepared to defend ourselves alone. We must never allow the foreign policy of our country to be dictated by those entities that may or may not have U.S. interests at heart.

Mr. Speaker, the Resolution before us does not mandate military intervention in Iraq. It does, however, give President Bush clear authority to invade Iraq should he determine that Saddam is not complying with the conditions we have laid before him. Chief among these conditions is full and unfettered weapons inspections; if Saddam fails to comply, as has been the unfortunate historical trend, we will have no choice but to take action. Our security demands it.

Mr. Speaker, the world community watching this debate ought not conclude that respectful disagreements on the Floor of this House divide us; on the contrary, we find strength through an open airing of all views. We never take this privilege for granted, and we need look no further than to Iraq to understand why.

Let us not forget those who continue to suffer under the evil hand of Saddam. To take just one example, the more than one and a half million Assyrians in Iraq have been displaced from their ancestral homes, tortured,

raped, murdered and caused to suffer every conceivable degradation at the hands of the Hussein regime. They have much to lose in any failed effort to remove Saddam, yet they fully support President Bush.

And they certainly will not stand alone. As President Bush noted in his address to the nation on Monday, "When these demands are met, the first and greatest benefit will come to Iraqi men, women and children. The oppression of Kurds, Assyrians, Turkmen, Shi'a, Sunnis and others will be lifted. The long captivity of Iraq will end, and an era of new hope will begin." In other words, as in Afghanistan, when given hope, an oppressed people will rise up and seize the opportunity for freedom.

At the end of this debate, Congress will speak with one voice. I have no doubt that the world will witness the same expression of unity as was demonstrated by Americans across the country following the attacks on September 11th. I find comfort in the knowledge that this unity represents a promise that we will never back down from preserving our freedoms and protecting our homeland from those who wish to destroy us, and our way of life.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, we are about to set the course for our nation's foreign policy that will impact the rest of this century, and we are about to decide the destiny of many of our young men and women.

There is not doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein poses a real threat to the United States. He has violated every U.N. Security Council Resolution and has committed unspeakable atrocities against his own people. If there is an axis of evil, then Saddam Hussein is its lynchpin. However, the question before the Congress today is not whether or not Saddam Hussein is a threat. The question is what do we do about it? And when? And how?

To begin, war must be the last option, not the first solution. We must demonstrate to the world that we will continue to exhaust diplomatic and peaceful options to protect our security and national interests.

As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, we must demand a Resolution that allows unhampered—any time any place—access to any and all areas within Iraq for inspection, and we must equip the inspection teams with thousands of coalition forces to ensure both their protection and the United Nations' commitment to peace.

A preemptive strike will have serious repercussions on the entire Middle East region. While the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is obvious, it is equally obvious that any aggressive actions taken by the United States will prompt Saddam Hussein to strike back not only on the U.S. directly, but also on our allies and interests in the region, and specifically, Israel.

The provocation of an Iraqi strike by the U.S. is the last thing we should be doing as Israel continues to seek peace with the Palestinians, Syria, and Lebanon. Should Iraq attack Israel, as it did in 1991, Israel will respond—and who can blame them?

This won't be a war that Israel has asked for, but it may well be one they are forced to engage in. I do not want to have to explain to my constituents why I voted for a war that guarantees the injury or death of Israelis.

While there is not doubt in my mind that the U.S. can prosecute a war to successful conclusion, I remind the Commander in Chief that

the men and women of our Armed Forces are already fully engaged in a war on terrorism.

In addition to that war, we have military commitments in Japan, Germany, and South Korea. We also have over 3 thousand troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, almost 5 thousand in Saudi Arabia, over 4 thousand in Kuwait, and another 5 thousand in Serbia, to name a few. How will a war with Iraq, and make no mistake, this will be a full-fledged war, affect our peacekeeping and peace enforcement obligations in these and other parts of the world?

H.J. Res 114 lacks even the barest essentials for good foreign policy and is bereft of any consideration of global politics. It does not include any short or long term planning. I submitted an amendment in the nature of a substitute that authorized the use of U.S. Armed Forces against Iraq, and my Resolution included a number of preconditions that the President would have been forced to follow, prior to receiving authority from Congress to engage U.S. troops in war.

Those preconditions included verification that all peaceful means to obtain compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions have been exhausted, a commitment that the war on terrorism remain the nation's highest priority, a plan for stabilizing a free Iraq, and a commitment to protect the health and safety of the Iraqi people. I am sorry that the full House was not permitted to vote on my proposal.

We are about to determine the destiny of far too many of our nation's young men and women. We must be absolutely certain that peaceful options have been exhausted and that we have achievable goals for stability in the region.

I am not yet certain that we have these plans or have exhausted these options. I will not support H.J. Res 114, or any other Resolution that authorizes a preemptive military strike against another nation, until these preconditions have been met. I urge my colleagues to adhere to these same standards.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, 12 years ago, I came to this floor and voted, with a heavy heart, to authorize military action against Iraq after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Sadly, I rise today to support another resolution which once again authorizes the use of military force against Iraq and Saddam Hussein.

I think everyone agrees that military action, especially unilateral action, should never be undertaken lightly, and that judicious thought must be given to the consequences of such action. While I strongly believe that diplomacy is always preferable, it has become clear to me that we can no longer afford to ignore the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his brutal regime.

It has been well documented by previous speakers today that since the end of the Persian Gulf War, the threats posed by Iraq have actually increased rather than diminished. For more than a decade, Saddam has persisted in violating numerous United Nations resolutions designed to ensure that Iraq does not pose a threat to international peace and security. At the same time, he has consistently tried to circumvent U.N. economic sanctions against his brutal regime. Iraq continues to breach its international obligations by pursuing its efforts to develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking nuclear weapons capability and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations.

Given his abysmal record for violating international obligations, there is no reason to be-

lieve that Saddam can be trusted to abide by his most recent promises for cooperation. Rather than making a true commitment to international peace, his latest statements are nothing more than ruse designed to give him one more time to further strengthen his own arsenal of weapons to use against us and our allies.

We cannot sit idly by and let Saddam Hussein wreck havoc on the world. Nor can we afford to wait until another terrorist attack claims the lives of more innocent Americans. History has taught us that there are severe consequences for inaction against a brutal dictator.

The United States is unique because it is the only country whose very existence was based on an idea—the idea of freedom; it is an idea that must be constantly guarded. It is a noble but a fragile thing that can be stolen or snuffed out if not protected.

Mr. Speaker, I sincerely hope that the use of military force can be avoided but we cannot shy away from it out of fear. Giving the president the authority to use military force as a last resort may be the best way to avoid actually having to use it at all.

I urge my colleagues to support H.J. Res. 114.

Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise this evening to speak about the question of life or death as we have considered the steps we will take to deal with the problem of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.

The Constitution was not created for us to be silent. It is a body of law that provides the roadmap of democracy in this country, and like any roadmap, it is designed to be followed.

Saddam Hussein is indeed an evil man. He has harmed his own people in the past, and cannot be trusted in the future to live peacefully with his neighbors in the region. I fully support efforts to disarm Iraq pursuant to the resolutions passed in the aftermath of the gulf war, and I do not rule out the possibility that military action might be needed in the future to defend the United States.

Right now, however, we are moving too far too quickly with many alarmist representations yet undocumented. There is no proof that our Nation is in imminent danger, because if there were, every single member of this body would rightfully expect and approve of the President acting immediately to protect the country.

It is not too late for peace. With tough weapons inspections and strict adherence to the Security Council resolutions dealing with weapons of mass destruction, war can still be averted if we are willing to pursue aggressive diplomacy. Since we are a just nation, we should wield our power judiciously—restraining where possible for the greater good.

We should make good on the promise to the people that we made in the passage of the 1998 Iraqi Liberation Act. We should do all that we can to assist the people of Iraq because as President Dwight Eisenhower said, "I like to believe that people in the long run are going to do more to promote peace than our governments. Indeed, I think that people want peace so much that one of these days, governments had better get out of the way and let them have it."

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, all Members of Congress agree that Saddam Hussein is a dangerous and tyrannical man. He is the enemy of the United States and all other civilized nations and his ability to wage biological

and chemical warfare must eventually be extinguished. But this can and must be accomplished without imperiling the security of our citizens or the moral integrity that has characterized the United States as the greatest democracy in the world.

Mr. Speaker, Congress cannot abdicate its responsibility in the decision to wage war and invade another country. This resolution makes possible a unilateral declaration of war against Iraq based on the sole determination of the President. He can do this without exhausting multi-national efforts and for any reason he deems appropriate. This is an overly broad delegation of authority from the legislative branch to the executive branch which is contrary to Constitutional authority.

Mr. Speaker, the substitute offered by Congressman SPRATT, which failed today, would have told the United Nations, Saddam Hussein and the entire world that the United States insists on unrestricted inspections, an abbreviated and absolute inspection timetable, strict standards of verification and accountability, and disarmament by any appropriate means at the proper time. Under this substitute, failure to accomplish these goals under U.N. auspices would have resulted in a vote in the U.S. Congress on whether to proceed unilaterally. This approach was the superior, more reasoned choice . . . both in responsibly protecting the American people and remaining faithful to Congress' Constitutional duties.

Mr. Speaker, it has been said that a smart man wins a war, a wise man avoids a war. Today Congress did not act wisely.

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Speaker, many years from now, when those so inclined decide to examine the Congress of this era, I am confident that they will find ours to be a thoughtful, involved House, one that judiciously examined every issue essential to the defense and freedom of our Nation and her allies.

For 3 days, members marched to the floor to offer their support for, or opposition to, this bipartisan resolution. Indeed, the true essence of democracy has been displayed on the floor of the House of Representatives. I am proud to have been a part of the dialogue concerning this important issue of our time.

And it was with much deliberation, consultation, and discussion that I came to support the resolution authorizing the use of military force against Iraq if that force becomes necessary and if all other means of eliminating this threat fail.

Let me be clear. This is not a declaration of war from the Congress. This was Congress ensuring that the President has the authority he needs to deal with the very real threat of Iraq.

Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a threat. He is the epitome of malevolence. Indeed, the record of this murderous regime has been outlined forcefully in this body, and by our Commander in Chief.

Saddam has used weapons of mass destruction against his own people. He waged war with Iran; he invaded Kuwait. For the last 11 years he has defied the will of the entire planet as expressed in resolutions by the United Nations Security Council.

I know of no thinking person who argues against the profound necessity of eliminating Saddam's weapons technology. We all agree on the menace he poses and desire a world where he is not a factor.

Saddam Hussein's repeated defiance when it comes to permitting weapons inspections is a strong indication that his regime poses a very real threat to the civilized world right now.

Ultimately, I believe that Saddam Hussein is dangerous. Dangerous in his country, dangerous to his region, and dangerous to the United States. Therefore I feel that giving the President the authority to use force against Iraq is an important matter of international-national security. Iraq poses an immediate biological and chemical threat to 50,000 American troops in the Middle East. This exacerbates the already enormous instability in the region.

However, I do not give the President this authority without reservation. To be sure, in my view, there are still important lingering questions that demand further discussion from the President and this Administration.

For example, should military force be required, when what? After the intervention, how will the situation likely evolve?

Why have more nations thus far chosen not to join us in this coalition against the threat of Saddam? How will we share the costs of war with those allies who have joined with us?

If Iraq is truly part of our war on terror, what about those other nations that seem to fit this criteria of harboring terrorists and possessing weapons of mass destruction? Will we address those threats next, and if so, how? The President must be prepared to answer this question of why Iraq and not others.

Further, we must make absolutely certain that whatever is done in Iraq does not negatively impact the broader war that we authorized 12 months ago—the war on terrorism. Al Qaeda has already taken thousands of our sons and daughters, fathers and mothers. We cannot waver one bit in our pursuit of those who attacked this nation on September 11, 2001.

An we must continually emphasize that our nation must work with its allies. It is critical that we try to attain as much international support as possible. Working together with other nations on this front will expedite the intervention process and enhance the chances for post-war success.

It is this last point that I find absolutely critical. That is why I was a cosponsor of the Spratt substitute resolution. It mandated the administration to fully work through the possibility of securing a new resolution from the United Nations Security Council calling for the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction before any pursuit of unilateral action.

Although I am disappointed that the mandate of the Spratt substitute did not pass, I am confident that as long as Congress exercises thorough oversight, then the president will proceed judiciously.

The resolution that passed the House today was negotiated with the Democratic leadership. This was a bipartisan compromise, incorporating many provisions that were left out of the President's initial draft proposal. President Bush has shown good faith thus far in his dealings with our party. It is time to unite behind our commander-in-chief.

Nobody wants this conflict to end up in war. Nobody fails to comprehend the gravity of this decision. Nobody wants one American soldier to be in harm's way.

In fact, we all hope that through the use of other means, including exhausting our diplo-

matic options, Iraq can be disarmed such that the world community determines that force is not necessary.

But shall that avenue fail, our nation must be prepared to protect its citizens fully and completely from those who wish us harm.

Indeed, it is imperative that the United States speaks with one voice to Saddam Hussein. There can be no ambiguity in our resolve to protect and defend this nation, and the House accomplished this today.

Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this important resolution. Mr. Speaker, I represent Fort Campbell, home of the 101st Airborne. These brave men and women may likely be among the first soldiers called into duty in the event we go to war with Iraq. The 101st was called into service during Operation Desert Storm, and more recently they continue to serve their country with pride in Afghanistan.

Saddam Hussein is an evil man who cannot be trusted. Almost everyone in this esteemed body agrees with that statement. If we allow Saddam to develop or obtain weapons of mass destruction, how then will we be able to stop him? As the President said on Monday night, we don't fully know what his weapons capabilities are, and we need to have our inspectors go to Iraq to find out. If Saddam continues to defy the will of the United Nations Security Council and of the global community, we must act.

No one wants to go to war with Iraq. I would prefer that the men and women at Fort Campbell, who I represent, not be forced to leave their families. However, I know that they are ready for another "rendezvous with destiny" should they be called upon.

Four years ago, an overwhelming majority of this House, including many of those who now speak out against action in Iraq, voted to make regime change in Iraq the official policy of our government. What has changed since then? Has Saddam allowed weapons inspectors full unfettered access in Iraq? Has he destroyed his weapons of mass destruction and stopped programs to develop these weapons? The answer is no.

Saddam has defied the U.N. Security Council and the global community by ignoring countless U.N. resolutions. Our Commander-in-Chief has called upon this great body to give him the authority to hold Saddam accountable. We must Act.

After World War II, when what some have deemed our "greatest generation" fought for freedom in Europe and in the Pacific, we promised ourselves "never again." Never again would we allow tyrannical dictators to threaten the global peace and to use unjust and immoral force against his own or other people. Unfortunately, again may be happening. I know that this generation will live up to its calling, and someday, we may just be calling those brave men and women our greatest generation.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this resolution. It is not only important for our security, but for the security of the entire free world.

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution.

Because this action could ultimately send our sons and daughters to war, my decision to support this resolution is one I have considered very carefully. I have spent the past several months gathering information from experts

in this and previous administrations, from other experts in the field, and from my constituents in Kansas. I have spoken to community leaders, religious leaders, and my family.

When I began this process, I stated my belief that the President should present to Congress, the American people, and the international community a compelling case for intervention in Iraq. I have been presented with evidence and intelligence—some of it classified—regarding the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. I am convinced that we must take action to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.

This resolution is not the same as the measure originally proposed by the White House. The resolution is a compromise agreed to by the President and Democratic and Republican leaders in Congress. It requires that the President exhaust all diplomatic options and notify Congress before implementing military action. Diplomacy must be our Nation's first priority in resolving the crisis in Iraq. I hope the use of force won't be necessary. But in order for diplomacy to be successful, the threat to use force must be credible.

The resolution also encourages the President to work with our allies and the United Nations in dealing with Saddam. We were successful in the Persian Gulf War and, more recently, in Afghanistan by working cooperatively with our allies and the United Nations. That policy should guide the President and Congress as we confront the threat from Iraq.

As a father and grandfather, this decision that could send our sons and daughters to war is the most difficult one I have faced as your congressman. But we must confront Saddam's threat to our security. And we must keep America safe. The resolution allows us to do that.

There is no question that Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction in the form of chemical and biological weapons. There is also no question that he is working to develop a nuclear capability. He could be in possession of a working nuclear device in a matter of several months to a few years.

There is also no question that Saddam has shown a willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other countries and his own people. And there is growing evidence of his willingness to share his weapons with terrorists and rogue agents who might use those weapons against America.

Saddam's aggressive nature knows few bounds. He represents a clear and present danger to the United States, our citizens, and our interests in the world. Based upon the evidence and intelligence I have reviewed, I believe Iraq presents a clear threat to the United States. I will support and vote for the use of force resolution the President and congressional leadership agreed to on October 2. This measure gives the President the authority he needs to enforce the U.N. resolutions Iraq has violated, while limiting the scope and duration of the authority to address the current threats posed by Iraq.

There's an old saying: "Politics stops at the water's edge." That is the case here. We must show the world that we are united in our determination to protect our Nation and our people from threat posed by Iraq.

Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, this past Sunday during a pancake breakfast at a firehouse in my hometown, one of my constituents ap-

proached me. "Why have we gotten into this headlong rush into war," he asked? "Why haven't we first exhausted all the other possibilities for dealing with Saddam?" His questions reflected both my feelings and those of so many other Americans: Where is the pressing need to send our Nation, our servicemen and women, into a potentially bloody, costly war that could threaten rather than strengthen our national security?

I will vote "no" on this resolution.

It is true that Saddam Hussein has for years presented a threat to his own people, to the Middle East, to the world. His relentless pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is unconscionable. We have a legal and a moral obligation to hold him accountable for his flagrant violation of international law and his maniacal disregard for human decency.

I applaud the President for refocusing international attention on the Iraqi threat. This is something that I have followed with concern since I worked in the State Department 15 years ago on nuclear nonproliferation. However, I believe it is at the least premature, and more likely contrary to our national interest, for Congress to authorize military action against Iraq now.

As I reviewed the arguments for and against this resolution, I found myself returning repeatedly to some basic questions. Would unilateral American military action against Iraq reduce the threat that Saddam Hussein poses? In other words, would a Saddam facing certain destruction be less likely or more likely to unleash his weapons of mass destruction on his neighbors, his own people, or on Americans? Will an attack against Iraq strengthen our greater and more pressing effort to combat al Qaeda and global terrorism? Will it bolster our ability to promote our many other national security interests around the world and make Americans more secure? I believe the answer to all of these questions is a resounding no.

Why should we undertake action that makes more likely the very thing we want to prevent? A cornered Saddam Hussein could release his arsenal of chemical, biological, and possible nuclear weapons on American soldiers or on his neighbors in the region, including Israel. The CIA recently reported that Iraq is much more likely to initiate a chemical or biological attack on the United States if Saddam concludes that a U.S.-led invasion can no longer be deterred.

In addition, I am also concerned that an American invasion of Iraq would send a destabilizing shockwave throughout the Middle East and ignite violent anti-Americanism, giving rise to future threats to our national security. While I have no doubt that we would successfully depose Saddam Hussein, I am concerned that the act of extinguishing Saddam would inflame, rather than diminish, the terrorist threat to the United States. And the ensuing anti-American sentiment could reinvigorate the terrorists' pursuit of the loose nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union—a greater threat than Iraq, I might add, one that America has largely neglected.

The Administration has tried and failed to prove that Saddam's regime is a grave and immediate threat to American security. It has also simply failed to explain to the American public what our responsibilities would be in a post-Saddam Iraq. How will we guarantee the security of our soldiers and the Iraqi people? How will we guarantee the success of a

democratic transition? How many hundreds of billions of dollars would it cost to rebuild Iraq?

This resolution would give the President a blank check, in the words of many of my constituents, and would allow him to use Iraq to launch a new military and diplomatic doctrine. By taking unilateral, preemptive military action against Iraq, we would set a dangerous precedent that would threaten the international order. Instead, we can and should take the lead in eliminating the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, not by taking unilateral military action. If we consult actively with our allies in the region, with NATO, with the U.N. Security Council, we will be able to undertake effective inspections and end Saddam's threat. I do not believe that we need the permission of our allies to take action, but I do believe that we need their partnership to be successful in the long run.

As the world's leading power, we should use the full diplomatic force at our disposal to work with our allies to get inspectors back into Iraq without any preconditions—including access to Saddam's presidential palaces. We can and we will disarm Iraq and end Saddam's threat. The United Nations and the international community may recognize the need to take military action. The American people will understand and be prepared for that possibility. Now, they are not. Now, they are saying that, for the United States, war should and must always be our last resort.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LAHOOD). All time for debate has expired.

Pursuant to House Resolution 574, the previous question is ordered on the joint resolution, as amended.

The question is on engrossment and third reading of the joint resolution.

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair notes a disturbance in the gallery in violation of the rules of the House and directs the Sergeant-at-Arms to restore order.

MOTION TO RECOMMIT OFFERED BY MR.

KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the joint resolution?

Mr. KUCINICH. I am, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. KUCINICH moves to recommit the joint resolution H.J. Res. 114 to the Committee on International Relations with instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith with the following amendment:

Page 9, after line 2, insert the following:

(c) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT.—Prior to the exercise of the authority granted in subsection (a) to use force, the President shall transmit to Congress a report, in unclassified form, that addresses the impact of such use of force on the national security interests of the United States. The report shall contain, at a minimum, the following:

(1)(A) An estimate of the costs associated with military action against Iraq, as determined by the Secretary of Defense, and an

estimate of the costs associated with the reconstruction of Iraq, as determined by the Secretary of State.

(B) An estimate by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget of any additional funding to pay the costs referred to in subparagraph (A) to be derived from one of more of the following:

(i) Offsetting reductions in other Federal programs.

(ii) Increases in Federal revenues.

(iii) Increases in public borrowing.

(2) An analysis by the Secretary of the Treasury of the impact on the United States economy likely to result from military action against Iraq, including the impact on the gross domestic product, the unemployment rate, the Federal Funds rate, and the financial markets.

(3) An estimate by the Secretary of Energy of any change in the price of crude oil and downstream products likely to result from military action against Iraq and an analysis of the impact of such change on the United States economy.

(4) A comprehensive plan developed by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State for United States financial and political commitment to provide short-term humanitarian assistance to the people of Iraq and to provide long-term economic and political stabilization assistance for Iraq.

(5) An assurance by the Secretary of Defense that all United States Armed Forces to be deployed pursuant to the exercise of authority granted in subsection (a) have been provided with equipment to protect against chemical and biological agents (A) in levels sufficient to meet minimum required levels previously established by the Department of Defense, and (B) in conditions that are neither defective nor expired.

(6) An estimate by the Secretary of Defense of the number of United States military casualties and Iraqi civilian casualties that would result from military action against Iraq, including an estimate of the number of such casualties that would result from military actions in and around Baghdad.

(7) A comprehensive statement by the Secretary of the Defense and the Secretary of State that details the nature and extent of the international support for military action against Iraq, and the effects, if any, military action against Iraq would have on the broader war on terrorism, including, but not limited to, the effect on the support of United States allies in the Middle East.

(8) An analysis by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Comptroller General of the assertions of the intelligence community with respect to Iraq's current capability to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction. In the preceding sentence, the term "intelligence community" has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947.

(9) A comprehensive analysis by the Secretary of State of the effect on the stability of Iraq and the region of any change in the government of Iraq that may occur as the result of United States military action, including, but not limited to, the effect on the national aspirations of the Kurds, Turkey and its continued support for United States policy in the region, the economic and political impact on Jordan and the stability of the Jordanian Monarchy, and the economic and political stability of Saudi Arabia.

(10) A comprehensive analysis by the Secretary of State of the long-term impact of a preemptive first strike attack by United States Armed Forces against Iraq on the stability of the United States and the world. The analysis should include, but not be lim-

ited to, the impact on regional conflicts involving the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia, Pakistan and India, Israel and the Palestinians, and the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. The analysis should also include the long-term impact on the United States of the international sentiment that a preemptive first strike attack by United States Armed Forces against Iraq would breach international law.

Page 9, line 3, strike "(c)" and insert "(d)".

Mr. KUCINICH (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the motion to recommit be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KUCINICH) is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion to recommit.

□ 1415

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. LEE).

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the motion to recommit.

We know that for every action there is a reaction. We do not know what danger lies before us. Every American has the right to know what price in terms of human lives and economic resources that they will have to pay. We owe them some answers. This is about life or death. We owe them answers to the questions the gentleman from Ohio has raised and will raise, and far more. In a democracy the people have a right to know.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. BROWN), my colleague and neighbor.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

In the Committee on International Relations, I offered this language embodied in the Kucinich recommitment motion: if we give the President the authority to radically change, to radically change, our decades-old military doctrine of containment and deterrence, we need answers to questions the American people are asking. If we strike Iraq on our own, will our coalition against terrorism fracture? Most of our allies in the war on terror oppose U.S. unilateral action against Iraq. And what will a unilateral strike tell the world? Does it embolden Russia to attack Georgia to chase down Chechnyan rebels? Does it set an international precedent for China to go into Taiwan or to deal even more harshly with Tibet? Does it embolden India, Pakistan, or both, each with nuclear weapons from going to war to protect their interests in Kashmir? And if we win a unilateral war, will we be responsible for unilaterally rebuilding Iraq?

This Congress should not authorize the use of force unless the administration can detail what it plans to do and how we deal with the consequences of

our actions. Vote "yes" on the recommitment motion.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3½ minutes.

The joint resolution, H.J. Res. 114, gives the President the authority to use all necessary force at his discretion. This motion to recommit is neutral on this central point. And I know there are people on both sides of the aisle, on both sides of the proposition before us, who are interested in knowing that, that that resolution does not take a position on the underlying bill. But with power comes responsibility, and in a democracy the responsibility is to the people. This motion to recommit would assign the administration with the responsibility to inform the American people on key questions raised by a use of force in Iraq, questions that Members on both sides of this proposition have raised.

The American people want to know what will use of force in Iraq cost, and how will it be paid for. With budget cuts? With more borrowing? With tax increases? The American people want to know what financial commitment the administration is making to address humanitarian consequences of a use of force in Iraq. The American people want to know what impact will the use of force in Iraq have on the economy of the United States and on the important price of oil. The American people want to know how a use of force in Iraq will affect efforts to prevent further terrorist attacks. The American people want to know these things because they know that ultimately they will be required to pay the price. They are entitled to answers, and the motion to recommit ensures that they will get those answers before they get the bill.

Mr. Speaker, as the ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform, I have sat in on several meetings where the Department of Defense, Inspector General, and the General Accounting Office have informed the Congress that 250,000 biological and chemical protective suits are defective; 250,000 of these suits are defective, but the Department of Defense cannot account for them. This motion before us would help protect our troops by requiring assurance that the United States Armed Forces deployed have been provided with functioning equipment to protect against chemical and biological agents in sufficient levels and that this equipment is not defective. Mr. Speaker, this becomes particularly urgent since the Central Intelligence Agency has just informed the Congress that if the United States invades Iraq, Saddam Hussein can be expected to use whatever biological or chemical weapons he may have.

Whatever our position on the war, I am certain that we want to protect our troops who would be called upon to put their lives on the line to protect this

country. This is an example of the information which the American people have a right to know.

Mr. Speaker, this has been an important debate for our Nation. People on both sides of this proposition as to whether or not the United States should pursue action against Iraq are doing the best they can to represent our country. All of us love our country; but our love of country should include our desire to get answers on behalf of our constituents, answers on behalf of those who would be called to serve overseas. So it is in that spirit that I ask my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and both sides of this proposition to join in support of this motion to recommit with instructions.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LAHOOD). Is the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE) opposed to the motion to recommit?

Mr. HYDE. I certainly am, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I oppose the motion to recommit; and if anybody wants detailed reasons, I suggest they read it. It sets up roadblocks that I think are virtually insurmountable.

In the thousands of words we have heard in the last couple of days uttered on Iraq, a few important truths emerge. First, Saddam Hussein is a very dangerous person. The history of his regime is one of unrestrained violence against Iran, against Kuwait, against the Kurds, against the Shias, and against others whose only offense is to oppose his despotic regime. Secondly, he hates America. Thirdly, he is making a feverish attempt to arm with weapons of immeasurable destructive capacity; and when he is ready, he will use them.

Do you remember the first time you saw the films of the mushroom cloud engulfing Hiroshima and then you learned about the deadly effect of radiation on humans? That was 1945. Does the fact that modern thermal nuclear weapons would unleash a thousand times the destructive power of Hiroshima worry you at all? You might ask why are we debating this resolution at this moment in time. The answer should be apparent: September 11, which was more than a wake-up call. It shook us out of a long, deep sleep and held us by the throat. It taught us there are people in the world willing to destroy themselves to gratify their hatred and we had better take them seriously.

We tend to visualize what we call weapons of mass destruction in terms of bombs reducing buildings to rubble, but missiles can carry bombs with chemical and biological agents that can poison a city as well as destroy its infrastructure. Either way, it is death and destruction on a horrendous scale. Is such an attack imminent? Did we know Pearl Harbor was imminent? Did we know the World Trade Center at-

tacks were imminent? The willingness to destroy must never marry the capability to destroy. And Santayana was right, those who do not read history are condemned to relive it.

In a book written sometime after, I suppose, in the 1940's by William C. Bullitt, who was our first ambassador to Russia appointed by President Roosevelt called "The Great Globe Itself," he said: "To beat our swords into plowshares while the spiritual descendants of Genghis Khan stalk the earth is to die and leave no descendants."

The world looks to us for leadership. The world looks to us for strength and resolve. We make no demands for territory or commercial advantage. All we want is a peaceful world. "If you love peace, prepare for war," said the ancient Romans. There are ideals and ideas worth fighting for. They are the civilizing forces that make life worth living, that respect the dignity that is every person's entitlement. Those ideals and principles are under attack and we must defend them. By supporting the President, we send a message to the forces of conquest and chaos that America, the West, is not as decadent as they may think. Support the President.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to recommit.

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 101, nays 325, not voting 5, as follows:

[Roll No. 454]

YEAS—101

Allen	Eshoo	Kucinich
Baldwin	Evans	Lee
Barrett	Farr	Lewis (GA)
Becerra	Fattah	Maloney (NY)
Blumenauer	Filner	Markey
Bonior	Frank	Matsui
Brown (FL)	Green (TX)	McCollum
Brown (OH)	Harman	McDermott
Capps	Hastings (FL)	McGovern
Capuano	Hilliard	Meehan
Carson (IN)	Hinchee	Meek (FL)
Clay	Hinojosa	Meeks (NY)
Clayton	Holt	Miller, George
Clyburn	Honda	Moran (VA)
Condit	Hooley	Napolitano
Conyers	Inslie	Neal
Coyne	Jackson (IL)	Oberstar
Crowley	Jackson-Lee	Obey
Cummings	(TX)	Olver
Davis (IL)	Jefferson	Owens
DeFazio	Johnson, E. B.	Pascarell
DeGette	Jones (OH)	Pastor
Delahunt	Kaptur	Paul
Dingell	Kilpatrick	Payne
Doggett	Kleckza	Pelosi

Rangel	Scott	Udall (CO)
Rodriguez	Slaughter	Udall (NM)
Roybal-Allard	Solis	Velazquez
Rush	Stark	Watson (CA)
Sabo	Tauscher	Watt (NC)
Sanchez	Thompson (CA)	Waxman
Sanders	Thompson (MS)	Wexler
Sawyer	Tierney	Woolsey
Schakowsky	Towns	Wu

NAYS—325

Abercrombie	Engel	Lewis (CA)
Ackerman	English	Lewis (KY)
Aderholt	Etheridge	Linder
Akin	Everett	Lipinski
Andrews	Ferguson	LoBiondo
Armey	Flake	LoGrande
Baca	Fletcher	Lowe
Bachus	Foley	Lucas (KY)
Baird	Forbes	Lucas (OK)
Baker	Ford	Luther
Baldacci	Fossella	Lynch
Ballenger	Frelinghuysen	Maloney (CT)
Barcia	Frost	Manzullo
Barr	Galleghy	Mascara
Bartlett	Ganske	Matheson
Barton	Gekas	McCarthy (MO)
Bass	Gephardt	McCarthy (NY)
Bentsen	Gibbons	McCreery
Bereuter	Gilchrest	McHugh
Berkley	Gillmor	McInnis
Berman	Gilman	McIntyre
Berry	Gonzalez	McKeon
Biggert	Goode	McNulty
Bilirakis	Goodlatte	Menendez
Bishop	Gordon	Mica
Blagojevich	Goss	Millender-McDonald
Blunt	Graham	Miller, Dan
Boehler	Granger	Miller, Gary
Boehner	Graves	Miller, Jeff
Bonilla	Green (WI)	Mollohan
Bono	Greenwood	Moore
Boozman	Grucci	Moran (KS)
Borski	Gutknecht	Morella
Boswell	Hall (TX)	Murtha
Boucher	Hansen	Myrick
Boyd	Hart	Nadler
Brady (PA)	Hastings (WA)	Nethercutt
Brady (TX)	Hayes	Ney
Brown (SC)	Hayworth	Northup
Bryant	Hefley	Norwood
Burr	Heger	Nussle
Burton	Hill	Osborne
Buyer	Hilleary	Ose
Callahan	Hobson	Otter
Calvert	Hoeffel	Oxley
Camp	Hoekstra	Holden
Cannon	Holden	Pence
Cantor	Horn	Peterson (MN)
Capito	Hostettler	Peterson (PA)
Cardin	Houghton	Petri
Carson (OK)	Hoyer	Phelps
Castle	Hulshof	Pickering
Chabot	Hunter	Pitts
Chambliss	Hyde	Platts
Clement	Isakson	Pombo
Coble	Israel	Pomeroy
Collins	Issa	Portman
Combest	Istook	Price (NC)
Cooksey	Jenkins	Pryce (OH)
Costello	John	Putnam
Cox	Johnson (CT)	Quinn
Cramer	Johnson (IL)	Radanovich
Crane	Johnson, Sam	Rahall
Crenshaw	Jones (NC)	Ramstad
Cubin	Kanjorski	Regula
Culberson	Keller	Rehberg
Cunningham	Kelly	Reyes
Davis (CA)	Kennedy (MN)	Reynolds
Davis (FL)	Kennedy (RI)	Riley
Davis, Jo Ann	Kerns	Rivers
Davis, Tom	Kildee	Roemer
Deal	Kind (WI)	Rogers (KY)
DeLauro	King (NY)	Rogers (MI)
DeLay	Kingston	Rohrabacher
DeMint	Kirk	Ros-Lehtinen
Deutsch	Knollenberg	Ross
Diaz-Balart	Kolbe	Rothman
Dicks	LaFalce	Royce
Dooley	LaHood	Ryan (WI)
Doolittle	Lampson	Ryan (KS)
Doyle	Langevin	Sandlin
Dreier	Lantos	Saxton
Duncan	Larsen (WA)	Schaffer
Dunn	Larson (CT)	Schiff
Edwards	Latham	Schrock
Ehlers	LaTourette	Sensenbrenner
Ehrlich	Leach	Serrano
Emerson	Levin	

Sessions Stenholm
Shadegg Strickland
Shaw Stupak
Shays Sullivan
Sherman Sununu
Sherwood Sweeney
Shimkus Tancredo
Shows Tanner
Shuster Tauzin
Simmons Taylor (MS)
Simpson Taylor (NC)
Skeen Terry
Skelton Thomas
Smith (MI) Thornberry
Smith (NJ) Thune
Smith (TX) Thurman
Smith (WA) Tiahrt
Snyder Tiberi
Souder Toomey
Spratt Turner
Stearns Upton

Visclosky Gilchrest
Vitter Gillmor
Walden Gilman
Walsh Goode
Wamp Goodlatte
Waters Gordon
Watkins (OK) Goss
Watts (OK) Graham
Weiner Granger
Weldon (FL) Graves
Weldon (PA) Green (TX)
Weller Green (WI)
Whitfield Greenwood
Wicker Grucci
Wilson (NM) Gutknecht
Wilson (SC) Hall (TX)
Wolf Hansen
Wynn Harman
Young (AK) Hart
Young (FL) Hastert

LoBiondo Sandlin
Lowey Saxton
Lucas (KY) Schaffer
Lucas (OK) Schiff
Luther Schroock
Lynch Sensenbrenner
Maloney (NY) Sessions
Manzullo Shadegg
Markey Shaw
Mascara Shays
Matheson Sherman
McCarthy (NY) Sherwood
McCrery Shimkus
McHugh Shows
McInnis Shuster
McIntyre Simmons
McKeon Skeeen
McNulty Skelton
Meehan Smith (MI)
Mica Miller, Dan
Miller, Gary
Miller, Jeff
Moore
Moran (KS)
Murtha
Myrick
Nethercutt
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Oxley
Pascrell
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Phelps
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reynolds
Riley
Roemer
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)

Napolitano Rivers
Neal Rodriguez
Oberstar Roybal-Allard
Obey Rush
Olver Sabo
Owens Sanchez
Pallone Sanders
Pastor Sawyer
Paul Schakowsky
Payne Scott
Pelosi Serrano
Price (NC) Slaughter
Rahall Snyder
Rangel Solis
Reyes Stark

Strickland
Stupak
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Velazquez
Visclosky
Waters
Watson (CA)
Watt (NC)
Woolsey
Wu

NOT VOTING—5

Gutierrez Ortiz
McKinney Roukema

Stump

□ 1447

Messrs. BAIRD, GOSS, LATHAM, PORTMAN, GARY G. MILLER of California, SMITH of Michigan, and LUTHER, and Mrs. NORTHUP changed their vote from “yea” to “nay.”

Mr. RODRIGUEZ, Ms. DEGETTE, and Mr. MATSUI changed their vote from “nay” to “yea.”

So the motion to recommit was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Stated for:

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, on roll-call No. 454 I inadvertently voted “nay”. I intended to vote “yea”.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LAHOOD). The question is on the passage of the joint resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 296, nays 133, not voting 3, as follows:

[Roll No. 455]

YEAS—296

Ackerman Brady (TX)
Aderholt Brown (SC)
Akin Bryant
Andrews Burr
Armye Burton
Bachus Buyer
Baker Callahan
Ballenger Calvert
Barcia Camp
Barr Cannon
Bartlett Cantor
Barton Capito
Bass Carson (OK)
Bentsen Castle
Bereuter Chabot
Berkley Chambliss
Berman Clement
Berry Coble
Biggert Collins
Bilirakis Combest
Bishop Cooksey
Blagojevich Cox
Blunt Cramer
Boehlert Crane
Boehner Crenshaw
Bonilla Crowley
Bono Cubin
Boozman Culbertson
Borski Cunningham
Boswell Davis (FL)
Boucher Davis, Jo Ann
Boyd Davis, Tom

Deal
DeLay
DeMint
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dooley
Doolittle
Dreier
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Etheridge
Everett
Ferguson
Flake
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gephardt
Gibbons

Abercrombie
Allen
Baca
Baird
Baldacci
Baldwin
Barrett
Becerra
Blumenauer
Bonior
Brady (PA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carson (IN)
Clay
Clayton
Clyburn
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt

NAYS—133

DeLauro
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Duncan
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Frank
Gonzalez
Gutierrez
Hastings (FL)
Hilliard
Hinchev
Hinojosa
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hostettler
Houghton
Inslie
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee
(TX)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kaptur
Kildee

Kilpatrick
Kleczka
Kucinich
LaFalce
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Loftgren
Maloney (CT)
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McKinney
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-
McDonald
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Morella
Nadler

NOT VOTING—3

Ortiz Roukema Stump

□ 1505

So the joint resolution was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Monahan, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate has passed without amendment a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 5531. An act to facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan.

WAIVING POINTS OF ORDER AGAINST CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 5010, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2003

Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 579 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 579

Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to consider the conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 5010) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2003, and for other purposes. All points of order against the conference report and against its consideration are waived. The conference report shall be considered as read.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. THORNBERRY). The gentlewoman from North Carolina (Mrs. MYRICK) is recognized for 1 hour.

Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. FROST), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only.

Mr. Speaker, the rule waives all points of order against the conference report to accompany H.R. 5010, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2003, and against its consideration. The rule provides that the conference report shall be considered as read.

The defense appropriations conference report provides the tools and