[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 133 (Thursday, October 10, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10233-S10342]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  AUTHORIZATION OF THE USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES AGAINST IRAQ

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the 
Senate will now resume consideration of S.J. Res. 45, which the clerk 
will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A joint resolution (S.J. Res. 45) to authorize the use of 
     United States Armed Forces against Iraq.

  Pending:

       Lieberman/Warner modified amendment No. 4856, in the nature 
     of a substitute;
       Byrd amendment No. 4868 (to amendment No. 4856, as 
     modified), to provide statutory construction that 
     constitutional authorities remain unaffected and that no 
     additional grant of authority is made to the President not 
     directly related to the existing threat posed by Iraq;
       Levin amendment No. 4862 (to amendment No. 4856), in the 
     nature of a substitute.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, what is the parliamentary situation?


                    Amendment No. 4869, As Modified

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the clerk 
will report the amendment of the Senator from West Virginia.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from West Virginia [Mr. Byrd] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 4869, as modified.

  The amendment, as modified, is as follows:

[[Page S10234]]

 (Purpose: To provide a termination date for the authorization of the 
use of the Armed Forces of the United States, together with procedures 
    for the extension of such date unless Congress disapproves the 
                               extension)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. 5. TERMINATION OF THE AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF THE 
                   UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

       (a) In General.--The authorization in section 4(a) shall 
     terminate 12 months after the date of enactment of this joint 
     resolution, except that the President may extend, for a 
     period or periods of 12 months each, such authorization if--
       (1) the President determines and certifies to Congress for 
     each such period, not later that 60 days before the date of 
     termination of the authorization, that the extension is 
     necessary for ongoing or impending military operations 
     against Iraq under section 4(a); and
       (2) the Congress does not enact into law, before the 
     extension of the authorization, a joint resolution 
     disapproving the extension of the authorization for the 
     additional 12-month period.
       (b) Congressional Review Procedures.--
       (1) In General.--For purposes of subsection (a)(2), a joint 
     resolution described in paragraph (2) shall be considered in 
     the Senate and the House of Representatives in accordance 
     with the procedures applicable to joint resolutions under 
     paragraphs (3) through (8) of section 8066(c) of the 
     Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985 (as contained 
     in Public Law 98-473; 98 Stat. 1936-1937), except that--
       (A) references in those provisions to the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives shall be 
     deemed to be references to the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives; and
       (B) references in those provisions to the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate shall be deemed to be references 
     to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
       (2) Joint resolution defined.--For purposes of paragraph 
     (1), the term ``joint resolution'' means only a joint 
     resolution introduced after the date on which the 
     certification of the President under subsection (a)(1) is 
     received by Congress, the matter after the resolving clause 
     of which is as follows: ``That, pursuant to section 5 of the 
     Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq, the 
     Congress disapproves the extension of the authorization under 
     section 4(a) of that joint resolution for the additional 12-
     month period specified in the certification of the President 
     to the Congress dated __.'', with the blank filled in with 
     the appropriate date.

  Mr. McCAIN. And the time is running; is that correct?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. There are 20 minutes overall--15 
minutes to the sponsor of the amendment and 5 minutes in opposition. If 
nobody yields time, time will be deducted proportionately.
  The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, does the distinguished Senator from Arizona 
wish to use any time at this point?
  Mr. McCAIN. No.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how much time do I have?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Fifteen minutes.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how much time does the distinguished Senator 
from Massachusetts wish?
  Mr. KENNEDY. Four and a half minutes.
  Mr. BYRD. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, for the past few days we have debated the 
details of a resolution but not the implication of war with Iraq. We 
were into the debate on the resolutions for 2 days, and then a cloture 
motion was filed. I am reminded of the excellent statements made by my 
friend from West Virginia that this subject about war and peace 
deserves a longer period of time for discussion.
  Earlier in the session, we debated for 21 days the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act; 23 days on the energy bill; 19 days on trade 
promotion; 18 days on the farm bill--all extremely important, but this 
issue is far more so.
  In facing the global challenges of these times, we defend American 
values and interests best when war is our last resort, not our first 
impulse. I commend President Bush for deciding in the end to take 
America's case to the United Nations. Make no mistake about it, this 
resolution lets the President go it alone. Iraq should have no doubt of 
the unity of the American purpose and the seriousness of our intent. 
Having suffered the tragedy of September 11, we will leave no stone 
unturned in the defense of innocent Americans.
  The question is not whether we will disarm Saddam Hussein of his 
weapons of mass destruction but how. And it is wrong for Congress to 
declare war against Iraq now before we have exhausted the alternatives. 
It is wrong for the President to demand a declaration of war from 
Congress when he says he has not decided whether to go to war. It is 
wrong to avert our attention now from the greater and far more 
immediate threat of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida terrorism.
  Pick up the paper and see the different headlines: ``Attacks Put 
Troops on Alert''; ``They fear contact with al-Qaida''; ``Tape, 
Assaults Stir Worry About Resurgent Al Qaeda''; and the list goes on 
about the al-Qaida activities all over the world.

  We cannot go it alone on Iraq and expect our allies to support us.
  We cannot go it alone and expect the world to stand with us in the 
urgent and ongoing war against terrorism and al-Qaida.
  We cannot go it alone in attacking Iraq and expect Saddam to keep his 
weapons of mass destruction at bay against us or our ally Israel.
  We cannot go it alone while urging unprincipled regimes to resist 
invasions of their adversaries.
  The better course for our Nation and for our goal of disarming Saddam 
Hussein is a two-step policy. We should approve a strong resolution 
today calling on the United Nations to require Iraq to submit to 
unfettered U.N. weapons inspections or face U.N.-backed international 
force. If such option fails, and Saddam refuses to cooperate, the 
President could then come to the Congress and request Congress to 
provide him with authorization to wage war against Iraq.
  By pursuing this course, we maximize the chance that the world can 
disarm Saddam without our going to war or, if war was necessary, we 
would be joined by allied troops in the cause. In the end, having tried 
these options and failed, our allies are far more likely to support our 
intervention should we elect to attack alone.
  The world looks to America not just because of our superior might or 
economic weight; they admire us and emulate us because we are a friend 
and ally that defends freedom and promotes our values around the globe. 
Those same traits that are the envy of the world should guide us today 
as we conclude this important debate.
  I thank the Senator from West Virginia, and I yield back to him the 
remainder of my time.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. How much time do I 
have?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator has 11 minutes.
  Mr. BYRD. I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I understand we have 5 minutes. I yield 
that 5 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut however he chooses to 
use it.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I thank my colleague 
from Arizona.
  The amendment of the Senator from West Virginia which is before us 
would terminate, 12 months after the date of enactment of the 
underlying joint resolution, the authorization given in that 
resolution. In other words, it would put a time limit of a year subject 
to extension, but, nonetheless, a time limit for a year on the 
authorization provided in the underlying resolution.
  I say to my colleagues respectfully, this amendment is unprecedented 
and unwise. It is unprecedented in the sense that in brief research 
overnight, I have not been able to find an occasion in which Congress 
has exercised authority with regard to military action under article I 
of the Constitution when Congress has attached a time limit to it.
  There was one occasion when time limits were discussed with regard to 
the deployment of American forces in Bosnia, the Balkans, during the 
nineties, but I think we saw there why congressional imposition of time 
limits on authorization of military action is unwise.
  Why is it unwise? It is unwise because it gives notice to our enemies 
that there is a limit to the authority we are giving the President as 
Commander in Chief of our military forces.

[[Page S10235]]

It allows them to calculate their actions based on that limited 
duration.
  In Bosnia, when that deadline was articulated by the administration, 
it created expectations which were quite naturally frustrated and 
therein created a credibility gap.
  There is a deadline in the underlying resolution, and the deadline is 
what it ought to be and always has been for military actions in which 
the Armed Forces of the United States have been involved. The 
authorization ends when the mission is accomplished, and in this case 
the authorization would end when the two missions stated were 
accomplished: When the President as Commander in Chief concluded that 
America was adequately protected, our national security was adequately 
protected from threats from Iraq, and that the relevant United Nations 
resolutions were adequately being enforced. That is the deadline.
  If the mood of Congress should change, if the attitude of the public 
should change, Congress always reserves, as it has shown in the past, 
the power of the purse and the power to change its opinion. But this 
amendment at this time, as we try to gather our strength and unity of 
purpose to convince the international community to join with us, as 
they surely will, is to finally get Saddam Hussein to keep his promise 
to disarm at the end of the gulf war.
  We need no limitations on authority. We need to speak with a clear 
voice. As it says in the Bible, if the sound of the trumpet be 
uncertain, who shall follow? And if we put a 12-month time limit on the 
authority of the underlying resolution, I fear that fewer will follow 
and the result will be much less than we want it to be.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I oppose the amendment offered by the 
Senator from West Virginia, which would sunset the authority Congress 
would grant to the President in this resolution to defend American 
security against the threat posed by Iraq.
  As the Senator has pointed out, the 12-month limit on congressional 
authorization for the use of force his amendment would set could be 
extended by presidential or congressional action. However, these 
requirements are onerous and infringe upon the authority of the 
Commander in Chief to meet his obligations to protect American 
security.
  The concept of imposing a deadline after which the President loses 
his authority to achieve the goals set out in the Iraq resolution 
strikes me as losing sight of the objective of a congressional 
authorization of the use of force: ending the threat to the United 
States and the world posed by Saddam Hussein's regime, so long as it 
possesses weapons of mass destruction and defies its obligations to the 
world.
  So long as that threat persists, and with Congress and the President 
having agreed that Saddam Hussein's regime endangers America, 
congressional authority for the President to use force must remain in 
force until he has met our common objective of disarming Saddam 
Hussein.
  To place a limit on the amount of time the President possesses this 
authority, once Congress has granted it to him, would only encourage 
Saddam Hussein to stall and temporize on his commitments, knowing that 
the clock is working in his favor. Such an incentive would make us less 
secure, not more secure.
  If the vast majority of Members of Congress and the American people 
agree upon the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and if we accept 
that the President will confront this danger within the parameters we 
have laid out in this congressional resolution, what about that threat 
would change in 12 months, assuming we have not acted against it by 
that time, that would somehow negate the President's need for the 
authority to meet it?
  If anything, the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime will only 
grow with time. Private and public estimates are that Saddam Hussein 
could possess nuclear weapons within six months to a year were he to 
acquire weapons-grade plutonium on the international market.
  That's why the President has requested the authority to act now. 
Saddam Hussein represents a grave and gathering danger. I hope he is no 
longer in power 1 year from now. But there is certainly a chance he 
could be.
  Congress cannot foresee the entire course of this conflict. Acting 
now to deprive the President 12 months from now of the authority we 
would grant him in this resolution would be an infringement on the 
authority of the Commander in Chief and a strange way to respond to the 
grave threat to American national security posed by Saddam Hussein's 
regime.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Who yields time?
  Mr. BYRD. I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senator from Connecticut is right that 
article 1 of the Constitution does not provide for this, but article 1 
of the Constitution also does not provide for a declaration of war 
before the President is asked to go to war. So this is a very different 
circumstance. The President has not asked us to go to war. He has said 
he wants the power to be able to go to war. It seems completely 
consistent with that request that we say: Yes, Mr. President, you have 
that power to go to war; you can do that within 1 year. If, in fact, 
you go to war in 1 year, you can extend that 1 year.
  Let me put it this way. If we are 2 years down the road still fooling 
around with Iraq, then my friends from Connecticut and other places 
have been so dead wrong about what we are supposed to do that it would 
be amazing.
  I point out that this is nothing like Bosnia and nothing like the 
Balkans. In that case, we were in the Balkans. There were forces there, 
and there were people on the floor who were attempting to put a time on 
how long they could stay after we had gone in, after we had already 
prevailed, after we were in place.
  The third point I make in the 2 minutes I have is, we learned from 
Vietnam the power of the purse is useless. The power of the purse is 
useless because it presents us with a Hobson's choice. We have our 
fighting men and women in place and we are told, by the way, the 
President will not take them home so let's cut off the support for them 
so they have no guns, no bullets, no ability to fight a war. And no one 
is willing to do that. This is a prudent way to do this, totally 
consistent with what the President is asking. I think it makes absolute 
eminent sense. I congratulate the Senator. Even though I disagree with 
him on his underlying notion, I do think he is right on this point and 
I support him.
  Mr. BYRD. How much time do I have remaining?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator has 9 minutes 20 
seconds.
  Mr. BYRD. I ask to be notified when I have 2 minutes left.
  Mr. President, 38 years ago I, Robert C. Byrd, voted on the Tonkin 
Gulf Resolution--the resolution that authorized the President to use 
military force to ``repel armed attacks'' and ``to prevent further 
Communist aggression'' in Southeast Asia.
  It was this resolution that provided the basis for American 
involvement in the war in Vietnam.
  It was the resolution that lead to the longest war in American 
history.
  It led to the deaths of 58,000 Americans, and 150,000 Americans being 
wounded in action.
  It led to massive protests, a deeply divided country, and the deaths 
of more Americans at Kent State.
  It was a war that destroyed the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson and 
wrecked the administration of Richard Nixon.
  After all that carnage, we began to learn that, in voting for the 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, we were basing our votes on bad information. We 
learned that the claims the administration made on the need for the 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution were simply not true, and history is repeating 
itself.
  We tragically and belatedly learned that we had not taken enough time 
to consider the resolution. We had not asked the right questions, nor 
enough questions. We learned that we should have been demanding more 
hard evidence from the administration rather than accepting the 
administration at its word.
  But it was too late.
  For all those spouting jingoes about going to war with Iraq, about 
the urgent need for regime change no matter what the cost, about the 
need to take out the evil dictator--and make no mistakes, I know and 
understand that

[[Page S10236]]

Saddam Hussein is an evil dictator--I urge Senators to go down on The 
Capital Mall and look at the Vietnam memorial. Nearly every day you 
will find someone at that wall weeping for a loved one, a father, a 
son, a brother, a friend, whose name is on that wall.
  If we are fortunate, a war with Iraq will be a short one with few 
American deaths, as in the Persian Gulf war, and we can go around again 
waving flags and singing patriotic songs.
  Or, maybe we will find ourselves building another wall on the mall.
  I will always remember the words of Senator Wayne Morse, one of the 
two Senators who opposed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. During the debate 
on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, he stated: ``The resolution will pass, 
and Senators who vote for it will live to regret it.''
  Many Senators did live to regret it.
  The Tonkin Gulf Resolution contained a sunset provision to end 
military action. S.J. Res. 46 will allow the President to continue war 
for as long as he wants, against anyone he wants as long he feels it 
will help eliminate the threat posed by Iraq.
  With the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Congress could ``terminate'' 
military action. With S.J. Res. 46 , only the President can terminate 
military action.
  I should point out that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and S.J. Res. 46 
do have several things in common. Congress is again being asked to vote 
on the use of force without hard evidence that the country poses an 
immediate threat to the national security of the United States. We are 
being asked to vote on a resolution authorizing the use of force in a 
hyped up, politically charged atmosphere in an election year. Congress 
is again being rushed into a judgment.
  This is why I stand here today, before this Chamber, and before this 
Nation, urging, pleading for some sanity, for more time to consider 
this resolution, for more hard evidence on the need for this 
resolution.
  Before we put this great Nation on the track to war, I want to see 
more evidence, hard evidence, not more Presidential rhetoric. In 
support of this resolution, several people have pointed out that 
President Kennedy acted unilaterally in the Cuban missile crisis. That 
is true. I remember that. I was here. I also remember President Kennedy 
going on national television and showing proof of the threat we faced. 
I remember him sending our UN ambassador, Adlai Stevenson, to the 
United Nations, to provide proof to the world that there was a threat 
to the national security of the United States.

  All we get from this administration is rhetoric. In fact, in an 
address to our NATO colleagues, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, 
according to the Chicago Tribune, urged our allies to resist the idea 
for the need of absolute proof about terrorists intent before they took 
action.
  Before we unleash what Thomas Jefferson called the ``dogs of war,'' I 
want to know, have we exhausted every avenue of peace? My favorite book 
does not say, blessed are the war makers. It says: ``Blessed are the 
peacemakers.'' Have we truly pursued peace?
  If the need for taking military action against Iraq is so obvious and 
so needed and so urgent, then why are nearly every one of our allies 
opposed to it? Why is the President on the phone nearly every day 
trying to convince our allies to join us?
  So many people, so many nations in the Arab world already hate and 
fear us. Why do we want them to hate and fear us even more?
  People are correct to point out that September 11 changed everything. 
We need to be more careful. We need to build up our intelligence 
efforts and our homeland security. But do we go around pounding 
everybody, anybody, who might pose a threat to our security? If we 
clobber Iraq today, do we clobber Iran tomorrow?
  When do we attack China? When do we attack North Korea? When do we 
attack Syria?
  Unless I can be shown proof that these distant nations do pose an 
immediate, serious threat to the national interests and security of the 
United States, I think we should finish our war on terrorism. I think 
we should destroy those who destroyed the Trade Towers and attacked the 
Pentagon. I think we should get thug No. 1 before we worry about thug 
No. 2.
  Yes, September 11 changed many aspects of our lives, but people still 
bleed. America's mothers will still weep for their sons and their 
daughters who will not come home.
  September 11 should have made us more aware of the pain that comes 
from being attacked. We, more than ever, are aware of the damage, the 
deaths, and the suffering that comes from violent attacks.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator has 2 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair.
  This is what we are about to do to other countries. We are about to 
inflict this horrible suffering upon other people.
  Of course, we do not talk about this. We talk about taking out Saddam 
Hussein. We are talking about taking out Iraq, about ``regime change.''
  I do not want history to remember my country as being on the side of 
evil.
  During the Civil War, a minister expressed his hope to President 
Lincoln that the Lord was on the side of the North. The Great 
Emancipator reportedly rebuked the minister stating:

       It is my constant anxiety and prayer that I and this nation 
     are on the Lord's side.

  Before I vote for this resolution for war, a war in which thousands, 
perhaps tens of thousands or hundred of thousands of people may die, I 
want to make sure that I and this Nation are on God's side.
  I want more time. I want more evidence. I want to know that I am 
right, that our Nation is right, and not just powerful.
  And I want the language that is in this amendment so that Congress 
can oversee this power grab and act to terminate it at some point in 
time--giving the President the opportunity to extend the time but let's 
keep Congress in the act.
  Senators, vote for this amendment. I plead with you.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am opposed to the Byrd amendment, for 
this is a resolution to deter war.
  The amendment proposed by Senator Byrd would insert into the joint 
resolution, language which would state that nothing in that joint 
resolution: is intended to alter the constitutional authorities of the 
Congress to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, or other 
authorities invested in Congress by Article I, Section 8, of the 
Constitution; or shall be construed as granting any authority to the 
President to use the U.S. Armed Forces for any purpose not directly 
related to a clear threat of imminent, sudden, and direct attack upon 
the U.S. or its armed forces unless the Congress otherwise authorizes.
  The amendment of the Senator from West Virginia attempts to do 
something that the Framers of the Constitution did not attempt--to 
define, with particularity, the extent of the President's powers as 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Specifically, it would limit 
the authority of the President to use Armed Forces to a narrowly 
defined set of circumstance--``a clear threat of imminent, sudden and 
direct attack upon the United States or its Armed Forces.'' Even when 
the United States enjoyed genuine geographic and political isolation 
from the Old World, such a limitation could not be maintained. Within a 
decade of the ratification of the Constitution, the United States 
engaged in an undeclared naval war with France. Shortly thereafter, we 
engaged in undeclared war with the Barbary States of North Africa, who 
had engaged in piratical depredations against American shipping.
  In 1861, President Lincoln, faced with an unprecedented situation, 
imposed a blockade--an act of war normally employed against a foreign 
enemy--upon the Southern Confederacy. He did this without congressional 
authorization. The Supreme Court later upheld this action in the famous 
Prize Cases, stating that the President had a constitutional duty to 
meet the insurrection as he found it; the determination that a state of 
war existed was for him to make.
  This is not a Republican or Democratic issue. Since 1945, Presidents 
of both parties have repeatedly committed American troops abroad 
without formal congressional approval. Whether in Korea, Grenada, 
Panama,

[[Page S10237]]

Kosovo, or numerous other areas of the world, our Presidents have used 
their powers as Commander in Chief to protect the Nation and American 
interests whenever they, in their considered judgment, thought it best 
to do so. The Clinton administration, which committed American troops 
to military operations abroad on an unprecedented scale in situations 
not involving imminent danger of attack to the United States, did not 
request formal congressional approval for any of those oeprations--
believing that the President possessed the constitutional authority to 
do so. Indeed, the Secretary of State in 1998 publicly stated that the 
1991 congressional resolution authorizing the use of force against 
Iraq, together with existing Security Council resolutions, constituted 
sufficient authority for the use of force against Iraq.
  On September 11th of last year the American people awoke to the 
realization that they were in imminent danger, had been for some time, 
and this danger gives no warning. It is a different type of danger, but 
no less real and no less threatening to the Nation than more 
traditional ones. As the President reminded us in his speech to the 
Nation on Monday evening:

       Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological 
     or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual 
     terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could allow the Iraqi 
     regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints . . 
     . confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning 
     the war on terror.

  On the Today Show this week, Richard Butler, former head of UNSCOM, 
was asked how easy it would be for the Iraqis to arm a terrorist group 
or an individual terrorist with weapons of mass destruction. His 
response was ``Extremely easy. If they decided to do it, piece of 
cake!''
  They may already have done it. The danger is clear, present, and 
imminent. We must grant the President the authority to use armed force 
to protect the Nation, and the flexibility to employ that force as 
seems best to him. Our enemies are cunning and flexible; we cannot 
defeat them with anything less.
  The Byrd amendment regarding preservation of Congress's 
constitutional authorities is unnecessary. The portion of the amendment 
that would limit the authority of the President to wage war is, 
arguably unconstitutional. The Congress can declare war, but it cannot 
dictate to the President how to wage war. No law passed by Congress 
could alter the constitutional separation of powers.
  I urge my colleagues to defeat this amendment.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I yield the remaining time on our side 
to my friend from Arizona.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Connecticut for 
his thoughtful statement. I want to say in the few remaining seconds 
that to view the cause of the tragedy of the Vietnam war as being the 
Tonkin Gulf resolution is a somewhat, in my view, simplistic view.
  There were a lot of factors that entered into the beginning and the 
continuation of the Vietnam war. The Tonkin Gulf resolution was simply 
window dressing. At any time the Congress of the United States could 
have reversed that resolution and chose not to.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time in opposition has expired.
  The sponsor has 37 seconds.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, this is a Tonkin Gulf resolution all over 
again. Let us stop, look, and listen. Let us not give this President, 
or any President, unchecked power. Remember the Constitution. Remember 
the Constitution.
  Mr. President, I yield back my time.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. They have not.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to Byrd amendment No. 4869, as modified.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas (Mrs. Lincoln) 
and the Senator from Maryland (Ms. Mikulski), are necessarily absent.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. 
Helms) is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Miller). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 31, nays 66, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 232 Leg.]

                                YEAS--31

     Akaka
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Chafee
     Clinton
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Dayton
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Harkin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Leahy
     Levin
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Stabenow
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--66

     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Campbell
     Carnahan
     Carper
     Cleland
     Cochran
     Collins
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Domenici
     Edwards
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Johnson
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Voinovich
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Helms
     Lincoln
     Mikulski
  The amendment (No. 4869), as modified, was rejected.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be 45 
minutes prior to the cloture vote on amendment No. 4856, as modified. 
Under the previous order, the first 15 minutes shall be under the 
control of the Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd, the second 15 
minutes shall be under the control of the Republican leader, and the 
third 15 minutes shall be under the control of the majority leader.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes of my 15 minutes to the 
distinguish Senator from Pennsylvania, Mr. Specter.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank the distinguished President pro tempore and the 
Chair.
  Mr. President, I have sought this time to register my very strong 
objection to cloture on this resolution authorizing the use of force, 
which is the equivalent of a declaration of war. In my 22 years in the 
Senate, the only issue which has been of equal importance was the 
authorization for the use of force in 1991. The motion to invoke 
cloture, which is to cut off debate, is supposed to be done when there 
is a filibuster. However, there is no filibuster present on this issue.
  I came to the floor yesterday in an effort to participate in a 
colloquy with Senator Lieberman, the lead proponent of the bill, and 
found that all the time was allotted and all the time was taken. When 
no one appeared, we had about 3 minutes to discuss an issue which 
really required 30 minutes or an hour. I then sought time later in the 
afternoon, and all the time was taken. I then sought time this morning 
and find that the only time which is available is some time after 5 
p.m. this afternoon.
  It is customary in the Senate to see two lights on for a quorum call, 
but there have been very few quorum calls on this resolution--really 
none--except when Senators are on their way to the floor or when there 
are discussions. So there has certainly not been any effort to 
filibuster. Those who sought time to come over and discuss important 
issues have found that there is no time to do so.
  We now have a series of amendments lined up with time allocations 
which are very brief. To discuss the cloture resolution itself in 45 
minutes is very limited. To discuss the amendments which are pending is 
very difficult.

[[Page S10238]]

There is in the bill a change from the 1991 resolution which has an 
objective test for the President to use force to carry out U.N. 
resolutions, whereas in the current resolution, it is subjective as the 
President sees fit. That is a matter of great moment which has not been 
debated in the Senate.

  The resolution has numerous whereas clauses so that one can read the 
resolution to justify the use of force if the Iraqi Government 
continues to abuse its citizens. I would not want to say the Iraqi 
Government has not abused its citizens, but I do not believe anyone is 
seriously contending that is the basis for the President to take the 
United States to war. To stop Saddam Hussein from having weapons of 
mass destruction which pose a threat to the United States, is a reason.
  Then there is the issue of regime change, which is in the whereas 
clause. The resolution contains a provision for U.S. national security 
interests. I posed questions to the Senator from Connecticut yesterday 
as to whether regime change was comprehended in our national security 
interest. That has yet to be answered.
  The point I am making is that this is a matter which requires 
discussion and analysis. I do not believe it helps the President of the 
United States to have the Senate rush to judgment. It is not quite a 
blank check. It is not quite a knee-jerk reaction, but it is not the 
kind of deliberation that ought to characterize the work of this body. 
It would be unfortunate if the Senate votes for a resolution 
authorizing the use of force notwithstanding the questions which I have 
raised, although I said on the floor before that I may well support the 
President. However, if we do so in a context of deliberation and 
thoughtfulness when people like Senator Lieberman, Senator McCain, 
Senator Warner, Senator Biden, Senator Jeffords, and other Members, put 
our imprimatur on it, it has some significance in the international 
arena, providing it is debated, and providing there is some lucid 
discussion on all of the issues we are confronting.
  I noted in the ``Philadelphia Inquirer'' this week the comment of a 
House member: The President has handcuffed us. I am voting yes on this 
resolution because I think ultimately the box the President has put us 
in has forced us to vote in the interests of national security.
  I do not think we ought to vote for this resolution because we are 
being handcuffed. I do not think anyone anywhere ought to vote for a 
resolution for being handcuffed or for being put in a box.
  These are matters which require a lot of analysis and a lot of 
debate. The cloture motion will cut off nongermane amendments. That is 
a very tight restriction. Other amendments ought to be offered which 
are very important to the discussion on this critical matter. I thank 
the Senator from West Virginia, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator for a very 
courageous statement.
  The Polycraticus of John of Salisbury, completed in 1159, says that 
Nero, the sixth in line from Julius, having heard the Senate had 
condemned him to death, begged that someone would give him courage to 
die by dying with him as an example. When he perceived the horseman 
drawing near, he upbraided his own cowardice by saying: ``I die 
shamefully.'' So saying, he drove the steel into his own throat and 
thus, says John of Salisbury, came to an end the whole House of the 
Caesars.
  Mr. President, here in this pernicious resolution on which the Senate 
will vote soon, we find the dagger that is being held at the throat of 
the Senate of the United States. I say to my friends, we ought to pause 
and wonder if Captain John Parker and his minutemen fought on the green 
of Lexington for this piece of rag, this so-called resolution. When 
Parker lost 8 or 10 of his men with that first shot, is this what they 
died for, this resolution? Is that what they died for?
  How about John Paul Jones, when he was fighting the Serapis. He was 
the captain of the Bon Homme Richard when he said, I have not yet begun 
to fight. What he was fighting for? Was he fighting for this piece of 
cowardice here in this resolution that gives to the President--lock, 
stock and barrel--the authority to use the military forces of this 
country however he will, whenever he will, and wherever he will, and 
for as long as he will?
  We are handing this over to the President of the United States. When 
we do that, we can put a sign on the top of this Capitol, and we can 
say: ``Gone home.'' ``Gone fishing.'' ``Out of business.''
  I don't believe our forebears died for that kind of a piece of paper. 
How about Nathan Hale? He, too, was from Connecticut, may I say to the 
chief sponsor of this resolution. Nathan Hale volunteered to go into 
the British lines when he was called upon to do so by George 
Washington. He volunteered. He went behind the British lines to draw 
the gun emplacements, the breastwork of the British. And on the night 
of September 21, 1776, he was prepared to return to his own lines. He 
had on his person the pictures that he had drawn, the notes he had 
made, and he was discovered as a spy on the night of September 21, 
1776. Nathan Hale.
  The next morning he was hauled up before a wooden coffin in which he 
knew that his body would soon lie and grow cold. And the captain of the 
British, Captain Cunningham, said to Nathan Hale: Do you have anything 
that you would like to say? He had already been refused a Bible. He was 
asked, did he have anything further.
  He said: I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my 
country.
  Nathan Hale gave his own life, one life. It was all he had. Can we 
give one vote for our country today? Each of us took an oath under this 
Constitution. You took it in the chair, Mr. President. Mr. Senator from 
Virginia, you took it. This is the Constitution that James Madison from 
the State of Virginia helped to write; that George Washington helped to 
write. We take an oath to support and defend that Constitution. Are we 
defending it here today? Are we defending the role of the Senate as set 
forth in this Constitution which says Congress shall declare war?
  Here we are about to hand off that role, that responsibility, to a 
President of the United States without limitation. He can go on and on. 
We are out of it. Once we pass this resolution and it is signed by the 
President, Senators are out of it. You can complain, but it won't help.

  I say that we are denying the American people their right to be 
heard. Here we are being shut off on a cloture vote. I know the rules 
of the Senate. I have used the cloture vote myself. But in a situation 
such as this, I have pleaded for time, more time. I have been turned 
down.
  The American people out there are going to render a judgment. They 
are going to render a judgment on every Senator in this body before it 
is over. I pray to God that if we go to war with Iraq, we will be 
lucky. I pray to God we will be lucky.
  Nobody will support this country in war any more strongly than will 
I. But here today we are being tested. I didn't swear to support and 
defend the President of the United States when I came here. I pledged 
on the Bible up there on the desk to support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States, so help me God. That was no light 
prayer. That was no light oath.
  I think we ought to look inside of ourselves. Look at our children 
and grandchildren. Look in the mirror and see if you can say: Old 
buddy, I voted for what I thought was right. I voted with the 
Constitution.
  They say: Well, support our Commander in Chief. He is Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Navy and the militia when called into service. He 
is not Commander in Chief of industry. He is not Commander in Chief of 
the Senate of the United States. So where are the Nathan Hales today 
who would give their life, their own life for their country? Give one 
vote for this Constitution. After all, if it were not for this 
Constitution, I wouldn't be here. You would not be here. You would not 
be here. You would not be here. None of us would be here. But because 
of this Constitution, we are here today.
  The people want us to ask questions. They want us to take a stand. 
They want us to take a stand against this stampede. Where are Senators 
today? Where are the backbones that stand up for the people? How many 
mothers, how many fathers will see their sons and their daughters die 
possibly in a war in a foreign land?

[[Page S10239]]

  I say, my friends, I am sorry to see this day. This is my 50th year 
in Congress. I never would have thought I would find a Senate which 
would lack the backbone to stand up against the stampede, this rush to 
war, this rush to give to the President of the United States, whatever 
President he is, whatever party, this rush to give a President, to put 
it in his hands alone, to let him determine alone when he will send the 
sons and daughters of the American people into war, let him have 
control of the military forces. He will not only make war, but he will 
declare war.
  That flies in the face of this Constitution. This Constitution does 
not give to a President of the United States the right to determine 
when, where, how, and for how long he will use the military forces of 
the United States.
  I plead to Senators in the name of this Constitution: We need people 
who will stand up for the American people. We need Senators who will 
take a stand. I hope Senators will take what I am saying in the best of 
spirit. I think we are making one horrible mistake.
  Remember: I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my 
country. Nathan Hale.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the next 15 minutes 
will be controlled by the Republican Party.
  The Republican leader is recognized.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I believe under the agreement, I have 15 
minutes of this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. LOTT. I will use approximately 5 minutes of the time and yield 
the remainder of my time to Senator Warner.
  I would like to begin by saying how much I appreciate the work that 
has been done here in handling this legislation, having a full debate. 
Senator Warner has been here joining in the discussion, Senator Reid, 
Senator McCain. There has been a serious effort to make sure we had an 
orderly process where Senators could make their feelings known. There 
has been thoughtful discussion on both sides of the issue, and there 
might have been one or two quorum calls the whole time because Senators 
have known, when you come to the floor, this will be your opportunity 
to speak on this issue.
  And there will be more time today. As I look at the schedule that was 
lined up through the diligent efforts of Senator Warner, Senator 
McCain, and Senator Reid, we are going to have votes on amendments--
even amendments that would not be germaine postcloture. There has been 
a real effort to make sure Senator Byrd and Senators Levin, Durbin, 
Boxer, and others have an opportunity to offer amendments and make 
their case. We will have five votes between now and approximately 4 
o'clock this afternoon.
  Mr. President, I remember the discussion back in 1991 on the Persian 
Gulf resolution. I think we had about 2 days of debate previously, and 
2 \1/2\ days when we actually took up the debate--when it passed. It 
was a very important debate. I thought it was an occasion when the 
Senate proved it is the world's greatest deliberative body. It was very 
serious. Every Senator spoke, we had the vote, and it passed. I thought 
it was one of the high-water marks since I have served in the Senate. 
It was only 2 \1/2\ days and every Senator got a chance to speak.
  In 1998, at the request of President Clinton, I moved aggressively, 
in a bipartisan way, to pass the Iraqi Liberation Act. As I recall, at 
that time, Senator Kyl worked with me on that issue, Senator Warner was 
involved, as were Senators Kerry and Lieberman, and we passed that 
resolution, which also called for a regime change unanimously, with 
very short debate--as I recall, maybe even a half day, or a day at the 
most. But it was important debate and an important vote.
  So when we have been called on by Presidents of both parties to 
address this very serious issue in this very serious area of the world, 
we have handled it in the right way. I think that is the case here. 
Senators were told in my conference, and I know Senator Daschle told 
his side's conference, you will be able to speak on Friday and, again, 
on Monday. We will stay as long as you need. We had all day yesterday. 
A great effort was made to make sure Senators had a chance to speak. 
Now Senators have a chance to offer amendments and speak on them. After 
the vote between 3 and 4 o'clock, there will be more time because 
Senators do feel strongly about this and want an opportunity to be 
heard. They are going to have that opportunity.
  I believe this issue has been aired fully. It is not new. We have 
been worrying about this, talking about this, and debating the 
seriousness of the threat from Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass 
destruction for years--really, for 11 years. There is new information 
that is available. We have had our classified briefings. I have made 
sure Senators on our side--and I know the administration has made sure 
Senators on both sides of the aisle--have had a chance to get briefings 
at multiple opportunities. So Senators know what the issue is. We have 
seen, yesterday, Senators from both parties moving toward giving the 
President the authority to do this job.
  I hope we can get inspectors in there, that they can find the weapons 
of mass destruction, and they are destroyed. But I don't trust Saddam 
Hussein. His record is clear. I think, once again, he will resist, he 
will agree, he will dissemble. In the end, he will try to block this. 
You can always hope and pray we will find a solution here.
  The President of the United States has listened to the American 
people, to the Congress, to the U.N, and our allies. The President came 
to the Congress and said, yes, I want your input. He sent up some 
suggested language on this resolution, and it was changed once and then 
twice; significant changes were made at the recommendation of Senators 
on both sides of the aisle. So he has worked with us in this effort. He 
encouraged our involvement and our debate. He has gone to the U.N. and 
called on them to stand up to their commitment and do their job, and 
quit passing resolutions that are not backed or demanded to be complied 
with, with force if necessary. He did the job. He and his 
administration, including the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, have 
worked with allies at the U.N. and with our allies around the world. 
This President has made it clear he is not going to act precipitously, 
but he is prepared to act.

  This President has led with commitment and has shown leadership. He 
is prepared to try to find a peaceful solution here. But unless we make 
it clear he is committed, we are committed, and the U.N. is committed, 
this problem will not go away. It is serious and it is imminent. It 
takes but one person with a small container to bring very dangerous 
weapons of mass destruction into this country.
  Some people say, why now? Well, because the threat is not going to 
lessen. It has been 4 years since we passed the Iraqi Liberation Act in 
1998. I suspect matters have gotten much worse. Besides that, the U.N. 
is going to be leaving soon for the year and won't be back until next 
August. We want to see action from the U.N. We need to act to show our 
commitment, and we need to show our determination to get them to act in 
a way that has real force.
  I think we have had a full debate and we will have more debate. To 
try to delay it another day, another week, is not going to be helpful. 
We need to stand up now, show we mean what we say, and we are going to 
get the results and, by doing that, perhaps something can be worked out 
without the use of force. But this President has asked for this. This 
Senate is committed to this. I believe the vote will be overwhelming.
  I urge my colleagues to vote for cloture. There will be times for 
postcloture debate. We have bent over backward to make sure everybody 
had an opportunity and will still have an opportunity to speak and even 
offer amendments.
  With that, I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from 
Virginia, who has done a magnificent job in fairly managing this 
legislation.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the leader. I appreciate very much the calm tone 
with which he addresses this issue of a rush to judgment. Regrettably, 
our colleague from Pennsylvania used those terms. I was reminded of 
being here last Friday afternoon for 5 \1/2\ hours. What a memorable 
opportunity it was with my distinguished colleague from West Virginia. 
Senator Kennedy and Senator Dodd joined in. I think we went about a 
very constructive debate

[[Page S10240]]

and exchanged our views. Senator Byrd and I debated again on Monday, 
Tuesday, and Wednesday. Here we are on the fifth day.
  Mr. President, this is not a rush to judgment. This is the Senate 
working diligently. Most of us were here close to 11 o'clock last 
night. In parallel, as the distinguished leader said--I remember it so 
well--the period of January 10 through 12, when a resolution, again 
drawn up by my colleague from Connecticut, the principal sponsor this 
time, at that time I was the principal sponsor. It was carefully 
debated. The Senate is doing its job and doing it well. We have had a 
very good debate and we will complete that debate here today, tomorrow, 
or whatever the case may be.
  I wish to draw the attention of the Senate to the last vote--a very 
strong vote, not against our colleague from West Virginia. But I 
thought, as he mentioned the Gulf of Tonkin, how appropriate it was 
that in the leader's chair, Senator McCain, my partner who is working 
diligently with me on this side, spoke very softly of his experience. I 
don't know of anyone in this Chamber more qualified than he to speak to 
that period, and the relevance of that resolution. I was Secretary of 
the Navy for 5 years, and Under Secretary during that period of time, 
and we remember well that period.
  I wish to talk about the President of the United States. As I look 
upon this situation and listen to the debate, I think we are of a mind, 
all 100 of us, of the seriousness of these weapons of mass destruction. 
We may have a difference of conscience as to the level of threat posed 
perhaps today, tomorrow, in the future, but it is there. This is no 
question.
  I stop to think that the United Nations has done nothing for 4 years. 
They have not sought to enforce the resolutions, 16 in number. It has 
been this President, President George Bush, who has taken the 
initiative to go not only to the American people, but to the whole 
world, and very carefully and methodically tell the world we should be 
on alert; we cannot do nothing. We should join as a community of 
nations to address it. He said that at the United Nations very 
brilliantly. I think everyone in this body respects him.
  As we are debating today, another debate is taking place in the U.N. 
To the extent this resolution remains strong as it is now is the extent 
to which we can expect an equal and perhaps even stronger statement of 
resolve by the United Nations to fulfill its mandate, to fulfill its 
charter.
  The League of Nations failed to act at a critical time in the history 
of this Nation, and it went into the dustbin of history. The United 
Nations will not go into the dustbin of history. I am confident that 
this time they will stand up, that they will devise a 17th resolution.
  I look upon the action by the Senate today in voting a strong 
bipartisan vote for this resolution as not an act of war. It is an act 
to deter war, to put in place the tools for our President and our 
Secretary of State to get the strongest possible resolution in the 
United Nations. It is an act seen to force, I repeat, the last option 
as our President has said ever so clearly time and again. It is an act 
to deter war to make the last option the use of force.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes of my time to the 
Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank the majority leader for his 
gracious yielding of time. I thank him for more than that. I thank him 
for his leadership in this matter of how the Senate should proceed with 
regard to Iraq, and I thank him specifically for the work that he and 
his staff did in negotiations with the White House and with Members of 
the House to get this resolution to where it is where I am confident it 
can and will enjoy broad bipartisan support.
  There will be time for debate later in the day about the relevance of 
this resolution, about the extent to which I am confident it is clearly 
within our constitutional authority under article I. I have comparisons 
to other declarations of war and authorizations of military action, 
that is, if anything, more specific than most.
  I am inspired by Senator Byrd's reference to Nathan Hale. Nathan Hale 
was not only a son of Connecticut, but a Yale man. For my entire 
freshman year, I walked by an inspiring statue of Nathan Hale. I read 
about him. I studied him. I cannot say I knew him personally, but I 
feel as if I knew Nathan Hale, who was remembered for saying: ``I 
regret I have only one life to give for my country.''
  Nathan Hale was a patriot, and he was prepared to give his life for 
the security and freedom of his country. I am absolutely confident that 
if Nathan Hale were in the Senate of the United States today, he would 
not only be cosponsoring this resolution, he would be impatient to have 
the talking stop and the action begin.
  Is it time? Are we ready? Time is what it is about.
  It is 12 years since Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened to invade 
Saudi Arabia and thereby showed that all that Saddam Hussein had been 
saying about wanting to make Baghdad the capital of the Arab world and 
dominate the Arab world was not just talk; he was prepared to act on 
it.
  It is 12 years since U.N. Resolution 678 authorizing the use of force 
against Iraq.
  It is 11 years since the congressional authorization for Desert Storm 
and the triumphant brilliant effort of our military in Desert Storm.
  It is 11 years since Saddam asked for a cease-fire and accepted the 
inspection regime as part of that cease-fire on which he has never 
followed through and complied.
  It is 11 years since the no-fly zones were first adopted and began to 
be enforced by American military personnel.
  It is 9 years since the U.N. found Saddam in ``material breach of his 
international obligations.''
  It is 9 years since Iraq under Saddam Hussein attempted to 
assassinate former President Bush.
  It is 6 years since Saddam crushed Kurdish and Shi'a resistance to 
his regime.
  It is 4 years since Saddam ejected inspectors and President Clinton 
ordered Operation Desert Fox, an air campaign against Iraq in response 
to this act.
  It is 4 years since this Senate called for the indictment of Saddam 
as a war criminal.
  It is 4 years since the Senate found Iraq in breach of international 
obligations and authorized the President to take ``appropriate action 
in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United 
States to bring Iraq into compliance with its international 
obligation.''
  It is 4 years since Congress passed and President Clinton signed the 
Iraq Liberation Act.

  It is more than 1 year since we were attacked by terrorists on 
September 11, 2001, showing us the risks of inaction against those who 
would arm and threaten us.
  It is 1 month since the President of the United States challenged the 
United Nations to act against this international lawbreaker.
  It is 8 days since we started the debate on this resolution in the 
Senate; excluding the Sabbath, 6 days. The Lord made Heaven and Earth 
in 6 days. It is time now for us to come to a conclusion.
  Is it time? Are we ready to act? I think the record shows we are 
ready to act.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, if I need additional time, I will take it 
from my Senate leader allocation for the day.
  The Senate is now engaged in one of the most consequential debates 
addressed in this Chamber for many years. We are confronting the grave 
issues of war and peace. We are considering how the United States 
should respond to a murderous dictator who has shown he will be bound 
neither by conscience nor by the laws or principles of civilized 
nations. And we are contemplating whether and under what conditions the 
Congress should authorize the preemptive use of American military power 
to remove the threat that he poses.
  These questions go directly to who we are as a nation. How we answer 
them will have a profound consequence for our Nation, for our allies, 
for the war on terror, and perhaps most importantly, for the men and 
women in our Armed Forces who could be called to

[[Page S10241]]

risk their lives because of our decisions.
  There is no question that Saddam Hussein is a dangerous man who has 
done barbaric things. He has invaded neighbors, supported terrorists, 
repressed and murdered his own people.
  Over the last several months, as the world has sought to calm the 
violence between Israelis and Palestinians, Iraq has tried to inflame 
the situation by speaking against the very existence of Israel and 
encouraging suicide bombers in Gaza and the West Bank.
  Saddam Hussein has stockpiled, weaponized and used chemical and 
biological weapons, and he has made no secret of his desire to acquire 
nuclear weapons. He has ignored international agreements and frustrated 
the efforts of international inspectors, and his ambitions today are as 
unrelenting as they have ever been.
  As a condition of the truce that ended the gulf war, Saddam Hussein 
agreed to eliminate Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons 
and to abandon all efforts to develop or deliver such weapons. That 
agreement is spelled out in U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. Iraq 
has never complied with the resolution.
  For the first 7 years after the gulf war, it tried to deceive U.N. 
weapons inspectors, block their access to key sites, and make it 
impossible for them to do their jobs.
  Finally, in October of 1998, the U.N. was left with no choice but to 
withdraw its inspectors from Iraq. As a result, we do not know exactly 
what is now in Iraq's arsenal. We do know Iraq has weaponized thousands 
of gallons of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. We know Iraq 
maintains stockpiles of some of the world's deadliest chemical weapons, 
including VX, sarin, and mustard gas. We know Iraq is developing 
deadlier ways to deliver these horrible weapons, including unmanned 
drones and long-range ballistic missiles. And we know Saddam Hussein is 
committed to one day possessing nuclear weapons.
  If that should happen, instead of simply bullying the gulf region, he 
could dominate it. Instead of threatening only his neighbors, he could 
become a grave threat to U.S. security and to global security.
  The threat posed by Saddam Hussein may not be imminent, but it is 
real, it is growing, and it cannot be ignored. Despite that, like many 
Americans, I was concerned by the way the administration first proposed 
to deal with that threat. The President's desire to wage war alone, 
without the support of our allies and without authorization from 
Congress, was wrong. Many of us, Democrats and Republicans, made it 
clear that such unilateralism was not in our Nation's best interest. I 
now commend the administration for changing its approach and 
acknowledging the importance of working with our allies. I also commend 
it for recognizing that under our Constitution, it is Congress that 
authorizes the use of force, and for requesting a resolution providing 
such authority.
  I applaud my colleagues, Democrats and Republicans in the House and 
in the Senate, for the improvements they have made to the 
administration's original resolution. Four changes were especially 
critical.
  First, instead of giving the President broad and unfocused 
authorization to take action in the region, as the administration 
originally sought, this resolution focuses specifically on the threat 
posed by Iraq. It no longer authorizes, nor should it be used to 
justify, the use of force against other nations, organizations, or 
individuals that the President may believe threaten peace and stability 
in the Persian Gulf region. It is a strong and focused response to a 
specific threat. It is not a template or model for any other situation.
  Second, the resolution expresses the deep conviction of this Congress 
and of the American people that President Bush should continue to work 
through the United Nations Security Council in order to secure Iraqi 
compliance with U.N. resolutions. Unfettered inspections may or may not 
lead to Iraqi disarmament, but whether they succeed or fail, the effort 
we expend in seeking inspections will make it easier for the President 
to assemble a global coalition against Saddam should military action 
eventually be needed.

  Third, this resolution makes it clear that before the President can 
use force in Iraq, he must certify to the Congress that diplomacy has 
failed, that further diplomatic efforts alone cannot protect America's 
national security interests, nor can they lead to enforcement of the 
U.N. Security Council resolutions.
  Fourth, this resolution protects the balance of power by requiring 
the President to comply with the War Powers Act and to report to 
Congress at least every 60 days on matters relevant to this resolution.
  This resolution gives the President the authority he needs to 
confront the threat posed by Iraq. It is fundamentally different and a 
better resolution than the one the President sent to us. It is neither 
a Democratic resolution nor a Republican resolution. It is now a 
statement of American resolve and values. It is more respectful of our 
Constitution, more reflective of our understanding that we need to work 
with our allies in this effort, and more in keeping with our strong 
belief that force must be a last resort, not a first response.
  Because this resolution is improved, because I believe Saddam Hussein 
represents a real threat, and because I believe it is important for 
America to speak with one voice at this critical moment, I will vote to 
give the President the authority he needs, but I respect those who 
reach different conclusions. For me, the deciding factor is my belief 
that a united Congress will help the President unite the world, and by 
uniting the world we can increase the world's chances of succeeding in 
this effort and reduce both the risks and the costs America may have to 
bear. With this resolution, we are giving the President extraordinary 
authority. How he exercises that authority will determine how 
successful any action in Iraq might be.
  In 1991, by the time the President's father sought congressional 
support to use force against Iraq, he had secured pledges of military 
cooperation from nearly 40 nations and statements of support from 
scores of others. He had already secured the backing of the United 
Nations, and he had already developed a clear plan of action. In 
assembling that coalition, the legitimacy of our cause was affirmed, 
regional stability was maintained, the risks to our soldiers were 
lessened, America's burden was reduced, and perhaps most importantly, 
Iraq was isolated.
  At this point, we have done none of those things. That is why, unlike 
in 1991, our vote on this resolution should be seen as the beginning of 
a process, not the end. For our efforts in Iraq to succeed, the 
President must continue to consult with Congress and work hard to build 
a global coalition. That is not capitulation, it is leadership. And it 
is essential.
  In my view, there are five other crucial steps the administration 
must take before any final decision on the use of force in Iraq is 
made. First and foremost, the President needs to be honest with the 
American people, not only about the benefits of action against Iraq but 
also about the risks and the costs of such action. We are no longer 
talking about driving Saddam Hussein back to within his borders, we are 
talking about driving him from power. That is a much more difficult and 
complicated goal.
  There was a story in this past Sunday's Philadelphia Inquirer that 
top officials in the administration ``have exaggerated the degree of 
allied support for a war in Iraq.'' The story goes on to say that 
others in the administration ``are rankled by what they charge is a 
tendency'' by some in the administration ``to gloss over the unpleasant 
realities'' of a potential war with Iraq.
  A report in yesterday's Washington Post suggests ``an increasing 
number of intelligence officials, including former and current 
intelligence agency employees, are concerned the agency is tailoring 
its public stance to fit the administration's views.''
  I do not know whether these reports are accurate. We do know from our 
own national experience, however, that public support for military 
action can evaporate quickly if the American people come to believe 
they have not been given all of the facts. If that should happen, no 
resolution Congress might pass will be able to unify our Nation. The 
American people expect, and success demands, that they be told both the 
benefits and the risks involved in any action against Iraq.

[[Page S10242]]

  Second, we need to make clear to the world that the reason we would 
use force in Iraq is to remove Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass 
destruction. I would have preferred if this goal had been made explicit 
in this resolution. However, it is clear from this debate that Saddam's 
weapons of mass destruction are the principal threat to the United 
States and the only threat that would justify the use of the United 
States military force against Iraq. It is the threat that the President 
cited repeatedly in his speech to the American people on Monday night. 
It may also be the only threat that can rally the world to support our 
efforts. Therefore, we expect, and success demands, that the 
administration not lose sight of this essential mission.
  Third, we need to prepare for what might happen in Iraq after Saddam 
Hussein. Regime change is an easy expression for a difficult job. One 
thing we have learned from our action in Afghanistan is that it is 
easier to topple illegitimate regimes than it is to build legitimate 
democracies. We will need to do much better in post-Saddam Iraq than 
the administration has done so far in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Iraq is 
driven by religious and ethnic differences and demoralized by a 
repressive government and crushing poverty. It has no experience with 
democracy. History tells us it is not enough merely to hope that well-
intentioned leaders will rise to fill the void that the departure of 
Saddam Hussein would leave. We must help create the conditions under 
which such a leader can arise and govern. Unless we want to risk seeing 
Iraq go from bad to worse, we must help the Iraqi people build their 
political and economic institutions after Saddam. That could take many 
years and many billions of dollars, which is another reason we must 
build a global coalition. The American people expect, and success 
demands, that we plan for stability and for economic and political 
progress in Iraq after Saddam.
  Fourth, we need to minimize the chances that any action we may take 
in Iraq will destabilize the region. Throughout the Persian Gulf, there 
are extremists who would like nothing more than to transform a 
confrontation with Iraq into a wider war between the Arab world and 
Israel or the Arab world and the West. What happens if, by acting in 
Iraq, we undermine the government in Jordan, a critical ally and a 
strategic buffer between Iraq and Israel? What happens if we 
destabilize Pakistan and empower Islamic fundamentalists? Unlike Iraq, 
Pakistan already has nuclear weapons and the means to deliver. What 
happens if that arsenal falls into the hands of al-Qaida or other 
extremists?
  We can tell the Arab world this is not a fight between their nations 
and ours. But a far better way to maintain stability in the gulf is to 
demonstrate that by building a global coalition to confront Saddam 
Hussein. That is why the administration must make every reasonable 
effort to secure a U.N. resolution just as we did in 1991. With U.N. 
support, we can count a number of Arab countries as full allies. 
Without U.N. support, we cannot even count on their airspace. We 
expect, and success demands, that any action we take in Iraq will make 
the region more stable, not less.

  Fifth, and finally, we cannot allow a war in Iraq to jeopardize the 
war on terrorism. We are fighting terrorist organizations with global 
networks, and we need partners around the globe. Some, including the 
chairman of the President's own Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 
doubt we can count on this continued cooperation in the war on terror 
if we go to war against Iraq. I do not know if that is true. I do know, 
however, that the military intelligence and political cooperation we 
receive from nations throughout the world are critical to the war on 
terrorism.
  Saddam Hussein may yet target America. Al-Qaida already has. The 
American people expect, and our national security demands, that the 
administration make plans to ensure that any action we take in Iraq 
does not distract or detract from the war on terror. If they fail to do 
so, any victory we win in Iraq will come at a terrible cost.
  On Monday night in his speech to the Nation, the President said: The 
situation could hardly get worse for world security and the people of 
Iraq.
  Yes, it can. If the administration attempts to use the authority in 
this resolution without doing the work that is required before and 
after military action in Iraq, the situation there and elsewhere can 
indeed get worse. We could see more turmoil in the Persian Gulf, not 
less. We could see more bloodshed in the Middle East, not less. 
Americans could find themselves more vulnerable to terrorist attacks, 
not less.
  So I stress again, this resolution represents a beginning, not an 
end. If we are going to make America and the world safer, much more 
work needs to be done before the force authorized in this document is 
used.
  Some people think it is wrong to ask questions or raise concerns when 
the President says our national security is at risk. They believe it is 
an act of disloyalty. I disagree. In America, asking questions is an 
act of patriotism. For those of us who have been entrusted by our 
fellow citizens to serve in this Senate, asking questions is more than 
a privilege, it is a constitutional responsibility.
  The American people have serious questions about the course of action 
on which this resolution could set us. Given the gravity of the issues 
involved and the far-reaching consequences of this course, it is 
essential that their questions are answered. I support this resolution. 
And for the sake of the American people, especially those who will be 
called to defend our Nation, we must continue to ask questions.
  On one point, however, I have no question. I believe deeply and 
absolutely in the courage, the skill, and the devotion of our men and 
women in uniform. I know that if it becomes necessary for them to stand 
in harm's way to protect America, they will do so with pride and 
without hesitation and they will succeed. They are the finest fighting 
force the world has ever known. For their sake, for the sake of all 
Americans, for the world's sake, we must confront Saddam Hussein. But 
we must do so in a way that avoids making a dangerous situation even 
worse.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Johnson). The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I congratulate the distinguished majority 
leader for a very powerful and very clear statement. I, too, join you 
in saying that it is our responsibility to ask questions. Questions 
have been asked throughout this debate. As best we can, we answered 
them.
  But I think the distinguished leader has provided very helpful 
guidance in the uncertain days, months, and perhaps years to come. I 
commend you. As one of the cosponsors, I welcome your strong support.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the Senator from Virginia for his kind words.
  Mr. BYRD. Will the Senator yield to me?
  Mr. DASCHLE. I am happy to yield.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I congratulate our leader. I congratulate 
him not only for his statement today, but I congratulate him on 
refusing to stand with other leaders of my party on the White House 
lawn. He has shown leadership. He has kept himself apart, kept himself 
in a position to make decisions. He hasn't rushed, pell-mell, to shake 
this piece of rag. He has done what leaders should do. He has stood 
aside and waited, helped to advise us and counsel with us. He is the 
one leader on this Hill in my party who didn't rush to judgment on this 
blank check that we are giving the President of the United States. I 
thank him. I congratulate him. I shall always praise him for that.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
West Virginia for his kind words and for his understanding and 
appreciation for the difficulties we face in this body as we make these 
momentous decisions.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, regular order.
  Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.


                             cloture motion

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The regular order has been called for.
  Under the previous order, pursuant to rule XXII, the Chair lays 
before the Senate the pending cloture motion, which the clerk will 
report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     hereby move

[[Page S10243]]

     to bring to a close debate on the Lieberman-Warner amendment 
     to S.J. Res. 45:
       Thomas Daschle, Bill Nelson, Joseph Lieberman, Evan Bayh, 
     Harry Reid, Pete Domenici, Joseph Biden, Patty Murray, Jay 
     Rockefeller, Larry E. Craig, Trent Lott, John Warner, John 
     McCain, Jesse Helms, Craig Thomas, Don Nickles, Frank H. 
     Murkowski.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the mandatory quorum 
call under the rule is waived.
  The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on 
amendment No. 4856, as modified, to S.J. Res. 45, a joint resolution to 
authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq, shall be 
brought to a close?
  The yeas and nays are required under the rule.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant bill clerk called the roll.
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 75, nays, 25, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 233 Leg.]

                                YEAS--75

     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Campbell
     Cantwell
     Carnahan
     Cleland
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Collins
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Edwards
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Johnson
     Kerry
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Voinovich
     Warner

                                NAYS--25

     Akaka
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Byrd
     Carper
     Chafee
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Dayton
     Dodd
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Kennedy
     Kohl
     Leahy
     Levin
     Murray
     Sarbanes
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Wellstone
     Wyden
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 75, the nays are 
25. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn having voted in 
the affirmative, the motion is agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 4868

  Under the previous order, there will now be 60 minutes of debate on 
the Byrd amendment No. 4868.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask 
unanimous consent that the time run equally during the quorum call.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I did not see the Senator from Minnesota in 
the Chamber. It is my understanding he now wants to proceed with his 15 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. DAYTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be added as 
an original cosponsor of Senator Byrd's amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DAYTON. Mr. President, I rise to support this amendment by the 
great senior Senator from West Virginia. It closely parallels an 
amendment which I filed and which, unfortunately, now that the Senate 
has made its determination to limit the amount of time and debate on 
this historic decision, I will not be bringing to the Senate for a 
vote.
  A decision to rush to judgment on this matter has now been made by 
the Senate. I won't belabor the point except to say that in January of 
1998, after Saddam Hussein had bounced U.N. inspectors out of Iraq, the 
Senate took 5 months to consider and finally approve a resolution which 
did not even authorize President Clinton to use force. In October, 
1998, the Senate passes another resolution which again did not 
authorize the President of the United States to use force.
  In 1990, the Senate took 5 months after Saddam Hussein invaded 
Kuwait, and that resolution was passed just days before President Bush 
committed this Nation to its first military engagement in the Persian 
Gulf war.
  We have had a number of very valuable hearings in the Senate Armed 
Services Committee in the last weeks. I asked one panel of recently 
retired generals, three of whom were directly involved in the Persian 
Gulf war, whether the absence of a Congressional resolution or 
declaration of war had in any way prevented or impeded that military 
buildup preparatory to the engagement in January of 1991. They said, 
no, it did not. So I don't understand why, from any consideration--
military, diplomatic, or constitutional--we should be voting and 
rushing to this judgment this weekend, but we will.
  We will be voting on what? What is it, S.J. Res. 46, that we are 
actually voting upon? It is a preapproval of whatever the President of 
the United States decides to do whenever. It is a vote for euphemisms 
such as ``to use force'' or ``as he determines to be necessary.'' Why? 
Why are we rushing to this judgment at this time? So we can adjourn in 
the next few days and go home until next January, or until we decide 
whether the outcome of the November election will aid or impair our own 
political agendas?

  Some of those concerns might seem justified, particularly as they 
relate to our own domestic concerns. But for decisions of war or peace, 
decisions about what is right for our national security, decisions 
about the life or death of Americans fighting on our behalf, decisions 
about the survival of the existing world order and even possibly the 
survival of our world as we know it, there are no justifications for 
political calculation or personal convenience. There should be only one 
consideration, and that is to do what is right for the country, as God 
gives each of us to see that right.
  Yet S.J. Res. 46 preapproves any decision by the President of the 
United States to commit this Nation to war at some time in the future, 
with U.N. support or without it--unilaterally, bilaterally, 
multilaterally, preventatively, preemptively. Even other amendments 
that I will support, which have the best of intentions, fall into this 
trap: What do you do when you are preapproving a war? Put a limit on 
this but not for that; if this; if that. However, it is very hard to 
forecast events of this magnitude.
  There is no need for us to try to do so. There are no good reasons 
for us to do so, except the need to preapprove something and then go 
home.
  If we don't vote for the final resolution, we will be accused of not 
supporting the President, of not speaking with one voice to Saddam 
Hussein, to the United Nations, and to the world. Those are very 
serious accusations, that you don't support the President of the United 
States. I do support the President. He is my President. He is our 
President. I pray he will make the right decisions and get the credit. 
I pray he won't make the wrong decisions and get the blame.
  But when I am asked to support this President, or any President, I 
need to understand what it is exactly that he wants us to do, what he 
intends for us to support. This President, as I understood his speech 
last Monday, is certainly not asking the Congress to declare war on 
Iraq today. He is wisely reserving that judgment. Why wouldn't we 
exercise the same wisdom?
  The situation, as we have seen in the last weeks, is inherently 
fluid. New facts become known; old facts even change. I support the 
President's reserving judgment until after the United Nations decision, 
until it attempts to force Saddam Hussein's compliance, until we can 
determine the outcome of those efforts. During those critical days or 
weeks ahead, I will be around. I will be available at any time, day or 
night, whenever, to participate back here on the Senate floor in this 
momentous decision. All of us in this Chamber and in the House could be 
here within hours, should be, and would be if we were called upon to do 
so, whenever the President or this Congress believed that a decision to 
commit this Nation to war must be made.
  As the President said Monday night, the time before that decision is 
limited. But the time for that decision is not now.
  Another reason to follow this protocol, the reason for my amendment,

[[Page S10244]]

the reason I support Senator Byrd's amendment, is that it is what the 
Constitution of the United States requires Congress to do--either 
declare war or not. It says right in that book--I don't carry it with 
me quite as faithfully as the great Senator from West Virginia, but I 
do happen to have my copy today--Congress shall declare war. That is 
about as clear and unambiguous a statement as could be made.

  There are important reasons that Congress was given, and only 
Congress was given, that authority and that responsibility. Because it 
was considered by our Founders to be essential to the system of checks 
and balances upon which this Republic depends.
  James Madison wrote a letter to Thomas Jefferson in 1798, less than a 
decade after the Constitution's ratification, in which he said:

       The Constitution supposes, what the History of all 
     Governments demonstrates, that the Executive is the branch of 
     power most interested in war, & most prone to it. It has, 
     accordingly, with studied care, vested the question of war in 
     the Legislature. But the Doctrines lately advanced strike at 
     the root of all these provisions, and will deposit the peace 
     of the Country in that Department which the Constitution 
     distrusts as most ready without cause to renounce it. For if 
     the opinion of the President, not the facts & proofs 
     themselves, are to sway the judgment of Congress in declaring 
     war, and if the President in the recess of Congress create a 
     foreign mission, appoint the minister, & negociate [sic] a 
     War Treaty, without the possibility of a check even from the 
     Senate, . . . it is evident that the people are cheated out 
     of the best ingredients of their Government, the safeguards 
     of peace which is the greatest of their blessings.

  The subsequent 204 years have demonstrated many times the wisdom and 
foresight of our Constitution. Its principles should give special pause 
to this body when being admonished by the President, by any President, 
not to ``tie my hands.'' Those words indicate a regrettable lack of 
regard for Congress and for our constitutional standing as a coequal 
branch of Government. Our Nation's Founders darn well wanted to tie a 
President's hands.
  Thomas Jefferson wrote:

       In questions of power, then, let no more be heard of 
     confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the 
     chains of the Constitution.

  Those words are meant to apply to this President, to any President. 
Except in matters of war and peace? Especially in matters of war and 
peace. I would say this, the Constitution's wisdom has a very valuable 
perspective on the pressures and perils we face in this body today. Not 
only the perils in confronting a dangerous dictator, as we must, but 
also the perils in how we decide to do so.
  Some might prefer to avoid the momentous decision the Constitution 
assigns us whether or not to declare war. Whether or not to send 
Americans into battle halfway around the world, where they would likely 
encounter the chemical or biological weapons we rightfully seek to 
spare this country. Some of those Americans will die too young, and 
others will suffer horrible wounds lasting for lifetimes. Iraqi 
children and their families will be destroyed in their own homes, 
schools, and mosques. The rest of the world will judge that decision 
and its consequences, which they could not escape.

  We will read about it in the newspapers. We will watch its 
manifestations on television. We will probably attempt to share the 
credit if it turns out well, and avoid the blame if, God forbid, it 
doesn't. We will talk about that decision. We might even hold hearings 
on it, but we won't assemble in this Chamber where previous Senates 
once voted declarations of war, but not since World War II.
  Mr. President, these decisions are ones we will live with for our 
lifetimes. They should not be made in these circumstances. We should 
follow the guidance we have seen evident from the changes in the 
administration's views over the last weeks. I support and applaud those 
changing perspectives. I respect a leader who can listen and learn, 
then adjust his views and decisions accordingly. I believe the wise 
counsel from Members of this body--Republicans, Democrats, and 
Independents--has been an important part of that process. I believe the 
American people, the collective wisdom of our fellow citizens, who 
overwhelmingly support the President, who overwhelmingly believe the 
President should consult with this body, who overwhelmingly believe the 
U.S. should act in concert with the U.N. and other nations of the 
world, and not alone, unilaterally, preemptively. I believe those 
public judgments, as we all manage to view them, probably daily in 
polling documents, have had enormous influence on the decisions that 
are going to be made.
  We owe it to our responsibilities to what is best for this country; 
we owe it to the brave men and women who will have to carry out those 
decisions, to make them when they must be made, on the basis of the 
best, most current, and most complete information possible--knowing, 
even then, that we will still not have the certainty, clarity, 
foresight we would wish to have.
  That is the wisdom of the Constitution. That is the wisdom of Senator 
Byrd's amendment. That is, I believe, the wisdom of the amendment I 
would have brought forth, which says simply the Congress shall go back 
to following the Constitution of the United States. The reasons for 
that document's decisions are as valid today as they were 213 years 
ago, and maybe some day--it will not be this week but soon, this body 
will review the decision not to follow its dictates and return to it. I 
look forward to that and, hopefully, Senator Byrd will be on the floor 
that day, as he deserves to be when that decision is made.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes. Mr. President, 
I wish to respond to a couple of the statements made by the junior 
Senator from Minnesota. I don't think they are actually correct in 
categorizing what happened in 1998. I believe I heard him say then we 
were very deliberative and the resolution we passed did not authorize 
the use of force. Well, I will show you what we did in 1998.
  In 1998, Saddam Hussein had continued his defiance of the U.N. He had 
not complied with any of the 16 resolutions. So the U.S. passed a 
resolution saying he should comply, Public Law 105-235, on August 14th. 
But the deliberative portion was introduced before the Senate on July 
31, 1998--placed on the calendar July 27, measure laid before the 
Senate on July 31--and it passed the Senate with an amendment by 
unanimous consent. So it passed in one day. I don't remember the number 
of hours spent in debate, but it wasn't a lot. To say we spent 
months deliberating it is not accurate. The fact is we passed it in one 
day. And then to say it had no authorization for force, I don't believe 
is actually correct either. If you look at the resolved section--I put 
the 1998 resolution in the calendar because I think it is important. It 
goes through several items of noncompliance by Iraq. Basically, we are 
saying we should force or compel Iraq to comply. The resolved section 
says:

       . . . the United States of America and Congress assembled, 
     find the government of Iraq in a material and unacceptable 
     breach of its international obligations, and therefore the 
     President is urged to take appropriate action in accordance 
     with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States 
     to bring Iraq into compliance with international obligations.

  I believe in the appropriate action Congress was saying with a united 
voice: Take military action, if necessary, to get Saddam Hussein to 
comply with the U.N. resolution. That is what this resolution stated. 
We passed it unanimously. We also passed, in 1998, the Iraqi Liberation 
Act. This act did not authorize any additional military force. That is 
correct with this act, but not with Public Law 105-235.
  When someone says we didn't authorize force in 1998--yes, we did. The 
Iraqi Liberation Act didn't have an authorization of force, but it did 
include a change of regime. It said Saddam Hussein should go. Again, we 
spoke with a united voice. We passed that by a voice vote. I might 
mention this to my colleagues. In the House, it passed by 360-38. In 
the Senate, we received it from the House on October 6 and passed it in 
the Senate on October 7. We passed it by unanimous consent. We passed 
it without objection.
  This resolution says it should be the policy of the U.S. to have a 
regime change. That became the law of the land. It passed unanimously 
in the Senate with an overwhelming vote in the House. Then, the earlier 
resolution that passed on August 14 said the President is urged to take 
appropriate action to compel compliance with existing U.N. resolutions. 
That was a

[[Page S10245]]

strong, united voice. Congress spoke together, overwhelmingly. It was 
not unanimous in the House, but it was unanimous in the Senate. Both of 
these resolutions passed in one day.
  So for people who are saying we haven't been deliberative enough, and 
what is the consequence of this--what has changed? This Congress, 
Democrats and Republicans, this Senate unanimously told President 
Clinton to compel compliance. Also, we stated it was the public policy 
of Congress to have a regime change in Iraq. I want to clarify the 
Record and make sure we are factually accurate.
  Congress spoke in a united fashion in 1998. It was proud to be part 
of that then, and I am proud to be part of the sponsorship of this 
resolution, which I believe will also pass with a very strong voice--
after much more extensive debate than we had in 1998. I thank my friend 
for yielding me the time.
  Mr. DAYTON. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. McCAIN. Not on our time. If the Senator from West Virginia would 
like to yield the Senator time, I would be more than happy.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from Minnesota 
that he has 1\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. DAYTON. I will use that 1\1/2\ minutes to respond. I was not here 
when those events occurred. I rely on the authorities and information 
available to me. I will note Senator Lott was quoted in several 
publications. On February 12, the then-majority leader said:

       I had hoped that we could get to the point where we can 
     pass a resolution this week on Iraq. But we really developed 
     some physical problems, if nothing else. . . . So we have 
     decided that the most important thing is not to move so 
     quickly, but to make sure that we have had all the right 
     questions asked and answered and that we have available to us 
     the latest information about what is . . . happening with our 
     allies in the world.

  He went on to say:

       The Senate is known for its deliberative actions. And the 
     longer I stay in the Senate, the more I have learned to 
     appreciate it. It does help to give us time to think about 
     the potential problems and the risks and ramifications and 
     to, frankly, press the administration.

  The majority leader made that statement on the Senate floor on 
February 12. The resolution was passed and signed by President Clinton 
August 14, 1998, 6 months later.
  Also, I am not a legal scholar, but in making my comments I cited the 
opinion of counsel at the Library of Congress and its Congressional 
Research Services. They opined--I realize lawyers and others can 
disagree----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. DAYTON. I ask for unanimous consent that I have 30 seconds more 
to finish my remarks.
  Mr. McCAIN. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. BYRD. I yield the Senator 2 minutes or whatever he needs.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Dayton's name be 
added as a cosponsor of my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DAYTON. I thank the Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. President, the opinion stated its judgment that since the 
document in 1998 urged the President to follow the actions which the 
Senator from Oklahoma has accurately described, it did not constitute 
an authorization under the War Powers Act. Furthermore, in the absence 
of any reference to authorization under the War Powers Act, which the 
resolution before us today contains, it did not provide that authority. 
I thank the Chair. I yield back time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how much time do I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 29 minutes 20 seconds.
  Mr. BYRD. How many minutes?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty-nine.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent 
that my time on this amendment not count against my hour under cloture.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. McCAIN. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. BYRD. This shows the patience of a Senator. This clearly 
demonstrates that the train is coming down on us like a Mack truck, and 
we are not even going to consider a few extra minutes for this Senator.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to my friend from 
Pennsylvania.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, in deference----
  Mr. BYRD. On the Senator's time.
  Mr. McCAIN. On my time. In deference to the Senator from West 
Virginia, on this one occasion, given all the circumstances, I will not 
object to it not counting against the Senator's hour.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank my friend.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Pennsylvania, Mr. Specter.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished President pro 
tempore for yielding me 5 minutes.
  I do support his amendment which has two provisions. First:

       Nothing . . . is intended to alter the constitutional 
     authorities of the Congress to declare war, grant letters of 
     Marque and Reprisal, or other authorities invested in 
     Congress by Section 8, Article I of the Constitution.

  I think this provision is necessary, although customarily you would 
not think that you would need a statute to say the Constitution 
governs. However, I have expressed on the floor of the Senate my 
concern of the constitutionality of the delegation of authority to the 
President here.
  Congress has the authority to declare war. The authorization for the 
use of force is a practical equivalent. What we are doing is saying the 
President may decide when to use that force and, in effect, decide when 
the war will start, or really to make a determination as to when war is 
declared. So I think that it is important to have this sort of 
provision, although its importance is hard to evaluate historically.
  The second part of the pending amendment of the Senator from West 
Virginia is:

       . . . shall be construed as granting any authority to the 
     President to use the United States Armed Forces for any 
     purpose not directly related to a clear threat of imminent, 
     sudden, and direct attack upon the United States, its 
     possessions, or territories, or the Armed Forces of the 
     United States, unless the Congress of the United States 
     otherwise authorizes.

  The language of ``clear threat of imminent, sudden, and direct 
attack'' has been inserted in place of the language ``the existing 
threat posed by Iraq.'' This does call for a more precise determination 
of the need for preemptive action, and I think is sound. Ultimately, it 
is not going to detract from the authority of the President because the 
resolution allows the President to ``use all means that he deems to be 
appropriate,'' which is very broad authority.
  The language of the pending Byrd amendment is consistent with one of 
the earliest articulations of the concept of self-defense. Secretary of 
State Daniel Webster in 1842, referring to self-defense in an 
anticipatory sense, stated that its use be ``confined to cases in which 
the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and 
leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation.''
  Hugo Grotius, considered the father of international law, said in his 
1925 treatise that a nation may use self-defense in anticipation of 
attack when there is ``present danger,'' which is a broader definition. 
Grotius further said:

       It is lawful to kill him who is preparing to kill.

  Elihu Root, a distinguished scholar on international law, said in 
1914 that international law did not require a nation to wait to use 
force in self-defense ``until it is too late to protect itself.''

  I think the language of the pending amendment offered by the Senator 
from West Virginia is helpful in providing assurance that preemptive 
force is really necessary. We know President Bush said he does not 
intend to use this military force unless absolutely necessary and has 
already made a determination that he thinks there is an imminent threat 
from Iraq. Some of the information which has been presented,

[[Page S10246]]

partly in closed session, supports the President's concern along that 
line, but I do think this language is helpful. Therefore, I support it.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Clinton). The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I wish to say very briefly that I 
understand people have a desire to speak. We have a number of Senators 
who have not spoken on this issue. It is already looking as if we may 
be here well into this evening. From now on, I will be adhering 
strictly to the rules according to postcloture. I hope my colleagues 
will be understanding because we have to resolve this issue.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I believe the distinguished Democratic 
whip was able to get unanimous consent last night for my amendment No. 
4868 to be modified to remove paragraph 2. It so states in the 
Congressional Record on page S10217; am I correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair believes the Record is in error and 
that only amendment No. 4869 was modified.
  Mr. BYRD. On what basis--Madam President, I hope this time is not 
being charged. We are trying to clarify something.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. On what basis does the Chair maintain that the Record is in 
error in that portion of the Record from which I read on page S10217? 
What is the basis for the Chair stating that Record portion is in 
error?
  I do not question the integrity of the Chair. I am only asking why 
does the Chair state--I know the Chair is being advised to that 
effect--why are we to say that this Record, as it is clearly written, 
is in error?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair is relying on the Journal of 
proceedings.
  Mr. BYRD. And what does the Journal say?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Journal indicates that only amendment No. 
4869 was modified.
  Mr. BYRD. May I ask the distinguished majority whip, is that 
statement by the Chair in accordance with his understanding?
  Mr. REID. I say to my friend from West Virginia, I read directly from 
the paper that the Senator gave me. There were two unanimous consent 
requests on it. The one was not acceptable. The other was, and I read 
that into the Record. As I recall, it was changing section 4 to 3, or 3 
to 4. That is what I submitted.
  Mr. BYRD. There were two requests, one changing the section numbers, 
and I am sure that one was agreed to.
  Mr. REID. Yes.
  Mr. BYRD. The other one, according to this Record, was also agreed 
to.
  Mr. REID. No. That is the only one that--in fact, I said on the 
Record the other was not agreed to.
  Mr. BYRD. May I read the Record. It is very short.

       Mr. REID. Mr. President, this has been cleared with the 
     minority. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Byrd, I ask 
     unanimous consent to modify his amendment No. 4868 to remove 
     paragraph 2, and further I ask consent to modify amendment 
     No. 4869 to change references to section 3(a) to 4(a).
       The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

  Mr. REID. I say to my friend from West Virginia, I had the paper here 
and the clerk took that paper. Maybe they made a mistake. But there is 
no question in my mind whatsoever--as I told the Senator this morning 
when he came in--that the one had been approved, the other had not.
  Mr. BYRD. Yes. The whip did tell me that, but when I looked at the 
Record, I saw, by the Record at least, it said that both requests were 
agreed to. I am not going to argue this point. I am going to take the 
distinguished whip's word, which is good for me at all times.
  Mr. REID. I say to my friend from West Virginia, I appreciate that 
very much. In fact, there are a lot of things going on I may not be 
quite certain on, but I am absolutely, unqualifiedly certain of what I 
did last night.
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I have absolute and complete faith in the 
integrity of the distinguished Senator from Nevada, and I thank the 
Chair, with the greatest of respect. I thank the Assistant 
Parliamentarian as well, for whom I have the greatest respect.
  Madam President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty-three minutes.
  Mr. BYRD. On this amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this amendment, that is correct.
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, a point I want to make about this 
discussion that ensued after the statement was made by the 
distinguished Senator from Minnesota: There were references made to 
Public Law 105-235, August 14, 1998. Here is the resolving clause which 
has been quoted by the distinguished Republican whip:

       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled, . . . .
       That the government of Iraq is in material and unacceptable 
     breach of its international obligations, and therefore the 
     President is urged to take appropriate action in accordance 
     with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, 
     to bring Iraq into compliance with its international 
     obligations. Approved August 14, 1998.

  Well, so what? What does that prove? What does that prove? Somebody 
tell me. Let's read it again. The resolving clause says that the 
Government of Iraq is in material and unacceptable breach of its 
international obligations. That is okay. But get this: And therefore 
the President is urged to take appropriate action.

  What does that mean? There is nothing definitive about that. That is 
ambiguous. It is not contemporaneous with today's question. It is 
ambiguous. It is vague. What would that prove in a court if the Supreme 
Court of the United States were to take this up? What would those who 
read this piece of junk maintain that this says? It is plain. The 
President is urged--well, what does that mean, ``urged''?--to take 
appropriate action. What is that? That is not a declaration of war. 
What is that? What does that mean, ``to take appropriate action''? 
Well, you can guess, I can guess, he can guess, he can guess. Anybody 
can guess.
  ``Urges the President to take appropriate action in accordance with 
the Constitution . . . .'' Now, that is fine. It is in accordance with 
the Constitution. Then that would say that Congress has the power to 
declare war.
  ``In accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United 
States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international 
obligations.'' What is he supposed to do? What is the President being 
urged to do to bring Iraq into compliance with its international 
obligations? Anybody's guess. Why, surely this great country of ours is 
not going to be able to launch a war on the basis of that ambiguous and 
vague language.
  I wish those who are continuing to refer to this Public Law 105-235 
and the so-called relevant U.N. resolutions would explain what they 
mean. I hear that over and over again. In connection with the 
resolution that is before this Senate today, it refers to all relevant 
U.N. Security Council resolutions. ``All relevant . . . .'' What does 
that mean? And they keep referring to 660 and 678 and 687. I would like 
to discuss those resolutions with those who will do so. I hope they 
come on the floor. Where are they? Where are these men of great 
strength? Let them come to the floor. I want to debate with them these 
so-called resolutions.
  In this resolution that is before the Senate, S.J. Res. 46, it refers 
to relevant resolutions. They keep talking about the relevant 
resolutions. What resolutions are they talking about enforcing? Are 
they talking about 660? Are they talking about 678? No. 678 was adopted 
on November 29, 1990. Is that what they are talking about? U.N. 
Resolution 687 was the enforcement resolution. That was the resolution 
that authorized the member states to act to uphold Resolution No. 660. 
But that conferring of authorization was wiped out. No. 678 was wiped 
out by 687 when Iraq contacted the Security Council and accepted 687. 
It was wiped out. So I am prepared to argue that. I do not want to do 
it on my flimsy 1 hour, but I am prepared.
  I have heard the Senator from Connecticut--he is not in the Chamber 
right now, but he will be back. I have heard him and others refer to 
the so-called relevant resolutions. They have been wiped out. They are 
gone, and no single member state can revive them. They were 
extinguished on April 6,

[[Page S10247]]

1991, when Iraq signified to the Security Council that it accepted the 
terms of 687.
  Now we can talk about that at a later time. I would love to get into 
it. I would like to get into a discussion on that, but for now, suffice 
it to say, what I am saying is this resolution we are talking about 
would accept as fact certain things that are not facts--this blank 
check we have been talking about that we are going to turn over to this 
President of the United States, the power to determine when, where, 
how, and for how long he will use the military forces of the United 
States. It is flimsy. That resolution is full of holes. The whereas 
clauses are full of holes. Now they have been wiped out by unanimous 
consent so they are no longer ``whereas'' but ``since.'' It is flimsy. 
Full of holes. Ambiguities. Statements of facts that are not facts. I 
am ready to debate that at any time.

  Mr. DURBIN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BYRD. I am happy to yield.
  Mr. DURBIN. I hope Members will carefully read this amendment by 
Senator Byrd. This amendment says two things. One of these things 
should not even be controversial. It asserts the constitutional 
authority of this Chamber and the U.S. Congress to declare war. The 
Senator and I have stood together on this floor.
  Mr. BYRD. Here it is, my Constitution.
  Mr. DURBIN. I thought you might have your Constitution with you.
  The Senator and I have stood on the floor and argued this point. 
Sometimes we did not fare so well. Keep in mind there was a question at 
the beginning of this debate about Iraq as to whether or not Congress 
would be engaged. Some argued that the President had the authority of 
his father's resolutions.
  The second point made by Senator Byrd in this resolution is one I 
hope you will read carefully because I address part of this in an 
amendment I will offer later. He establishes a standard by which we 
would declare war. A standard is stated clearly: A clear threat of 
imminent, sudden, direct attack upon the United States, its possessions 
or territories, or the Armed Forces.
  I hope Members of the Senate will read that. If that is not a 
standard by which we will measure whether this Nation will dedicate its 
Armed Forces and risk the lives of Americans in combat and the lives of 
innocent victims, I cannot imagine what we are going to debate. To take 
any other standard is to take the power away from Congress to declare 
war. This is a constitutional resolution. I applaud the Senator from 
West Virginia for offering it.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the distinguished Senator. How much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Thirteen minutes.
  Mr. BYRD. I hope Senators will show an abundance of mercy before the 
day is over and perhaps give me some more time.
  Mr. President, this week the Senate is considering a very important 
resolution. The language of this resolution has been touted as a 
bipartisan compromise that addresses the concerns of both the White 
House and the Democratic leadership in Congress. But the only thing 
that I see being compromised in this resolution is this Constitution of 
the United States, which I hold in my hand, and the power that 
Constitution gives to Congress to declare war. This resolution we are 
considering is a dangerous step toward a government in which one man at 
the other end of this avenue holds in his hand the power to use the 
world's most powerful military force in whatever manner he chooses, 
whenever he chooses, wherever he chooses, and wherever he perceives a 
threat against national security.
  The Bush administration has announced a new security doctrine that 
advocates acting preemptively to head off threats to U.S. national 
security. Much has been said about the diplomatic problem with this 
doctrine. But we should also recognize that the administration's new 
approach to war may also pose serious problems for our own 
constitutional system.
  In the proposed use-of-force resolution, the White House lawyers 
claim ``the President has authority under the Constitution to use force 
in order to defend the national security interests of the United 
States.''
  It says no such thing. I dare them to go to the Constitution and 
point out where that Constitution says what they say it said. They 
cannot do it. I know the job of any good lawyer--I have never been a 
practicing lawyer, but I know the job of a good lawyer is to craft 
legal interpretations that are most beneficial to the client. But for 
the life of me, I cannot find any basis for such a broad, expansive 
interpretation in the interpretation of the Constitution of the United 
States. Find it. Show it to me. You can't do it.
  Where in the Constitution is it written that the title of Commander 
in Chief carries with it the power to decide unilaterally whether to 
commit the resources of the United States to war? Show it to me, 
lawyers, lawyers of the White House, or lawyers in this body. Show it.
  There is a dangerous agenda, believe me, underlying these broad 
claims by this White House. The President is hoping to secure power 
under the Constitution that no President has ever claimed before. 
Never. He wants the power--the Bush administration wants that President 
to have power to launch this Nation into war without provocation and 
without clear evidence of an imminent attack on the United States. And 
we are going to be foolish enough to give it to him. I never thought I 
would see the day in these 44 years I have been in this body, never did 
I think I would see the day when we would cede this kind of power to 
any President. The White House lawyers have redefined the President's 
power under the Constitution to repel sudden acts against the United 
States. And he has that power, to repel sudden, unforeseen 
attacks against the United States, against its possessions, its 
territories, and its Armed Forces.

  But they suggest he could also justify military action whenever there 
is a high risk of a surprise attack. That Constitution, how they would 
love to stretch it to give this President that power which he does not 
have. Those White House lawyers would have us believe that the 
President has independent authority not only to repel attacks but to 
prevent them. How silly. You cannot find it in that Constitution.
  The White House wants to redefine the President's implied power under 
the Constitution to repel sudden attacks, suggesting that the realities 
of the modern world justify preemptive military action whenever there 
is a high risk of a surprise attack. What in the world are they 
teaching in law school these days? What are they teaching? I never 
heard of such as that when I was in law school. Of course I had to go 
at night. I had to go 10 years to get my law degree. In the national 
security strategy released last week, a few days ago, the President 
argued--let me tell you what the President argued--we must adapt the 
concept of imminent threat to the capabilities of today's adversary. 
Get that.
  Defense Secretary Rumsfeld echoed this sentiment when he told the 
Senate Armed Services Committee: I suggest that any who insist on 
perfect evidence are back in the 20th century and still thinking in 
pre-9/11 years.
  What a profound statement that was. How profound. Perhaps the 
Secretary of Defense ought to go back to law school, too. I don't 
believe he was taught that in law school.
  The President does not want to shackle his new doctrine of 20th 
century ideas of war and security, much less any outdated notion from 
the 18th century about how this Republic should go to war. The Bush 
administration thinks the Constitution, with its inefficient separation 
of powers and its cumbersome checks and balances--they are cumbersome--
has become an anachronism in a world of international terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction.
  They say it is too old. This Constitution, which I hold in my hand, 
is an anachronism. It is too old. It was all right back in the 19th 
century. It was all right in the 20th century. But we are living in a 
new time, a new age. There it is, right up there, inscribed, ``Novus 
ordo seclorum.'' A new order of the ages. New order of the ages.
  This modern President does not have time for old-fashioned political 
ideas that complicate his job of going after the bad guys single-
handedly.
  And make no mistake, the resolution we are considering will allow the 
President to go it alone at every stage of the

[[Page S10248]]

process. It will be President Bush, by himself, who defines the 
national security interests of the United States. It will be President 
Bush, by himself, who identifies threats to our national security. It 
will be President Bush, by himself, who decides when those threats 
justify a bloody and costly war. And it will be President Bush, by 
himself, who determines what the objectives of such a war should be, 
and when it should begin and when it should end.
  The most dangerous part of this modernized approach to war is the 
wide latitude the President will have to identify which threats present 
a ``high risk'' to national security. The administration's National 
Security Strategy briefly outlines a few common attributes shared by 
dangerous ``rogue states,'' but the administration is careful not to 
confine its doctrine to any fixed set of objective criteria for 
determining when the threat posed by any one of these states is 
sufficient to warrant preemptive action.
  The President's doctrine--and we are about to put our stamp on it, 
the stamp of this Senate. The President's doctrine, get this, gives 
him--Him? Who is he? He puts his britches on just the same way I do. He 
is a man. I respect his office. But look what we are turning over to 
this man, one man.
  The President's doctrine gives him a free hand to justify almost any 
military action with unsubstantiated allegations and arbitrary risk 
assessments.
  Even if Senators accept the argument that the United States does not 
have to wait until it has been attacked before acting to protect its 
citizens, the President does not have the power to decide when and 
where such action is justified, especially when his decision is 
supported only by fear and speculation. The power to make that decision 
belongs here in Congress. That is where it belongs. That is where this 
Constitution vests it. The power to make this decision belongs to 
Congress and Congress alone.
  Ultimately, Congress must decide whether the threat posed by Iraq is 
compelling enough to mobilize this Nation to war. Deciding questions of 
war is a heavy burden for every Member of Congress. It is the most 
serious responsibility imposed on us by the Constitution. We should not 
shrink from our duty to provide authority to the President where action 
is needed. But just as importantly, we should not shrink from our 
constitutional duty to decide for ourselves whether launching this 
Nation into war is an appropriate response to the threats facing our 
people--those people looking, watching this debate through that 
electronic lens there. They are the ones who will have to suffer. It is 
their sons and daughters whose blood will be spilled. Our ultimate duty 
is not to the President. They say: Give the President the benefit of 
the doubt. Why, how sickening that idea is. Our ultimate duty is not to 
the President of the United States. I don't give a darn whether he is a 
Democrat or Republican or an Independent--whatever. It makes no 
difference. I don't believe that our ultimate duty is to him. Our 
ultimate duty is to the people out there who elected us.
  Our duty is not to rubber-stamp the language of the President's 
resolution, but to honor the text of the Constitution. Our duty is not 
to give the President a blank check to enforce his foreign policy 
doctrine, but to exercise our legislative power to protect the national 
security interests of this Republic.
  Our constitutional system was designed to prevent the executive from 
plunging the Nation into war in the name of contrived ideals and 
political ambitions. The nature of the threats posed by a sudden attack 
on the United States may have changed dramatically since the time when 
Constitution was drafted, but the reasons for limiting the war powers 
of the President have not changed at all. In fact, the concerns of the 
Framers are even more relevant. Talk about this being old fashioned. 
The concerns of the Framers are even more relevant to the dangerous 
global environment in which our military must now operate, because the 
consequences of unchecked military action may be more severe for our 
citizens than ever before.

  Congress has the sole power under the Constitution to decide whether 
the threat posed by Iraq is compelling enough to mobilize this nation 
to war, and no Presidential doctrine can change that. If President Bush 
wants our foreign policy to include any military action, whether for 
preemption, containment, or any other objective, he must first convince 
Congress that such a policy is in the best interest of the American 
people.
  The amendment I am offering reaffirms the obligation of the Congress 
to decide whether this country should go to war. It makes clear that 
Congress retains this power, even in the event that we pass this broad 
language, which I believe gives the President a blank check to initiate 
war whenever he wants, wherever he wants, and against any perceived 
enemy he can link to Iraq. My amendment makes clear that the President 
has the power to respond to the threat of an imminent, sudden, and 
direct attack by Iraq against the United States, and that any military 
action that does not serve this purpose must be specifically authorized 
by the Congress.
  Other Senators have said on the floor that the language of this 
resolution does not give the President a blank check, and they have 
said that this resolution is narrowly tailored to Iraq. I do not read 
the resolution that way, but I hope that the President does. I hope the 
President reads this resolution as a narrowly crafted authorization to 
deal with Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and not as an open-ended 
endorsement of his doctrine of preemptive military action.
  We should all hope that the President does not fully exercise his 
authority under this resolution, and that he does not abuse the 
imprecise language Congress may ultimately adopt. But I believe that 
Congress must do more than give the President a blank check and then 
stand aside and hope for the best. Congress must make clear that this 
resolution does not affect its constitutional power to declare war 
under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution; otherwise, this 
resolution may appear to delegate this important legislative function 
to the executive
  My amendment also clarifies the intent of this resolution is limited 
to authorizing a military response to the threat of an Iraqi attack 
upon the United States. Congress must ensure that the broad language of 
this resolution does not allow the President to use this authority to 
act outside the boundaries of his constitutional powers. This amendment 
affirms the constitutional requirement that the President must have 
congressional authorization before initiating military action for any 
purpose other than defending the United States against an imminent, 
sudden, and direct attack. We must not provide the temptation to this 
President, or any president, to unleash the dogs of war for reasons 
beyond those anticipated by the Congress.
  The power of Congress to declare war is a political check on the 
President's ability to arbitrarily commit the United States to changing 
military doctrines, and the evolving nature of war and security threats 
does not change the language of the Constitution. The President cannot 
use the uncertainty of terrorist threats to confuse the clearly defined 
political processes required by the Constitution, and Congress should 
not rush to endorse a doctrine that will commit untold American 
resources to unknown military objectives.
  The President admits in his National Security Strategy that 
``America's constitution has served us well.'' But his actions suggest 
that he feels this service is no longer needed. Congress should ensure 
that the Constitution continues to serve our national security 
interests by preventing the United States from plunging headlong into 
an ever-growing war in the Middle East. I urge my colleagues to support 
this amendment in order to preserve the constitutional system of checks 
and balances that the founders of this republic valued so highly.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I would like to be recognized on a 
unanimous consent request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, based on the conversation I had earlier 
today, with everybody--Senator Byrd--about what is not in the Record, 
one of the things we did not do is dispose of the other amendments. 
Reciting from the Record, I said we

[[Page S10249]]

will dispose--they will offer no other amendments tomorrow.
  That is today, speaking for Senator Durbin, Senator Boxer, and 
Senator Levin. So I ask unanimous consent that their other amendments 
at the desk be withdrawn from the desk.
  Mr. BYRD. What is the request?
  Mr. REID. I was reading from the Record that the amendments of 
Durbin, Boxer, and Levin are not going to be offered. They are being 
withdrawn from the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator asking the amendments be 
recalled?
  Mr. REID. Yes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Senator Dayton would also ask his be recalled. I ask 
unanimous consent that be the case.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is recalled.
  The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. How much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 14 minutes 40 seconds.
  Mr. McCAIN. I would like to yield 3 minutes to the Senator from 
Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, the case that the Senator from West 
Virginia makes is a good case on the merits of whether or not we 
should, in fact, delegate this authority, but I am confused by the 
argument that constitutionally we are unable to delegate that 
authority.
  Historically, the way in which the delegation of the authority under 
the constitutional separation of powers doctrine functions is there 
have to be some parameters to the delegation. For example, we could not 
delegate to the President the authority to pick and confirm any Supreme 
Court Justice he wanted to confirm.
  The essence of the constitutional argument which my friend from West 
Virginia makes is, I assume, that there are no parameters to this 
delegation; therefore, the delegation per se is unconstitutional. I 
assume that is the rationale. But as I read this grant of authority, it 
is not so broad as to make it unconstitutional for us, under the war 
clause of the Constitution, to delegate to the President the power to 
use force if certain conditions exist. My time is about up, but I would 
argue that in section 4(a), subsections (1) and (2), the conjunctive 
``and'' instead of ``or'' exists, which means that as a practical 
matter in reading this, the only circumstance the President could find, 
in my view, that the national security was being threatened would be as 
it relates to the resolutions relating to weapons of mass destruction. 
But I will speak to that later. I appreciate my friend yielding me the 
time.
  But, again, constitutionally, this resolution meets the test of our 
ability to delegate. It is not an overly broad delegation which would 
make it per se unconstitutional, in my view.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, according to the letter of the Byrd 
amendment, a clear threat of imminent, sudden, and direct attack upon 
the United States, its possessions or territories, et cetera, clearly 
would have, would absolutely deprive the President of the United States 
of what he is seeking today. It would deprive the President of the 
United States of the authority he has requested to compel Saddam 
Hussein to disarm, so let's have no doubt about the impact of this 
amendment.
  The President has spoken clearly of the threat Saddam Hussein's 
regime poses to America and the world today--even though Iraq today 
clearly does not meet the Byrd amendment's standard of threatening 
imminent, sudden, and direct attack upon the United States of our Armed 
Forces. To wait for Saddam Hussein to threaten imminent attack against 
America would be to acquiesce to his development of nuclear weapons, to 
ignore his record of aggression against his neighbors, and to disregard 
his continuing threats to destroy Israel.
  Failure now to make the choice to remove Saddam Hussein from power 
will leave us with choices later, when Saddam's inevitable acquisition 
of nuclear weapons will make it much more dangerous to defend our 
friends and interests in the region. It will permit Saddam to control 
much of the region, and to wield its resources in ways that can only 
weaken America's position. It will put Israel's very survival at risk, 
with moral consequences no American can welcome.
  Failure to end the danger posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq makes it 
more likely that the interaction we believe to have occurred between 
members of al-Qaida and Saddam's regime may increasingly take the form 
of active cooperation to target the United States.
  We live in a world in which international terrorists continue to this 
day to plot mass murder in America. Saddam Hussein unquestionably has 
strong incentives to cooperate with al-Qaida. Whatever they may or may 
not have in common, their overwhelming hostility to America and 
rejection of any moral code suggest that collaboration against us would 
be natural. It is all too imaginable. Whether or not it has yet 
happened, the odds favor it--and they are not odds the United States 
can accept.
  Standing by while an odious regime with a history of support for 
terrorism develops weapons whose use by terrorists could literally kill 
millions of Americans is not a choice. It is an abdication. In this new 
era, preventive action to target rogue regimes is not only imaginable 
but necessary.
  Who would not have attacked Osama bib Laden's network before 
September 11th had we realized that his intentions to bring harm to 
America were matched by the capability to do so? Who would not have 
heeded Churchill's call to stand up to Adolf Hitler in the 1930's, 
while Europe slept and appeasement fed the greatest threat to Western 
civilization the world had ever known? Who would not have supported 
Israel's bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981 had we then known, 
as Israel knew, that Saddam was on the verge of developing the bomb?
  In the new era we entered last September, warning of an attack before 
it happens is a luxury we cannot expect. Waiting for imminence of 
attack could be catastrophic. Many fear we will not know of an attack 
until it happens--and should our enemies use weapons of mass 
destruction in such an attack, the deaths of thousands or millions of 
Americans could occur with no warning--as happened last September. In 
this age, to wait for our enemies to come to us is suicidal.
  In 1962, President Kennedy made the point that America cannot wait 
until we face the threat of open attack without gravely endangering our 
security. In President Kennedy's words, ``Neither the United States of 
America, nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate 
deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or 
small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of 
weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to 
constitute maximum peril.''
  The Byrd amendment would overturn the doctrine announced by the 
President of the United States to guide his administration's conduct of 
American national security policy. The Byrd amendment would negate any 
Congressional resolution authorizing the President to use all means to 
protect America from the threat posed by Iraq. It would set such a high 
threshold for the use of military force as to render the Commander in 
Chief powerless to respond to the clear and present danger Saddam 
Hussein's regime poses to America and the world.
  I urge my colleagues to reject the Byrd amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, how much time do I have left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 7 minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Delaware.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, this is one of the confusing aspects of 
this debate. I find myself supporting this resolution but worried that 
supporting this resolution will get us into real trouble.
  We use Saddam, Hitler, and al-Qaida all in the same verbiage and 
language. Let me make the real distinction, as I see it, regarding 
preemption.
  If we knew that al-Qaida had particular weapons, knowing, as we did, 
what their stated objective was, and with the intelligence we had, we 
would be fully within our rights--not under

[[Page S10250]]

any doctrine of preemption--because of the existence of a clear, 
present, and imminent danger to move against al-Qaida.
  Conversely, with Hitler in the 1930s, the rationale for moving 
against Hitler wasn't a doctrine of preemption because we knew he was a 
bad guy. It was because his country signed the Treaty of Versailles. He 
was violating the Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty of Versailles did 
not have an end date on it. It didn't say you cannot have forces for 
the first 2 or 3 years, or you cannot do the following things. We were 
fully within our rights as a world community to go after Hitler in 
1934, 1935, 1936, or 1937. It was not based on the doctrine of 
preemption but a doctrine of enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles, 
and in a very limited time.
  What we have here, I argue, as the rationale for going after Saddam, 
is that he signed a cease-fire agreement. The condition for his 
continuing in power was the elimination of his weapons of mass 
destruction, and the permission to have inspectors in to make sure he 
had eliminated them. He expelled those inspectors. So he violated the 
cease-fire; ergo, we have authority--not under a doctrine of 
preemption. This will not be a preemptive strike, if we go with the 
rest of the world. It will be an enforcement strike.
  I hope we don't walk out of here with my voting for this final 
document and somebody 6 months from now or 6 years from now will say we 
have the right now to establish this new doctrine of preemption and go 
wherever we want anytime.
  The part on which I do empathize with my friend from West Virginia is 
this is not a very clearly written piece of work. That is why I think 
Senator Lugar and myself and others had a better way of doing this. But 
it does incorporate with the President's words the notion that we are 
operating relative to weapons of mass destruction and U.S. security 
interests and enforcement--not preemption.
  I conclude by saying that the President started his speech explaining 
the reason why he wanted his resolution on Monday. I guess it was 
Monday. And he said at the very outset that this is based upon 
enforcing what was committed to in dealing with weapons of mass 
destruction.
  I know my time is up. I will speak to this more later.
  I am opposed to the Byrd amendment, but I hope we don't establish 
some totally new doctrine in our opposition to it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. How much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three and one-half minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from 
Tennessee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Arizona. I 
appreciate what the Senator from Delaware just said. I think it makes a 
lot of sense.
  I have many concerns about this amendment, but two stick out to me as 
I read it. My concern is that, under this rationale, if we were told we 
had good intelligence and we were convinced that within, let us say, 6 
months we were going to be attacked, it would still not fit the 
definition of imminent and sudden.
  As I read it, the threat must be an imminent, sudden, and direct 
attack upon the United States. A sudden attack of 6 months would not 
qualify. It might be imminent, but it certainly wouldn't be sudden. I 
don't think we can afford that luxury.
  Second, our allies are totally excluded. Do we want to announce to 
the world that there must be only an imminent, sudden, direct attack 
upon the United States, its possessions, territories, and our Armed 
Forces, leaving our allies in that particular part of the world totally 
undefended by the United States? I don't think that is a message we 
want to send.
  I respectfully oppose the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, in summary, this amendment regarding the 
preservation of Congress's constitutional authority is unnecessary. A 
portion of the amendment that would limit the authority of the 
President to wage war is arguably unconstitutional. The Congress can 
declare war, but it cannot dictate to the President how to wage war. No 
law passed by Congress could alter the constitutional separation of 
powers.
  I urge my colleagues to defeat this amendment.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
4868.
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 14, nays 86, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 234 Leg.]

                                YEAS--14

     Boxer
     Byrd
     Dayton
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Kennedy
     Leahy
     Mikulski
     Murray
     Sarbanes
     Specter
     Wellstone

                                NAYS--86

     Akaka
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Campbell
     Cantwell
     Carnahan
     Carper
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Edwards
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Johnson
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden
  The amendment (No. 4868) was rejected.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Edwards). The Senator from Virginia is 
recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is the intention of the Senate now to 
proceed to the Levin amendment No. 4862, with 50 minutes for the 
Senator from Michigan, 15 minutes for the Senator from Delaware, 15 
minutes for the Senator from Arizona, Mr. McCain, and 15 minutes for 
the Senator from Virginia. It is the intention of the Senator from 
Virginia to see that time is given to the distinguished Senator from 
Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman.
  We are now awaiting the opening statement of our distinguished 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I advise Senators that at the 
completion of that time, it is the intention of the Senator from 
Virginia to move to table the amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator will withhold for a moment.


                           Amendment No. 4862

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
proceed to consider amendment No. 4862, the Levin amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in consultation with my colleagues, I 
withdraw the comment at this time of the desire of the Senator from 
Virginia to table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield myself 8 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the short title of our amendment is ``The 
Multilateral Use of Force Authorization Act of 2002.'' The very title 
of this alternative to the Lieberman-Warner amendment establishes both 
its similarity and its difference from the Lieberman amendment.
  It is similar because both of our approaches authorize the use of 
U.S.

[[Page S10251]]

Armed Forces. It is different because our resolution authorizes the use 
of force multilaterally pursuant to a U.N. resolution that the 
President has asked the Security Council to adopt for the purpose of 
destroying Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and prohibited 
missile delivery systems.
  Our resolution also supports the President's call and urges the 
United Nations Security Council to promptly adopt a resolution that 
demands Iraq to provide unconditional access, unconditional destruction 
of all weapons of mass destruction and, in the same resolution, 
authorize U.N. member states to use military force to enforce that 
resolution.
  Our resolution also affirms that the United States has at all times 
the inherent right to use military force in self-defense. There is no 
veto given the United Nations in this resolution of ours. Quite the 
opposite. We explicitly make it clear we maintain, of course, a right 
to use self-defense. And we provide that the Congress will not adjourn 
sine die this year, but will return to session to consider promptly 
proposals relative to Iraq if, in the judgment of the President, the 
United Nations fails to adopt or enforce the United Nations resolution 
for which he and we call.
  The Lieberman resolution, like ours, authorizes the use of U.S. 
military force to enforce the Security Council resolution that is being 
sought by the President, as well as in the case of the Lieberman 
resolution, as well as earlier U.N. resolutions. But the Lieberman 
resolution also would authorize the use of force on a unilateral basis, 
not requiring that there be an imminent threat, which is essential to 
using force in self-defense preemptively under international law, but a 
lower threshold called a continuing threat.

  That would be a departure from the requirement in international law 
that the use of force in self-defense be for imminent threats. That can 
have significant negative consequences for the world. If other nations 
adopt that precedent, if India and Pakistan adopt that precedent, two 
nuclear-armed nations, they can find continuing threats against each 
other, not imminent, just continuing threats and, using our precedent, 
if we adopt the Lieberman resolution, say: That is the new standard in 
international law; it does not have to be an imminent threat; we can 
preemptively attack a neighbor and anybody else if, in our judgment, it 
is a continuing threat.
  If China decided that Taiwan, which it labels a renegade province, is 
a threat to its security, then under this precedent it can attack 
Taiwan under the approach that ``imminent'' is no longer a requirement.
  Acting multilaterally--multilaterally--as our alternative resolution 
does--in other words, with the backing of the United Nations--has a 
number of advantages. It will garner the most support from other 
nations and avoid the negative consequences of being deprived of 
airbases, supply bases, overflight rights, and command-and-control 
facilities that are needed for military action.
  Saudi Arabia has already said explicitly: If you do not get a U.N. 
resolution, you cannot use our military bases. And other nations have 
said the same. If they are going to be involved with us in using force 
against Iraq, they want the authority of a U.N. resolution to do it.
  Our resolution has a better chance of success in persuading Saddam 
Hussein to comply, to capitulate, to cooperate finally with the U.N. 
weapons inspectors and to disarm because it will have the world 
community looking at the other end of the barrel down at him.
  Our multilateral resolution reduces the chances of losing support 
from other nations in the war on terrorism, and we need law 
enforcement, intelligence, and financial cooperation from other 
nations.
  Our multilateral approach reduces the potential for instability in an 
already volatile region, and that instability can undermine Jordan, 
Pakistan, and possibly even end up with a radical regime in Pakistan, a 
nuclear weapon nation.
  Our multilateral approach reduces the likelihood of Saddam Hussein or 
his military commanders using biological or chemical weapons against 
our forces, as he will be looking, again, down the barrel of a gun with 
the world at the other end rather than only at the United States.
  Both General Shalikashvili and General Clark testified in front of 
our committee that there is a significant advantage to our troops by 
going multilaterally in terms of the likely response of Saddam Hussein 
to a unilateral attack by the United States and the likelier use of 
weapons of mass destruction by him in response to a unilateral attack.
  Our multilateral approach will increase the number of nations that 
will be willing to participate in the fighting. It will increase the 
number of nations that will be willing to participate in the long and 
costly effort in a post-Saddam Iraq, and we would be avoiding setting 
that precedent of using force preemptively without an imminent threat.

  Mr. President, if we are serious about going to the U.N., as the 
President has said he is, we must focus our efforts there. We should 
not send an inconsistent message. We should not take the U.N. off the 
hook. We should not say: We really are interested in the U.N. acting, 
adopting a resolution, requiring an unconditional opening by Saddam, 
requiring the destruction of his weapons of mass destruction.
  We are saying we really mean that; that is the kind of resolution we 
want. We are saying that. We also want that resolution to authorize 
member states to use military force to enforce it. That is what we are 
saying on the one hand, but if the Lieberman resolution passes, then we 
will be sending the exact opposite message: If you do not, we will 
anyway.
  That takes the U.N. off the hook. That blurs the focus that we should 
be placing on the importance of multilateral action authorized by the 
United Nations.
  I believe that Saddam Hussein must be forced to disarm. I think it is 
going to take force, or the threat of force, to get him to comply.
  It seems to me there is a huge advantage if that force is 
multilateral, and going it alone is a very different calculus with very 
different risks.
  If we fail at the U.N., then under our resolution, the President can 
come back at any time he determines that the U.N. is not acting to 
either adopt or enforce its resolution. He can then come back here 
under our resolution, call us back into session, and then urge us to 
authorize a going-it-alone, unilateral resolution.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield 8 minutes to Senator Bingaman.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I rise to speak on the two resolutions 
that the Senator from Michigan has talked about in his comments because 
there are two resolutions before the Senate, both of which authorize 
the President to use force, if necessary, against Iraq.
  Before I discuss those, let me just say a few words about the war on 
terrorism which has engaged the attention of this entire Nation during 
the last 13 months.
  Before I discuss those, I congratulate the President on the way he 
was able to bring our country together after the attack of September 11 
of last year. In cooperation with the President, Congress put aside 
other matters, put aside partisan issues, and acted quickly to 
appropriate necessary funds and to enact important legislation to help 
safeguard our country and its citizens. I think all of us in Congress 
joined in meeting this challenge, and I am proud we were able to do so.
  The President has come to us again, and this time he has focused 
attention on another threat--that is, the threat that Saddam Hussein, 
the leader of Iraq, will use weapons of mass destruction against us or 
our allies or that he will provide such weapons to terrorists for them 
to use.
  The President has indicated his belief that regime change in Iraq is 
needed to deal with this threat, but he makes the point that at this 
time he has not made a decision about whether or when to commence any 
military action.
  The United Nations, for many years, has agreed with our country's 
view that Saddam Hussein should not be permitted to possess weapons of 
mass destruction. An inspection regime was established by the United 
Nations in April of 1991, and inspections by UNSCOM continued until 
August of 1998 to ensure that weapons were not being developed or 
maintained.

[[Page S10252]]

I11In December of 1998, Iraq expelled those weapons inspectors, and 
since that time it is widely believed the likelihood of such weapons 
being developed in Iraq has increased.
  So in response to this threat, the President has urged Congress to 
adopt a broadly worded resolution that authorizes him at any time in 
the future:

       To use the Armed Forces of the United States as he 
     determines to be necessary and appropriate, in order to 
     defend the national security of the United States against the 
     continuing threat posed by Iraq; and enforce the United 
     Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.

  Senator Levin, who is chairman of the Armed Services Committee, with 
whom I have been privileged to serve for the last 20 years, has urged 
us to adopt a different resolution that grants the President the 
authority to use military power, but Senator Levin's proposed 
resolution differs from the broad grant of authority the President has 
requested in two very significant ways.
  First, it authorizes the use of force at this time only pursuant to a 
resolution of the U.N. Security Council. In this way, we would be 
ensuring our actions to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 
continue to be taken in coordination with our allies.
  Second, the Levin resolution authorizes the use of:

       The Armed Forces of the United States to destroy, remove, 
     or render harmless Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, 
     nuclear weapons-usable material, ballistic missiles with a 
     range greater than 150 kilometers, and related facilities, if 
     Iraq fails to comply with the terms of the Security Council 
     resolution.

  There is a specific objective we are saying the President is 
authorized to use military force to accomplish.
  The Levin resolution does not authorize unilateral action at this 
time to accomplish so-called regime change. Rather, it would leave open 
the option for the President to come back to seek and obtain that 
authority from Congress if and when he determines that military action 
against Iraq is required, even without U.N. sanction.
  I strongly support giving the President authority to work with our 
allies in the United Nations, to inspect for, locate, and destroy 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. It may well prove necessary to use 
military force to accomplish that objective. In my view, the Levin 
resolution grants the President that authority. Unless that effort, 
which is already underway, fails, I believe it would be wrong for us to 
grant authority to the President to use U.S. Armed Forces in what is 
essentially a unilateral action to achieve goals that are, at best, 
vague and broad.
  The President has made clear that in his view our goal should be 
regime change. The argument is Saddam Hussein has shown such a 
proclivity to lie, cheat, and evade that anything short of regime 
change will leave us vulnerable to a future attack by Iraq.
  Depending on the success of our current efforts to reinstitute an 
inspection regime, the American people and our allies may well conclude 
the President is correct. We may have to conclude that finding and 
destroying weapons of mass destruction in Iraq cannot be achieved as 
long as Saddam Hussein is in power, and if that is the necessary 
conclusion we reach, then a major military action will likely be 
required, with all the casualties and consequences such an action 
entails.
  Our allies have not reached that conclusion yet. They believe a new 
inspection regime can be made to work and that the threat can be dealt 
with short of going to war. At least they believe it is worthwhile for 
us to make that final effort.
  The President's proposed resolution authorizes him:

       To use the Armed Forces of the United States as he 
     determines to be necessary and appropriate.

  This is, in my view, a virtually open-ended grant of authority. It is 
not a proper action for Congress to take at this time. I do not believe 
it is wise at this point to be authorizing war without the support of 
the United Nations and our allies. If war must be waged, other 
countries should be there with us, sharing the costs, both the 
financial and human costs, and helping restore stability in what will 
almost certainly be the tumultuous aftermath of that military action.
  I also do not favor an authorization for war unless and until the 
President is prepared to advise Congress that war is necessary, and he 
has explicitly said he is not prepared to advise us of that at this 
time.
  For all these reasons, I will support the resolution put forth by 
Senator Levin and not support the much broader grant of authority urged 
by the President.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will my colleague yield for a question on 
my time and a response on his time? In other words, I will ask the 
question on the time allocated to me and the Senator can respond on the 
time allocated to him.
  Mr. LEVIN. I am afraid my time is allocated totally, unless it can be 
a brief answer. I would be happy to answer briefly.
  Mr. WARNER. Then I am going to have to narrow our ability to enter 
into a colloquy, which you and I have done so many times.
  I will ask one question: As I read this amendment, I find it could be 
interpreted as precluding the ability to enforce the existing 
resolutions, namely 688, the no-fly zone. If the Senator wants a few 
minutes to study and reflect on that, I would like to have the Senator 
think this through. That is one very serious shortcoming. In other 
words, for 11 years we have been enforcing the no-fly zone, but as I 
read this, it could be construed as stopping that. I make that point.
  Mr. LEVIN. I would be happy to answer that. It would be misconstrued 
if it were interpreted that way. This does not preclude the President 
from doing anything. This is an authorization. It is not a prohibition. 
It is an authorization to the President to use force. It does not 
preclude the President. It does not say the President may not use 
force. It says the President is authorized to use force. So there is no 
prohibition; there is no negative.
  The President has sought our authority. This resolution would give 
the President that authority.
  Mr. WARNER. I draw my colleague's attention to the fact it would 
require the United States to wait for the U.N. Security Council to act 
on a resolution before the President could take action to protect our 
national security interests.
  Mr. LEVIN. Which is the WMD issue. It is only the WMD issue that is 
referred to.
  Mr. WARNER. I will have to reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Connecticut.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair and I thank my friend from Virginia 
for yielding me the time.
  Mr. SARBANES. Parliamentary inquiry: Will the Chair inform us what 
the time allocations are and how much time is remaining.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Levin began with 50 minutes and has 33 
minutes remaining. Senator Biden has 15 minutes, Senator McCain has 15 
minutes, and Senator Warner has used 2 of his 15 minutes.
  Mr. SARBANES. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment offered 
by my friend, the Senator from Michigan. It seems to me, as I look at 
this amendment, that the difference we have--those of us who have 
sponsored the underlying resolution, and the Senator from Michigan and 
others sponsoring the amendment--is over tactics, not 
objectives. Perhaps we should acknowledge one to the other. We each 
have the objective, I believe, to compel Saddam Hussein to comply with 
the various U.N. Security Council resolutions, and in that sense, 
particularly, to disarm.

  I suggest to my friend from Michigan, noting how he continues to 
refer to his amendment as the multilateral approach, that those who 
sponsored the underlying resolution consider ours to be a multilateral 
international approach as well. We believe our willingness not only to 
accept and urge and encourage the President to go to the United Nations 
and hope the United Nations will authorize use of force if

[[Page S10253]]

Saddam Hussein does not comply with their resolutions but our 
willingness after that fact to say if that does not happen, the 
President has the right to utilize America's Armed Forces for that 
purpose, is probably the better way to achieve an international action 
against Iraq under Saddam Hussein. To show our willingness, our 
seriousness to use military force to lead an international coalition 
ourselves is the better way to convince the United Nations to take 
action on its own and therefore to have an international act.
  There is a disagreement about tactics. The disagreement is whether we 
should do all this in one resolution, as we have, or, as the Senator 
from Michigan proposes in the amendment, to have two steps: First, go 
to the United Nations, only allow enforcement, particularly of the 
resolutions concerning Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, to be done 
by the United States with the permission of the United Nations. If that 
does not work, the President must come back for a separate resolution.
  Last night in a colloquy with the Senator from Michigan, I suggested 
that his resolution does in fact give the Security Council a veto over 
the President's determination, the President's capacity, to use the 
American military to enforce certainly those resolutions having to do 
with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and related 
facilities.
  It seems to me, notwithstanding the fact that the Senator's amendment 
affirms the President's inherent right to use military force in self-
defense, section 4(a) also makes clear the President of the United 
States can only do that if he wants to take action to destroy or remove 
or render harmless Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons, 
fissile material, ballistics, et cetera, pursuant to a resolution of 
the U.N. Security Council.
  That means any member of the Security Council--Russia, China, France, 
any temporary member--can veto action by the United States, by the 
Commander in Chief. I don't want that to happen.
  The question is, Why assume, if the United Nations does not take 
action, the United States will have to go it alone? Having gone to the 
United Nations, having made our case, the fact is if military action is 
necessary, the United States will never have to go alone. We will have 
allies in Europe, allies in the Middle East, who see our seriousness of 
purpose, who share in our desire to protect themselves and the world 
from Saddam Hussein, who will come to our side. We will have what we 
called in the case of Kosovo a coalition of the willing.
  The Kosovo case is instructive on several points raised in this 
debate. There was no United Nations resolution authorizing the United 
States to deploy forces in the case of Kosovo because everyone, 
including the Clinton administration, the President, determined we 
would possibly be subject to a Russian veto at the Security Council. 
The President was unwilling to accept that. There was no congressional 
resolution then organizing the deployment of our forces because there 
was controversy about that. There was clearly no imminent threat of a 
sudden direct attack against the United States, as in other amendments 
that have been before the Senate, because this was happening in the 
Balkans. But the President of the United States, President Clinton, 
clearly understood what was happening there was wrong. He wanted to 
take action not only to stop the genocide and prevent a wider war in 
Europe but in the most distant threat, to prevent a potential threat to 
the security of the United States, so he formed a coalition of willing 
nations.
  Here the threat from Iraq under Saddam Hussein is much more imminent 
to the United States. So to subject our capacity to defend ourselves 
against that threat to a veto by the United Nations Security Council is 
inappropriate and wrong.
  Again, I state a great phrase from the Bible: If the sound of the 
trumpet is uncertain, who will follow into battle?
  If we sound a certain trumpet with this resolution, which this 
amendment would make uncertain, then many other nations will follow us 
into battle.
  I oppose the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. I will take a few minutes under my time and give to this 
Chamber two quotations that frame the entire debate. The first 
quotation is from 40 years ago. It was the President of the United 
States, John F. Kennedy, in 1962:

       This Nation is prepared to present its case against the 
     Soviet threat to peace and our own proposals for a peaceful 
     world at any time and in any form, in the Organization of 
     American States, in the United Nations, or in any other 
     meeting that could be useful, without limiting our freedom of 
     action.

  This is precisely what this amendment does. It is a total substitute 
for the work that has been done by the Senator from Connecticut, 
working with others, the leadership on both sides of the aisle, and the 
President's staff. That would all come down, and in its place would be 
this resolution which has provisions that could be interpreted as a 
veto, questions the authority of the President, and puts too much 
reliance that the United Nations is going to devise a resolution which 
would meet the criteria that our President and other nations deem 
essential for a new inspection regime.
  That was a quote by President Kennedy.
  Now, 40 years forward, a second quote:

       This resolution gives the President the authority he needs 
     to confront the threat posed by Iraq. It is fundamentally 
     different and a better resolution than the one the President 
     sent to us. It is neither a Democratic resolution nor a 
     Republican resolution. It is now a statement of American 
     resolve and values.

  Continuing:

       For me, the deciding factor is my belief that a united 
     Congress will help the President unite the world, and by 
     uniting the world we can increase the world's chances of 
     succeeding in this effort and reduce both the risks and the 
     cost.

  That quote was made just over 40 minutes ago by the distinguished 
majority leader of the Senate.
  The House of Representatives debated language identical in both 
Chambers. To achieve that united Congress, we must maintain the 
integrity of the amendment that is presently pending. That is the 
amendment by Senator Lieberman and myself, Senator McCain, and Senator 
Bayh.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from California.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I thank Senator Carl Levin for his 
amendment. I thank the State of Michigan for sending Senator Levin to 
the Senate. His independence, his courage, his clear thinking, his love 
of country are evident in the work he has put behind this important 
amendment. I believe his answer to Iraq's challenge is, indeed, the 
right course for this country.
  To me, the issue of Iraq should be approached in the following way. 
Iraq must be held to its word that it will submit to thorough 
inspections and dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction. Let me 
repeat that: Iraq must be held to its word that it will submit to 
thorough inspections and dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction.
  The United Nations should pass an updated resolution ensuring 
unfettered inspections and disarmament, and that should take place or 
there will be dire consequences for Iraq. The weapons they have are a 
threat to the world. The world must respond. If we handle this matter 
correctly, the way Senator Levin is suggesting, I believe the world 
will respond. If we handle it wrong--and I think the underlying 
resolution is the wrong approach--if our allies believe we have not 
made the case, they believe somehow this is a grudge match, or if they 
believe they are being manipulated for domestic political reasons, that 
is going to hurt our Nation and that is going to isolate us.
  Indeed, this rush to pass unilateral authority--I have never seen 
anything quite like what has happened in the Senate. The rush to pass 
unilateral authority, the rush to say to the President, go it alone, 
don't worry about anybody else, is hurting this debate, and this debate 
looks political. It looks political.
  If there are those in the administration who believe this debate 
could hurt Democrats, they may be surprised. Democrats do not walk in 
lockstep. We are independent thinking. I believe the people want that.
  Remember, this administration started out thumbing its nose at the

[[Page S10254]]

Constitution and the role of Congress in terms of war and peace. This 
administration did not want to bring the debate on this war to 
Congress. We have many quotes I have already put in the Record on that 
subject. They did not want the President to go to the United Nations. 
Indeed, they said he did not have to go there; he did not have to come 
here; he did not have to do anything. Also, as the Presiding Officer 
knows, they wanted a resolution that gave the authority far beyond 
Iraq. They wanted to give the President authority to go anywhere in the 
world.

  Now that idea is gone from the underlying Lieberman resolution. So 
checks and balances do work. I think what we ought to do is continue 
those checks and balances by passing the Levin amendment.
  The Levin amendment puts America front and center in a way that will 
win over the civilized world. This is what it does.
  No. 1, it urges the U.N. Security Council to quickly adopt a 
resolution for inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and 
the dismantlement of those weapons.
  No. 2, this new U.N. Security Council resolution urges that we will 
back up the resolution with the use of force, including the United 
States. And the President gets that authority in Senator Levin's 
resolution.
  No. 3, it reaffirms that, under international law and the United 
Nations Charter, the United States has the inherent right to self-
defense. So anybody who says, my God, we are giving everything over to 
the U.N., has not read the resolution.
  Last, it states the Congress will not adjourn sine die so that in a 
moment's notice we can return if the President believes we need to go 
it alone.
  Some have said that the Levin amendment, again, gives veto power to 
the U.N. Security Council. That is not true. Again, under the Levin 
amendment, if the President cannot secure a new U.N. resolution that 
will ensure disarmament of Iraq, he can come back, he can lay out the 
case and answer the questions that have not been answered.
  I have looked back through history. I never have seen a situation 
where the President of the United States asked for the ability to go to 
war alone and yet has not told the American people what that would 
mean. How many troops would be involved? How many casualties might 
there be? Would the U.S. have to foot the entire cost of using force 
against Iraq? If not, which nations are ready to provide financial 
support? Troop support? What will the cost be to rebuild Iraq? How long 
would our troops have to stay there? What if our troops become a target 
for terrorists?
  We have seen in Kuwait, a very secure place for our people; we have 
had terrorist incidents already against our young people there.
  Will weapons of mass destruction be launched against our troops? 
Against Israel? If you read the CIA declassified report--declassified 
report--they are telling us that the chance that he will use them is 
greater if he feels his back is up against the wall. Everybody knows 
the underlying resolution implies regime change. It implies regime 
change. What I think is important about the Levin resolution is that it 
goes to the heart, the core of the matter, which is dismantlement of 
the weapons of mass destruction.
  If Saddam knows his back is against the wall, he will use these.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 1 minute remaining.
  Mrs. BOXER. I thank the President.
  So let's be careful. Why not take the conservative approach, the two-
step approach of the Levin resolution, when it comes to the life and 
death of our people? There are more questions that have not been 
answered, and I have put them in the Record. Yet the President wants 
the authority to go it alone and he has not answered even one of those 
questions to Members of this Senate, let alone to the American people.

  I cannot vote for a blank check for unilateral action. I cannot vote 
for a go-it-alone approach before any of these fundamental questions 
have been answered. Twice in the past 4 years I voted to use force: 
once against Milosevic, once after September 11. So it is not that this 
Senator will never vote for force, but in this case, when the President 
is proposing to go it alone, I think we have the right on behalf of the 
people we represent to have the questions answered.
  In closing, the Levin resolution gives us that two-step approach. It 
says to this President: If you want to go as part of a world force and 
make sure that we get the dismantlement of these weapons, we give you 
the authority and the blessing. If not, come back and ask us and we 
will debate then and we will vote then. I hope we will vote for the 
Levin resolution.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. I understand I have 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, at the outset, let me state that I agree 
with the distinguished Chairman of the Armed Services Committee: U.S. 
policy would be stronger if we received the unequivocal support of the 
United Nations Security Council. Of that, there is no doubt.
  But that does not mean that our country must delegate our national 
security decisionmaking to the United Nations. It is neither morally 
necessary nor wise to give the U.N. Security Council veto power over 
our security.
  I am a supporter of the United Nations. I have supported efforts to 
pay U.S. arrears to the organization. The U.N. does many good deeds 
around the world.
  However, we should not kid ourselves: the Security Council is not a 
repository of moral goodness. It is not some supranational authority on 
international law, world peace or transnational justice. It is a 
collection of nation-states, each of whom makes decisions based on 
their national interests. Five nations have veto power. Ten more can 
vote up or down, or abstain on a given matter. Individual states may 
cloak their decisions in grand rhetoric of global interest, but they 
are driven by cool calculations of self-interest.
  As my friend from Michigan knows, the atmosphere before a Security 
Council vote often resembles a Middle Eastern bazaar more than it does 
a somber courtroom. Deals are cut, resolutions are watered down, and 
statements are made based on the national interests of the five 
permanent Security Council members. That is as it should be, but we 
should not fool ourselves that there is some innate moral authority 
once 15 nations negotiate a deal.
  Russia is engaged in vicious human rights abuses in Chechnya. Russia 
continues to undermine the sovereignty of the Republic of Georgia. 
Russia is owed billions of dollars from its ill-advised arms deals with 
Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Russia has long advocated easing and even 
lifting of sanctions against Iraq. Russia abstained on U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1284 in December 1999, creating the current weapons 
inspections regime in Iraq--apparently because it believed the regime 
was too tough.
  China also abstained from supporting U.N. Security Council Resolution 
1284. China has good reason to be concerned about international 
opinion. China has engaged in serious proliferation activities. China 
severely represses its own people. Gaining the diplomatic acquiescence 
of the People's Republic of China may be desirable but it does not add 
any moral stature to our position.
  And then there is France. France has armed Saddam Hussein for years. 
French President Chirac was Prime Minister when France sold a nuclear 
reactor to Iraq. In the words of the former head of Iraq's nuclear 
program, Khidhir Hamza, Saddam ``knew Chirac would eat old tires from 
the Tigris if it got him our nuclear deal, worth hundreds of millions 
of dollars, along with the prospect of cheap oil.''
  For years, French businessmen have been regular visitors to Baghdad, 
seeking commercial advantage despite U.N. sanctions. No one in this 
body should be under any illusions about French motivations.
  If President Bush and his team can gain French, Chinese and Russian 
support for a strong U.N. Security Council resolution, I applaud them. 
Recent signs are promising. Their support will help in the political 
and diplomatic realms. But their support will not make our case more 
just, or more right.

[[Page S10255]]

  In fact, the U.S. position in making progress at the U.N. precisely 
because of our determination. If this body were to pass the Levin 
amendment, we would set our cause back in New York. We would send a 
signal of indecision that would embolden those who oppose a tough 
resolution. They would see that the U.S. Senate is deferring judgment 
to them, virtually inviting them to harden their opposition to the U.S. 
position.
  Let me address some real concerns I have about the amendment offered 
by my distinguished colleague. It urges the U.N. Security Council to 
adopt a particular resolution--one limited solely to inspectors' access 
to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. I don't think we should 
try to put the U.S. Senate in the role of drafting the parameters of 
U.N. Security Council resolutions. Such a unilateral position by one 
legislative body in one U.N. member state seems a little bit out of 
keeping with his oft-stated desire for multilateralism.
  The U.N. Security Council resolution urged by the Levin amendment is 
silent on the real issues facing the U.S. government in New York right 
now. Does the amendment accept or reject the U.N. Secretary General's 
1998 deal with Saddam Hussein to leave huge swaths of Iraqi territory 
under separate rules? Does the amendment take a position on the need to 
interview Iraqi scientists outside of Saddam's control--and with their 
families so the regime cannot hold them hostage?
  The Levin amendment is silent about many issues raised in U.N. 
Security Council resolutions--issues that the U.N. Security Council may 
see fit to address in the future as they have in the past: support for 
terrorism; threatening conventional military moves against Kuwait, and 
protection of the Iraqi people from Saddam's tyranny. Each of these has 
been addressed by U.N. Security Council resolutions in the past. Each 
of these has been addressed by the United States in the past. Why are 
they ignored in the Levin amendment.
  Even more troubling is the narrow authorization for the use of force 
in the Levin amendment. Right now, American and British pilots are 
risking their lives enforcing the northern and southern no fly zones in 
Iraq. They are being shot at. They are defending themselves by 
attacking Iraqi radar and SAM sites that target them. These zones were 
erected to prevent Saddam from continuing to slaughter the Iraqi 
people--not to engage in search and destroy mission for weapons of mass 
destruction. They are authorized by U.N. Security Council Resolution 
688, passed on April 5, 1991. By omitting any reference to the ongoing 
Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch, one could 
construe the Levin amendment to not authorizing no fly zone 
enforcement. I am sure that is not its intent, but it could be its 
effect.

  The same is true of U.N. Security Council Resolution 949, passed on 
October 15, 1994, which prohibits Saddam from reinforcing his 
conventional forces in southern Iraq. This resolution was necessitated 
by Saddam's massing of thousands of troops--including at least two 
Republican Guard divisions--near the Iraq-Kuwait border. By limiting 
the authorization to only weapons of mass destruction, the Levin 
amendment's silence on the conventional threat to Kuwait could send the 
wrong signal to Iraq and undermine existing U.N. Security Council 
resolutions. Again, I am sure that is not its intent but it may be the 
effect.
  Finally, there is the issue of what to do if the U.N. Security 
Council does not act. It may be, at the end of the day, that the 
individual nations making decisions in the U.N. Security Council do not 
agree with the compelling case that President Bush has laid out. It may 
be that they will decide that U.N. Security Council resolutions are not 
to be enforced, that the worst violator of U.N. Security Council 
resolutions should not be confronted. It may be that other nations 
choose to appease, accommodate, or ignore the clear and present danger 
posed by Iraq. Under the Levin amendment, what is the United States to 
do if the U.N. proves to be as unable to deal with Iraq as it was to 
deal with genocide in Rwanda and mass murder in Bosnia committed under 
the nose of U.N. peacekeepers?
  Under the Levin amendment, Congress would reconvene to ``consider 
promptly proposals relative to Iraq if in the judgment of the 
President, the U.N. Security Council fails to adopt or enforce the 
resolution'' called for in the amendment. It is not sufficient to claim 
the Levin amendment affirms the U.S. right of self-defense and, 
therefore, there is not U.N. veto. If the U.N. vetoes action on Iraq, 
Congress will come back to ``consider proposals.'' Why? Why should we 
not decide now about the issue? Why should we wait and see?
  Does the Senator believe the administration is pursuing the wrong 
resolution in New York? If he does, he should say so. Does the Senator 
believe the administration is not seriously committed to pursuing a 
resolution? If he does he should say so. But if he believes the U.S. is 
seriously pursuing a serious resolution in New York, there is no need 
for this amendment. Unless he wants to grant bargaining power to those 
who oppose the U.S. position in the U.N. or unless he disagrees with 
the U.S. position, there is not need for his amendment. The diplomatic 
process will continue. We may succeed. We may fail. But I believe we 
have enough information to act now. I believe we do not need to wait 
for the U.N. to act. I believe that even if the U.N. does not act, 
America should--as we did in Kosovo in 1999.
  The case of NATO's preventive attack in Kosovo is instructive. I 
supported the NATO intervention. It was an intervention designed to 
stop ethnic cleansing and mass murder by a government against its own 
people. Milosevic had no weapons of mass destruction. The threat he 
posed was to citizens in his country, not his neighbors. In Kosovo, the 
U.N. Security Council could not pass a resolution because of Russian 
opposition. Yet NATO, under U.S. leadership acted. Indeed, in 1998, 
Senator Levin noted with approval the Administration's position ``that 
the Security Council's authorization was desirable but not required for 
NATO action to intervene in Kosovo.'' Remarks on the Senate floor, July 
8, 1998. This was 8 months before hostilities began. This was before 
any serious effort had been made at the U.N. This was before any veto 
was cast. It seems to me that if my distinguished colleague from 
Michigan could reach that kind of judgment that far in advance 
concerning the use of force against a far less threatening adversary, 
he should be able to do the same today.
  In summary, the Levin amendment sends the wrong signal at the wrong 
time. It could give a green light to Saddam to repress his own people 
or use conventional forces to Kuwait while giving a red light to our 
diplomatic efforts at the U.N. This body should allow the executive 
branch the leeway to conduct diplomacy at the U.N.--not try to 
micromange it from the Senate floor. I urge the rejection of the 
amendment.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Carnahan). The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I will yield myself 30 seconds to, first 
of all, assure my good friend from Arizona that my amendment means what 
it says, that we reserve the right of self-defense at all times. There 
is no ceding of our security policy to the United Nations. We are very 
explicit on that.
  If I could also point out to my friend from Arizona, back in the gulf 
war time--and I will yield myself 30 additional seconds--the exact 
authorization in the gulf war was: The President is authorized, subject 
to such and such section, to use the Armed Forces of the United States 
pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions.
  And my friend from Arizona said at that time: I think we should get 
approval from the United Nations to use force, if necessary. And we 
should then, and if it could be done shortly, get approval from 
Congress to use force, if necessary.
  I am not suggesting--I am not suggesting--nor did I suggest then that 
the Senator from Arizona was ceding the policy of the United States to 
the United Nations just because he wanted to go to the United Nations 
first before we voted to get authority from the United Nations. I never 
suggested that because it was not true. He would never cede authority 
over our security policy to the United Nations, nor would I, nor would 
any Member of this

[[Page S10256]]

body, nor does the resolution on which we are going to vote.
  I yield 3 minutes to our friend from Maryland.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. SARBANES. Madam President, I commend again the able Senator from 
Michigan for this proposal that he has before us. The strength of the 
proposal, and the care with which it has been crafted, is made manifest 
by the tortured argument of the Senators from Connecticut and Arizona 
against his resolution. They are in a convoluted posture to try to 
misinterpret this in order to try to make an argument against it. It is 
just incredible what has happened. We need some intellectual integrity 
here as we deal with this issue.
  Let me ask the Senator from Michigan if he would answer a question or 
two.
  The Senator from Connecticut said earlier that you were precluding 
the use of military force to exercise our inherent right of self-
defense because we would have to have a United Nations resolution 
before, as I understand--before--we could exercise such force.
  I read in your resolution a specific affirmation under international 
law of our inherent right to use military force; is that right?
  Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is correct. It specifically ``affirms that . . 
. the United States has at all times the inherent right to use military 
force in self-defense.'' It explicitly preserves that right.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. SARBANES. On your time.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Is there time remaining, I ask the Senator from 
Arizona--the Senator from Virginia?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes. Madam President, may I inquire as to the remaining 
time of the Senator from Arizona?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has 3 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. WARNER. Three minutes. And for the Senator from Virginia?

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 3 \1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry, Madam President: How much time is 
under my control?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fifteen minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I would be happy to yield time for the 
Senator to respond.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator from Delaware very much.
  I want to ask my friend from Michigan or my friend from Maryland to 
explain how you relate two parts of the Levin amendment. One, yes, does 
say you affirm the right of the U.S. to self-defense, but then, two 
sections lower, it seems to me, you cut a very big exception, and you 
say ``pursuant.'' And because you say ``pursuant,'' I assume it means 
only pursuant to a U.N. Security Council resolution can the President 
authorize the use of ``the Armed Forces of the United States to 
destroy, remove, or render harmless Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, 
nuclear weapons-usable material, ballistics missiles . . . and related 
facilities. . . .''
  So it is one thing to affirm the general right of self-defense, but 
then the amendment takes it away with regard to what we all acknowledge 
is the most serious threat that Iraq constitutes to the U.S., which is 
weapons of mass destruction.
  Mr. SARBANES. The Senator did this last night, and he is doing it 
again today. He has inserted into the authorization to use force 
pursuant to a U.N. resolution the word ``only.'' The word ``only'' is 
not there. These are two separate sections. One provides an authority 
under a U.N. resolution; the other preserves the inherent right of 
military--I want to say to my good friend from Connecticut, it is 
painful to me to see a former able and distinguished attorney general 
of the State of Connecticut twist and turn to try to do this, what he 
is trying to do, to the very well-crafted amendment of the Senator from 
Michigan. It is painful. It is painful to see this.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Well, let me relieve you of your pain.
  Mr. SARBANES. Will you withdraw the use of the word ``only''?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. This comes directly from my experience as an attorney 
and attorney general. If you are saying ``pursuant,'' how else--I ask 
the Senator from Michigan, do you believe, under your amendment, and if 
there is no resolution of the United Nations regarding destruction of 
weapons of mass destruction of Iraq, that the President could authorize 
the use of force?
  Mr. SARBANES. Of course.
  Mr. LEVIN. Of course he could. Pursuant to----
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Then why require that the President come back a second 
time to seek such authorization?
  Mr. LEVIN. Because we are explicitly saying, pursuant to the right of 
self-defense, he may always, at any time, without authority from 
anybody. But the United Nations----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 3 minutes yielded to the Senator from 
Maryland has expired.
  Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator from Delaware would yield a couple 
minutes for me to answer.
  Mr. BIDEN. I am happy to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. This is a grant of authority. The word ``only'' is not in 
there. The Senator from Connecticut sought to add it last night.

  Mr. SARBANES. And again here.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. And I am adding it----
  Mr. LEVIN. If I could finish my answer, when the Senator from 
Connecticut, in 1991, introduced and supported a resolution, which 
passed this Congress in a close vote--and the Senator from Connecticut 
was a leader in that effort; and I commend him for it--the resolution 
relative to the gulf war said:

       The President is authorized subject to this subsection to 
     use U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security 
     Council Resolution 678.

  Did that mean because that grant of authority pursuant to a U.N. 
resolution was present, that the President could not operate in self-
defense? Did you, somehow or other, by granting that right intend to 
eliminate the right of this Nation to act in self-defense? I know the 
answer is no. I know the answer is no.
  Yet in our resolution, when we explicitly preserve that right, 
somehow or other the Senator from Connecticut is finding it 
inconsistent with the pursuant grant.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Since the Senator from Maryland has questioned my 
legal capacity, I want to----
  Mr. SARBANES. I said it just pained me to see it at work here on the 
floor.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I want to assure the Senator from Maryland----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time at this point?
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, how much time is under the control of the 
Senator from Delaware?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 13 minutes remaining.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I will bring this to a close.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I will yield 2 more minutes to the 
Senator from Connecticut.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I want to assure the Senator from Maryland this is not 
a tactic. I am genuinely puzzled, for two reasons.
  You give the grant of authority, and then you say ``pursuant.'' It 
seems to me logical the grant of self-defense, and then you spell out 
that pursuant to only a U.N. resolution can the President use the Armed 
Forces. But then here is the second. Only----
  Mr. LEVIN. Only?
  Mr. SARBANES. Where is the word ``only''?
  If the Senator will yield to me, I think the Senator----
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. No. I think I will just finish because I am taking 
Senator Biden's time.
  I am reassured but still puzzled about why you then have the second 
part of your amendment, I say to Senator Levin. And it is this: If you 
believe you are not saying the ``only'' way the President can use 
America's military forces to disarm Iraq, then why do you require a 
return to the Congress for that authorization later?
  It seems to me your affirmation of self-defense is very broad, and in 
spelling out the pursuant clause, you are limiting it. If you are not, 
then your language is effectively a nullity.

[[Page S10257]]

  Mr. LEVIN. It is a very significant section. What it says is, if the 
President does not get the resolution and if he cannot act in self-
defense because the threat is not imminent, then he would come back to 
this Congress to seek unilateral authority. What the President has done 
is laid out a course of action which says even though the threat is not 
imminent, the President wants the authority to use unilateral action.
  As a matter of fact, the amendment which will be offered later on 
today by Senator Durbin will add the word ``imminent.'' I am quite sure 
the administration and the sponsors of the underlying amendment are 
going to fight very hard against adding that word ``imminent'' which 
has always, under international law, been required in order to attack 
based on a theory of self-defense.
  So all our language does is protect the opportunity for the 
President, in the absence of a threat which rises to self-defense, an 
imminent threat which would justify self-defense, in the absence of a 
U.N. resolution, it specifically says, we are not going to adjourn sine 
die. This is too important.
  If there is no threat that is imminent, if the U.N. does not act 
pursuant to this resolution, we would say to the President, we will 
come back to consider a unilateral authority. You don't need it, if it 
is self-defense. You don't need it, if the U.N. acts. But if it is not 
an imminent threat and the U.N. does not act, then we will be here to 
consider that request.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank my friend. This exchange has clarified for me 
the intentions of the amendment. If I may briefly state it, you are 
saying the President can only take--forgive me for using the word 
``only,'' but I will clarify it--action against, can only use the Armed 
Forces of the U.S. to take action against the weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq without a U.N. resolution if he determines the 
threat from those weapons is imminent.
  Mr. LEVIN. Is not imminent.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. If he determines the threat is not imminent, then he 
cannot take action against those weapons without the U.N. resolution, 
unless he returns to the Senate.
  Mr. LEVIN. We are not saying what he cannot do here. This is an 
authority, if I may repeat.
  I assume this is coming out of the time of the Senator from Delaware; 
is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Then I will not yield any more time. How much time do I 
have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN. If I may, how much time remains under my control?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 9 minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield another 2 minutes to the Senator to finish his 
answer, but then I would want to speak briefly to this, if I may.
  Mr. LEVIN. If I could complete that thought, this is a grant of 
authority. It is not a limitation of authority. That is a critical 
difference which, as lawyers, I think we understand. We are not saying 
what the President cannot do. We are saying nothing in here is in any 
way affecting the inherent right of self-defense. We are reiterating 
the inherent right of self-defense to avoid the kind of argument the 
Senator from Connecticut is now making, to preclude the argument. It 
has not worked. The Senator from Connecticut is still making the 
argument. But to make it clear that in no way are we affecting the 
inherent right of self-defense, we reiterated that right.

  Secondly, there is a grant of authority to act pursuant to a U.N. 
resolution.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has used an additional minute.
  Mr. LEVIN. Could I have 30 seconds?
  Mr. BIDEN. Sure.
  Mr. LEVIN. If there is neither an imminent threat, which has been the 
traditional definition of self-defense, if there is neither a threat 
which is imminent, which would justify traditionally acting in self-
defense, or if there is not a U.N. resolution authorizing member states 
to use force to go with those weapons of mass destruction, then we are 
saying we will be in session to consider a Presidential request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The additional time has been used.
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield me 10 seconds?
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I yield myself 3 minutes of the remaining 
9 minutes I have, and I yield 10 seconds of that to my friend from 
Maryland.
  Mr. SARBANES. I thank the Senator from Delaware.
  I strongly commend the Senator from Michigan for how carefully 
thought-out and reasoned and constructive his amendment is, as was just 
reflected in the exchange which he had with the Senator from 
Connecticut.
  Obviously, this amendment, which is before us and which I support, 
has been very carefully thought through to deal with all these 
eventualities. I commend the Senator from Michigan for it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I rise to explain why three brilliant 
lawyers can be all right at the same time--because they all started 
from a different premise, part of the confusion for the debate that 
listeners will find on the floor.
  I join my friend from Arizona and my friend from Virginia in being 
opposed to this amendment, but for reasons different than theirs. Let 
me try to explain as briefly as I can.
  The point about whether or not there needs to be an imminent threat 
to justify the President taking action is what is at stake. I am of the 
school that suggests the President need not, if the underlying 
amendment passes, have to show there is an imminent threat. He is 
enforcing a peace agreement in effect. He is enforcing, not preempting. 
And he is not responding to imminent threat.
  I do not believe there is an imminent threat in the next day or two 
or week or a month. The reason why I oppose my friend from the State of 
Michigan is because I believe there is an inevitable threat. We are 
either going to have to react, if not tomorrow, we will have to in the 
next 5 years. If this man is unfettered, with $2 billion per year in 
revenues, on the course he is on, I guarantee you, we will be 
responding. I guarantee you, we will.
  Is it imminent now? No. Is al-Qaida involved now? No. Is all this 
talk about the likelihood of cooperation with terrorist groups a real 
immediate threat? No. I don't believe any of that now. But I do know we 
are going to have to address it. So the question is, do we address it 
now or do we wait a year or two or three.
  The reason I oppose the amendment of my friend from Michigan is 
because the basic premise upon which I began is consistent with where 
my friend from Connecticut began, and that is the threat need not be 
imminent for us to take action. That is because we would be enforcing 
Security Council resolutions. That is authority we are about to 
delegate to the President.
  I can understand why my friend from Maryland is upset about the way 
it is characterized by the Senator from Connecticut.
  The bottom line is I believe if, in fact, we do not get a U.N. 
resolution, we are in a position we were in with regard to Kosovo. My 
friend from Arizona and I stood shoulder to shoulder on Kosovo trying 
to encourage the previous President of the United States to use force 
against the Serbs in Kosovo. I will submit for the Record at the 
appropriate time, after we had gone through an effort to get the U.N. 
to support it. The U.N. would not support it. And then we went.
  The bottom line was, the Senator from Arizona and I felt strongly we 
had to go. We had to move. Were the Serbs an imminent threat to the 
United States of America? No. Was it a threat to our security 
interests? Yes. The stabilization of southeastern Europe. And so I 
think part of the thing that confuses people here--anyone listening to 
the debate, myself included, as part of the debate--is this notion of 
the place from which you began.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise to briefly comment on Senator 
Levin's alternative proposal relating to Iraq. Some of my colleagues 
for whom I have tremendous respect have tried to address the fact that 
the administration's proposal is simply not good enough by emphasizing 
the desirability of a United Nations resolution, thus transforming this 
dangerous unilateral proposal into an internationally sanctioned 
multilateral mission. But while I recognize that international support

[[Page S10258]]

is a crucial ingredient in any recipe for addressing the weapons of 
mass destruction threat in Iraq without undercutting the fight against 
terrorism, I will not and cannot support any effort to give the United 
Nations Security Council Congress's proxy in deciding whether or not to 
send American men and women into combat in Iraq. No Security Council 
vote can answer my questions about plans for securing WMD or American 
responsibilities in the wake of an invasion of Iraq. It is for this 
reason that I must oppose the proposal of the distinguished Senator 
from Michigan.
  Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Levin amendment 
to the underlying resolution and am proud to be counted as a cosponsor. 
I believe Senator Levin's legislation represents a rational and 
measured approach to military action against Iraq's tyrannical regime.
  The Levin amendment emphasizes the importance of multilateralism and 
understands that the cooperation of the world community is an important 
component of American success in disarming Iraq and in Iraq's eventual 
reconstruction. As I said in my statement last night, if the world 
community is not with us when we take off, it will be hard to ask for 
their help when we land.
  Although the administration at times appears to believe otherwise, 
multilateralism is not an unnecessary inconvenience, but an important 
precondition for success not just for actions to disarm Iraq but more 
importantly is prosecuting our war on terrorism. We rely on other 
countries for logistics, intelligence, and overflight rights. We have 
called on other countries to help cover the costs of previous military 
engagements. And we rely on other countries to provide peacekeepers to 
help restore law and order around the globe, including most recently in 
Afghanistan. And we most certainly depend on the 90-odd countries in 
our global coalition to combat terrorism at home in the post 9-11 
government.
  However, if we adopt a unilateral approach, we undermine cooperation 
of the world community we have so often enjoyed.
  Furthermore, the Levin amendment wisely stops short of codifying the 
Bush preemption doctrine, a dangerous and reckless new development in 
American foreign policy.
  Many countries have adversaries who they believe present continuing 
threats, maybe even imminent threats, to their security. If we 
establish a precedent of preemption, how in the future can we criticize 
Russia for attacking Georgia, stop India from taking action against 
Pakistan, or oppose a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the court of world 
public opinion.
  Nothing in the Levin amendment precludes unilateral action by the 
United States in self-defense where imminent and immediate threats 
exist. And nothing in the Levin amendment prevents the Congress from 
authorizing force at a later date if the U.N. does not take action.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Levin amendment. I believe that 
it presents an excellent balance between the desire to contain and 
eliminate potential threats to American interests while demonstrating 
leadership in the post-cold-war world, and the value of devising a 
multilateral approach.
  Thank you and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I believe I have 3 minutes remaining. In 
all due respect to the Senator from Michigan, as Paul Harvey would say, 
``Let's hear the rest of the story.'' The reason I said in 1991 that 
the U.N. Security Council should approve it is because the U.N. 
Security Council had already acted and approved. Never, at any time in 
my entire history, would I believe we are dependent upon the good will 
or the approval or disapproval of the U.N. Security Council. So I 
resent, slightly, the Senator from Michigan taking me out of context 
there.
  The fact is, in Kosovo, if we took the same course of action the 
Senator from Michigan is contemplating now, when butchery and genocide 
was going on there, we would have waited until the Security Council 
acted, or didn't act, and then we would have gone back into session to 
determine what we should do about Kosovo.
  How many thousands of people would have been murdered, butchered, and 
ethnically cleansed had we taken the same route that the Senator from 
Michigan is advocating on this issue, as far as Iraq is concerned?
  All I have to say about this amendment is--well, you can just read 
it:

     . . . will not adjourn sine die and will return to session at 
     any time before the next Congress convenes--

  Et cetera, et cetera. If that isn't a dictate by the action of the 
U.N. Security Council, nothing is.
  We have come a long way. John F. Kennedy, on October 22, 1962, said 
this:

       This Nation is prepared to present its case against the 
     Soviet threat to peace and our own proposals for a peaceful 
     world at any time, and in any forum, in the Organization of 
     American States, in the United Nations, or in any other 
     meeting that could be useful, without limiting our freedom of 
     action.

  The Levin amendment limits our freedom of action and contradicts the 
words of John F. Kennedy at the time of the Cuban missile crisis.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I yield 6 minutes to the Senator from 
Hawaii.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii is recognized.
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for a 
resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. I do so with two 
cardinal prerequisites: first, that all possible means be exhausted 
short of war to enforce United Nations resolutions concerning Iraq and, 
second, that any attack against Iraq take place as part of an 
international coalition. That is why I am pleased to cosponsor the 
amendment offered by my colleague from Michigan, Mr. Levin, the 
Chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
  Before the United States wages war against Iraq, President Bush and 
the Congress owe it to the young Americans who face death or injury in 
that conflict to ensure that every effort has been made to obtain our 
ends without endangering them. Every ounce of preparation must be taken 
to ensure a swift and efficient outcome should war become necessary. As 
another President, Herbert Hoover, once said, ``Older men declare war. 
But it is youth that must fight and die.'' The burden is on our leaders 
to justify why young men and women need to risk their future now.
  Defense analysts suggest that anywhere from 100,000 to 400,000 troops 
will be necessary for an attack. There are already approximately 75,000 
Reservists and National Guard troops on active duty, and even more may 
be needed to deal with the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan while not 
degrading military missions elsewhere in the world. An occupation force 
in Iraq might require at least 75,000 troops plus a civilian 
counterpart to the military presence. The Congressional Budget Office 
estimates that the war will cost between $6 billion to $9 billion a 
month on top of an initial deployment cost of $9 billion to $13 billion 
and that an occupation force would cost $1 billion to $4 billion per 
month. Remember in the first Persian Gulf War, it was our allies who 
paid for the war. The cost of the war this time will be borne largely 
by the American treasury, unless we are supported by an international 
coalition. With a battered economy, it will be difficult to fund two 
wars at once for an indefinite period of time. Already our funds are 
stretched. The head of the U.S. Special Operations Command has 
indicated that he requires an additional $23 billion over the next 5 
years to maintain his global responsibilities.
  The need to justify such a course of action is particularly critical 
in the case of Iraq as President Bush is advocating a preemptive strike 
against a potential threat to the American homeland. Traditionally, 
America has never sought war by striking first nor has America eagerly 
sought foreign entanglements. This would be a preemptive war and one in 
which we could have few allies. Not since the Spanish-American War 
would the United States be fighting a war so far from our borders with 
so few friends.
  As we consider this war, we must also consider the implications of 
what we are doing. Saddam Hussein is not the only dictator who 
oppresses his people, attacks his neighbors, and is developing weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD). North Korea's Kim Jong Il,

[[Page S10259]]

Libya's Muammar Qadhafi, Iran's Ayatollah Khamenei, Syria's Bashar al-
Asad, and others, all pose threats or have posed threats to American 
interests. All are known for their human rights abuses.
  American troops stand eye to eye with North Korean troops on the DMZ. 
Libyan agents blew up an American commercial aircraft; Iran has 
imprisoned American diplomats; and Syria has supported terrorist groups 
who have attacked and murdered Americans. All have or are developing 
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and missiles to 
deliver them. Some of these countries may already have nuclear weapons. 
Some have attacked--directly or indirectly through support for 
terrorist groups--their neighbors. In the case of Iran, recent reports 
indicate that it is sheltering and assisting al-Qaida leaders.
  In the case of other countries, we are working diligently, through 
bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, to constrain their efforts to 
develop weapons of mass destruction. However, in regard to Iraq, the 
President argues that Saddam poses a unique threat. His argument is 
convincing concerning the extent of devastation that Saddam has wreaked 
on his own people and his neighbors. He is truly, as the President 
notes, a ``homicidal dictator,'' but he is not the only dictator 
addicted to developing weapons of mass destruction. Nor is the policy 
solely a choice between invading Iraq or standing hopelessly by while 
Saddam becomes ever stronger. Since the Persian Gulf War, we and our 
allies have worked to make Saddam weaker and, according to all reports, 
including that of our own military, Saddam's military capability is 
much less now than it was in 1991.
  Congressional testimony, reports by the intelligence community and 
outside analysts, state that Iraq's WMD capability is much less now 
than it was before the Gulf War. A recent CIA public report states that 
Iraq's chemical weapons capability ``is probably more limited now than 
it was at the time of the Gulf war . . . '' Although it is probable 
that Iraq's biological weapons program is more advanced than it was 
before the war, its delivery capability, according to the respected 
London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, ``appears 
limited.''
  I agree that we must neutralize Iraq's WMD threat. The question is 
how to do that most effectively while minimizing the loss in American 
lives. The argument that an inspection system cannot guarantee the 
elimination of Iraq's WMD program is certainly true but misses the 
point. There are few absolutes in this world. Defense Secretary 
Rumsfeld insists that we need American troops on the ground, rummaging 
through every Iraqi nook and cranny for evidence of WMD. Even with our 
troops doing so, there would be no guarantee that every item would be 
uncovered or how long it would take. We are still finding traces of 
chemical weapons left over from World War I in the backyards of homes 
in Washington, D.C. Nor have our troops in Afghanistan, despite heroic 
efforts, been able to eradicate every al-Qaida operative.
  But what aggressive inspections can do is destabilize the Iraqi WMD 
program, keep it bottled up, frustrate efforts at gaining new 
technologies and additional supplies, and force Iraqi technicians to 
hide and keep moving constantly. It will not be disarmament, but, if 
implemented effectively, it will be dismemberment of the Iraqi WMD 
program, splitting it in parts and preventing it from becoming whole.
  A new inspection regime has to be very aggressive, receive 
considerable support from the United States and its allies, have a 
fixed set of dates for marking compliance, and be backed by the threat 
of war. Iraq's record of evading inspections is well documented. 
Benchmarks for compliance will remove wiggle room for countries who 
argue for a softening of sanctions provisions. Putting in place an 
aggressive new inspection regime is not an insubstantial achievement, 
and it does not undermine necessary preparations to develop an 
effective war-fighting strategy and strengthen international backing 
for a conflict.
  Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and others in the administration tell us 
that time is not on our side. But we must make the time to ensure that 
we minimize American casualties. Time is not on Saddam Hussein's side 
either. Our patience has been exhausted and a new U.N. resolution must 
be firm in its deadlines. Some in the Administration believe Saddam's 
hold on those responsible for guarding him is so tenuous that in the 
event of an attack, they will turn on him and overthrow him.

  The current discussion about Iraq has obscured the successes of 
American policy toward Iraq. A recent Congressional Research Service 
report by its distinguished Middle East expert, Kenneth Katzman, 
observes, the United States ``has largely succeeded in preventing Iraq 
from reemerging as an immediate strategic threat to the region.'' A 
British Government intelligence report notes that the ``success of U.N. 
restrictions means the development of new longer-range missiles is 
likely to be a slow process.''
  If war becomes inevitable because Iraq refuses to give inspectors the 
liberty they need to perform their mission, then the United States must 
have an effective military strategy for fighting a war.
  Great uncertainty surrounds the President's post-war strategy. 
Remember the day the war ends, Iraq becomes our responsibility, our 
problem. The United States lacks strategic planning for a post-conflict 
situation. Retired General George Joulwan recently said that the U.S. 
needs ``to organize for the peace'' and design now a strategy with 
``clear goals, milestones, objectives.'' General Joulwan argues we did 
not have such a plan for Bosnia and we are late to develop one in 
Afghanistan. Our objectives in Iraq have not yet been made clear: is it 
our goal to occupy Baghdad and if so, for how long? A rush to battle 
without a strategy to win the peace is folly.
  General Hoar observed that ``there has been scant discussion about 
what will take place after a successful military campaign against Iraq. 
The term ``regime change'' does not adequately describe the concept of 
what we expect to achieve as a result of a military campaign in Iraq. 
One would ask the question, ``Are we willing to spend the time and 
treasure to rebuild Iraq and its institution after fighting, if we go 
it alone during a military campaign? Who will provide the troops, the 
policemen, the economists, the politicians, the judicial advisors to 
start Iraq on the road to democracy? Or are we going to turn the 
country over to another thug, who swears fealty to the United States?''
  As General Shalikashvili stated in testimony before the Armed 
Services Committee, ``we were very fortunate in Afghanistan that in 
fact a government, interim government, emerged that seemed to have a 
modicum of support from its people. . . . We should not count on being 
lucky twice.'' Nor can we count on Iraq's oil funding reconstruction if 
wellheads are blown up as they were by retreating Iraqi forces in 
Kuwait.
  Experts indicate that American troops will need to remain inside Iraq 
for many years in order to ensure stability. Iraq will require 
extensive economic assistance. As the current situation in Afghanistan 
indicates, the process of restoring viability to a nation--nation-
building--after years of repression is a difficult one and made more 
difficult by the inability of other nations to sustain their support in 
the effort. Violent attacks are on the increase in Afghanistan. Afghan 
officials have received only about half of the $1.8 billion in aid 
promised last January. A study by the Army's Center of Military History 
has concluded that we would need to commit 300,000 peacekeeping troops 
in Afghanistan and 100,000 in Iraq if we are to have an impact 
comparable to that which we had in reconstructing Japan and Germany 
after the war.
  The consequences of a long-term American occupation of Iraq needs to 
be carefully weighed. Anthony Cordesman, an analyst with the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, has observed, ``there has been a 
`deafening silence' from the Administration about how Iraq will be run 
after Hussein.'' Historically, the United States has had a poor record 
in the Middle East. We supported Iraq in its war against Iran.
  Nor does eliminating Saddam necessarily mean that the Iraqi people 
will welcome American occupiers or that they will have democratic 
leaders to govern. Secretary Rumsfeld asserts that he trusts the Iraqi 
people will be

[[Page S10260]]

inspired to form a new government. But can we be assured that it would 
be a democratic government or a democratic government that is pro-
American? Can we be assured that the new regime will be committed to 
getting rid of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, especially as Iraq's 
traditional adversary, Iran, has an even more advanced program of 
weapons of mass destruction?
  Even though our military forces may be equipped to fight a war in 
Iraq and a war on terrorism in Afghanistan, there is a significant 
price to be paid. In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, noted 
that certain unique units, such as intelligence platforms, command and 
control assets, and Special Operations Forces would need to be 
prioritized if the war on terrorism expanded. Richard Solomon, former 
Assistant Secretary of State in the first Bush Administration, refers 
to the ``danger of over-stretch'' in which the United States assets are 
deployed in multiple nation-building enterprises and are not able to 
respond if another crisis erupts.
  All of these concerns point to the importance of international 
support as a critical ingredient of both our war-fighting and our 
peace-making strategy. Without the imprimatur of the international 
community, the President's war will be seen as a private vendetta by 
the United States.
  The President was right to frame his speech at the United Nations in 
the context of restoring credibility to the United Nations through 
enforcement of its resolutions. This is the essential context of this 
conflict but it can be validated as such only if the international 
community joins it. Regional support will provide an allied force with 
the forward basing needed to mount a large-scale attack. Right now no 
country in the region contiguous to Iraq is volunteering to host 
American troops in a war. International support will help dampen 
hostility toward the United States by the peoples of the region and 
help build support among the Iraqi people. International support for 
the post-war, peace-making phase of the operation will reduce the 
American military's footprint and decrease the need for American 
financial resources. Secretary Rumsfeld has testified that the United 
Nations or an international coalition will run Iraq after Saddam. For 
that to be the case, the United Nations or some ad hoc international 
coalition will have to be formed before the war.
  The President also must ensure our troops are properly prepared. 
Recently, the Pentagon's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Chemical and 
Biological Defense stated that American troops are not ``fully equipped 
and prepared'' against a bio-chem attack. Decontamination shelters are 
reported to be in short supply as is the decontaminant foam used to 
clean up following an attack. The General Accounting Office recently 
testified that 250,000 defective protective suits against a chemical or 
biological attack cannot be located and may remain in current Pentagon 
inventories.
  We must take the threat of an Iraqi chemical or biological attack 
very seriously. According to the British Government's White Paper on 
Iraq, Iraq chemical weapons caused over 20,000 casualties in the Iran-
Iraq War. Iraq used sprayers, bombs, artillery rockets, and artillery 
shells to deliver these weapons. Thousands of rockets and artillery 
shells filled with chemical weapons remain hidden in Iraq's arsenal.
  Haste makes waste, affirms the adage, and in this case, haste means a 
waste of American lives. We may have an all-volunteer force but they 
are not mercenaries; they are citizen-soldiers and we owe it to each 
and every one of them and their families to proceed carefully when 
endangering their lives. Preparation is not the same as 
procrastination.
  Constituent opinion in my home state is running strongly against any 
authorization of the use of force against Iraq. The President and his 
Administration need to make a clear and compelling case to the American 
people and to our allies abroad as to why this confrontation is 
necessary now.
  For that reason, Mr. President, I support efforts to frame a 
multilateral approach to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. I 
support action by the United Nations in the form of a resolution 
calling for unconditional and unfettered inspections in Iraq. Only 
after we exhaust all of our alternative means should we engage in the 
use of force, and before then, the President must ensure we have a 
strategy and plans in place for winning the war and building the peace.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, how much time do I control?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 2 minutes remaining.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I yield myself the remainder of my time.
  The reason to go to the U.N. Security Council does not relate to 
sovereignty, it relates to security, and the security of the United 
States based upon the notion the President of the United States has 
recognized when he said he thought it was necessary to go to the U.N. 
Security Council.
  I think the arguments made against the first part of the Levin 
amendment are specious. Why did the President of the United States go 
to the Security Council? Was he yielding our sovereignty? No more than 
our friend from Michigan is ``yielding our sovereignty.''
  The President went to the U.N. because, as one White House official 
said to me, he had to do so. Why? For our security interests. If we did 
not go to the U.N. Security Council and check off the blocks, the 
moment any force crossed into Iraq, we would find every U.S. embassy 
burned down in every Muslim country in the world. He went for security 
reasons.
  My only disagreement with my friend from Michigan is I do not think 
we need a two-step process. We should go to the United Nations, and the 
President says we should go to the United Nations. We should seek the 
authority to enforce the inspectors in disarming weapons of mass 
destruction. And if he fails, my friend says come back and get 
authorization to proceed anyway. I am prepared to give him the 
authorization now. That is the only disagreement we have.
  I would disagree with those who argue against my friend from Michigan 
saying that by his making this contingent of going to the United 
Nations first, he is in no way yielding to American sovereignty, any 
more than the President has.
  In the underlying resolution, it requires the President, in effect, 
to go to the United Nations and exhaust all diplomacy.
  Nobody has suggested the President of the United States has yielded 
our sovereignty. No one should suggest the Senator from Michigan is, 
either.
  Mr. WARNER. Will the Senator yield for a brief question?
  Mr. BIDEN. My time is up.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 20 seconds.
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator raises a key point on which I was going to 
conclude, and that is, as we are debating, the Secretary of State is 
working before the U.N. Security Council.
  Mr. BIDEN. Correct.
  Mr. WARNER. He has made it clear to the Senator from Delaware, I am 
certain, as he has made it clear to me, that the two-step process will 
not achieve the goals a coalition of nations now working--Great Britain 
and the United States--desire to achieve; am I not correct?
  Mr. BIDEN. Yes, with one caveat. He has expressed to me his ability 
to achieve a tough resolution would be enhanced by our not making it a 
two-step process. But he personally has told me and my committee he 
would consider and the President would consider a U.N. two-step process 
if they had to. The reason for my saying not two steps now is it 
strengthens his hand, in my view, to say to all the members of the 
Security Council: I just want you to know, if you do not give me 
something strong, I am already authorized, if you fail to do that, to 
use force against this fellow.
  Mr. WARNER. That is right. Were we to act now, we would substantially 
reduce his leverage and ability.
  Mr. BIDEN. In response, I cannot honestly say substantially reduce 
it. I think it will reduce it some. This resolution, for example, 
reduces the possibility of getting a strong response compared to what 
Lugar-Biden would have done. The truth is it is marginal. Everyone has 
to make their own judgment. I think it would reduce his ability. I 
would be hard pressed to say it

[[Page S10261]]

was substantial. He has a stronger hand having the authority granted to 
him after he exhausts the U.N. outcome to say to them: Look, if you do 
not give it to me, I now have the authority to move.

  Mr. WARNER. I say, Madam President, the distinguished majority leader 
said Congress should speak with one voice. We have in our resolution--
you recognize the problem of one body. This is a total substitute 
amendment. It strips out everything. As the Senator from Delaware 
knows, I say to the distinguished chairman, the Levin resolution just 
takes part of 687. It does not incorporate the previous resolutions, 
the 16 which we have time and again on this floor said Saddam Hussein 
has ignored.
  I say to my friend, it is very important, as the leader said, that 
Congress speak with one voice, and the only way to do that is to retain 
our Lieberman-Warner-McCain-Bayh amendment and not have a substitute.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 30 
seconds.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, if the President attempts to take this 
Nation to war over Kuwaiti prisoners, I hope to God that is not what 
you all mean by this underlying provision. If this President attempts 
to take this Nation to war over return of Kuwaiti property, if this 
President attempts to take this Nation to war based on this authority 
for any reason--any reason--other than weapons of mass destruction, I 
will be on this floor every day taking issue with this President 
attempting to stop the war. I cannot fathom anyone suggesting that 
Kuwaiti prisoners warrant us going to war. This is about weapons of 
mass destruction, in this Senator's view.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I totally reject there has been any 
inference on this side of such a nature, but we do incorporate in the 
preamble the other resolutions, and I think it important they be 
incorporated.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I yield myself 15 seconds. There may not 
be an inference in their rhetoric, but there is more than an inference 
in the resolution they support. It says resolutions of the U.N. It 
identifies them all, including the one on Kuwaiti prisoners. I am 
afraid while they may want to ignore the language in their own 
resolution, that is more than an inference that is there; that is 
authorized there.
  It is amazing to me that language is inserted into my resolution, 
which is not there, by the opponents of my resolution, while ignoring 
the language in their own resolution which is there.
  I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Vermont.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I should point out it also includes the 
return of an American prisoner, an accounting of him.
  Mr. LEVIN. That part I support.
  Mr. WARNER. Fine.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Madam President, the vote on the Levin substitute 
amendment is one of the most important votes we will cast in this 
process. I commend the Senator from Michigan for his fine work on this 
alternative. The Levin amendment urges the United Nations to take 
strong and immediate action to pass a resolution demanding unrestricted 
access for U.N. arms inspectors in Iraq. It also urges the United 
Nations to press for full enforcement of its prior resolutions on Iraq. 
The Levin substitute language makes it clear that the United States 
will stand behind the U.N. Security Council, even authorizing the use 
of U.S. military force to support the Security Council directives if 
necessary.
  At the conclusion of World War II, the United States had a vision of 
a world body that would be a forum for resolving future disputes with 
means other than war. There were many important initiatives that needed 
multilateral coordination by an international body. For more than half 
a century, the United States has poured diplomatic energy and 
considerable resources into the United Nations system. During the cold 
war years, the U.N. languished, weakened by the divisive United States-
Soviet confrontation. But following the demise of the Soviet Union, the 
United Nations has regained considerable authority, and as the world's 
lone superpower, the United States is now finding that it has 
considerable use for the United Nations.
  Our decade-long struggle with Saddam Hussein is one example of how 
working with the United Nations serves our interests. We partnered with 
the United Nations very effectively during the Persian Gulf War. 
Sanctions have prevented any significant rebuilding of Iraq's 
conventional military capabilities. We maintain U.N. no-fly zones over 
Iraq that have restricted military reprisals against the Iraqi Kurds 
and Shiites. United Nations inspectors on the ground in Iraq learned a 
great deal about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program immediately 
following the gulf war. But things fell apart in subsequent years.
  Once again, we need a strong United Nations to step up to Saddam 
Hussein. The United Nations must take the lead in enforcing its demands 
that Iraq give up its biological and chemical weapons stockpiles and 
production capabilities. The United Nations also demanded that Iraq 
dismantle its nuclear weapons program. I am pleased that last month, 
President Bush decided to take his case against Saddam Hussein to the 
United Nations. The U.N. Security Council has responded with vigorous 
debate, and is considering a strong U.S. proposal for enforcement of a 
strict U.N. inspections regime. I urge the Security Council to act now, 
and act decisively.
  The Levin amendment puts us squarely behind this United Nations 
effort. It is the only language that does so. It is critical that we 
give the U.N. our full support at this time, and give the Security 
Council the opportunity to take bold action as proposed by the United 
States. If we undercut the United Nations here today, we are depriving 
ourselves of the best chance to peacefully achieve the most important 
goal of disarming Saddam Hussein.
  As the world's lone super power, we need a partner in the United 
Nations. Many of the critical tasks before us are actually 
international tasks. For instance, degradation of the environment is a 
global problem and requires a global solution. The crisis of climate 
change can hardly be addressed by the United States alone. Improving 
the quality of our water and air requires internationally coordinated 
efforts. Economic, employment and health problems are increasingly 
becoming global issues, as people move across national boundaries in 
search of jobs and opportunity. We need a strong partner in these 
efforts, and the United Nations system is our best hope.
  We are becoming increasingly aware of the disparities in the economic 
wealth and use of resources around the globe. Addressing these problems 
will require a great deal of creative thinking and financial resources. 
While we are the world's strongest nation, we cannot solve these 
problems alone. Nor do we want to. We need a strong partner in this 
effort. A reinvigorated United Nations is the most likely venue for 
progress.
  The spread of weapons of mass destruction has clearly become a threat 
to our national security. There is much more that the United States can 
do to stop this proliferation. But in order to have much success at 
these efforts, we must work in concert with the international 
community. We need a strong United Nations as a partner in this effort.
  The effect of the Levin substitute is to give the United Nations a 
chance to prove it is up to the task. If we are to have a strong and 
effective partner in confronting the many problems facing the United 
States, then we must stand squarely behind the United Nations today. I 
urge my colleagues to support the Levin amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Illinois.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, I rise in support of the Levin 
resolution. I salute my colleague from the State of

[[Page S10262]]

Michigan because I think what he has captured in this resolution is, 
frankly, what the American people believe.
  There is no one in this Senate Chamber making apologies for Saddam 
Hussein or his weapons of mass destruction. There is no one who wants 
to ignore the peril which that man could pose to the Middle East or to 
the United States of America. But what Senator Levin is suggesting is, 
frankly, to follow what the President is suggesting.
  On September 12, President Bush went to the United Nations and he 
said to them, if their organization means anything, then they have to 
stand up to this man. We have to have unconditional inspections. For 5 
years we have been standing by the sidelines, and we want to know what 
is happening in Iraq.
  Senator Levin says that is the first place we should go, and I agree 
with him. And it is not as if the United Nations has ignored this. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, a man I respect very much--one of the 
leaders in this administration--has been in New York working with the 
United Nations for this resolution. That is the best course of action. 
To have the United Nations behind us, as President Bush's father had 
the United Nations behind him in the Persian Gulf war, to have a 
coalition of allies representing countries from all around the world; 
countries that have joined us in the war on terrorism would now join us 
in a meaningful inspection regime in Iraq. That is what Senator Levin 
suggests.
  What a contrast it is from the President's own resolution. The 
President's resolution talks about continued discussion with the United 
Nations. But make no mistake, the President's resolution gives him 
unconditional, go-it-alone authority to launch a land invasion in Iraq 
with or without an ally. There is a world of difference between what 
Senator Levin and I support and what the President has asked for.
  Doesn't it make more sense for us to work with the United Nations for 
unconditional inspections to make certain we have inspectors on the 
ground looking at every square inch of Iraq, and if there is resistance 
from Saddam Hussein, if he obstructs us, if he creates obstacles, we 
then have the force of the United Nations behind us in enforcement? We 
do not stand alone. We stand with other nations and with the United 
Nations. That is what President Bush's father did, and it was the right 
thing to do. That is what we should do because, frankly, bringing this 
force together is a validation of this organization, the United 
Nations, which the United States, as much as any other nation in the 
world, helped to create.
  After World War II, we said: Let's come together in collective 
security to work together to solve the problems of the world and to 
deal with war and peace.
  Time and again, in over 100 instances, the United Nations has risen 
to that challenge. We should give them that same opportunity and 
responsibility with the Levin resolution. That is the better course of 
action. As Senator Levin says clearly in his resolution, nothing in the 
resolution ever diminishes in any way whatsoever the power of the 
President of the United States to defend this country, its people, its 
territory, its Armed Forces, against any threat of aggression. That is 
part of what we expect of the Commander in Chief, the President, 
and Senator Levin preserves and protects that.

  I urge my colleagues to support the Levin amendment. The Levin 
amendment is the best way for us to approach this challenge.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  The Senator from Arizona has 1 minute.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I may be in the debate on the Durbin 
amendment. We can discuss the comparison between this situation and 
Kosovo. The United Nations Security Council never acted in Kosovo. The 
United States of America was not imminently threatened--was not 
threatened--but genocide was going on in Kosovo where thousands of 
people were being ethnically cleansed. If we had passed the Levin 
amendment at the time of Kosovo, when those of us supported then-
President Clinton, we would have waited to find out whether the 
Security Council acted or not and then we would have come back and 
considered whether Kosovo was a threat to the United States of America. 
Kosovo is not today, was not then, and will not be tomorrow a threat, 
but the United States of America had an obligation, and because the 
United Nations Security Council did not act did not hamstring us.
  The reading of this amendment says the Congress will come back into 
session in case of certain Security Council actions. There is no other 
way to read it. This amendment should be resoundingly defeated.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan controls the 
remaining 5 minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, that Saddam Hussein is a threat, must 
agree to inspections and be disarmed is something on which I hope we 
all agree. The only question here is: What is the best way to do that? 
Do we do that by going to the world community, as the President has, 
and saying we want the world community to enforce its resolution 
relative to weapons of mass destruction? And do we mean it? Do we go 
there, and are we serious when we say to them: We want you to act 
because it makes a difference, when force is used, as to whether or not 
it has the credibility and strength of the United Nations and the world 
community behind it? It makes a difference.
  It did not make a difference in Kosovo. It makes a difference here. 
The ramifications of going it alone here are major. In the short term, 
our troops are going to be more in danger if we go it alone without the 
U.N. authorization.
  We have been told by the Saudis and other countries we are not going 
to have access to their bases, their airspace, their support, unless 
there is a U.N. resolution. We have been informed of that.
  We know that the war against terrorism can be weakened unless we act 
as a world community. We cannot act unilaterally and expect that other 
nations are going to join us in a war on terrorism the way they would 
if there were a U.N. resolution supporting it.
  If we go it alone, there are both short-term risks as well as long-
term risks. The long-term risks in going it alone are that without an 
imminent threat--if there is one, we can move in self-defense. No U.N. 
resolution is ever needed to act in self-defense. But to act without an 
imminent threat, to attack another nation, raises some significant 
precedent problems for other threatening parts of the world. India and 
Pakistan can easily say there is a continuing threat and use this kind 
of a precedent to justify attacking each other. That is not the kind of 
precedent we should set.

  So there are real risks that we should recognize in using force 
unilaterally. We should see the advantage of doing this multilaterally 
with the support of the world community. We should go to the world 
community, focus all of our efforts there, and tell them we are 
serious.
  We say we are. Let's mean it, not just say that we want them to be 
credible but mean it, and to tell them in advance: Oh, by the way, if 
you do not do it, we will anyway.
  It takes them right off the hook. Instead of putting a focus on the 
need for world community action to authorize this action and the 
advantage of it, our focus becomes blurred. It is an inconsistent 
message to the world. Now it is a message of unilateralism. We say: We 
need you, but whether you do it or not, we are going it alone.
  This resolution--and here I must say I agree with my friend from 
Arizona. He agrees with me that it would be better if we got authority 
from the U.N., and I am glad he does. And then when he says we must not 
delegate our security policy to the U.N., I agree with him. We never 
will; we never would. This resolution explicitly eliminates any such 
implication by the reiteration of the right to act in self-defense.
  Mrs. BOXER. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. LEVIN. I would be happy to yield for a question. How much time do 
I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 50 seconds.
  Mrs. BOXER. This is a quick question. Some of our colleagues on the 
other side have basically said the Senator is relying totally on the 
United

[[Page S10263]]

Nations. I have read the Senator's resolution over and over. He is so 
clear on the point that at any time the President can take action in 
self-defense and, in addition, at any time the President can come back 
and make the case for unilateral action. Am I correct on that reading, 
that at any time he can come back and answer the questions he has yet 
to answer and lay out what it would mean to us to go it alone? Is that 
correct?
  Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is very much correct. I thank the Senator for 
the support and for her kind words earlier this afternoon.
  Madam President, is there any time remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 3 seconds.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield back the entire length of my remaining time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed 
to speak.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, my good friend, the senior Senator from 
Pennsylvania, has questioned some of the things I have done today. I am 
disappointed he feels that way.
  Last night we worked for a long period of time. It was not a matter 
of minutes; it took a long time. The Senator from Virginia, the Senator 
from Arizona, the Senator from Connecticut, and others, including the 
people offering these amendments--I personally spent time on the phone 
calling Senators who had amendments. The result, after a long period of 
time, was that Senators who have amendments--Senator Boxer, Senator 
Durbin, Senator Levin, Senator Byrd--we worked out an arrangement where 
they could offer their amendments. Senator Dayton always was going to 
offer his amendment and he withdrew it and decided not to offer it. His 
was nongermane.
  In an effort to get this done, we allowed some amendments to be voted 
on today that were nongermane. That is how compromises are made in 
legislation. As part of the deal, the Senators who had other amendments 
would withdraw those amendments. There was clearly never any question 
about that. It is in the Record last night, ``and they will offer no 
other amendments tomorrow.''
  In the rush of things, they were not withdrawn last night. They 
should have been. They were not. Just like the problem we had with 
Senator Byrd today, he understood there was a unanimous consent request 
that had never been made that was in the Record.
  First, we did not need consent to withdraw this. Every Senator had 
the right on their own to withdraw this. That is a right. They did not 
need unanimous consent.
  My good friend who understands the rules as well as anyone here had 
the right at any time to file a first-degree amendment. For reasons he 
knows, he decided not to do so. He indicated he had second-degree 
amendments that he wanted to pin to some of the amendments, that the 
arrangements were made to not be part of the proceedings today.
  I also say to my friend, the senior Senator from Pennsylvania, he 
said: Well, I will not agree to any of your unanimous consent requests.
  I don't make unanimous consent requests for me. Rarely. I bet out of 
100 unanimous consent requests, there is not three-tenths of 1 percent 
that I make for myself. I will try during this vote and the rest of the 
evening to see if we can work something out for the Senator from 
Pennsylvania that will satisfy him. We always try to do that. Both the 
majority and the minority floor staffs work very hard. We will try to 
do that. I don't want him upset and disappointed.
  I want the Record to indicate that what they did last night was for 
the good of this body. We did our best. It may not have been a perfect 
arrangement, but I think it was fair. Senators were allowed to offer an 
amendment and in exchange for that they withdrew the others. 
Technically, they didn't do that last night. I didn't do it on their 
behalf. We did it this morning. It is done. That was the fair thing to 
do.
  I repeat for the second time that I will be happy to work with the 
Senator from Pennsylvania to see if we can arrive at the conclusion he 
wants. We will see what we can do.
  Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. REID. I would be happy to yield.
  Mr. McCAIN. Along with the Senator from Virginia, the Senator from 
West Virginia, and other Senators, negotiations were conducted in good 
faith, in fairness, with full consultation. Many, many Senators are 
unhappy that they were unable to perhaps propose more amendments or 
perhaps do other things.
  I attest to the fact that the Senator from Nevada, fulfilling his 
duties of getting this legislation achieved with the consideration due 
every Senator, in my view, did a fair and unbiased job.
  I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. I associate myself with the----
  Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
  Mr. WARNER. The leader is to be recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is the manager and 
is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. I associate myself with the remarks of my colleague, Mr. 
McCain. I attest to the accuracy of the statement the Senator made.
  I further add that the distinguished Republican leader, Mr. Lott, 
from time to time visited with the floor managers, so he, likewise, was 
very much aware of the procedures.
  Mr. REID. I kept the majority leader advised of everything that we 
did.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to respond to 
the Senator from Nevada, over the Senator from Virginia, because what 
the Senator from Virginia has said and what the Senator from Arizona 
has said does not bear on this issue.
  I am not upset. I think I have been treated unfairly. I did not offer 
a first-degree amendment to the so-called Biden-Lugar amendment because 
I had expected Senator Biden to offer that amendment. He did not do so 
up until 1 p.m. yesterday. Having found that out, I consulted with the 
Parliamentarian and found out that I could offer a second-degree 
amendment to some seven pending first-degree amendments. I worked it 
out very carefully and elaborately with the Parliamentarian this 
morning. The word was out that I was offering the Biden-Lugar 
amendment.
  Other Members of the Senate from the other side of the aisle 
approached me, liked the fact I was doing it, and wanted an opportunity 
to vote on it. I got a call from a ranking member of the State 
Department saying the White House was concerned that I offered the 
amendment. The word was out that I had moved ahead to offer the Biden-
Lugar amendment as a second-degree amendment. I had done that because, 
after extensive conversations with Senator Biden last week, I had 
decided to cosponsor it. When it was not offered, I decided to offer 
it. I was under no illusion of its being successful. It seemed to me on 
a matter of this importance, going to war, that matter ought to be 
before the Senate. So I worked it out. When I walked off the floor, I 
was told by an aide that the Senator from Nevada had asked unanimous 
consent to withdraw not only the Levin amendment, the Durbin amendment, 
and the Boxer amendment, but also the Dayton amendment. That was done 
in my absence. I thought that was unfair. I approached the Senator from 
Nevada and said so. It seems to me that I ought to have an opportunity 
to offer that amendment.
  Now, I read the Record from last night that is referred to with 
respect to three of the Senators, Senator Levin, Senator Boxer, and 
Senator Durbin. Senator Dayton is not mentioned. I know he has the 
right to withdraw the amendment. Senator Dayton does not like the 
resolution. Perhaps he would not have. There is an issue as to whether 
Senator Dayton's amendment was germane. I am advised by the 
Parliamentarian that my second-degree amendment being germane cures 
whatever infirmity there may be on the Dayton first-degree amendment.
  I have been in this body for 22 years, and I do not think I have 
objected to any unanimous consent agreement. However, there are plenty 
of Senators who do. I am not talking about the percentage the Senator 
from Nevada offers on his own behalf. This is part of my

[[Page S10264]]

objection to the way this entire debate is being run. There is cloture 
filed. I understand the rules. Seventh-five Senators voted against it. 
I have already heard comments from some who voted against it who are 
sorry they did so.
  We are about to go to war and a Senator does not have a right to 
offer an amendment. A unanimous consent agreement is asked in my 
absence and I do not think that is fair.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Utah (Mr. Bennett) is 
necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Nelson of Nebraska). Are there any other 
Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 24, nays 75, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 235 Leg.]

                                YEAS--24

     Akaka
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Dayton
     Durbin
     Feinstein
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Kennedy
     Kohl
     Leahy
     Levin
     Mikulski
     Reed
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Stabenow
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--75

     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Biden
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Campbell
     Cantwell
     Carnahan
     Carper
     Cleland
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Collins
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Edwards
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Johnson
     Kerry
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Reid
     Roberts
     Santorum
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Voinovich
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Bennett
       
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: It is the 
understanding of the Senator from Virginia that the Durbin amendment is 
next under the order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. And will the Chair state the allocation of time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois controls 40 minutes; 
the Senator from Delaware, Mr. Biden, controls 10 minutes; and Senators 
Warner and McCain share 15 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are ready to proceed. I would like to 
just address the Senate momentarily, and I say to my distinguished 
friend and floor leader, that on this side, the following Senators have 
indicated a desire for some time to speak: Senator DeWine, Senator 
Collins, Senator Specter, Senator Sessions, Senator Ensign, Senator 
Smith, Senator McConnell, Senator Gramm, Senator Fitzgerald, and 
Senator Shelby.
  Now, we have progressed very well through this debate to allocate the 
speakers going from one side to the other. I would hope we could do 
that. And in due course we could work together, I say to my good 
friend, who has been so helpful to move this piece of legislation, to 
get a UC to put speakers in line so as to sequence the times so that 
Senators can go about their duties today on other matters more 
conveniently.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Virginia, we also 
have a list of people who want to speak. Under the rules, we have 30 
hours postcloture. We have used some of that time today. We have 100 
Senators. A number of Senators have already spoken. I have looked at 
our list. I heard the Senator briefly mention his list. I would hope 
those Senators who have already spoken would allow some who have not 
the opportunity to speak. But that is a personal choice they have to 
make.
  During this next debate, I will be happy to direct our floor staff, 
as you will, to see if we can work out--I think if we do more than four 
at a time, it creates a problem. So we will work on that and see if we 
can come up with some speakers after we dispose of this next amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the leader. So we shall work together.
  Senator McCain and I will require additional time on this side, both 
of us, to address various issues. Having managed the bill, there are 
areas of this debate we believe need to be put in the proper context in 
which questions arose and were answered.
  Mr. REID. After the two leaders, you have the right of first 
recognition, so you would certainly be able to do that.
  Mr. WARNER. If I understand, I say to my leader, following 
disposition of the Durbin amendment, the parliamentary situation is 
that we are now on the balance of the 30 hours remaining under cloture; 
am I correct?
  Mr. REID. Since cloture was invoked this morning. I don't remember 
exactly when it was invoked.
  Mr. WARNER. About 11:10 is my recollection.
  Mr. REID. The 30 hours started running at that time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time was 11:38 a.m.
  Mr. WARNER. Just to inform Senators what the parliamentary situation 
is.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Illinois is recognized to offer an amendment.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, if I am not mistaken, the Senator from 
Mississippi was seeking unanimous consent to speak at this time. I 
yield to him before I call up the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, over the last several years the 
Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal 
Services has monitored weapons systems development in Iraq and 
elsewhere. We have held numerous public hearings on the threat these 
developments pose to our national security.
  For the information of all Senators, I am putting in the Record an 
unclassified description of the subcommittee's findings from the 
testimony presented to us by the intelligence agencies at our hearings. 
I firmly believe we are confronted with a dangerous threat to our 
forces who are now deployed in that area of the world. I am also 
convinced the President has outlined a strategy for dealing with this 
threat and with the dangers faced by our homeland which involves the 
United Nations and the Congress in the decisionmaking process, and we 
should support him.
  This support would be clearly illustrated by approval of the 
Lieberman-Warner-McCain amendment. We should let our friends and 
adversaries alike know that, as a nation, we are united in our resolve 
to do whatever is necessary to protect our national security and the 
safety of our citizens, including the use of military force.
  I ask unanimous consent that the outline of findings from my 
subcommittee which I described be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             Facts About Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction

       Iraq's program to develop weapons of mass destruction and 
     the means to deliver them has been underway for over three 
     decades. Although it suffered setbacks during and immediately 
     after the Gulf War, the program has since been reconstituted 
     and has achieved significant progress in recent years. The 
     following key facts about Iraq's program to acquire and 
     employ weapons of mass destruction are drawn from 
     publications and testimony of intelligence officials.
       In an October 2002 report entitled ``Iraq's Weapons of Mass 
     Destruction Programs,'' the Central Intelligence Agency 
     reached these key judgments:
       Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
     programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Iraq 
     has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with 
     ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it 
     probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.
       Iraq hides large portions of its WMD efforts. Revelations 
     after the Gulf War starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts 
     undertaken by Iraq to deny the world information about its 
     programs.

[[Page S10265]]

       Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its 
     chemical weapons efforts, energized its missile program, and 
     invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts 
     assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
       Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases 
     Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual 
     earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled.
       Iraq largely has rebuilt missile and biological weapons 
     facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has 
     expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the 
     cover of civilian production.
       Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its 
     ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial 
     vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to 
     deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.
       Although Saddam probably does not yet have nuclear weapons 
     or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on 
     acquiring them.
       How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon 
     depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile 
     material.
       If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile 
     material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a 
     year.
       Iraq has begun renewed production of chemical warfare 
     agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and 
     VX. Its capability was reduced during United Nations 
     inspections and is probably more limited now than it was at 
     the time of the Gulf War, although VX production and agent 
     storage life probably have been improved.
       Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of 
     chemical weapon (CW) agents.
       The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs, 
     artillery rockets, and projectiles, and probably possess 
     chemical agents for ballistic missile warheads, including for 
     a limited number of covertly stored, extended-range Scuds.
       All key aspects--R&D, production, and weaponization--of 
     Iraq's offensive biological weapon (BW) program are active 
     and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were 
     before the Gulf War.
       Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is 
     capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of 
     such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, Scud 
     missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including 
     potentially against the U.S. Homeland.
       Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and 
     concealed BW agent production capability, which includes 
     mobile facilities; these facilities can evade detection, are 
     highly survivable, and can exceed the production rates Iraq 
     had prior to the Gulf War.
       Iraq maintains a small missile force and several 
     development programs, including for an Unmanned Aerial 
     Vehicle (UAV) that most analysts believe probably is intended 
     to deliver biological warfare agents.
       Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggests that Saddam 
     retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant 
     missiles with ranges of 650 to 900 km.
       Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababil-100 short-
     range ballistic missiles, which are capable of flying beyond 
     the U.N.-authorized 150-km range limit.
       Iraq's UAVs, especially if used for delivery of chemical 
     and biological warfare (CBW) agents, could threaten its 
     neighbors, U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United 
     States if brought close to, or into, the U.S. Homeland.
       Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile 
     capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in building 
     specialized facilities.
       Iraq's effort to extend the reach of its ballistic missile 
     force is not limited to medium-range missiles capable of 
     striking its immediate neighbors. Iraq has pursued long-range 
     ballistic missiles in the past and has even tested a 
     rudimentary space launch vehicle (SLV).
       In testimony before the Subcommittee on International 
     Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, Robert Walpole, 
     the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear 
     Programs stated, ``Iraq's goals of becoming the predominant 
     regional power, and its hostile relations with many of its 
     neighbors, are the key drivers behind Iraq's ballistic 
     missile program.''
       According to the Department of Defense's report 
     ``Proliferation: Threat and Response,'' Iraq in December 1988 
     attempted to launch the Al Abid 3-stage space launch vehicle, 
     which used 5 Scud missiles clustered together as a first 
     stage.
       The Intelligence Community's unclassified summary of the 
     ``National Intelligence Estimate on Foreign Missile 
     Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015'' 
     states:
       After observing North Korean missile development the past 
     few years, Iraq would be likely to pursue a three-stage Taepo 
     Dong-2 [TD-2] approach to a ICBM, or space-launched vehicle, 
     which would be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon-sized 
     payload to the United States.
       Iraq could develop and test a Taepo Dong-2-type system 
     within about ten years of a decision to do so.
       If Iraq could buy a TD-2 from North Korea, it could have a 
     launch capability within a year or two of a purchase.
       It could develop and test a TD-1-type [Taepo Dong-1] 
     system, within a few years.
       Iraq could attempt before 2015 to test a rudimentary long-
     range missile based on its failed Al-Abid SLV . . .
       If it acquired No Dongs from North Korea, it could test an 
     ICBM within a few years of acquisition by clustering and 
     staging the No Dongs--similar to the clustering of Scuds for 
     the Al-Abid SLV.

  Mr. COCHRAN. I thank the distinguished Senator from Illinois.


                Amendment No. 4865 To Amendment No. 4586

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, pursuant to the unanimous consent 
agreement, I call up my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Illinois [Mr. Durbin] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 4865 to amendment No. 4586.

(Purpose: To amend the authorization for the use of the Armed Forces to 
 cover an imminent threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 
            rather than the continuing threat posed by Iraq)

       On page 7, line 20, strike ``the continuing threat posed by 
     Iraq'' and insert ``an imminent threat posed by Iraq's 
     weapons of mass destruction''.

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I call up this amendment to the underlying 
resolution presented by the President and sponsored by Senator 
Lieberman and others on the floor of the Senate.
  In this Capitol Building, there are many historic rooms. There is one 
that is of great significance to me. It is only a few steps down the 
hall. It was in room 219 where I gathered with about a dozen of my 
colleagues among the Senate Democrats for a meeting on the morning of 
September 11, 2001. I can still recall the meeting vividly as we 
watched the television screen and its report, as we heard of the 
evacuation of the White House, as we jumped from our chairs and looked 
down The Mall to see the black smoke billowing from the Pentagon. And 
then we were told immediately to leave this great building and rushed 
down the steps and far away.
  That is my image of September 11. Everyone who is following this 
debate has their own image of September 11. My world changed. America 
changed. Perhaps things changed all around the world on that day.
  I came to work on that morning never believing that just a few days 
later, on September 14, I would stand on this floor and join every one 
of my colleagues in the Senate in a unanimous bipartisan vote of 
support for President Bush's request for war on terrorism. I am not a 
person who comes to that vote easily. I am one who grew up with the 
specter of war during our war in Vietnam. I am a person who served in 
the Congress and considered the momentous decision of the Persian Gulf 
war. I always took those votes extremely seriously. But there was no 
doubt in my mind on September 14, this was the right one. The war 
against terrorism was the right one. We were going to go after those 
parties responsible for what they had done to us on that day of infamy.
  Now we gather in the Senate, a little over a year later, to face 
another historic vote. The President has asked Congress for the 
authority to wage another war, a war against Iraq. It is fair first to 
ask what progress we have made on the war against terrorism. Some 
things have happened for which we can be very proud.
  The Taliban is out of power in Afghanistan. They no longer will be 
catering to the kind of extremist we saw with al-Qaida. Osama bin Laden 
is at least on the run, and that is certainly good news. Afghanistan is 
moving back toward a civilized state. Women are returning to the 
streets without the burkas. Girls are going to school. Positive things 
are happening. We saw an intelligence network created around the world 
to support the U.S. war on terrorism, an amazing display of unity and 
support for what we were doing.
  But still, as I stand here today and make this assessment of the war 
on terrorism, the manhunt continues for Osama bin Laden and his top 
lieutenants. Afghanistan is still in its national infancy. Hamid 
Karzai, leader of Afghanistan, is a good man but barely escaped an 
assassination attempt a few weeks ago, an assassination that, had it 
resulted, would have thrown that nation into chaos. Al-Qaida is still 
known to be in 60 nations around the world, and this war is far from 
over.
  Make no mistake, we cannot dedicate the resources, the manpower, the 
skills, and the weapons of war to a new war in Iraq without sacrifices 
in our war on terrorism. This will be a war on two fronts; sacrifices 
will be made.

[[Page S10266]]

  Let's speak to the President's request for a war against Iraq. If you 
have followed the comments from the President since August until today, 
you will note that his approach has changed. In fact, this is the third 
version of the resolution before us.

  In one respect it is a tribute to the President that he has worked 
with others to try to improve the resolution. We expect that. In 
another, it suggests a change in attitude and philosophy and perhaps an 
intent as this resolution develops.
  The speech the President gave on Monday night I listened to, every 
single word of it. I wanted to hear everything he had to say. The 
speech the President gave to the American people was far different than 
the language of the resolution before us.
  What has happened since August when the President first raised the 
specter of Iraq as a threat to the United States?
  Initially the White House said: We don't need congressional approval. 
We can move forward. They went on to say: We can do it unilaterally. We 
don't need any allies. We can attack Iraq if necessary by ourselves. 
And the President said our goal is regime change. We want Saddam 
Hussein gone. We have had enough of him. And he went on to say--Vice 
President Cheney backed him up--inspections by the U.N. are worthless. 
We tried that.
  That was the first cut, the first position of the White House.
  Last Monday, when the President gave a speech, it was a much 
different message. He is seeking congressional approval. That is why we 
are here today. He said that he is going to help lead a coalition of 
forces against Saddam Hussein, far different than what this resolution 
says, far different than what he said at the outset.
  He is now working through the United Nations; something that had been 
dismissed early on in the debate has now become a big part of it. The 
President went on to say that he is now focusing on weapons of mass 
destruction and destroying them. There won't be any argument here. I 
have yet to meet a single Member of Congress who defends Saddam Hussein 
and his weapons of mass destruction.
  The President said we need an inspection regime through the United 
Nations. That is a big departure from where he was. But that speech 
basically described a process the President suggested and endorsed, 
which many of us endorse as well.
  In 8 weeks the administration has changed its rhetoric but the 
resolution we have before us has not. This resolution is important for 
many reasons. First, it is a war resolution. With this expression of 
authority from Congress, the President will have what he needs under 
our Constitution to move forward, to dispatch troops, mobilize 
reserves, move the men and women in uniform into harm's way, and be 
prepared for battle. That is, of course, the most important part of the 
resolution.

  Another part rivals it in importance. This resolution is historically 
important because it marks a dramatic departure in the foreign policy 
of the United States of America. It is not simply a question of our 
policy toward Iraq or Saddam Hussein; it is a question of our policy 
toward the world.
  This resolution still authorizes a unilateral, go-it-alone invasion 
of Iraq. This resolution contains no requirement to build a coalition 
of allies behind us. It has been said over and over again, isn't it 
better for the United States to have a coalition behind us than to have 
a coalition against us? This resolution does not specify that we are 
targeting weapons of mass destruction. This resolution represents a 
dramatic departure in foreign policy. That is why I have offered this 
amendment.
  Senator Levin of Michigan was here earlier speaking about the role of 
the U.N. As much as any nation, the United States has guided and 
nurtured the U.N. We have gone through painful, frustrating moments 
when we have disagreed with their actions and could not agree with 
Security Council decisions, but by and large we have stood by the U.N. 
since its creation. In the words of Kofi Annan, ``The U.N. is the 
international community at work for the rule of law.''
  That is as succinct a description of what the U.N. is all about as I 
have ever read. We have been with the U.N. through NATO, in the cold 
war, on questions of post-Soviet transatlantic order, and a variety of 
other issues. Now comes the President, on September 12 of this year, 
who visits the U.N. and issues a significant challenge. He says to the 
U.N. on September 12: If this organization has a backbone, it is going 
to stand up to Saddam Hussein, demand inspections for the weapons of 
mass destruction, and remove or destroy them. And if it does not, the 
President basically said that the U.N. is irrelevant; it has become the 
League of Nations.
  Well, since then, progress has been made. A man whom I respect very 
much, Secretary of State Colin Powell, has been involved in shuttle 
diplomacy with the Security Council to put together U.N. support for 
just the very approach the President asked. It is the right approach--
to really put our inspectors on the ground with no holds barred, 
nothing off limits, with no exemptions for Presidential palaces, so 
that we can go in and discover, with the help of our intelligence 
community, which will provide information where we think the weapons 
can be found and, in finding them, be able to establish once and for 
all that Iraq is in violation of U.N. resolutions and destroy the 
weapons.
  If Saddam Hussein and Iraq should resist or stop us, consider the 
position we are in. We can then turn to the U.N. and say: We gave you 
your opportunity. You know this man will not comply with orders. Now 
stand together in enforcing the U.N. inspection. What a strong position 
that is--for us to have a coalition of nations, through the U.N., 
working with us, rather than the Bush resolution, which says we will do 
it by ourselves.
  I think we have seen progress, but this resolution would brush it all 
aside. This resolution would say to the U.N. and others around the 
world: Go ahead and finish your debate and engage yourself as much as 
you like, but in the final analysis this Nation, the United States of 
America, will do exactly what it wants to do.
  I don't think that has been our approach historically. We have always 
said: If you attack us, expect an answer. That is what happened on 
September 14, when we voted on the resolution on the war on terrorism. 
But why, if the U.N. is making progress toward this goal, do we want to 
say we are going to ignore the progress you have made, ignore the fact 
that you have accepted this challenge, we are going to ignore the 
possibility of meaningful inspections to disarm Iraq, and we will go it 
alone, we will launch a land invasion?
  I think that is a mistake. This U.N. coalition effort is very 
important. In October of last year, President Bush stated, with some 
pride, that we had launched our war on terrorism, and he said: ``We are 
supported by the collective will of the world.'' And we were. The 
President has a right to be proud of that. The fact that we mobilized 
nations around the world to come behind us in the war against al-Qaida 
and the terrorists meant something in the war on terrorism.
  Why, then, does it not mean something today? Why, then, when we are 
considering this war resolution, are we not committing to build a 
coalition of force to make sure we are successful? We know what the 
coalition means. It means strength in numbers. It means a sharing of 
the burden. Why should it only be American soldiers walking through the 
deserts on the way to Baghdad? Should we not have an international 
force? Because the threat Saddam Hussein poses is certainly to the 
Middle East and other countries before it threatens the United States. 
Why should other nations not defray the cost of this war? The fact that 
we would spend $100 billion or $200 billion when we are currently in 
deficit--why should that not be shared? Certainly, when we fought in 
the Persian Gulf, that was what happened. There is nothing in the Bush 
resolution for a coalition of force to join us in this effort in Iraq.
  Also, the creation of a coalition establishes vital cover for other 
nations to join us. Do you recall the comments made by Saudi Arabia a 
few days after the President's visit to the U.N.? They had been not 
only cold but antagonistic to the idea of the United States going it 
alone against Iraq. They announced, after his visit to the U.N., that 
if the U.N. took action, they

[[Page S10267]]

would cooperate. Why is that significant? It is as significant today as 
it was in the Persian Gulf. President Bush's father realized that when 
you bring Arab States into the coalition, it is critically important as 
we consider action against an Arab nation, Iraq.
  Think of this for a moment, too: If our coalition includes Arab 
States and countries from around the world, it minimizes the impact 
this will have on the fundamentalists and extremists who are trying to 
breed and educate and train the next generation of terrorists. A third 
of the people living in the Arab world today are under the age of 14.
  If this is a coalition including Arab States, then we are in a much 
stronger position to argue that it is U.N. action, collective action, 
it is not the United States going it alone. This will help to defuse 
any terrorists who might come out and will help to establish stability 
after the attack.
  Let me go to the particular reason to raise this amendment to this 
resolution. The House has passed the resolution we are considering. It 
tells you we are drawing that much closer to the possibility of war. It 
is a historic decision, one which now is in this Chamber. If this 
Chamber agrees to the same resolution and presents it on the 
President's desk, my guess is it will be signed very quickly. It is 
more than just war against Iraq. Just a few weeks ago, the 
administration released what they called ``The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America.'' It is a document which 
outlines what they consider to be the new parameters of foreign policy 
in our Nation. It is well worth the read.
  You will find in this document, on page 15, a significant and 
historic departure from the foreign policy of the United States. The 
argument is made in this publication by the administration, by 
President Bush's White House, that the world has changed so 
significantly since September 11, 2001, that the principles and values 
and norms of conduct of our foreign policy must be changed dramatically 
in this respect. We have always said to the world: The United States is 
not an aggressor nation. We are not seeking to invade your country for 
territory or treasure. But if you threaten us, you can expect that we 
will return with all the force and power we have. We are not trying to 
conquer you, but if you threaten our territory, our people, our allies, 
our Armed Forces, you can expect the worst. That is the way it should 
be.

  We have said historically we are a defensive nation. Even at the 
height of the cold war, we did not endorse a first strike against the 
Soviet Union. No, we are a defensive nation. This new foreign policy 
reflected in the resolution before us is a dramatic departure from 
that.
  The argument is made that we have no choice. Because we are now 
fighting terrorism, we can no longer wait for an imminent threat 
against the United States. We have to be able to move preemptively for 
what might be, as is said in this resolution, a continuing threat.
  What does it mean? If you list the nations of the world that pose any 
threat to the United States, unfortunately the list is fairly long. It 
would not just be Iraq. The President's ``axis of evil'' includes North 
Korea and Iran. One would certainly put Syria, Libya, and maybe many 
other countries on that list.
  What the President's foreign policy is calling for is the right of 
the United States to attack these countries without provocation, 
without imminent threat. That, I say to my friends in the Senate, is a 
dramatic departure in foreign policy. We are not just talking about how 
to deal with Saddam Hussein, how to deal with weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq, what to do through the United Nations. The 
supporters of this resolution are calling for a dramatic departure in 
American foreign policy.
  From my point of view, it is a departure which is unwarranted and 
unwise. This is why I believe it: For over 50 years, with nuclear 
Armageddon facing us, with nuclear missiles poised in the Soviet Union 
and in the United States, our position was one of deterrence. We said, 
as I mentioned before, we would not strike first. We held that 
position, with some rare exceptions. That was our position as a nation, 
and it prevailed. It prevailed to overcome the Soviet Union and, 
frankly, to bring the Russians closer to our position in the world and 
to bring the world closer to peace.
  Look what has happened in the last 10 years in our relationship with 
Iraq. Since the Persian Gulf war, we have made it clear to Saddam 
Hussein and his leaders that if they make one bad move with a weapon of 
mass destruction, either through a terrorist organization or directly 
against the United States, its neighbors, or any of our allies, 
frankly, they will pay a heavy price. There has never been a doubt 
about that. There is no doubt about that today.
  The establishment and maintenance of the no-fly zone is our way of 
keeping an eye on Saddam Hussein from start to finish. There is not a 
tank or truck that moves in Iraq today we do not monitor. There is not 
a hole that is dug and filled up we do not monitor. We made that clear 
under existing foreign policy, but this resolution says it is time for 
us to change that policy. It is time for us to argue we can 
preemptively strike Iraq or any other country before they pose a threat 
to the United States. That is a dramatic change.
  My amendment goes to this issue and says the President has the 
authority to use force. Let me read it specifically because I do not 
want to misstate it for my colleagues:

       The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the 
     United States as he determines to be necessary and 
     appropriate in order to defend the national security of 
     the United States against an imminent threat posed by 
     Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

  That is what my amendment says. It spells that out in terms of 
foreign policy that we have created, in many respects, and honored 
throughout our history. To state it as stated in this resolution is to 
endorse this new rewrite of American foreign policy and to say in the 
age of terrorism that preemption is the answer.
  I asked Dr. Condoleezza Rice a question when she came before us a few 
weeks ago, as follows: If we are going to argue that we have the right 
as a nation to attack any nation we suspect may be a threat to us, how 
then can the United States play a role in the world supporting 
diplomacy and peace? How can we argue to countries that are in 
incendiary relationships, such as India and Pakistan over Kashmir, that 
they should not do preemptive attacks of their own? How do we make that 
argument?
  Oh, she said, diplomacy is working in Kashmir. It depends on what day 
of the week that question is asked. I hope it works. I hope peace comes 
to that region. We really lose our right to argue and demand more 
diplomacy and more peacekeeping when we say the United States may 
preempt any perceived threat, but other nations in the world should 
negotiate. The same can be said of China and Taiwan and many other 
places in the world.
  To my colleagues I say this: This resolution not only addresses Iraq, 
it marks a significant departure in foreign policy. I hope, even though 
we have not had hearings, even though we have not debated this at 
length, that this amendment which I offer, with just a handful of 
words, will call into question whether this is the wisest policy, 
whether this is a necessary policy.
  Let me say this as well. I know the United States is in a fearful and 
anxious situation since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Though we 
have been heartened by the strength of this Nation and its unity, there 
is still a lingering question as to whether we will be struck again.
  It is because of that anxiety, because of that fear, I think many of 
us are moving now to say, let's do what is necessary, let's make the 
changes, let's get on with it.
  I caution and beg my colleagues to think twice about that. America 
has faced periods of fear in its past, some not from foreign threats 
but from domestic situations.
  One of the most noteworthy in our history was the Great Depression 
which faced our country when then-President Franklin Roosevelt, in his 
Inaugural Address, said:

       This great Nation will endure as it has endured, will 
     revive and will prosper. So, first of all, let me assert my 
     firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear 
     itself. Nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which 
     paralyzes needed efforts to convert, retreat, and advance. In 
     every dark hour of our national life, a leadership of 
     frankness and vigor is met with that understanding

[[Page S10268]]

     and support of the people themselves, which is essential to 
     victory.

  I have listened to speeches on this floor, speeches which have, 
frankly, touched the anxiety, concerns, and fear of America. I have 
heard people on this floor lionize Saddam's weapons of mass destruction 
as a threat. The President's own resolution said Saddam Hussein may 
launch a surprise attack against the United States, language which is 
almost, frankly, impossible to understand in the world in which we 
live.
  I heard those same voices minimize the impact of weapons of mass 
destruction on the battlefields of Iraq if we launch a land invasion to 
try to force regime change.

  As we know--it has been declassified this week--our intelligence 
community tells us the most likely scenario of weapons of mass 
destruction to be used against Americans is if we launch an invasion of 
Iraq. Saddam Hussein knows today if those weapons move or are used in 
any way against us and our allies, he will pay a terrible price.
  Our foreign policy must not be driven by fear. We must be vigilant. 
We must be careful. But at this moment of national concern over our 
vulnerability of terrorism, we cannot lose sight of the course which 
guided our Nation for generations. As we search every corner of our 
Nation and every corner of the world for danger and threats, we can 
never lose our sight on true north, and that rock-solid reliable point 
is a commitment to a rule of law, a commitment to a foreign policy 
based on established values and established standards of international 
conduct.
  We cannot now ignore the challenge of Saddam Hussein. We need to 
address it. We should push forward with inspections through the United 
Nations, and build a coalition of support to make sure he is kept under 
control. The Presidential resolution, which envisions the United States 
standing alone, is not the best course. The Presidential resolution, 
which calls for a dramatic departure in our foreign policy, is not the 
best course.
  Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time and yield the 
floor. How much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Carper). The Senator from Illinois has 15 
minutes remaining.
  The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, my understanding is the Senator from 
Virginia and the Senator from Arizona have 15 minutes, equally divided.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. At this time, the Senator from Arizona wishes to allocate 
his time to Senator Kyl.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will speak for about 7 minutes. If any 
other Senator wishes to speak, they may certainly do so.
  Mr. President, I want to address directly the Senator's amendment. He 
talked about everything but his amendment. His amendment is remarkable 
because instead of allowing the President to deal with the continuing 
threat posed by Iraq, this amendment would require the President to 
identify an imminent threat; that is to say, one that is immediate, 
pressing, upon us, imminent. I suggest, as a member of the Intelligence 
Committee for almost 8 years, that it is virtually impossible for us to 
know when a threat is imminent, a threat posed by a regime such as 
Saddam Hussein's, or a group of terrorists.
  These people do not announce their threats in advance. They conceal 
their intentions, as well as their capabilities, and it is very 
difficult for us to know the precise moment at which the threat is 
imminent.
  So this amendment is remarkable because it would literally force the 
President to wait until the last minute in order to take the action 
that is permitted by the amendment.
  There is a saying in the intelligence community that we do not know 
what we do not know. We find out later what we did not know.
  We did not know that Saddam Hussein, for example, had gone to the 
extent he had in the development of biological and chemical weapons 
until defectors came out of Iraq and told us what he had done. We did 
not find out about that through other intelligence. Then we sent 
inspectors, and before Saddam Hussein got it all hidden, they were able 
to find some of it, at which point he said: Oh, gosh I forgot about 
that--or words to that effect.
  We did not realize the extent to which he had developed his nuclear 
capability until after the gulf war was over, when we learned that he 
was years closer to having a nuclear weapon than we had thought.
  If Saddam Hussein had waited to attack Kuwait, had not attacked 
Kuwait, and gone ahead with his plans, he would have had a nuclear 
capability before the United States knew about it. By then, it would 
have been too late.
  My point is this: We may have pretty good intelligence, but it is not 
good enough to calibrate as closely as the Senator's amendment would 
require, to wait until the moment when the President says now it is 
imminent. And that is the problem. Action has to be taken when the 
threat is clear, when it is known to be there, but we do not really 
know exactly when he is going to make his move.
  As September 11 showed, if it showed us anything, our intelligence is 
not good enough to do that. We can know there is a threat. We can know 
it is growing, we can know it is continuing, but we cannot know that 
moment when it becomes imminent.
  This amendment asks an impossibility of the President: To prove that 
the threat is imminent or at least to wait until it is clear to him 
that the threat is imminent. But we may never know until it is too late 
that Saddam Hussein has a nuclear weapon.
  The Senator also complained about this new doctrine of preemption, 
but I would suggest that with respect to Iraq, we are not talking about 
preemption, we are talking about unfinished business called the gulf 
war.
  Every day the United States and the United Kingdom fly airplanes, 
pursuant to United Nations resolutions, to enforce those resolutions--
frankly, to engage in aerial inspection called reconnaissance--and they 
get shot at almost every day. When they get shot at, they either try to 
take out the radar site or SAM missile site that is firing at them 
after they have been shot at, or what they try to do is knock it out 
before they get shot at. Now, somebody may call that preemption. I call 
it self-defense and common sense.

  This is not some new doctrine we are about to engage in that is going 
to threaten world peace. This is the unfinished business of the gulf 
war that is authorized by United Nations resolutions that we engage in 
every day and that requires us to act in our own self-defense.
  It is also said that for the last 11 years, Saddam Hussein has not 
used his weapons of mass destruction. So why deal with this now? Why 
not wait until the threat is imminent? Is that it? We are supposed to 
put our trust in Saddam Hussein? I am unwilling to place the security 
of the United States of America in the hands of the likes of Saddam 
Hussein. I do not believe we can trust him.
  Because our intelligence is not good enough to calibrate this threat 
to the action that would be authorized by the amendment, and because we 
cannot trust Saddam Hussein, I support the resolution that is before us 
and oppose the amendment of the Senator from Illinois.
  Finally, suggesting, as some have, although I did not hear these 
words from the Senator, that there has to be a smoking gun--that is the 
concept behind this notion of imminence--before we can take action, is 
extraordinarily misguided. Remember, a gun smokes after it has been 
fired.
  When I think of a smoking gun, I think of the Pentagon and the World 
Trade Center. I believe that the amendment of the Senator from Illinois 
is dangerous, misguided, and I hope my colleagues will join me in 
defeating it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, how much time do we have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time to the Senator from Texas?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Warner, unless Senator 
Lieberman wishes any time, I yield the remainder of the time to Senator 
Gramm.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Nine minutes.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, this has been a great debate. I want to 
congratulate Senator Warner and Senator Lieberman, and I want to thank 
my

[[Page S10269]]

dear friend John McCain for his leadership on this issue.
  Even error has been presented on the floor of the Senate in a way 
that one could be proud of. I think these kinds of debates build the 
stature of the Senate, and when the American people listen to this 
debate they will realize that on this issue there is a lot of serious 
thinking, a lot of good thought, and I believe in the end we are going 
to make the right decision.
  I have waited to speak--did the Senator want me to yield?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes. I had to speak to the Republican leader. I had 7 
minutes. I wish to allocate several of those minutes to our colleague 
from Connecticut.
  Mr. President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Seven minutes.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I have 5 
minutes.
  Mr. REID. Objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. WARNER. I regret to say to my good friend from Texas----
  Mr. GRAMM. How about 4\1/2\ minutes?
  Mr. WARNER. Why doesn't the Senator take an additional 2 minutes so 
we can complete the debate on this amendment?
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I will wait until this amendment is 
completed and then I will speak.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my friend from Texas for his cooperation. I now 
yield the remaining time, with the exception of 1 minute for the 
Senator from Virginia, to the Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask that the Chair notify me when a 
minute remains so I may terminate my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will do so.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to oppose, respectfully, the 
amendment introduced by the Senator from Illinois.
  The underlying resolution, building on 11 years in which the world 
community has tried every way imaginable, except war, to get Saddam 
Hussein to keep the promises he made at the end the gulf war to disarm, 
is a strong resolution. This amendment would diminish it, and in that 
sense it would also diminish its effectiveness to convince the United 
Nations to act so we do not have to form our own international 
coalition.
  In two regards, it also diminishes the authority of the Commander in 
Chief, as granted by our resolution, and does so in a way that is far 
more restrictive than most any authorizing resolution for war or 
military action that I have seen before.
  First, it introduces the word ``imminent'' in place of the words 
``continuing threat.'' We say in our resolution that the President may 
use the Armed Forces of the United States in order to defend the 
national security of our country against the continuing threat posed by 
Iraq. The Durbin amendment would change that to the imminent threat 
posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
  In changing it to ``imminent,'' which is a temporal term--it suggests 
time, that something is about to happen soon--it adds a qualification 
that I think is unwarranted. In the totality of Saddam Hussein's evil 
administration, weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, 
unmanned aerial vehicles, there is a threat that is real to us, and I 
am convinced will be used against the American people unless we act, 
hopefully through the United Nations, to disarm him.
  So while it might not be imminent in the sense that he is about to 
use it against us, in my opinion it is a ticking time bomb. We do not 
know exactly how many seconds or minutes or hours are left on that 
timer. I don't want the President to be limited to an imminent threat 
to use the power we are giving him here.

  Second, it limits that authority for the President to act only in 
regard to an imminent threat of weapons of mass destruction.
  The resolution we have introduced provides two conditions under which 
the President may use the Armed Forces to defend the national security 
of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq and to 
enforce all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq. 
This harkens back to a colloquy I had with Senator Specter of 
Pennsylvania yesterday.
  It seems to me these two parts have to be read in totality as 
modifying each other. The resolutions that are relevant in the U.N. 
Security Council are to be enforced particularly in relationship to the 
extent to which they threaten the national security of the United 
States. In doing this, we are expressing our understanding that the 
President is unlikely to go to war to enforce a resolution of the 
United Nations that does not significantly affect the national security 
of the United States.
  We want to do what the Constitution invites us to do. Congress is 
given the authority under article I to declare war. The President under 
article II is the Commander in Chief. There is a healthy tension there. 
It is up to Congress to authorize and to the President to act as 
Commander in Chief with the latitude that authority gives him but also 
with the accountability and responsibility that authority gives him.
  I have spent time looking at authorizing resolutions for war or 
military action from the past. The one that we put together--although 
some of our colleagues have described it, I think, erroneously as a 
blank check--is quite limited compared to the declaration of war 
authorizing and directing the President to employ the entire naval and 
military forces of the United States and the resources of the 
Government to carry on war--this was in the case of World War I--and to 
bring the conflict to a successful termination, all the resources of 
the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.
  We have only one Commander in Chief; 535 Members of Congress cannot 
effectively conduct a war. We set the parameters, as this resolution 
does. We authorize. But it is the President ultimately who carries out 
and serves as our Commander in Chief. That is what our resolution does. 
That purpose would be significantly altered and, I say respectfully, 
weakened by the language of the Senator from Illinois, which is why I 
respectfully oppose his amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. My understanding is that the Senator from Delaware has 10 
minutes. He is not here. I will ask unanimous consent I take 7 of his 
10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to retain 2 of those minutes for 
myself and give 4 minutes to our colleague from Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I thank my dear colleague and floor leader. 
I will make a couple of comments.
  I have listened to these arguments, and I would say they have been 
made very effectively and with great eloquence. But as I hear them, 
they boil down to two simple arguments. The first argument is that if 
we are going to use military power against Saddam Hussein, we ought to 
do it within the context of the United Nations and it ought to be part 
of a multinational effort. I reject that.
  I reject it because when we are talking about the security of our 
Nation, I am not willing to delegate the responsibility of protecting 
it to the U.N. When it comes to the lives and safety of our people, I 
am not willing to leave that up to the U.N. I am not even willing to 
leave it up to our allies. It is the responsibility of the U.S. 
Government. That is why we need this resolution.
  The plain truth is, if nobody else in the world is willing or able to 
do this job, we are able and we are willing. That is what this 
resolution says. And by being able and being willing, I believe there 
will be others who will help us.
  The second argument can be explained through an analogy. Let's say 
there is a rattlesnake nesting in your rock garden. Our colleagues are 
saying, look, if you go in there and try to find that rattlesnake and 
try to kill him, he is liable to bite you. The probability of being 
bitten is lower if you leave him alone.

[[Page S10270]]

  For a short period of time, they are right. There is no doubt about 
the fact if you put on your snake boots and you get rat shot and your 
pistol and go out there with a stick and start poking around trying to 
find him, the probability during that period of time that you are going 
to get bitten does go up. But most rational people get their pistol and 
get that stick and go out there because that rattlesnake will be out 
there for a long time. Your dog might go through there and get bitten. 
Your grandchild might be playing out there. The good thing about going 
in to find a rattlesnake is you know he is there and you are alert to 
the threat.
  My view is we do have the rattlesnake in the rock garden. We have the 
ability to go in and get him out. And because of the threat that it 
poses to us, I don't think we ought to wait around to do what we know 
we need to do. In looking at the future, I say the threat is greater if 
we do not act than if we do.
  Those are the two arguments I hear. They are in fancier garb and they 
are better put. But it really boils down to, let's turn over our 
security to the U.N. or to our allies. I am not willing to do that. 
Let's avoid the risk of this conflict because it will be dangerous 
while the conflict is going on. It will be a lot safer once the 
conflict is over.
  That is where we are. I think we are doing the right thing. I think 
we are going to have an overwhelming vote. We have had great bipartisan 
success on this force resolution because Saddam Hussein has no 
organized political support in America. I wish we did not face 
organized political support for opposition to homeland security.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say to our distinguished colleague from 
Texas, I listened intently to his remarks. Two things occurred to me. 
First, how much we value the Senator's contribution these many years we 
have served together. We shall miss him. Also, the Senator cut right to 
the heart of the argument, leaving no doubt where he stands.
  Mr. President, I am happy to yield the floor. I think I have 3 
minutes left under my control.
  Mr. DURBIN. It is my understanding the Senator from Delaware still 
has time remaining under the unanimous consent request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 3 minutes 
remaining, and the Senator from Illinois has 15 minutes remaining.
  Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator for his courtesy. When we disagree, 
he is always courteous in his treatment and fair on the floor of the 
Senate.
  I might say to my friend from Connecticut, it is rare we disagree. I 
am sorry this is one of those cases. But I would pose a question, if he 
wants to answer it--without yielding the floor.
  Do you believe that the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq 
is an imminent threat to the United States today?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank my friend. I agree it is rare we disagree, so 
I do so with respect.
  That is my point. I believe the threat is real. The weapons of mass 
destruction threat is real. Whether it is imminent or not, I do not 
know.
  As I said, the analogy that comes to mind is of a bomb on a timer. I 
don't know whether the timer is set to go off in a day or a year. But 
because the danger is so real, I don't want to establish the standard 
of imminence before the United Nations or the President of the United 
States can act to eliminate the danger.
  Mr. DURBIN. I thank my colleague from Connecticut, and I think it is 
an honest answer. But let me tell you, I serve on the Intelligence 
Committee and I would not disclose anything I learned there because it 
is classified and top secret, but some things I can say because they 
are public knowledge.
  If you want to talk about threats to the United States, let me 
quickly add to that list North Korea. Currently, North Korea has 
nuclear weapons. North Korea has missiles that can deliver that nuclear 
weapon to many countries that we consider our friends and allies in 
their region.
  Iran may not have a nuclear weapon today but could be further along 
than Iraq is at this moment. There is scant if little evidence that 
Iraq has a nuclear weapon.
  We do not trust Syria because it is a harbor for some 12 or 15 
different terrorist organizations in Damascus, and we certainly do not 
trust Libya because of our fear of weapons of mass destruction.
  So now of all the countries I have listed, Iraq is one of them for 
sure. But I have given you five or six countries which, under this 
resolution's logic and under this President's new foreign policy, we 
should be considering invading. Which one and when?
  Historically, we have said it is not enough to say you have a weapon 
that can hurt us. Think of 50 years of cold war when the Soviet Union 
had weapons poised and pointed at us. It is not enough that you just 
have weapons. We will watch to see if you make any effort toward 
hurting anyone in the United States, any of our citizens or our 
territory.
  It was a bright-line difference in our foreign policy which we drew 
and an important difference in our foreign policy. It distinguished us 
from aggressor nations. It said that we are a defensive nation. We do 
not strike out at you simply because you have a weapon if you are not 
menacing or threatening to us. Has September 11, 2001, changed that so 
dramatically?
  The words ``imminent threat'' have been used throughout the history 
of the United States. One of the first people to articulate that was a 
man who served on the floor of this Chamber, Daniel Webster, who talked 
about anticipatory self-defense, recognized way back in time, in the 
19th century. What we are saying today is those rules don't work 
anymore; we are going to change them.
  I might also add, even though the Senator from Connecticut didn't 
address it directly, as to whether Iraq is an imminent threat, the 
minority leader, Republican minority leader, Senator Lott, today on the 
floor came forward and said, and I quote:

       He [meaning the President] is prepared to try to find a 
     peaceful solution here. But unless we make it clear he is 
     committed, we are committed, the U.N. is committed, this 
     problem will not go way. It is serious and it is imminent.

  The words of Senator Lott on the floor today, recognizing the point I 
am trying to make here. If the President believes it is an imminent 
threat from weapons of mass destruction, he should have the authority 
to go forward.
  But this is not just a matter of striking a strong position and 
showing that we have resolve. It is a matter of the people of the 
United States, through the Senate and the House, giving authority to 
the President of the United States to commit the lives of our men and 
women in the U.S. Armed Forces.
  I, for one, have thought long and hard about voting for war. As I 
said on September 14, 2001, I did. I would do it again on the war on 
terrorism. I believe every Senator--every Senator--Republican and 
Democrat alike, takes this responsibility particularly seriously.
  I had a personal experience in my district as a Congressman in the 
Persian Gulf war. One of my friends had a son who was in the Marines. 
She called me and said: He has just been sent over there, and I am 
worried to death about him.
  I said: Let's wait and see how this goes.
  We engaged in a debate on the floor of the House and Senate, and we 
gave President Bush's father, the President, authority to go forward. 
If you remember, we built up our troops and forces for 6 months, the 
day came, and the war began, and we were prepared, and we were 
decisive; in a matter of 48 hours the war ended and I breathed a sigh 
of relief. It was over quickly, and there were just a handful--I think 
about 200 American--of casualties out of the thousands and thousands of 
troops who were in harm's way.
  No sooner had I had this feeling of relief than I got a call. One of 
the 200 killed in that 48-hour period was Christian Porter, a lance 
corporal in the U.S. Marine Corps, killed by friendly fire--the son of 
my close friend. I went to that funeral, faced his mother and his 
father. There was little I could say. I went to the veterans cemetery, 
the National Cemetery, afterwards, as I am sure all of the Members of 
the Senate would do to pay their respects to his family and respect to 
this man who served his country.
  The image of that funeral at that service in that day is still in my 
mind

[[Page S10271]]

today as I think about the decision we are making, about whether or not 
we are just striking a position to show our resolve or whether we are 
in fact, as this resolution says, giving to this President the 
authority to call into combat men and women who will put their lives on 
the line for the decision we make today.
  Is it unfair for us to say, on this side of the debate, that we 
should exhaust every reasonable and realistic option before we engage 
in war? That we should work through the United Nations if we can find 
an inspection regime that is honest, to try to lessen the threat on the 
United States at any time in the future? That we should gather a 
coalition of forces?
  I couldn't disagree more with my colleague from Texas. Yes, it is a 
threat to the United States. All of the countries I listed are threats. 
But why should we bear this burden alone? Should this burden not be 
shared by our allies and those who agree with us that we need a 
peaceful and civilized world? Shouldn't their troops be in the field 
with American troops fighting side by side for this cause? Only 
American soldiers? Only American tax dollars? Only America is assuming 
the responsibility for stability when the war on Iraq is over?

  I don't think it is a fair approach. It is far better for us to have 
a coalition working on it. But what triggers it, goes to the heart of 
this amendment, is that moment in time when this President--and he is 
the one who has the authority as Commander in Chief--says we now face 
an imminent threat from weapons of mass destruction.
  What could that be? It could be the identification of fissile 
material that is now going into Iraq which could lead to their 
development of a nuclear weapon. That, in my mind, shows imminent 
threat. It could be his using weapons of mass destruction and sharing 
them with terrorist organizations. That is clearly an imminent threat. 
All of these things would trigger the United States to step forward and 
say now we have to defend ourselves. But at this point in time, none of 
that is here.
  We are being asked, by voting on this resolution, not to wait for the 
United Nations, not to wait for a coalition, but to move forward on a 
continuing threat. Member after Member comes to the floor and tells us: 
The threat against the United States of weapons of mass destruction is 
an imminent threat. We have to take it seriously. We have to vote on 
this before the election. That is what the White House says: We have to 
do it now, we have to do it before we leave town.
  Yet when you ask them to put the words ``imminent threat'' in the 
resolution, watch them scatter and run when the vote comes to the desk 
here. There will be a handful of us voting for that, a handful of us 
who believe the foreign policy which has guided the United States for 
so many generations, so successfully, which has brought us peace and 
stability, should be honored and respected even on this resolution of 
great historic moment.
  I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my time. I don't know 
if there are others who wish to speak.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are making excellent progress on this 
bill. Did the leader wish to speak?
  Mr. REID. Not quite yet. We need a few more minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. I am sorry. I did not hear the leader.
  Mr. President, we have some matters moving along very well. I thank 
my colleague from Illinois for his remarks. I shall proceed to use my 3 
minutes, and the 3 minutes from the Senator from Delaware, which as I 
understand it is still there, without objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection.
  Mr. WARNER. I have listened carefully to our colleague. His amendment 
is very simple on its face. But behind the simplicity lies a great deal 
of history.
  This Nation of ours has been protected by the two oceans, and by 
wonderful neighbors to the north and to the south. We have had a sense 
of security. But with the advent of high technology, and with the 
advent of worldwide syndicates of terrorists, America will never be the 
same again.
  That is a tough thing for me to tell my children and my grandchildren 
because I have labored in my life--as everyone in this Chamber has--to 
provide not only for my family, friends and neighbors such that they 
can enjoy the life we have enjoyed these many years. However, high 
technology, while it benefits mankind in so many ways, has brought 
about dramatic change.
  If you wish to have the standard of imminent threat placed in the 
bill that Senator Lieberman, Senator McCain, Senator Bayh and I have 
crafted, I say to you most respectfully, with the advent of this 
extraordinary evolution of technology, the time involved in warning 
that is implicit in imminent threat left us with the end of the 20th 
century. The 21st century high technology has erased that. Imminent 
danger struck us on September 11th. We didn't know it was coming. The 
doctrine of imminent danger, as I say, has changed in this 21st 
century. It no longer gives us the warning that we must have.
  I urge my colleagues to let this resolution remain unchanged by this 
amendment as they have with the other amendments that have been brought 
before us.
  I expect Senator Reid in the Chamber momentarily. I know he has a 
concluding matter by way of a unanimous consent request.
  Before I, ask for regular order, I want to make certain that----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from Virginia 
that all time has not expired.
  Mr. BYRD. What is the Chair saying, may I ask?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from Virginia 
that all time has not expired. Forty-five seconds remain to the Senator 
from Virginia, and 6 minutes remain to the Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Virginia for his 
courtesy. I am not going to use all 6 minutes. The Senator is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Has the Senator from Virginia yielded?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Chair.
  The Senator is correct. The tools of war, the incidence of war, the 
timing of war has changed. But it has changed throughout our history. 
The principles, the rules of value, the norms and conduct which we 
apply today were applied starting in a much different era, and applied 
again and again as we saw ourselves move into an era of airplanes, into 
an era of intercontinental missiles. The same standards, principles, 
norms, conduct, and value remain.
  I do not believe the war on terrorism is easy. But I also believe the 
United States has established an international reputation behind the 
rule of law--a reputation which I am afraid is going to be changed 
dramatically by this resolution. No longer will we wait for that 
imminent threat if this amendment is defeated. It is enough for us to 
assert that a country is a threat to the United States and begin a land 
invasion. And that, to me, is a dramatic change from where the United 
States has always been throughout its history.
  I hope we will think twice about that. I have no illusions about the 
result of this vote. But to think we are going to make this wholesale 
change in foreign policy without the deliberations and hearings and 
without a direct debate, to me, is just wrong.
  I think the Foreign Affairs Committee and others should have taken 
the President's new foreign policy suggestions directly and seriously 
and gone forward with them. Instead, through Saddam Hussein and the 
debate on Iraq, we are about to make a historic change in foreign 
policy which I hope we do not do.
  In the interest of moving this to a vote, I not only yield the floor, 
but I yield the remainder of my time.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. They have not.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might conclude, time doesn't permit

[[Page S10272]]

me to get into the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, but I think 
at another opportunity we will have that debate, perhaps before we 
conclude this matter.
  I think we are about to proceed as soon as the distinguished majority 
whip addresses the Senate.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I haven't had a chance to speak to my friend 
from Virginia, but the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee--if 
we could just get a unanimous consent request agreed to, which I am 
hopeful and confident we will--the Senator from Delaware wants to be 
recognized to speak.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, yes. I received this information. But I 
would be happy to allow our distinguished chairman time.
  Mr. REID. We know others want to speak, but he is chairman of the 
committee, and he has been very quiet, which is unusual.
  Mr. WARNER. I wouldn't suggest that he has been quiet, but I 
certainly want to recognize him and give him such time----
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, let the Record 
show I have spoken about one-tenth the amount of time my friend from 
Virginia has, but not nearly with the persuasiveness he has. I want the 
opportunity to speak before the final vote.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that upon 
disposition of the Durbin amendment, Senator Byrd be recognized to 
speak for up to 2 hours; that upon the disposition of the Lieberman 
amendment, the joint resolution be read a third time; the cloture vote 
on the joint resolution be vitiated; the Senate proceed to the 
consideration of the House companion, H.J. Res. 114; the joint 
resolution be read a third time, and the Senate vote on final passage 
of that joint resolution; that the preamble be agreed to and that no 
amendments to the title be in order; and that S.J. Res. 45 be 
indefinitely postponed, with the preceding all occurring without any 
intervening action or debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I had not 
intended to, but I just received a request from Senator McCain that he 
be allowed to follow Senator Byrd's speech for not to exceed 30 
minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, as chairman 
of this committee, I have yet to make a full speech on this subject. I 
have withheld for 3 days on the request of everyone else. I understand 
that.
  Two things: No. 1, I just want to make sure I get to speak before the 
final vote; and, No. 2, that I speak at some point after Senator McCain 
speaks and very close to Senator Byrd's speech.
  Mr. REID. The Senator will speak after Senator McCain.
  I ask unanimous consent that be part of the request.
  Mr. BIDEN. This is highly unusual. I can't think of another time when 
the chairman of the Foreign Relations has been denied an opportunity to 
speak when he wishes to. But I will be happy to yield, because I just 
want to be a nice fellow. But this is preposterous.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, may I say to the distinguished Senator from 
Delaware that at the request of the distinguished majority whip, which 
was agreed to, I will have two hours. This Senator will be glad to 
yield to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee the first one-
half hour of my time.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, there is no need for that. I just want an 
opportunity to make my speech. It will take about 35 or 40 minutes to 
lay out in the Record why this is an important position which we are 
all about to take.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. WARNER. No objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Regular order, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Cantwell). The question is on agreeing to 
amendment No. 4865. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk 
will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 30, nays 70, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 236 Leg.]

                                YEAS--30

     Akaka
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Dayton
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Leahy
     Levin
     Mikulski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Reed
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Stabenow
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--70

     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Campbell
     Carnahan
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Collins
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Domenici
     Edwards
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Johnson
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Nelson (FL)
     Nickles
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Voinovich
     Warner
  The amendment (No. 4865) was rejected.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, Senator Byrd has indicated to me and a 
number of us that he will not use the full 2 hours. In that we are 
waiting for him, I think it appropriate that the time of the quorum 
call I will make run against his allotted 2 hours. I ask unanimous 
consent that be the order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I withdraw my unanimous consent request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the request is vitiated.
  Mr. REID. I ask the Senator from Arizona--he is entitled to a half 
hour after Senator Byrd speaks--if he would mind using that time now?
  Mr. McCAIN. I say to the Senator from Nevada, not only will I be glad 
to start using the time now, but when Senator Byrd returns to the 
floor, I will be glad to interrupt my speech for Senator Byrd.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I will proceed with my statement. If 
Senator Byrd arrives on the floor, I will interrupt it and yield to 
Senator Byrd.
  In the history of nations, greatness is forged, or opportunity 
squandered, not by natural evolution or by the hand of mysterious Fate, 
but by decisions leaders make in times of potential or imminent peril. 
A common view in America is that these decisions are thrust on us--the 
world wars, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the attacks of September 11--and 
we find meaning, and honor, in our response. As Americans, that 
response is guided by faith in our founding principles, in our love of 
freedom, and the blessings of justice.
  Yet leaders always have choices, and history teaches that hard 
choices deferred--appeasing Hitler, choosing not to deter Saddam 
Hussein in 1990, failing to act sooner against al Qaeda--often bring 
about the very circumstances we wished to avoid by deferring action, 
requiring us to react in freedom's defense.
  America's leaders today have a choice. It will determine whether our 
people live in fear behind walls that have already been breeched, as 
our enemies plan our defeat in time we have given them to do it. It 
will answer the fundamental question about America's purpose in the 
world--whether we perceive our beliefs to be uniquely American 
principles or universal values, for if they are so dear to us that we 
believe all people have the right to enjoy them, we should be willing 
to stand up for them, wherever they are threatened.
  It will reveal whether we are brave, and wise or reluctant self-
doubting, and in retreat from a world that still, in its cruelest 
corners, possesses a merciless hostility to our values and interests. 
It will test us, as did September

[[Page S10273]]

11, except that we can choose to engage the enemy on our terms rather 
than wait for the battle to be brought to us.
  Our choice is whether to assume history's burden to make the world 
safe from a megalomaniacal tyrant whose cruelty and offense to the 
norms of civilization are infamous, or whether to wait for this man, 
armed with the world's worst weapons and willing and able to use them, 
to make history for us.
  It is a question of whether preemptive action to defeat an adversary 
whose designs would imperil our vital interests is not only appropriate 
but moral--and whether our morality and security give us cause to fire 
the first shot in this battle. It will help determine whether the 
greater Middle East will progress toward possession of the values 
Americans hold to be universal, or whether the Arab and Islamic worlds 
will be further influenced by a tyrant whose intent is to breed his own 
virulent anti-Americanism in all who fall under his influence, and use 
that influence to hurt us gravely.
  The government of Saddam Hussein is a clear and present danger to the 
United States of America. Would that he were just another Arab 
dictator, pumping oil and repressing his people but satisfied with his 
personal circumstances within the confines of his country's 
borders. That situation alone would offend our sense of justice and 
compel us to militate for a regime change, but buy means short of 
preemptive military action. But Saddam Hussein has shown he has greater 
ambitions.

  His ambitions lie not in Baghdad, or Tikrit, or Basra, but in the 
deserts of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. They lie in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 
where he sponsors suicide bombings by Palestinians he calls ``martyrs'' 
and the civilized world calls terrorists, using murder by proxy to 
advance his aspirations to lead the Arab world and fan hatred of 
Israel, America, and the universal ideal of freedom. These ambitions 
have led him to attack his sovereign neighbors--Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Israel, Iran and Bahrain. His will to power has so affected his 
judgment that he has started two major wars and lost them, each time 
imperiling his own grip on power.
  His moral code is so spare that he has gassed his own people--horror 
the world thought it had left behind at Auschwitz and Treblinka. We are 
told that he enjoys watching video of his opponents being tortured, for 
fun. He kills not just his political opponents but their families, 
cruelly.
  He has developed stocks of germs and toxins in sufficient quantities 
to kill the entire population of the Earth multiple times. He has 
placed weapons laden with these poisons on alert to fire at his 
neighbors within minutes, not hours, and has devolved authority to fire 
them to subordinates. He develops nuclear weapons with which he would 
hold his neighbors and us hostage.
  No, this is not just another self-serving, oil-rich potentate. He is 
the worst kind of modern-day tryant--a conscienceless murderer who 
aspires to omnipotence who has repeatedly committed irrational acts 
since seizing power. Given this reality, containment and deterrence and 
international inspections will work no better than the Maginot Line did 
62 years ago.
  He has unrepentantly violated sixteen United Nations Security Council 
resolutions, defying the will of the international community so 
consistently, so compulsively, so completely that no leader who 
professes allegiance to the values the United Nations was formed to 
uphold can sanction his audacity. His defiance, if not ended, is a 
threat to every nation that claims membership in the civilized world by 
virtue of its respect for law and fundamental human values.
  Because Saddam Hussein respects neither law nor values, advocating 
inspections of his weapons facilities as an alternative to war posits a 
false choice between ending the threat he poses peaceably or by force 
of arms. His character, his ambition, and his record make clear that he 
will never accept the intrusive inspections that, by depriving him of 
his arsenal of dangerous weapons, would deprive him of his power. This 
power gives him international stature, feeds his fantasy of being a 
Saladin for our time, and sustains his ability to repress his people 
and thus remain the rule of Iraq.
  Saddam Hussein is on a crash course to construct a nuclear weapon--as 
he was in 1981 when Israel preemptively destroyed his reactor at 
Osirak, enabling U.S. forces to go into Iraq a decade later without the 
threat of nuclear attack, and as he was in 1990, when he thought 
development of such a weapon, if completed in time, would have deterred 
American military action against him, allowing him to secure his 
control over his neighbors and dominate the region.

  Saddam has masterfully manipulated the international weapons 
inspections regime over the course of a decade, enabling him to remain 
in power with his weapons of mass destruction intact, and growing in 
lethality. He knows how to play for time, and how to exploit divisions 
within the international community, greased by the prospect of oil 
contracts for friendly foreign powers.
  His calculated ambiguity about his willingness to accept a new 
inspections regime are intended to stave off military attack until such 
time as he is able to deter it through deployment of an Iraqi nuclear 
weapon. He is using opponents of war in America, including well-
intentioned individuals who honestly believe inspections represent an 
alternative to war, to advance his own ends, sowing divisions within 
our ranks that encourage reasonable people to believe he may be 
sincere.
  He is not. He has had ten years to prove otherwise, and he has 
transparently failed. His regime would be secure if he would only 
acquiesce to the international community's demands to disarm, but he 
has not. It is Saddam Hussein who puts his own regime at risk by 
developing these weapons. The burden is not on America to justify going 
to war. The burden is Saddam Hussein's, to justify whey his regime 
should continue to exist as long as its continuing existence threatens 
the world.
  Giving peace a chance only gives Saddam Hussein more time to prepare 
for war--on his terms, at a time of his choosing, in pursuit of 
ambitions that will only grow as his power to achieve them grows. 
American credibility, American security, and the future of the United 
Nations Security Council rest on the will of the United States to 
enforce the legitimate demands of the international community for 
Iraq's disarmament, by means that match the menace posed by his 
ambitions.
  Saddam Hussein's regime cannot be contained, deterred, or 
accommodated. Containment has failed. It failed to halt Saddam's 
attacks on five sovereign nations. The sanctions regime has collapsed. 
As long as Saddam remains in power, he will be able to deceive, bribe, 
intimidate, and attack his way out of any containment scheme.
  Some say we can deter Saddam Hussein, even though deterrence has 
failed utterly in the past. I fail to see how waiting for some 
unspecified period of time, allowing Saddam's nuclear ambitions to grow 
unchecked, will ever result in a stable deterrence regime. Not only 
would deterrence condemn the Iraqi people to more unspeakable tyranny, 
it would condemn Saddam's neighbors to perpetual instability. And once 
Iraq's nuclear ambitions are realized, no serious person could expect 
the Iraqi threat to diminish.
  As for accommodation, I am reminded of Winston Churchill's 
characterization of appeasement: continually feeding the alligator in 
the hope that he will eat you last.
  I do not believe the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime will be 
eliminated until he is removed from power. Congress made the same point 
in 1998 when we passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which made regime 
change in Baghdad a priority of American policy.
  Our regional allies who oppose using force against Saddam Hussein 
warn of uncontrollable popular hostility to an American attack on Iraq. 
But what would really be the effect on Arab populations of seeing other 
Arabs liberated from oppression? Most Iraqi soldiers will not willingly 
die for Saddam Hussein. Far from fighting to the last Iraqi, the people 
of that tortured society will surely dance on the regime's grave.
  I wish the Bush administration and its predecessor had given more 
serious support to internal and external Iraqi opposition than has been 
the case. But it's a safe assumption that Iraqis will be grateful to 
whoever is responsible

[[Page S10274]]

for securing their freedom. Perhaps that is what truly concerns some of 
our Gulf War allies: that among the consequences of regime change in 
Iraq might be a stronger demand for self-determination from their own 
people.
  I commend the President for making a strong case for bringing Iraq 
into compliance with its international obligations to the United 
Nations. The Security Council bears the responsibility for enforcing 
the obligations it has imposed on Iraq in order to uphold international 
peace and security. The President was right to tell our friends and 
allies on the Council that if it does not act, America will.
  Diplomacy is important, and I welcome the diplomatic campaign the 
administration is waging to solicit the support of other nations. At 
the end of the day, we will not wage this war alone. Many nations are 
threatened by Saddam Hussein's rule, and many nations have a stake in 
the new order that will be built atop the ruins of Saddam Hussein's 
fascist state. Our friends and allies will help us construct this new 
order, and we should welcome that.
  Our friends and allies must know that we do not target Saddam's 
regime simply because he is a bad man, although his continuation of his 
tyranny is a rebuke to every decent value of humanity. We contemplate 
military action to end his rule because allowing him to remain in 
power, with the resources at his disposal, would intolerably and 
inevitably risk American interests in a region of the world where 
threats to those interests affect the whole world.
  For the United States to accept Saddam's continued rule is to 
acquiesce to the certain prospect of strategic blackmail when, soon, 
Saddam wields a nuclear weapon and threatens the destruction of Israel 
or the invasion of Saudi Arabia, or demands the withdrawal of all 
American forces from the region, and America finds itself forced to 
respond at much more terrible cost than we would pay today.
  Failure now to make the choice to remove Saddam Hussein from power 
will leave us with few choices late, when Saddam's inevitable 
acquisition of nuclear weapons will make it much more dangerous to 
defend our friends and interests in the region. It will permit Saddam 
to control much of the region, and to wield its resources in ways that 
can only weaken America's position. It will put Israel's very survival 
at risk, with moral consequences no American can welcome.
  Failure to end the danger posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq makes it 
more likely that the interaction we believe to have occurred between 
members of al Qaeda and Saddam's regime may increasingly take the form 
of active cooperation to target the United States.
  We live in a world in which international terrorists continue to this 
day to plot mass murder in America. Saddam Hussein unquestionably has 
strong incentives to cooperate with al Qaeda. Whatever they may or may 
not have in common, their overwhelming hostility to America and 
rejection of any moral code suggest that collaboration against us would 
be natural. It is all too imaginable. Whether or not it has yet 
happened, the odds favor it, and they are not odds the United States 
can accept.
  To those who argue that America's threat to Saddam's rule makes it 
more likely that he would collaborate with terrorists to attack our 
homeland, I would ask: how can we sanction the continuing existence of 
a regime whose ruler has the capability to inflict such damage on us 
and would even consider doing so?
  Standing by while an odious regime with a history of support for 
terrorism develops weapons whose use by terrorists could literally kill 
millions of Americans is not a choice. It is an abdication. In this new 
era, preventive action to target rogue regimes is not only imaginable 
but necessary. Who would not have attacked Osama bin Laden's network 
before September 11th had we realized that his intentions to bring harm 
to America were matched by the capability to do so? Who would not have 
heeded Churchill's call to stand up to Adolf Hitler in the 1930s, while 
Europe slept and appeasement fed the greatest threat to Western 
civilization the world had ever known? Who would not have supported 
Israel's bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981 had we then known, 
as Israel knew, that Saddam was on the verge of developing the bomb?
  Opponents of this resolution offer many questions that are designed 
to persuade the President to wait before moving against Saddam Hussein. 
They have every right to do so. But there is one question I don't want 
to be asked in the months and years ahead: ``Why did you give Saddam 
Hussein time to harm us?''
  Weighing the costs of inaction is an important as chronicling the 
costs of action in blood and treasure as we prepare to confront Iraq in 
2002. In an age of weapons of mass destruction and global terrorists 
bent on acquiring those weapons, the costs of inaction could well be 
catastrophic.
  As we hold this debate today, this future is not preordained. We have 
choices. I hope we make the right one.
  Politics has no place in this debate. Voting for a course of action 
that will send young Americans off to fight and die for their country 
is the most solemn responsibility every member of this Congress will 
undertake. Those of us who have the honor of bearing that 
responsibility must weigh our words, and consult our consciences 
carefully. By voting to give the President the authority to wage war, 
we assume and share his responsibility for the war's outcome. Others 
have neither that burden nor that privilege.
  We have a choice. The men and women who wear the uniform of our 
country, and who might lose their lives in service to our cause, do 
not. They will do their duty, as we see fit to define it for them.
  We have a responsibility to these men and women to judge responsibly 
when our security is so threatened that we must call on them to uphold 
their oath to defend it. When we call them to serve, they will make us 
proud. We should strive to make them proud by showing deliberation, 
judgment, and statesmanship in the debate that will determine their 
mission.
  There is no such thing as a Democrat or a Republican war. We vote on 
this resolution in the same way brave young men and women in uniform 
will fight and die as a result of our vote-as Americans. The freedom 
and security Americans will continue to enjoy as history's greatest 
nation will be their legacy, and their honor.
  They will do their duty. Ours lies before us. Its outcome will 
determine America's course in this century, in an age when waiting for 
imminence of attack is catastrophic.
  In this age, liberating oppressed peoples from the tyranny of those 
who would do us harm serves not only narrow American interests but the 
ordered progress of freedom. The global success of liberty is America's 
greatest strategic interest as well as its most compelling moral 
argument. All our other interests are served in that cause. In it rests 
our faith in the greatness of America, the last, best hope of earth.
  What ensures our success in this long struggle against terrorism and 
rogue leaders who conspire against us is that our military strength is 
surpassed only by the strength of our ideals. Our enemies are weaker 
than we are in men and arms, but weaker still in causes. they fight to 
express an irrational hatred for all that is good in humanity, a hatred 
that has fallen time and again to the armies and ideals of the 
righteous. We fight for love of freedom and justice, a love that is 
invincible. We will never surrender. They will. All we must do is stay 
true to our faith.
  Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent to speak.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Before the Senator from West Virginia begins his remarks, I 
wish to say something publicly that I should have said privately. That 
is, I know a little bit about the rules of the Senate, but very little 
compared to the Senator from West Virginia.
  I am not sure everyone appreciates how far along we are. This is a 
very important resolution we are debating no matter on what side of the 
resolution you are. The Senator from West Virginia has expressed his 
thoughts now for almost a week off and on. We would not be in the 
position we are today to finish this sometime tonight but for the 
Senator from West Virginia.
  In my younger days when I would be involved in things physical, there 
is not anyone I would like to have next to

[[Page S10275]]

me than the Senator from West Virginia. He is a fighter. I have never 
come across many fighters like the President pro tempore of the Senate. 
I express my personal appreciation and that of all the Senators for the 
Senator allowing us to be in the position we are today to finish this 
resolution tonight.
  The Senator from West Virginia has forgotten more about the Senate 
rules than I will ever know. I am searching for words to express my 
admiration and respect for the Senator from West Virginia. He is a 
fighter, but he is a fair fighter and is always willing to see the 
other side of the picture, even though we may not agree.
  Senator Byrd, you have made my life and that of the Senate, while 
interesting today, a lot easier than it could have been. The Senator 
accomplished this. No one in the world could have expressed themselves 
with the sincerity of feelings and love of country and Constitution as 
has the Senator. I say again, thank you for allowing us to be in this 
situation we are in today.

  Mr. McCAIN. May I add to the comments of the Senator from Nevada. I 
find from my days trying to enact a line-item veto, the days when the 
Senator from West Virginia was the majority leader, that he has always 
treated me with the utmost courtesy and consideration. In all of my 
encounters, I have found him to be incredibly enlightening, very 
educational, and occasionally frustrating. I would like to thank 
Senator Byrd for setting the tone and the tenor of this debate at a 
level that I think was important to maintain and one that I think all 
Members of the Senate, no matter which side they are on on this issue, 
can be proud of as we will look back at this debate and this very 
important resolution that is being considered.
  I thank the Senator from West Virginia. I look forward to hearing him 
for the next couple of hours.
  I thank the Chair.
  How much time do I have remaining on my time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dayton). Eight minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent to reserve the remainder of my 
time for Senator Bayh, who is one of the original cosponsors.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I wish to begin. I read this quote:

       Naturally, the common people don't want war but, after all, 
     it is the leaders of a country who determine the policy and 
     it is always a simple matter to drag the people along. 
     Whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a 
     parliament or a Communist dictatorship, voice or no voice, 
     the people can always be brought to the bidding of the 
     leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they 
     are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for a lack of 
     patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the 
     same in every country.

  Hermann Goering, 1893-1946, field marshal, German Army, founder of 
the Gestapo, President of the Reichstag, Nazi parliament, and convicted 
war criminal. Speech, 1934.
  Mr. President:

     The moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
     Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit
     Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
     Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it.

  So said the Persian poet, Omar Khayyam, in the 11th century.
  And so I say today. The Senate has made clear its intentions on the 
Iraq resolution. There is no doubt, there is no question. The Senate 
has made its intentions indubitably clear. The outcome is certain. The 
ending has been scripted. The Senate will vote, and the Iraq resolution 
will pass.
  I continue to believe that the Senate, in following this preordained 
course of action, will be doing a grave disservice to the Nation and to 
the Constitution on which it was founded.
  In the newly published ``National Security Strategy of the United 
States,'' the document which I hold in my hand--``The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America,'' date: September 2002, the 
document in which the President of the United States outlines the 
unprecedented policy of preemptive deterrence which the Iraq resolution 
will implement--the President asserts that: ``The constitution has 
served us well.''
  There you have it, 31 pages, and that is the only reference to the 
Constitution of the United States that is made in this document titled 
``The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.'' He 
asserts that: ``The constitution has served us well.'' That's it. That 
is the alpha and the omega of the reference to the Constitution, this 
great Constitution of the United States which creates the Presidency of 
the United States, which creates a bicameral legislative body, which 
creates the judicial branch of this great Nation--provides for it. That 
is all it says about the Constitution. He asserts that ``the 
Constitution has served us well.''
  And note, too, that the word ``constitution'' as mentioned in the 
President's document is in lower case. It doesn't begin with a capital 
letter, it begins with a lower-case letter, ``the constitution.''
  I have a constitution. The Senator from New Mexico has a 
constitution. His constitution, which was given to him by his Roman 
ancestral forebears, that is his constitution. He is strong, he is 
weak, he has strong mental processes, he has a good heart, or whatever 
it is--his constitution, lower case. But this Constitution is with a 
capital C. This administration doesn't believe that it merits a capital 
C even, and only mentions, as I say, one time in passing that ``the 
Constitution has served us well.''
  That, apparently, is what this administration thinks of the 
Constitution. And it references the Constitution as though it were some 
dusty relic of the past that needs to be eulogized before it is 
retired. And so it says: ``The constitution has served us well.''
  He is wrong about that. The Constitution is no more dated than the 
principles that it established than is this great book that I treasure 
above all books, this great book right here.
  The President is wrong. The Constitution is no more dated in the 
principles it established than is the Holy Bible.
  The Constitution continues to serve us well, if only we would take 
the time to heed it.
  I am deeply disappointed that this Senate, which I have believed in 
for all these many years--and which God and the people of West Virginia 
have blessed me to experience, 44 years come next January 3rd--I am 
deeply disappointed the Senate is not heeding the imperatives of the 
Constitution and is instead poised to hand off to the President of the 
United States the exclusive power of Congress to determine matters of 
war and peace--to declare war.
  I do not in my heart believe this is what the American people expect 
of the Senate.
  I have had many occasions in which to stand and laud the Senate, and 
to renew my expression of deep belief in the Senate of the United 
States as an institution. I have done that many times. But I am deeply 
disappointed the Senate is not heeding the imperatives of the 
Constitution, and is instead poised, as I say, to hand over to the 
President the exclusive power of Congress to determine matters of war 
and peace.
  I do not in my heart believe this is what the American people expect 
of the Senate.
  I have heard from tens of thousands of people--people from all across 
this country of ours--people from every State in the Union, from New 
Mexico to Florida to California to the State of Washington, and to the 
States of Wisconsin, Minnesota, West Virginia, New York, and all in 
between. I have heard from thousands of Americans who have urged me to 
keep up the fight--almost 50,000 e-mail letters within the last 5 days, 
and more than 18,000 telephone calls to my office in the last 5 days--
urging me to keep up the fight. So they are listening, and they want to 
hear more.
  If Senators don't think for a moment that people are listening to 
this Senate debate, the people are listening. They want to be informed. 
They have questions they want answered.
  When I came to this body, we didn't have televised coverage. We 
didn't have a radio. We didn't even have radio coverage of the debates 
in this Senate. I can remember that when a Senator stood to his feet, 
other Senators gathered closely. They moved up close in their seats to 
listen to that Senator. We had no public address system in

[[Page S10276]]

this Chamber. But they were being informed by the Senate debates. The 
people were being educated and informed as to the great issues of the 
day. The Senate was an institution which did inform the people. We 
spent days upon days on the great issues that came before this Senate--
more than 100 days, for example, on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, more 
than 100 days. This institution did its duty to the American people by 
informing them of the issues of the day, and by debating those issues--
Republicans and Democrats. The aisle was not as wide in those days as 
it is now. Sometimes I think it is a great canyon here, a great chasm 
that separates the Democratic and the Republican parties in this 
Senate. But not so then. We disagreed from time to time.
  But I can remember. If I were to take the time now, I could call the 
names of the faces who in my dreams come back to me--the faces of those 
who sat in those seats years ago, decades ago. They were men. There was 
only one woman at that time, Margaret Chase Smith of Maine. But 
Senators, Republicans and Democrats, joined in informing the people 
through the process of debate.

  I am only one Senator from a very small State. Yet, as I say, within 
the past week, I have received nearly 20,000 telephone calls and nearly 
50,000 e-mails supporting the position I have taken on this floor. This 
is not counting the calls and the e-mails that have come in to my State 
office in Charleston, WVA.
  I want all of those people across America, out there across the 
plains, the Great Rockies, across the Mississippi, and to the Pacific 
coast, from the gulf coast to the Canadian border--I want all those 
people who took the time to contact me to know how their words have 
strengthened, heartened me and sustained me in my feeble efforts here 
to turn the tide of opinion in the Senate.
  ``The iron will of one stout heart shall make a thousand quail.''
  These are my heroes--the people out there who have called, who have 
written, and who have told me in person as I have walked across the 
street. They are my heroes. And I will never forget the remarkable 
courage and patriotism that reverberated in the fervor--in the fervor--
of their messages. I gave them hope because they love this country. And 
they love this Constitution. Senators all know that. The people out 
there love this Constitution. They love this Constitution. All of the 
people out there do.
  So they are my heroes.
  As the Apostle Paul, that great apostle, said, ``I have fought a good 
fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith.''
  There are Americans all across this country in every State of this 
Union who have joined in spirit with me and with a small band of like-
minded Senators in fighting the good fight.
  We could stay here on this floor and continue to fight. They say, 
well, we might stay here until 4:30 in the morning. Come on. Come on.
  I am thinking of the words of Fitzjames in ``The Lady of the Lake,'' 
when he stood there before Roderick and said: ``Come one, come all! 
this rock shall fly From its firm base as soon as I.'' So come on. 
Let's see the clock turn to 4:30 in the morning. Who cares what time it 
is as long as we are speaking for our country?
  So I say to the distinguished Senator who presides over this Chamber 
tonight, whose forebear and ancestral relative signed his name at the 
Constitutional Convention on September 17, 1787--his name was Dayton, 
Jonathan Dayton. This is his relative who presides over the Senate at 
this moment.
  So we could continue this fight. Let me tell you, ladies and 
gentlemen, there are several checkpoints--I will call them 
checkpoints--at which, under the rules, I could cause the Senate to 
have to go through another cloture and another 72 hours. I could do 
that. And I would have no hesitancy, not any, in doing it if I did not 
know the Senate has already spoken.
  Also, there is a point at which it becomes time to accept reality and 
to regroup. It is clear we have lost this battle in the Senate. The 
next front is the White House. I urge all those people who are 
following the debate out there, and who have encouraged me in my 
efforts, and have encouraged the other Senators who have stayed with me 
firmly--without faltering, without fainting, and without wavering--I 
urge the people to keep on in their behalf, who have encouraged us in 
our efforts, I urge them to turn their attention to the President of 
the United States. Call him, write him, e-mail him, urge him to heed 
the Constitution and not short circuit this Constitution by exercising 
the broad grant of authority the Iraq resolution provides.
  The President has said on many occasions that he has not yet made up 
his mind to go to war. And here we are, we have been stampeded into 
this moment, when we will soon approve this resolution.
  Let me say again, there are several checkpoints at which we could 
play this record over and over again. For example, the title of the 
resolution could be amended. How about that? And then there is going to 
be a House resolution coming over to this body, and there is going to 
be a request, I suppose, after the Senate votes on that resolution, a 
request to insert the words of the Senate, which are likewise the same 
words, so that it will have a House number. And there would have been a 
place.
  I will not go through all these places. But we could fight on. No, we 
would not finish at 4:30 tomorrow morning, we would not finish it at 
4:30 the next morning, if we wanted to. I hope the leadership and the 
Senators will all understand that. I am not bragging. Dizzy Dean said: 
It's all right to brag if you have done it. We could do that. We could 
do that. But what good would it do? What good would it do? The course 
of destiny has already been set by this Senate.
  So the President has said on many occasions he has not made up his 
mind to go to war. When he does make up his mind, if he does, then he 
should come back to Congress and seek formal authorization.
  Let those high-powered lawyers of the White House tell him otherwise. 
They are going to stand by their client, I suppose. But they did not go 
to the same law school I went to. They probably did not have to work as 
hard as I had to work. Their wives may not have worked as hard as my 
wife to put me through law school. Well, so much for that.

  Let him come back to the Congress for authorization.
  Mr. President, I continue to have faith in our system of Government. 
It works. I continue to have faith in the basic values that shape this 
country, this Nation. Ours was a great country before it became a great 
nation. Those values do not include striking first at other countries, 
at other nations. Those values do not include using our position as the 
strongest and most formidable Nation in the world to bully and 
intimidate other nations.
  There are no preemptive strikes in the language of the Constitution, 
I do not care what other Senators say. Those values do not include 
putting other nations on an enemies list so we can justify preemptive 
military strikes.
  Were I not to believe in the inherent ability of the Constitution to 
withstand the folly of such actions as the Senate is about to take, I 
would not stop fighting. Yes, he is 85--85. I will be 85 years old 41 
days from now if the good Lord--if the good Lord--lets me live. But 
don't you think for a moment I can't stand on this floor all the rest 
of this night. I like to fight when I am fighting for the Constitution 
and for this institution. I will fight until I drop, yes, fight until 
they hack my flesh to the bone. I would fight with every fiber in my 
body, every ounce of my energy, with every parliamentary tool at my 
disposal--and there are parliamentary tools at my disposal; don't you 
ever think there are not--but I do believe the Constitution will 
weather this storm. The Senate will weather the storm as well.
  I only hope that when the tempest passes, Senators will reflect upon 
the ramifications of what they have done and understand the damage that 
has been inflicted on the Constitution of the United States.
  Now, those people out there believe in the Constitution. And I have 
been very disappointed to have stood on my feet--an 85-year-old man, 
standing on his feet, and pleading with his colleagues to stand up for 
the Constitution--I have been disappointed that some of them seem not 
to have listened at all. That is a real disappointment. It

[[Page S10277]]

isn't Robert C. Byrd who counts; it is the Constitution of the United 
States. And but for that Constitution, they would not be here, I would 
not be here, and you, Mr. President, would not be here. It is that 
Constitution.
  And we all take an oath, a solemn oath, to support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic.
  In the greatest oration that was ever delivered in the history of 
mankind, the oration ``On the Crown,'' delivered in the year 331 B.C. 
by Demosthenes in his denunciation of Aeschines, he asked this 
question: Who deceives the state?
  He answered his own question by saying: The man who does not speak 
what he thinks. Who deceives the state? The man who does not speak what 
he thinks.
  I believe we ought to speak what we think. A political party means 
nothing, absolutely nothing to me, in comparison with this Constitution 
which I hold in my hand. It means nothing, political party means 
nothing to me, in comparison with this great old book which our mothers 
read, the Holy Bible.
  It seems to me that in this debate--thinking about the 50,000 e-mails 
that have come to this country boy from the hills of West Virginia, 
50,000 e-mails, almost 20,000 telephone calls; my wonderful staff have 
been hard-pressed to take all these calls and log them in--the American 
people seem to have a better understanding of the Constitution than do 
those who are elected to represent them.
  Now, that is a shame, isn't it? I feel sorry for some of my 
colleagues. I love them; bless their hearts. I love them. I forgive 
them. But you might as well talk to the ocean. I might as well speak to 
the waves as they come with the tides that rise and fall. I might as 
well speak to the waves, as did King Canute, as to speak to some of my 
colleagues. They won't hear me. And it isn't because it is Robert Byrd. 
They just don't want to hear about that Constitution.
  That is what these people are writing me about. Perhaps it is that 
their understanding, the understanding of the people, the great mass of 
people out there, it may be that their understanding of the 
Constitution has not yet filtered through the prism of the election 
year politics. That's it--the election year politics.
  I believe the American people have a better understanding of what the 
Senate is about to do, a greater respect for the inherent powers of the 
Constitution, and a greater comprehension of the far-reaching 
consequences of this resolution, a greater comprehension than do most 
of their leaders.
  I thank my colleagues who have allowed me to express at considerable 
length my reasons for opposing the resolution. I thank those Senators, 
such as the Senator who presides over the Senate at this very moment, I 
thank those Senators who have stood with me in my fight for the 
Constitution and for this institution and for that provision in the 
Constitution that says, Congress shall have power to declare war.
  I thank those Senators who have engaged in thoughtful debate with me. 
I thank Senator McCain. I thank Senator Warner. I thank these men. They 
stood up for what they believe. They stood up for this administration. 
The only difference is, I will stand for no administration--none--when 
it comes to this Constitution. If the administration took a position 
opposite that Constitution, forget it. I don't care if it is a 
Democrat.
  I do not believe the Senate has given enough time or enough 
consideration to the question of handing the President unchecked 
authority to usurp the Constitution and declare war on Iraq. I have no 
brief for Iraq. But I accept the futility of continuing to fight on 
this front. So I could keep us here all night tonight. I know there 
would be other Senators who would stand with me. Other Senators believe 
as I do. I could keep us here tomorrow. I could keep us here through 
Saturday. I would hope we would not be in on Sunday. That is the 
Sabbath Day. But come back on next Tuesday, have at it again, until the 
flesh from my bones be hacked.
  I say to the people of America, to those who have encouraged other 
Senators and me to uphold the principles of the Constitution: Keep up 
the fight. Keep fighting for what is right. Let your voices be heard.
  Why do you think George Washington crossed the Delaware? I say to my 
good friend from Delaware, Joe Biden, my esteemed friend, my esteemed 
colleague. He crossed the Delaware, I say to my friend Fred Thompson--
Senator Fred Thompson, we are going to soon miss him. I like him. I 
like him. He always speaks with great passion and fervor, and he is 
always respectful of other Senators. He was here during the days of Sam 
Ervin, Howard Baker, the days of Watergate, that Senator from 
Tennessee.
  Let me say, I will always listen to you, the people out there, and I 
hope the President will begin to listen to you.
  If the President really wants to do something for this country, let 
him help to fight the war at home. This week, we will soon be passing 
another CR. Time and time again, the President's Attorney General and 
the Director of Homeland Security have put the Nation on notice that 
there is an imminent threat of another terrorist attack to our 
homeland. And from time to time, they have even identified the most 
likely targets, such as our nuclear powerplants, our transportation 
infrastructure, our Nation's monuments, our embassies. They have told 
our citizens to be vigilant about this imminent risk.
  What has the President done to respond to this imminent risk of 
terrorist attack on our Nation's shoulders? The President has proposed 
to create a new bureaucracy. He has proposed to move boxes around on an 
organization of flowcharts. He has proposed to create the second-
largest domestic agency in the history of the Republic. Even the 
President recognizes that actually creating the new Department of 
Homeland Security will take at least 1 year.
  I tell you, my friends, if I ever saw a good lawyer, he sits right 
here on the back row, right now--that Senator from Tennessee, Fred 
Thompson. Why do I say that? Because he made the most rousing defense 
of this sorry resolution that is before the Senate and on which we will 
soon vote, the most rousing defense of it. And yet he is against it. He 
is against it. That is what I call a good lawyer; he makes a rousing 
defense of this thing which he hates.
  Even the President recognizes that actually creating the new 
Department of Homeland Security will take at least 1 year. The GAO has 
said it will take at least 5 to 10 years for a new Department to be 
effected.
  So while our citizens are facing this imminent risk, under the 
President's proposal, the agencies responsible for securing our 
borders, such as the Customs Service, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, and the Coast Guard, will spend the next year 
or more figuring out for whom they work, with whom they work. Instead 
of focusing on their mission, our border agencies and inspectors will 
be wondering whether their units will be reorganized or transferred to 
new locations, and they will be wondering where their phones are, where 
their computers are, and whether their jobs are going to be eliminated. 
And what would be happening in the meantime? Who will be keeping the 
store and watching the terrorists?
  Reorganizing our bureaucracy will not improve our Nation's immediate 
capacity to deter or respond to the imminent threat of a terrorist 
attack. Since September 11, the Senate Appropriations Committee has 
focused on providing immediate resources to Federal, State, and local 
agencies and first responders in order to improve our capacity to 
respond to this evolving threat.
  On September 14, 2001--just 3 days after the horrific attacks on 
September 11--Congress approved $40 billion. That is $40 for every day 
since Jesus Christ was born. Congress approved $40 billion, including 
$9.8 billion for homeland defense. Resources were provided to the FBI 
to hire more agents and to improve their computers; to State and local 
governments to improve the capacity of our hospitals and clinics to 
respond to chemical or biological weapons attacks; to State and local 
governments to train and equip our law enforcement and fire personnel 
to respond to attacks; for HHS to purchase smallpox vaccine for USDA; 
to the FDA to protect our food safety; to the Postal Service to 
purchase equipment that can protect the mail--where have you been, Mr. 
President? That is what

[[Page S10278]]

Congress did--for the FAA to secure cockpits and to improve the 
security of our airports; to the Department of Transportation for port 
security; to the Energy Department to help secure our nuclear 
facilities; to Customs and INS for additional border security 
inspectors and agencies, and for improved training and equipment.
  To listen to the President, he is the only person who has been 
thinking anything about homeland security. Here is the great Congress 
of the United States that has been providing moneys for the defense of 
our country.
  Despite objections from the White House, Congress was able to 
increase funding for homeland security programs by $3.9 billion. Where 
have you been, Mr. President? If you want to do something, do something 
here at home.
  On November 14, 2001, Senate Democrats supported the inclusion of $15 
billion for homeland security in an economic stimulus package, 
including $4 billion for bioterrorism and food safety; $4.6 billion for 
law enforcement and responsive initiatives; $3.2 billion for 
transportation security: and $3 billion for other homeland security 
programs, including mail screening and protection for our nuclear 
plants and labs, water projects, and other facilities.
  Where has he been, Mr. Commander in Chief? Out on the campaign trail 
raising money for the campaign? This is what Congress has been doing.
  On November 14, 2001, the White House strongly objected to the 
amendment, asserting that existing funding was ``more than adequate to 
meet foreseeable needs.''
  Now, who is fighting for homeland security? Under pressure from the 
White House, Senate Republicans, objecting to the emergency designation 
for the homeland security funding, raised the Budget Act point of 
order. Efforts to waive the budget point of order failed. On December 
4, 2001, the Appropriations Committee reported out, by a vote of 29 to 
0, the Defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 2002.
  In addition to the $20 billion appropriated on September 14, the bill 
would have provided $7.5 billion in additional homeland security funds, 
including $3.9 billion for bioterrorism and food safety; $1.3 billion 
for antiterrorism law enforcement; $1.43 billion for security of mail 
and nuclear facilities; $879 million for transportation and border 
security. The bill would also have provided an additional $7.5 billion 
to FEMA's disaster relief account for activities and assistance related 
to 9/11.
  On December 5, 2001, in a meeting with congressional leaders, 
President Bush threatened to veto the Defense appropriations bill 
because of funding ``that is not needed at this time.''
  On December 6, 2001, Senate Republicans objected to the emergency 
designation for the homeland security funding in the Defense 
appropriations bill and raised the Budget Act point of order. Efforts 
to waive the budget point of order failed.
  On December 7, 2001, after negotiations with Senate Republicans, 
homeland security programs were reduced by over $3.6 billion. The 
Senate then passed the Defense appropriations bill. In April and May of 
2002, the Senate Appropriations Committee held five bipartisan 
hearings, led and conducted by Senator Ted Stevens and me, concerning 
the defense of our homeland. Senator Stevens and I, and others on that 
committee, Republicans and Democrats, heard from Governors and from 
mayors. We heard from firemen, law enforcement, and emergency medical 
personnel. We heard from specialists in the field of counterterrorism. 
Based on those hearings, the Committee on Appropriations in the Senate 
produced a bipartisan supplemental appropriations bill to continue our 
effort to provide immediate resources to improve our Nation's capacity 
to deter and respond to terrorist attack.
  On May 22, 2002, the Senate Appropriations Committee, by a vote of 29 
to 0, reported out a supplemental appropriations bill that included 
$8.3 billion for homeland defense programs.
  Once again, on June 4, 2002, the President threatened to veto the 
bill because he believed it contained unnecessary homeland security 
spending.
  On June 7, 2002, the Senate passed the Supplemental Appropriations 
Act for further recovery from and response to terrorist attacks on the 
United States. The bill provided $8.3 billion for homeland security 
programs, including the following amounts above the President's 
request: $265 million for airport security funds; $646 million for 
first responder programs; $716 million for port security. However, 
under pressure from the White House, conferees on that bill were forced 
to reduce homeland security funding from $8.3 billion to $6.7 billion--
under pressure from the White House.
  In negotiations with House Republicans, homeland security funding was 
dropped for cybersecurity, for improved capacity for the Centers for 
Disease Control to investigate potential biological attacks, for 
airport security, for the Coast Guard, and for the Customs Service.
  On July 24 of this year, the Senate passed the conference report to 
the Supplemental Appropriations Act for further recovery from and 
response to terrorist attacks on the United States. Get this now; we 
are talking about war here, the war on terrorism. Where? Here in this 
country. This act reduced the $8.3 billion for homeland security 
appropriated by the Senate to $6.7 billion.
  Did the White House agree to fund the full $6.7 billion for homeland 
defense programs? Did it?
  No. The White House talks a good game on homeland defense, but the 
White House support is more about rhetoric than it is about resources. 
In order for the President to spend $2.5 billion for homeland defense 
spending, it was necessary for him to do what? Just sign his name on a 
document designating the funding as an emergency requirement.
  What did the President choose to do? Did he choose to sign his name 
and start that $2.5 billion to flowing into the States and counties and 
municipalities of this country? No. The President chose not to make 
that designation.
  In making that decision, he terminated $2.5 billion of funding for 
the FBI, funding to train and equip our Nation's firefighters, funding 
for the Corps of Engineers to help ensure our water supply, funding for 
security at nuclear facilities, funding for the Coast Guard.
  Now tell that, Mr. President, at your next campaign stop, your next 
fundraiser when you are talking about making war on Iraq. Tell the 
people there what I have been reading. It is fact. These are for the 
record.
  One of the lessons we learned at the World Trade Center on September 
11 was that our fire personnel could not communicate by radio with 
police personnel; that local officials could not communicate with State 
and regional personnel.
  When the President decided to block the $2.5 billion, he blocked the 
$100 million that we approved to help State and local governments 
across the land to solve the problem, and $90 million to provide 
medical assistance to the first responders at the World Trade Center 
was lost.
  What is the President's solution for the imminent threat to our 
Nation's homeland security? Rhetoric? Yes. More bureaucracy? Yes. 
Resources to respond to the immediate threat? No.
  Mr. President, with reference to this Commander in Chief business 
that we hear about--oh, the Commander in Chief, they say. I listen to 
my friends across the aisle talking about the Commander in Chief. We 
must do this for the Commander in Chief; we must stand shoulder to 
shoulder with the Commander in Chief. The Commander in Chief. Of what 
is he Commander in Chief? The army, the navy, and the militia of the 
several States. But who provides the army and the navy? Who provides 
for the calling out of the militia of the several States? Congress. So 
much for the the term ``Commander in Chief.''
  Charles I used that term in 1639--Commander in Chief. You know what 
happened to Charles I of England? The swordsman cut off the head of 
Charles I on January 30, 1649. So much for Commander in Chief.
  Parliament and the King of England fought a war. Can you imagine 
that? Can you imagine Congress fighting a war with the President of the 
United States? They did that in England. Yes, Parliament and the King 
fought a war. Who lost? The King. Who was it? King Charles I. A high 
court convened on January 1, I believe it was, 1649, and in 30 days 
they cut Charles I's head off--severed it from his body. So much for

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Charles I. That was the Commander in Chief. Yes. Hail to the chief.
  I respect the President as much as anybody else. But the Barons at 
Runnemede on the banks of the Thames on June 15, 1215, took it upon 
themselves to let the King know that there was a law, and that Kings 
had to live by the law, just as did barons and others.
  I do not know who is talking to this President down here. I do not 
know who among his crowd down there is trying to pump him up, but my 
friends, this President of the United States is the President by virtue 
of this Constitution. He is created by this Constitution that I hold in 
my hand, which says in article II that the President shall be Commander 
in Chief. And yet this refers to the Constitution in this national 
security strategy of the United States of America printed on September 
2002. It refers to the Constitution not even with a capital letter.
  The Constitution of America--what is the matter with those people? 
Haven't they studied the Constitution down at the other end of the 
avenue? They better become aware of it. This is the Constitution, and 
that Constitution refutes this resolution on which Congress is about to 
vote to give to the President of the United States power to determine 
the use of the military forces, when he will use them, where he will 
use them, how long he will use them. It is this Constitution. You 
better believe it, may I say to those who advise the President.
  I think the President is probably a much better individual by 
himself, but somebody is giving him bad advice.
  Here is what Hamilton says. Let's read what Hamilton says. He is one 
of the three authors of the ``Federalist Papers.'' Hamilton, who was 
shot to death in Weehawken, NJ, on the 11th of July, 1804. He died on 
the 12th of July, 1804; shot by the Vice President of the United 
States; murdered by the Vice President of the United States. Let's hear 
what Alexander Hamilton has to say in the Federalist Paper No. 69. Read 
it. These are the ``Federalist Papers.'' There are 85 of them written 
by Jay, Hamilton, and Madison. Let's hear what he says about the 
Commander in Chief. I want the Commander in Chief to hear me. I want 
the Commander in Chief to hear not what Robert Byrd said--who is he?--
but read what Alexander Hamilton said:

       The President is to be the ``commander-in-chief'' of the 
     army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the 
     several States, when called into the actual service of the 
     United States. . . .In most of these particulars, the power 
     of the President will resemble equally that of the king of 
     Great Britain and of the governor of New York. The most 
     material points of difference are these:--First. The 
     President will have only the occasional command of such part 
     of the militia of the nation as by legislative provision may 
     be called into the actual service of the Union. The king of 
     Great Britain and the governor of New York have at all times 
     the entire command of all the militia within their several 
     jurisdictions. In this article, therefore--

  Talking about this article of the Constitution--

       In this article, therefore, the power of the President 
     would be inferior to that of either the monarch or the 
     governor. Second. The President is to be commander-in-chief 
     of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect 
     his authority would be nominally the same with that of the 
     king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it.

  Get that down there at the other end of the avenue. Read it.

       Second. The President is to be commander-in-chief. . . .It 
     would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and 
     direction of the military and naval forces, as first general 
     and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British 
     king extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and 
     regulating of fleets and armies--all which, by the 
     Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the 
     legislature.

  That is Hamilton.
  I am reading from the Federalist Papers. Perhaps I ought to send a 
copy down to the White House. I will see if I can't do that. I will 
send them a copy. It will not cost them anything, just a gift from 
Robert C. Byrd. 
  Now, I have a little more to say. Suffice it to say there are other 
of my colleagues, and I, who have stood on this floor and we have 
pointed to the Constitution of the United States. We have said time and 
time again, as we have offered amendments, to try to uphold this 
Constitution of the United States, read those amendments. They went 
down, I am sorry to say, but I am not discouraged.
  Let me read some verses from the Book of Luke in the Holy Bible, 
beginning with chapter 16, verse 19 and continuing through verse 31:

       There was a certain rich man, which was clothed in purple 
     and fine linen, and fared sumptuously every day. And there 
     was a certain beggar named Lazarus, which was laid at his 
     gate, full of sores, and desiring to be fed with the crumbs 
     which fell from the rich man's table. Moreover the dogs came 
     and licked his sores. And it came to pass that the beggar 
     died, and was carried by the angels into Abraham's bosom. The 
     rich man also died, and was buried.
       And in hell he lift up his eyes, being in torments, and 
     seeth Abraham afar off, and Lazarus in his bosom. And he 
     cried and said, Father Abraham, have mercy on me, and send 
     Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger in water, and 
     cool my tongue; for I am tormented in this flame.
       But Abraham said, Son, remember that thou in thy lifetime 
     receivedst thy good things, and likewise Lazarus evil things; 
     but now he is comforted and thou art tormented. And beside 
     all of this, between us and you there is a great gulf fixed; 
     so that they which would pass from hence to you cannot. 
     Neither can they pass to us, that would come from thence.
       Then he said, I pray thee therefore, father, that thou 
     wouldest send him to my father's house; For I have five 
     brethren: that he may testify unto them, lest they also come 
     into this place of torment. And Abraham saith unto him, They 
     have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them. And he said, 
     Nay, father Abraham; but if one went unto them from the dead 
     they will repent. And he said unto him, if they hear not 
     Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, 
     though one rose from the dead.

  There you have it. We can speak until we are blue in the face, we can 
speak until our tongues fall out, and they will not hear us. So if 
there were those who were brought from the dead, would some listen?
  Some would; some would not.
  We have spoken. We have spoken out of our hearts, and we can speak 
until our hearts fall from our bodies, but some would not hear. Let 
those who will not hear understand that this Constitution will endure. 
It will endure because it was written, as John Marshall said, to endure 
for the ages.
  In closing, I want to thank my dear friends in this Senate who have 
stood in this Chamber day after day in the effort to educate our 
people.
  The Senate is a great institution, but somehow I think we are 
failing. We are failing to educate the people. Why? Because we do not 
want to spend enough time. How much time have we spent on this 
resolution as of yesterday at 4 p.m.? A little over 25 hours on this 
bill--25 hours. Why, many of the larger municipalities in this country 
would spend a week on an application for a sewer permit. And here we 
spend 2 days?--that is what it amounts to, 25 hours--and we are ready 
to quit.
  We know we might as well quit because this cloture rule is being used 
against us. Why at this critical time, when we are discussing the most 
critical legislation we have had before the Senate this year, the most 
critical legislation we may have in a long time? We have been 
stampeded, we have been rushed, and it is unfair to the people of this 
country. Yet it has to be that way.
  I have letters from constitutional scholars in response to my inquiry 
of them as to the war powers of the United States Congress. I received 
several letters from constitutional scholars from around the country, 
and I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the Record: A 
letter by Jane E. Stromseth, professor of law, Georgetown University 
Law Center; a letter from Tufts University, the Fletcher School of Law 
and Diplomacy, a letter signed by Michael J. Glennon, professor of 
international law.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                             Georgetown University Law Center,

                                  Washington, DC, August 26, 2002.
     Hon. Robert C. Byrd,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Byrd: Thank you for your letter of July 22, 
     asking for my opinion regarding whether the Bush 
     Administration currently has sufficient constitutional and/or 
     statutory authority to introduce U.S. Armed Forces into Iraq 
     for the purpose of removing Saddam Hussein from power. This 
     question is of vital importance to our country and our 
     Constitution, and I appreciate the opportunity to address it.
       The answer to your question requires an interpretation of 
     the Constitution and of several statutes, and it also depends 
     on the factual circumstances surrounding any contemplated 
     military action. As I discuss below, if the United States or 
     its armed

[[Page S10280]]

     forces are subject to attack or imminent attack by Iraq, the 
     President can invoke his constitutional authority as 
     Commander in Chief to repel sudden attacks. Also, if the 
     President establishes a direct link between Iraq and the 
     attacks of September 11, he can invoke S.J. Res. 23 (Pub. L. 
     No. 107-40) as statutory authority to commit U.S. forces to 
     Iraq. However, based on the facts as they have been presented 
     by the Bush Administration as of August 26, 2002, neither an 
     imminent attack by Iraq nor a clear link between Iraq and the 
     September 11 attacks have been established. Moreover, given 
     the likely scale and risks of a U.S. military action to 
     remove Saddam Hussein from power, the commitment of U.S. 
     forces to Iraq to impose a regime change would constitute a 
     war requiring prior congressional authorization, which, 
     absent a connection to the September 11 attacks does not 
     presently exist. While serious arguments can be advanced that 
     the 1991 Gulf War authorization, coupled with subsequent 
     legislative action, provide statutory authority to use U.S. 
     armed forces to remove Saddam Hussein as part of enforcing 
     the Gulf War cease-fire resolution (UN Security Council 
     Resolution 687), those arguments ultimately fall short on 
     close examination. In sum, whether commencing U.S. military 
     action against Saddam Hussein, in circumstances outside a 
     link to Sept. 11 or an attack or imminent attack against the 
     United States, is a wise policy is a question on which 
     reasonable people can disagree; it is also a question that 
     ought, under our Constitution, to be debated by Congress and 
     its authorization secured before any such military action 
     commences. The basis for these conclusions is set forth full 
     below.
     First Principles
       As you know well, the Constitution's war powers provisions 
     are part of a structural system of checks and balances 
     designed to protect liberty by guarding against the 
     concentration of power. The Constitution gave Congress the 
     power to declare war because the Founders believed that such 
     a significant decision should be made not by one person, but 
     by the legislature as a whole, to ensure careful deliberation 
     by the people's elected representatives and broad national 
     support before the country embarked on a course so full of 
     risks. As James Madison put it: ``In no part of the 
     constitution is more wisdom to be found, than in the clause 
     which confides the question of war or peace to the 
     legislation, and not to the executive department . . . 
     [T]he trust and the temptation would be too great for any 
     one man. . . .''\1\ The Founders, in short, vested the 
     power to decide whether the country should go to war in 
     the Congress to ensure that the decision to expose the 
     country to such sacrifices and costs reflected the 
     judgment and deliberation of the legislative branch as a 
     whole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ James Madison, in Alexander Hamilton & James Madison, 
     Letters of Pacificus and Helvidius on the Proclamation of 
     Neutrality of 1793, at 89 (Washington, D.C., J. Gideon & G.S. 
     Gideon, 1845).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       At the same time, the framers wanted a strong Executive who 
     could ``repel sudden attacks'' and act with efficiency and 
     dispatch in protecting the interests of the United States in 
     a dangerous world. By making the President Commander in 
     Chief, moreover, they sought to ensure effective, unified 
     command over U.S. forces and civilian accountability. My best 
     reading of the constitutional sources is that the Founders 
     expected the President, as Commander in Chief and Chief 
     Executive, to protect the United States in a dangerous and 
     uncertain world by repelling attacks or imminent attacks 
     against the United States, its vessels, and its armed forces, 
     but not, on his own, to go beyond this authority and commence 
     war without congressional authority. The Founders, in short, 
     made a clear distinction between defending against attacks 
     initiated by others and commencing war.
       Historical practice since the Constitution's ratification 
     has not fundamentally altered how we should understand the 
     Constitution's allocation of war powers today. On the 
     contrary, practice cannot supplant or override the clear 
     requirements of the Constitution, which gives the power to 
     declare or initiate war to Congress. Furthermore, of the 
     dozen major wars in American history, five were formally 
     declared by Congress and six were authorized by other 
     legislative measures.\2\ Whatever conclusions one might reach 
     about small-scale uses of force, which admittedly raise more 
     complicated issues, the fact remains that major wars have 
     been authorized by Congress.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \2\ President Truman committed U.S. forces to Korea without 
     seeking congressional authorization. For a discussion of 
     constitutional war powers and the Korean War, see Jane 
     Stromseth, ``Rethinking War Powers: Congress, The President, 
     and the United Nations,'' 81 Georgetown Law Journal 597, 621-
     640 (1993). Congress subsequently enacted legislation to 
     provide funds for the Korean War and to extend the draft, id. 
     at 626, 630.
     \3\ In a longer piece, I discuss original intent, historical 
     practice, and current arguments about war powers more fully 
     and systematically, and I draw upon my conclusions in that 
     piece here. See Jane E. Stromseth, ``Understanding 
     Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters,'' 
     106 Yale L.J. 845 (1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The War Powers Resolution (Pub. L. No. 93-148) aims to 
     ``insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress 
     and the President'' apply to the introduction of U.S. forces 
     into hostilities and to the continued use of those forces. 
     Moreover, it seeks to enable the Congress to better fulfill 
     its constitutional responsibilities by requiring the 
     President ``in every possible instance'' to ``consult with 
     Congress before introducing'' U.S. armed forces into 
     hostilities or imminent hostilities. Among its other 
     provisions, the War Powers Resolution makes clear, in Section 
     8(a), that authority to introduce U.S. Armed Forces into 
     hostilities or imminent hostilities ``shall not be inferred . 
     . . from any provision of law . . . , including any provision 
     contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision 
     specifically authorizes the introduction of United States 
     Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and 
     states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory 
     authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution.'' 
     This clear-statement rule is designed to serve the 
     constitutional purpose of ensuring a clear and deliberate 
     congressional authorization of force. Thus, when Congress 
     authorized commencement of the Gulf War in 1991, and again 
     when Congress authorized the use of force in response to the 
     September 11 attacks, it expressly affirmed that it was 
     providing specific statutory authorization within the meaning 
     of the War Powers Resolution.
       Moreover, the War Powers Resolution makes clear that it is 
     not intended ``to alter the constitutional authority of the 
     Congress or of the President,'' nor shall it ``be construed 
     as granting any authority to the President with respect to 
     the introduction of United States Armed Forces into 
     hostilities . . . which authority he would not have had in 
     the absence of this joint resolution.'' (Section 8(d)(1) and 
     8(d)(2)). Thus, contrary to claims sometimes made, the War 
     Powers Resolution does not authorize the President to commit 
     U.S. forces to war for 60 days.\4\ On the contrary, because 
     the Constitution requires congressional authorization to 
     commence war, the War Powers Resolution should not be read to 
     confer such authority on the President. Congress thus 
     expressly authorized the 1991 Persian Gulf War and certainly 
     did not view the War Powers Resolution as obviating the need 
     for such authorization. (I have attached my summary of the 
     congressional debate preceding the Gulf War as an appendix to 
     this letter).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \4\ The War Powers Resolution and its 60/90 day time-clock 
     apply to a wide variety of situations in which U.S. forces 
     are introduced into hostilities as well as into ``situations 
     where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly 
     indicated by the circumstances.'' Whatever effects this 
     statute has, or was intended to have on smaller-scale 
     deployments of force, including deployments that involve 
     simply the prospect of hostilities, the War Powers Resolution 
     cannot be read as authorizing 60 days wars because of the 
     clear language to the contrary in sections 8(d) and 2(c) of 
     the statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Military Action Against Iraq for the Purpose of Removing 
         Saddam Hussein from Power
       If the President were to commit U.S. armed forces to Iraq 
     for the purpose of removing Saddam Hussein from power, the 
     United States would be embarking on what likely would be a 
     major and sustained commitment of military forces in a 
     campaign that would involve enormous risks and substantial 
     potential casualties. In order to commit U.S. forces to 
     such a military action, the President would need authority 
     to act.
       Constitutionally, the President possesses the power to 
     repel sudden attacks, which, in my view, includes the power 
     to forestall imminent attacks against the United States and 
     its armed forces, and to protect Americans in imminent danger 
     abroad.\5\ In an age of terrorism, there may well be direct 
     and imminent threats to the United States that require an 
     immediate defensive response by the President and constitute 
     a legitimate exercise of the international right of self-
     defense. But, at this point, the President has not offered 
     evidence of an imminent attack by Iraq on the United States 
     or its forces. The purpose behind the President's power as 
     Chief Executive and Commander in Chief to ``repel sudden 
     attacks'' is to give the President the flexibility to act to 
     defend the United States when there is not time to consult 
     with Congress. But the decision to go beyond this and to 
     commence a war is vested in Congress. Moreover, there is time 
     for a thorough legislative debate regarding Iraq; the United 
     States and its forces are not currently being attacked; 
     military forces would be built up over a period of time 
     before military action could be commenced; and ample time 
     exists to consult with Congress and seek its authorization to 
     use force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \5\ This interpretation of the President's authority is 
     consistent with the understanding reflected in the original 
     Senate version of the War Powers Resolution. See S. Rep. No. 
     93-220, at 22 (1973). For a discussion of the scope of the 
     President's defensive war powers, see Stromseth, 
     ``Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why 
     Methodology Matters,'' 106 Yale L. J. 845, 888-892 (1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Major military action with far-reaching objectives such as 
     regime change is precisely the kind of action that 
     constitutionally should be debated and authorized by Congress 
     in advance. Under present circumstances, which admittedly 
     could change, military action against Iraq to force a change 
     in regime would pose significant risks to U.S. forces, 
     including risks of Iraqi retaliation with weapons of mass 
     destruction, and risks of a larger conflict in an already 
     hemoraging Middle East. Initiating a military confrontation 
     of this nature would be a decision to engage in war that is 
     precisely the kind of decision the Founders vested in 
     Congress by virtue of its power to declare war. Moreover, the 
     purposes behind that power (ensuring deliberation, democratic 
     consensus and national unity before

[[Page S10281]]

     engaging in war) are critical if the American people and 
     American armed forces are being asked to bear those risks. In 
     short, under the factual circumstances that exist as of the 
     date of this letter, the President cannot rely on inherent 
     constitutional authority to commit U.S. forces to Iraq for 
     the purpose of removing Saddam Hussein from power.
     Congress's Post-September 11 Authorization of Force
       Whether statutory authority presently exists to introduce 
     U.S. armed forces into Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein depends 
     on whether such action would fall within the provisions of 
     S.J. Res. 23 (Pub. L. No. 107-40), adopted in response to the 
     September 11 attacks.
       Congress's authorization for the use of force against those 
     responsible for the attacks of September 11 is an express 
     recognition that Congress and the President both have a 
     critical constitutional role to play in the war on terrorism. 
     S.J. Res. 23 authorizes the President: ``to use all necessary 
     and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, 
     or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
     aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
     2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
     prevent any future acts of international terrorism against 
     the United States by such nations, organizations or 
     persons.'' Thus, the force must be directed against those 
     responsible for the September 11th attacks, or those who 
     harbored such organizations or persons; and the purpose of 
     using force is focused and future-oriented: to prevent 
     additional terrorist acts against the United States by the 
     states, organizations, or persons responsible for the 
     September 11th attacks or who harbored those responsible.
       Congress' post-September 11th resolution was an unambiguous 
     decision to authorize force. Like the Gulf War authorization 
     in 1991, the authorization explicitly affirms that it ``is 
     intended to constitute specific statutory authorization 
     within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers 
     Resolution.'' This removes any actions that fall within the 
     scope of the authorization from the War Powers Resolution's 
     60-day time-clock provision. At the same time, Congress made 
     clear that the requirements of the War Powers Resolution 
     otherwise remain applicable, which would include the 
     requirement of regular reporting and consultation. Moreover, 
     in signing the Joint Resolution, President Bush made clear 
     that he would consult closely with Congress as the United 
     States responds to terrorism.
       Whether this joint resolution authorizes military action 
     against Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power depends on 
     whether the requisite link to the attacks of September 11 
     exists or not. That is, did Iraq ``plan [ ], authorize, [ ] 
     commit [ ], or aid [ ] the September 11 attacks,'' or 
     ``harbor'' organizations or persons who did? Under the terms 
     of the resolution, the President determines whether such a 
     link to the September 11th attacks is established, but 
     Congress undoubtedly expected that the President would 
     make his determination and the basis for it known to 
     Congress. In a matter as momentous as commencing 
     hostilities against Iraq, Congress and the American people 
     would certainly expect a clear and convincing indication 
     of evidence linking Iraq to the September 11 attacks. As 
     of August 26, 2002, the Administration, to my knowledge, 
     has not made such a showing nor publicly argued that there 
     is a direct link between Iraq and the September 11 
     attacks. Nor has the Administration presented its views 
     regarding whether using force to remove Saddam Hussein 
     from power is ``necessary and appropriate force . . . in 
     order to prevent any future acts of international 
     terrorism against the United States'' by the nations, 
     organizations or persons responsible for the September 11 
     attacks. If the link between Iraq and the September 11 
     attacks is tenuous, additional congressional authorization 
     clearly addressing Iraq would better serve the important 
     constitutional purposes underlying Congress's power to 
     declare war: congressional deliberation and national 
     consensus before the country embarks on a major military 
     action so full of risks.
     The 1991 Gulf War Authorization
       Some argue that the President has current authority to use 
     U.S. forces against Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein based on 
     the 1991 Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Pub. 
     L. 102-1). This Resolution, adopted prior to the 1991 Gulf 
     War, authorized the President to use U.S. Armed Forces 
     pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 to achieve 
     implementation of previous, enumerated Security Council 
     resolutions.\6\ Those Security Council resolutions included 
     Resolution 660 (1990) demanding that Iraq withdraw 
     immediately from Kuwait. UN Security Council Resolution 678, 
     in turn, authorized UN member states cooperating with Kuwait 
     ``to use all necessary means to uphold and implement 
     resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions 
     and to restore international peace and security in the 
     area.'' In contrast to this UN resolution, which refers to 
     ``all subsequent relevant resolutions,'' the 1991 
     congressional authorization of force was crafted to refer 
     only to implementation of specific UN resolutions adopted 
     prior to Resolution 678--resolutions that focus above all on 
     Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and restoration of Kuwait's 
     sovereignty. Congress, in short, tailored its 1991 
     authorization to the specific goal of liberating Kuwait 
     rather than providing an open-ended authorization of force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \6\ H.J. Res. 77, Pub. L. No. 102-1, provides in Section 
     2(a): ``The President is authorized, subject to subsection 
     (b), to use United States armed forces pursuant to United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to 
     achieve implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 
     661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677.'' 
     Section 2(b), in turn, requires the President, before using 
     force, to make available to Congress his determination that 
     ``the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and 
     other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the 
     United Nations Security Council resolutions cited in 
     subsection (a); and . . . that those efforts have not been 
     and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Those who invoke the 1991 Use of Military Force Against 
     Iraq Resolution as current authority to remove Saddam Hussein 
     begin by noting that Iraq is in material breach of UN 
     Security Council Resolution 687 (the Gulf War cease-fire 
     resolution). That resolution requires Iraq to relinquish all 
     weapons of mass destruction and authorized a UN Special 
     Commission (UNSCOM) to monitor Iraq's compliance. Resolution 
     687, in particular, requires Iraq to ``unconditionally accept 
     the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under 
     international supervision'' of all chemical and biological 
     weapons and all ballistic missiles with a range exceeding 150 
     kilometers and to ``unconditionally undertake not to use, 
     develop, construct or acquire'' such weapons. (Resolution 
     687, paragraphs 8 and 10). Iraq likewise is required not to 
     develop or acquire nuclear weapons or subsystems or 
     components, and to submit to ongoing monitoring and 
     verification of its compliance (paragraphs 12, 13). 
     Undoubtedly, Iraq's persistent refusal to allow full, 
     unimpaired weapons inspections is a clear and unacceptable 
     breach of Resolution 687. The domestic legal question then 
     is: has Congress authorized the use of U.S. armed forces to 
     remove Saddam Hussein from power in order to enforce UN 
     Security Council Resolution 687?
       The 1991 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against 
     Iraq Resolution does not, on its face, provide authorization 
     to use force to implement Resolution 687. Adopted prior to 
     the Gulf War, the 1991 Joint Resolution authorized the 
     President to use U.S. armed forces pursuant to UN Resolution 
     687 in order to achieve implementation of specific UN 
     resolutions adopted prior to Resolution 687. So purely as a 
     temporal matter, the cease-fire resolution (687), which came 
     at the end of the Gulf War, is not among the UN resolutions 
     enumerated in the 1991 Joint Resolution. Consequently, the 
     1991 authorization does not provide clear authority to use 
     force today to remove Saddam Hussein from power as a means to 
     enforce the Gulf War cease-fire resolution.
       Since 1991, Congress has indicated in a ``sense of the 
     Congress'' resolution its support for using ``all necessary 
     means'' to achieve the ``goals'' of UN Resolution 687; 
     Congress has also indicated its support for a policy of 
     regime change in Iraq. Yet, upon careful examination, these 
     indications of congressional intent do not provide a 
     clear authorization by Congress of the use of U.S. armed 
     forces to attack Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power. 
     If the United States is to commence war against Iraq, and 
     to expose U.S. forces and citizens to the considerable 
     costs and sacrifices that this would entail, both the 
     Constitution and the War Powers Resolution (section 
     8(a)(1)) expect a clear authorization from Congress that 
     reflects a deliberate decision to initiate hostilities on 
     a major scale. The various congressional actions since 
     1991 concerning Iraq do not provide that authorization.
       First, Section 1095 of the FY1992 Defense Authorization Act 
     (Pub. L. 102-190, signed December 5, 1991) declared the sense 
     of the Congress that Iraq's noncompliance with UN Resolution 
     687 constitutes ``a continuing threat to the peace, security, 
     and stability of the Persian Gulf region'' and that ``the 
     Congress supports the use of all necessary means to achieve 
     the goals of Security Council Resolution 687 as being 
     consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
     Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1).'' At the same 
     time, Section 1095 also expressed the sense of the Congress 
     that ``the President should consult closely with the partners 
     of the United States in the Desert Storm coalition and with 
     the members of the United Nations Security Council in order 
     to present a united front of opposition to Iraq's continuing 
     noncompliance with Security Council Resolution 687.''
       Some may contend that Section 1095 together with the 1991 
     Authorization for Use of Military Force Resolution gives the 
     President the authority to use force to commence war against 
     Iraq to impose a regime change because the 102nd Congress 
     expressed its view that using ``all necessary means to 
     achieve the goals of Security Council Resolution 687'' is 
     ``consistent with'' the 1991 authorization of force. Iraq is 
     in material breach of Resolution 687, as it was back in 1991, 
     and thus, according to this argument, the President can use 
     force to achieve Iraq's compliance, in accordance with 
     Section 1095 and the 1991 authorization, by removing Saddam 
     Hussein from power.
       Yet, upon careful review, this argument ultimately falls 
     short. First, regime change goes beyond the provisions or 
     requirements of UN Resolution 687, so Congress has not 
     provided clear authority for commencing hostilities for this 
     purpose as a means to implement 687. It is one thing to use 
     limited force to enforce no-fly-zones, for instance; it is a 
     quite different thing to commence war

[[Page S10282]]

     to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Second, and more 
     importantly, Section 1095 does not provide the clear 
     authorization of war that both the Constitution and the War 
     Powers Resolution expect. Section 1095 does not use the word 
     ``force'' or ``authorize''; rather, it is a ``sense of the 
     Congress'' resolution indicating that Congress ``supports'' 
     the use of ``all necessary means'' to ``achieve the goals'' 
     of Resolution 687 as being consistent with the 1991 
     Authorization. Section 1095 also fails to fulfil the War 
     Powers Resolution's clear-statement rule that authority to 
     use force cannot be inferred from legislation that does not 
     specifically cite its provisions. Although Section 1095 
     refers to the 1991 Authorization, it does not itself cite the 
     War Powers Resolution. Constitutionally, reliance on a 
     ``sense of the Congress'' resolution in a massive defense 
     authorization bill enacted over a decade ago as authorization 
     to commence a war against Iraq today to remove Saddam Hussein 
     from power falls short of a clear contemporaneous 
     authorization of major military action that is faithful to 
     the purposes underlying the Constitution's vesting of the 
     power to declare war in Congress.
       The Constitution vested the power to declare war in 
     Congress to ensure careful deliberation by the Congress as 
     well as the President before the United States commenced war. 
     Much has changed over the last decade, particularly after the 
     attacks of September 11, and initiating war against Iraq 
     today clearly would involve substantial costs and risks for 
     the United States, our forces and citizens, and for our 
     allies. Reasonable people may come to different conclusions 
     on the merits of this issue. But commencing a major military 
     action against Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power would 
     clearly constitute war, and congressional deliberation and 
     clear authorization is required. Reliance on an ambiguous 
     ``sense of the Congress'' resolution adopted over a decade 
     ago falls short of clear authority to commence war against 
     Iraq. The American people, including the brave men and women 
     who fight for our country, would expect a full debate and 
     consideration of the issue from their elected representatives 
     in Congress in light of the circumstances we face today. The 
     Constitution's wisdom on this point is compelling: 
     Authorization, if provided by Congress, ensures that the 
     costs and implications of any such action have been fully 
     considered and that a national consensus to proceed exists. 
     Congressional authorization also ensures American combat 
     forces that the country is behind them, and conveys America's 
     resolve and unity to allies as well as adversaries.
       To be sure, congressional action since 1991 indicates 
     Congress's continuing concern about Iraq's noncompliance with 
     UN Resolution 687 and Congress's support for maintaining the 
     no-fly-zones. But Congress has not provided clear statutory 
     authority to commence war against Iraq to overthrow Saddam 
     Hussein. In 1998, in response to Saddam Hussein's continuing 
     defiance of UN Resolution 687 and his refusal to allow 
     weapons inspections, the Senate and House passed a 
     resolution, S.J. Res. 54 (Pub. L. 105-235, signed Aug. 14, 
     1998), which declared Iraq in ``material breach'' of 
     its international obligations and ``urged'' the President 
     ``to take appropriate action, in accordance with the 
     Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to 
     bring Iraq into compliance with its international 
     obligations.'' This did not, however, provide clear 
     authorization to use U.S. armed forces.
       Later in October 1998, Congress declared in the Iraq 
     Liberation Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-338 (112 Stat. 3178), 
     that it ``should be the policy of the United States to 
     support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein 
     from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a 
     democratic government to replace that regime.'' (sec. 3). But 
     that Act also declared that ``[n]othing in this Act shall be 
     construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of 
     United States Armed Forces . . . in carrying out this Act'' 
     except as provided in section 4(a)(2) of the Act, which 
     authorizes the President to provide assistance to Iraqi 
     democratic opposition organizations through a ``drawdown of 
     defense articles from the stocks of the Department of 
     Defense, defense services of the Department of Defense, and 
     military education and training for such organizations.'' 
     (sec. 4(a)(2)).
       Some may argue that the 1991 Authorization and Section 
     1095--combined with Pub. L. 105-235 (declaring Iraq in 
     material breach of its international obligations); Publ. L. 
     105-338 (calling for a regime change in Iraq); and 
     congressional acquiescence during ``Operation Desert Fox'' 
     (Dec. 16-19, 1998) when force was used in response to Iraq's 
     refusal to readmit weapons inspectors--amounts to implied 
     authorization by Congress to use U.S. armed forces on a more 
     substantial scale to remove Saddam Hussein from power. See 
     Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (relying on 
     related legislation and congressional acquiescence in holding 
     that the President was implicitly authorized to suspend 
     claims pending in U.S. courts).
       This argument falls short as well. While Congress's acts 
     and resolutions clearly indicate its concern about Iraq's 
     noncompliance with UN Resolution 687, nowhere in the record 
     is there explicit authorization by Congress to commence a war 
     against Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Sense of 
     the Congress resolutions and congressional acquiescence 
     cannot substitute for a clear authorization to initiate war. 
     They do not meet the clear-statement provisions of Section 8 
     of the War Powers Resolution. Furthermore, the principles 
     underlying the Constitution's decision to vest the power to 
     declare war in Congress are not served by relying on 
     ambiguous indications of Congressional intent regarding 
     force. Moreover, Congress itself decisively closed the door 
     to ``composite'' interpretations of its intent in 1998, when 
     it made clear that its support for a policy of regime change 
     should not be ``construed to authorize or otherwise speak to 
     the use of United States Armed Forces.''
     Summing Up
       To recap the basic points of this letter: If the United 
     States is subject to attack or imminent attack by Iraq, the 
     President clearly possesses constitutional authority to use 
     U.S. armed forces. Likewise, if it can be demonstrated that 
     Iraq ``planned, authorized, committed, or aided'' the 
     September 11 attacks, or ``harbored'' those responsible, the 
     President would have authority to use force under S.J. Res. 
     23. If the link is tenuous and disputed, however, the 
     constitutional purposes underlying the vesting of the power 
     to declare war in Congress would be best served by an 
     additional clear, express authorization of force against Iraq 
     that reflects the deliberation and judgment of the Congress. 
     Finally, Congress's authorization of the Persian Gulf War, 
     together with subsequent legislative action, fall short of a 
     clear authorization of war against Iraq to remove Saddam 
     Hussein from power.
       Both the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution affirm 
     the critical importance of ensuring that decisions to commit 
     U.S. forces to war reflect the deliberation and support of 
     both the President and the Congress. Prior to the Persian 
     Gulf War, the President obtained clear authority to use force 
     from Congress. Likewise, in response to the September 11 
     attacks, Congress and the President acted together in 
     enacting S.J. Res. 23. As our country moves ahead in the war 
     against terrorism and as it considers policy options with 
     respect to Iraq, I sincerely hope that the Congress and the 
     President will work together as the Constitution envisions.
       Please call on me again if I can be of assistance.
           Sincerely,
                                                Jane E. Stromseth,
     Professor of Law.
                                  ____

       Tufts University, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,


                                 Medford, MA, August 20, 2002.

     Hon. Robert C. Byrd,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Byrd: Thank you for your letter of July 22, 
     2002 requesting my opinion whether the President currently 
     has authority under U.S. domestic law to introduce the U.S. 
     armed forces into hostilities against Iraq for the purpose of 
     removing Saddam Hussein from power.
       To summarize, I believe that he does not, although that 
     conclusion is based upon the assumption that Iraq was not 
     involved in the events of September 11, and that use of force 
     for this purpose would risk substantial casualties or large-
     scale hostilities over a prolonged duration. I reach that 
     conclusion for the following reasons:
       A. No treaty currently in force gives the President 
     authority to use force.
       B. None of the three relevant statutes gives the President 
     authority to use force.
       1. The War Powers Resolution confers no power on the 
     President to introduce the armed forces into hostilities that 
     he would not have had in its absence.
       2. Congress's Gulf War authorization would confer such 
     power only if Security Council Resolution 678 did so, and 
     Resolution 678 probably does not do so.
       a. The authority conferred by Resolution 678, which 
     authorized use of force against Iraq following its invasion 
     of Kuwait, was narrowly circumscribed and was directed at 
     reversing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
       b. That authority most likely was extinguished on April 6, 
     1991, the date the Iraqis notified the United Nations of 
     their acceptance of the pertinent provisions of Security 
     Council Resolution 687, which declared a formal cease-fire.
       c. Once extinguished that authority did not revive when 
     Iraq failed to comply with its obligations under Resolution 
     687.
       d. A decision to revive Resolution 678 must be made by the 
     Security Council and cannot be made by an individual member 
     state.
       e. It would be inappropriate to infer Security Council 
     intent to revive Resolution 678 from acquiescence by the 
     Council to subsequent military strikes against Iraq that were 
     not expressly authorized.
       f. The War Powers Resolution requires that doubts flowing 
     from ambiguous or unclear measures be resolved against 
     finding authority to use force; at a minimum, these 
     considerations raise such doubts.
       3. S.J. Res. 23 would permit use of force against Iraq only 
     if Iraq participated in the events of September 11.
       C. Absent authorization from a treaty or statute, authority 
     to use force against Iraq can derive only the Constitution. 
     The Constitution's text, the case law, custom, the intent of 
     the Framers, and structural and functional considerations all 
     suggest that, to the extent that use of force against Iraq 
     would risk substantial casualties or large-scale hostilities 
     over a prolonged duration, prior congressional approval would 
     be required.
       I now turn to a closer examination of each of the three 
     sources from which authorization to use force could in 
     principle derive: a treaty, a statute, or the Constitution.

[[Page S10283]]

     A. Authorization by treaty
       No treaty currently in force gives the President authority 
     to use force. Indeed, the United States has never been a 
     party to any treaty that purported to give the President 
     authority to use force. The constitutionality of any such 
     treaty would be doubtful in that it would necessarily divest 
     the House of Representatives of its share of the 
     congressional war power. (For this reason, all of the United 
     States' mutual security treaties have made clear that they do 
     not affect the domestic allocation of power.) Moreover, war-
     making authority conferred by any such treaty would be cut 
     off unless it met the requirements of section 8(a)(2) of the 
     War Powers Resolution. Section 8(a)(2) requires, in effect, 
     that any treaty authorizing the use of force meet two 
     conditions. The first condition is that any such treaty must 
     ``be implemented by legislation specifically authorizing'' 
     the introduction of the armed forces into hostilities or 
     likely hostilities. This condition is not met because no 
     treaty is so implemented. The second condition is that any 
     such implementing legislation must state that it is 
     ``intended to constitute specific statutory authorization'' 
     within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution. Again, since 
     no implementing legislation is in effect, the second 
     condition is also not met. Thus it must be concluded that, if 
     further authority to use force is required, the President 
     cannot seek that authority from any treaty.

                           *   *   *   *   *

     B. Authorization by statute
       The second source to which the President might turn for 
     authority to use force is statutory law. I referred above to 
     the provision of the War Powers Resolution that limits 
     authority to use force that can be inferred from a treaty. A 
     companion provision limits such authority that can be 
     inferred from a statute. That provision is section 8(a)(1). 
     Section 8(a)(1) sets out two similar conditions that must be 
     met before authority to use armed force can be inferred from 
     a given statute. The first condition is that such a statute 
     must ``specifically authorize'' the introduction of the armed 
     forces into hostilities or likely hostilities. The second 
     condition is that such a statute must state ``that it is 
     intended to constitute specific statutory authorization 
     within the meaning of'' the War Powers Resolution. Unless 
     each condition is met, a given statute may not be relied upon 
     as a source of authority to use armed force. Arguments 
     challenging the validity of this provision are essentially 
     frivolous. (Archibald Cox testified that he was ``aghast'' at 
     the contention; I addressed the argument in an appendix to my 
     testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 17, 
     2002.)
       The War Powers Resolution cannot itself be relied upon as 
     authorization to introduce the armed forces into hostilities 
     because it does not meet these two conditions and because it 
     explicitly provides that it confers no power on the President 
     to introduce the armed forces into hostilities that he would 
     not have had in its absence. Two statutes now in effect, 
     however, may meet these conditions. The first statute is H.J. 
     Res. 77 of January 14, 1991 (P.L. 102-1), the law authorizing 
     use of force against during the Gulf War. The second statute 
     is S.J. Res. 23, the law enacted by Congress and signed by 
     the President on September 18, 2001 (P.L. 107-40).
       1. The Gulf War authorization
       Congress's Gulf War resolution authorized the President to 
     use force against Iraq only to the extent that such use of 
     force had been authorized by the United Nations Security 
     Council. Section 2(a) of P.L. 102-1 provides that ``[t]he 
     President is authorized, pursuant to subsection (b), to use 
     the United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations 
     Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve 
     implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 
     664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677.'' (Subsection (b) 
     required the President to determine, before using force, that 
     all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means had been 
     used.) Thus the Gulf War resolution would continue to 
     authorize use of force against Iraq if such use continues to 
     be authorized under resolution 678 of the Security Council. 
     If Resolution 678 does not continue to authorize the United 
     States to use force against Iraq, on the other hand, the Gulf 
     War resolution would not authorize the President to introduce 
     the armed forces into hostilities against Iraq, and further 
     congressional approval would be required. This would be true, 
     as indicated above, even if the Security Council adopts new 
     approval to use force against Iraq, since the existing 
     congressional authorization, the Gulf War resolution, refers 
     only to specific Security Council measures adopted at the 
     time of the Gulf War.
       In considering this key issue, it is helpful to recall the 
     chain of events that led to the adoption of the relevant 
     congressional and Security Council resolutions:
       On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied the territory 
     of Kuwait.
       On August 2, 1990, the Security Council adopted the first 
     of the eleven resolutions later set out in Congress's Gulf 
     War resolution, quoted above. This was Resolution 660, which 
     condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and called for an 
     immediate and unconditional withdrawal. All eleven Security 
     Council resolutions related to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
     and represented an effort gradually to tighten the screws 
     before authorizing use of force.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ Among other things, those resolutions imposed economic 
     sanctions on Iraq (661), found that the Iraqi annexation of 
     Kuwait was null and void and demanded that Iraq rescind its 
     annexation (662), demanded that Iraq permit the departure of 
     third-country nationals and ensure their safety (664), 
     authorized member states to halt maritime shipping to Iraq so 
     as to inspect cargoes incident to the economic embargo (665), 
     took steps to ensure a supply of foodstuffs to alleviate 
     human suffering in Iraq (666), demanded the release of 
     diplomatic personnel seized by Iraq in Kuwait (667), 
     established a consultative mechanism to deal with special 
     economic problems arising from the economic sanctions (669), 
     extended limitations on aircraft destined to land in Iraq or 
     Kuwait (670), demanded that Iraq cease and desist from taking 
     third-country nationals hostage or otherwise mistreating them 
     or Kuwaiti nationals (674), and condemned the Iraqi 
     destruction of civil records maintained by the government of 
     Kuwait (677).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       On November 29, 1990, the UN Security Council adopted 
     Resolution 678 which, among other things, authorized ``all 
     member States to uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990) 
     and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore 
     international peace and security in the region.'' The 
     Resolution provided that this authority could not be 
     exercised, however, if Iraq ``on or before January 15, 1991, 
     fully implements . . . the above-mentioned resolutions. . .'' 
     (The ``above mentioned resolutions'' were the same eleven 
     measures.)
       On January 14, 1991, Congress adopted the Gulf War 
     resolution.
       On January 17, 1991, the United States commenced air 
     attacks against Iraq.
       On February 24, 1991, the United States commenced the 
     ground attack.
       On February 27, 1991, Iraq in a letter to the President of 
     the Security Council, promised to comply with the twelve 
     Security Council resolutions.
       On February 28, a cease-fire was declared.
       On March 2, 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
     686, noting the cease-fire, noting Iraq's promise to comply 
     with the the Council's twelve resolutions, demanding that 
     Iraq do so, and demanding that Iraq meet additional 
     conditions spelled out in paragraphs (2) and (3). 
     Significantly, Resolution 686 further provided that, ``during 
     the period required for Iraq to comply with paragraphs 2 and 
     3 above, the provisions of paragraph 2 of resolution 678 
     (1990) remain valid. . . .''
       On April 3, 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
     687 which demanded that Iraq destroy all weapons of mass 
     destruction and set up a comprehensive on-site inspection 
     regime under the aegis of the UN Special Commission on Iraq 
     (UNSCOM). The Resolution also declared that ``upon official 
     notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the 
     Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above a 
     formal cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and 
     the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with 
     resolution 678 (1990).''
       On April 6, 1991 in a letter from its Iraqi Minister of 
     Foreign Affairs, Iraq notified the President of the Security 
     Council and the Secretary-General that it accepted the 
     provisions of the Resolution 687.
       In light of this background, can Resolution 678 reasonably 
     be construed to continue to authorize use of force by the 
     United States against Iraq? While reasonable arguments can be 
     made on both sides,\2\ the more persuasive argument appears 
     to be that it does not, for these reasons:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \2\ Most commentators have rejected the argument that 
     authority to use force continues to flow from Resolution 678. 
     See, e.g., Gray, After the Cease-Fire: Iraq, the Security 
     Council and the Use of Force, 65 British Yearbook of 
     International Law 135 (1994); Krisch, Unilateral Enforcement 
     of the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq, and the Security 
     Council, 3 Max Planck United Nations. Y.B. 59 (1999); Lobel & 
     Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous 
     Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi 
     Inspection Regime, 93 American Journal of International Law 
     124 (1999); Tomuschat, Using Force against Iraq, 73 Die 
     Friedens-Warte-Journal of International Peace and 
     Organization 75 (1997); and Dekker & Wessel, Military 
     Enforcement of Arms Control in Iraq, 11 Leiden Journal of 
     International Law 497 (1998). But see Wedgewood, The 
     Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat of 
     Force against Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 American 
     Journal of International Law 724 (1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       (a) The authority conferred by Resolution 678 was narrowly 
     circumscribed and was directed at reversing the Iraqi 
     invasion of Kuwait. Resolution 678 conferred authority to use 
     armed force for three different purposes. (i) The first 
     purpose was to uphold and implement resolution 660. 
     Resolution 660, however, simply called upon Iraq to withdraw 
     from Kuwait that goal has been achieved. (ii) The second 
     purpose was to uphold and implement ``all subsequent relevant 
     resolutions'' The phrase could conceivably be construed as 
     referring to any resolution adopted after the date on which 
     Resolution 660 was adopted, August 2, 1990. Read in context, 
     however, it seems more likely that the phrase refers to the 
     nine ``foregoing resolutions'' that were recalled and 
     reaffirmed in the first prefatory clause of Resolution 678. 
     Those resolutions were ``subsequent to'' Resolution 660 but 
     of course all preceded Resolution 678. ``All subsequent 
     resolutions,'' it might further be argued, could hardly be 
     taken as referring to any resolution ever adopted on any 
     future date by the Security Council. Such a construction 
     would have had the effect, internationally, divesting the 
     Security Council of any future role in deciding whether to 
     authorize use of force against Iraq--even though paragraph 5 
     of Resolution 678 explicitly affirms the intent of the 
     Security Council ``to remain seized of the matter.'' 
     Domestically, given the incorporation by reference of the 
     phrase in Congress's Gulf War resolution, such as 
     interpretation would

[[Page S10284]]

     have effected a massive delegation of the congressional war 
     power to the Security Council--a delegation that would crate 
     profound constitutional problems. These difficulties are 
     avoided by giving the phrase ``all subsequent relevant 
     resolutions'' the meaning that it seems plainly intended to 
     have had, namely, as referring to resolutions subsequently to 
     Resolution 660 but adopted before Resolution 678. (iii) The 
     third purpose for which Resolution 678 authorized use of 
     force was to restore international peace and security in the 
     region. A broad interpretation of that grant of authority 
     would view it as permitting use of force against Iraq by any 
     state at any point in the future when that state concluded 
     that Iraq had disrupted that region's peace and security. The 
     authority to restore peace and security was, however, like 
     other provisions of Resolution 678 authorizing use of force 
     against Iraq, tied to and precipitated by the Iraqi invasion 
     of Kuwait. Each of the twelve Security Council resolutions 
     cited in Congress's Gulf War Resolution relates directly to 
     that invasion. Resolution 687, declaring a ``formal cease-
     fire,'' appears to have represented a de facto finding by the 
     Security Council that peace and security had been restored. 
     It seems unlikely that the Security Council, in adopting 
     Resolution 678, intended to declare Iraq a free-fire zone 
     into the indefinite future.
       (b) The authority to use force conferred in Resolution 678 
     was most likely extinguished April 6, 1991, the date the 
     Iraqis notified the United Nations of their acceptance of the 
     pertinent provisions of Resolution 687. Under that 
     Resolution, ``a formal cease-fire'' took effect upon such 
     notification. The legal obligations that flow from a formal 
     cease-fire are incompatible with the legal rights that flow 
     from authorization to use force. The Security Council did 
     ``reaffirm'' Resolution 678 in Resolution 949, adopted 
     October 15, 1994, and also in Resolution 1137, adopted 
     November 12, 1997. However, this was done only in prefatory 
     clauses; neither Resolution 949 nor Resolution 1137 re-
     authorizes the use of force against Iraq. No resolution has 
     done so. The Security Council has never declared that either 
     the cease-fire or Resolution 687 is no longer in effect.
       (c) The authority to use force conferred in Resolution 678, 
     once extinguished did not revive when Iraq failed to comply 
     with its obligations under Resolution 687. Resolution 687 
     makes clear that the termination of that authority was 
     conditioned upon Iraq's notification of acceptance of the 
     pertinent provisions of Resolutions 687, not upon Iraq's 
     compliance with those provisions. In this regard it is 
     instructive to compare the terms of Resolution 687 with 
     the terms of its predecessor resolution, Resolution 686. 
     Resolution 686 implemented a provisional cease-fire 
     following the suspension of hostilities between Iraq and 
     the coalition forces. As noted above, Resolution 686 
     provides that compliance, not acceptance, by Iraq was 
     required with respect to two paragraphs of Resolution 686 
     to bring about the termination of authority to use force. 
     (It is agreed that Iraq has complied with those two 
     paragraphs.) In contrast, Resolution 687 provides that 
     acceptance, not compliance, was all that was required to 
     terminate authority to use force. Had the Security Council 
     intended to cause that authority to revive upon Iraqi non-
     compliance, the Council presumably would have used the 
     same words, or similar words, that it used in the 
     preceding resolution to bring about that result. But it 
     did not. There is no indication in the terms of Resolution 
     687 or any other Security Council resolution that the 
     Council intended that Iraqi non-compliance would trigger a 
     revival of authority to use force.
       (d) A decision to revive Resolution 678 must be made by the 
     Security Council and cannot be made by an individual member 
     state. As suggested by the interactive context in which the 
     Gulf War was ended, the transaction that brought hostilities 
     to a close was in the nature of an agreement. Its terms were 
     set forth in Resolution 686 and 687. Those terms were agreed 
     to and approved by Iraq and the U.N. Security Council, not by 
     Iraq and individual member states of the Security Council, 
     and not by Iraq and individual member states of the Gulf War 
     coalition. An earlier, informal, battlefield cease-fire was 
     instituted by coalition forces. But the coalition owed its 
     presence to authority conferred by the Security Council, and 
     the informal cease-fire was superseded by the formal 
     termination of hostilities set out by the Security Council in 
     Resolution 687. The parties to that formal undertaking were 
     Iraq and the U.N. Security Council. With rare exceptions that 
     are not applicable here, under long-settled principles of 
     international law rights flowing from the material breach of 
     an agreement run to the aggrieved party of the agreement; a 
     state has no right to complain of the breach of an agreement 
     to which it is not a party. One of the rights that flows from 
     the power to complain of the material breach of an agreement 
     is the option to terminate or suspend the agreement in whole 
     or in part. In Resolution 687 the Security Council apparently 
     intended to retain that right: paragraph 34 of Resolution 687 
     provides that the Council, not individual states, ``shall 
     take such further steps as may be required for the 
     implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace 
     and security in the region.'' Thus it would be up to the 
     Council as a body to decide what action to take in response 
     to a breach. Individual states such as the United States have 
     no right to terminate or suspend those provisions of 
     Resolution 687 that caused the authorities granted in 
     Resolution 678 to be extinguished upon the notification of 
     Iraqi acceptance. The option to terminate or suspend those 
     provisions resides exclusively in the author of Resolution 
     678 and party to the agreement with Iraq: the Security 
     Council, not individual member states.
       (e) It would be inappropriate to infer implicit Security 
     Council intent to revive Resolution 678 from acquiescence by 
     the Council to subsequent military strikes against Iraq that 
     were not expressly authorized. It can be argued that a 
     consistent pattern of acquiescent practice would constitute 
     evidence of the authoritative interpretation of the 
     Resolution. However, the right of veto that inheres in the 
     Council's five permanent members renders this argument 
     unconvincing in these circumstances. All five members have 
     not remained silent during each of the subsequent strikes 
     against Iraq; several have on occasion objected. Following 
     the 1998 air strikes on Iraq, for example, the President of 
     the Russian Federation declared that ``[t]he U.N. Security 
     Council resolutions on Iraq do not provide any grounds for 
     such actions. By the use of force, the U.S. and Great Britain 
     have flagrantly violated the U.N. Charter and universally 
     accepted principles of international law.'' \3\ The Chinese 
     also objected.\4\ When Resolution 1154 was adopted, warning 
     that continued violations of Iraq's obligations to permit 
     unconditional access to UNSCOM ``would have the severest 
     consequences,'' the French representative to the Security 
     Council stated that the resolution was designed ``to 
     underscore the prerogatives of the Security Council in a way 
     that excludes any question of automaticity. . . . It is the 
     Security Council that must evaluate the behavior of a 
     country, if necessary to determine any possible violations, 
     and to take the appropriate decisions.'' \5\ Even if all five 
     permanent members of the Security Council had remained 
     silent, silence under such circumstances does not necessarily 
     signify consent or approval. Silence may simply indicate a 
     belief that objection is futile. Moreover, if formal 
     objection were now legally required, this argument would in 
     effect establish a new procedure under which each of those 
     five members would be required to take the affirmative step 
     of voicing objection to acts not authorized by the Council 
     that they did not wish to be seen as approving. The U.N. 
     Charter itself places no such obligation on the permanent 
     five members of the Council; to prevent the Council from 
     acting, each is required to voice objection only to a formal 
     proposal made by a member of the Council within the Council's 
     proceedings, not to the external conduct of third states. In 
     any event, even if it were appropriate to infer the Council's 
     approval to attack Iraq from its acquiescence to other 
     attacks on Iraq, there would be no reason to assume that the 
     Council, in its acquiescence, intended to revive Resolution 
     678 rather than to create new, implicit authority. New, 
     implicit Security Council authority would not constitute 
     authorization under Congress's Gulf War Resolution to 
     introduce the armed forces into hostilities against Iraq. As 
     noted above the Gulf War Resolution permits such use of force 
     only if it is permitted by Resolution 678. New Security 
     Council authorization, whether given explicitly in the form 
     of a new resolution or implicitly in the form of 
     acquiescence, would not satisfy the terms of the Gulf War 
     Resolution and could not, under U.S. domestic law, authorize 
     the President to introduce the armed forces into hostilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \3\ Statement of the President of the Russian Federation, 
     press release of the Mission of the Russian Federation to the 
     U.N., Dec. 20, 1998.
     \4\ Press release of the Foreign Ministry of China, Dec. 17, 
     1998 (``The unilateral use of force . . . without the 
     authorization of the Security Council runs counter to the 
     U.N. Charter and the principles of international law.')
     \5\ U.N. Doc. S/PV.3858, at 15, 18 (1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       (f) The War Powers Resolution requires that doubts flowing 
     from ambiguous or unclear measures be resolved against 
     finding authority to use force; at a minimum, 
     these considerations raise such doubts. As discussed 
     above, section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution 
     requires that Congress ``specifically authorize'' the 
     introduction of the armed forces into hostilities if its 
     enactment is to suffice as statutory approval. The War 
     Powers Resolution, in other words, requires that doubts 
     flowing from ambiguous or unclear measures be resolved 
     against finding authority to use force. Because serious 
     doubt exists whether Security Council Resolution 678 
     confers continuing authority on the United States to use 
     force against Iraq,\6\ the Gulf War Resolution, which 
     incorporates Security Council Resolution 678 by reference, 
     cannot be said to constitute specific statutory 
     authorization within the meaning of the War Powers 
     Resolution to introduce the armed forces into hostilities 
     against Iraq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \6\ Because your letter requests my views concerning the 
     application of U.S. domestic law, I do not here discuss 
     whether international law would permit use of force against 
     Iraq absent Security Council approval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       For these reasons, I conclude that the Gulf War 
     authorization is most reasonably construed as conferring no 
     such authority.
       2. S.J. Res. 23
       The second statute that meets these conditions is the law 
     enacted by Congress and signed by the President on September 
     18, 2002, P.L. 107-40, also known as Senate Joint Resolution 
     23 or S.J. Res. 23.
       The statute contains five whereas clauses. Under 
     traditional principles of statutory

[[Page S10285]]

     construction these provisions have no binding legal effect. 
     Only material that comes after the so-called ``resolving 
     clause''--Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives 
     of the United States of America in Congress assembled''--can 
     have any operative effect. Material set out in a whereas 
     clause is purely precatory. Such material may be relevant for 
     the purpose of clarifying ambiguities in a statute's legally 
     operative terms, but in and of itself such a provision can 
     confer no legal right or obligation.
       To determine the breadth of authority conferred upon the 
     President by this statute, therefore, it is necessary to 
     examine the legally operative provisions, which are set forth 
     in section 2(a) thereof. That section provides as follows: 
     ``In General.--That the President is authorized to use all 
     necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
     organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
     committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
     September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
     persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international 
     terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
     organizations or persons.'' The central conclusion that 
     emerges from these words (which represent the only 
     substantive provision of this statute) is that all authority 
     that the statute confers is tightly linked to the events of 
     September 11. The statute confers no authority unrelated to 
     those events. The statue authorizes the President to act only 
     against entities that planned, authorized committed, or aided 
     the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11. 2002. No 
     authority is provided to act against entities that were not 
     involved in those attacks. The closing reference limits 
     rather than expands the authority granted, by specifying the 
     purpose for which that authority must be exercised--``to 
     prevent any future acts of international terrorism against 
     the United States. . . .'' No authority is conferred to act 
     for any other purpose or to act against ``nations, 
     organizations or persons'' generally. Action is permitted 
     only against ``such'' nations, organizations or persons, to 
     wit, those involved in the September 11 attacks.
       The statute thus cannot serve as a source of authority to 
     use force in prosecuting the war on terrorism against 
     entities other than those involved in the September 11 
     attacks. To justify use of force under this statute, some 
     nexus must be established between the entity against which 
     action is taken and the September 11 attacks.
       The requirement of nexus between the September 11 attacks 
     and the target of any force is reinforced by the statute's 
     legislative history. Unfortunately, because of the truncated 
     procedure by which the statute was enacted, no official 
     legislative history can be compiled that might detail what 
     changes were made in the statute and why. It has been 
     reported unofficially however, that the Administration 
     initially sought the enactment legislation which would have 
     set out broad authority to act against targets not linked to 
     the September 11 attacks. The statute proposed by the 
     Administration reportedly would have provided independent 
     authority for the President to ``deter and preempt any future 
     acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States.'' 
     \7\ Members of Congress from both parties, however, 
     reportedly objected to this provision.\8\ The provision was 
     therefore dropped from the operative part of the statute and 
     added as a final whereas clause, where it remained upon 
     enactment. You outlined this history in your remarks on the 
     Senate floor on October 1, 2001 (Cong. Rec., daily ed., Oct. 
     1, 2001 at S9949).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \7\ Helen Dewar & Juliet Eilperin, Emergency Funding Deal 
     Reached; Hill Leaders Agree to Work Out Language on Use of 
     Force, Wash. Post, Sept. 14, 2001 at A30.
     \8\ Helen Dewar & John Lancaster, Congress Clears Use of 
     Force, Aid Package; $40 Billion--Double Bush's Request--
     Earmarked for Rebuilding. Terror Response, Wash. Post, Sept. 
     16, 2001 at A11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Accordingly, unless Iraq participated in the events of 
     September 11, authority for use of force against Iraq must 
     derive from a source other than S.J. Res. 23. Only one 
     possible source remains: the United States Constitution. If 
     use of force by the President is authorized by the 
     Constitution, no authority is needed from any treaty or 
     statute.
     C. Constitutional authorization
       A starting point in considering the scope of the 
     President's independent constitutional powers is to note a 
     proposition on which commentators from all points on the 
     spectrum have agreed: that the President was possessed of 
     independent constitutional power to use force in response to 
     the September 11 attacks upon the United States. As was 
     widely observed at the time, the War Powers Resolution itself 
     supports this conclusion. Its statement of congressional 
     opinion concerning the breadth of independent presidential 
     power under the Constitution (section 2(c)(3)) recognizes the 
     President's power to use force without statutory 
     authorization in the event of ``a national emergency created 
     by attack upon the United States, its territories or 
     possessions, or its armed forces.'' Thus, U.S. military 
     operations in Afghanistan could have been carried out 
     under the President's constitutional authority, even if 
     S.J. Res. 23 had never been enacted. This conclusion has 
     important implications for the question you have posed. If 
     it turns out that Iraq is linked to the September 11 
     attacks, S.J. Res. 23 will continue to suffice, along with 
     the President's constitutional authority, to provide all 
     necessary authorization.
       A more difficult question arises if Iraq was not connected 
     with the September 11 attacks. In the last 30 years, Congress 
     has on two occasions expressed its opinion concerning the 
     scope of the President's power to use armed force without 
     prior congressional approval the issue. One statement of 
     opinion, as I mentioned, is set forth in section 2(c)(3) of 
     the War Powers Resolution. I've also alluded to the other 
     statement: the final whereas clause in S.J. Res. 23. That 
     whereas clause expresses the opinion of Congress that ``the 
     president has authority under the Constitution to take action 
     to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against 
     the United States.'' Obviously, these two statements are 
     inconsistent. The scope of presidential power to wage war 
     that was recognized by Congress in the War Powers Resolution 
     is much narrower than that recognized in S.J. Res. 23. If the 
     President only has power to act alone in ``a national 
     emergency created by attack upon the United States, its 
     territories or possessions, or its armed forces,'' then he 
     obviously is without power to ``to take action to deter and 
     prevent acts of international terrorism against the United 
     States'' where no attack upon the United States has occurred. 
     Which statement is correct?
       In my view, neither. The statement in the War Powers 
     Resolution is overly narrow, and the statement in S.J. Res. 
     23 is overly broad. The original, Senate-passed version of 
     the War Powers Resolution contained wording, which was 
     dropped in conference, that came close to capturing 
     accurately the scope of the President's independent 
     constitutional power. It provided--in legally binding, not 
     precatory, terms--that the President may use force ``to repel 
     an armed attack upon the United States, its territories or 
     possessions; to take necessary and appropriate retaliatory 
     actions in the event of such an attack; and to forestall the 
     direct and imminent threat of such an attack.'' This formula, 
     unlike the hastily-crafted words of the S.J. Res. 23 whereas 
     clause, was drafted over a period of years, with numerous 
     hearings and advice from the top constitutional scholars in 
     the country. It was supported by Senators Fulbright, 
     Symington, Mansfield, Church, Cooper, Eagleton, Muskie, 
     Stennis, Aiken, Javits, Case, Percy, Hatfield, Mathias, Scott 
     and yourself--not an inconsequential group. They agreed upon 
     a simple premise: that the war power is shared between 
     Congress and the President.
       This is the premise that animates all efforts by members of 
     Congress who seek to have the Executive meet authorization 
     and consultation requirements. This is the premise that is, 
     for all practical intents and purposes, rejected by 
     proponents of sole executive power.
       The premise flows from each source of constitutional power:
        The constitutional text. Textual grants of war power to 
     the President are paltry in relation to grants of that power 
     to the Congress. The president is denominated ``commander-in-
     chief.'' In contrast, Congress is given power to ``declare 
     war,'' to lay and collect taxes ``to provide for a common 
     defense,'' to ``raise and support armies,'' to ``provide and 
     maintain a navy,'' to ``provide for calling forth the militia 
     to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and 
     repel invasions,'' to provide for organizing, arming, and 
     disciplining, the militia,'' and to `'make all laws necessary 
     and proper for carrying into execution...all...powers vested 
     by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
     States.''
       The case law. Support for the Executive derives primarily 
     from unrelated dicta pulled acontextually from inapposite 
     cases, such as United States v. Curtiss-Wright (1936). The 
     actual record is striking: Congress has never lost a war 
     powers dispute with the President before the Supreme Court. 
     While the cases are few, in every instance where the issue of 
     decision-making primacy has arisen--from Little v. Barreme 
     (1804) to the Steel Seizure Case (1952)--the Court has sided 
     with Congress.
       Custom. It is true that Presidents have used armed force 
     abroad over 200 times throughout U.S. history. It is also 
     true that practice can affect the Constitution's meaning and 
     allocation of power. The President's power to recognize 
     foreign governments, for example, like the Senate's power to 
     condition its consent to treaties, derives largely from 
     unquestioned practice tracing to the earliest days of the 
     republic. But not all practice is of constitutional moment. A 
     practice of constitutional dimension must be regarded by both 
     political branches as a juridical norm, the incidents 
     comprising the practice must be accepted, or at least 
     acquiesced in, by the other branch. In many of the precedents 
     cited, Congress objected. Furthermore, the precedents must be 
     on point. Here, many are not. Nearly all involved fights with 
     pirates, clashes with cattle rustlers, trivial naval 
     engagements and other minor uses of force not directed at 
     significant adversaries, or risking substantial casualties or 
     large-scale hostilities over a prolonged duration. In a 
     number of the ``precedents,'' Congress actually approved of 
     the executive's action by enacting authorizing legislation 
     (as with the Barbary Wars).
       Structure and function. If any useful principle derives 
     from structural and functional considerations, it is that the 
     Constitution gives the Executive primacy in emergency war 
     powers crises, where Congress has no time to act, and that in 
     non-emergency situations--circumstances where deliberative

[[Page S10286]]

     legislative functions have time to play out--congressional 
     approval is required.
       Intent of the Framers. Individual quotations can be, and 
     regularly are, drawn out of context and assumed to represent 
     a factitious collective intent. It is difficult to read the 
     primary sources, however, without drawing the same conclusion 
     drawn by Abraham Lincoln. He said: ``The provision of the 
     Constitution giving the war-making power to Congress, was 
     dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons. Kings 
     had always been involving and impoverishing their people in 
     wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of 
     the people was the object. This our convention understood to 
     be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions; and they 
     resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should 
     hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us.'' 
     Chief Justice William Rehnquist, quoting Justice Robert 
     Jackson in Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981), shared Lincoln's 
     belief that the Framers' rejected the English model. He 
     said: ``The example of such unlimited executive power that 
     must have most impressed the forefathers was the 
     prerogative exercised by George III, and the description 
     of its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me 
     to doubt that they were creating their new Executive in 
     his image.''
       Notwithstanding the plain import of these sources of 
     constitutional power, some argue that the only role for 
     Congress occurs after the fact--in cutting off funds if the 
     president commences a war that Congress does not support. Two 
     problems inhere in this theory. First, it reads the 
     declaration-of-war clause out of the Constitution as a 
     separate and independent check on presidential power. The 
     Framers intended to give Congress control over waging war 
     before the decision to go to war is made. Giving Congress a 
     role only after the fact, however, would make its power to 
     declare war nothing but a mere congressional trumpet to 
     herald a decision made elsewhere.
       Second, the theory flies in the face of the Framers' 
     manifest intention to make it more difficult to get into war 
     than out of it. This approach would do the opposite. If the 
     only congressional option is to wait for the president to 
     begin a war that Congress does not wish the nation to fight 
     and then cut off funds, war can be instituted routinely with 
     no congressional approval--and seldom if ever ended quickly. 
     The practical method of cutting off funds is to attach a 
     rider to the Department of Defense authorization or 
     appropriation legislation. This means, necessarily, passing 
     the legislation by a two-thirds vote so as to overcome the 
     inevitable presidential veto. The alternative is for Congress 
     to withhold funding altogether--and be blamed by the 
     president for closing down not merely the Pentagon but 
     perhaps the entire federal government. The short of it is, 
     therefore, that to view the congressional appropriations 
     power as the only constitutional check on presidential war 
     power is for all practical purposes to eliminate the 
     declaration-of-war clause as a constitutional restraint on 
     the president.
       For reasons such as these, the Office of Legal Counsel of 
     the Justice Department concluded in 1980 that the core 
     provision of the War Powers Resolution--the 60-day time 
     limit--is constitutional. It said: ``We believe that Congress 
     may, as a general constitutional matter, place a 60-day limit 
     on the use of our armed forces as required by the provisions 
     of [section 5(b)] of the Resolution. The Resolution gives the 
     President the flexibility to extend that deadline for up to 
     30 days in cases of ``unavoidable military necessity.'' This 
     flexibility is, we believe, sufficient under any scenarios we 
     can hypothesize to preserve his function as Commander-in-
     Chief. The practical effect of the 60-day limit is to shift 
     the burden to the President to convince the Congress of the 
     continuing need for the use of our armed forces abroad. We 
     cannot say that placing that burden on the President 
     unconstitutionally intrudes upon his executive powers.
       ``We believe that Congress may, as a general constitutional 
     matter, place a 60-day limit on the use of our armed forces 
     as required by the provisions of [section 5(b)] of the 
     Resolution. The Resolution gives the President the 
     flexibility to extend that deadline for up to 30 days in 
     cases of ``unavoidable military necessity.'' This flexibility 
     is, we believe, sufficient under any scenarios we can 
     hypothesize to preserve his function as Commander-in-Chief. 
     The practical effect of the 60-day limit is to shift the 
     burden to the President to convince the Congress of the 
     continuing need for the use of our armed forces abroad. We 
     cannot say that placing that burden on the President 
     unconstitutionally intrudes upon his executive powers.
       ``Finally, Congress can regulate the President's exercise 
     of his inherent powers by imposing limits by statute.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \9\ Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad without 
     Statutory Authorization, 4A, Op. Office of the Legal Counsel, 
     Dept of Justice 185, 196 (1980).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Finally, it is worth recalling that much the same issue 
     arose prior to the outset of the Gulf War. The President, 
     executive branch lawyers maintained, was constitutionally 
     empowered to place the United States at war against Iraq 
     without congressional approval. A number of Members of 
     Congress brought an action seeking an injunction to prevent 
     him from initiating an offensive attack against Iraq without 
     first securing a declaration of war or some other explicit 
     congressional authorization. The action was dismissed by a 
     federal district court as not yet ripe for review. In the 
     course of doing so, however, the court made the following 
     pithy but important observation, which seems directly 
     pertinent to events unfolding today: ``If the Executive had 
     the sole power to determine that any particular offensive 
     military operation, no matter how vast, does not constitute 
     war-making but only an offensive military attack, the 
     congressional power to declare war will be at the mercy of a 
     semantic decision by the Executive. Such an 
     ``interpretation'' would evade the plain language of the 
     constitution, and it cannot stand: \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \10\ Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       To the extent that use of force against Iraq to remove 
     Saddam Hussein from power would risk substantial casualties 
     or large-scale hostilities over a prolonged duration, I 
     therefore conclude that prior congressional approval would be 
     required.
           Sincerely,
                                               Michael J. Glennon,
                                   Professor of International Law.

  Ms. STABENOW. Will my friend from West Virginia yield for a moment?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes, I would be happy to.
  Ms. STABENOW. Before the Senator concludes this evening, I wanted to 
thank him, as a new Member to this body, for his incredible commitment 
to our Constitution, our country, and our people. It has been an 
inspirational time for me to watch the Senator from West Virginia on 
the floor, listen to his arguments, and see his dedication. I have been 
proud to stand with him in opposing this resolution.
  I ask unanimous consent that a New York Times op-ed written today by 
the distinguished Senator from West Virginia be printed in the Record. 
It is an excellent summary of the concerns that many of us have in 
rushing into this war, and I want to thank the Senator for that. I 
think it is important this be in the Record of the Senate as a part of 
this debate today.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the New York Times, Oct. 10, 2002]

                  Congress Must Resist the Rush to War

                          (By Robert C. Byrd)

       A sudden appetite for war with Iraq seems to have consumed 
     the Bush administration and Congress. The debate that began 
     in the Senate last week is centered not on the fundamental 
     and monumental questions of whether and why the United States 
     should go to war with Iraq, but rather on the mechanics of 
     how best to wordsmith the president's use-of-force resolution 
     in order to give him virtually unchecked authority to commit 
     the nation's military to an unprovoked attack on a sovereign 
     nation.
       How have we gotten to this low point in the history of 
     Congress? Are we too feeble to resist the demands of a 
     president who is determined to bend the collective will of 
     Congress to his will--a president who is changing the 
     conventional understanding of the term ``self-defense''? And 
     why are we allowing the executive to rush our decision-making 
     right before an election? Congress, under pressure from the 
     executive branch, should not hand away its Constitutional 
     powers. We should not hamstring future Congresses by casting 
     such a shortsighted vote. We owe our country a due 
     deliberation.
       I have listened closely to the president. I have questioned 
     the members of his war cabinet. I have searched for that 
     single piece of evidence that would convince me that the 
     president must have in his hands, before the month is out, 
     open-ended Congressional authorization to deliver an 
     unprovoked attack on Iraq. I remain unconvinced. The 
     president's case for an unprovoked attack is circumstantial 
     at best. Saddam Hussein is a threat, but the threat is not so 
     great that we must be stampeded to provide such authority to 
     this president just weeks before an election.
       Why are we being hounded into action on a resolution that 
     turns over to President Bush the Congress's Constitutional 
     power to declare war? This resolution would authorize the 
     president to use the military forces of this nation wherever, 
     whenever and however he determines, and for as long as he 
     determines, if he can somehow make a connection to Iraq. It 
     is a blank check for the president to take whatever action he 
     feels ``is necessary and appropriate in order to defend the 
     national security of the United States against the continuing 
     threat posed by Iraq.'' This broad resolution underwrites, 
     promotes and endorses the unprecedented Bush doctrine of 
     preventive war and pre-emptive strikes--detailed in a recent 
     publication, ``National Security Strategy of the United 
     States''--against any nation that the president, and the 
     president alone, determines to be a threat.
       We are at the graves of moments. Members of Congress must 
     not simply walk away from their Constitutional 
     responsibilities. We are the directly elected representatives 
     of the American people, and the American people expect us to 
     carry out our duty, not simply hand it off to this or any 
     other president. To do so would be to fail the people we 
     represent and to fall woefully short of our sworn oath to 
     support and defend the Constitution.

[[Page S10287]]

       We may not always be able to avoid war, particularly if it 
     is thrust upon us, but Congress must not attempt to give away 
     the authority to determine when war is to be declared We 
     must not allow any president to unleash the dogs of war at 
     his own discretion and or an unlimited period of time.
       Yet that is what we are being asked to do. The judgment of 
     history will not be kind to us if we take this step.
       Members of Congress should take time out and go home to 
     listen to their constituents. We must not yield to this 
     absurd pressure to act now, 27 days before an election that 
     we will determine the entire membership of the House of 
     Representatives and that of a third of the Senate. Congress 
     should take the time to hear from the American people, to 
     answer their remaining questions, and to put the frenzy of 
     ballot-box politics behind us before we vote. We should hear 
     them well, because while it is Congress that casts the vote, 
     it is the American people who will pay for a war with the 
     lives of their sons and daughters.

  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, let me first thank the Senator from 
Michigan, Debbie Stabenow, for her eloquence, for her steadfast 
determination to stand by the Constitution as she has shown so many 
days, so many times in recent days. I thank her for being the Senator 
she is, a Senator who is indebted to her people and stands every day 
somewhere in this Senate complex working for the people she represents. 
I have received great inspiration from watching her. I serve on the 
Budget Committee with her and she is an outstanding voice for the 
people who believe in the Constitution, who takes a stand and is so 
eloquent, so articulate on behalf of that Constitution.
  I thank the Senator from Michigan from the bottom of my heart.
  I am about to yield the floor.
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield for a moment?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I join my colleague from Michigan in 
expressing my deep thanks to the Senator from West Virginia for his 
extraordinarily effective and powerful presentations in the course of 
this debate. I was also planning to put this article in, as my 
colleague has already done. It is a very powerful statement that 
appeared in this morning's New York Times entitled ``Congress Must 
Resist the Rush to War.'' The Senator from West Virginia, as he always 
does, asks some very piercing questions and calls the Congress to its 
responsibilities.

  Let me quote a paragraph or two from the article:

       This broad resolution underwrites, promotes and endorses 
     the unprecedented Bush doctrine of preventive war and pre-
     emptive strikes--detailed in a recent publication, ``National 
     Security Strategy of the United States''--against any nation 
     that the president, and the president alone, determines to be 
     a threat.

  Of course, the particular resolution that is before the Senate, as is 
pointed out in this article, and I quote the Senator from West 
Virginia:

       This resolution would authorize the president to use the 
     military forces of this nation wherever, whenever, and 
     however he determines, and for as long as he determines if he 
     can somehow make a connection to Iraq.

  And there actually were other proposals to narrow that authority, but 
of course none of them carried.
  Further quoting:

       It is a blank check for the president to take whatever 
     action he feels ``is necessary and appropriate in order to 
     defend the national security of the United States against the 
     continuing threat posed by Iraq.''

  I say to my colleague from West Virginia, it seems to me clear that 
upon approval of this resolution, as far as the Congress is concerned, 
war has been declared against Iraq. Would the Senator agree with that 
observation?
  Mr. BYRD. I do, I do. And I say further to my dear friend that as 
soon as this resolution is adopted and signed by the President of the 
United States, Congress is out of it. It is on the sidelines. We may 
wish we could say something. We may wish we could do something. But as 
far as the human eye can see, we are out of it until such time as 
Congress asks to repeal this legislation or to put a limit on it 
internally.
  Mr. SARBANES. Let me ask my colleague this question: Suppose some 
unforeseen, extraordinary development should take place after this 
resolution is passed and sent down and signed by the President which 
transforms perhaps the weapons of mass destruction situation. The 
President, though, could still move ahead and go to war, could he not?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. SARBANES. They would have been given the authority to do that; 
would that be correct?
  Mr. BYRD. Absolutely. We would have handed this over to the 
President--lock, stock, and barrel. Here it is.
  Mr. SARBANES. When would the President have to decide whether he was 
going to use this authority? Let's assume with respect to passing it 
later in the evening--although I will oppose it--assuming it is passed 
and the Congress authorizes the President to go to war, in effect, with 
Iraq, is there a limit on the time period in which the President could 
then use that power to launch war against Iraq?
  Mr. BYRD. There is no limit.
  I offered an amendment, and the distinguished Senator from Maryland 
supported that amendment today, as the distinguished Senator from 
Minnesota supported it, the distinguished Senator from Michigan, the 
distinguished Senator from New York, but we only got 31 votes. That 
amendment was defeated.
  Mr. SARBANES. That underscores what the distinguished Senator says in 
this op-ed piece that appeared in this morning's New York Times. I 
quote:

       We may not always be able to avoid war, particularly if it 
     is thrust upon us, but Congress must not attempt to give away 
     the authority to determine when war is to be declared. We 
     must not allow any president to unleash the dogs of war at 
     his own discretion and for an unlimited period of time.
       Yet that is what we are being asked to do [in the 
     resolution before the Senate].

  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. SARBANES. This, of course, is a decision with far-sweeping 
consequences, certainly as it deals with Iraq and all of its 
implication. But the precedent is being established in terms of the 
future, it seems to me, and that constitutes a major erosion of the 
role of the Congress with respect to the Nation going to war.
  Mr. BYRD. It does. And it is easy enough, I suppose, to pass this 
resolution. But should we try to negate it, should we try to repeal it, 
should we try to change the law, a President can veto any change that 
Congress might bring along later, any change it might enact, in order 
to overturn this law it is now about to adopt.
  Mr. SARBANES. I am glad the distinguished Senator made that point 
because that is the next item I wanted to go to. People could say: If 
the circumstances changed and the Congress wants to pull it back, why 
not come in, pass a law, and pull it back? But the fact is that a 
President who wanted to keep that authority and may well want to use 
it, as long as he could keep the support of one-third--not of each 
House of the Congress but only one-third of one House, either a third 
of the Senators, plus one, or a third of the Members of the House of 
Representatives--he could negate congressional action that tried to 
pull back this war-making authority, could he not?
  Mr. BYRD. The distinguished Senator from Maryland is absolutely 
correct. It only takes a majority of both Houses to pass this 
resolution, but it would take two-thirds in the future if the President 
should attempt to veto a substitute piece of legislation by this 
Congress to abort what we are doing here today, to appeal it, to amend 
it. One-third plus one in either body could uphold the President's 
veto, and that legislation would not become law.
  Mr. SARBANES. I think that is a point we have not really touched on 
much in this debate, but I think it is an extremely important point.
  What has happened--you pass this resolution, you make a major grant 
of war-making authority to the President, but then if subsequently you 
decide it ought to be pulled back or ought not be exercised by the 
President, it is extraordinarily difficult to do that, so not only have 
you given the President this broad power to begin with, but the way the 
system is constructed, he can hold on to that power, even if a majority 
of both Houses of the Congress which gave the power want to take it 
back. Is that not correct?
  Mr. BYRD. The Senator could not be more correct. The Senator is 
absolutely correct.
  Mr. SARBANES. It is worth engaging in this discussion just to 
underscore the sweep of authority that is being provided.
  Again, I thank my colleague for his leadership on this issue and 
especially commend him for what I thought was a very thoughtful and 
powerful article. I

[[Page S10288]]

encourage people across the country to read this article. It is a very 
succinct, analytical, and perceptive statement of the issues that are 
at stake.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Maryland. He is a great Senator. I am proud of the years I have served 
with him. We have gone through some interesting times here in the 
Senate. We stood beside one another, shoulder to shoulder, shoulder to 
shoulder in fighting for this Constitution on several occasions--the 
line-item veto, constitutional amendment to balance the budget, and on 
other occasions. I thank the people of Maryland for sending him and for 
keeping him here.

  I would say that the Republic will long live, as long as the people 
of America send Senators here like Paul Sarbanes.
  I thank the people of Maryland, and I thank God for him.
  Mr. President, I am about to yield the floor. I have been asked by 
the distinguished Senator from New York to yield to her. How much time 
do I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JEFFORDS). The Senator has 42 minutes.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I do not intend to hold the floor much 
longer. How much time will the Senator from New York, Mrs. Clinton, 
wish me to yield to her?
  Mrs. CLINTON. Twenty minutes.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield 20 minutes to the Senator, and I 
reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator from New York just yield for a second to 
me?
  Mr. BYRD. And I yield to the distinguished Senator whatever time he 
needs.
  Mr. McCAIN. I point out the distinguished chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee has not had an opportunity to speak. In all due 
respect, I would like to give the chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee the respect he deserves.
  Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator. I am delighted to wait in line, and I 
will wait until after the Senator has finished.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Forty-one minutes.
  Mr. BYRD. I yield 20 minutes to the Senator from New York, Mrs. 
Clinton, and I yield 20 minutes, leaving myself 1 minute, to the 
Senator from Delaware, Mr. Biden.
  I thank the distinguished Senator from Arizona for reminding me the 
Senator from Delaware had been waiting very patiently.
  I thank all Senators.
  Mr. BIDEN. No problem.
  Mrs. CLINTON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia 
for his courtesy. By far beyond that, I thank him for his leadership 
and his eloquence and his passion and commitment to this body and to 
our Constitution. I join with the remarks by both the Senators from 
Michigan and Maryland, expressing our appreciation for the way in which 
he has waged this battle on behalf of his convictions. It is a lesson 
to us all.
  Today, Mr. President, we are asked whether to give the President of 
the United States authority to use force in Iraq should diplomatic 
efforts fail to dismantle Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological 
weapons and his nuclear program.
  I am honored to represent nearly 19 million New Yorkers, a thoughtful 
democracy of voices and opinions who make themselves heard on the great 
issues of our day, especially this one. Many have contacted my office 
about this resolution, both in support of and in opposition to it. I am 
grateful to all who have expressed an opinion.
  I also greatly respect the differing opinions within this body. The 
debate they engender will aid our search for a wise, effective policy. 
Therefore, on no account should dissent be discouraged or disparaged. 
It is central to our freedom and to our progress, for on more than one 
occasion history has proven our great dissenters to be right.
  I believe the facts that have brought us to this fateful vote are not 
in doubt. Saddam Hussein is a tyrant who has tortured and killed his 
own people, even his own family members, to maintain his iron grip on 
power. He used chemical weapons on Iraqi Kurds and on Iranians, killing 
over 20,000 people.
  Unfortunately, during the 1980s, while he engaged in such horrific 
activity, he enjoyed the support of the American Government because he 
had oil and was seen as a counterweight to the Ayatollah Khomeini in 
Iran.
  In 1991, Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied Kuwait, losing the 
support of the United States. The first President Bush assembled a 
global coalition, including many Arab States, and threw Saddam out 
after 43 days of bombing and hundreds of hours of ground operations. 
The United States led the coalition, then withdrew, leaving the Kurds 
and the Shiites, who had risen against Saddam Hussein at our urging, to 
Saddam's revenge.
  As a condition for ending the conflict, the United Nations imposed a 
number of requirements on Iraq, among them disarmament of all weapons 
of mass destruction, stocks used to make such weapons, and laboratories 
necessary to do the work. Saddam Hussein agreed and an inspection 
system was set up to ensure compliance. Though he repeatedly lied, 
delayed, and obstructed the inspectors' work, the inspectors found and 
destroyed far more weapons of mass destruction capability than were 
destroyed in the gulf war, including thousands of chemical weapons, 
large volumes of chemical and biological stocks, a number of missiles 
and warheads, a major lab equipped to produce anthrax and other 
bioweapons, as well as substantial nuclear facilities.
  In 1998, Saddam Hussein pressured the United Nations to lift the 
sanctions by threatening to stop all cooperation with the inspectors. 
In an attempt to resolve the situation, the U.N., unwisely in my view, 
agreed to put limits on inspections of designated sovereign sites, 
including the so-called Presidential palaces--which in reality were 
huge compounds, well suited to hold weapons labs, stocks, and records 
which Saddam Hussein was required by U.N. resolution to turn over.
  When Saddam blocked the inspection process, the inspectors left. As a 
result, President Clinton, with the British and others, ordered an 
intensive 4-day air assault, Operation Desert Fox, on known and 
suspected weapons of mass destruction sites and other military targets.

  In 1998, the United States also changed its underlying policy toward 
Iraq from containment to regime change and began to examine options to 
effect such a change, including support for Iraqi opposition leaders 
within the country and abroad. In the 4 years since the inspectors, 
intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his 
chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, 
and his nuclear program. He has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary 
to terrorists, including al-Qaida members, though there is apparently 
no evidence of his involvement in the terrible events of September 11, 
2001.
  It is clear, however, that if left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will 
continue to increase his capability to wage biological and chemical 
warfare and will keep trying to develop nuclear weapons. Should he 
succeed in that endeavor, he could alter the political and security 
landscape of the Middle East which, as we know all too well, affects 
American security.
  This much is undisputed. The open questions are: What should we do 
about it? How, when, and with whom?
  Some people favor attacking Saddam Hussein now, with any allies we 
can muster, in the belief that one more round of weapons inspections 
would not produce the required disarmament and that deposing Saddam 
would be a positive good for the Iraqi people and would create the 
possibility of a secular, democratic state in the Middle East, one 
which could, perhaps, move the entire region toward democratic reform.
  This view has appeal to some because it would assure disarmament; 
because it would right old wrongs after our abandonment of the Shiites 
and Kurds in 1991 and our support for Saddam Hussein in the 1980s when 
he was using chemical weapons and terrorizing his people; and because 
it could give the Iraqi people a chance to build a future in freedom.
  However, this course is fraught with danger. We and our NATO allies 
did not depose Mr. Milosevic, who was responsible for more than a 
quarter of million

[[Page S10289]]

people being killed in the 1990s. Instead, by stopping his aggression 
in Bosnia and Kosovo, and keeping the tough sanctions, we created the 
conditions in which his own people threw him out and led to his being 
in the dock and being tried for war crimes as we speak.

  If we were to attack Iraq now, alone or with few allies, it would set 
a precedent that could come back to haunt us. In recent days, Russia 
has talked of an invasion of Georgia to attack Chechen rebels. India 
has mentioned the possibility of a preemptive strike on Pakistan. What 
if China should perceive a threat from Taiwan?
  So, for all its appeal, a unilateral attack, while it cannot be ruled 
out, is not a good option.
  Others argue that we should work through the United Nations and 
should only resort to force if and when the United Nations Security 
Council approves it. This too has great appeal for different reasons. 
The United Nations deserves our support. Whenever possible we should 
work through it and strengthen it, for it enables the world to share 
the risks and burdens of global security and when it acts, it confers a 
legitimacy that increases the likelihood of long-term success. The 
United Nations can lead the world into a new era of global cooperation. 
And the United States should support that goal.
  But there are problems with this approach as well. The United Nations 
is an organization that is still growing and maturing. It often lacks 
the cohesion to enforce its own mandates. And when Security Council 
members use the veto on occasion for reasons of narrow national 
interest, it cannot act. In Kosovo, the Russians did not approve the 
NATO military action because of political, ethnic, and religious ties 
to the Serbs.
  The United States, therefore, could not obtain a Security Council 
resolution in favor of the action necessary to stop the dislocation and 
ethnic cleansing of more than a million Kosovar Albanians. However, 
most of the world was with us because there was a genuine emergency 
with thousands dead and a million more driven from their homes. As soon 
as the American-led conflict was over, Russia joined the peacekeeping 
effort that is still underway.
  In the case of Iraq, recent comments indicate that one or two 
Security Council members might never approve forces against Saddam 
Hussein until he has actually used chemical, biological, or God forbid, 
nuclear weapons.
  So, the question is how do we do our best to both diffuse the threat 
Saddam Hussein poses to his people, the region, including Israel, and 
the United States, and at the same time, work to maximize our 
international support and strengthen the United Nations.
  While there is no perfect approach to this thorny dilemma, and while 
people of good faith and high intelligence can reach diametrically 
opposing conclusions, I believe the best course is to go to the United 
Nations for a strong resolution that scraps the 1998 restrictions on 
inspections and calls for complete, unlimited inspections, with 
cooperation expected and demanded from Iraq.
  I know the administration wants more, including an explicit 
authorization to use force, but we may not be able to secure that now, 
perhaps even later. If we get a clear requirement for unfettered 
inspections, I believe the authority to use force to enforce that 
mandate is inherent in the original 1991 United Nations resolutions, as 
President Clinton recognized when he launched Operation Desert Fox in 
1998.
  If we get the resolution the President seeks, and Saddam complies, 
disarmament can proceed and the threat can be eliminated. Regime change 
will, of course, take longer but we must still work for it, nurturing 
all reasonable forces of opposition.
  If we get the resolution and Saddam does not comply, we can attack 
him with far more support and legitimacy than we would have otherwise.
  If we try and fail to get a resolution that simply calls for Saddam's 
compliance with unlimited inspections, those who oppose even that will 
be in an indefensible position. And, we will still have more support 
and legitimacy than if we insist now on a resolution that includes 
authorizing military action and other requirements giving other nations 
superficially legitimate reasons to oppose Security Council action. 
They will say, we never wanted a resolution at all and that we only 
support the U.N. when it does exactly want we want.
  I believe international support and legitimacy are crucial. After 
shots are fired and bombs are dropped, not all consequences are 
predictable. While the military outcome is not in doubt, should we put 
troops on the ground, there is still the matter of Saddam Hussein's 
biological and chemical weapons. Today he has maximum incentive not to 
use them or give them away. If he did either, the world would demand 
his immediate removal. Once the battle is joined, with the outcome 
certain, he will have maximum incentive to use weapons of mass 
destruction and give what he can't use to terrorists who can torment us 
with them long after he is gone. We cannot be paralyzed by this 
possibility, but we would be foolish to ignore it. According to recent 
reports, the CIA agrees with this analysis. A world united in sharing 
the risk at least would make this occurrence less likely and more 
bearable and would be far more likely to share the considerable burden 
of rebuilding a secure and peaceful post-Saddam Iraq.
  President Bush's speech in Cincinnati and the changes in policy that 
have come forth from the administration since they first began 
broaching this issue some weeks ago have made my vote easier.
  Even though the resolution before the Senate is not as strong as I 
would like in requiring the diplomatic route first and placing highest 
priority on a simple, clear requirement for unlimited inspections, I 
take the President at his word that he will try hard to pass a United 
Nations resolution and seek to avoid war, if possible.
  Because bipartisan support for this resolution makes success in the 
United Nations more likely and war less likely, and because a good 
faith effort by the United States, even if it fails, will bring more 
allies and legitimacy to our cause, I have concluded, after careful and 
serious consideration, that a vote for the resolution best serves the 
security of our Nation. If we were to defeat this resolution or pass it 
with only a few Democrats, I am concerned that those who want to 
pretend this problem will go way with delay will oppose any United 
Nations resolution calling for unrestricted inspections.
  This is a difficult vote. This is probably the hardest decision I 
have ever had to make. Any vote that may lead to war should be hard, 
but I cast it with conviction. Perhaps my decision is influenced by my 
8 years of experience on the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue in the 
White House watching my husband deal with serious challenges to our 
Nation. I want this President, or any future President, to be in the 
strongest possible position to lead our country in the United Nations 
or in war. Secondly, I want to ensure that Saddam Hussein makes no 
mistake about our national unity and support for the President's 
efforts to wage America's war against terrorists and weapons of mass 
destruction. Thirdly, I want the men and women in our Armed Forces to 
know that if they should be called upon to act against Iraq our country 
will stand resolutely behind them.
  My vote is not, however, a vote for any new doctrine of preemption or 
for unilateralism or for the arrogance of American power or purpose, 
all of which carry grave dangers for our Nation, the rule of 
international law, and the peace and security of people throughout the 
world.
  Over 11 years have passed since the UN called on Saddam Hussein to 
rid himself of weapons of mass destruction as a condition of returning 
to the world community.
  Time and time again, he has frustrated and denied these conditions. 
This matter cannot be left hanging forever with consequences we would 
all live to regret. War can yet be avoided, but our responsibility to 
global security and the integrity of United Nations resolutions 
protecting it cannot.
  I urge the President to spare no effort to secure a clear, 
unambiguous demand by the United Nations for unlimited inspections.
  Finally, on another personal note, I come to this decision from the 
perspective of a Senator from New York who has seen all too closely the 
consequences of last year's terrible attacks on our Nation. In 
balancing the

[[Page S10290]]

risks of action versus inaction, I think New Yorkers, who have gone 
through the fires of hell, may be more attuned to the risk of not 
acting. I know I am.
  So it is with conviction that I support this resolution as being in 
the best interests of our Nation. A vote for it is not a vote to rush 
to war; it is a vote that puts awesome responsibility in the hands of 
our President. And we say to him: Use these powers wisely and as a last 
resort. And it is a vote that says clearly to Saddam Hussein: This is 
your last chance; disarm or be disarmed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I seek the floor in my own right. I 
understand the distinguished Senator from West Virginia offered me 20 
minutes of his time. I seek the floor in my own right. As I understand, 
under the present state of affairs, I have up to 1 hour.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has the remainder of his 1 hour: 
47 minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I will vote for the Lieberman-Warner amendment to 
authorize the use of military force against Iraq. And unlike my 
colleagues from West Virginia and Maryland, I do not believe this is a 
rush to war. I believe it is a march to peace and security.
  I believe that failure to overwhelmingly support this resolution is 
likely to enhance the prospects that war will occur. And in line with 
what the distinguished Senator from New York just said, I believe 
passage of this, with strong support, is very likely to enhance the 
prospects that the Secretary of State will get a strong resolution out 
of the Security Council.
  I will vote for this because we should be compelling Iraq to make 
good on its obligations to the United Nations. Because while Iraq's 
illegal weapons of mass destruction program do not--do not--pose an 
imminent threat to our national security, in my view, they will, if 
left unfettered. And because a strong vote in Congress, as I said, 
increases the prospect for a tough, new U.N. resolution on weapons of 
mass destruction, it is likely to get weapons inspectors in, which, in 
turn, decreases the prospects of war, in my view.
  I am among those who had serious reservations about and flat out 
straight opposition to the first draft proposed by the White House on 
September 19. It was much too broad. The draft raised more questions 
than it answered. It was not clear whether the authorization requested 
by the President to use force was limited to Iraq or applicable to the 
region as a whole.

  It was not clear whether the objective was to compel Iraq to destroy 
its weapons of mass destruction programs, to liberate Kuwaiti 
prisoners, or to end Saddam Hussein's regime. It was not clear whether 
the rationale for action was to enforce the U.N. Security Council 
resolutions that Saddam has flouted for the last decade or to implement 
a new doctrine of preemption. And it was not clear whether the 
administration considered working through the U.N. and working with 
allies important or irrelevant.
  The second draft negotiated with congressional leadership--and I 
would say I believe, in part, as a consequence of the efforts of my 
good friend, Senator Lugar, and me, and roughly 23 or 24 Republicans--
got the attention of the administration. They were simultaneously 
negotiating with the Senator from Indiana and me as well as the leader 
in the House. The leader in the House reached an agreement first. I 
thought that was unfortunate because I believe we could have had a 
better resolution had that not occurred.
  Nonetheless, the second draft negotiated addressed some of these 
questions but left others unanswered. Along with many of my colleagues 
on both sides of the aisle--notably, Senator Lugar--I continued to seek 
greater clarity about the focus of the proposed resolution.
  President Bush brought the resolution into sharper focus this week in 
his speech to the Nation. He said:

       War is neither imminent nor inevitable.

  He also said his objective was to disarm Iraq, that his rationale to 
enforce United Nations resolutions was not based upon preemption, and 
that he desired to lead the world, and if war was necessary, it would 
be with allies at our side.
  Mr. President, the resolution now before the Congress, similarly, is 
clear and more focused than previous drafts. It is not perfect, but it 
acknowledges the core concerns that Senator Lugar, I, and others raised 
and that have been raised by such Senators as Hagel and Specter and 
many others. Considered in the context of the President's speech this 
week, and his address last month to the United Nations General 
Assembly, this resolution, though still imperfect, deserves our 
support. Let me explain why.
  First, the objective is more clearly and carefully stated. The 
objective is to compel Iraq to destroy its illegal weapons of mass 
destruction and its programs to develop and produce missiles and more 
of those weapons.
  Saddam is dangerous. The world would be a better place without him. 
But the reason he poses a growing danger to the United States and its 
allies is that he possesses chemical and biological weapons and is 
seeking nuclear weapons, with the $2 billion a year he illegally skims 
from the U.N. oil-for-food program. For four years now, he has 
prevented United Nations inspectors from uncovering those weapons and 
verifying Iraq's disarmament, and he is in violation of the terms he 
agreed to allowing him to stay in power.
  What essentially happened was, he sued for peace. What essentially 
happened was, the U.N. resolutions were a reflection of what 
ordinarily, if there were no U.N., would be in the form of a peace 
agreement.
  This resolution authorizes the President to use force to

     defend the national security of the United States against the 
     continuing threat posed by Iraq; and enforce all relevant 
     United Nations Security Council Resolutions. . . .

  In my view, and as has been stated by the President and Secretary of 
State, the threat to the United States is Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction programs. The relevant U.N. resolutions are those related 
to Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. And the fact that 
we use the conjunctive clause, the word ``and,'' and not the word 
``or,'' means that the authorization we are granting to the President 
is tied to defending the national security of the United States in the 
context of enforcing the relevant U.N. resolutions relating to weapons 
of mass destruction.
  This is not a blank check for the use of force against Iraq for any 
reason. It is an authorization for the use of force, if necessary, to 
compel Iraq to disarm, as it promised after the Gulf War.
  Some in the Administration have argued that our stated objectives 
should be the end of Saddam Hussein's regime. Regime change is the 
ultimate goal of American policy, as embodied in the sense-of-the-
Congress provision of the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998. Indeed, an 
effective effort to disarm Iraq could well result in regime change. 
After all, such an effort would force Saddam to make a hard choice--
either give up his weapons or give up power--and he has made the wrong 
choices many times before.
  In his own words, the President said:

       Taking these steps would also change the nature of the 
     Iraqi regime itself. America hopes the regime will make that 
     choice.

  But this resolution does not make Saddam's removal its explicit goal. 
To have done so, in my view, would run the risk of alienating other 
countries who do not share that goal and whose support we need to 
disarm Iraq and possibly to rebuild it. And it would significantly 
weaken our hand at the United Nations.
  Nor does this resolution give the President the authorization to go 
to war over Bahraini prisoners, reparations owed to Kuwait, foreign 
MIAs, the return of Kuwait's national archives, or Saddam's ties to 
terrorism and human rights abuses. These are serious problems. The 
United Nations must continue to insist they be resolved, including 
maintaining embargoes and tightening and strengthening those sanctions 
against Iraq. But I doubt seriously the American people will support 
going to war to rectify any of them; nor will our allies.
  The Secretary of State, in testimony before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, made clear that our core objective is disarmament. I quote:

       I think it is unlikely that the President would use force 
     if [Iraq] complied with the weapons of mass destruction 
     conditions. . . .

[[Page S10291]]

     we all know that the major problem . . . the President is 
     focused on and the danger to us and to the world are the 
     weapons of mass destruction.

  By the way, even if my reading is incorrect and he would be able to 
go to liberate Bahraini prisoners, does anybody in this body think the 
President of the United States would risk American forces and, in a 
very crass sense, his presidency by going in with American forces 
unilaterally to make sure that Bahraini prisoners were in fact 
released? That is fiction.
  This week the President stated the objective clearly and concisely. 
He said:

       Saddam Hussein must disarm himself or, for the sake of 
     peace, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.

  The President is right to focus on disarming Iraq and not on regime 
change.
  Second, the rationale is more tightly focused. It is to enforce the 
U.N. Security Council resolutions on weapons of mass destruction that 
Saddam has defied for more than a decade. This is a man who waged a war 
of aggression, lost the war, and sued for peace. The terms of surrender 
dictated by the United Nations require him to declare and destroy his 
weapons of mass destruction programs. He has not done so.
  This resolution sets out in detail Saddam's decade of defying the 
Security Council resolutions on disarmament. It states that Iraq 
``remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international 
obligations,'' through its weapons of mass destruction programs. It 
authorizes the President to enforce all ``relevant U.N. Security 
Council resolutions regarding Iraq,'' with force, if necessary.
  As the President said this week:

       America is challenging all nations to take the resolutions 
     of the United Nations Security Council seriously.

  That is what this is about. Yet some administration supporters have 
argued using force against Iraq is justified on the basis of a new 
doctrine of preemption, a doctrine that would represent the most far-
reaching change in our foreign policy since the end of the cold war. In 
fact, the concept of preemption has long been part of our foreign 
policy tool kit. It is a doctrine well established under international 
law.
  What we are talking about here in this new policy is a policy of 
prevention, striking first at someone who may some day pose a threat to 
us, even if that threat is not imminent today. This policy merits a 
serious national debate, but not adoption by this body, nor is it 
contained in this resolution.

  The speed and stealth with which an outlaw state or terrorist could 
use weapons of mass destruction and the catastrophic damage they could 
inflict require us to consider new ways of acting, not reacting. But 
that is not what this is about.
  It would be dangerous to rush to embrace as a new principle of 
American foreign policy a rule that gives every nation the right to act 
preventively. The former Secretary of State, Secretary Henry Kissinger, 
made this point powerfully in his testimony before my committee 2 weeks 
ago. I quote him:

       As the most powerful nation in the world, the United States 
     has a special unilateral capacity and indeed obligation to 
     lead in implementing its convictions. But it also has a 
     special obligation to justify its actions by principles that 
     transcend the assertions of preponderant power. It cannot be 
     in either the American national interest or the world's 
     interest to develop principles that grant every nation an 
     unfettered right of preemption against its own definition of 
     threats to its security.

  Dr. Kissinger is right. What message would declaring a policy of 
prevention send to the Indians and Pakistanis, the Chinese and the 
Taiwanese, the Israelis and the Arabs, the Russians and Georgians?
  This resolution does not send that message because it does not 
endorse the prevention doctrine. It does not need to. Because, as the 
President has argued, this is about compelling Saddam Hussein to make 
good on his requirement and obligation to disarm.
  Third, this resolution makes clear the President's determination to 
build international support for our Iraq policy. Our allies throughout 
the world and in the region have important contributions to make in the 
effort to disarm Iraq and to rebuild Iraq, if we go to war. And we 
depend upon their continued cooperation in the unfinished war against 
terrorism. The United States has a singular capacity to act alone, if 
necessary. We must--and this resolution does--preserve our right to do 
so. But acting alone in Iraq would cost us significantly more in lost 
lives, in dollars spent, and influence dissipated around the world. 
Acting alone must be a last resort, not a defiant retort to those not 
yet convinced of our policy.
  This resolution emphasizes the importance of international support, 
manifested through the United Nations Security Council. It states that:

       The Congress of the United States supports the efforts by 
     the President to--
       (1) strictly enforce through the United Nations Security 
     Council all relevant Security Council resolutions applicable 
     to Iraq and encourages him in those efforts; and,
       (2) obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security 
     Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, 
     evasion and noncompliance. . . .

  Similarly, the President, in going to the United Nations over the 
strong objection of half his administration, made clear his desire to 
work with others, not around them. In his speech this week, he talked 
about his determination ``to lead the world'' in confronting the Iraqi 
problem. He stated that if we act militarily, we will act ``with allies 
at our side.''
  I am convinced he will follow through on this commitment.
  In short, the combination of this resolution and the President's own 
words in recent speeches, both publicly and privately, give me 
confidence that most of our core concerns have been addressed.
  I also take confidence from how far this administration has come on 
Iraq over the past year. Many in this Chamber predicted, and many who 
oppose this resolution predicted, that the administration would use the 
terrible events of September 11 as an excuse to strike back at Iraq. 
This, despite any credible evidence that Iraq was involved in the 
terrorist attacks on America.
  Both The New York Times and The Washington Post have reported that in 
the days following 9/11, the most senior Pentagon officials urged the 
President to consider setting his sights on Iraq, not Afghanistan. I 
can say from personal conversations, I know that to be true. As a 
matter of fact, I gathered my Foreign Relations Committee staff not 
long after 9/11, when talk of going to Afghanistan was in this Chamber 
and at the administration. I suggested, based on conversations I had 
with some, be careful, prepare. We are not going to Afghanistan. We are 
going to Iraq.
  I know there was a proposal that was being promoted to the President 
that he should use this as an excuse to go to Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld 
is reported to have argued there would be a big buildup of forces with 
not that many good targets in Afghanistan.
  At some point, the United States would have to deal with Iraq and is 
this not the opportunity? he apparently suggested--not to me; that is 
as reported. Many predicted the administration would ignore the U.N. 
and the need to build international support for its Iraqi policy. That 
is not surprising because senior administration officials said as much.
  During the spring and early summer, literally dozens of articles 
flatly stated that the President planned a unilateral attack against 
Iraq. As late as August 29 of this year, The New York Times reported:

       Officials in Washington and Crawford, TX, are engaged in an 
     intense debate over whether they should seek to involve the 
     United Nations one last time. . . . As one top adviser 
     described the argument, Mr. Bush must decide ``whether to go 
     it alone or go to the United Nations.'' He went to the United 
     Nations.

  Many predicted the administration would refuse to give the weapons 
inspectors one last chance to disarm. That is not surprising. That 
prediction would have been made because administrative officials 
consistently disparaged inspections.
  Richard Perle, senior adviser to the Pentagon, said:

       The inspectors are not going to find anything. . . .They 
     will flounder if they are permitted to return.

  Vice President Cheney, as late as August 26 of this year, took this 
line:

       A person would be right to question any suggestion that we 
     should just get inspectors

[[Page S10292]]

     back into Iraq and then our worries will be over. A return of 
     inspectors would provide no insurance whatsoever of Saddam's 
     compliance with U.N. resolutions.

  I don't know how many Sunday shows I did from June through now, where 
every interviewer would say: But, Senator, you are wrong, the President 
is going to act alone. And they read me quote after quote from high 
officials.
  Thank God for Colin Powell. Thank God for Colin Powell because that 
was the other half being argued by the administration quietly, saying: 
Mr. President, do not listen to those voices who counsel ``no 
inspectors and do not go back to the U.N.''
  Many predicted the administration would not seek authorization from 
Congress for the use of force and, again, that is not surprising. As 
late as August 29 of this year, the White House counsel--the White 
House counsel--reportedly told the President that he had all the 
authority he needs to wage war against Iraq--there was a big deal about 
leaking a memorandum from the White House counsel to the world that 
Congress need not be involved, Mr. President. I had two private 
meetings with the President myself, where I made clear that I thought 
that was dead wrong and he would be--to use the slang on the east side 
of my city--``in a world of hurt'' if he attempted to do that.
  The President said to me personally he was going to come to Congress 
if he sought authority. What did he do? He came to Congress. But it is 
not strange that my colleagues up here would believe he would not do 
that. The White House press secretary actually reiterated that 
conclusion of the White House counsel at a White House briefing. Each 
prediction by those who thought the President would make, in my view, 
the wrong choice, seemed very well founded because it was based on the 
beliefs and statements of very senior administration officials, 
including the Vice President of the United States.
  We all know the lore around here--that the Vice President of the 
United States is the most powerful man in the administration. Some even 
suggest it goes beyond that. But guess what? Each prediction proved to 
be wrong, as some of us, quite frankly, predicted all along.
  My colleague from New York may remember my getting a little bit of a 
sarcastic response in the Democratic Caucus when I suggested there was 
no possibility there would be a war before November; there was no 
possibility of an October surprise; there was no possibility that he 
would go and seek power to go to war, if need be, absent congressional 
authorization. There was no possibility he would fail to go to the U.N. 
It is not just because that is the only thing I believe a rational 
President could do, but because he told me--and I suspect many others--
that that is what he would do.
  Mr. President, President Bush did not lash out precipitously after 9/
11. He did not snub the U.N. or our allies. He did not dismiss a new 
inspection regime. He did not ignore the Congress. At each pivotal 
moment, he has chosen a course of moderation and deliberation. I 
believe he will continue to do so--at least that is my fervent hope. I 
wish he would turn down the rhetorical excess in some cases because I 
think it undercuts the decision he ends up making. But in each case, in 
my view, he has made the right rational and calm, deliberate decision.
  As I noted a few moments ago, the President said this week that the 
use of force in Iraq is neither ``imminent nor inevitable,'' and that 
makes sense because while the threat from Iraq is real and growing, its 
imminence and inevitability in terms of America's security have been 
exaggerated.
  For two decades, Saddam Hussein has relentlessly pursued weapons of 
mass destruction. There is a broad agreement that he retains chemical 
and biological weapons, the means to manufacture those weapons and 
modified Scud missiles, and that he is actively seeking a nuclear 
capability. It remains less clear how effective his delivery vehicles 
are, whether they be the al-Hussein missiles, with a 650 kilometer 
range, short-range missiles, or untested and unmanned aerial vehicles 
for the dispersion of chemical and biological weapons.
  Shifting weather conditions, the likely incineration of much of the 
chemical or biological agent in a warhead explosion, and the potential 
blowback on Iraqi forces, all complicate the Iraqi use of these 
weapons. But we are right to be concerned that, given time and a free 
hand, Saddam would improve this technology.
  Other countries have, or seek, weapons of mass destruction. Saddam 
actually used them against his neighbors, against his own people. He 
has a lengthy track record of aggression--first, in Iran, then Kuwait. 
He has brutally repressed Iraqi civilians--the Kurds in the North, then 
the Shias in the south, and then the Kurds again. And the combination 
of Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction is dangerous, 
destabilizing, and deadly.
  Ultimately, either those weapons must be dislodged from Iraq, or 
Saddam must be dislodged from power. But exactly what threat does the 
combination of Saddam and weapons of mass destruction pose to the 
United States? How urgent is the problem? Some argue the danger is 
threefold: one, Iraq could use these weapons against us; two, it could 
use them to blackmail us; three, it could become a surreptitious 
supplier to terrorist groups.
  Others question these scenarios. For example, Brent Scowcroft, 
President George Herbert Walker Bush's National Security Adviser, and 
chairman of President Bush's foreign intelligence advisory board, 
recently wrote:

       Threatening to use these weapons for blackmail--much less 
     their actual use--would open [Saddam] and his entire regime 
     to a devastating response by the U.S. While Saddam is 
     thoroughly evil, he is above all a power-hungry survivor.

  Similarly, Scowcroft wrote ``there is scant evidence to tie Saddam to 
terrorist organizations, and even less to the September 11 attacks. 
Indeed, Saddam's goals have little in common with the terrorists who 
threaten us . . . and he is unlikely to risk his investment in weapons 
of mass destruction, much less his country, by handing such weapons to 
terrorists who would use them for their own purposes and leave Baghdad 
as a return address.''
  Daniel Benjamin, former Director of Counter-terrorism on the National 
Security Council staff, and co-author of the remarkable new book, ``The 
Age of Sacred Terror,'' wrote recently in The New York Times the 
following:

       Iraq and Al Qaeda are not obvious allies. In fact, they are 
     natural enemies. . . .To contemporary jihadists, Saddam 
     Hussein is another in a line of dangerous secularists, an 
     enemy of the faith. . . .Saddam Hussein has long recognized 
     that Al Qaeda and like-minded Islamists represent a threat to 
     his regime. Consequently, he has shown no interest in working 
     with them against their common enemy, the United States. . . 
     . Iraq has indeed sponsored terrorism in the past, but always 
     of a traditional variety: it sought to eliminate Iraqi 
     opponents abroad or, when conspiring against others, to 
     inflict enough harm to show the costs of confronting it. But 
     Mr. Hussein has remained true to the unwritten rules of state 
     sponsorship of terrorism: never get involved with a group 
     that cannot be controlled, and never give a weapons of mass 
     destruction to terrorists who might use it against you.

  I reiterate here, just as Mark Twain said, ``The reports of my death 
are much exaggerated,'' the reports of al-Qaida in Iraq are much 
exaggerated.
  Our own intelligence community, in testimony before the Foreign 
Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence Committees--that has been 
declassified--concluded that the probability of Iraq initiating an 
attack against the United States with weapons of mass destruction is 
``low''--l-o-w--low. They also have concluded that ``Baghdad for now 
appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks . . 
. with chemical or biological weapons against the United States.''
  I believe it is unlikely Saddam Hussein will use weapons of mass 
destruction against us unless he is attacked. To do so would invite 
immediate annihilation, and I am skeptical that he would become a 
supplier to terrorist groups. He would risk being caught in the act or 
having those weapons turned against him by groups who disdain Saddam as 
much as they despise us, and he would be giving away what is to him the 
ultimate source and symbol of his power, the only thing that makes him 
unique among the thugs in the region.
  Of course, Saddam has miscalculated before, and we are right to be 
concerned about the possibility, however remote, that he will do it 
again, but we are wrong on this floor to exaggerate

[[Page S10293]]

and suggest this is the reason and justification for going against 
Saddam.
  What I do believe is that Saddam's primary goal is to dominate his 
region. His history, his actions, and his statements make that clear. 
Weapons are a means to that end for him, a terrible tool of 
intimidation that he could use to bully his people and his neighbors.
  During the gulf war, the knowledge that Saddam Hussein had chemical 
and biological weapons did not deter us from expelling his forces from 
Kuwait. We gave him clear warning that using these weapons against our 
troops would invite a devastating response. Let me remind everybody, he 
did not use them. But a nuclear weapon could well change Saddam's 
calculus. It could give Saddam an inflated sense of his invisibility. 
It could lead him to conclude erroneously that he finally had the great 
equalizer against American power and that he could fuel a new spasm of 
aggression against his neighbors or the Kurds in the mistaken belief 
that we would be deterred for fear that, if we put anyone on the 
ground, they would be annihilated with his theater or tactical nuclear 
weapon.
  We cannot let Saddam Hussein get his hands on nuclear weapons. In 
particular, we must deny Iraq the necessary fissile material, highly 
enriched uranium, or weapons grade plutonium needed for a nuclear 
weapon.
  According to an unclassified letter released by the Director of 
Central Intelligence this week:

       Iraq is unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons 
     grade material for a deliverable nuclear weapon until the 
     last half of this decade.

  Therefore, if Iraq wants a nuclear capability sooner, it will need to 
turn to foreign sources for fissile material which could shorten the 
timetable for an Iraqi nuclear weapon to about a year. This reality 
underscores the importance of U.S. and international efforts not only 
to disarm Iraq, but also to reduce and better secure fissile materials 
in the former Soviet Union, the most logical source of black market 
purchases or theft.
  Concerning Iraq, our first step should be the one the President 
apparently has chosen: to get the weapons inspectors back into Iraq. 
There is disagreement about the value of weapons inspections. Skeptics, 
particularly our Vice President, contend that inspections can never 
guarantee the complete disarmament of Iraqi weapons, especially given 
the prevalence of dual-use materials and mobile facilities for the 
production of chemical and biological weapons.

  Proponents believe that inspectors heighten the barrier to 
development and production of WMD and will buy time until a regime 
change in Iraq occurs. They point to the success of UNSCOM and IAEA.
  For example, the British white paper on Iraq's WMD issued last month, 
which was quoted by those who wish to move against Iraq, says:

       Despite the conduct of the Iraqi authorities toward them, 
     both UNSCOM and IAEA action teams have valuable records of 
     achievement in discovering and exposing Iraq's biological 
     weapons programs and destroying very large quantities of 
     chemical weapons stocks and missiles, as well as the 
     infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons program.

  It has been argued that UNSCOM's most notable achievements were the 
result of fortuitous defections. In fact, much of UNSCOM's success was 
due to diligent detective work in Iraq. But let's assume that 
defections and not detection are the key to success. Isn't the best way 
to encourage defections, isn't the best way to get firsthand 
information about Iraq's weapons programs to have inspectors back on 
the ground talking to the key people?
  I agree with President Bush that given a new mandate and the 
authority to go any place, any time, with no advance warning, U.N. 
inspections can work. They can succeed in discovering and destroying 
much of Saddam's chemical and biological arsenals and his missile 
program. They can delay and derail his efforts to acquire nuclear 
weapons and, at the very least, they will give us a clearer picture of 
what Saddam has, force him to focus on hiding his weapons and not 
building more, and it will buy us time to build a strong coalition to 
act if he refuses to disarm.
  There is no question that with regard to Iraq, we have a real and 
growing problem. But I also believe we have time to deal with that 
problem in a way that isolates Saddam and does not isolate the United 
States of America . . . that makes the use of force the final option, 
not the first one . . . that produces the desired results, not 
unintended consequences. That is the course President Bush has chosen, 
in my view.
  Now it is incumbent upon the United Nations and the U.S. Congress to 
help him stay the course. The United Nations Security Council must 
deliver a tough new resolution that gives the weapons inspectors the 
authority they need to get the job done. As the President put it, the 
inspectors ``must have access to any site at any time without 
preconditions, without delay, and without exceptions.''
  Mr. President, the resolution should set clear deadlines for 
compliance, and it should make clear the consequences if Saddam Hussein 
fails to disarm, including authorizing willing U.N. members to use 
force to compel compliance.
  I also agree with the President that a key component of any 
inspections regime must be the U.N.'s ability to interview those with 
knowledge of Iraq's weapons programs in a climate free of fear and 
intimidation, including being able to take them outside of Iraq. 
Offering sanctuary to those who tell the truth would also deprive 
Saddam Hussein of their expertise.
  To that end, this week, Senator Specter and I introduced legislation 
called ``The Iraqi Scientist Liberation Act'' that would admit to our 
country up to 500 Iraqi scientists, engineers, and technicians, and 
their families who give reliable information on Saddam's programs to 
us, to the United Nations, or to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency.
  It is also critical the Congress send the right message to the United 
Nations Security Council. Its members must not doubt our determination 
to deal with the problems posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, 
including our willingness to use force, if necessary.
  The stronger the vote in favor of this resolution, the stronger the 
likelihood, in my view, that the Security Council will approve a tough 
U.N. resolution. That is because the U.N. will conclude if we do not 
act, America will. So we'd better.
  The tougher a U.N. resolution, the less likely it is that we will 
have to use force in Iraq. That is because such a resolution would 
finally force Saddam to face the choice between inspectors and 
invaders, between giving up his weapons and giving up power, and there 
is at least a chance that he might make the right choice.
  There is also a chance Saddam will once again miscalculate, that he 
will misjudge our resolve, and in that event we must be prepared to use 
force with others if we can, and alone if we must.
  The American people must be prepared. They must be prepared for the 
possible consequences of military action. They must be prepared for the 
cost of rebuilding Iraq as the President said he is committed to do. 
They must be prepared for the tradeoffs that may be asked of them 
between competing priorities. They must be prepared for all these 
things and more because no matter how well conceived, no matter how 
well thought out a foreign policy, it cannot be sustained without the 
informed consent of the American people.
  If it comes to that, if it comes to war, I fully expect the President 
will come back to the American people and tell us what is expected of 
us. As a matter of fact, when he met with the congressional leadership 
and the committee chairmen about 10 to 15 days ago--I forget the exact 
date--we were all around the Cabinet table and at one point he turned 
to me and he said: Mr. Chairman, what do you think?
  And I said: Mr. President, I will be with you if you make an earnest 
effort to go through the United Nations, if you try to do this with our 
allies and friends; if in fact the U.N. does not support our effort, as 
in Kosovo, and if you are willing to be square with the American 
people, Mr. President, of what sacrifices we are going to ask of them, 
particularly the need to have a significant number of American forces 
in place in Iraq after Saddam Hussein is taken down.
  In the presence of all my colleagues at that meeting, he said: I will 
do that.
  He has never broken his word.

[[Page S10294]]

  He has made two very important speeches so far--one at the U.N. and 
one to the American people--about the danger of Saddam Hussein, but no 
one yet has told the people of Georgia, the people of Delaware, the 
people of this country what we will be asking of them because it will 
be profound. It may be necessary, but it will be profound. As I said, 
if it comes to war, the President, I am confident, will go to the 
American people.
  In his speech this week, he made a compelling case that Iraq's 
failure to disarm is our problem as well as the world's, but he has not 
yet made the case to the American people that the United States may 
have to solve this problem alone or with relatively few others, nor has 
he told us of the sacrifices that such a course of action could 
involve.
  I am confident he will do so, if and when it proves necessary, but I 
also want to be clear about the issues the President must address 
before committing our Armed Forces to combat in Iraq, as a moral 
obligation to level with our people.
  First, the consequences of military action: Attacking Iraq could and 
probably will go smoothly. We have the finest fighting force in the 
world. Our defense budget exceeds that of the next 15 countries 
combined. According to expert testimony my committee received this 
summer, Iraq's conventional forces are significantly weaker than they 
were during the Gulf War. As a leading expert in the Middle East, Mr. 
Fouad Ajami told the committee there is a strong likelihood the Iraqis 
will welcome us as liberators.

  While it would be reasonable to expect the best, it would be 
foolhardy not to prepare for the worst. There is a danger in assuming 
that attacking Iraq will be, as some suggest, ``a cakewalk.'' We should 
all heed the powerful words of military analyst, Anthony Cordesman, who 
testified before the Foreign Relations Committee in July. He said to my 
committee:

       I think it is incredibly dangerous to be dismissive [of the 
     difficulty]. It is very easy to send people home unused and 
     alive. It is costly to send them home in body bags because we 
     did not have a sufficient force when we engaged. And to be 
     careless about this war, to me, would be a disaster . . . 
     This is not a game, and it is not something to be decided 
     from an armchair.

  There is a danger in attacking Iraq. There is a danger that attacking 
Iraq could precipitate what we are trying to prevent: Saddam's use of 
weapons of mass destruction against our troops.
  My friend from Georgia who is presiding is a military man. He is a 
former marine. He is a tough guy. He is level headed and straight. He 
might be interested that last Sunday, as I came down to the memorial 
for firefighters--he knows I commute every day and I never come to 
Washington on Sunday--but there was a tribute to fallen firefighters 
which occurs every year and I was asked to speak. As I got off the 
train, I ran into a four-star--I do not want to identify him too 
closely--general in one of our branches who held a very high position 
very recently and still holds a very high position. I asked him what he 
thought about the possibility of this war, and he said he did not like 
it.
  He said two things to me, and I say this to the Presiding Officer, an 
ex-marine. He said there are two things that will be fundamentally 
different from ever before: We have never gone to war in an environment 
that could possibly be totally contaminated before we get there; and, 
number two, we have never gone house to house in a city of 4 million 
people.
  This all may work perfectly well. This all may go just so nicely. But 
to imply to the American people that is a surety would be immoral, 
disingenuous, and would reap a whirlwind if it does not occur.
  The American people are tough. They will do what they think is 
necessary for our security and they will make sacrifices. But I will 
have no part if we go to war providing pablum to them that somehow this 
is going to likely be an overwhelmingly easy undertaking.
  If we notice, everybody says the American people support this war. 
That is not true. They support this war if it is a 100-day war like the 
last war was. They do not support the President's ability to go to war 
unilaterally. If we look at all the polling data, what they support is 
if we go with our allies in response to a genuine threat, which I think 
exists, and if it is not going to be costly in terms of the loss of 
human life, American soldiers, then they overwhelmingly support it. 
Over half still support it even if there is some loss of life, but 
hardly anyone supports it if it is alone or if there is a significant 
loss of life.
  As CIA Director George Tenet stated in a letter to Senator Graham 
this week:

       Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no 
     longer be deterred, he probably--

  Let me say that again--

     He probably would become much less constrained in adopting 
     terrorist actions. Such terrorism might involve . . . 
     chemical and biological weapons. Saddam might decide that the 
     extreme step of assisting Islamist terrorists in conducting a 
     WMD attack against the United States would be his last chance 
     to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with 
     him.

  There is a danger that Saddam would seek to spark a wider war. I just 
did one of the shows we all do with Charlie Rose. He quoted to me what 
I knew privately from my discussions with him: the former commander of 
CENTCOM testifying that he saw no need to go into Iraq now, and the 
cost would be high.
  There is a danger that Saddam would seek to spark a wider war. Many 
experts have expressed concern to my committee that if attacked Saddam 
Hussein would lash out at Israel. Last month, The New York Times 
reported that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon told senior 
administration officials that Israel would strike back if Iraq attacks 
Israel. Then, key Arab countries could come under tremendous pressure 
to break with us and confront Israel. It would be wrong for us to tell 
Israel what they should or should not do in their self-defense, but it 
would also be wrong to ignore the risk that a war against Saddam 
Hussein will ignite a much larger conflagration.
  There is a danger that Saddam's downfall could lead to widespread 
civil unrest and reprisals. There is only one thing I disagree with in 
the President's speech on Monday. He said what could be worse than 
Saddam Hussein? I can tell you, a lot.

  As I said, there is a danger that Saddam's downfall could lead to 
widespread civil unrest and reprisal. Chaos could invite the Kurds to 
seize valuable oil fields; the Turks to cross the border in an effort 
to prevent a Kurdish state from arising; and Iran and even Syria to 
move in to fill a vacuum.
  Not one of these scenarios is inevitable. None should be used as an 
excuse for inaction. But each must figure into our planning and into 
the minds of the American people if we ultimately use force against 
Iraq. We must be honest with the American people.
  In his speech this week, the President made it clear that if military 
action is necessary, ``the United States and our allies will help the 
Iraqi people rebuild their economy and create the institutions of 
liberty in a unified Iraq and peace with its neighbors.''
  This is a much more complicated country than Afghanistan. We are not 
done in Afghanistan. We have not kept our commitment in Afghanistan. We 
are taking on a big deal here. I know the Presiding Officer and my 
colleague from Ohio and my colleague from Vermont know Iraq is an 
artificially constructed nation. When has there been a circumstance in 
Iraq when there has been anything remotely approaching a democratic 
republic? I cannot think of it in the history of Iraq as defined now. 
The Kurds are Indo-European Sunnis, the Sunnis are Arab Sunnis, the 
Shiites, who make up 60 percent of the population primarily between the 
Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, are Shiites who have been at war with the 
Sunnis. The Iranians are Shiite. There are 700,000 Iraqi Shiites in 
Iran.
  This is complicated stuff. But to listen to some of my colleagues on 
the floor who blow this off like, no problem, take down Saddam, there 
is a James Madison waiting to step into the vacuum, we will have a 
democratic republic, it will set a new tone and tenor, as the Vice 
President said, for all of the Middle East, because we will have a new 
democracy there, that is a big deal. It is a big undertaking.
  Why did the President say this? This is a critical commitment, one I 
wholeheartedly endorse, but it is not done out of altruism, but out of 
a hard-boiled calculation that in Iraq we cannot afford to trade a 
despot for chaos.

[[Page S10295]]

None of this will be cost free. It will require a significant 
investment of military, financial, and human resources.
  Let's start with the cost of war. Last month the White House economic 
adviser estimated the cost of the military campaign in Iraq at between 
$100 and $200 billion. My friends in the Senate are all economic 
conservatives. Where are we going to get the money? I say to my 
friends, as I said in committee, those who want to see a national 
health insurance policy, forget it for a while. Those who want to make 
permanent the present tax cut, forget it for a while. As they say in 
parts of my State, ``you ain't got the money.''
  It doesn't mean we shouldn't move on Iraq, but it means we should be 
honest with the American people, and tell them what the estimated cost 
by this administration is. By the way, that estimated cost is similar 
to what the Congressional Budget Office suggested. The higher cost 
estimates would result from a lengthy campaign and external factors 
such as a spike in oil prices if that occurs. That is just to win the 
war. The cost of securing the peace could be significantly higher and 
could extend years into the future.
  On the other hand, maybe we will end up with an Iraqi Government in 
place. There is plenty of money in Iraq. They can fund their own 
reconstruction. And that may happen. I am not being facetious. But it 
is not anywhere near certain.
  I say ``could'' because there are those who believe our commitment to 
Iraq the ``day after'' need not involve exorbitant expenditures. Former 
Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger told my committee in August, and 
Secretary Rumsfeld repeated it last month, that the United States would 
not have to stay too long in Iraq. They and others argue that Iraq has 
a talented population and considerable resources to pay for its own 
reconstruction.
  The problem is, one-third of that population hates the other two-
thirds of the population. They say Iraq will quickly be able to 
organize itself politically, economically, and militarily into a 
peaceful, unified nation, free of weapons of mass destruction.
  The American people need to know that most experts believe Iraq will 
require considerable assistance politically, militarily, and 
economically. Indeed, they say we should speak not of ``the day after'' 
but of ``the decade after.'' My committee heard testimony in July from 
a military expert in post-conflict reconstruction. The fellow who 
headed up that department in the Pentagon stated that 75,000 troops 
would be required at a cost of $16 billion for just the first year, to 
maintain order, preserve Iraq's integrity, and secure its weapons of 
mass destruction sites. Just to do that. Just to do that. Other experts 
predict the United States will have to engage substantial resources in 
Iraq, which has no history of democracy, for many more years.
  When my cowboy friends say, ``Why do we need anybody? Let's go get 
them,'' I don't want all 75,000 of the forces being American. Anybody 
happen to notice recently that in Kuwait American military personnel 
are being picked off? Anybody happen to notice that? Anybody happen to 
notice the targets in Afghanistan? Where have we been? The American 
people need to know what the experts know. We have an obligation, the 
President has an obligation, to tell them, if the need arises.
  In a recent study in the Atlantic Monthly, James Fallows summed up 
the significant challenges that Iraqis will not be able to handle on 
their own. This is overwhelmingly agreed upon by left, right, and 
center. He says they will not be able on their own to handle the 
following: Cleaning up the after-effects of battle and malicious 
destruction Saddam Hussein may create with chemical and biological 
weapons or by sabotaging his own oil fields; providing basic 
humanitarian needs in the short term such as food, water, and medical 
care; dealing with refugees and displaced persons, the 700,000 Shiites 
in Iran--I remind Members of the 700,000 in Iran; catching Saddam 
Hussein if he tries to flee--we are still looking for Osama bin Laden. 
We are still looking for Omar the tent maker. We are still looking for 
these guys. We don't have them; Providing police protection and 
preventing reprisal killings; denazification of Baathist officials and 
security services; aiding in the formation of a new government; 
ensuring Iraq's territorial integrity and dealing with possible Iranian 
and Turkish intervention; rebuilding the oil industry while ensuring a 
smooth reentry of Iraqi oil into the world market.
  That is a finite list that everyone acknowledges no new government in 
Iraq could do quickly. Those who argue most vigorously that a post-
Saddam Iraq can be a model and source of inspiration for democracy in 
the region and throughout the Muslim world must be prepared to back the 
massive, long term American commitment. To set that objective, but then 
to believe it can be done on the cheap, is a recipe for failure.
  Let me quote from Mr. Gingrich. This is a news report in The New York 
Times.

       The advisers, who include former House Speaker Newt 
     Gingrich and Mr. Perle, argue the White House should create a 
     high-level interagency group to coordinate military and 
     reconstruction planning before an invasion takes place. That 
     sort of powerful council could overcome the bureaucratic and 
     philosophic divisions that have hindered reconstruction 
     planning, the advisers contend.
       ``It was a mistake we made in Afghanistan,'' said Mr. 
     Gingrich who sits on the Defense Policy Board. ``You 
     shouldn't go into a country militarily without having thought 
     through what it should look like afterwards.''

  The mere fact that these men on the board are saying we should do 
this is evidence it has not been done yet.
  We must be clear with the American people that we are committing to 
Iraq for the long haul; not just the day after, but the decade after.
  Finally, let's consider the possible tradeoffs here.
  The President has argued that confronting Iraq would not detract from 
the unfinished war against terrorism. I believe he is right. We should 
be able to walk and chew gum at the same time. But if military action 
comes, it will take a herculean effort for senior leaders of our 
Government to stay focused on two major undertakings at once. War is 
intense. A new front against Iraq must not distract us from job number 
one--taking down al-Qaida.
  Let's also be clear that this could involve sacrifices. For example, 
the war on terrorism is putting intense demands on Navy Seals, Army 
Green Berets, Delta Commandos, Air Force ground controllers, and Arabic 
linguists. Units have been deployed to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Georgia, 
Yemen, Africa, and the Philippines, and last month the commander of 
United States special-operation forces requested an additional $23 
billion over the next 5 years to prosecute the war against al-Qaida and 
other terrorist groups. Not--not--Iraq. Our intelligence services have 
also redirected resources to the war on terrorism.
  How are we going to pay for all this? Can we take on Iraq, prosecute 
the war on terrorism, and maintain the President's tax cut for the 
wealthiest Americans? Can we afford to repeal the estate tax for the 
top 2 percent of the population who pay it? What would be the prospects 
for national health insurance and prescription drug benefits in the 
near term?
  The point is, we will do what we have to do to protect our national 
security, but let's not kid ourselves that it can come down cost free, 
without tradeoffs, and without setting priorities.
  Setting priorities and making hard choices is what governing is all 
about. So is being forthright with the American people about what is 
expected of them. We should not be afraid to ask our fellow Americans 
to sacrifice for a vital cause if we conclude we should go to war. 
Generation after generation of Americans has done so willingly and will 
do it again if that is what they are called upon to do. But we must be 
straight with them.
  In conclusion, few resolutions that come before the Congress are as 
grave and consequential as the one before us today. We have heard 
powerful arguments on both sides of the resolution, and concerning the 
various amendments that have been presented. That is how it should be. 
We have come a long way during the last year. The administration that 
many thought would ignore the United Nations, ignore the Congress, has 
and is seeking the support of both.
  We have come a long way in 3 weeks, a long way since the White House 
first offered its draft resolution. This resolution and the President's 
words make it clear that the administration's objective is to disarm 
Iraq and that the

[[Page S10296]]

rationale to enforce Iraq's obligations to the United Nations is the 
reason we would go, and that its determination is to work with others, 
not alone. The President has made it clear that war is neither imminent 
nor inevitable.
  I am confident that the reason the President, thankfully, disregarded 
the advice of some in the administration--that he understands the 
significant need for others to support us--is that fighting two wars, a 
war in Iraq and a war against terrorism, can be greatly assisted the 
more the world is with us. We do not need them if it comes to that. But 
the cost we will pay will be significantly higher.
  I compliment the President for recognizing that. I am absolutely 
confident the President will not take us to war alone. I am absolutely 
confident we will enhance his ability to get the world to be with us by 
us voting for this resolution. I am absolutely confident, if it comes 
time and need to go to war, with others or alone, the President will 
keep his commitment to make the third most important speech in his 
life, to come to the American people and tell them what is expected of 
them, what is being asked of them.
  To do any less would be to repeat the sin of Vietnam. And the sin of 
Vietnam, no matter what our view on Vietnam is, is not whether we went 
or didn't go. But the sin, in my view, is the failure of two Presidents 
to level with the American people of what the costs would be, what the 
continued involvement would require, and what was being asked of them.
  We cannot, must not, and, if I have anything to do with it, we will 
not do that again.
  I thank the Chair for its consideration and its patience. I yield the 
floor.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Miller). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, we have exhausted the last unanimous consent 
order that has been entered here. We have a lot of Senators who have 
indicated a desire to speak, and they have the right to do that. What I 
would like to do is this. Both cloakrooms have worked to come up with a 
list of speakers. We have a very long list, but we have learned from 
sad experience here this week that we should not make it a really long 
list.
  So what I suggest to my colleague, Senator McCain, is that we go down 
the list for four or five Senators and then we will come back again and 
try to get another list. We have a long list, but rather than enter 
it--we tried that earlier this week, and everyone should understand it 
will not work because people do not use all their time so others are 
not here when it is time to start. But if we have a few Senators, it 
works better.
  I ask unanimous consent that the list of speakers start with Senator 
DeWine for 35 minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. For 45.
  Mr. REID. OK, that is fine.
  Mr. McCAIN. Forty-five.
  Mr. REID. Senator Collins for 20 minutes. The reason we have this is 
we have had a long string of Democrats who have spoken: Senator Kohl, 7 
minutes; Senator Harkin, 7 minutes; Senator Schumer, 30 minutes; 
Senator Specter, 45 minutes; and Senator Carper, 20 minutes. We would 
end it at that time--not end it, but we would be back to enter another 
list and find out if we have had any added to it or taken from it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. McCAIN. I am sorry, I will not object, but I couldn't hear.
  Mr. REID. What I said is we will come back after this list is 
completed and see if there are any additions or deletions and try to 
get another list. We have a very long list here but, believe me, it 
will not work to stick it in from top to bottom.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Would the Senator from Nevada repeat the list 
again?
  Mr. REID. DeWine, 45 minutes; Collins, 20 minutes; Kohl, 7 minutes; 
Harkin, 7 minutes; Schumer, 30 minutes; Specter, 45 minutes; Carper, 20 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. I would say to everyone within the sound of my voice, 
everyone has time to speak if they can get the floor. We have a list 
here to make it so people are not trying to get the attention of the 
Chair.
  I hope Senators will be considerate. There is only 30 hours. If 
somebody comes and takes an hour, it does not leave time for others. 
Some have already spoken. I think those who have spoken--I hope they 
will be considerate of a lot of Senators who have not spoken.
  The fact that we have allotted all this time doesn't mean everyone 
has to use every minute of the time allotted. So those Senators who are 
in this queue, if they would be around in case someone doesn't show up 
or is stuck in traffic or whatever the case might be, we could finish a 
lot quicker.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized.
  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I would like to begin by thanking all my 
colleagues who have participated in this very crucial and historic 
debate. I must say I was struck last Friday by the magnificent debate 
between Senator Byrd and Senator Warner. I think their debate on Friday 
represented what the Senate is all about, and I congratulate both of 
them. Really, every Member who has come down here has had something to 
contribute.
  It is clear that each Member who came down here has thought long and 
hard about this very important vote.
  Throughout my Congressional career, I have believed that the United 
States must lead in foreign affairs. In doing so, our foreign policy 
must reinforce and promote our own core values of democracy, free 
markets, human rights, and the rule of law. And, I am not at all 
ashamed to say that our most important export to the international 
community is our ideals and our ideas.
  The first U.S. President I remember as a child is Dwight D. 
Eisenhower. We know that he ran for President because of his strong 
belief that the United States needed to lead in the world. He believed 
that by leading and by being involved in the world--and not isolated 
from it--we would have the best chance of guaranteeing peace, freedom, 
and stability. As President Eisenhower said in his January 1961 
farewell address:

       America's leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon 
     our unmatched material progress, riches and military 
     strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of 
     world peace and human betterment.

  He understood that we have a moral obligation, as the leader of the 
Free World, to use our power to promote freedom and stability and to 
help alleviate suffering around the globe. And in that process, he 
understood the importance and the necessity of working with our 
partners through organizations, such as NATO.
  And though it is vital that we be engaged in world affairs and work 
with other nations whenever possible, ultimately we cannot escape the 
fact that when the world looks for leadership, it can look to only one 
place--and that place is, of course, the United States of America.
  History has put us here. And, if the United States does not lead, 
there is no one else who can lead--and frankly, no one else who will 
lead.
  That is why, in the 1980s, when I was in the House of 
Representatives, I supported efforts to establish stability and 
democracy in Central America. The United States led--and it made a 
difference. Significant progress was made in Central America. 
Democracies emerged.
  And, significant progress was made throughout the Western Hemisphere. 
In 1981, 16 of the 33 countries in our hemisphere were ruled by 
authoritarian regimes. Today, all but one of those nations--Cuba--have 
democratically elected heads of government.
  They are certainly not all perfect and maybe those nations don't 
conform exactly with how we see democracy, but they certainly are 
better off than they were 25 years ago.
  The United States led. It made a difference. It paid off.
  That is why, throughout my career, I have supported U.S. leadership 
efforts--efforts to export our democratic values to other areas of the 
world,

[[Page S10297]]

using tools, such as foreign trade and foreign aid.
  Speaking of foreign aid, though I wasn't in Congress at the time, I 
supported U.S. leadership through NAFTA. I voted in favor of Trade 
Promotion Authority to give the President fast track or enhanced 
trading abilities with our global partners. I voted in favor of the 
Andean Trade Preferences Act to expand the economic benefits of trade 
with the nations of the Andean region. I voted in favor of the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act and the expanded Caribbean Basin Initiative. 
And, I support efforts to negotiate free trade agreements within our 
Western Hemisphere.
  All of these efforts require strong U.S. leadership. So, too, does an 
underutilized tool of our foreign policy--and that is foreign aid.
  First, we don't utilize it enough. Currently, our foreign assistance 
budget comprises less than one percent of our overall budget, and is 
barely 0.1 percent of our Gross Domestic Product.
  Second, we aren't creative enough with the limited resources we do 
have in our foreign assistance budget. And so, here, too, the United 
States needs to lead.
  There are things we can do with this assistance. We can and we must 
do more to help end suffering throughout the world. We can and we must 
do more to help alleviate the worldwide AIDS pandemic. We can and we 
must do more to feed starving children worldwide. We can and must do 
more to help implement the rule of law in developing democracies. We 
can and we must do more to foster agricultural and economic development 
in poverty-stricken, disease-ridden, war-ravaged parts of our world. 
And, as the leader of the Free World, we also have a moral obligation 
to bring stability and peace to volatile, violent regions around the 
globe.
  Candidly, sometimes the only way to do that is through the use of our 
military. That's why I supported military action in Bosnia in 1995 and 
in Kosovo in 1999. The simple reality is that the job could not get 
done without U.S. leadership. We had to go in. We had to lead. It was 
the right thing to do, and we did it.
  And so, Mr. President, it may seem paradoxical now that I have found 
the decision concerning this Resolution to be very, very difficult. It 
is difficult, I believe, principally for two reasons.
  Let me outline them for the Senate.
  First, the resolution before us is an authorization of force to be 
used by the President--at his discretion--at some point in the future. 
It is not a declaration of war. And, it does not say that war will take 
place.
  But, it does authorize the President ``to use the Armed Forces of the 
United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order 
to: Defend the national security of the United States against the 
continuing threat posed by Iraq; and enforce all relevant United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq.''
  While unusual, this type of resolution is not without precedent. 
Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, which said this:

       Congress approves and supports the determination of the 
     President as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary 
     measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the 
     United States and to prevent further aggression.

  I went back to the Congressional Record of 1964 and read some of 
Senator Gruening's and Senator Morse's remarks to get a better 
understanding of why they dissented--why they voted against this 
resolution. I also read comments from those who voted ``yes.''
  However, it is noteworthy that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was not 
the first time Congress had passed a resolution to give the President 
the authority to use force--at his discretion--at some point in the 
future. Actually, Congress passed two such resolutions during the 
Eisenhower Administration: one in 1955 regarding Formosa and one in 
1957 regarding the Middle East.
  So while there is precedent, this type of resolution to grant the 
President the authority to use force, at his discretion, at some point 
in the future, is certainly unusual, and so we have an obligation to 
treat this matter with great caution. Granting the President this kind 
of power is indeed a very grave matter.
  The second reason this decision, for me, has been so difficult is 
that the consequences of war would be so serious. A possible war 
against Iraq would have very real and very serious consequences, many 
of them unforeseen today.
  I believe the American people need to understand this. My colleague, 
Senator Biden, who preceded me, made that point very well. I believe we 
have an obligation during this debate to explain to the American people 
what war with Iraq might mean. We have an obligation to be brutally 
frank in telling the American people about these consequences of war.
  What are they? What are the risks of war with Iraq?
  First, Saddam Hussein may very well use chemical and biological 
weapons against our troops. If we went to war, we would be attempting 
to remove Saddam from power. Therefore, unlike the Persian Gulf war, 
this time he is likely to actually use those chemical and biological 
weapons against our troops, or at least attempt to.
  Second, we know that war with Iraq dramatically increases the 
possibility of attacks against United States troops stationed in other 
places abroad and United States civilians throughout the world.
  Third, we know that war with Iraq increases the possibility of 
attacks against Americans right here at home, in our mainland.
  This has already been read on the floor and discussed, but I would 
like to read to my colleagues some information recently declassified by 
the CIA. In a letter to Senator Graham dated October 7--Monday of this 
week--the CIA released the following:

       Baghdad, for now, appears to be drawing a line short of 
     conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or biological 
     weapons against the United States.
       Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no 
     longer be deterred, he probably would become much less 
     constrained in adopting terrorist actions. Such terrorism 
     might involve conventional means, as with Iraq's unsuccessful 
     attempt at a terrorist offensive in 1991, or [through] 
     chemical or biological weapons.
       Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting 
     Islamist terrorists in conducting a weapons of mass 
     destruction attack against the United States would be his 
     last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of 
     victims with him.

  This information is certainly chilling.
  We also know that war with Iraq increases the likelihood that Saddam 
will launch Scud missiles against Israel, this time maybe with 
biological or chemical agents attached to the missiles. In fact, Iraq 
has admitted to the weaponization of thousands of liters of anthrax, 
botulinim toxin, and aflatoxin for use with Scud warheads, aerial 
bombs, and aircraft.
  Furthermore, if attacked, what would Israel do? Would Israel, this 
time, retaliate? In the Persian Gulf war, Israel held back, but would 
they this time? And if they did not, in such a scenario, what would 
other countries do? What would Syria do, for example? What are the 
chances of the entire Middle East literally going up in flames?
  At the conclusion of a war with Iraq--we would win the war; we know 
that--but at the conclusion of a war with Iraq, there very well may be 
bloody, fractious battles among the different ethnic groups residing in 
Iraq. Pent up hostilities among Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds--just to 
mention a few--would be difficult to restrain, easily resulting in 
families warring against families and neighbors against neighbors, all 
fighting village to village and house to house. And there simply would 
not be enough United States troops or allies you could place into Iraq 
to stop that from happening.
  What are the unintended global consequences of the United States 
using preemptive action? How does this change the dynamics of the 
world? What would it mean for the India-Pakistan nuclear standoff? What 
would it mean for China and Taiwan? Would these nations be less 
restrained in using preemptive strikes? These are questions to which we 
do not know the answers.
  Finally, what will Iraq look like after the war? What kind of 
humanitarian assistance will be needed? How many people will we have to 
feed? What is our plan now for reconstruction? What does it cost? Who 
will help? What other countries will we be able to involve in helping 
us?
  We can expect to pay for a large part of this. And we can expect our 
troops

[[Page S10298]]

to be involved for an extended, indefinite period of time--not days, 
not months, but years. And there could be no doubt about that.
  So, yes, Mr. President, there are grave consequences of going to war 
with Iraq. We cannot predict the future. We do not know exactly how 
Saddam would react. But it is vital that the American people understand 
the sobering reality of a war with Iraq; that all Americans understand 
the uncertainty and the risks and the dire consequences.
  Yet we also know that inaction is not a choice when it comes to the 
situation in Iraq. Inaction is just not a choice. We know the status 
quo is unacceptable. We know things have languished too long. We know 
Saddam Hussein's regime is in possession of chemical and biological 
weapons. And we know they are working, as frantically as they can, to 
develop nuclear weapons.
  The fear is, also, that Saddam Hussein would eventually put these 
weapons into the hands of other terrorist groups, terrorist groups such 
as al-Qaida, terrorist groups that have no qualms about targeting U.S. 
citizens anywhere in the world, terrorist groups that have networks 
already established around the world. When that handoff would be made, 
the consequences would be unbelievable.
  President Bush made very clear in his speech on Monday night in 
Cincinnati:

       Saddam Hussein is a threat to peace, and he must disarm.

  So I commend President Bush for putting Iraq back on the world stage 
in his very forceful speech at the United Nations. He has taken Saddam 
Hussein's evil regime by the throat and dragged it back in front of the 
eyes of the international community. And he has forced the United 
Nations to confront Saddam's rampant and flagrant disregard of 10 
years' worth of U.N. Security Council resolutions. He has forced the 
U.N. to confront its failure to enforce past resolutions regarding 
weapons inspections. And, rightly so, President Bush has forced both 
the U.N. and our own country to confront this global threat and to deal 
with it. I commend the President for his leadership.
  None of us in this body disagrees about what Saddam Hussein is. We 
know he is a power-hungry dictator, the embodiment of pure evil. The 
litany, ably recited here day after day, detailing Hussein's thirst for 
power, is by no means exaggerated, nor is it understated. And there is 
simply no logic to his actions. Just think back to his attempt to 
assassinate former President Bush shortly after President Clinton took 
office. Even in his perverse view of the world, what in the world could 
that have accomplished from his point of view?
  Clearly, Saddam is ruthless. He is diabolical. He is a cold-blooded 
killer. He has launched Scud missiles against his neighbors. He has 
diverted much of the $10 billion worth of goods now entering Iraq every 
year--money he gets from oil--he has diverted that money he is supposed 
to use for humanitarian purposes, to help his own people, to develop 
weapons of mass destruction.
  He has murdered his own people. He has killed or injured more than 
20,000 Kurds with mustard gas and sarin.
  In short, Saddam is a 20th century Adolf Hitler, straddling 21st 
century weapons of mass destruction. No one in this body disagrees 
Saddam Hussein is an evil despot, but reasonable people can still 
disagree about our policy for disarming Hussein; reasonable people can 
disagree with the wording of the resolution we are debating; reasonable 
people can disagree about the timing; and reasonable people can 
disagree about how we proceed at the United Nations.
  This is a very difficult decision. There are very legitimate issues 
of controversy.
  Yes, the costs will be high, very high, if we go to war. Again, that 
is why this decision has for me been so very difficult. It is the most 
serious vote I have cast in the 8 years I have been in the Senate.
  None of us take the gravity of this vote lightly. Over the last 
several weeks I have spent many hours in Intelligence Committee 
hearings and briefings and other briefings gathering as much 
intelligence and information as humanly possible. I have met with 
numerous current and former high-ranking officials from the military, 
the CIA, the State Department. I met personally with President Bush.
  At the end of the day, we still must weigh all of the costs and all 
of the consequences of a potential war with Iraq against the potential 
for peace and stability and lives saved that will come with the 
disarmament of Saddam Hussein.
  Let's be honest, though. The fact is, the ghost of the 1964 Gulf of 
Tonkin resolution haunts this Chamber, just as the tragedy of Vietnam 
and the over 58,000 U.S. lives that were lost hang heavy in the heart 
of America. We should be haunted by the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, and 
we should be haunted and troubled by the Vietnam war.
  However, it is instructive, as I mentioned earlier, to remember that 
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was not the first time Congress gave the 
President the authority to commit U.S. Armed Forces at his discretion 
at some time in the future.
  In January 1955, when Dwight Eisenhower was President, the Chinese 
Communists were threatening to take over the Chinese nationalists in 
Formosa. It was a very serious time in our history. Believing that the 
time had come to draw the line--those are President Eisenhower's 
words--to draw the line and hold back the Communist aggression, 
President Eisenhower asked Congress to pass a resolution giving him the 
authority ``to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems 
necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa 
against armed attack.''
  Congress granted President Eisenhower this authority with an 
overwhelming vote, 410 to 3 in the House, and 85 to 3 in the Senate. 
Later President Eisenhower said that while he went to Congress for 
several reasons, his real reason was ``to serve notice on the 
Communists that they are not going to be able to get away with it.''
  Because of that resolution, the Chinese Communists in 1955 did not 
act. War was avoided. There have been problems. There have been 
tensions ever since. But war at that crucial time was avoided.
  By passing the Formosa resolution, Congress sent a clear, unequivocal 
signal to the Chinese Communists that the United States would defend 
Formosa, that Congress would support President Eisenhower, and that our 
country was, in fact, united.
  It is instructive that during that debate, there was an attempt in 
the Senate, in the Congress, to change the wording and to be more 
specific and to mention President Eisenhower, in defending Formosa, had 
the specific authority to defend Quemoy and Matsu, two little islands 
close to mainland China, far away from Formosa, but controlled by 
Formosa at the time. President Eisenhower said, no, do not do that; do 
not be that specific in the resolution.

  President Eisenhower was looking for the authorization to protect 
Formosa, but he also wanted the discretion to decide how to do it. And 
he also did not want to tell the Communist Chinese exactly what he 
would do.
  With the flexibility and discretion to use force as he deemed 
necessary, President Eisenhower left the Communists guessing about the 
ways in which the United States would act, but they had no doubt that 
we would act.
  That is why I believe we must pass the resolution before us. We need 
a tough resolution that gives the President the authority he needs to 
disarm Saddam Hussein. We need a tough resolution that also gives the 
President flexibility and discretion. We have that before us. We need a 
tough resolution that does not tie the President's hands.
  Through the resolution before us, this Senate and this Congress is 
saying to Saddam Hussein that he is on notice. Saddam Hussein, we are 
saying, you are not going to be able to flagrantly disregard U.N. 
Security Council resolutions any more. You are not going to be able to 
get away with building weapons of mass destruction. You are not going 
to be able to threaten our lives and the lives of our children and the 
lives of our grandchildren and the peace and security of the world.
  In the final analysis, we are left with the sober realization that 
when it comes to Saddam Hussein, there really are no good choices. When 
it comes to him, lives are being lost in his own

[[Page S10299]]

country now, and many more could be lost around the world in the future 
if we allow him to continue his weapons of mass destruction obsession. 
Left unrestrained, Saddam Hussein will only become more dangerous, more 
diabolical, and certainly more deadly.
  So I believe when you weigh the risk of action versus the risk of 
inaction, we, as the leader of the free world, simply have a moral 
obligation to act. As I already said, we simply cannot, as a nation, 
escape the fact that when the world looks for leadership, it can look 
to only one place today. That place is the United States of America.
  We have an obligation to lead the efforts to disarm Saddam Hussein. 
In the process, we may tragically end up at war with Iraq. But my 
prayer, my prayer is that by passing this resolution, we will not have 
to go to war against Iraq. My prayer is that congressional unity will 
signal to Saddam Hussein and to the international community that we do, 
in fact, mean business.
  My hope is we can get a tough new U.N. Security Council resolution 
passed, giving weapons inspectors unfettered access to every mile, 
every square foot, every inch of Iraq. We increase the chances for 
peace by telling Saddam Hussein and his evil regime that our Nation is 
united and that we do, in fact, speak with one voice. We increase the 
chances for peace by giving the President the strongest possible hand, 
while at the same time giving him flexibility.
  Finally, I must say I am convinced President George Bush will do 
absolutely everything he can to avoid war.
  Mr. President, I do not know if war can be avoided, but I do know if 
we are serious about disarming Saddam Hussein of his weapons of mass 
destruction, our best chance of avoiding war is through the passage of 
a tough resolution. That is why I will vote in favor of this 
resolution.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, before I give my speech, I commend my 
friend, the Senator from Ohio, Senator DeWine, for a very thoughtful 
presentation this evening. He and I have had many discussions about how 
difficult this decision has been for both of us. We have reached many 
of the same conclusions. But I just want to salute him for a very 
thoughtful and thorough analysis of the resolution and the challenges 
before us.
  The decision to authorize the use of military force is the most 
significant vote that a Member of the Senate can ever cast. The 
Constitution clearly vests this responsibility in Congress, a duty that 
rests heavily on the shoulders of each and every Member.
  As a Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I am keenly aware 
of the sacrifices and dangers faced by our young men and women in the 
military. They are ready to answer the call to combat, ready to fight 
the war against terrorism, ready to defend our freedoms around the 
globe.
  In the wake of the attacks on our country on September 11, the Senate 
vote to authorize the war against terrorism was rapid, unanimous, and 
clear-cut. By contrast, whether to authorize the use of military force 
against Iraq is a far more difficult and complex question. It requires 
a thorough analysis of the nature and urgency of the threat and an 
evaluation of all possible responses.
  As a member of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, 
and the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security and 
Proliferation, I have received many briefings on the dangers posed by 
lawless regimes in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea during the past 5 years. 
And during the past 2 months, I have attended several highly 
classified, in-depth briefings on Iraq from the CIA, the National 
Security Agency, the Department of Defense, the State Department, and 
the White House. I have questioned the experts--I have questioned them 
closely--including former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and 
former National Security Adviser Samuel Berger, as well as Secretary 
Rumsfeld, at public hearings before the Armed Services Committee.

  I have read studies and assessments, both classified and public, 
conducted by the administration, the British Joint Intelligence 
Committee, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and many 
others. I talked at length with Secretary Colin Powell about the 
appropriate strategy to respond to Iraq's development of weapons of 
mass destruction.
  Let me first discuss my conclusions about the nature and the extent 
of the threat posed by the Iraqi regime and its continued defiance of 
the United Nations resolutions. In 1991, Iraq accepted a cease-fire 
agreement in the form of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
678, to end the gulf war. The Iraqi regime was required to 
unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless 
under international supervision of all of its chemical and biological 
agents.
  In addition, the resolution prohibited Iraq from acquiring or 
developing nuclear weapons and required the destruction of all 
ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers. From a 
series of Iraqi declarations to the U.N. subsequent to this resolution, 
we know that Iraq, by its own admission, had by 1991 produced thousands 
of tons of deadly chemical weapons, such as mustard gas, sarin, and VX, 
as well as very large quantities of biological agents, including 
anthrax and ricin. Most experts believe Iraq's declarations grossly 
understated the true sense of its chemical and biological programs. But 
even the admitted amounts were sufficient to kill hundreds of thousands 
of people.
  For a time in the 1990s, the U.N. inspectors succeeded in destroying 
quantities of these weapons, as well as the associated production 
facilities, ballistic missiles, and much of the infrastructure for 
Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Subsequently, however, the Iraqi 
regime's harassment, obstruction, and deception made it impossible for 
the inspectors to continue their work, and they were withdrawn.
  At the time they left in 1998, the inspectors were unable to account 
for very large discrepancies between the weapons that were declared and 
the amounts that were destroyed. For example, at least 1.5 tons of the 
deadly nerve agent VX were unaccounted for. Just under 10 milligrams of 
VX can cause a quick and painful death.
  The CIA has concluded all key aspects of Iraq's offensive biological 
and chemical weapons program, including research and development, 
production and weaponization, are active and, in some cases, larger and 
more advanced than before the gulf war.
  In addition to the weapons unaccounted for in the post-gulf war 
inspections, there is significant evidence that since 1998, Saddam has 
expanded his stockpile of chemical and biological weapons; rebuilt and 
expanded manufacturing sites, including mobile biological production 
facilities; developed more effective delivery systems, such as unmanned 
drones; and sought to procure materials for a nuclear bomb.
  The reports demonstrating Iraq's violation of U.N. resolutions are 
numerous, compelling, and indisputable. They are based on the findings 
of U.N. weapons inspectors, credible reports from Iraqi defectors, 
sophisticated surveillance equipment, and other strong evidence.
  Even more troubling is the evidence compiled by the American and 
British intelligence agencies that Iraq has converted its L-29 jet 
trainers to allow them to be used as unmanned aerial vehicles, capable 
of delivering chemical and biological agents over a large area.
  While the evidence of Iraq's pursuit of biological and chemical 
weapons is overwhelming, it is more difficult to determine the state of 
Iraq's development of nuclear weapons. Numerous reports suggest, 
however, a renewed determination by Saddam Hussein to obtain the 
materials for a nuclear bomb.
  A September report by the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies paints a chilling picture of Saddam's quest for nuclear 
weapons. Had the gulf war not intervened, Iraq ``could have accumulated 
a nuclear stockpile of a dozen or so weapons by the end of the 
decade,'' according to the report.
  It further concludes that the scientific and technical expertise of 
Iraq's nuclear program remains intact, and the British Government has 
revealed that Iraqi nuclear personnel were ordered to resume work on 
nuclear projects in 1998.
  According to British intelligence, Iraq has also attempted to obtain 
uranium from Africa. This is extraordinarily troubling. Since Iraq has 
no

[[Page S10300]]

active civil nuclear power program or nuclear powerplants, it simply 
has no peaceful reason to attempt to secure uranium.
  In addition, the Iraqi Government has attempted to procure tens of 
thousands of high-strength aluminum tubes that could be used in 
centrifuges designed to enrich uranium to produce the fissile material 
necessary for a nuclear bomb.
  How soon could Iraq acquire nuclear weapons? The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that Iraq is probably years 
away from producing nuclear weapons if it has to rely on indigenously 
produced material. It points out if Iraq were to acquire nuclear 
material from a foreign source, the timeframe could be reduced to a 
matter of months.
  This is the scenario the institute calls the nuclear wild card. An 
independent assessment conducted by Professor Anthony Cordesman of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, confirms the growing 
threat posed by Iraq. The professor states that Saddam Hussein seeks 
weapons to offset American superiority and high-tech weaponry. In other 
words, while the United States has developed conventional weapons to be 
as surgical as possible and to limit unintended casualties, Iraq 
develops its weapons to be as blunt and as destructive as possible, to 
instill fear in its enemies and its neighbors.
  In short, Saddam Hussein has continued to develop a stockpile of the 
deadliest chemical and biological agents known to mankind and has 
continued to seek nuclear weapons in defiance of his international 
obligations.
  The more difficult question is whether the growing and serious threat 
posed by Saddam Hussein is sufficiently imminent to warrant the 
authorization of a military strike by the United States and its allies 
should diplomatic means of disarming Iraq fail.
  The President correctly noted in his recent speech that the passage 
of this authorization does not mean that war is imminent and 
unavoidable. In fact, the resolution before us represents a 
considerable improvement over the administration's earlier draft which 
I would have opposed because of its insufficient emphasis on pursuing 
diplomatic means first and working through the United Nations Security 
Council.
  The bipartisan resolution, by contrast, specifically requires a 
Presidential determination that further reliance on diplomatic or other 
peaceful means alone would not adequately protect our national security 
or lead to the enforcement of the relevant U.N. resolutions. But 
nevertheless, the difficult question remains of whether the threat is 
so urgent that a military strike may be required and should be 
authorized by this resolution.
  The evidence of Saddam's massive buildup of the most dangerous 
weapons is compelling, but as Mr. Berger pointed out in his testimony 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the threat is not defined 
by capability alone. We have to probe Saddam Hussein's intentions, as 
well as his capability, to determine the threat. In that regard, if, as 
Shakespeare tells us, the past is prolog, the history of Saddam's 
regime gives us great cause for concern.
  While none of us can predict for certain whether or when Saddam would 
strike, there are simply far too many warning signs in his past 
behavior and in his present undertakings. His coldblooded willingness 
to use chemical weapons against his own people, as well as his enemies; 
his aggressive invasion of two nations; his blatant defiance of 
international sanctions; his continued efforts to procure the materials 
to build a nuclear bomb; and his determined progress to develop a more 
effective means of delivering chemical and biological weapons all 
strongly suggest an intention and an ability to use these weapons.

  As the assessment of the British Government states, the evidence 
shows that Saddam Hussein does not regard these weapons of mass 
destruction as only weapons of last resort. He is ready to use them and 
determined to retain them. In fact, British intelligence reports that 
some of the weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use 
them.
  The history of Saddam Hussein's rule over Iraq is a history of war 
and aggression against his enemies, his neighbors, and his own people. 
Throughout the decade of the 1980s, Saddam Hussein used chemical 
weapons to kill thousands of civilians, and Iraq has the means, through 
billions of dollars in oil revenues, to continue to develop, procure, 
or steal the materials necessary for its weapons.
  The risks are simply too catastrophic for the world to allow Iraq to 
continue on its present course, but is a military response the only 
answer?
  From the beginning of this debate, I have emphasized my belief that 
military force must be the last resort, not the first alternative. 
Today I still hold out the hope that military action will not prove 
necessary to disarm this dangerous regime. A strong United Nations 
resolution to compel Iraq to declare its weapons and to accept 
unfettered, rigorous inspections may well be successful in convincing 
Saddam that he must disarm.
  I believe our policy should be focused on disarming Iraq rather than 
on regime change, much as I would like Saddam Hussein to be deposed.
  In making what has been a very difficult decision, I was persuaded 
ultimately to support this resolution by an extensive discussion with 
Secretary Powell. He has convinced me the process for effective action 
by the United Nations to disarm Iraq depends on the credible threat of 
the use of force, and that is the reason ultimately that I will decide 
to cast my vote in favor of this resolution.
  Secretary Powell told me his ability to secure a strong resolution 
from the U.N. Security Council will be strengthened enormously by a 
strong, bipartisan congressional vote for this authorization.
  Similarly, as Secretary Schlesinger testified, the greater degree to 
which the President and the Congress are united in purpose with respect 
to Iraq, the greater is the likelihood the United Nations will take a 
firm and appropriate stand toward Iraq.
  Only if Saddam understands we are prepared to use military force will 
a peaceful means of disarming him have any chance to succeed. All 
Americans share the goal of eliminating this threat without war, but we 
differ on how to achieve that goal.
  In my view, there are times in dealing with a tyrant when the best, 
indeed perhaps the only, chance to avoid war is to express, in 
unmistakable terms, our willingness to wage it. And this is one of 
those times.
  Some understandably ask: Why now? Has not our current policy 
contained Saddam?
  It has, only if allowing him to acquire the capability to kill and 
destroy on a scale that far exceeds his past efforts means that we have 
contained him. No, the truth is we have not really contained Saddam. We 
have largely ignored him, a strategy that simply delays the inevitable 
while the stakes grow ever higher.
  The reason we must deal with this threat now is both clear, 
convincing, and chilling. Given Saddam's insatiable desire to possess 
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, this danger will not 
disappear on its own, and the price we may have to pay today to 
eliminate this threat will prove modest compared to the price we will 
have to pay tomorrow.
  As difficult as the decision to authorize military action is, one 
need only consider how much more difficult it will be when Saddam has a 
nuclear bomb.
  Finally, let me emphasize my strong belief that the United States 
should act in concert with our allies, as we pursue a new Security 
Council resolution, or in the event we have to resort to military 
force. While the United States must always retain the right to defend 
itself, our prospects for dealing effectively with the Iraqi threat, 
our standing in the community of nations, and our ability to continue 
to wage an effective global effort against terrorism depend on our 
forging a multilateral coalition.
  The President deserves great credit for putting together a coalition 
of some 90 nations to combat terrorism. That same kind of effort must 
be devoted to building a coalition to confront and disarm the Iraqi 
regime.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada has the floor.

[[Page S10301]]

  Mr. REID. On the continuing saga of speeches, there have been a 
couple of changes. Senator Cantwell will speak in place of Senator 
Harkin for 10 minutes. Instead of 30 minutes, Senator Schumer will 
speak for 25 minutes, and Senator Specter will speak for 30 minutes 
rather than 45 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I want to make a very brief comment. I 
thought Senator Collins' and Senator DeWine's statements were 
outstanding. They are to be congratulated. I think it added a great 
deal to this debate and discussion.
  I do not object to the change in the lineup.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise in support of the resolution before 
the Senate. There is no more serious vote we as Senators take than to 
authorize war. To do so, we must believe that there is great cause--a 
great threat to America. I cast my vote today with the great hope that 
this show of unity from the American Government and from the American 
people, along with the actions of the international community, will 
achieve our stated goal of disarming Iraq without war.
  I will vote for this authorization because, after great 
consideration, I believe Saddam Hussein's acquisition of weapons of 
mass destruction is a great threat. I believe disarming Saddam is a 
great cause. And I believe that moving to disarm Saddam--in concert 
with the international community--is the President's great goal.
  There is no doubt that the threat Saddam Hussein and his weapons pose 
to this country and to world peace is real. More than a decade has 
passed since we defeated Saddam, but he has not changed. He is the same 
repressive dictator, willing to overrun his neighbors, and to use 
weapons of mass destruction against his own people.
  We know that Saddam's regime has produced and is continuing to 
produce massive quantities of biological and chemical agents. We know 
much less about his current nuclear capabilities. But there can be no 
doubt that he is doing everything in his power to acquire nuclear 
weapons.
  While there is good reason to believe that Saddam Hussein is not 
interested in jeopardizing his hold on power, we cannot predict what 
Saddam will do with these capabilities should he have them. The best we 
can do is to rely on the past as a guide to what the future may hold. 
And, the future is now colored by the events of September 11 and the 
subsequent anthrax attacks of last year. These have given us a 
disturbing glimpse at a possible worst case scenario. Given Saddam 
Hussein's track record--his ejection of weapons inspectors and his 
murderous ways--I believe the security of our nation depends on 
disarming Iraq and containing this regime notorious for its deceptions 
and ruthlessness.

  Let me be clear on that point. My vote today is a vote for 
disarmament, not a vote for regime change. While it is clear that Iraq 
is a rogue regime of the worst kind, going into overthrow it would be 
enormously destabilizing. There are many repressive governments around 
the world, some of which have access to weapons of mass destruction. 
There are many ruthless and aggressive nations around the world that 
have threatened their neighbors. Yet, we cannot be the world's 
policeman, offering to make the world safe by eliminating each and 
every tyrant. Should the President choose to use force against Iraq, it 
should be for the purpose of ensuring unfettered weapons inspections 
and full disarmament. If Saddam Hussein no longer rules as a result of 
our actions, then I say--find--but for us to take action with the 
primary purpose of overthrowing the Iraqi government would be wrong.
  The President has vowed to seek the support of the international 
community against Iraq, and my vote today is cast accepting and 
supporting that position fully. I Believe we should not commit U.S. 
troops abroad without the support of the international community. The 
costs are too great for us to take unilateral action unless we have no 
other choice. International involvement will strengthen our hand 
against Saddam Hussein, increasing the likelihood that we will be able 
to resume inspections and disarm Iraq.
  In order for the President to use force, the resolution requires the 
President to make a formal determination that relying on diplomatic and 
peaceful means will not adequately protect our national security, or 
lead to the enforcement of U.N. Security Council resolutions. I am 
confident that this administration is doing everything in its power to 
engage the international community, and to work with our allies to 
contain Iraq. I am comforted to see the Administration working with the 
United Nations on a stronger resolution. The President has rightly 
challenged the U.N. to put some teeth in the Security Council 
resolutions which have been flouted by Iraq, and he has given the 
international community notice that there must be accountability for 
the U.N. resolutions to have any meaning.
  Mr. President, my vote today is a vote to support the President in 
his efforts to disarm Saddam Hussein. My vote is not an endorsement of 
a policy of preemptive war, whether it is initiated by the United 
States or any other country. My vote today is to authorize the 
President to gather a world force against the threat of a dangerous 
regime armed with chemical, biological, and possibly nuclear weapons, 
and to disarm that regime. And finally, my vote today is to authorize 
the President to go to war, in the hope that this strong statement of 
our commitment to disarming Iraq will enable us to do so without war.
  Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that the time be charged to Senator 
Cantwell.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Following Senator Schumer is Senator Specter. Senator 
Schumer is here and I ask unanimous consent that he be next in order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from New York.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I am honored to be part of this historic 
debate. Before I get into the substance of my remarks, I thank all of 
my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for their excellent debate. I 
have listened to a great deal of it. This is how the Senate ought to 
work and ought to be. This is a fine day for the Senate.
  Today we are faced with the most solemn decision a lawmaker can make: 
whether or not to authorize the use of military force. I approach this 
decision with caution, deliberation, and seriousness.
  As is our tradition, there has been a great debate on this issue over 
the last 2 months. We have discussed multiple strategies for dealing 
with Saddam Hussein, and advanced many arguments for and against the 
use of military force. Some of these remain under consideration, others 
have been wisely tabled.
  For example, the President's original plan of not consulting Congress 
or the United Nations has thankfully been abandoned.
  In considering our next step, I have spent considerable time 
listening to experts, attending briefings, talking with constituents, 
and even praying to arrive at a sound conclusion.
  I believe that there are two points--one on each side, standing in 
equipoise--that focus my attention, and that embody the tension felt by 
all of us.
  On the one hand, going to war is the most serious, even awesome 
decision--awesome in the biblical sense of angels trembling before 
God--that a lawmaker is called on to make.
  Invasion means that thousands of our sons and daughters, the flowers 
of their generation, will be put in immediate harm's way should we 
invade.
  I have an 18-year-old daughter, who along with her sister is the joy 
of my life. When I think of thousands of young people her age who have 
volunteered to serve, and of the previous generations of Americans who 
have willingly laid down their lives in past wars, and to whom we are 
eternally grateful, I am filled with awe and dread.
  Poised against the solemnity of war is the fact that a major, if not 
the primary function of government is to secure the safety of its 
people--to protect the citizenry from threats, both foreign and 
domestic.
  Discharging this responsibility is the very essence of a state and, 
if a real danger exists, the government has a

[[Page S10302]]

solemn obligation to protect its citizenry.
  These two looming issues push and pull against one another and yield 
the ultimate question we debate today` Does Saddam Hussein threaten the 
citizenry of America to the point that we must now consider the 
unthinkable option of authorizing war in order to protect ourselves?
  Saddam Hussein is an evil man, a dictator who oppresses his people 
and flouts the mandate of the international community.
  While this behavior is reprehensible, it is Hussein's vigorous 
pursuit of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, and his present 
and potential future support for terrorist acts and organizations, that 
make him a terrible danger to the people to the United States.
  If our other efforts to thwart the threat posed by Hussein do not 
work, is war justified? If justified, how long can we leave Hussein 
alone before we need to act?
  The struggle for these answers come in a brand new context. Our's is 
a brave new post 9/11 world, a time and place where things are 
different and more dangerous than before, much as we wish they weren't.
  Those who would use terror--or those who would aid and abet that 
terror--pose a new danger to every one of us living in the United 
States, whether in midtown Manhattan or the wheat fields of Kansas.
  I have seen firsthand the devastation that comes from being 
unprepared and unprotected. On September 12, I peered into the dark and 
smoky crater at the World Trade Center with horror, an image that still 
burns in my memory. I have met with the families of victims and heard 
about their losses, and shed tears over the evil and mendacity of our 
enemies.
  I know it is my solemn obligation to do everything I can to ensure 
that my city, State, and country never again endure such an atrocity. 
Yet, at the same time, I know that war must be our last resort.
  When I consider that Hussein could either use or give to terrorists 
weapons of mass destruction--biological, chemical or nuclear--and that 
he might just be made enough to do it--I find, after careful research, 
the answer to my question: we cannot afford to leave him alone over the 
next 5 or even 3 years.
  I say this with caution and worry. But I have searched my mind and my 
soul and cannot escape this conclusion: Saddam Hussein left unfettered 
will at some point create such a danger to our lives that we cannot 
afford to leave him be.
  In the post 9/11 world, inaction is not an option: at some point, 
Hussein must be de-fanged.
  The question is how and when?
  Do we mobilize our military for battle? Do we take pains to ensure 
that other possible options are exhausted first? I say yes to both--
proceed on parallel tracks: prepared for the worst and work toward, and 
pray for, the best; empower the President to act to protect our 
national security but hope it will not be necessary.
  Let me first address the question of how by making three points.
  One, we must certainly try less costly, less ultimate options before 
we choose the last resort, war.
  Our first option must be working with our allies at the United 
Nations to secure a strict resolution that will compel Saddam Hussein 
to disarm and submit to unlimited and unrestricted inspections.
  The administration believes a unified Congress that authorizes the 
President to wage war will importune the United Nations to take the 
kind of vigorous and unified action that has eluded that body for the 
last 11 years: real inspections, real sanctions, real threats of 
military force. I hope and pray they are right.
  Let me repeat: inspections and sanctions backed by the threat of 
military force. These must come first. These are the reasons to favor 
this resolution.
  And if after exhausting these options, Saddam Hussein remains a 
threat, I believe other nations will support and follow us as we pursue 
the last option, war.
  Working cooperatively with our allies in the United Nations must be a 
paramount priority for us all. We need their help not simply to force 
effective disarmament in Iraq; they are also key players in an historic 
fight--the war on terror.
  They provide us with intelligence to protect ourselves from future 
attack; they permit us to pursue our enemies in foreign lands so that 
our foes know that they have no haven from justice; and they cooperate 
to help us choke off terrorists' financial support.
  Without their help and co-operation, the war on terror would be much 
more difficult to wage. Therefore, their support for our efforts on 
Iraq is essential for our safety as a nation.
  This new resolution puts far more emphasis on international 
cooperation first and is a substantial improvement over what the 
President originally proposed.
  Unfortunately, time and again, Hussein has shown that the only 
language he understands is the language of power. By empowering the 
President to use force, we will send a message to both Hussein and the 
nations of the world that the threat of force is real and that we are 
serious about disarming him.
  Without this possibility, Hussein will never allow inspections, and 
the probability of more terror and horror will increase. A determined 
U.N., backed by the possibility of force, may finally convince Saddam 
Hussein to submit to the real inspections he has evaded for the last 11 
years.
  Second, should we go to war, the President must see to it that we 
don't lose vigilance in other aspects of the war on terror, apart form 
Iraq, both abroad and at home.
  Al-Qaida and other groups will continue to target our citizens; we 
must not let down our guard. Countries like Syria and Iran will 
continue to aid and abet terrorists; we must keep a watchful eye.
  The President and the Secretary of Defense have assured us that, if 
war become necessary, our military can launch a successful invasion of 
Iraq without compromising these efforts.
  In addition, if there is a war in Iraq, we must not let it diminish 
our efforts to make our homeland more secure--our airports, sea ports, 
rail lines, nuclear facilities, and our communications infrastructure 
all remain unacceptably vulnerable.
  I have been quite critical of the administration on this point and 
again urge them to refocus their efforts. We are about to spend 
billions of dollars to reduce threats abroad; we should spend a similar 
amount to safeguard ourselves at home.
  Third, the President must begin to pay attention to our economy. Up 
to this point, he has failed to do so. The American people are 
particularly nervous about our economic future and the prospect of war 
only deepens these fears. The President and Congress must address this 
issue immediately.
  People must have secure, family-supporting jobs, access to quality 
health care, and the ability to pay for necessities like college 
tuition and prescription drugs. Our epoque of prosperity has quickly 
given way to an era of uncertainty.
  I believe we can reverse that trend. Our Nation is big enough and 
strong enough to secure our safety abroad and increase our prosperity 
at home. I urge the President to pay equal attention to both causes, 
which he has not done up to now.
  As I have discussed, I believe at some point we will have to confront 
Saddam Hussein. We should coordinate with our allies in the United 
Nations; maintain focus on terrorist threats at home and abroad; and 
make a concerted effort to revive our economy.
  That is how our Government can secure the safety of its people.
  The second question is when to act. Evidence suggests that we 
probably have some time before the growing threat posed by Saddam 
Hussein would require military action. If I were President, I would not 
go to war now. My next step would be, as ours must be, to explore fully 
the compelling force of a determined United Nations.
  Given the President's recent statements of support for action through 
the U.N.; if he were to invade Iraq now after passage of the 
resolution, he would have completely misled Congress and the American 
people.
  As he said in Cincinnati on Monday.

       Approving this resolution does not mean that military 
     action is imminent or unavoidable. The resolution will tell 
     the United Nations, and all nations, that America speaks with 
     one voice and it is determined to make demands of the 
     civilized world mean something.


[[Page S10303]]


  I will, therefore, take the President at his word and do my very best 
to hold him to it.
  I realize the resolution before us would allow the President to act 
sooner than that. If I had drafted the resolution, it would surely have 
been different. However, if each of us insisted on our own resolution, 
we would have 535 resolutions, each with one vote, no concensus--only 
paralysis.
  In our post 9/11 world, there are no good choices, only less bad 
ones. As we move toward final passage, the choice before us is this 
resolution--imperfect as it is--or none at all.
  Saddam Hussein, his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the 
will he has shown to use them, makes the non-at-all option 
unacceptable.
  So I will vote for this resolution. More than anything else we can 
do, this resolution will show Hussein and nay naysayers in the United 
Nations that we are serious about this war on terrorism. We understand 
the challenges of this brave new world and we are prepared to meet 
them.
  We do not want to send our sons and daughters to war, yet we can 
never again find ourselves unprepared: the risks are far too great.
  Certainly action--any type of action--poses real danger and must be 
taken with great caution and concern. But sometimes doing nothing is 
riskier than acting. This is one of those moments.
  Therefore, I will cautiously cast my vote for the Lieberman 
resolution. I pray that we shall not have to use the awesome authority 
it grants.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, it cannot be repeated too often in the 
Chamber of the Senate, the gravity of the action which we are about to 
take. The House of Representatives has already considered and passed a 
similar resolution. For some time now it has been apparent the die has 
been cast.
  Of all of the constitutional responsibilities entrusted to Congress, 
the authority and responsibility to declare war is the most important. 
This will be the second most important vote which I will have cast in 
the 22 years I have had the privilege of serving in the Senate. The 
other vote was the authorization for the use of force against Iraq in 
1991. Now, the same situation confronts us because, albeit by 20/20 
hindsight, we did not finish the job in 1991.
  The question is: What course of action would be most likely to avoid 
violence--that is, an attack on the United States or other peaceful 
countries, or an attack on Iraq? The most desirable objective would be 
to achieve the disarmament of Iraq in accordance with the commitments 
which Iraq made at the conclusion of the Gulf War: to disarm; not to 
produce chemical or biological weapons, which Iraq has violated; and 
not to produce nuclear weapons. Iraq has been doing its utmost to 
create nuclear weapons.
  The coalition, which was formed in 1991 by then-President Bush, is 
the preferable way to go at the present time. We know Saddam Hussein is 
cruel, repressive, and evil. There are hardly sufficient adjectives in 
the lexicon to adequately describe his vicious character. That has long 
since been recognized and was the point of a resolution which this 
Senator introduced on March 3, 1998, to constitute a war crimes 
tribunal and to try Saddam Hussein as a war criminal because he had 
violated the basic laws against humanity. He had engaged in 
reprehensible conduct. That resolution passed the Senate by a vote of 
93 to 0 on March 13, 1998.

  Rather than take time to delineate all of his acts of barbarism and 
cruelty, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of this resolution be 
printed in the Congressional Record at the conclusion of my 
presentation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, all the rules have changed since 
September 11 of last year. We now know that in the United States, we 
are no longer invulnerable to attack by outside powers. The breadth of 
the Atlantic and the Pacific no longer protect us. We learned a very 
bitter lesson on September 11 that has to be taken into account in our 
current conduct.
  By 20/20 hindsight, it is apparent that we should have acted against 
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida long before September 11. Osama bin Laden 
was under indictment for killing Americans in Mogadishu in 1993. Osama 
bin Laden was later indicted for the embassy bombings in Africa in 
1998. We knew Osama bin Laden was implicated in the terrorism against 
the destroyer USS Cole. We knew Osama bin Laden had carried on a 
worldwide jihad aimed at the United States, and we have not yet 
determined the full extent of our knowledge of bin Laden. However, it 
is my personal view, having served as chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee of the 104th Congress, that had we put all of the so-called 
dots together on one screen, we would have had a virtual blueprint as 
to what al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden would do.
  Now we have the risk as to what to do about Saddam Hussein and what 
to do about Iraq. There is considerable unrest in the United States 
today about whatever course of action we take.
  In a series of town meetings for the last 3 months, I have had many 
constituents say to me: Why does the United States want to start a war? 
The United States has never started a war in the past. The United 
States has only finished wars. Certainly were it not for the experience 
on September 11 last year, I think we would not have considered 
preemptive action. However, the authorities and international law do 
contemplate action where there is a threat--a significant threat.
  Hugo Grotius, considered the father of international law, said in his 
1925 book ``The Law of War and Peace'' that a nation may use self-
defense in anticipation of attack when there is ``present danger.'' He 
said, ``It is lawful to kill him who is preparing to kill.''
  There is no doubt that there is present danger. Is Saddam Hussein 
preparing to attack the United States or other peace-loving nations? 
There is a real question as to why he would amass chemical weapons in 
great quantity, biological weapons in great quantity, delivery systems 
capable of reaching the United States, and search for nuclear weapons 
which we are not sure of, but he may be very close.
  Another foremost authority on international law, Elihu Root, said in 
1914 that international law did not require a nation to wait to use 
force in self-defense until it is too late to protect itself.
  This is the essential legal backdrop where we must consider what 
should be done. There are a number of alternatives we can take.
  First, we can do nothing--no resolution, no action--and simply let 
Saddam Hussein continue to flout his commitments made to the United 
Nations. However, my view is, after a lot of careful deliberation, 
analysis, and study, that the risk of inaction is worse than the risk 
of action. There are major risks in action.
  We have to consider what losses there will be on United States 
personnel, British personnel, or whoever may join us. We have to 
consider the risk to Israel, which is in the neighborhood of Iraq. Iraq 
is still at war with Israel. During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, some 
39 Scud missiles were rained down on Israel. While they have a missile 
defense system, it is not adequate to protect the whole nation. 
Notwithstanding that, Prime Minister Sharon has made public 
announcements that he endorses United States military action against 
Iraq.
  The risks of not doing anything may subject the United States to a 
repeat of September 11, which could be even more cataclysmic. We 
continue to worry about al-Qaida, which has shown a ruthless disregard 
for human life and the most barbaric kind of conduct. The risks with 
Saddam Hussein are comparable.
  Then how do we approach the matter to have the best likelihood of 
producing the kind of coalition put together by President Bush in 1991? 
President Bush, in 1991, was able to motivate the Arab world to move 
against Saddam Hussein, as well as the traditional allies.
  I gave very careful consideration to the amendment proposed by the 
Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin, where he proposed that we ought to 
grant the President authority to use force, but only after a United 
Nations resolution authorizing the use of force.

[[Page S10304]]

  The advantage of the Levin amendment was that we would have 
multilateral action, very much like the Gulf War in 1991. The 
disadvantage would be that we would be subject to the veto of Russia, 
China, or even France, and that ultimately the United States would be 
ceding a considerable quantum of national sovereignty if we gave up our 
right to decide what course of conduct we should take, which is in our 
national interest.
  I carefully considered an amendment which had been prepared and 
circulated by Senator Lugar and Senator Biden. That resolution 
emphasized that the President should exhaust all possible means for an 
international coalition. However, if the President found it impossible 
to organize an international coalition and believed that the interests 
of the United States were threatened, in self-defense the President 
could act on his own or in conjunction with Great Britain. However, the 
President would not have to await U.N. action.

  It would seem to me the proposal of Senator Biden and Senator Lugar 
was the best idea, and I had agreed to cosponsor that resolution or an 
amendment offered which contained the essence of that resolution.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Biden-
Lugar resolution be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my 
statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. STABENOW). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (See exhibit 2.)
  Mr. SPECTER. When Senator Biden and Senator Lugar decided not to 
offer that amendment, I decided to offer it myself. I was surprised 
that the Biden-Lugar amendment was not offered before 1 o'clock 
yesterday, which was the deadline. I worked with the Parliamentarian to 
structure a procedure to offer this as a second-degree amendment, and 
for reasons which were detailed in an earlier speech on the Senate 
floor, a unanimous consent agreement, in my absence, was entered into, 
and the pending first-degree amendments, to which this would have been 
amended, were withdrawn.
  I do not want to get too much into the arcane details of our Senate 
procedure, but I was foreclosed from offering that amendment, and I 
think it is very unfortunate the Senate did not have an opportunity to 
consider the Biden-Lugar amendment. I am not sanguine to say it would 
have been enacted, but, on a matter of this importance, I felt very 
strongly that procedural rules should not bar the Senate from 
consideration, especially when those procedural rules had been complied 
with until, as I say, the unanimous consent agreement, in my absence, 
in effect, pulled the rug out from under me.
  I am concerned that the scope of the present resolution goes a little 
far in authorizing the President to use ``all means that he determines 
to be appropriate,'' which is a subjective test, contrasted with the 
1991 authorization which said the President was authorized to use force 
in order to implement Security Council resolutions. It is too late in 
the day to press that distinction, but I think it is important to note.
  Similarly, I think it is important to note the potential historical 
impact of the pending resolution which, in effect, delegates to the 
President the authority to declare war.
  Make no mistake about it, this resolution for the use of force is the 
equivalent of a declaration of war, and Congress has the authority to 
declare war. However, we are saying in effect that the President may 
decide at some future time whether war should be declared.
  In an earlier presentation on the Senate floor, I detailed, to 
substantial extent, the considerations and concerns I had about the 
constitutionality of that kind of a delegation of power.
  So, in sum, we are faced with a tough decision for the first time in 
the history of this country to use preemptive action. I commend 
President Bush for coming to Congress. Originally he said he did not 
need to do so and would not do so. Later, he modified that, saying that 
while he might not have to, he was coming to Congress. He initially 
talked about unilateral action, and since has worked very hard in the 
United Nations.
  It may be that the practical effect of what the President is doing 
now, through Secretary of State Colin Powell, amounts to what was 
sought in the Biden-Lugar resolution, and I do believe the likelihood 
of getting UN action is better if we proceed to give the President the 
authority to act without UN support because if we said, as Senator 
Levin proposed, that his authority to use force would be conditioned on 
a UN resolution, it would be, in effect, an open invitation to the UN 
not to act, knowing the President and the United States, were limited 
from acting if the UN did not, and subjecting our national interests to 
China, Russia, or France's veto.

  So I do believe, of all the alternatives, giving the President this 
power without conditioning it on previous UN resolutions is the best 
way to get the United Nations to act to enforce the obligations which 
Iraq has to the United Nations, running since 1991, which have been in 
desperate breach.
  So I do intend to vote for the pending resolution. I supported the 
amendment by Senator Byrd to the effect that nothing in this resolution 
should be deemed to impede or affect the constitutional authority of 
the Congress to declare war. Ordinarily you would not think a statute 
or a resolution would jeopardize constitutional authority, which is 
paramount, but I am concerned about the issue of erosion, and that is 
why I supported Senator Byrd in the amendment that nothing in this 
resolution should undercut the authority of Congress to declare war.
  On this solemn occasion, when it appears now highly likely--or 
perhaps more accurately, virtually certain--that this resolution will 
be enacted by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and 
that we are on a very difficult course, it is hoped that the tremendous 
power of the United States, in conjunction with other countries, will 
be sufficient to bring Saddam Hussein to his senses, if he has any, 
that he ought to submit to inspections. If he does not submit to 
inspections, then it is confirmation that he, in fact, has something to 
hide and there is something really at risk.
  So among the very many complex considerations, it is my considered 
judgment the adoption of this resolution is the best course for our 
country.
  I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1

                            S. Con. Res. 78

       Whereas the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
     was convened to try individuals for crimes against 
     international law committed during World War II;
       Whereas the Nuremberg tribunal provision which held that 
     ``crimes against international law are committed by men, not 
     by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
     commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
     enforced'' is as valid today as it was in 1946;
       Whereas, on August 2, 1990, and without provocation, Iraq 
     initiated a war of aggression against the sovereign state of 
     Kuwait;
       Whereas the Charter of the United Nations imposes on its 
     members the obligations to ``refrain in their international 
     relations from the threat or use of force against the 
     territorial integrity or political independence of any 
     state'';
       Whereas the leaders of the Government of Iraq, a country 
     which is a member of the United Nations, did violate this 
     provision of the United Nations Charter;
       Whereas the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
     Civilian Persons in Times of War (the Fourth Geneva 
     Convention) imposes certain obligations upon a belligerent 
     State, occupying another country by force of arms, in order 
     to protect the civilian population of the occupied territory 
     from some of the ravages of the conflict;
       Whereas both Iraq and Kuwait are parties to the Fourth 
     Geneva Convention;
       Whereas the public testimony of witnesses and victims has 
     indicated that Iraqi officials violated Article 27 of the 
     Fourth Geneva Convention by their inhumane treatment and acts 
     of violence against the Kuwaiti civilian population;
       Whereas the public testimony of witnesses and victims has 
     indicated that Iraqi officials violated Articles 31 and 32 of 
     the Fourth Geneva Convention by subjecting Kuwait civilians 
     to physical coercion, suffering and extermination in order to 
     obtain information;
       Whereas, in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, from 
     January 18, 1991, to February 25, 1991, Iraq did fire 39 
     missiles on Israel in 18 separate attacks with the intent of 
     making it a party to war and with the intent of killing or 
     injuring innocent civilians, killing 2 persons directly, 
     killing 12 people indirectly (through heart attacks, improper 
     use of gas masks, choking), and injuring more than 200 
     persons;
       Whereas Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states 
     that persons committing ``grave breaches'' are to be 
     apprehended and subjected to trial;
       Whereas, on several occasions, the United Nations Security 
     Council has found Iraq's

[[Page S10305]]

     treatment of Kuwaiti civilians to be in violation of 
     international law;
       Whereas, in Revolution 665, adopted on August 25, 1990, the 
     United Nations Security Council deplored ``the loss of 
     innocent life stemming from the Iraq invasion of Kuwait'';
       Whereas, in Revolution 670, adopted by the United Nations 
     Security Council on September 25, 1990, it condemned further 
     ``the treatment by Iraqi forces on Kuwait nationals and 
     reaffirmed that the Fourth Geneva Convention applied to 
     Kuwait'';
       Whereas, in Resolution 674, the United Nations Security 
     Council demanded that Iraq cease mistreating and oppressing 
     Kuwaiti nationals in violation of the Convention and reminded 
     Iraq that it would be liable for any damage or injury 
     suffered by Kuwaiti nationals due to Iraq's invasion and 
     illegal occupation;
       Whereas Iraq is a party to the Prisoners of War Convention 
     and there is evidence and testimony that during the Persian 
     Gulf War, Iraq violated articles of the Convention by its 
     physical and psychological abuse of military and civilian 
     POW's including members of the international press;
       Whereas Iraq has committed deliberate and calculated crimes 
     of environmental terrorism, inflicting grave risk to the 
     health and well-being of innocent civilians in the region by 
     its willful ignition of 732 Kuwaiti oil wells in January and 
     February, 1991:
       Whereas President Clinton found ``compelling evidence'' 
     that the Iraqi Intelligence Service directed and pursued an 
     operation to assassinate former President George Bush in 
     April 1993 when he visited Kuwait;
       Whereas Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials have 
     systematically attempted to destroy the Kurdish population in 
     Iraq through the use of chemical weapons against civilian 
     Kurds, campaigns in 1987-88 which resulted in the 
     disappearance of more than 182,000 persons and the 
     destruction of more than 4,000 villages, the placement of 
     more than 10 million landmines in Iraqi Kurdistan, and ethnic 
     cleansing in the city of Kirkuk;
       Whereas the Republic of Iraq is a signatory to 
     international agreements including the Universal Declaration 
     on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
     Political Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and 
     Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the POW Convention, 
     and is obligated to comply with these international 
     agreements;
       Whereas section 8 of Resolution 687 of the United Nations 
     Security Council, adopted on April 3, 1991, requires Iraq to 
     unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or 
     rendering harmless, under international supervision of all 
     chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents 
     and all related subsystems and components and all 
     research, development, support, and manufacturing 
     facilities;
       Whereas Saddam Hussein and the Republic of Iraq have 
     persistently and flagrantly violated the terms of Resolution 
     687 with respect to elimination of weapons of mass 
     destruction and inspections by international supervisors;
       Whereas there is good reason to believe that Iraq continues 
     to have stockpiles of chemical and biological munitions, 
     missiles capable of transporting such agents, and the 
     capacity to produce such weapons of mass destruction, putting 
     the international community at risk;
       Whereas, on February 22, 1993, the United Nations Security 
     Council adopted Resolution 808 establishing an international 
     tribunal to try individuals accused of violations of 
     international law in the former Yugoslavia;
       Whereas, on November 8, 1994, the United Nations Security 
     Council adopted Resolution 955 establishing an international 
     tribunal to try individuals accused of the commission of 
     violations of international law in Rwanda;
       Whereas more than 70 individuals have faced indictments 
     handed down by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
     Former Yugoslavia in the Hague for war crimes and crimes 
     against humanity in the former Yugoslavia, leading in the 
     first trial to the sentencing of a Serb jailer to 20 years in 
     prison;
       Whereas the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has 
     indicted 31 individuals, with three trials occurring at 
     present and 27 individuals in custody;
       Whereas the United States has to date spent more than $24 
     million for the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
     Former Yugoslavia and more than $20 million for the 
     International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda;
       Whereas officials such as former President George Bush, 
     Vice President Al Gore, General Normal Schwarzkopf and others 
     have labeled Saddam Hussein a war criminal and called for his 
     indictment;
       Whereas a failure to try and punish leaders and other 
     persons for crimes, against international law establishes a 
     dangerous precedent and negatively impacts the value of 
     deterrence to future illegal acts;
       Resolved, by the Senate (the House of Representatives 
     concurring),
       That the President should--
       (1) call for the creation of a commission under the 
     auspices of the United Nations to establish an international 
     record of the criminal culpability of Saddam Hussein and 
     other Iraqi officials;
       (2) call for the United Nations to form an international 
     criminal tribunal for the purpose of indicting, prosecuting, 
     and imprisoning Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials who 
     are responsible for crimes against humanity, genocide, and 
     other violations of international law; and
       (3) upon the creation of such an international criminal 
     tribunal, week the reprogramming of necessary funds to 
     support the efforts of the tribunal, including the gathering 
     of evidence necessary to indict, prosecute and imprison 
     Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials.
                                  ____


                               S.J. Res  

       Authorizing the use of the United States Armed Forces 
     pursuant to a new resolution of the United Nations Security 
     Council seeking to enforce the destruction and dismantlement 
     of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program and prohibited 
     ballistic missiles program or pursuant to the United States 
     right of individual or collective self-defense if the 
     Security Council fails to act.
       Whereas under United Nations Security Council Resolution 
     687 (1991), which effected a formal cease-fire following the 
     Persian Gulf War, Iraq agreed to destroy or dismantle, under 
     international supervision, its nuclear, chemical, and 
     biological weapons programs (hereafter in this joint 
     resolution referred to as Iraq's ``weapons of mass 
     destruction program''), as well as its program to develop or 
     acquire ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 
     kilometers (hereafter in this joint resolution referred to as 
     Iraq's ``prohibited ballistic missile program''), and 
     undertook unconditionally not to develop any such weapons 
     thereafter.
       Whereas on numerous occasions since 1991, the United 
     Nations Security Council has reaffirmed Resolution 687, most 
     recently in Resolution 1284, which established a new weapons 
     inspection regime to ensure Iraqi compliance with its 
     obligations under Resolution 687;
       Whereas on numerous occasions since 1991, the United States 
     and the United Nations Security Council have condemned Iraq's 
     failure to fulfill its obligations under Resolution 687 to 
     destroy or dismantle its weapons of mass destruction program 
     and its prohibited ballistic missile program;
       Whereas Iraq under Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons in 
     its war with Iran in the 1980s and against the Kurdish 
     population in northern Iraq in 1988;
       Whereas since 1990, the United States has considered Iraq 
     to be a state sponsor of terrorism;
       Whereas Iraq's failure to comply with its international 
     obligations to destroy or dismantle its weapons of mass 
     destruction program and its prohibited ballistic missile 
     program, its record of using weapons of mass destruction, its 
     record of using force against neighboring states, and its 
     support for international terrorism require a strong 
     diplomatic, and if necessary, military response by the 
     international community, led by the United States: Now, 
     therefore be it
       Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Authorization for the Use of 
     Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.''

     SECTION 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED 
                   FORCES.

       (a) Authorization for the Use of Force.--The President, 
     subject to subsection (b), is authorized to use United States 
     Armed Forces--
       (1) to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 
     687, and other resolutions approved by the Council which 
     govern Iraqi compliance with Resolution 687, in order to 
     secure the dismantlement or destruction of Iraq's weapons of 
     mass destruction program and its prohibited ballistic missile 
     program; or
       (2) in the exercise of individual or collective self-
     defense, to defend the United States or allied nations 
     against a grave threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass 
     destruction program and its prohibited ballistic missile 
     program.
       (b) Requirement for Determination That Use of Force is 
     Necessary.--Before exercising the authority granted by 
     subsection (a), the President shall make available to the 
     Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro 
     tempore of the Senate his determination that--
       (1) the United States has attempted to seek, through the 
     United Nations Security Council, adoption of a resolution 
     that after September 12, 2002 under Chapter VII of the United 
     Nations Charter authorizing the action described in 
     subsection (a)(1), and such resolution has been adopted; or
       (2) that the threat to the United States or allied nations 
     posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program and 
     prohibited ballistic missile program is so grave that the use 
     of force is necessary pursuant to subsection (a)(2), 
     notwithstanding the failure of the Security Council to 
     approve a resolution described in paragraph (1).

     SECTION 3. CONSULTATION AND REPORTS.

       (a) Consultation.--The President shall keep Congress fully 
     and currently informed on matters relevant to this joint 
     resolution.
       (b) Initial Report.--
       (1) As soon as practicable, but not later than 30 days 
     after exercising the authority under subsection 2(a), the 
     President shall submit to Congress a report setting forth 
     information--
       (A) about the degree to which other nations will assist the 
     United States in the use of force in Iraq;
       (B) regarding measures the United States is taking, or 
     preparaing to take, to protect

[[Page S10306]]

     key allies in the region from armed attack by Iraq; and
       (C) on planning to establish a secure environment in the 
     immediate aftermath of the use of force (including estimated 
     expenditures by the United States and allied nations), and, 
     if necessary, prepare for the political and economic 
     reconstruction of Iraq following the use of force.
       (2) Classification of report.-- The report required by 
     paragraph (1) may be submitted in classified form.
       (c) Subsequent Reports.--Following transmittal of the 
     report required by subsection (b), the President shall submit 
     a report to Congress every 60 days thereafter on the status 
     of United States diplomatic, military and reconstruction 
     operations with respect to Iraq.

     SECTION 4. WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Specific Statutory Authorization.--Consistent with 
     section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress 
     declares that section 2 is intended to constitute specific 
     statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of 
     the War Powers Resolution.
       (b) Applicability of Other Requirements.--Nothing in this 
     resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers 
     Resolution.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
allowed to speak for 30 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, just so the record is clear, he is filling 
the spot Senator Carper had.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I thank the Senator from Nevada very much.
  Madam President, we are here today to debate one of the most 
difficult decisions that I, at least, have ever had to make in my 18 
years in the Senate. There is no doubt in my mind Saddam Hussein is a 
despicable dictator, a war criminal, a regional menace, and a real and 
growing threat to the United States. The difficulty of this decision is 
that while Saddam Hussein represents a threat, each of the options for 
dealing with him poses a threat--to America's service members, to our 
citizens, and to our role in the world at large.
  It is clear none of the options that confront us are easy or risk 
free. For all of us, the upcoming vote on this critical issue will 
reflect our best judgment on which path will minimize the risk to our 
fellow Americans because we all know the risk cannot be eliminated. And 
that judgment will, in turn, depend on a complex interaction of many 
factors, some of which we do not know and perhaps cannot know.
  It is clear military operations against Saddam Hussein, of the sort 
that are being discussed, pose serious risks, and we should all admit 
to that. Any military campaign runs very serious risks to our service 
members. On paper, we surely have an overwhelming advantage against 
Saddam Hussein--in the skill, the technology, and, of course, 
dedication of our Armed Forces.
  We defeated Saddam quickly and conclusively in 1991. In the decade 
since, our force effectiveness has improved dramatically, while many of 
Saddam's capabilities have deteriorated. But a new battle against 
Saddam Hussein, if it comes to that, will be very different and much 
more difficult.
  A U.S. victory might be quick, and it might be painless. One hopes 
that will be the case, but it may not be so. The American people need 
to know a war against Saddam will have high costs, including loss of 
American lives. Our confident assertions that Saddam Hussein will 
quickly be deposed by his own people have in the past been too 
optimistic.
  Presumably, Saddam Hussein will be more determined to use all the 
weapons and tactics in his arsenal, if he believes that our ultimate 
goal is to remove him from power. The administration assures us our 
troops have equipment and uniforms that will protect them from that 
risk, should that risk arise. We can only hope to God they are right.
  We also acknowledge that any military operations against Saddam 
Hussein pose potential risks to our own homeland. Saddam's government 
has contact with many international terrorist organizations that likely 
have cells here in the United States.
  Finally, we also need to recognize that should we go to war with 
Iraq, it could have a serious impact on America's role in the world and 
the way the rest of the world responds, therefore, to America's 
leadership.
  We are told that if Saddam Hussein is overthrown, American soldiers 
would be welcomed into Baghdad with liberation parades. That may be 
true. But it is true the people who have suffered most at Saddam's 
hands are, of course, his own citizens.
  For many people around the world, an American-led victory over Saddam 
Hussein would not be cause for celebration. No matter how strong our 
case, there will inevitably be some who will see a U.S.-led action 
against Iraq as a cause for concern. At its most extreme, that concern 
feeds the terrorist paranoia that drives their mission to hurt America. 
We can affect how deep that sentiment runs by how we conduct 
ourselves--whether we work with allies, whether we show ourselves to be 
committed to the reconstruction of Iraq and to the reconciliation with 
the Arab world. But we ignore all of that at our peril.
  Clearly, there are many risks associated with the resolution we are 
considering today, but it is equally clear that doing nothing and 
preserving the status quo also poses serious risks. Those risks are 
less visible, and their frame of time is less certain. But after a 
great deal of consultation and soul searching, I have come to the 
conclusion that the risks to our citizens and to our Nation of doing 
nothing are too great to bear.
  There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working 
aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear 
weapons within the next 5 years. He could have it earlier if he is able 
to obtain fissile materials on the outside market, which is possible--
difficult but possible. We also should remember we have always 
underestimated the progress that Saddam Hussein has been able to make 
in the development of weapons of mass destruction.
  When Saddam Hussein obtains nuclear capabilities, the constraints 
that he feels will diminish dramatically, and the risk to America's 
homeland, as well as to America's allies, will increase even more 
dramatically. Our existing policies to contain or counter Saddam will 
become, therefore, irrelevant.
  Americans will return to a situation like we faced in the cold war, 
waking each morning knowing that we are at risk from nuclear blackmail 
by a dictatorship that has declared itself to be our enemy, only back 
then our Communist foes--in those so-called good old days, which, of 
course, they were not, but in making the comparison between now and 
then, our Communist foes were a rational and predictable bureaucracy. 
This time our nuclear foe would be an unpredictable and often 
irrational individual, a dictator who has demonstrated that he is 
prepared to violate international law and initiate unprovoked attacks 
when he believes it serves any of his whims or purposes to so do.

  The global community in the form of the United Nations has declared 
repeatedly, through multiple resolutions, that the frightening prospect 
of a nuclear-armed Saddam cannot come to pass, but the U.N. has been 
unable to enforce these resolutions. We must eliminate that threat now 
before it is too late. But that isn't just a future threat. Saddam's 
existing biological and chemical weapons capabilities pose real threats 
to America today, tomorrow.
  Saddam has used chemical weapons before, both against Iraq's enemies 
and against his own people. He is working to develop delivery systems 
like missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles that could bring these 
deadly weapons against U.S. forces and U.S. facilities in the Middle 
East. He could make these weapons available to many terrorist groups, 
third parties, which have contact with his government. Those groups, in 
turn, could bring those weapons into the United States and unleash a 
devastating attack against our citizens. I fear that greatly.
  We cannot know for certain that Saddam will use the weapons of mass 
destruction that he currently possesses or that he will use them 
against us. But as we do know, Saddam has the capability to do that. We 
know that very

[[Page S10307]]

well. Rebuilding that capability has been a higher priority for Saddam 
than the welfare of his own people, and he has ill will toward 
Americans.
  I am forced to conclude on all the evidence that Saddam poses a 
significant risk. Some argue it would be totally irrational for Saddam 
Hussein to initiate an attack against the mainland United States and 
believe he would not do so. But if Saddam thought he could attack 
America through terrorist proxies and cover the trail back to Baghdad, 
he might not think it is so irrational. If he thought, as he got older 
and looked around an impoverished and isolated Iraq, his principal 
legacy to the Arab world to be a brutal attack on the United States, he 
might not think it is so irrational. If he thought the U.S. would be 
too paralyzed with fear to respond, he might not think it was too 
irrational.
  Saddam has misjudged what he can get away with and how the United 
States and the world will respond many times before. At the end of the 
day, we cannot let the security of the American citizens rest in the 
hands of somebody whose track record gives us every reason to fear that 
he is prepared to use the weapons he has used against his enemies 
before.
  As the attacks of September 11 demonstrated, the immense 
destructiveness of modern technology means we can no longer afford to 
wait around for a smoking gun. The fact that an attack on our homeland 
has not occurred since September 11 cannot give us any false sense of 
security that one will not occur in the future or on any day. We no 
longer have that luxury.
  September 11 changed America. It made us realize we must deal 
differently with the very real threat, the overwhelming threat and 
reality of terrorism, whether it comes from shadowy groups operating in 
the mountains of Afghanistan or in 70 other countries around the world 
or in our own country.
  There has been some debate over how ``imminent'' a threat Iraq poses. 
I do believe Iraq poses an imminent threat. I also believe after 
September 11, that question is increasingly outdated.
  It is in the nature of these weapons that he has and the way they are 
targeted against civilian populations, that documented capability and 
demonstrated intent may be the only warning we get. To insist on 
further evidence could put some of our fellow Americans at risk. Can we 
afford to take that chance? I do not think we can.
  The President has rightly called Saddam Hussein's efforts to develop 
weapons of mass destruction a grave and gathering threat to Americans. 
The global community has tried but has failed to address that threat 
over the past decade. I have come to the inescapable conclusion that 
the threat posed to America by Saddam's weapons of mass destruction is 
so serious that despite the risks--and we should not minimize the 
risks--we must authorize the President to take the necessary steps to 
deal with that threat. So I will vote for the Lieberman-McCain 
resolution.
  This is a difficult vote, but I could not sleep knowing that, faced 
with this grave danger to the people of my State and to all Americans, 
I have voted for nothing more than continuing the policies that have 
failed to address this problem over the years.
  Two months ago, or even a month ago, I would have been reluctant to 
support this resolution. At the time, it appeared that the 
administration's principal goal was a unilateral invasion of Iraq, 
clear and simple, without fully exploring every option to resolve this 
peacefully, without trying to enlist the support of other countries, 
without any limitation on the use of United States force in the Middle 
East region.
  The original use of force resolution that the White House sent to the 
Congress was far too broad in its scope and ignored the possibility 
that diplomatic efforts might just be able to resolve this crisis 
without bloodshed. Moreover, it appeared that the administration 
planned to cut back its efforts in the war on terrorism and shift all 
of its attention and resources to Iraq, and that would have been a 
tragic mistake.
  I believe the war against global terrorist networks remains the 
greatest current threat to the security of America over the long term 
and to our forces overseas. We have seen that in Kuwait in just the 
last week. America cannot be diverted or distracted from our war on 
terrorism. In the past month or so, in my judgment, we have begun to 
see an encouraging shift in the administration's approach. The 
President stated earlier this week that war is neither imminent nor 
unavoidable. The administration has assured us that whatever action we 
take toward Iraq, it will not be permitted to divert resources or 
attention from the war on terrorism internationally.
  Secretary Powell has been working with the U.N. Security Council to 
put together a new resolution to make clear that Iraq must disarm, or 
face the consequences. We have already begun to see some encouraging 
movement on the issue of Iraqi disarmament. Other Security Council 
members--I mentioned France and Russia, as well as other Arab States in 
the Middle East--have begun to talk seriously about forcing Saddam to 
comply with the U.N. resolutions. Saddam Hussein has begun to make 
offers on inspections and disarmament, offers that, while inadequate so 
far, indicate that he has at least begun to move off his hardline 
position against inspections.
  Obviously, much important and very hard work remains to be done. That 
will take tough negotiating with the other members of the U.N. and a 
firm line with Iraq. We need to be realistic about how best to move 
forward.
  Any headway we are making toward getting Saddam to disarm has not 
occurred in a vacuum. U.N. members did not just suddenly decide to 
debate a new resolution forcing Iraq to disarm. Saddam Hussein did not 
just suddenly decide to reinvite U.N. inspectors and to remove the 
roadblocks that had hindered their efforts in the past. Progress is 
occurring because the President told the United Nations General 
Assembly that if the U.N. is not prepared to enforce its resolution on 
Iraqi disarmament, the United States will be forced to act.

  At this point, America's best opportunity to move the United Nations 
and Iraq to a peaceful resolution of this crisis is by making clear 
that the United States is prepared to act on our own, if necessary, as 
one nation, indivisible. Sometimes, the rest of the world looks to 
America not just for the diversity of our debate, or the vitality of 
our ideals, but for the firm resolve that the world's leader must 
demonstrate if intractable global problems are to be solved--and 
dangerous ones at that. So that is the context in which I am 
approaching this vote.
  This resolution does authorize the use of force, if necessary. Saddam 
Hussein represents a grave threat to the United States, and I have 
concluded we must use force to deal with him if all other means fail. 
That is just the core issue. It is the only core issue. And whether we 
vote on it now, or in January, or in 6 months, or in 1 year, that is 
the issue we will all have to confront.
  War--if it comes to that--will cost money. I and the Presiding 
Officer dearly wish we could use that money for other domestic 
purposes--to address the very real needs that West Virginia, Michigan, 
and other States face in this tough economy. But, ultimately, defending 
America's citizens from danger, their safety, and their security is a 
responsibility whose costs we must bear because this is not just a 
resolution authorizing war; in my judgment, it is a resolution that 
could provide a path to peace. I hope that by voting on this resolution 
now, while the negotiations at the U.N. are continuing, this resolution 
will show to the world that the American people are united in our 
resolve to deal with the Iraqi threat, and it will strengthen the hand 
of the administration in making a final effort to try to get the U.N. 
to deal with the issue. Given the difficulty of trying to build a 
coalition in the United Nations, I could not, in good conscience, tie 
the President's hands.
  The administration is in negotiations on which the safety and 
security of all Americans depend. I believe we must give the President 
the authority he will need, if there is any hope to bring those 
negotiations to a successful conclusion. So I will vote for the 
Lieberman-McCain resolution. Preventing a war with Saddam Hussein--
whether now or later--must be a top priority. I believe this resolution 
will strengthen the President's hand to resolve that crisis.

[[Page S10308]]

  By my vote, I say to the U.N. and our allies that America is united 
in our resolve to deal with Saddam Hussein and that the U.N. must act 
to eliminate the weapons of mass destruction.
  By my vote, I say to Saddam Hussein: Disarm or the United States will 
be forced to act. We have that resolve.
  September 11 changed our world forever. We may not like it, but it is 
the world in which we live. When there is a grave threat to Americans' 
lives, we have a responsibility to take action to prevent it.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada is recognized.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, we have had a number of unanimous consent 
requests granted that listed the order of speakers. In effect, now, we 
have a new one that will make more sense. We have cleared this with 
both cloakrooms:
  Senator Sessions will be recognized for 30 minutes; Senator Carper 
will be recognized for 20 minutes; Senator Ensign will be recognized 
for 20 minutes; Senator Cantwell will be recognized for 30 minutes; 
Senator Bob Smith will be recognized for 15 minutes; Senator Bob Graham 
will be recognized for 30 minutes; Senator Conrad will be recognized 
for 30 minutes.
  Following these speakers, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
vote on final passage of H.J. Res. 114, as under the previous order. 
After that, if anybody else wishes to speak--and we have a number of 
people who have indicated they would like to--they can do that. It will 
be probably 12:30 or 1 o'clock if everybody uses their time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, people have been granted this time. If 
they could read a little bit faster or eliminate a paragraph or two, 
some people would appreciate that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, very briefly, I thank the Senator from 
Nevada. As I understand it, I ask the Senator from Nevada, we have 
Senator Gordon Smith, Senator Shelby, Senator Fitzgerald, Senator 
Santorum, Senator Sarbanes, Senator Dayton, Senator Murkowski, and 
Senator Mikulski who are still scheduled to speak after that.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I thank the Chair, and I thank the leadership for the 
work they have put into this bill. I thank Senator McCain. It is great 
to see Senator John Warner here. He helped write the 1991 gulf war 
resolution and led its successful vote in this body, which served the 
body exceedingly well. That was a courageous act that he led at that 
time.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank my colleague for his kind 
remarks.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, any contemplation of the use of military 
force is a very serious matter and calls for the Congress, the peoples' 
representatives, to be engaged and to discuss and debate the issue. I 
do not believe the Lord is pleased when his children fight--and 
according to my faith, all people are creatures of one Lord and 
precious in his sight.
  In my view the resort to war can never be considered something to 
glory in but must be viewed as an act that is taken as a result of 
human failure, and where after serious consideration, it is concluded 
that alternatives are worse.
  When the status quo presents more dangers than the war the most just, 
the most logical, the most moral thing is to fight. I wish it were not 
so but my experience and my best judgement tells me this is the way we 
live in this transitory world. I truly respect the pacifist--it is a 
position with a long and honored tradition in my faith--but whether it 
is by judgement or lack of faith, I do not go there.
  To have a just war one must reasonably believe the ultimate goal of 
the violence will be to produce a good result--a better condition than 
existed before. And while as leaders of the people of the United States 
we must focus primarily on the just national security interests of our 
country, we, as enlightened, moral and decent people, ought to ask 
ourselves, whether our actions will ultimately benefit the world and 
even our adversary. Will the future for all be better or not?
  Further, we should consider our national heritage of promoting peace, 
freedom and prosperity. War obviously destroys peace, but if the result 
can be to create a safer and more peaceful world, war can be an 
instrument of peace.
  Afghanistan has had two decades of war. Our strong military action to 
totally defeat the Taliban government has given that brutalized country 
its best chance for peace, freedom and prosperity in generations. We 
cannot guarantee it, but great optimism exists for a positive future 
that could never have been possible under the oppressive, hateful, 
bigoted Taliban.
  The practitioners of the art of ``realpolitic'' may sneer at the 
concept of free countries in the Arab world, but I am proud of the 
results of our military action in Afghanistan, not only because it 
represented just retribution for their support of attacks on the United 
States but also because we have left that oppressed country better than 
we found it. We liberated the people of Afghanistan from the most 
brutal circumstances.
  Can anyone forget the scenes of men beating women on the streets for 
the most insignificant or imagined acts? No, I am proud of our wise and 
brilliant use of force.
  I also remember such actions played a positive role in our nation's 
founding. Indeed, one can go down to Yorktown, as I did recently, and 
visit the site of the final American victory over the British. As one 
considers that climactic victory, after years of war and many defeats 
inflicted by the skilled British military, one learns that our victory 
would not have been possible but for the intervention of the large 
French fleet at Yorktown, and that fleet's victory over the British in 
a major battle.
  With no ability to retreat or resupply, the cornered General 
Cornwallis had no choice but to surrender. This French action aided our 
liberation immensely and have served as a bond of loyalty between our 
nations even to this day. If the French were justified in the use of 
military force to help liberate us, may not our use of force in years 
to come be seen by the world and the people of Iraq in the same 
positive way. Can such a positive result be guaranteed? Of course not, 
but I and many others believe the chances for any improved Iraq's 
government are greater than some think.
  Still, we must clearly remember that we cannot guarantee any nation, 
so liberated, future success. There are limits on our power, our reach 
and our resources. I am very pleased that under the leadership of 
President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, we have only a few 
more soldiers in Afghanistan than we have in Kosovo. The fate of 
Afghanistan will be up to their people ultimately. We can help, and we 
have, but their final fate will be in their hands--as it should be.
  It is also important to consider that the threats to the United 
States do not come from free and prosperous states but failing ones. 
They fail because of flawed governments.
  Thus, I say the President is right to reject a half century of 
valueless, cynical, diplomatic wordplay, words that sound good but are 
totally disconnected from reality, and to establish a new foreign 
policy based on our venerable heritage of honest and direct discussion 
of issues and values.

  I am somewhat puzzled that those who have long advocated our taking 
steps to aid poor countries in the world do not recognize the 
possibilities for good that can come from a change in government. It 
seems there is still a strong strain of ``blame America first'' about. 
Many had rather complain about our imperfections, real or imagined, 
than to see the possibilities for a better world.
  I strongly believe that America is a force for good in the world. The 
London based ``Economist'' magazine has recently produced a special 
insert for that magazine called ``Present at the Creation: A Survey of 
America's World Role''. It concludes that a strong America is good for 
the world and notes that America's national interest, ``offers the 
clearest match there is to a world interest. The desire for unimpeded 
trade, the rule of law, safety and security, the protection of property 
and the free movement of property and capital match world needs, not 
just American ones.''

[[Page S10309]]

  We are a good, decent and, yes, powerful world leader. I am proud of 
our history of being, time after time, on the right side of world 
issues and am very pleased we have a President that understands the new 
world we are in and who has the courage worthy of the great people he 
leads.
  It is important to point out that if force cannot be avoided, our 
action will not be against the people of Iraq or the nation of Iraq, 
but it will be against the brutal, illegal, Saddam Hussein regime. It 
is a regime that has caused more destruction than any existing in the 
world today. The people of Iraq will be the greatest beneficiaries of 
our victory. At this moment, pursuant to U.N. resolutions, our forces 
are attempting to enforce an embargo against Iraq. It has been only 
partially successful and it is leaking more and more. The Arab world 
complains, with much truth, that the embargo only hurts the people, the 
children of Iraq. Saddam Hussein continues to build places and weapons 
of mass destruction while his people suffer.
  It has been eleven years. How long must the United States continue to 
carry this burden to enforce a policy that is not significantly hurting 
the regime but hurts innocent civilians? How can we justify this 
morally?
  There are certainly dangers in military action. While we can hope and 
believe that if war commences it will go well and that our people will 
be viewed as liberators and that many Iraqi forces will not fight but 
defect to our side. We cannot know that. While I am certain we will 
prevail, I cannot know for certain how tough this war will be. We must 
recognize there are dangers. The American people understand there are 
risks and so do all of us. One thing is sure, our magnificent military 
will work tirelessly to prevail in this conflict with the lowest 
possible number of personnel killed or injured. But, we know the risks 
are great and losses could be great. While our forces will work to 
minimize civilian casualties and to solicit Iraqi military units to 
defect, such is not certain. There could be civilian losses.
  As to the risk of an attack on Israel, cited by many, we should ask 
what Israel has to say about it. They are clear. It is a decision that 
is left to the United States. If you must act, do so. Israel is 
prepared to take the risk.
  Well, that's the big picture as I see it. Our motive is good, our 
goals positive and realistic, and our leaders honest, careful, 
principled and have the courage to act on those beliefs. Some jaded 
politicos sneer and say that this is just politics, but I know it is 
not. I know the vision that President Bush has to protect his people 
and improve the world. His courage has already placed him at personal 
risk. These people, after all, have tried to assassinate one former 
President of the United States. In addition, in acting on his beliefs, 
he is laying it all on the line. He has told us repeatedly he would not 
look to polls to decide what actions he should take as our leader.
  President Bush is acting honorably and with integrity. He is 
informing the American people, consulting with Congress, conferring 
with world leaders and trying to work with the U.N. apparatus. He has 
altered his tactics to win support from others, but his goal has not 
changed. Ultimately, if his views are proven false, and all the 
predicted disasters come true then he will surely pay the price at the 
ballot box. But, I don't think so. Neither do most of those in this 
body. I think he is correct and though the road may be difficult and 
dangerous, I am confident his Iraq policies will succeed as have his 
policies in Afghanistan. I truly believe that peace, freedom, security 
and prosperity will be enhanced not reduced as a result of our actions.
  It is important to recognize that while this resolution could lead to 
war, it also offers the best chance we have to avoid war and to achieve 
security. The distinguished Democratic Chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee has objected to the President's statement that he 
has not decided to go to war while he asks for a resolution to allow 
war. But, this is not contradictory. This Congress knows the score. We 
know Saddam Hussein's deceitful manipulations, his lies, his violence 
against the Iraqi people and their neighbors, and the constant attacks 
against our aircraft, even firing on them with missiles this last week. 
We know he only allowed inspectors into Iraq in 1991 to save his 
regime. He did it out of fear.

  I agree with former President Clinton's National Security Advisor, 
Sandy Berger, who said at an Armed Services hearing, that he thinks it 
is unlikely that Saddam will ever accept ``unfettered'' inspections. A 
strong resolution is essential so that Saddam Hussein knows there will 
not be another Congressional session to meet and discuss these same 
issues again. He must know without the slightest doubt, that the man he 
is dealing with, President George W. Bush, has full and complete 
authority, as commander-in-chief, to use our armed forces to protect 
our security and to remove him from power, if need be, if he does not 
comply and disarm.
  Who knows, in that case maybe he will relent. Nothing clears the mind 
so well as the absence of alternatives.
  Maybe he would choose to abdicate and allow a new government to be 
formed. Maybe parts of his army would defect, or parts of his country 
would revolt. Indeed, the ``Washington Times'', running an article from 
the ``London Daily Telegraph'' reports yesterday that

       Members of Saddam Hussein's inner circle are defecting to 
     the opposition or making discreet offers for peace in the 
     hope of being spared retribution if the Bagdad dictator is 
     toppled, according to Iraqi exiles.

  One defector came from the Iraqi security services, which form the 
regime's nerve center. Kurdish groups say:

       They have received secret approaches from military 
     commanders offering to turn their weapons on Saddam when the 
     war begins.

  Columnist Morton Kondracke wrote today that there are many 
possibilities for a regime change without a war. He notes Idi Amin took 
exile. As the pressure mounts, as the circle tightens, these are among 
possibilities for achieving our goals short of a full scale conflict.
  Yes, it is quite true that the President has requested our 
authorization to use force, but he still hopes he will not have to use 
it. For us to not grant him that authority would be only to allow the 
President to continue negotiations but require him to come back to 
Congress another time (while we are in recess perhaps) for an 
authorization to use force. To state that position is to expose its 
fatal flaw. Such an action would eliminate any chance for a real 
agreement.
  Saddam Hussein will know what we have done. He will know that the 
President cannot until Congress meets again. He will know that the 
fateful moment has not come, and that he can continue to delay and 
maneuver. Clearly, we must authorize the use of force if the President 
finds it necessary. Otherwise this whole process is a charade. I am 
confident a majority in this body understand this fundamental concept, 
or else, the strong vote that is coming would not occur.
  Some say, we are acting unilaterally, ``upsetting'' the little 
nations. But, it was not the United States that invaded Iran resulting 
in a prolonged and brutal war costing over one million lives. It was 
not the United States that invaded Kuwait, precipitating an 
international effort, overwhelmingly led by America, to roll back 
Saddam's conquest. It was not the United States that has systematically 
violated 16 U.N. resolutions--resolutions Saddam Hussein agreed to in 
order to save his regime.
  The unilateralist is Saddam Hussein. The United States, on the other 
hand, has worked assiduously with our allies, Arab nations, other 
nations and the United Nations to develop a policy that will end the 
menace presented by Saddam Hussein.
  Only the ``blame America first crowd'' would make such an argument. 
Indeed, we have been patient many times over these eleven years. So 
patient, so docile, that it has encouraged Saddam Hussein to 
miscalculation.

  Amazingly, several Senators have objected to the resolution because 
they believe we must have the full support of the United Nations. This 
is suggested in several ways.
  They argue, ``Why now?'' Why not let the United Nations vote first. 
Why not have the Congress ``come in behind a U. N. resolution?''
  This argument is dangerous and counter-productive to our goals. 
Unless, of course, one's real goal is simply

[[Page S10310]]

to wish the whole matter to go away and to not bring it to a head.
  First, a U.N. Resolution is very hard to obtain. The primary problem 
is that any resolution can be vetoed by any one of the permanent 
security council members, which includes China, Russia and France. 
These countries may demand concessions in exchange for their votes. 
They may just refuse. No reason is required.
  Secondly, this is our military. Funded, built and staffed by 
Americans. The American people did not sacrifice to create the greatest 
military in history to allow China, Russia or even France to have a 
veto over its use. It is no wonder that these nations would like, 
through the mechanism of the United Nations, to seize control over our 
military and to use it as they will. The wonder is why we are even 
discussing it seriously. Of course, we want to solicit the United 
Nation's support and aid. After all, Saddam Hussein is in violation of 
sixteen U.N. Resolutions. Why is the U.N. not anxious to act to bring 
him into compliance? Former Secretary of Defense James Schlessinger 
said recently in an Armed Services hearing that,

       This is a test of whether the United Nations--in the face 
     of perennial defiance by Saddam Hussein of its resolutions, 
     and indeed by his own promises--will, like the League of 
     Nations a century ago, turn out to be an institution given 
     only to talk.

  The President has frankly and courageously framed the question to the 
U.N. He has stated plainly that Saddam Hussein is in violation of 
sixteen U.N. Resolutions and is a danger to the region and the world. 
He has made it clear that it is his duty to protect the American people 
from this threat and that he intends to do so. But, he expressed 
support for the U.N. programs and urged the U.N. to take action, to be 
a relevant player in this crisis. He urged the U.N. not to sit on the 
sidelines. He made it clear that no change was unacceptable. Since then 
he has worked steadfastly to win the necessary support in the U.N. and 
the Security Council. He has humored, maneuvered, pleaded and, I am 
sure ``promised'' to gain support. Maybe the U.N. will arouse itself 
and take action. Nothing could do more for its credibility.
  But there are limits. This Congress must not crawfish or we will 
thereby tell Russia or France that they have a veto over our actions. 
It will encourage their resistance. If Russia knows Congress has 
allowed them to decide the issue, their power is even greater--it is 
absolute.
  Now, if members of this body oppose bringing the Iraq matter to a 
head and oppose any use of military force then let them come out and 
say so. It is wrong, however, and harmful to America to take an 
indirect approach that gives the appearance of support but which would 
undermine the execution of our policy.
  Yes, it would be very desirable to have U.N. support to deal with the 
Iraq problem. But, the best way to get it is to let them know we will 
act even if they don't.
  I agree with former Secretary of Defense James Schlessinger that 
while the doctrine of prevention is sound and historical and has been 
applied in tougher cases than this, it is not necessary here. 
Schlessinger rightly says that,

       In an ongoing conflict, the issue of pre-emption is close 
     to meaningless.

  The truth is, we have been at war with Iraq since 1991. In essence, 
Saddam Hussein sued for peace to save his regime. The world in effect 
said we will end hostilities, but you must give up your weapons of mass 
destruction and agree to full inspections to prove that you have.
  Since then, we fly missions every day to enforce the northern and 
southern no-fly zones. Iraq fires surface-to-air missiles at our planes 
almost daily and we bomb in response regularly. Iraq has shot down 
three of our predator, unmanned aircraft, in recent months. We defend 
the Kurds. We keep forces in Kuwait and in the region to deter another 
attack by Iraq. The war has never ended. In 1988, the Congress voted 
for the ``Iraq Liberation Act''. We declared it U.S. policy to effect a 
regime change in Iraq and authorized the President to carry out that 
policy. In fact, it gave five million dollars to Iraqi resistance 
forces and called for trying Iraqi leaders for war crimes.

  Those who are reluctant to use force have focused on concerns about 
the idea of using pre-emptive force to protect our security. They have 
forgotten the war has never ended, that our aircraft pilots are being 
fired at daily.
  It is undisputed that our actions are taken as part of a U.N. program 
to protect the world from Saddam Hussein's aggression.
  Thus, we have every basis to use force to enforce the agreements 
Saddam Hussein made and to react to the hostile fire he brings to bear 
against us.
  My fear is that the President is being forced to deal with the 
tendency to move to the lowest common denominator that always results 
from U.N. negotiations, and will not be able to obtain the clarity we 
need from any resolution approved by the Security Council. So far, he 
has been courageous and effective. Let us stand with him so we can 
enhance the chances of a good resolution, not undermine his efforts 
with a lack of support.
  Regardless, it must continue to be clear that no one nation or group 
of nations will be allowed to block our duty to defend our people. 
Especially when we are dealing with a regime that violates U.N. 
resolutions and continually directs hostile fire at U.S. forces.
  This is an important time for America. We have a duty to protect our 
nation and our deployed forces from attack. We have the ability to do 
so. Our superb military personnel stand ready to put themselves at risk 
to promote our just national interests.
  We are fully justified in acting under the venerable doctrine of 
preventing an attack upon ourselves. When there is a smoking gun or a 
mushroom cloud it is too late.
  For those who have anxiety about the pre-emption doctrine, and I do 
not in this case, I urge them to remember that we have been in an 
actual state of military hostilities with Iraq almost since 1991. He 
shoots at our pilots and aircraft regularly. He has violated, in 16 
ways, the conditions that he agreed to save his evil regime.
  Let's not waiver, let's not delay, let's not go wobbly. Let us 
produce a strong vote for this strong resolution. Then the situation 
will become clear. We will say to Saddam Hussein, once and for all, you 
will disarm or, like the Taliban, you will fall.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. CARPER. Madam President, I come before the Senate this evening to 
join in this debate, to express my support for our Nation's effort to 
address the threat Saddam Hussein poses, and to lay out the concerns 
that I believe must be addressed if we are to succeed in disarming 
Iraq. The President has called upon Congress and the American people to 
support his administration in its effort to eliminate Saddam Hussein's 
hold on weapons of mass destruction. The Congress has responded by 
taking up this resolution authorizing the use of force, if needed, to 
strip Iraq of those weapons and the ability to deliver them. A number 
of serious questions have been raised in this historic debate. It is 
critical that President Bush and the Congress fulfill our obligation to 
all Americans, and to the international community, by ensuring that 
those questions are faithfully addressed.
  Saddam Hussein has shown himself to be an implacable foe of the 
United States. It is essential that we confront the threat that he 
represents. The question is not whether we confront it, but how we 
confront it. We must make every effort to build a multilateral 
coalition. If we do so, we raise the likelihood of bringing a measure 
of stability to a turbulent part of the world. If we do so, we can 
minimize the impact of any conflict on the Iraqi people, on Iraq's 
neighbors and on American and allied forces. And if we do so, we will 
serve to strengthen, not undermine, the international laws and 
institutions that have served us well in the years since World War II.
  Leadership is a responsibility that cannot be taken lightly. 
Leadership in deciding whether to resort to military force requires the 
greatest deliberation and consideration. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, in recent testimony before the House Armed Services 
Committee, said that ``no one with any sense considers war a first 
choice--it is the last thing that any rational person wants to do. And 
it is important that the issues surrounding this decision be discussed 
and debated.''

[[Page S10311]]

  It is clear to me that millions of Americans are discussing and 
debating the issues (that are before us this evening. I have heard from 
Delawareans throughout my state. I have heard from veterans who know 
the harsh realities of war. I have heard children who can scarcely 
imagine it. I am comforted by the fact that the American people, and 
their representative in Congress, have been thoughtful and deliberate 
in discussing the challenges that we face and how we might confront 
those challenges.
  This is not the first time that I have faced the question of how we 
ought to deal with Saddam Hussein's intransigence in the facet of 
international law. As a Member of the House of Representatives, I voted 
in 1991, along with many members of this body, to authorize President 
George Herbert Walker Bush to use military force to expel the armed 
forces of Iraq from Kuwait. I am proud of that vote, and I am prouder 
still of the American and allied forces that went on to liberate 
Kuwait.
  Having engaged in that debate, and witnessed Saddam Hussein's refusal 
to yield except when confronted with the threat of force, I have no 
illusions about the danger he poses to regional stability and 
international security today. I am concerned that Iraq remains in 
violation of more than a dozen Security Council resolutions. I am 
alarmed that the regime of Saddam Hussein continues to develop weapons 
of mass destruction in violation of the international agreements it 
promised to comply with at the end of the gulf war. Above all, I feel 
strongly that we must not allow Saddam Hussein to develop the capacity 
to acquire or deploy nuclear weapons.
  This past Monday night, President Bush addressed our Nation. He 
reminded us that there are significant risks to the United States both 
in acting and in not acting. If we choose not to act, we must remember 
that, in Saddam Hussein, we are talking about a man who has invaded his 
neighbors, showing a reckless disregard for the stability of a volatile 
region. We are talking about a man who has risked his own survival, and 
that of his regime, to indulge his own vengeance. Finally, we are 
talking about a man who has used weapons of mass destruction before, 
even against his own people.
  The need for action, however, does not preempt the need for an 
objective and open debate on the course of action we choose and the 
consequences of our subsequent actions. Bringing the weight of the 
world's disapproval to bear on Iraq; demanding unfettered inspections 
of every potential weapons site; and preparing for any military or 
diplomatic contingency offers us the best chance to face down our foe 
now and to ensure his permanent disarmament.
  Like many in this chamber, I believe that it is essential for us to 
work closely with the international community to reinstate inspections 
that will lead to Iraq's disarmament. But it's imperative that such 
inspections be unhindered. Inspectors must have the freedom to go where 
they want, when they want. They must have the right to talk to whomever 
they wish and to provide immediate amnesty to any Iraqis who provide 
information that might place them at risk of reprisal from the regime. 
Inspections are only valuable if they are truly a means of stripping 
Saddam Hussein of his weapons of mass destruction and his ability to 
deliver them. If Saddam Hussein's regime is unwilling to accept this 
level of intrusion, both he and Iraq must be prepared to accept the 
consequences, including the likelihood of a war they will lose.
  Looking back, one of the principal reasons we were so successful in 
the gulf war was because former President Bush and his administration 
did the hard work necessary to build a broad, strong international 
coalition before unleashing our military might. Our current President 
and his aides similarly did the hard work necessary to build such a 
coalition after the attacks on our country last fall. This up-front 
investment has paid off in the arrests of Al Qaeda operatives 
throughout the globe, as well as in the elimination of the regime that 
was harboring them in Afghanstan--though the war on terror is far from 
over. These are prime examples of America's global leadership in action 
at its very best. They are examples that we should emulate now.
  If we fail to uphold our international leadership responsibilities, 
and act without regard to the views and interests of our allies, we 
invite our isolation in the world. We undermine our position as a 
preeminent force in global policy and order. We make more difficult the 
task of securing the assistance of the international community in 
helping Iraq to return as a responsible member of the community of 
nations. We invite additional terrorist attacks on Americans at home 
and abroad, as well as put the fragile governments of many Muslim 
nations further at risk. Moreover, if we are perceived to act without 
the sanction of international law or authorization of the United 
Nations, we further fuel anti-American resentment in the Arab world, 
thereby increasing the threat to Israel. On the other hand, if we make 
an effort to work in concert with our allies, we have the opportunity 
to strengthen the international institutions that will be critical in 
addressing future threats.
  At a time when 24-hour news networks have made the images of war 
instantly accessible, our nation's recent military successes have made 
the awful realities of war appear ever more remote: images of laser-
guided bombs falling on indistinguishable targets; missiles lighting up 
the night sky. For an entire generation of Americans, our military 
efforts have come to be seen almost as a casualty-free video game, 
where no one gets hurt and few families face the knowledge that their 
son or daughter will not be coming home.
  But like a handful of my colleagues here in the Senate, I have known 
a different side to war, having seen if first-hand. During my 23 years 
in the Navy, including service in Southeast Asia, we witnessed 
soldiers, sailors, and airmen leaving for missions from which they 
would never return. I've met countless veterans who left part of 
themselves on the battlefield. Some of those heroes serve in this very 
body today.
  War can--and often does--enact a terrible price. It should be entered 
into as a last resort. So, the decision we face this week, which may 
lead to war, is not one that I take lightly. Nor do any of us.
  For the past 11 years, people in this country and elsewhere have 
second-guessed the decision of former President Bush to stop short of 
entering Baghdad in 1991. I have never criticized that decision. That 
flat, open sands on which our soldiers fought and won is a far 
different--and less dangerous--terrain than the streets of major Iraqi 
cities. There, our enemy's tactical advantage likely would have enacted 
a far heavier toll on American lives.
  If the course of events in this decade ultimately leads to another 
conflict with Iraq, and I hope it does not, the risks associated with 
urban warfare may well become a reality this time. Before they do, it 
is critical that we prepare ourselves, and the American people, for the 
losses we may endure in a military campaign of that nature.
  We must also face head-on the fact that, if war should occur, 
liberating Baghdad from Hussein's power will not solve every problem in 
the region. It will, however, force us to find answers to a difficult 
set of new questions. Among them, how will we operate in Iraq after a 
military victory? A number of competing factions will vie for control 
if Saddam Hussein is removed from power. Who will we support? How will 
we convince them to work together? We will need a coherent policy to 
help Iraq make the transition to political and economic stability. We 
will also need a great deal of patience and fortitude. Otherwise, we 
risk creating a less stable and more explosive Iraq than we face today 
and, worse yet, an even more volatile region.
  We have learned from our missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan 
that bringing meaningful change to unstable nations requires enormous 
time, resources, and effort. We have been relatively successful in 
restoring stability in Bosnia and Kosovo, but it has not been without a 
painstaking commitment over many years. Indeed, the U.S. and our NATO 
allies continue to maintain a significant troop presence in both of 
those nations.
  Afghanistan, on the other hand, has demonstrated how minimal troop 
commitments can impair efforts to restore peace in a war-ravaged 
nation. Hamid Karzai and his coalition government continue to express 
Afghanistan's ongoing need for adequate support and resources from the 
U.S. and other nations if the Afghan people are to realize

[[Page S10312]]

the peace and democracy of which they dream.
  In a post-war Iraq, the need for ongoing U.S. and allied intervention 
is likely to be far greater and far more costly. Experts in military 
operations maintain that creating a more stable Iraq will require the 
continued presence of between 50,000 to 100,000 troops. Not for a few 
weeks or months, but for several years.
  There is another question that I believe must be addressed as we move 
forward: How will we bear the financial burdens of such a mission? It 
is impossible to place a price tag on the lives that might be saved by 
disarming Saddam Hussein. At the same time, it would be fiscally 
irresponsible to take on such an operation without at least considering 
the impact of a potential war on our already fragile economy. Over the 
past 2 years, we have watched the stock market plummet, making its 
sharpest decline in 70 years. The budget surplus that we worked so hard 
to achieve in the 1990's is gone. All the while, current estimates 
project the likely cost of U.S. military action in Iraq to be in the 
range of $100 billion. These estimates do not include the prospect of 
long-term peacekeeping operations in the event of a regime change. The 
presence of tens of thousands of U.S. troops for months--maybe years--
once the fighting has ended will cost billions more. This is a cost we 
should not bear alone.
  I believe the principles and questions I have laid out today were 
best embodied in, and addressed by, the bipartisan resolution drafted 
earlier this month by Senate Richard Lugar and my fellow Senator from 
Delaware, Joe Biden--two Senators of intellect and skill in the area of 
international diplomacy. The Biden-Lugar draft resolution focused on 
the most critical task at hand--disarming Saddam Hussein. Senators 
Biden and Lugar carefully crafted this resolution to give President 
Bush the flexibility he needs to garner international support now for a 
tough, new U.N. Security Council resolution. Their draft resolution 
also provided the President with the authority to unleash U.S. military 
force against Iraq should he determine that Iraq's continued 
intransigence makes such action necessary. I'm disappointed that we 
will not have the opportunity to vote on that alternative this week. 
Having said that though, I do believe that the Biden-Lugar proposal 
contributed appreciatively to the change in direction that this debate 
has taken in recent weeks, particularly in its emphasis on acting 
together with our allies. That change in tone was clearly evident in 
the address of President Bush to the American people this past Monday 
night. What he said encouraged me and served to reassure much of our 
nation.
  The President spoke of the importance of working with the United 
Nations to craft a tough inspection regimen in Iraq. I agree with him. 
The President said that the U.N. must be ``an effective organization 
that helps keep the peace.'' I agree with him. The President told the 
American people that our primary goal in this endeavor is to strip 
Saddam Hussein of his ability to manufacture and deploy weapons of mass 
destruction. Again, I agree with him. We also heard the President state 
that he hopes the policy he has laid out will not require military 
action, although he acknowledged that it might. I hope it will not. We 
all share that hope in the Senate as members of this body prepare to 
cast our votes and to authorize the use of force if certain conditions 
are met.
  In closing, let me say for much of our Nation's history, the United 
States has been an instrument for peace and justice and a better life 
for the people of many nations throughout the world. That is our 
heritage. It is one of which we can be proud.
  There have been times in our history when we have had to go it alone. 
But history has shown that we have been most successful when we 
provided the leadership that compelled other nations to join us in a 
just cause--two World Wars, the Cold War, the Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the war on terrorism. Stripping Saddam 
Hussein, once and for all, of the weapons that would enable him to 
create havoc and great loss of life is a just cause. Other nations know 
that, too.
  If we make the case to them forcefully, skillfully, and persistently 
in the weeks ahead, they will join us. I am certain of it. The burden 
before us--disarming Iraq--is one we should not bear alone. If the 
President uses the powers inherent in this resolution authorizing the 
use of force with great skill and diplomacy, we will not have to bear 
this burden, and face this challenge, alone. An armada of nations, 
again, will join us, and together we will make this world, at least for 
a little while, a safer and saner place in which to live.
  I yield back my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada is recognized for 20 
minutes.
  Mr. ENSIGN. Madam President, as our nation appears to draw closer to 
war, I rise with full consciousness of the burden that each of us has 
to help guide our nation during this time of peril. It is indeed a 
heavy burden to bear, but nothing compared to the burden of those who 
serve in our military.
  The vote to authorize the use of force in Iraq is one of the most 
difficult and important votes any of us will ever cast. We need to 
approach this issue as if we are sending our very own children to war 
because, in effect, we are voting to send our nation's children to war.
  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recently told Congress that ``a 
decision to use military force is never easy. No one with any sense 
considers war a first choice.'' The risks of war are real but the risks 
of inaction may be even greater. As Ronald Reagan put it in his first 
inaugural address, ``I do not believe in a fate that will fall on us no 
matter what we do. I do believe in a fate that will fall on us if we do 
nothing.''
  The threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime is growing with each 
passing day. He has, at this moment, chemical and biological weapons he 
could use against us or share with terrorist networks that threaten us. 
He is pursuing nuclear weapons. He has used chemical weapons against 
his own people, and against foreign forces. He has invaded two of his 
neighbors and fired ballistic missiles at four of his neighbors. He 
supports terrorist networks, and has harbored senior al-Qaida 
terrorists in Baghdad since September 11. He has a long-standing 
hostility toward the United States, because we have denied him his 
ambition to occupy the territory of his neighbors and dominate the 
Persian Gulf region. He has openly praised the September 11th attacks, 
and his state-run press has called them ``God's punishment.'' He has 
warned that Americans should understand that ``every Iraqi [can] become 
a missile.''
  Each of us needs to carefully weigh the risks posed by his regime the 
risk of acting and the risk of doing nothing in the face of this 
threat. And Mr. President, I submit that the risk of inaction far 
outweigh the risk of war in Iraq. Here is why:

  For most of our history, America has been able to rely on our 
geography to protect us. Two oceans, and friendly neighbors, provided a 
buffer against enemies who might want to attack us. After September 
11th, we now know our invulnerability has passed away. We are not only 
vulnerable to terrorists who use airplanes as missiles we are 
vulnerable to terrorist networks and terrorist states that want to use 
weapons of mass destruction against us.
  As Secretary Rumsfeld has pointed out, when the threats came from 
conventional weapons, our country could afford to wait for an attack to 
happen, absorb the first blow, regroup, and then respond militarily. In 
the age of weapons of mass destruction, however, we can no longer 
afford to wait.
  In this new security environment, we must become more proactive in 
our efforts to prevent attacks that have the potential to be far worse 
than that of September 11. We must make sure when possible that those 
who have the desire to attack us are prevented from having the means 
with which to carry out those attacks. We have a right and an 
obligation to take anticipatory action in our own self-defense.
  This certainly would not be the first time that our nation engaged in 
preventative military action in defense of our homeland. During the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy ordered a military blockade of 
Cuba in 1962, an act of war under international law. This was done even 
though the Soviets were not engaged in an armed attack, nor were the 
missiles an imminent threat.
  Today, Saddam Hussein poses a similar threat. And we should give this 
President the authority he needs to

[[Page S10313]]

deal with the Iraqi threat now, before it reaches our shores.
  Saddam Hussein poses a very real and imminent danger to the United 
States. According to the CIA, Iraq ``has broad capability to attack'' 
the U.S. ``with chemical or biological weapons and could build a 
nuclear bomb within a year if it obtains fissile material from 
abroad.'' Iraq ``probably'' has ``stockpiled more than 100 tons of 
mustard gas and other chemical weapons. Iraq has developed `large 
scale' capability to produce anthrax and other bioweapons in mobile 
facilities that are easy to hide and hard to destroy.''
  The longer we wait, the stronger he becomes, and the harder he will 
be to defeat. Saddam Hussein's regime hosts terrorist networks and has 
directly ordered acts of terror on foreign soil. He has used weapons of 
mass murder before, and would not hesitate to use them again.

  Moreover, Saddam Hussein's ongoing defiance of U.N. Security Council 
resolutions has made clear that he has no intention of disarming or 
discontinuing his weapons of mass destruction programs.
  Remember, our goal is not to get weapons inspectors back into Iraq. 
Our goal is disarmament. And Saddam Hussein has shown that he is not 
willing to disarm. To the contrary, he has proven willing to pay an 
enormously high price to maintain his weapons of mass destruction 
aspirations. Under U.N. sanctions, he has given up about $180 billion 
in oil revenue to keep his weapons of mass destruction. As Richard 
Butler, a former U.N. chief weapons inspector has said, ``The 
fundamental problem with Iraq remains the nature of the regime, itself. 
Saddam Hussein is a homicidal dictator who is addicted to weapons of 
mass destruction.''
  Congress recognized that fact in 1998 when it passed The Iraq 
Liberation Act stating that, ``It should be the policy of the United 
States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein 
from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic 
government to replace that regime.'' We knew then what we know now--
that regime change and disarmament are inextricably linked.
  Just like there are career criminals there are career criminal 
regimes. Leniency only incites them to more violence. They are driven; 
they are compulsive. And unless they are constantly thwarted they will 
continue to prey on the weak and defenseless.
  We cannot stake the lives of tens of thousands of innocent American 
citizens on the hope that Saddam Hussein will never use his weapons of 
mass destruction against us. He has already proven that he cannot be 
trusted, and that he poses a great threat to the peace and stability of 
the world. This is a critical moment for the United States. If Saddam 
Hussein is appeased with more talk of weakened, compromised weapons 
inspections, which he has repeatedly defied, we risk leaving our 
country open for another catastrophic attack, one potentially far worse 
than the heinous acts of September 11th.
  As we debate how to deal with the Iraqi threat, we must never forget 
that in Saddam Hussein we are dealing not just with a homicidal 
dictator; we are confronting Evil that is akin to Stalin and Hitler.
  Just ask former Iraqi general, Najib Salhi. He defected from Iraq and 
was living in Amman, Jordan when one day he came home to find a package 
from Saddam Hussein's intelligence service. He opened it to find a 
video tape.
  When he put it into the VCR, he saw what he thought was a 
pornographic film--till he realized, to his horror, that he was 
watching the rape of one of his closest female relatives. The message 
was clear. They wanted to blackmail him into silence.
  That is the face of Evil.
  Or consider the fact that Saddam Hussein's regime has admitted to 
having weaponized aflotoxin--the only country in the world known to 
have done so. As former CIA Director Jim Woolsey has stated, ``The only 
use of aflatoxin is that it creates cancer, long-term cancer, 
especially in children.''
  Aflatoxin has no military value. It has no battlefield use. It takes 
tens of years to kill its victim. It is a weapons whose only purpose is 
to kill innocent people for murder's sake. Richard Spertzel, the former 
chief biological weapons inspector for UNSCOM, declared that aflatoxin 
is ``a devilish weapon. From a moral standpoint, aflatoxin is the 
cruelest weapon--it means watching children die slowly of liver 
cancer.''
  That is the face of Evil.
  Look at the attacks Saddam Hussein has ordered on his own people--on 
thousands of innocent men, women, and children--in Halabja, using a 
chemical weapons cocktail. Those attacks are causing cancer and genetic 
mutations that will be felt in this generation and the next.
  That is the face of Evil.
  Saddam Hussein is a man who has personally shot and killed members of 
his own cabinet; who has ordered his opponents to be burned alive in 
vats of acid; who forces those suspected of disloyalty to watch the 
gang rape of their mothers, daughters, wives, and sisters; who not only 
tortures dissidents, but tortures their children in front of them.
  He is the living incarnation of an Evil that cannot be appeased and 
cannot be deterred, and must be confronted and defeated.
  He has murdered hundreds of thousands of innocent people--and is 
pursuing weapons that will allow him to extend his deadly reach across 
oceans and continents--that will give him the capability to kill our 
people--our children, our families.
  The President has rightly called Saddam Hussein ``a student of 
Stalin.'' And I applaud him for his resolve in confronting the dangers 
posed by the Iraqi Regime.
  The President has awakened the world to the existence of evil in our 
midst--and challenged the world to confront that evil before it 
confronts us, at the cost of millions of lives.
  It is a natural reaction to flee in the face of evil. It is little 
wonder that much of the world has been reluctant to stand its ground 
and face down Saddam Hussein, which is why the President's leadership 
has been critical, and why it is so important for the United States 
Congress to show similar resolve, and demonstrate our unity with the 
President.
  In showing steadfastness and steely determination, the President made 
clear to the Iraqi regime, and the world, that we were not going to 
repeat the tired old pattern of meeting Iraq's threats with inaction. 
And that leadership has had an impact. One by one we have seen nations 
join the U.S. in recognition that Saddam must go. Some have said so 
publicly, others privately. Let there be no doubt: if we go to war, we 
will not be going it alone.
  Thanks to our President, the world understands that there is a price 
to be paid for defying the United States when our survival is at stake. 
And I believe that a strong show of support by Congress will strengthen 
the President's hand at the United Nations.
  While we greatly value the support of our allies in the war on 
terror, we must never give other nations the authority to stop us from 
defending our freedom or from acting in our own self-defense. We must 
do what we feel is right in protecting America, whether or not we have 
the approval of France, Russia, China or any of the other nations which 
currently sit on the U.N. Security Council.
  None of us takes the prospect of war lightly. War is difficult and 
dangerous, and lives will be lost. I understand the concerns many 
Americans have about war in Iraq, and I fully appreciate the sacrifice 
American families make when they lose a loved-one in the fight to keep 
America and the rest of the world free from tyranny and oppression.
  This country lives, freedom lives, because brave men and women were 
willing to die for it--willing to risk their lives, and give their 
lives, for a cause greater than themselves. As scripture teaches 
``there is no greater love than this: that a man lay down his life for 
his friends.'' We are all concerned for the well being of our troops, 
and we thank them for their willingness to keep America safe from the 
evil that has been made so apparent in the last year.
  While I value diplomacy and rhetoric, there comes a time when force 
is inevitable--when our choice is not between war and peace, but 
between war today, when our enemy is weaker, or war tomorrow, when our 
enemy is stronger. That is the choice we face today.

[[Page S10314]]

  We have tried diplomacy. We have imposed sanctions. We have sent 
inspectors. All attempts to reason with the Iraqi Regime have failed. 
The only language Saddam Hussein understands is force.
  Indeed, in a way, we are already at war with Iraq. Since hostilities 
ended in 1991, Iraq has repeatedly violated the ceasefire conditions 
which were set out at the close of the Gulf War. Just ask our brave 
pilots who are being shot almost every day as they patrol the no-fly 
zones over Iraq.
  After President Bush's speech to the U.N., Saddam Hussein sent a 
letter to the U.N. promising to ``allow the return of United Nations 
weapons inspectors to Iraq without conditions.'' He went on to say that 
Iraq ``based its decision concerning the return of inspectors on its 
desire to complete the implementation of the relevant Security Council 
resolutions and to remove any doubts that Iraq still possesses weapons 
of mass destruction.''
  Hours after that letter arrived at the U.N., Iraq was shooting at 
U.S. aircraft implementing those same relevant U.N. Security Council 
resolutions. Since 1992, the Iraqis have used anti-aircraft artillery, 
or Triple-A, against our aircraft in the northern and southern no-fly 
zones. In fact, over the last three years Iraqi Triple-A has fired at 
coalition aircraft over 1,000 times. This year to date they have fired 
on us over 400 times--and since that September 16 letter where Saddam 
pledged his support for U.N. resolutions they have fired on coalition 
aircraft more than 70 times. It appears that Iraq has actually stepped 
up its firing on U.S. and British planes since he agreed to cooperate 
with the U.N. Actions speak louder than words. And for 11 years Saddam 
Hussein's actions have shown that he is bent upon pursuing weapons of 
mass destruction at all costs.
  After all, three days after Saddam Hussein's September 16th letter 
pledging the unconditional return of weapons inspectors, Iraq's foreign 
minister stated U.N. resolutions were ``unjust and at odds with the 
U.N. charter and international law.'' He further declared, ``Iraq 
demands that its inalienable rights are met, including respect for its 
sovereignty, security and the lifting of the blockade imposed on it.'' 
Then Baghdad stated that the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding which 
exempted certain presidential palaces must stand. I am sure we will 
hear from time to time that Baghdad is once again stating that 
unconditional inspections could take place. The words change, but the 
actions stay the same. They keep right on firing at our pilots.
  Madam President, on September 11, 3,000 innocent citizens were 
killed. If their deaths are to have any meaning, our nation must not 
forget the lesson they gave their lives for us to learn. The era of our 
invulnerability is over. Evil exists--it is real, it is out there, and 
it seeks our destruction. If we ignore it, it will not go away. It will 
continue to stalk us, and kill more of our people.
  It must be confronted and it must be defeated.
  ``There is a time for all things,'' the Rev. Peter Muhlenberg told 
his congregation on the eve of the Revolutionary War, ``a time to 
preach and a time to pray. But those times have passed away. There is a 
time to fight, and that time has now come.''
  We have listened and we have prayed. Now we must fight.
  For the best honor we can bestow on those who have died for our 
nation, and those who will die for our nation, is victory. Victory over 
terrorism. And if the President believes it is necessary to secure our 
freedom, victory over the regime of Saddam Hussein.
  Madam President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Graham's and Senator Cantwell's time be changed. Senator Graham will go 
before Senator Cantwell.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Florida is recognized for 30 minutes.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Madam President.
  Madam President, I rise this evening to speak to my colleagues, more 
importantly to speak to the people of the United States and, 
especially, my fellow Floridians.
  In my service in the Senate I have not shied away from authorizing 
the use of force when I believed it was in our Nation's interests.
  I voted to use force in the Persian Gulf in 1991. I voted to use 
force in Bosnia in 1992. I voted to use force in Kosovo in 1999.
  I have given the President of the United States a presumption of 
correctness in his assessment of our national security interest.
  But, Madam President, tonight I am going to vote no on this 
resolution. The reason is this resolution is too timid. It is too 
limiting. It is too weak. This resolution fails to recognize the new 
reality of the era of terrorism. And that reality is that war abroad 
will, without assertive security actions, increase the prospects of 
terrorist attacks here at home.
  In fact, war on Iraq alone leaves Americans more vulnerable to the 
No. 1 threat facing us today, those international terrorist 
organizations that have the capability to inflict upon us a repeat of 
the tragedy of September 11.
  The resolution I had hoped we would pass would contain what the 
President has asked for relative to the use of force against Saddam 
Hussein's regime in Iraq, and more.
  It also should provide the President all necessary authorities to use 
force against the international terrorist groups that will probably 
strike the United States as the regime of Saddam Hussein crumbles.
  I offered an amendment on this floor yesterday that would have given 
the President the authorities he needs to deal with the threat posed by 
the five deadliest terrorist organizations in addition to al-Qaida--
that would gladly join Saddam Hussein in his retaliatory strike.
  Those five organizations have already killed hundreds of Americans. 
Those five organizations have ties to countries that could provide them 
with weapons of mass destruction. Those five organizations have the 
capability to strike within our homeland. They have recruited, trained, 
and placed operatives in our hometowns.
  I argued that the President should have the option to set priorities 
and choose our targets, and to be able to preempt terrorists before 
they can order strikes against us in our homeland. Unfortunately, that 
amendment was rejected.
  Some said I was incorrect in my contention that the President, as 
Commander in Chief, lacks the power to expand the war on terrorism 
beyond al-Qaida. I disagree. But I will not repeat the legal arguments 
that I made yesterday.
  But even accepting the fact that others may disagree, how is it in 
the interest of our Nation's security to leave the question in doubt as 
to whether the President has the authority to attack these 
international terrorist organizations that represent such a lethal 
threat to the people of the United States?
  There have been some past administrations which have allowed leaders 
of rogue states to be uncertain as to how America would respond if they 
used weapons of mass destruction. This administration should not repeat 
that fundamental error.
  If we want to deter the world's terrorists and madmen, shouldn't we 
tell them, in the most explicit terms, what they will face by U.S. 
retaliation to their action?
  I also want to restate my conviction that this resolution forces the 
President to focus our military and intelligence resources on the wrong 
target. A historical example, which has been used repeatedly in this 
debate, is the example of the 1930s: that England, France, and other 
nations, which would eventually join in the world's greatest alliance, 
slept while Hitler's power grew.
  They say the equivalent of passing this resolution is to have 
declared war on Hitler. I disagree with that assessment of what this 
lesson of history means. In my judgment, passing this resolution 
tonight will be the equivalent of declaring war on Italy. That is not 
what we should be doing. We should not be declaring war just on 
Mussolini's Italy. We should also be declaring war on Hitler's Germany.
  There are good reasons to consider attacking today's Italy, by which 
I

[[Page S10315]]

mean Iraq. Saddam Hussein's regime has chemical and biological weapons 
and is trying to get nuclear capacity. But the briefings I have 
received suggest our efforts, for instance, to block him from obtaining 
necessary nuclear materials have been largely successful, as evidenced 
by the recent intercept of centrifuge tubes, and that he is years away 
from having nuclear capability.
  So why does it make sense to attack this era's Italy and not Germany, 
especially when by attacking Italy, we are making Germany a more 
probable adversary?
  The CIA has warned us that international terrorist organizations will 
probably use United States action against Iraq as a justification for 
striking us here in the homeland. You might ask: What does the word 
``probably'' mean in intelligence speak. ``Probably'' means there is a 
75 percent or greater chance of the event occurring. And the event is 
that international terrorist organizations will use United States 
action against Iraq as a justification for striking us here in the 
homeland.
  Let me read a declassified portion of a CIA report recently presented 
to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence:

       Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of 
     conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or [chemical 
     and biological weapons] against the United States.
       Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no 
     longer be deterred, he probably would become much less 
     constrained in adopting terrorist actions.
       Such terrorism might involve conventional means . . . or 
     [chemical and biological weapons].
       Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting 
     Islamic terrorists in conducting a [weapon of mass 
     destruction] attack against the United States would be his 
     last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of 
     victims with him.

  In other words, the odds of another strike against the people of the 
United States by al-Qaida or one of the international terrorist groups 
goes up when we attack Baghdad.
  The President should be in the most advantageous position to protect 
Americans, to launch preemptive strikes and hack off the heads of these 
snakes. With the resolution before us, we are denying the President 
that opportunity, and we are sending confusing signals to our people 
and our allies as to the sincerity of our commitment to the war on 
terrorism.
  The American people and our allies gave President Bush their 
wholehearted support in the war on terrorism after September 11. They 
cheered our efforts to remove Osama bin Laden and the Taliban 
government from Afghanistan. A year after we commenced that war, action 
in Afghanistan has ground to a virtual halt. Osama bin Laden remains at 
large, and we have not moved aggressively beyond Afghanistan to take on 
the cells of al-Qaida operatives in other parts of the world.
  We also know of sanctuaries, training camps where the next generation 
of terrorists are being trained and that those sanctuaries are going 
unattacked.
  With sadness, I predict we will live to regret on this day, October 
10, 2002, we stood by, and we allowed those terrorist organizations to 
continue growing in the shadows. It may be days, weeks, months, or 
years before they strike Americans again, but they will, and we will 
have allowed them to grow that capability.
  If we are going to pass this resolution--and I expect we will--there 
are several things we should say about the need to protect the American 
people. Within the region of the Middle East and central Asia, we have 
a constellation of challenges, threats, and commitments of the United 
States. We need to use this period of time to begin to reduce the 
threat environment in that area by active, sustained U.S. diplomacy on 
two half-century-old disputes: The dispute between Israel and 
Palestine, and the dispute over Kashmir, the festering sore between two 
nuclear powers, India and Pakistan.
  Second, the President a year ago should have ordered all of the law 
enforcement agencies under his control to design a comprehensive means 
of determining the number, location, and capability of terrorists who 
are living among us. But tonight, no one in our government can fully 
tell us which, when, where, and how terrorist organizations might hurt 
us. This I consider to be a stunning admission and an unnecessary 
vulnerability.
  At this late hour, such action should be of the most urgent priority. 
This should be done, of course, within the confines of the protections 
afforded to all American persons by the Constitution of the United 
States.
  Third, we should be moving to detain all those who can be legally 
detained who represent a threat to the United States.
  Fourth, the President should direct the military forces of our 
country to prepare to execute a full-fledged war on terrorism. We must 
complete our mission in Afghanistan and then move to the next targets 
of al-Qaida cells.
  Finally, I would advise the President to request of the Congress the 
authorities he needs to execute the war on terror and to protect 
Americans. Specifically, this should include the authority to use force 
against those international terrorist organizations with the greatest 
capability to kill Americans here at home, with the greatest history of 
having used their evil intent against Americans, and with the largest 
number of terrorist operatives located within the United States.
  Our people need to know their government is doing all it can to keep 
them safe. Tonight many Americans are anxious and frightened, and they 
have cause to be. One year ago letters carrying anthrax killed five 
Americans, including one in my home State, and created great concern. 
That case has not yet been solved.
  One year later, here in the Capital region, a sniper is randomly 
taking lives of innocent people going about their daily activities. 
Just hours ago, police confirmed the man who was shot last night while 
pumping gas into his car at a service station is the eighth victim, six 
of whom are dead. And in today's Washington Post, a front page article 
has the headline ``Probe Less Cohesive Than Advertised.''
  It states:

       Behind the scenes at the command central, however, 
     interviews with leading investigators suggest that while some 
     aspects of the massive effort are working well, others are 
     fraught with the same turf battles, politics, leaks and 
     confusion that historically have characterized manhunts of 
     this size.

  Are these acts that we are trying to unravel those of a madman, a mad 
scientist, a terrorist? The honest answer is that we do not know. In 
these frightening times, it is irresponsible to add to the anxiety of 
the American people by going to war with Iraq--without taking the 
additional steps required to curtail the possibility of more horrors 
being inflicted upon us here in our homeland. This resolution fails to 
take those steps.
  Different people have different opinions of what our national 
security priorities should be. Clearly, some--including the President--
believe the first priority should be regime change in Baghdad. Others 
believe our first priority should be to disarm Iraq by removing its 
weapons of mass destruction. As important as they may be, I have a 
different view.
  The United States has many challenges, threats, and commitments to 
respond to, particularly in the region of the Middle East and central 
Asia. These include the Israel-Palestine conflict, the India-Pakistan 
standoff, and the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. Even if 
we say the No. 1 issue in the region should be containing weapons of 
mass destruction--especially nuclear weapons--I frankly do not believe 
Iraq should be our first concern. We do not know the full capabilities 
of the State of Israel, although we believe it has the full capacity to 
defend itself against attacks, or the threat of an attack. We are aware 
of the significant capacity possessed by India, Pakistan, and Iran. I 
can say without fear of contradiction that all of these possess 
substantially greater capabilities and means of delivering nuclear or 
other weapons of mass destruction than Iraq.
  Of all the issues we care about, and those issues over which we have 
some capability to determine the outcome, in my judgment, the No. 1 
priority should be the war on terrorism and its threat to the people of 
the United States in our homeland. Our top targets should be those 
groups that have the greatest potential to repeat what happened on 
September 11, killing thousands of Americans. Passing this

[[Page S10316]]

timid resolution, I fear, will only increase the chances of Americans 
again being killed. That is not a burden of probability I am prepared 
to accept. Therefore, I will vote no.
  I close with the words spoken in one of the darkest periods of the 
history of the Western World. In 1941, Winston Churchill said:

       Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and 
     easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can 
     measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter.
       The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that 
     once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of 
     policy, but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable 
     events.

  Mr. REID. Madam President, how much time did the Senator from Florida 
use?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator used 20 minutes.
  Mr. REID. And he had 30 allocated to him. Therefore, I ask unanimous 
consent that Senator Mikulski be recognized for 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Maryland is recognized.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Madam President, after careful consideration, I have 
decided to oppose the Bush resolution on Iraq. This resolution would 
give President Bush the unilateral authority he seeks to go to war 
against Iraq without international support or international resources. 
The resolution includes only tepid language supporting diplomatic 
efforts at the United Nations.
  The Senate is making a grave decision: Whether to give the President 
unlimited authority to go to war and send American military men and 
women into harm's way.
  I take this responsibility very seriously. I have listened to the 
President and his advisors. I have consulted with experts and wise 
heads. I have participated in hearings and briefings as a member of the 
Senate, and particularly as a member of the Intelligence Committee. I 
have listened intently to my own constituents.
  The American people are deeply ambivalent. The American people want a 
safer world, a world in which distant tyrants can't threaten us and our 
bases and our embassies and our treasured allies. The American people 
are counting on us to assess the Iraqi threat and to confront it with 
our allies. They and I firmly believe that Saddam Hussein is 
duplicitous, deceptive, and dangerous.
  Iraq has grim and ghoulish weapons to carry out his evil plans. As 
part of the Gulf War cease-fire agreement, Saddam Hussein committed to 
destroying its chemical and biological and nuclear weapons programs and 
longer-range missiles. Instead, Saddam Hussein is trying to add nuclear 
weapons to an arsenal that already includes chemical and biological 
weapons and ballistic missiles.
  These threats cannot be ignored and allowed to grow. But these are 
not only threats to us. These are threats to the international 
community, and the international community must share the 
responsibility of addressing them.
  I support a robust multinational response to the Iraqi threat. That's 
why I supported the Levin resolution, urging the United Nations 
Security Council to fulfill President Bush's request to demand Iraqi 
disarmament, verified by unfettered inspections, and to authorize the 
use of multinational force if Iraq refuses to comply.
  If the UN refuses to act, then Congress would consider a request from 
the President to authorize acting alone against Iraq.
  Let me be very clear on one point. The United States always has the 
authority to take military action in self-defense. That is our right 
under international law, included as Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter, and I support that.
  President Bush says he has not yet decided whether the use of 
military force is necessary, and I take him at his word.
  The United States should first exhaust all diplomatic and other non-
military means.
  The United States should give the United Nations the opportunity to 
fulfill its responsibility to address the Iraqi threat.
  The United States should fully pursue whether the UN Security Council 
will authorize the use of multinational force.
  The Bush resolution, the White House resolution, would authorize the 
President to send our Armed Forces to war against Iraq without any 
further consideration by Congress.
  Under the Levin resolution, which I cosponsored, Congress would 
remain in session, standing ready to promptly reconsider if the UN does 
not meet the challenge.
  I have had to ask myself, 'Why should the Senate wait to see what the 
United Nations will do before deciding on the unilateral use of force?
  The answer is this:
  Voting now in support of unilateral action would take the 
international community off the hook.
  Why would the other members of the United Nations Security Council 
make the tough decision to effectively authorize war against a member 
state if they know the U.S. will do it by ourselves?
  I believe this resolution would actually weaken the negotiating 
position of the President and the Secretary of State at the United 
Nations.
  Why would other nations send their troops into harm's way if America 
is ready to send our troops without them?
  Why would other nations join us to rebuild Iraq after a war if Uncle 
Sam is willing to bear the financial burden, as well as the dangers?
  I'm concerned about the prospect of America going it alone because 
I've thought about the risks and consequences.
  The risks and consequences of acting alone are so much greater than 
they would be for multinational action.
  The risks to our troops are greater if allied forces do not join the 
mission.
  The challenge in post-conflict Iraq is greater if other nations do 
not share the burden and the cost.
  The consequences for the war on terrorism are greater if we lose the 
essential cooperation of other nations in the effort to pursue al-Qaida 
and other terrorist groups. The consequences on our economy would be 
severe.
  A mandate from the United Nations would mean the international 
community against Saddam instead of the United States against Iraq, and 
other countries in the region would join our coalition rather than 
obstructing or opposing us.
  I recognize that I will likely be in the minority on this vote. The 
Senate and House of Representatives will probably grant the President 
the broad authority he now seeks.
  I will vote differently than the majority, but I want my 
constituents, particularly our men and women in uniform, to know that I 
believe my vote represents the wisest, most prudent course with them in 
mind.
  America's soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines will always have my 
full and steadfast support. I stand accountable to the oath I took to 
defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. I 
hold myself accountable to my constituents, and I am prepared to defend 
this vote because I think when history is written, it would have been 
wiser not to give authority to go it alone right now.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized 
for 15 minutes.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I thank the Chair.
  Madam President, I can recall 11 years ago--12 years ago actually--I 
made my maiden speech on the floor of the Senate. It was about Saddam 
Hussein and going to war with President Bush in office. Here we are 12 
years later doing the same thing.
  I rise today to again support the President in his duty, I believe, 
to stop Iraq from bringing weapons of mass destruction throughout the 
world. When I addressed this topic in January of 1991, I said then that 
there was a lot of talk about George Bush--President Bush 41--leading 
us into war. What I said then, and I will say now, is that was wrong. 
It is Saddam Hussein who is leading us into war. The same holds true 
today as it did 12 years ago.
  Those voices against the Desert Storm operation, some of whom are 
repeating this same antiwar rhetoric today, are simply wrong. The 
warmonger is Saddam Hussein. He is now moving us toward another major 
military engagement with the stakes even higher than they were 12 years 
ago.
  Unfortunately, Desert Storm did not finish the job. There has been 
some

[[Page S10317]]

criticism about that. Given the data and facts President Bush had at 
the time and with the U.N. resolution, he did what he had to do.
  If we calculate the costs of air operations, no-fly zones, and other 
activities over these past 12 years, containment has not worked. In 
this age of weapons of mass destruction, relying on a policy of 
containment and deterrence is a risk we cannot and must not take.
  I pulled out a copy of the speech I made in 1991. I do not know 
anyone in this body who wants war. I do not know anyone in America who 
wants war. I certainly do not. The President does not. Nobody wants 
war. Yet we heard today on the floor that President Bush is leading us 
into war, and that is wrong.

  Thomas Paine, who is often quoted, over 200 years ago said: These are 
the times that try men's souls. This is the time that American service 
men and women are keenly aware of the enormous burden which the world 
events have placed upon us. I said that in 1991, and it is true today.
  Unfortunately, Saddam Hussein is still with us. The stakes are high. 
We are in a virtual state of war now with Saddam Hussein and with Iraq, 
but it has not produced the necessary results. Saddam is again 
developing the potential to threaten us with weapons of mass 
destruction and with terrorist attacks.
  This threat has to be met. It just simply has to be met head on. And 
the only answer is the overthrow of Saddam's regime one way or the 
other--domestically if possible, militarily if necessary. The stakes 
are simply too high not to do it.
  I served in Vietnam. Others have served in war. We all know the 
stakes. If we do not do this, people may die. If we do this, people 
will die. Imagine the tremendous burden that is placed now upon the 
President of the United States.
  Democracies do not threaten democracies, and democracies do not start 
wars. We would all be much safer nations if everybody believed the way 
we did, but that is not the way it is.
  We have learned much in the wake of the vicious attack upon our 
country on September 11. Frankly, we were pretty much asleep. We were 
complacent. The terrorist attacks in Africa, the U.S.S. Cole, Khobar 
Towers, our barracks in Saudi Arabia--these losses were largely 
inflicted on our military and on our State Department personnel, but we 
were still largely oblivious to the risks we faced right here on 
American soil. We were not prepared for the devastation of 9/11 and the 
lives of nearly 3,000 innocent Americans lost. The total costs are 
immeasurable. Some say as much as a trillion dollars, but how about in 
the human loss? All the children orphaned, young people, men and women 
who were embarking on careers--what they might have contributed to 
America over the next several years we will never know.
  What Saddam Hussein is doing has to be met. He is a threat to the 
people of the world. He is indeed a threat to the world. I know. I have 
seen enough intelligence on this over the past several years to know--
not only to believe it but to know it. Weapons of mass destruction--
nuclear, biological, and chemical, whatever they may be--can kill 
millions in insidious ways throughout the world. We simply cannot let 
this stand.
  I know, having been there, the enormous burden felt by young men and 
women in uniform who will be there when and if this happens. They need 
our support. Have the debate, get the debate behind us, and get behind 
our men and women because they are going to have to do the work, and 
they deserve our support, unlike Vietnam when the troops did not get 
that support.
  We need to find out where the links to al-Qaida are. They annihilate 
innocent people by virtue of their religious faith or their national 
identity. That is what they are doing. They will do it with terrorist 
bombs on their backs. They can do it with nuclear missiles or 
biological or chemical missiles as well.
  If there are some in doubt, I urge them to go down to the Holocaust 
Museum and take a look and see what the cost of doing nothing is: 6 
million innocent lives annihilated because we stood by as a world and 
let it go too long, and then we finally stopped it. We cannot let this 
go too long. Six million lives lost the way Hitler took them is 
horrible, and as despicable as it was, it is nothing compared to the 
number of lives that can be taken in more evil and despicable ways now.
  Some say we should not take preemptive action. Preemptive action? 
There is already action taken against the United States of America. 
Remember the 3,000 people dead. This is not preemptive. We are 
reacting.
  Our survival as a nation is at risk. Earlier this year in the wake of 
the unprecedented and vicious attack in the United States and world by 
al-Qaida, President Bush came before the American people in his State 
of the Union Address and unveiled his advocacy for regime change in 
Iraq.
  That is a sound policy. And this is a terrible dilemma. How would you 
like to be the President of the United States today, sitting in the 
White House contemplating what has to be done? Criticized if you take 
action, criticized if you don't; risking death if you do, risking death 
if you don't.
  There is no time in American history where a decision has been more 
important. There is no more important debate, ever, in my view, in 
American history where the stakes are higher than they are right now.
  I am standing right now at the desk of Daniel Webster. He probably 
from this desk made some of the greatest speeches in the history of 
this body, but none of them, whether they were about slavery or all the 
great issues of the day of the 1830s and 1840s, even come close to the 
impact of what could happen by allowing this man, this despot, to move 
forward in the world unchecked.
  We cannot rely on the United Nations, weapons inspectors, or Saddam's 
word that he is going to comply with inspections and disarm. I wish we 
could. Neville Chamberlain thought that about Hitler, didn't he?
  Saddam Hussein's brutal dictatorship has reigned for 30 years. During 
these three decades, we have seen him attack Iran in a war that took a 
million lives; we have seen him repress, through murder and terror, 
ethnic and political elements in Iraq; We have seen him use weapons of 
mass destruction on 250 occasions against the civilian population. He 
had come close to producing a nuclear device before the gulf war and is 
successfully continuing these efforts despite several years of failed 
weapons inspections. He has breached international law. He has invaded 
Kuwait. He set oil wells on fire. He has threatened the stability of 
the world. He prompted the use of military force to contain him, and 
Saddam Hussein has tried to assassinate a former President of the 
United States of America.
  He is a sponsor of Islamic terrorism throughout the world, and his 
regime has harbored the likes and established relations with Osama bin 
Laden's al-Qaida. What more evidence do we need to act?
  This resolution also touches my heart in another way. This resolution 
makes very brief mention that Iraq has failed to account for an 
American serviceman. It might be a small matter compared to the big 
issue of war with Iraq, but Captain Speicher, who was shot down over 
Iraq, was the first pilot lost in the war. He was pronounced dead by 
the Pentagon, but there is no evidence that he is dead. The information 
was incorrect. His status changed in January 2001. I worked for 7 years 
to change that status and President Clinton, to his credit, prior to 
leaving office, changed that status. I give him great credit for that 
because he very well may be a prisoner held by Saddam Hussein today. In 
short, whether he is a prisoner or not, Saddam Hussein knows what 
happened to him. We do not. This is simply unacceptable.
  By not seeking a regime change in Iraq, by not backing our policies 
with military force, by not dismantling Saddam's regime and weapons of 
mass destruction, I am concerned America will repeat its folly and give 
Saddam the breathing room to produce a nuclear device, proliferate it, 
threaten to use it, or use it. He will continue to support terrorism 
which devastated our Nation.
  I supported the resolution on Iraq during the administration of 
President Bush 41, and I will support the resolution of this President 
Bush to give him the power to authorize the use of military force 
against Iraq.
  I will close with a comment I made in my closing remarks in 1991:


[[Page S10318]]


       Stand with the Commander in Chief. Have the courage to 
     stand with him who was elected by all of the American people. 
     Stand with him, and stand with our sons and daughters in the 
     Persian Gulf. Do not give Saddam Hussein a reason to doubt 
     our resolve. Stand together. Let us discard Saddam Hussein on 
     the garbage heap of history along with the other despots like 
     Khrushchev, Stalin, and Hitler. That is where he belongs, and 
     that is where we are going to put him sooner or later.

  Unfortunately, it is a little bit later than we expected. We need not 
fear. We are the greatest Nation in the world, with the greatest 
people, and I believe it is the right thing to confront this monster 
and do it now. That is why I will be supporting President Bush.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DURBIN). The Senator from Washington is 
recognized for 30 minutes.
  Ms. CANTWELL. Mr. President, I come to the floor today to discuss 
S.J. Res. 46, the Lieberman, Warner Bayh-McCain resolution, and the 
issue that everyone of my colleagues agree on--that Iraq is in serious 
violation of its U.S. and U.N. agreements prohibiting its possession of 
weapons of mass destruction.
  What my colleagues cannot agree on is how we should go about 
disarming Iraq.
  Let me add my views.
  I believe that the best way to deal with the threat posed by Saddam 
Hussein is to build a multinational coalition and engage the United 
Nations.
  But we can't ask the United Nations to disarm Saddam Hussein if we 
are not willing to disarm him ourselves.
  Today's vote for S.J. Res. 46 is a statement of national resolve to 
disarm Saddam Hussein. By showing our unity as a nation, we help the 
United States unite the world against his continued effort to use 
weapons of mass destruction.
  History has shown that we have been very patient with Saddam Hussein.
  First, let us remember that the United States and 34 other nations 
were at war with Iraq in 1991.
  After 3 months of war in which the U.S. coalition lost 556 lives and 
502 wounded--including seven young men from my home State--not to 
mention the estimated 100,000 Iraqis killed--we negotiated a cease-fire 
agreement with Iraq that ended our military campaign.
  This cease-fire was approved in return for Saddam Hussein's promise 
that he would unconditionally accept the destruction and removal of all 
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and to allow U.N. inspectors 
to verify the elimination of these programs.
  This cease-fire agreement was even signed by the Iraq government.
  We staked lives, resources, and diplomatic weight on that promise, 
and yet here we are today because of the non-compliance of that issue.
  If military action is eventually taken by a UN-backed effort or 
multinational US effort, that military action would not be a pre-
emptive strike, but the enforcement of the Iraqi government cease fire 
agreement.
  In fact, I would say we have been in a constant battle of enforcement 
for 11 years on this enforcement issue.
  Shortly after the cease-fire agreement in 1991, Saddam Hussein 
started to thwart the cease fire agreement.
  For 7 years, inspectors were sent to Iraq to verify his promise to 
disclose and destroy his cache of chemical, biological and nuclear 
weapons, and for 7 years Hussein obstructed the inspectors efforts.
  Saddam Hussein did hide and inspectors did find weapons of mass 
destruction--literally tons of them--most of which were unaccounted for 
in the final reports'' and in clear breach of the cease-fire agreement.
  Saddam Hussein even bugged the UNSCOM offices in Bahrain and New 
York, disguised weapons and hid them in various places. He leaked false 
intelligence and blatantly lied over, and as Sandra Mackey outlines in 
her book, ``The Reckoning, Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein,'' 
``Hussein's tactical war of cheat and retreat with UN arms inspectors 
gave him power to remain a world figure and gain a hold over his own 
people.''
  What has been our response and the response of the United Nations?
  We have tried economic sanctions to get Iraq to comply with the 
disarmament agreement--and they have failed miserably.
  It is the innocent Iraqi people that feel the effects of sanctions, 
including hunger and a lack of medical care.
  Saddam Hussein not only continues to eat well--hoarding much of the 
aid and food imported into Iraq through the oil-for-food program--but 
he builds palaces, and he devotes substantial riches toward developing 
weapons of mass destruction.
  We have tried sending a strong signal to the United Nations.
  In 1994, I joined my colleagues in the House of Representatives in 
calling for the United Nations to take action on Iraq's noncompliance.
  The House resolution went even further and urged the President and 
the United Nations to establish a tribunal to charge Saddam Hussein as 
a war criminal.
  That vote showed a clear consensus eight years ago when members of 
the House agreed that Saddam Hussein was neither a legitimate ruler nor 
an honest actor in the ceasefire and UN agreements.
  In 1998, we increased military pressure in the region and even 
conducted a military strike under President Clinton called Operation 
Desert Fox--hoping that the threat of force and the destruction of 
military installations would bring Hussein to reason and allow the 
inspectors back in.
  While this limited military pressure produced some initial results, 
as soon as the United States turned down the heat Saddam Hussein went 
back to his old ways.
  Where are we today.
  For 11 years since our cease-fire agreement with Iraq we have tried 
to stop Iraq's effort to develop weapons of mass destruction.
  In reality, our efforts have failed to stop his continued build-up of 
weapons of mass destruction.
  The United Nations should never have allowed Saddam to negotiate the 
terms of inspections.
  When he crossed the line in the sand that separated Iraq from Kuwait, 
Hussein demonstrated to the world his absolute disregard for 
international law; and his defiance of the will of the international 
community.
  He also displayed, on a world platform, his utter disdain for the 
principles of human rights and a free society; and revealed to the 
world a frightening weapons capacity, including chemical and biological 
weapons and substantial progress towards developing a nuclear weapon--
all of which he intended to use to advance his regional ambitions and 
threaten enemies.
  Saddam Hussein is a global menace that we cannot simply wish away.
  By doing nothing the world is not only failing to enforce the terms 
of a cease-fire that we fought for; but it is allowing a dangerous 
threat to grow that deserves renewed immediacy.
  This immediacy was demonstrated 13 months ago, when we witnessed the 
devastating steps that terrorists were willing to take and we know that 
this problem is not going away; and Saddam only increases the danger.
  Some citizens say there are other countries in the world producing 
weapons of mass destruction and could be a source of aid to terrorists. 
Why worry about Iraq?
  I know of no other country that has posed such a unique threat by: 
Violating of US/UN cease-fire agreement to stop development of weapons 
of mass destruction; Using weapons of mass destruction in war or 
against its own people; and Refusing to help the U.S. in the 
Afghanistan war on terrorism and actually applauded the efforts of Al 
Quida of 9/11.
  We are now considering a resolution that I believe will take a 
positive step towards effectively dealing with the threat of Saddam 
Hussein, his failure to comply with the terms of the 1991 ceasefire 
agreement.
  The best way to do that is to bolster the President's and the U.S. 
efforts by sending a message to the U.N. Security Council that we must 
act. This vote tells the President of the United States we agree Saddam 
Hussein and his failure to comply with the cease-fire agreement 
constitutes a serious breach and a threat to global stability.
  The vote tells the President we firmly support his promise to go to 
the United Nations Security Council and live up to the responsibilities 
to enforce a cease-fire agreement that Iraq has continued to try to 
subvert. This vote is a statement of national resolve that Saddam 
Hussein must be disarmed

[[Page S10319]]

by peaceful means, if necessary, but by showing our unity as a nation, 
that we, the United States, will help eliminate this threat and will 
unite the world behind it.
  Some have called this unconditional authorization. That is not the 
case. Senators Lieberman, Warner, Bayh, and others have made great 
progress on this legislation. There are conditions. It requires a 
limited scope of operations in the Iraq theater, continued consultation 
with Congress on military action, and serious reporting requirements to 
inform Congress of the commencement progress and plans of both 
operations and postwar strategies.
  I make clear this resolution does not endorse a unilateral action. If 
for some reason the U.N. Security Council does not act, I expect the 
President to make a major and aggressive diplomatic effort to enlist 
other partners around the globe in doing the right thing to stop 
Hussein's efforts. The President has promised Members of Congress, 
including the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, that he would 
be committed to developing a coalition of allies for military action. 
We know how important these coalitions are. We expect the President to 
fulfill this promise.
  My vote for this resolution does not mean I am convinced the 
administration has answered all the questions. In fact, I believe the 
following issues must be addressed--there are several--before the U.N. 
or the United States takes military action: First, it is clear we need 
a continued, multilateral approach. The President must continue to make 
the disarmament of Iraq a global issue. The rhetoric surrounding Iraq 
earlier this summer was unilateralist. It offended our allies and 
others who might have been with us. It brandished the view around the 
world that the United States is an arrogant power, and did serious 
damage to our relationship with many important powers in the Middle 
East region.
  The President's September speech to the United Nations reflected a 
new chapter and much needed improvement in the administration's efforts 
to confront Saddam Hussein. He made clear that the priority of the 
administration was to mobilize an international effort to enforce the 
cease-fire.
  Second, we must understand what our successful military strategy is. 
This vote is not an endorsement of the President's military strategy, 
mainly because we have not been given what it is. However, there is 
good reason to believe that this operation, which may require force to 
enter Baghdad, will prove substantially more complex and difficult and 
costly than Operation Desert Storm--not only in its economic cost, but 
most important, in the lives of soldiers and innocent Iraqi citizens. 
This is, indeed, a troubling scenario. And if the administration 
ultimately acts within the scope of this authorization, it must be up 
front and honest with Congress and the American people in explaining 
what we are up against.
  Third, we must have a postwar commitment strategy. This vote is not 
an endorsement of the President's postwar scenario either, largely 
because I have not seen details on that. We have heard some broad 
outlines, if, in fact, action by the U.N. or U.S. troops were taken. 
But we need to realize the process of creating a peaceful and stable 
post-Saddam Iraq will be huge and expensive and politically volatile.
  If the President does not commit to multilateral military action, we 
must similarly commit ourself to a serious long-term strategy to bring 
about freedom, representative democracy, and prosperity to the people 
of Iraq. This will require a substantial obligation and commitment.
  Fourth, fighting the broader war on terrorism cannot be left behind. 
And while the President has made the point that this effort is related, 
we need to make sure if we commit troops to the Persian Gulf, that we 
will not be diminishing our other efforts on the war on terrorism.
  Fifth, and probably the challenge that most of my colleagues have 
tried to address, maintaining the Middle East stability. I do remain 
very concerned about the effective military action and the volatile 
situation that may occur in the Middle East. The Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict remains in a disappointing and potentially volatile state. We 
must be aware that any action in Iraq and the possible extension to 
Israel poses a serious threat to the future peace in this region.
  If the administration or the U.N. selects military action against 
Iraq within the scope of this resolution, we must work aggressively 
through diplomatic channels to ensure that such action is kept separate 
and distinct from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
  And lastly, we must protect Iraqi civilians. We cannot diminish the 
serious concerns regarding the effective potential military action on 
that population. They have been the victims of a brutal, harsh and 
inhumane dictator who has not only stripped away their political 
liberty and free expression but also distributed to Iraqi populations 
economic deprivation, malnutrition, lack of medicine, and diverted 
billions of dollars into other programs.
  If the President of the United States or the U.N. determines that we 
should move forward within the framework of this resolution and 
military action must be taken, it must be used as a last resort.
  The President needs to take leadership and work with Congress to 
incorporate the issues I have just mentioned and come back to Congress 
and consult with them.
  I take this vote very seriously. The men and women in the Armed 
Forces from Washington State may very well be called into action. 
Whether it be our troops at Fort Lewis, our refueling tankers flying 
out of Fairchild Air Force Base in Spokane, our cargo planes from 
McChord, our radio jammers or P-2 aircraft out of Whidbey Island, or 
even the men and women of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln who were recently 
in the Persian Gulf, or the thousands of men and women serving in 
Washington State--I hope our vote tonight with the President's 
multilateral effort will lead to a successful result where we would not 
need to use these personnel. But if we do, I know these men and women 
will be ready to meet the task with conviction, resolve, and 
professionalism.
  I do not now, nor have I ever believed, that military action is our 
preferred method to address international conflict. But I have seen 
over the last 11 years, Saddam Hussein has consistently failed to live 
up to the 1991 cease-fire agreement, and his noncompliance is a 
dangerous failure that this body must address. This problem is not 
going away. If anything, it will grow increasingly more dangerous as 
Saddam Hussein increases his chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons 
stockpile.
  There is no question that we are looking for a strong and effective 
response from the United Nations Security Council, and I believe this 
vote sends an important message to the United Nations Security Council 
and gives the President the domestic backing he needs to get that 
international support. By being serious, forceful, and resolute in 
expressing our dissatisfaction with Saddam Hussein for his continued 
noncompliance, I think we are charting the best course for an 
international response. We are taking action in this body tonight, and 
we want the international community to take action with us.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the unanimous consent agreement, the 
Chair recognizes the Senator from North Dakota for 30 minutes.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, in a few moments we will make one of the 
most fateful decisions for our country. We will decide if we authorize 
the President to take this Nation to war. As with every momentous 
debate in this Chamber, our deliberations will resonate long into the 
future. Few decisions will have greater consequences to the people we 
represent and to the future of our Nation.
  Before I ask young men and women to put themselves in harm's way, I 
must be convinced we have exhausted every other possibility, pursued 
every other avenue. For me, and I believe for the people I represent, 
war must be the last resort.
  As we debate the course this Nation will take, some facts are clear 
and unassailable. Saddam Hussein is a menace to the whole region of the 
Middle East and a vicious tyrant who harms and oppresses his own 
people. He has waged war against neighboring nations, and he has 
attacked the people of his own country. He has acquired

[[Page S10320]]

chemical and biological weapons. He is attempting to acquire nuclear 
weapons and the means to deliver those weapons using ballistic 
missiles.
  There is no question that Saddam Hussein is ignoring the will of the 
United Nations and that he has not honored the agreements he made 
following the Gulf War. Saddam Hussein is a dangerous force in the 
world.
  I agree that we must take action. The question is, What course do we 
take? How do we best protect the national security of our country?
  A decade ago in the gulf war, Saddam Hussein launched a surprise 
attack on Kuwait and we rallied a powerful international response to 
defeat him. Today, we debate a much different scenario. Saddam has not 
directly threatened his neighbors since the gulf war. In a recent 
threat assessment from the Central Intelligence Agency, it concludes 
that Iraq is not likely to initiate a chemical or biological attack on 
the United States. Yet the President is contemplating a preemptive 
invasion of Iraq with the goal of ousting Saddam Hussein and installing 
a new regime. Never before in the history of this Nation has the 
Congress voted to authorize a preemptive attack on a country that has 
not first attacked us or our allies.
  Let me be clear. I do not oppose the use of force against this 
lawless and dangerous tyrant, but I cannot support the resolution 
before us as it stands. It is too broad and open-ended, and I do not 
believe it is in the national security interest of the United States. 
In my judgment, an invasion of Iraq at this time would make the United 
States less secure rather than more secure. It would make a dangerous 
world even more dangerous.
  First, we have unfinished business with the terrorists of al-Qaida. 
For the past year we have all agreed that combating al-Qaida was our 
first priority. News reports just this morning warned us of the danger 
of renewed terrorist attacks against our country, organized and 
orchestrated by al-Qaida. I believe defeating the terrorists who 
launched the attacks on the United States last September 11 must be our 
first priority before we launch a new war on a new front. Yet today the 
President asks us to take action against Iraq as a first priority. I 
believe that has the priority wrong.
  Second, a unilateral invasion could prompt the very attack we seek to 
preempt. In just the last few days, the CIA has reported that there is 
a very low probability Saddam Hussein would launch a biological or 
chemical attack against the United States or our interests in the 
region. However, if we launch a unilateral invasion, the risk rises 
dramatically that a desperate Saddam would use biological and chemical 
weapons.
  Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser to former President Bush, 
wrote that in the wake of an invasion:

       Saddam would be likely to conclude he had nothing left to 
     lose, leading him to unleash whatever weapons of mass 
     destruction he possesses.

  Third, an invasion of Iraq for the purposes of regime change would 
necessitate a march on Baghdad. Such a course would expose our forces 
on the ground to serious risks in hand-to-hand, street-by-street urban 
warfare in a foreign capital. We would lose much of our advantage in 
superior airpower and technology. The military and civilian casualties 
could be substantial.
  The former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command, retired 
Marine Corps General Joseph Hoar, testified before Congress:

       In urban warfare you could run through battalions a day at 
     a time. All our advantages of command and control, 
     technology, mobility . . . are in part given up.

  Those are sobering words--battalions a day at a time.
  Fourth, a unilateral attack by the United States could destabilize an 
already volatile and dangerous region and inflame anti-American 
interests around the globe. An American invasion could doubtless impact 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The backlash in Arab nations could 
further energize and deepen anti-American sentiment. Al-Qaida and other 
terrorist groups could gain more willing suicide bombers and raise even 
greater financial resources from the wealthy nations of the region.
  General Wesley Clark, the former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 
put it succinctly: ``If we go in unilaterally or without the full 
weight of the international organizations behind us, if we go in with a 
very sparse number of allies. . . . we're liable to super-charge 
recruiting for al Qaeda.'' Let me repeat that. ``We're liable to super-
charge recruiting for al Qaeda.''
  Fifth, if this nation asserts that pre-emptive military attacks are 
justified in this conflict, what are the consequences for other 
conflicts around the globe? Would India or Pakistan claim the same 
justification in Kashmir, raising the prospect of nuclear war in South 
Asia? Could China use this precedent to attack Taiwan, potentially 
drawing the U.S. into a major war with China? Could Russia use this 
justification to re-occupy parts of the former Soviet Union?
  And sixth, while the financial costs of this effort should not drive 
this debate, we cannot ignore them. The Congressional Budget Office has 
just estimated that an invasion of Iraq could cost this nation $6 
billion to $9 billion a month. That is a significant financial toll at 
any time, but particularly when we are still engaged in conflict in 
Afghanistan. The economic downturn makes the expense even harder to 
bear.
  CBO estimates that the costs of an invasion plus a five-year 
occupation would reach some $272 billion. How will we pay for this? 
Does the White House propose new taxes? Or are we to assume that this 
will be paid for out of the Social Security trust funds? Will we go 
deeper and deeper into debt? Or does the President suggest cuts in key 
domestic programs, such as education, highways, or healthcare.
  Which brings me to my final point. If our goal is to topple Saddam, 
what is our responsibility for the regime that follows:
  Forming a new government in Iraq is far from simple. There is no 
clear successor to Saddam Hussein. Iraq is a country filled with 
competing ethnic groups and religious and tribal factions with no 
history of democracy.
  I do not want to see our forces mired in a long occupation, in 
dangerous territory, in a destabilized region, subject to violence 
within Iraq. I do not want to see the United States responsible for the 
stability of Iraq, the economy of Iraq, and the political future of 
that nation.
  I began by saying that while I do not oppose the use of force against 
this dictator, war must be our last resort. I believe history has 
important lessons for us.
  Many other dangerous dictators have acquired weapons of mass 
destruction, or tried to. Yet we successfully contained the Soviet 
Union, Communist China, and North Korea and others without resorting to 
a pre-emptive first strike. Again and again, we have seen the scenario. 
A vicious dictator amasses weapons of mass destruction, threatens his 
neighbors, and threatens the United States.
  Always in the past, we have chosen containment and deterence--not 
invasion. In the past, we have contained the dictator, rallied 
international support to isolate him, and together with our allies 
carried out a disciplined, forceful and effective strategy of 
deterrence. We did not launch an invasion.
  Even when the Soviet Union placed nuclear missiles just 90 miles off 
our coastline, we did not invade. Rather, President John F. Kennedy 
issued an ultimatum--a successful ultimatum. We demanded the removal of 
those missiles. We succeeded, and we brought the world back from the 
brink of a nuclear conflict that might have engulfed the world.
  Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., recently asked: ``Why not . . . 
try the combination of containment and deterrence that won us the Cold 
War? Saddam is not likely to attack other countries. He knows that he 
would be playing into Bush's hands. Retaliation would be prompt and 
overwhelming, and Saddam has no interest in suicide. The one situation 
that might induce him to use his weaponry is a U.S. attack on Iraq.''
  The historical lesson is clear. There are disciplined and forceful 
actions we can take against dictators and aggressors short of invasion, 
actions that can succeed.
  Clearly, if Saddam Hussein were to attack this country--or if we had 
strong evidence that an attack on this country were imminent--we would 
have every right to defend ourselves. In that case, Saddam should have 
no

[[Page S10321]]

doubt that the United States would obliterate him.
  If the President has new knowledge on an imminent threat from Iraq 
that contradicts the statement of his CIA Director just this week that 
an attack is unlikely, he should reveal it to this Congress. I believe 
in protecting our people and our allies from imminent danger. But I 
believe the President must present stronger evidence to the Congress 
and the American public before he reverses a strategy that has worked 
well against dictators around the world. Before this nation strikes 
first, strikes unilaterally, strikes preemptively, we must know how 
this threat is different from those that have come before.
  Inaction and appeasement are not options. We must be prepared to use 
force to defend out national security interests, with or without the 
support of the UN. And I support the use of force against Iraq in the 
following circumstances.
  We need no one's permission to fight back when attacked, and force 
would be fully justified in the case of an Iraqi attack against this 
country or our allies. Force would also be justified if we were 
presented with clear and compelling evidence Saddam was preparing an 
imminent attack on this nation, or on our allies.
  Additionally, the use of force would be justified if we were provided 
with credible evidence that Saddam was linked to the September 11th 
attacks on this nation or if Saddam were to provide weapons of mass 
destruction to terrorists.
  Finally, I believe we must be prepared to use force in concert with 
our allies to destroy, Iraq's weapons of mass destruction if Saddam 
refuses to comply with UN resolutions ordering him to disarm.
  I support the use of force when it is in our national security 
interest. I voted for the Levin amendment to authorize the use of force 
to disarm Saddam Hussein and affirm our right to self defense. I also 
voted for the Durbin amendment to authorize the use of force to destroy 
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
  For all the reasons I have cited, I believe an invasion of Iraq must 
be a last resort, not a first response. Instead, I believe we can and 
should take a phased approach.
  First, we should exhaust every option available to us at the United 
Nations. Saddam has defied the U.N. in the past, but the growing U.S. 
and international pressure, and the imminent threat of military action 
may give the process new life. Further, our allies will be more willing 
to join with us if we exhaust every option at the U.N.
  Next, we should make every attempt to forge the same strong coalition 
of nations that brought Saddam to his knees during the Gulf War. The 
knowledge that he is an outlaw in the eyes of the world community will 
send a powerful message to Saddam to comply with the U.N. resolutions 
he agreed to after the Gulf War.
  I believe we should issue an ultimatum to Saddam to allow weapons 
inspections and immediately disarm. If he does not comply we can then 
take swift military action to force his compliance and deprive him of 
his weapons. But I do not believe we should authorize an invasion of 
Iraq tonight.
  I know this vote will place me with a small minority of colleagues 
here, but I must vote my conscience.
  I say to the President and to my colleagues that while I do not 
support this resolution, I know it will pass. And if the President 
exercises the authority it grants him to launch a unilateral invasion 
of Iraq, I will stand with him. I will do everything in my power to 
support our troops and ask for the support of our allies. Like every 
American on that day, I will pray for the safety of our soldiers in 
battle, the wisdom of our leaders, a swift victory, and the lasting 
peace that has so far eluded the troubled peoples of the region.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I would like to explain why I am voting 
against final passage of the Lieberman amendment. I have already 
explained much of my reasoning during the debate on my earlier 
amendment, but I wanted to state my opposition in one place.
  Section 4 of the Lieberman amendment authorizes the President to use 
the Armed Forces of the United States, one, ``against the continuing 
threat posed by Iraq;'' and, two, to ``enforce all relevant United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq.''
  This grant of authority under (1) above, with its threshold of 
``continuing threat,'' is virtually the issuance of a blank check to 
the President to use U.S. military force, since the Findings section of 
the amendment already contains the statement that ``Iraq poses a 
continuing threat to the national security of the United States.''
  The only limitation on the President's authority is found in section 
4 of the amendment which requires that the President submit his 
determination to the Congress, within 48 hours after he exercises such 
authority, that further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone will 
not protect our national security or is not likely to lead to 
enforcement of all relevant Security Council Resolutions and that 
exercising such authority is consistent with the continuation of the 
United States and other countries actions against international 
terrorism.
  This grant of authority is also unacceptable since it empowers the 
President to initiate the use of U.S. military force although the 
threat against which it is used is not imminent. International law has 
required that there be an imminent threat before one initiates an 
attack under the rubric of self defense. The resolution's language 
regrettably, therefore, serves to implement the President's desire, as 
expressed in his September 2002 National Security Strategy, to ``adapt 
the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of 
today's adversaries.'' This unfortunate precedent, if followed by, for 
example, nation A as a justification to use aggressive military force 
in the name of self-defense against nation B that nation A perceives 
poses a continuing threat to it, although the threat is not imminent, 
could lead to an increase in violence and aggression throughout the 
world. And it could have extraordinary consequences for the world if 
one or both of such nations possess nuclear weapons, such as India and 
Pakistan.
  The grant of authority under (2) above, to enforce all relevant U.N. 
Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq is also unacceptable. For 
instance, Iraq is presently in default on its obligations under 
relevant Security Council Resolutions that require it to return Kuwaiti 
archives and property. It is exceedingly unwise to provide such a broad 
grant of authority when the real threat that Iraq poses is because of 
its refusal to destroy its weapons of mass destruction and prohibited 
delivery systems.
  The Lieberman amendment also sends the wrong message to the United 
Nations. It contradicts the thrust of the President's speech to the 
U.N. General Assembly on September 12 when he said ``We will work with 
the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions'' and ``We want 
the United Nations to be effective, and respectful, and successful.'' 
That is so because, at the same time that Secretary of State Powell is 
trying to negotiate with the U.N. Security Council for the very 
resolution that the President said he wants, the Congress would be 
vesting extraordinary authority in the President of the United States 
to ``go it alone,'' to use U.S. military force whether or not the 
Security Council authorizes Members States to use military force to 
enforce its resolutions. By telling the Security Council, if you don't 
act, we will, we are letting them off the hook. We should, instead, as 
we did at the time of the Gulf War, be putting all of our focus on 
having the Security Council adopt the requisite resolution and 
committing forces to implement it. We should be working to unite the 
world community, not divide it.
  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Lieberman amendment 
compounds all of these problems by authorizing the use of U.S. military 
force at this time unilaterally, i.e., without U.N. Security Council 
authorization. The unilateral, go-it-alone use of U.S. military force 
carries with it all of the risks that could be avoided or, at least, 
reduced by acting multilaterally, i.e., with the strength and world-
wide political acceptance that flows from U.N. authorization. If we act 
unilaterally, will we be able to secure the use of airbases, supply 
bases, and overflight rights that we need; will there be a reduction in 
the international support we are receiving for the war on terrorism;

[[Page S10322]]

will it destabilize an already volatile region and undermine 
governments such as Jordan and Pakistan; will Saddam Hussein and his 
generals be more likely to use weapons of mass destruction against our 
forces and other nations in the region; will we be undercutting efforts 
to get other nations to help us with the expensive, lengthy task of 
stabilizing a post-Saddam Iraq? These are serious short- and long-term 
risks that will be exacerbated if we act unilaterally rather than 
multilaterally.
  Accordingly, and for all of these reasons, I will cast my vote 
against final passage of the Lieberman amendment.


                Vote On Amendment No. 4856, As Modified

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the unanimous consent agreement, the 
question now occurs on agreeing to amendment No. 4856, as modified.
  The amendment (No. 4856), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, in 1991, just prior to the Persian Gulf 
war, I was the author of legislation that would have allowed one parent 
of a dual military couple to receive a waiver from deployment to areas 
where combat is imminent.
  I remain very concerned about this issue and fear that if the 
President decides to use force against Iraq, minor children may face a 
situation in which both parents are deployed. The Military Family 
Resource Center estimates that there are approximately 35,000 dual 
military couples with children serving in the military today.
  According to the Department of Defense, request for combat exceptions 
can be submitted at any time and military personnel may apply for 
reassignment for humanitarian or compassionate reasons. However, there 
are no specific policies restricting both parents from being assigned 
to a war zone.
  I hope the Senator from Virginia, the ranking member of the Armed 
Services Committee, will join me in urging the Secretary of Defense to 
do everything possible to see that dual military couples are not 
deployed concurrently to a war zone.
  Mr. WARNER. I understand the Senator's concerns, and I believe that 
the Department of Defense is already very sensitive to this situation, 
as reflected in the assignment policies of the military services. I 
trust the Department will continue to make every reasonable effort, 
through existing practices and policies, to avoid situations in which 
both parents would be deployed to a combat zone.
  I thank the Senator from California for once again focusing attention 
on this issue.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, this is an important issue that Senator 
Boxer has raised and that she has been concerned about for many years; 
that is, when both parents of minor children are in the military, the 
Secretary of Defense should make every effort to ensure that both 
parents are not deployed in combat at the same time.
  If we do indeed go to war against Iraq, this is an important issue 
that needs to be addressed, and I thank the Senator from California for 
raising it.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr President, I rise today in support of the resolution 
authorizing the use of military force against Iraq.
  I support this resolution because the threat posed by the brutal 
dictatorship of Saddam Hussein is real, immediate, and growing.
  The threat is real because Saddam possesses conventional, chemical, 
and biological weapons. He also is doing everything in his power to 
acquire the means to construct and field nuclear weapons.
  The threat is real because Saddam has used his conventional and 
chemical weapons to attack his neighbors and his own people.
  The threat is real because Saddam has openly defied the world and has 
made no secret of his enmity toward the United States and our allies. 
Saddam even attempted to assassinate a former American President.
  The threat is immediate and growing because Saddam has extensive and 
growing ties to terrorist organizations that have either attacked the 
United States or declared the United States to be a legitimate target 
of their twisted crusade that they call ``jihad.''
  The threat is immediate and growing because Saddam has developed the 
ability to deliver his poisons and pestilence by unmanned aerial 
vehicles that can easily be smuggled into the United States.
  The threat is immediate and growing because Saddam has circumvented 
the sanctions regime to such an extent that he is virtually 
unrestrained by resources in his pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction.
  Let me put this in a historical context.
  Following its bloody war with Iran, Hussein's Iraq was heavily in 
debt. While continuing to spend billions on weapons of mass destruction 
and long-range missiles, Saddam, in 1990, invaded and plundered Kuwait 
in order to help pay his bills. With that act, he made it clear that 
his priority was to feed the war machine which kept him in power.
  In 1991, Kuwait was liberated and the Persian Gulf war ended when 
Saddam Hussein committed to abide by U.N. Security Council resolutions. 
Since then, he has broken those commitments. He ignored U.N. weapons 
prohibitions and ruthlessly crushed rebellions of the Shia and the 
Kurds.
  Today, he continues to violate U.N. resolutions, the very commitments 
he made to save his regime. His actions continue to impose terrible 
hardships on his own people. After a decade of sanctions, Saddams's 
unwillingness to relinquish his prohibited weapons programs continues 
to cost his country tens of billions of dollars.
  There are those who believe that a new U.N. Security Council 
resolution and renewed inspections are the answer. In reality, 
inspections will accomplish little, delay the inevitable and provide 
Saddam with yet more time to field additional weapons of mass 
destruction.
  U.N. Security Council Resolutions have required much of Saddam and 
produced very little.
  Starting in April 1991, Resolution 687 requires Iraq to declare 
destroy, remove, or render harmless under U.N. or International Atomic 
Energy Agency supervision and not to use, develop, construct, or 
acquire all chemical and biological weapons, all ballistic missiles 
with ranges greater than 150 kilometers, and all nuclear weapons-usable 
material, including related material, equipment, and facilities. What 
has happened?
  Saddam has refused to declare all parts of each WMD program, 
submitted several declarations as part of his aggressive efforts to 
deny and deceive inspectors, and ensured that certain elements of the 
program would remain concealed. The prohibition against developing 
delivery platforms with ranges greater than 150 km allowed Baghdad to 
research and develop shorter-range systems with applications for 
longer-range systems.
  Additionally, the prohibition did not affect Iraqi efforts to convert 
full-size aircraft into unmanned aerial vehicles for use as potential 
WMD delivery systems with ranges far beyond 150 km.
  Resolution 707 enacted in August 1991, requires Iraq to allow U.N. 
and International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, inspectors immediate and 
unrestricted access to any site they wish to inspect. it also demands 
that Iraq provide full, final, and complete disclosure of all aspects 
of its WMD programs; cease immediately any attempt to conceal, move, or 
destroy WMD-related material or equipment; allow UNSCOM and IAEA teams 
to use fixed-wing and helicopter flights throughout Iraq; and respond 
fully, completely, and promptly to any Special Commission questions or 
requests. What has happened?
  In 1996, Saddam negotiated with the UNSCOM Executive Chairman 
modalities that it used to delay inspections, to restrict to four the 
number of inspectors allowed into any site Baghdad declared as 
``sensitive,'' and to prohibit them from visiting altogether sites 
regarded as sovereign. These modalities gave Iraq leverage over 
individual inspections. Iraq eventually allowed larger numbers of 
inspectors into such sites but only after time consuming negotiations 
at each site.
  Resolution 715 adopted in October 1991, requires Iraq to submit to 
long-term monitoring of Iraqi WMD programs by UNSCOM and IAEA; approved 
detailed plans called for in United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 687 and 707 for long-term monitoring.
  In reality, Iraq generally accommodated U.N. monitors at declared 
sites but obstructed access and manipulated the monitoring process.

[[Page S10323]]

  Beginning in March 1996, Resolution 1051 established the Iraqi export 
and import monitoring system. This system requires U.N. members to 
provide IAEA and UNSCOM with information on materials exported to Iraq 
that may be applicable to WMD production, and requires Iraq to report 
imports of all dual-use items.
  In reality, Iraq is negotiating contracts for the procurement, 
outside of U.N. controls, of dual-use items with WMD applications. The 
U.N. lacks the staff needed to conduct thorough inspections of goods at 
Iraq's borders and to monitor imports inside Iraq.
  In June 1996 the following resolutions were adopted: Resolutions 
1060, 1115, 1134, 1137, 1154, 1194, and 1205. These demand that Iraq 
cooperate with UNSCOM and allow inspection teams immediate, 
unconditional, and unrestricted access to facilities for inspection and 
access to Iraqi officials for interviews. U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1137 condemns Saddam for his refusal to allow entry into 
Iraq of UNSCOM officials on the grounds of their nationality and for 
his threats to the safety of U.N. reconnaissance aircraft.
  Throughout the inspection process in Iraq, Saddam consistently sought 
to impede and limit UNSCOM by blocking access to numerous facilities, 
sanitizing sites before the arrival of inspectors and routinely 
attempting to deny inspectors access to requested sites and 
individuals. At times, Saddam would promise compliance to avoid 
consequences, only to renege later.
  Resolution 1154 enacted in March 1998, demands that Iraq comply with 
UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and endorses the Secretary General's 
memorandum of understanding with Iraq, providing for ``severest 
consequences'' if Iraq fails to comply.
  Resolution 1194 adopted in September 1998, condemns Iraq's decision 
to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.
  Resolution 1205 adopted November 1998, condemns Iraq's decision to 
cease cooperation with UNSCOM.
  These resolutions were meaningless without Iraqi compliance. Baghdad 
refused to work with UNSCOM and instead negotiated with the Secretary 
General, whom it believed would be more sympathetic to Iraq's needs.
  Finally, in December 1999, Resolution 1284 established the United 
Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, UNMOVIC, 
replacing UNSCOM. The resolution demanded that Iraq allow the 
commission's teams immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to 
any and all aspects of Iraq's WMD programs.
  Iraq repeatedly has rejected the unrestricted return of U.N. arms 
inspectors and claims that it has satisfied all U.N. resolutions 
relevant to disarmament. Compared with UNSCOM, Resolution 1284 gives 
the UNMOVIC chairman less authority, gives the Security Council a 
greater role in defining key disarmament tasks, and requires that 
inspectors be full-time U.N. employees.
  Saddam has manipulated the U.N. before, and if permitted, he will do 
it again. Right now, Saddam is ``shuffling the deck'' to hide his 
prohibited items in anticipation of the return of inspectors.
  I believe that inspectors will not set foot in Iraq until Baghdad is 
ready for them. If they were to return, they would be starting from 
square one in a hostile and deceitful environment.
  In a June 11, 2000 article, Charles Duelfer, the former deputy 
executive chairman for UNSCOM, noted that, ``. . . the attempt to 
disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction was doomed from the 
start. This failure repeats the same mismatch between disarmament goals 
and disarmament mechanisms that frustrated efforts to disarm Germany . 
. .'' after the First World War.
  In the Versailles Treaty of 1919, the victorious allies imposed 
disarmament obligations upon a defeated Germany. An international 
organization called the Inter-Allied Control Commission was created to 
implement those provisions. The Germans, however, were very adept at 
denial and deception. Consequently, Germany was able to preserve 
illicit armaments and weapons production. The Germans argued that the 
inspectors were too demanding and acted like spies. Does this rhetoric 
sound familiar?
  The lessons of appeasement are not intended solely for history 
classrooms. These lessons are to be learned and where relevant, 
applied. Saddam Hussein's priorities have not changed and I do not 
believe that they ever will, so we must act before his alliance with 
terror finds it way to our shores.
  Much has been said about how unprecedented it would be to engage in 
anticipatory self defense by taking military action against Iraq. In 
one respect, this is true: it is a step that our country has 
historically tended to shy away from taking.
  But ``unprecedented'' is not the same thing as illegal or improper. 
Scholars have debated the idea of anticipatory self-defense for many 
years, and while there is no consensus upon its exact meaning, the idea 
is clearly not foreign to international law.
  Under article 2 of the United Nations Charter, countries may not use 
the ``threat or use of force'' in a manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations. Article 51 of the charter also 
recognizes that countries have an inherent right of both individual and 
collective self-defense.
  Reading articles 2 and 51 together, it is clear to me that the right 
to self-defense can arise not only in response to the ``use'' of force 
but also in response to the threat of the use of force.
  That this must be the case should be clear to anyone familiar with 
the dangers of the modern world. At some point in the past, it might 
have been possible to wait until an attack actually occurs before 
striking back. Today, however, such a rule would clearly be unworkable, 
so dangerously unworkable as to imperil the inherent right of self-
defense in the first place.
  Today, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction make it 
madness to wait until one is attacked first. These basic military 
realities compel us to understand the idea of self-defense in response 
to a threat in broader ways than before.
  To paraphrase U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the law is 
not a suicide pact.
  The law does not require us to wait for a biological weapon such as 
smallpox or a genetically engineered anthrax strain to be used to kill 
potentially millions of Americans before we have the right to attack 
the would-be user.
  Especially in this age of modern transportation, biological weapons 
know no boundaries. From 1918 to 1919, the influenza pandemic killed 
between 20 and 40 million people worldwide. Today's biological weapons 
scientists have the capacity to cause even worse mayhem, not just to 
any single target country, but perhaps to everyone on the planet.
  We have long recognized such principles in our domestic law. A 
policeman, for instance, need not wait for a criminal to actually shoot 
at him before he can use lethal force in self-defense.
  The United States has been involved in Iraq for years in attempting 
to enforce the many Security Council resolutions violated by Iraq. 
Throughout this entire period, Iraq has continually fired upon our 
forces, and those of our allies, with conventional weapons.
  Iraq has a large and expanding biological and chemical weapons 
program. And he is doing everything in his power to add nuclear weapons 
and long-range ballistic missiles to his arsenal.
  The law does not require us to wait to be attached with the other 
weapons in Saddam's arsenal before completing the task the Security 
Council has set for ending the threat Iraq poses to international peace 
and security. The law does not require this, and our security, and that 
of other countries in the region, and around the world, does not permit 
it.
  I will close with these final thoughts. There are those at home and 
abroad who criticize U.S. intent to take action. I remind them that the 
United States did not pick this conflict. The United States doe not 
want this fight, Saddam Hussein forced our hand by not complying with 
his obligations under the 1991 cease fire. He forced our hand by not 
complying with U.N. resolutions. He forced our hand by building 
alliances with terrorists.
  We do not make this decision lightly, we are very aware of the 
potential costs of taking action, but we are much more aware of the 
costs of not taking action. As said by Edmond Burke, ``All that is 
necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.''

[[Page S10324]]

  I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I have decided that I will cast a vote 
tonight to authorize the President to use force if necessary to find 
and destroy any weapons of mass destruction under the control of Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq.
  Some of my colleagues have expressed the ease with which they will 
vote to authorize the use of force. For me it has been very difficult.
  When we cast a vote that could send our sons and daughters to war, it 
is deadly serious business. It requires us to ask tough questions and 
demand good answers.
  And while I will vote to authorize the President to use force if 
necessary, I do so with reservation because I believe very strongly 
that force should be an option that is used only as a last resort, 
after all other diplomatic and peaceful means have been exhausted. And, 
if force is necessary , it ought to be carried out with a coalition of 
countries in whose interest it is to rid Iraq of weapons of mass 
destruction.
  I want to stress that I would never have voted for the resolution in 
the form that the White House originally asked Congress to approve. 
That proposal asked Congress to give the President a blank check to use 
force, with or without the backing of other nations, not just to disarm 
Iraq, but also to deal with unspecified threats to American interests 
anywhere in the region.
  However, the Joint Resolution that Congress will vote on tonight is 
fundamentally different from the one the President sent to us. It was 
narrowed substantially in scope through bipartisan negotiations.
  First, this resolution focuses specifically on the threat posed by 
Iraq, instead of giving the President broad and unfocused authorization 
to take action in the region, as the Administration originally sought. 
Second, the resolution expresses the conviction that President Bush 
should continue to work through the United Nations to secure Iraq's 
compliance with U.N. resolutions. Third, this resolution makes it clear 
that the President must exhaust diplomatic and peaceful efforts before 
he can use force against Iraq. And fourth, this resolution protects the 
balance of power by requiring the President to comply with the War 
Powers Act.
  I believe it is the right course to go to the United Nations, extract 
from the Security Council the tough new resolution requested by the 
President, and then coercively enforce that resolution with a coalition 
of countries who will not only bear the burden of fighting along side 
us if it is required, but who will also bear the expensive burden of 
occupation, peace keeping and nation building following any military 
action.
  My fervent hope is that the Joint Resolution we pass tonight 
authorizing the President to use force if necessary to disarm Iraq will 
spur the United Nations Security Council to take similar action. And I 
hope that the action of Congress and the United Nations together will 
convince Saddam Hussein to allow complete and unfettered inspections 
and to cooperate in the elimination of any weapons of mass destruction 
that he still possesses.
  With a backdrop of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United 
States and the clear and present danger to our country of future 
terrorist attacks, coupled with the evidence that Saddam Hussein is 
aggressively trying to acquire nuclear weapons, I finally concluded 
that, if we err in this matter, we must err on the side of our national 
security interests. The stakes are too high, and the consequences too 
deadly to do otherwise.
  The final point I will make about this resolution is that our 
confrontation with Iraq is dramatically different from our 
confrontation with any other ``rogue'' country. Saddam Hussein has 
consistently defied the terms of surrender to which he agreed at the 
end of the Gulf War in 1991. We know that he lied about his weapons of 
mass destruction and hid them from United Nations inspectors. We know 
that he secretly continued to produce chemical and biological agents. 
We know that he is still trying to acquire nuclear weapons.
  I've been to the Incerlik Air Base in Turkey where American fighter 
pilots fly air cover over the Northern Iraq no-fly zone. I know 
firsthand that Iraq continues to fire on our pilots who are just doing 
what Saddam Hussein promised to allow under the terms of the Gulf War 
surrender.
  I know there are some who say, ``well, let's not be so hasty. There's 
another way, let's explore other options.'' But the fact is we have 
worked for 10 years without success to force Iraq to comply with the 
terms of its surrender following the Gulf War. So, to those who say 
let's give them more time, I say this situation is unique. Iraq has had 
a decade to comply, and the tyrant who runs it has demonstrated that he 
has no intention of complying without the threat of the use of force.
  I will vote for this resolution because I think that it is important 
that we unite behind our President to deal with the clear and present 
danger that Iraq poses to our national security. But I want to point 
out a few concerns about aspects of this administration's foreign 
policy which I consider to be very troubling.
  Recently the Bush administration released a new 33-page National 
Security Policy document that has alarmed even our closest allies 
because it declares that it is America's new policy to maintain 
overwhelming military might and to use preemptive force whenever and 
wherever it suits our national interests.
  Few would deny that the United States has the right to go after 
terrorists or rogue states preemptively if we are in serious danger of 
being attacked by a weapon of mass destruction. So what in the world 
was the administration thinking when it decided to release this 
document at the same time that our diplomats around the world are 
seeking the support of the international community for action against 
Saddam Hussein?
  In my judgment, this is an example of the Bush administration's 
approach to foreign policy that has largely abandoned the successful 
strategies we've employed for decades to weld together alliances and 
coalitions of our allies to tackle the threats and challenges of an 
unstable world.
  Another issue that relates to this debate is America's role in the 
international effort to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  One of the centerpieces of the debate about the danger Iraq poses for 
the rest of the world is that Saddam Hussein might soon possess a 
nuclear weapon. I acknowledge the danger that would pose for the region 
and the rest of the world, but I want to ask those who are experiencing 
seizures over that prospect: where is their concern about the larger 
danger posed by the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and to 
terrorists?
  Year after year, and time after time those who now appear most 
alarmed about the prospect that Iraq would possess even one nuclear 
weapon, are the same people who are unwilling to exert U.S. leadership 
in the international effort to stop the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons.
  For example, President Bush has appointed John Bolton to be the 
Assistant Secretary of State responsible for arms control even though 
Bolton's stated position is that he doesn't believe in arms control. 
This administration, and its supporters in Congress, have demonstrated 
a lack of interest in making any effort to stop the spread of nuclear 
weapons.
  They oppose the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty even though a 
blue-ribbon panel of the National Academies of Science recently 
concluded that the treaty would significantly enhance U.S. security by 
slowing the spread of nuclear weapons.
  And this administration and its supporters want to deploy a new 
generation of ``designer'' nuclear weapons that could be used like 
conventional weapons. Nothing would do more to undermine international 
efforts to stigmatize countries that aspire to become nuclear powers.
  Perhaps now the prospect of a country like Iraq acquiring one nuclear 
weapon will convince the Bush administration that safeguarding the 
nuclear weapons that exist around the world, reducing nuclear 
stockpiles, and stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other 
countries and to terrorists must be among this country's top 
priorities.
  There are somewhere in the neighborhood of 25,000-30,000 nuclear 
weapons in the world today. A fair number of them are not very well 
controlled,

[[Page S10325]]

particularly in Russia, which has thousands of nuclear weapons in 
storage facilities that fall far short of American security standards. 
Russia also has enough highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade 
plutonium for 80,000 nuclear weapons. Much of it is poorly protected 
against theft or diversion.
  One nuclear weapon in the wrong hands will make the devastating 
tragedy of 9/11 seem like a small incident by comparison. That is why 
this issue is so critical, and it is why I raise it now to point out 
the inconsistency of those who are pushing so hard to use force against 
Iraq but who are so unwilling to exhibit any muscle in dealing with the 
broader and potentially more devastating problem of the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons.
  So I will vote for this Joint Resolution because I am convinced it is 
time for the United States to assume leadership in the effort to disarm 
Saddam Hussein and make Iraq live up to the commitments it made after 
the Gulf War. But I hope that President Bush will help prevent further 
Iraqs by stepping forward and exerting US leadership in the 
international effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
and other weapons of mass destruction.
  Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. President, I am here to speak in support of the 
resolution before us, which I cosponsored. I believe we must vote for 
this resolution not because we want war, but because the national 
security of our country requires action. The prospect of using force to 
protect our security is the most difficult decision a Nation must ever 
make.
  We all agree that this is not an easy decision. It carries many 
risks. If force proves necessary, it will also carry costs, certainly 
in resources, and perhaps in lives. After careful consideration, I 
believe that the risks of inaction are far greater than the risks of 
action.
  Saddam Hussein's regime represents a grave threat to America and our 
allies, including our vital ally, Israel. For more than two decades, 
Saddam Hussein has sought weapons of mass destruction through every 
available means. We know that he has chemical and biological weapons. 
He has already used them against his neighbors and his own people, and 
is trying to build more. We know that he is doing everything he can to 
build nuclear weapons, and we know that each day he gets closer to 
achieving that goal.
  Iraq has continued to seek nuclear weapons and develop its arsenal in 
defiance of the collective will of the international community, as 
expressed through the United Nations Security Council. It is violating 
the terms of the 1991 cease-fire that ended the Gulf war and as many as 
16 Security Council resolutions, including 11 resolutions concerning 
Iraq's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction.
  By ignoring these resolutions, Saddam Hussein is undermining the 
credibility of the United Nations, openly violating international law, 
and making a mockery of the very idea of collective action that is so 
important to the United States and its allies.
  We cannot allow Saddam Hussein to get nuclear weapons in violation of 
his own commitments, our commitments, and the world's commitments.
  This resolution will send a clear message to Iraq and the world: 
America is united in its determination to eliminate forever the threat 
of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
  The United States must do as much as possible to build a new United 
Nations Security Council coalition against Saddam Hussein.
  Although the administration was far too slow to start this diplomatic 
process, squandering valuable time to bring nations to our side, I 
support its recent efforts to forge a new U.N. Security Council 
resolution to disarm Iraq.
  If inspectors go back into Iraq, they should do so with parameters 
that are air-tight, water-tight, and Saddam-tight. They should be 
allowed to see what they want when they want, anytime, anywhere, 
without warning, and without delay.
  Yet if the Security Council is prevented from supporting this new 
effort, then the United States must be prepared to act with as many 
allies as possible to address this threat.
  We must achieve the central goal of disarming Iraq. Of course, the 
best outcome would be a peaceful resolution of this issue. No one here 
wants war. We all hope that Saddam Hussein meets his obligations to 
existing Security Council Resolutions and agrees to disarm, but after 
11 years of watching Hussein play shell-games with his weapons 
programs, there is little reason to believe he has any intention to 
comply with an even tougher resolution. We cannot trust Saddam Hussein, 
and we would be irresponsible to do so.
  That is why we must be prepared to use force, if necessary, to disarm 
Saddam Hussein, and eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction once 
and for all.
  Almost no one disagrees with these basic facts: that Saddam Hussein 
is a tyrant and a menace; that he has weapons of mass destruction and 
that he is doing everything in his power to get nuclear weapons; that 
he has supported terrorists; that he is a grave threat to the region, 
to vital allies like Israel, and to the United States; and that he is 
thwarting the will of the international community and undermining the 
United Nations' credibility.
  Yet some question why Congress should act now to give the President 
the authority to act against Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass 
destruction.
  I believe we should act now for two reasons: first, bipartisan 
congressional action on a strong, unambiguous resolution, like the one 
before us now, will strengthen America's hand as we seek support from 
the Security Council and seek to enlist the cooperation of our allies.
  If the administration continues its strong, if belated, diplomacy, 
backed by the bipartisan resolve of the Congress, I believe the United 
States will succeed in rallying many allies to our side.
  Second, strong domestic support and a broad international coalition 
will make it less likely that force would need to be used. Saddam 
Hussein has one last chance to adhere to his obligations and disarm, 
and his past behavior shows that the only chance he will comply is if 
he is threatened with force.
  Of course, there is no guarantee that he will comply even if 
threatened by force, but we must try.
  Others argue that if even our allies support us, we should not 
support this resolution because confronting Iraq now would undermine 
the long-term fight against terrorist groups like al-Qaida. Yet, I 
believe that this is not an either-or choice. Our national security 
requires us to do both, and we can.
  The resolution before us today is significantly better than the one 
the president initially submitted. It is not a blank check. It contains 
several provisions that I and many of my colleagues have long argued 
were required.
  First, it gives the administration the authority to use all necessary 
means to eliminate the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass 
destruction.
  Second, it calls on the administration to do as much as possible to 
forge a new U.N. Security Council mandate, understanding that if new 
Security Council action proves impossible, the United States must be 
prepared to act with as many allies as will join us.
  Third, it requires the administration to report to Congress on its 
plans to assist with Iraq's transition to democracy after Saddam 
Hussein is gone.
  It is in America's national interest to help build an Iraq at peace 
with itself and its neighbors, because a democratic, tolerant and 
accountable Iraq will be a peaceful regional partner. Such an Iraq 
could serve as a model for the entire Arab world.
  So far, we have not heard nearly enough from the administration about 
its plans for assisting the Iraqi people as they rebuild their lives 
and create a new, democratic government. The president has said that 
the U.S. will help, but he hasn't offered any details about how.
  As we have learned in Afghanistan, this administration's words are 
not enough. This resolution will require the administration to move 
beyond its words and share with Congress, and the world, its concrete 
plans for how America will support a post-Saddam Iraq.
  Finally, in taking this action, Congress must make clear that any 
actions against Iraq are part of a broader strategy to strengthen 
American security in the Middle East, and indeed around the world.
  We must do more to support existing non-proliferation and disarmament

[[Page S10326]]

programs that can help prevent access to the weapons-grade materials 
that tyrants like Saddam Hussein want. We must demand America's active 
and continuous involvement in addressing the crisis between Israel and 
the Palestinians, and promoting democratization throughout the Arab 
world. We must commit to developing a national strategy for energy 
security, one that would reduce our reliance on the Middle East for 
such critical resources.
  The decision we must make now is one a nation never seeks. Yet when 
confronted with a danger as great as Saddam Hussein, it is a decision 
we must make. America's security requires nothing less.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I rise today to speak out on the issue of 
Iraq. This conceivably is one of the most important issues that we as a 
governing body will address in what remains of the 107th Congress.
  Let me start by saying that Saddam Hussein is a dangerous man. As 
many of my colleagues have already pointed out, he has actively engaged 
in attacking Americans in the region. He has actively engaged in 
deploying chemical and biological weapons against his own people. He 
has participated in genocide against his own people. He has continually 
deceived U.N. weapons inspectors. He has failed to comply with U.N. 
resolutions to disarm his weapons of mass destruction. He was involved 
in an assassination attempt against former President George Bush 
senior. He has committed serious acts of aggression against his 
neighbors.
  These are all acts of a man that cannot be trusted.
  Back in 1998, the Senate passed the Iraqi Liberation Act that 
declared it should be the policy of the United States to seek to remove 
Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and replace him with a democratic 
government. I supported this bill and believe that Saddam continues to 
be a detriment to his people. The Iraqi people deserve a chance to be 
free from a vicious dictator.
  Our actions today go far beyond declaring Saddam a danger to his 
people and to the rest of the world. Our actions today will authorize 
the use of force in the case Saddam refuses once again to defy U.N. 
resolutions and disarm. Our actions today could send our sons and 
daughters to battle. And, our actions today, if not handled cautiously, 
could erupt into a conflict we as a nation are not prepared to address. 
This is not something we can take lightly.
  Last week, a bipartisan group of Congressmen and Senators brokered an 
agreement with the President and produced a resolution that strikes a 
good balance between diplomacy and force. The resolution supports 
exhausting diplomatic means to disarm Saddam prior to engaging in the 
use of force. It also provides the President with adequate flexibility 
to do what needs to be done in the case that Saddam refuses to disarm. 
I have cosponsored this bipartisan agreement and believe that the focus 
of the resolution is appropriate.
  I believe that a strong resolution is necessary to protect the 
American people from threats posed by Saddam Hussein. And while I 
believe we should strive to garner the support of the U.N. and our 
allies around the world, we must ensure that we don't limit our ability 
to act to protect American lives.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I have the privilege of serving 
in what was, for 30 years, Mark Hatfield's seat in the United States 
Senate. And as those who served with him know, no one is more dedicated 
to peace than Mark Hatfield. As I have thought about the question of 
going to war with Iraq, I find myself mindful of Senator Hatfield, and 
I am likewise committed to working for peace.
  I am also very mindful of the Oregonians who have expressed to me 
their hopes and prayers for peace. And it is precisely because I want 
peace that I stand today to express my support for this resolution.
  I believe in peace and diplomacy. These values have guided my service 
on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And rather than an immediate 
declaration of war, I strongly believe that this resolution is but one 
step in a continuing diplomatic process.
  I have no doubt that Saddam Hussein presents an imminent threat to 
America, our freedom and our way of life. The proof lies in Baghdad. 
Over the last decade we have collected a considerable body of evidence 
that Hussein is amassing weapons of mass destruction, weapons that he 
has already used on his own people.
  It is only with a heavy heart that any of us can reach the solemn 
conclusion that our young men and women may have to risk their lives in 
defense of our Nation. But the heavy weight of proof moves us now to 
prevent the loss of more American lives.
  More than a decade ago, the United States led a coalition of nations 
against the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein. The United Nations 
resolutions that followed Saddam's surrender required Iraq, among other 
things, to halt its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs, 
account for POWs from the Gulf War, and cease its support for 
terrorism. Since that time, Saddam Hussein has continually and 
flagrantly violated the U.N.'s requirements. In less than 12 years, he 
has defied 16 Security Council resolutions and provoked at least 30 
Council statements condemning these violations. He has exploited the 
goodwill of the international community, oppressed his people, 
devastated his nation and developed weapons of mass destruction.
  Today, as it was then, we are called as Americans not simply to 
contribute to an international coalition, but to lead it. That 
obligation became all the more clear when last year's terrorist attacks 
ushered in an era when threats are more tangible, where civilians are 
at risk, and where deterrence no longer works. I believe the free 
nations of the world will again join us in the fight against tyranny, 
and I still hold out hope that the danger Iraq poses can be eliminated 
without war.
  But today, we must choose whether to allow Saddam Hussein to continue 
threatening the civilized world or to disarm him. I believe we must 
choose the latter. We will first exhaust every peaceful means in our 
effort, but confront him we must.
  Saddam Hussein has attacked Iran, Israel, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. He 
recently called on the people of the Arab world to attack the United 
States and he is an avowed enemy of the democracy in the Middle East, 
Israel. He is a man who murdered his own people in chemical attacks and 
systematically attempted to destroy an ethnic minority in his nation. 
To believe that Saddam Hussein would hesitate to launch future attacks 
would be to turn a blind eye to a lethal mix of weapons of mass 
destruction and terrorists waiting to use them.
  In addition to the arms we are certain he has, overwhelming evidence 
indicates that he continues to develop weapons of mass destruction with 
the full intention of using them. High level Iraqi defectors have 
provided similar evidence of biological and nuclear weapons programs, 
evidence that is substantiated by Saddam's actions. We know that he has 
sold $3 billion worth of oil illegally this year, money that is 
unaccounted for, while importing materials used in nuclear enrichment 
programs. All the while, he has called Iraq's nuclear scientists ``the 
salvation of his nation.''
  On September 12, President Bush outlined these facts when he spoke to 
the United Nations. As he said then, Saddam is truly defying the U.N., 
not only the United States. The 16 resolutions Iraq has violated were 
not issued by the U.S. Congress, but by the U.N. Security Council, the 
highest body of international diplomacy. While few reasonable people 
would disagree that Saddam Hussein is dangerous and will attack America 
and its allies whenever it is possible, the President was correct in 
seeking international support for confronting Iraq.
  Diplomacy and efforts toward peace are always preferable to war. But 
if war is unavoidable, it is best to have the backing of the world 
community. Immediately following the president's call to action, 
international support began to increase. And the president continues to 
build on that support. I believe that with the passage of this 
resolution we will see our allies join in lending our sons and 
daughters in seeking a peaceful regime in Iraq.
  The United Nations now has the opportunity to prove itself to be an 
important world body. It is incumbent upon the U.N., and especially the 
Security Council, to ensure that if Saddam

[[Page S10327]]

Hussein fails to fulfill his most recent commitments to weapons 
inspectors, he does not do so with impunity.
  I would like to conclude by telling you about a trip I made earlier 
this year, I traveled to Coos Bay, OR to attend the memorial service of 
a remarkable young man named Byran Bertrand. Bryan was a 23-year-old 
Marine who gave his life for his country when his C-130 crashed into a 
mountain near the Afghan-Pakistan border. The memorial service program 
included excerpts from the last letter that Bryan had send this 
parents.
  In this letter he explained why he had turned down the opportunity to 
return to duty in the United States. ``You know me,'' wrote the former 
high school athlete, ``I always hated sitting on the bench.''
  In those words, we can find our calling as a Nation. If Saddam 
Hussein does not comply with United Nations resolutions and if he 
continues to build and stockpile weapons of mass destruction, then 
America can no longer sit on the bench. We must take the heavy mantle 
of leadership to seek a peaceful regime change. This burden rests on 
the President, on the Congress, but more importantly, it rests on the 
people of the United States. For it is the American people, 3,000 of 
whom died on September 11, 2001, who are Saddam's targets. We are 
targets because ours is a Nation that is the beacon of liberty in the 
world. We must never forget that, and we must never take it for 
granted.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, the debate here in this chamber is being 
held in community halls, meeting places and living rooms across America 
and across Iowa. Many Iowans have told me in recent weeks that going to 
war should be the last resort for our Nation and I agree with them.
  Saddam Hussein is a brutal dictator, who has brought nothing but pain 
and suffering to the Iraqi people and threat and instability to his 
neighbors throughout the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. He invaded 
Iran before he invaded Kuwait. He has aided and abetted the suicide 
bombers. He is guilty of countless crimes against humanity. He has even 
used chemical weapons against men, women and children in his own 
country. I understand the grave danger posed to America and the whole 
international community by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of 
a reckless dictator like Saddam Hussein. Since the terrorist hijackings 
and anthrax attacks in America last year, which wantonly took the lives 
of more than 3,000 people, all Americans are rightly concerned about 
the safety of our homeland and united in supporting the brave men and 
women who defend us and the cause of freedom around the world.
  While there is not definite evidence of prior close collaboration 
between the al-Qaeda criminals who attacked our nation last year and 
Saddam Hussein, there is no doubt they might find common cause in 
attacking us and our allies at any time. Simply put: it is clear to me 
that the current situation in Iraq is an on-going tragedy for the Iraqi 
people and an unacceptable menace for us, his neighbors, and the world. 
President Bush is to be commended for calling on the United Nations to 
confront this menace and Iraq's flagrant disregard of past Security 
Council Resolutions. It remains to be seen whether and how the UN 
Security Council will meet head-on the direct challenge posed by the 
continued failure of Saddam Hussein and the Government of Iraq to fully 
comply with 16 resolutions approved by the Council since 1991, 
including an ironclad requirement that Iraq destroy all of its 
biological and chemical weapons, dismantle its nuclear program, and 
submit to rigorous international inspections to verify its compliance.
  But there is a right way and a wrong way to confront Saddam Hussein 
and to force him to relinquish all of the weapons of mass destruction 
at his disposal. Our policy, and certainly any fateful decision to 
actually go to war, must be made after careful deliberation and in full 
accordance with the U.S. Constitution and our Nation's laws. No 
President of either political party should be allowed to take our 
nation into war like the one that is now possible solely on his or her 
own authority. That is why last July Senator Specter and I were the 
first members of the Senate to introduce bipartisan legislation to 
require the Congress to debate and vote on a resolution to require the 
Congress to debate and vote on a resolution authorizing the use of 
force by American armed forces against Iraq before the President issued 
such an order. I think the President was right to provide 
additional information to the Congress and the American people and to 
put this issue before the Congress with the draft resolution of three 
weeks ago.

  In my view, that first draft amounted to a blank check for the 
President to go to war with Iraq and other countries in the region, 
whenever he saw fit, and regardless of whether we had the backing of 
our allies inside and outside the region or in the international 
community. I have said that I could not have supported that resolution. 
It was too broad, too unqualified, and too far-reaching. I am glad that 
since then Republican and Democratic Senators across the political 
spectrum have recognized the need to narrow and improve upon the 
President's initial request. Senators Biden and Levin, Chairmen of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Services Committee 
respectively, held essential hearings and formulated thoughtful 
legislative proposals. Their work reaffirms that the focus of U.S. 
policy should be to secure the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction and the establishment of a new, effective international 
inspections regime to enforce that policy. Their careful approach also 
underscores the urgency and importance of maximizing our diplomatic 
efforts to secure the strongest possible U.N. Security Council 
resolution to force Saddam Hussein to relinquish his pursuit of weapons 
of mass destruction once and for all.
  I also took to heart the President's statement in his address to the 
nation Monday night in which he said that the pending congressional 
resolution giving him the right to use force if necessary, ``does not 
mean that military action is imminent or unavoidable.'' That statement 
is consistent with the approach I believe in, which can maximize the 
strength of our coalition and the success of our policy. Accordingly, 
at this point in time, I believe the President and the Congress should 
be united and focused like a laser on getting the strongest possible, 
enforceable resolution through the U.N. Security Council. That is why I 
will vote for the Levin resolution and why I ultimately will vote for 
the Lieberman resolution, too, if that is the final choice. But I want 
to be very clear that in voting for these resolutions, this Senator is 
not voting for immediate war with Iraq. I am voting for them in order 
to give the President and Secretary of State Powell the 
maximum leverage to persuade the UN Security Council to promptly 
approve a new, tough, resolution that requires Iraq to immediately 
allow unconditional, unfettered inspections designed to secure the 
complete disarmament of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. 
There should be clear consequences that follow from his failure to 
comply. And the UN inspectors should be given enough time to complete 
their work and to determine whether Iraq can be disarmed short of going 
to war.

  I am concerned that if we immediately move to unilateral U.S. 
military action or in concert with only our British allies we will 
weaken our coalition efforts to wage and win the international fight 
against terrorism. This would also undermine international respect for 
the rule of law and the multilateral problem-solving institutions that 
America helped to create and which have served as the foundation for 
principled U.S. leadership in the world for 50 years and more. Indeed, 
I am concerned that precipitous U.S. military action against Iraq could 
result in our nation and world becoming less rather than more stable 
and secure. Under the terms of these resolutions, the President will be 
required to report to the Congress every 60 days on on-going diplomatic 
efforts at the UN Security Council and elsewhere to establish a tough 
new inspections regime and to force Saddam Hussein to destroy his 
weapons of mass destruction. At that time, we will have the opportunity 
to examine the issues again. Nobody knows for certain at this time, 
including the President of the United States, how best to compel Iraq 
to get rid of all of its weapons of mass destruction. But we do know, 
we all

[[Page S10328]]

agree, that war must be a last resort, not a first response. We must 
work with the international community as much as possible to find new 
and enforceable means to deal with the Iraqi danger in ways that make 
this a safe world.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, the resolution authorizing the use of 
force against Iraq is before us.
  We are being asked to decide some fundamental questions about the 
world in which we live. But more significantly, we are being asked to 
decide what kind of world we choose for our children.
  Essentially, the question is this: Is the world going to be safer 
today, tomorrow and in the years ahead if the United States leads an 
effort to rid the world of not only Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, 
but of a ruthless terrorist-supporting despot as well?
  Here is what we have learned.
  There is agreement that Saddam Hussein is amassing weapons of mass 
destruction--chemical, biological, and even nuclear--but some continue 
to naively believe that diplomatic initiatives and weapon inspections 
must be given a chance to succeed. There is consensus that Iraq is a 
state sponsor of terrorism, but some believe that America should not 
act alone against Iraq and that an attack on Iraq will detract from our 
ongoing pursuit of al-Qaida. There is concurrence that Saddam Hussein 
is a mass murderer of Iraqi, Kurdish, Kuwaiti and Iranian men, women, 
and children, but some believe that Iraq poses no immediate threat to 
the American people or those in Saddam's backyard, including our 
allies.
  My views on this issue could not be more clear: Our Commander in 
Chief has requested the authority to use force against Iraq to ``defend 
the national security of the United States against the continuing 
threat posed by Iraq'' and Congress must authorize it and must do so 
now.
  Nine days after the al-Qaida attacks on our soil, President Bush 
promised Congress and the world that America would bring the war on 
terrorism to the terrorists wherever they may hide. He intends to do 
just that in Iraq. This Congress and our entire nation stood as one 
with President Bush following the September 11th attacks. A year later, 
we must continue to stand behind his outstanding leadership in 
combating terrorism around the globe. This war on terrorism will not 
end--it must not end--until terrorists and their supporters are 
destroyed.
  Let me say to my colleagues who suggest that diplomatic initiatives 
and weapon inspections can prevent the coming conflict with Iraq to 
look at recent history. Saddam Hussein has violated each and every one 
of the 16 U.N. Security Council Resolutions pertaining to Iraq. His 
armed forces continue to fire on American and coalition aircraft in the 
no-fly zone. Al-Qaida terrorists continue to leave footprints on Iraqi 
soil. And Saddam Hussein and his henchmen continue to make billions of 
dollars by exploiting the U.N.'s oil for food program and through other 
illicit activities.
  Although the regime recently proved that it can fool some 
embarrassingly naive visiting American lawmakers into believing its 
empty assurances of cooperation and compliance, they are not duping 
this Senator--or the President.
  More importantly, the American people will not follow the lead of 
these modern-day Neville Chamberlains and allow the United States to be 
played for a fool. For it is only a fool who does not learn from past 
mistakes, and the world has ten years of Iraqi lies from which to 
learn. Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly a day after 
the anniversary of the September 11th attacks, President Bush 
challenged the United Nations to maintain its relevancy in a world 
challenged by terror:

       Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of 
     defiance. . . . [America] will work with the U.N. Security 
     Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq's regime defies 
     us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to 
     hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security 
     Council for the necessary resolutions.

  The fact is that President Bush is giving the United Nations and the 
international community a final chance to disarm Saddam Hussein through 
diplomatic means. But under no illusions of Saddam Hussein's violent 
and irrational character, the President has made clear that if reason 
fails, force will prevail. I am reminded of President Franklin 
Roosevelt insights into Nazi Germany and Adolph Hitler: ``No man can 
tame a tiger into a kitten by stroking it. There can be no appeasement 
with ruthlessness. There can be no reasoning with an incendiary bomb.''
  Unfortunately, some of my colleagues seem to ignore this indisputable 
truth--and the fact that America is at war against global terrorists. 
Former Vice President Al Gore's recent attack on the President for his 
conduct of the war was ill-timed and ill-advised. A self proclaimed 
hawk, Mr. Gore alleged in a recent speech that in a single year, 
President Bush ``squandered the international outpouring of sympathy, 
goodwill, and solidarity that followed the attacks of September 11th 
and converted it into anger and apprehension aimed much more at the 
United States than at the terrorist network. . . . '' This is utter 
nonsense, and the American people are right to expect more from a 
former national leader.
  Mr. Gore seems to have forgotten that in a single year the Bush 
administration liberated the people of Afghanistan from oppressive 
Taliban rule, destroyed and disrupted al-Qaida operations in South Asia 
and throughout the world, and bolstered homeland defense for the 
American people. If Mr. Gore belittles the victory in Afghanistan--
against what he describes as a ``fifth rate military power''--why was 
it that his own administration failed to take decisive action to topple 
the Taliban and al-Qaida? One might surmise that they were too busy 
``feeling pain'' to inflict any.
  Mr. Gore's characterization of the pre-emptive use of force to 
prevent terrorist attacks as ``a troubling new element'' of U.S. 
foreign policy is similarly misguided. In the post-September 11th 
world, the Bush doctrine of pre-emption makes plain old common sense. 
Who among us disagrees that terrorists should be destroyed before they 
have a chance to again bring death and destruction on our family, 
friends, or neighbors? What do we say to the victims of a terrorist 
attack that we could have prevented--sorry, but Moscow, Paris, or 
Beijing objected to pre-emptive action?
  The fact is that that America has the right and the responsibility to 
protect and defend its citizens against terrorism--be it from al Qaida 
terrorists or weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
  Let me also dispel the myth that military action against Iraq will 
detract from ongoing operations against al-Qaida. Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld testified before Congress last month that ``. . . Iraq 
is part of the global war on terror. Stopping terrorist regimes from 
acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a key objective of that war. 
And we can fight all elements of the global war on terrorism 
simultaneously.''
  We have no choice but to fight these threats simultaneously. Our 
nation is at war. Given Saddam Hussein's use of chemical and biological 
weapons against his own people and his neighbors, it is reckless to 
dismiss the immediacy of the threats posed by his regime to the United 
States. We already know that he is a mass murderer and that he is armed 
and dangerous--to treat him otherwise is folly.
  Saddam Hussein is also a danger to the region. Those nations 
reluctant to confront him would be wise to take note of the British 
Government's assessment that Iraq is capable of deploying chemical and 
biological weapons within 45 minutes.
  With Fort Campbell and the 101st Airborne Division in Kentucky, I 
understand firsthand what risks are posed to our military personnel by 
an attack on Iraq. Having fired the opening shots of Operation Desert 
Storm more than a decade ago, the Screaming Eagles are no strangers to 
that country. They--and the Special Forces soldiers of the 5th Group 
and the Night Stalkers of Task Force 160--are professionals, the best 
of best. America is fortunate to have such dedicated patriots serving 
on our front lines. We can be secure in the knowledge that if these 
troops return to the region, they will answer the call with the same 
determination and dedication as they did in 1991.
  Let me conclude by saying that we did not ask for this war on 
terrorism.

[[Page S10329]]

But we will fight it and win it--on our terms and conditions.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I have come to the floor to state 
that, after much deliberation, I have decided to vote for the 
resolution introduced by Senators Lieberman, Warner, Bayh and McCain.
  In two prior floor statements, I have expressed my views. I serve as 
the senior Senator from California, representing 35 million people. 
That is a formidable task. People have weighed in by the tens of 
thousands. If I were just to cast a representative vote based on those 
who have voiced their opinions with my office--and with no other 
factors--I would have to vote against this resolution. But as a member 
of the Intelligence Committee, as someone who has read and discussed 
and studied the history of Iraq, the record of obfuscation and the 
terror Saddam Hussein has sown, one comes to the conclusion that he 
remains a consequential threat.
  Although the ties between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida are tenuous, 
there should be no question that his entire government is forged and 
held together by terror: The terror of secret police in station wagons 
on street corners watching; The terror forged through assassinations 
and brutal murders of anyone who disagrees with him; And yes even of 
his own family members.
  While the distance between the United States and Iraq is great, 
Saddam Hussein's ability to use his chemical and biological weapons 
against us is not constrained by geography--it can be accomplished in a 
number of different ways--which is what makes this threat so real and 
persuasive. I supported the Levin amendment, which authorized use of 
force pursuant to U.N. Security Council action, because it was the 
strongest resolution supporting a multilateral effort. I believe a 
multilateral effort, through the United Nations, provides a strong 
moral imprimatur and as such is preferable to America's taking 
preemptive action that could have consequences tomorrow and years after 
that--consequences we cannot imagine or even begin to understand today.
  The original resolution sent to Congress by the President would have 
authorized a broad and sweeping use of force whenever or wherever he 
deemed necessary--literally any place on earth. It would have 
authorized the newly promulgated national security strategy of 
unilateral preemptive use of force in the defense of the nation in the 
war on terror. The resolution before us does not grant such a sweeping 
use of force. Rather, the use of force is confined to Iraq and targeted 
toward forcing Iraq to comply with 16 Security Council resolutions 
passed in the wake of the Persian Gulf war in 1991.
  Most importantly, I believe the Lieberman resolution becomes a 
catalyst to encourage prompt, forceful and effective action by the 
United Nations to compel this long sought-after and much-evaded 
disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. Disarming Iraq under Saddam 
Hussein is necessary and vital to the safety and security of America, 
the Persian Gulf and the Middle East--let there be no doubt about this. 
But the decision to cast this vote does not come lightly. I continue to 
have serious concerns that there are those in the administration who 
would seek to use this authorization for a unilateral, preemptive 
attack against Iraq. I believe this would be a terrible mistake.
  But I am reassured by statements made by the President in his address 
to the United Nations on September 12, which conveyed a major shift in 
the administration's approach--turning away from a preemptive strategy 
and, instead, engaging and challenging the U.N. Security Council to 
compel Iraq's disarmament and back this with force. I deeply believe 
that it is vital for the U.N. Security Council to approve a new, robust 
resolution requiring full and unconditional access to search for and 
destroy all weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, the Security 
Council has not yet taken this action. Nor do we, at this time, know if 
they will.
  If one believes Iraq is a real threat, and I do, and if the United 
Nations fails to act, then the only alternative is military action led 
by the United States. Ironically, this authorization of use of force 
may well prompt the Security Council to act. Because if they do not, 
the United Nations becomes a paper tiger unable to enforce its mandates 
and unwilling to meet the challenge of this new day of danger.
  For the past 11 years, Saddam Hussein has prevaricated, manipulated, 
deceived and violated every agreement he has made to disarm. If the 
past is prologue, this record means that arms inspections, alone, will 
not force disarmament. The great danger is a nuclear one. If Saddam 
Hussein achieves nuclear capability, the risk increases exponentially 
and the balance of power shifts radically in a deeply menacing way. As 
I said on this floor in earlier remarks, I believe that Saddam Hussein 
rules by terror and has squirreled away stores of biological and 
chemical weapons. He has used them on Kurdish villages and in his 
invasion of Iran.
  Evidence indicates that he is engaged in developing nuclear weapons. 
However, today the best authorities I could find indicate he does not 
yet have nuclear capability. But this is only a question of time. And 
we cannot let Saddam Hussein become a nuclear power.
  And, so, it is my intention to vote yes on the resolution before us. 
I do so with the hope that the United Nations will rise to the 
challenge and with the trust that the administration forge a coalition 
rather than go it alone. And I do so with the fervent prayer that it 
will not be necessary to place America's fighting forces or innocent 
civilians anywhere in harm's way.
  Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. President, as Members of this body, there is no 
issue we face as grave and important as determining whether we should 
authorize force against Iraq that might place our men and women in 
uniform in mortal danger in order to protect the freedoms we cherish, 
and extend these freedoms to the people of Iraq, through the 
disarmament of a tyrant committed to harming his own people and the 
rest of the world. As a member of the Armed Services Committee, and as 
a citizen, I have given great consideration and thought to this course 
of action. Can I in good conscience authorize the use of force that 
could place someone's child, or my child, or someone's husband, wife, 
mother, or father in harm's way? Should the President commit troops to 
Iraq, American blood will certainly be shed. But, the authorization of 
force is recourse we must take.
  For 11 years, Saddam Hussein has openly violated 16 U.N. resolutions 
calling on him to disarm; cease his production of weapons of mass 
destruction; and stop the ethnic cleansing of his own people. For 11 
years, the people of Iraq have suffered. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein 
has made the world a much more dangerous place. His relish to produce 
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons has only increased since the 
end of the Gulf War. Now, we have learned that he is harboring al-Qaida 
terrorists; strengthening his ties to al-Qaida; and financing terrorist 
organizations that promote suicide bomb attacks in Israel.
  I am confident that the enactment of this resolution will give our 
President the tools he needs to bring the world community together to 
disarm this brutal tyrant through diplomacy. But, this resolution also 
gives the President authority to follow diplomacy with force, if 
necessary, to ensure that the threats Saddam Hussein brings to the 
world are neutralized.
  The threat from Saddam Hussein's WMD programs is real and growing 
every day we fail to take action to disarm him. He has used WMD against 
his own people and his neighbors. We should not wonder whether he has 
any interest in using them against the U.S. or our allies.
  As chair of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, along 
with Senator Roberts, the Subcommittee held a hearing in February to 
investigate the status of his WMD programs since inspectors left and 
the threat those weapons could pose to the U.S. At that hearing, the 
Subcommittee was faced with the blunt findings that Saddam successfully 
hid weapons while U.N. inspectors were in Iraq. Moreover, there are no 
mechanisms in place to prohibit Iraq from ramping up its production of 
biological and chemical weapons, and its quest for nuclear weapons.
  At the hearing, Anthony Cordesman, from the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, stated Iraq admitted in 1995, ``that it had 
produced

[[Page S10330]]

30,000 liters of bulk biological agents. Iraq admitted it produced 
anthrax, botulinum toxins, and aflatoxins.'' We must remember it took 
only a few grams of Anthrax to throw the Senate and the East Coast of 
the U.S. into disarray. Worse yet, Iraq admitted it had affixed these 
biological agents to missile warheads and bombs.
  Dr. Cordesman went on to say that UNSCOM believed Iraq had produced 
as much as 120,000 liters of biological weapons, not the 30,000 it 
admitted--enough to kill millions. Furthermore, UNSCOM has been out of 
Iraq for 4 years, yet UNSCOM stated that Iraq could reconstitute its 
biological weapons program within a matter of weeks after UNSCOM's 
departure. Imagine the destruction that could be caused by Saddam 
Hussein with his unchecked inventory of hundreds of thousands of liters 
of biological weapons. Again, he has the capability to injure or kill 
millions.
  The Subcommittee also received testimony that Iraq has actively 
rebuilt its chemical weapons programs since UNSCOM was thrown out of 
Iraq. UNSCOM reported to the Security Council that Iraq withheld 
information related to Iraq's chemical weapons program. UNSCOM 
uncovered only a small portion of Iraq's chemical weapons. In fact, 
Iraq confiscated information gathered by UNSCOM regarding Iraq's 
chemical weapons, so the information could not be transmitted to the 
Security Council. Iraq also told UNSCOM Iraq had not armed missiles 
with VX gas--one of the deadliest of nerve agents. Yet, in 1998, UNSCOM 
discovered missiles tipped with VX. Soon after, UNSCOM was told to 
leave Iraq and Iraq has resumed chemical weapons production. It takes 
only 10 milligrams of VX to kill a person. A wine bottle full of VX 
could kill at least 75 people. We must find out how much VX Saddam has, 
and destroy it.
  Moreover, Saddam Hussein is devoting much of his defense budget to 
becoming a nuclear power. After the Gulf War, we learned from the U.N. 
weapons inspectors that Iraq was within 1 year of developing nuclear 
weapons. Prior to the war, we thought Iraq was 5 to 7 years away. Since 
1998, we cannot say with any certainty that we know the status of 
Iraq's nuclear program. Once again, Saddam could be less than a year 
away from a nuclear bomb. The world must know how close he is, and he 
must stop his nuclear development. Once he develops a nuclear program, 
we will never be able to shut it down.
  For these reasons, we cannot take our time in passing this 
resolution. We must act now. Saddam Hussein has shown, on numerous 
occasions, his willingness to use WMD to attack his countrymen and his 
neighbors. He has killed 20,000 Iraqis in 40 villages with WMD. As 
President Bush said two nights ago, ``Saddam Hussein is a homicidal 
dictator who is addicted to weapons of mass destruction.''
  I want to read from Charles Duelfer's testimony before the Emerging 
Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee's hearing on Iraq's WMD programs 
on February 27, 2002. Mr. Duelfer was the Deputy Executive Chairman of 
UNSCOM. He said that it is inconceivable that Iraq did not resume its 
WMD programs after UNSCOM left. Mr. Duelfer said it is difficult ``to 
imagine circumstances under which this regime would end these 
programs'' of WMD because . . . ``the regime in Baghdad will devote 
full resources to its weapons programs . . . This has not changed even 
under sanctions . . . The regime seeks to dominate the region . . . The 
use of force comes naturally'' to Saddam Hussein. WMD are his tools to 
dominate the region. If we wait to pass this resolution, Saddam will 
only continue to enlarge his WMD program; threaten the Middle East; and 
then threaten the U.S. He will never end his programs unless the world 
reins down on him to eliminate his tremendous capacity for killing.

  This resolution is the proper tool to give the Administration a firm 
hand in negotiating with the world to disarm Saddam Hussein and 
eliminate his capacity to kill. We should pass the Lieberman-McCain 
Resolution immediately and overwhelmingly to show the world we are 
united. We must not tie the President's hands and the hands of 
Secretary Powell to negotiate a new Security Council Resolution that 
calls for the disarmament of Iraq--and the threat of force against Iraq 
if Saddam does not abide by the resolution. We can bring the Security 
Council on board if we can show them the United States stands together 
to disarm Saddam Hussein. If this body is divided, the U.N., and 
especially Saddam Hussein, will pay us no mind.
  The best outcome is a new Security Council resolution that calls for 
unfettered inspections throughout Iraq, including Saddam's presidential 
palaces; the disarmament of all WMD; and the threat of force should 
Saddam Hussein not comply. That outcome has a better chance of becoming 
a reality if we pass this resolution.
  The new U.N. resolution the President and Secretary Powell seek is 
our best chance to avoid a war. But the threat of force must be present 
to enforce a new resolution because Saddam only understands force. 
Again, Charles Duelfer testified before the Iraqis were perfectly 
willing to thumb their nose at UNSCOM because the U.N. had not 
authorized force to make Iraq comply.
  Iraq's Deputy Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, regularly told Mr. 
Duelfer, ``You are not General MacArthur (referring to MacArthur's 
occupation/disarmament of the Japanese) . . . Therefore, there are 
limits to what you can do.'' What Aziz meant was you have no authorized 
force; you have no army with you to make us show you what we have and 
where it is. A new resolution will only work if the threat of force 
lurks behind any Iraqi failure to obey.
  This resolution is also a narrowly tailored authorization of force. 
It seeks peace before war to enforce past and future U.N. resolutions 
against Iraq. This resolution does not give the President carte blanche 
to use force throughout the Middle East for any reason. Force is only 
authorized to bring Iraq into compliance with U.N. resolutions--so that 
Iraq disarms its WMD; ceases production of WMD; does not threaten its 
neighbors, and does not repress and commit atrocities against its 
citizens with WMD.
  This resolution correctly authorizes force for the violation of all 
16 U.N. resolutions, because Saddam's crimes against humanity should 
concern America as much as his WMD capabilities.
  America has been a tremendous defender of human rights. But, at 
times, we have not always defended the victims of ruthless dictators.
  In Rwanda, 800,000 Rwandans were slaughtered in 12 months, yet 
America did nothing to stop the ethnic cleansing. America's failure to 
act in Rwanda could be the lowest point in American history. We should 
not make the same mistake by turning a blind eye to the Kurds and 
Shiites Saddam has tortured for years. Any resolution to dismantle his 
WMD must also call for him to end ethnic cleansing in Iraq.
  In 1944, two Jews who escaped Auschwitz--and revealed the horrors of 
concentration camps to the world--asked the U.S. War Department and the 
War Refugee Board to bomb train tracks leading to Auschwitz so no more 
Jews could be brought there. U.S. bombers were already bombing fuel 
dumps near Auschwitz. Yet the War Refugee Board refused this simple 
request. John McCloy, the head of the Refugee Board, denied the 
request. He stated the operation did ``not warrant the use of our 
resources.'' How could saving lives not warrant the use of American 
resources? As a result, between 500,000 and 800,000 Jews died at 
Auschwitz in the final year of WWII. These lives could have been saved, 
but we did not make it a priority.
  We shouldn't now say that human rights are not worthy of U.S. and 
international diplomacy. We should not say that we are unwilling to 
disarm a dictator who brutalizes his people. If we do, we will have 
failed the world, again.
  Fortunately, I think this body and the American people do care about 
human rights. We stood up for human rights in Kosovo. We used force 
against a sovereign leader, Milosevic, who was committed to the 
genocide of ethnic Albanians. Through American force, Milosevic was 
removed from power and indicted for numerous war crimes. We did the 
right thing for an oppressed people. And, I must remind you President 
Clinton did not seek Congressional authorization to use force in 
Kosovo. Today, unlike in Kosovo, the President does seek Congressional 
approval for force in an effort to seek a unified American front to 
disarm another leader threatening his people and the world.
  But, I must say, again, that force is a last option under this 
resolution. The

[[Page S10331]]

resolution requires the president not to use force until he presents 
his determination to Congress that diplomacy is no longer an option. 
This resolution is not a call to arms. The President will not roll 
tanks into Iraq as soon as we pass the Lieberman-McCain resolution. As 
the President said on Monday, ``War is neither desirable nor 
inevitable.'' War can be avoided.
  The President will seek Security Council support and support from 
other allies to bring about a diplomatic answer to disarm Saddam 
Hussein. I have no doubt that the President's first hope is to 
neutralize the Iraqi threat without invading Iraq.
  But, if a Security Council resolution cannot be achieved and Saddam 
continues to jeopardize the livelihood of Americans--or if Saddam 
violates any future resolution--the President should have the authority 
to use force. Because his most important job as Commander in Chief is 
to keep the American people safe from a tyrant.
  In conclusion, I want to, once again, reiterate my support for the 
Lieberman-McCain resolution. As a co-sponsor, this resolution is 
America's best effort to stand united to show the world, and especially 
Saddam Hussein, that we are committed to disarm Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction, which are a clear and present danger to America and the 
world. Hopefully, this can be accomplished diplomatically with the 
world-wide support. But, this resolution also sends a clear signal that 
we are willing to use force to change Iraq's ways if Iraq continues to 
threaten the U.S.; if Iraq disobeys a new Security Council resolution; 
or if the President determines all diplomatic efforts have been 
exhausted. At that time, force may be necessary for America to defend 
herself. This resolution is the proper mix of diplomacy and force. As 
President Kennedy said, ``Either alone, will fail.'' I hope the Senate 
will pass this resolution overwhelmingly to show solidarity and resolve 
to our friends and our enemies.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I rise tonight to address the important 
resolution pending before the Senate concerning the authority to use 
military force against the Republic of Iraq. I firmly believe that this 
resolution we are debating will strengthen the hand of President Bush 
and the international community in forcing Saddam Hussein to disarm and 
to ensure his compliance with all relevant United Nations Security 
Council resolutions.
  I believe President Bush will do everything possible before deciding 
to commit U.S. military forces against Saddam Hussein's regime. The 
President has not decided to employ military force, nor does this 
resolution demand that he do so. Rather, the resolution signals to the 
President that Congress stands behind his decision to employ military 
force if Saddam Hussein fails to disarm or abide by all relevant United 
Nations Security Council resolutions.
  When he addressed the United Nations on September 12, 2002, President 
Bush convincingly and accurately presented the case against Saddam 
Hussein and his flouting of international norms and agreements. 
President Bush rightly called attention to Saddam Hussein's abysmal 
track record on complying with the terms of disarmament he accepted at 
the conclusion of the Persian Gulf war. In so doing, President Bush 
bucked current international attitudes that would prefer that we not 
call attention to his regime's activities.
  Ever since the conclusion of the Persian Gulf war, we have seen 
Saddam behave with contempt towards those countries that see value in 
the United Nations resolutions and that ultimately seek a peaceful and 
stable Middle East. For more than 10 years, the world looked the other 
way and ignored the problem with the hope that Saddam Hussein and his 
regime would go away. Regretfully, Saddam Hussein has displayed 
remarkable staying power and a powerful appetite for acquiring weapons 
of mass destruction.
  I commend President Bush for seeking congressional authorization for 
possible military action against Iraq and for consulting with Congress 
on the drafting of a truly bipartisan resolution. In response to those 
who condemn the United States for displaying ``unilateralism,'' 
President Bush took his case to the United Nations and forced the world 
to acknowledge the realities of the Iraqi transgressions. The President 
is also right to seek a United Nations Security Council resolution 
authorizing a return of weapons inspectors to Iraq. These inspectors 
must have unfettered access to suspected weapons sites in Iraq. There 
can be no conditions or dickering over Iraq's national sovereignty. 
Saddam Hussein lost a war he initiated, he sued for peace, and he needs 
to accept the terms and conditions he pledged to honor. To expect 
anything less would be to condone his transgressions.
  The President is being practical by raising the ``what if'' element 
to the debate. History has shown Saddam will go to elaborate measures 
to conceal and elude efforts to uncover his weapons of mass destruction 
capabilities and development efforts. It is only prudent that the U.S. 
Congress and all members of the U.N. Security Council consider 
authorizing measures to force Iraq's compliance with efforts to ensure 
disarmament. Earlier today, the House of Representatives passed this 
same resolution on a vote of 296 to 133, and I firmly believe that 
overwhelming bicameral approval of this resolution will strengthen the 
hand of the President in securing the strongest possible United Nations 
Security Council resolution.
  In plain terms, the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is analogous to 
the threat posed by a drunk driver. The drunk driver is a threat to all 
on and in close proximity to the road. Behind the wheel of a rolling 
weapon, it is only a matter of time before the drunk driver crashes 
into another car, kills an innocent bystander or causes immense damage 
to someone's personal property. Saddam is this drunk driver careening 
along the road, a threat to all those innocents who have the misfortune 
to cross his path. It is time to get Saddam off the road before he can 
kill or injure innocents who cross his path.
  For those who are critical of discussion or references to ``regime 
change,'' I call to your attention section 3 of the Iraq Liberation Act 
of 1998, P.L. 105-338. Section 3 of the act states: ``It should be the 
policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime 
headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the 
emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.'' Through 
this provision, Congress has already expressed its views on this 
subject. I applaud the efforts of the Bush administration to engage 
Iraqi opponents of Saddam Hussein and to work with these groups to 
provide a democratic alternative to this tyrant.
  The United States has a strong record of restoring order and 
cultivating democracy in post-conflict regions of the globe. Examples 
such as post-World War II Germany and Japan are stellar illustrations 
of how the U.S. has worked to better defeated nations that strayed from 
the norms and rules of acceptable international behavior. In addition, 
unlike Afghanistan, Iraq is a wealthy nation with natural resources, an 
educated populace and a middle class--all elements that will bolster 
the chances of democracy thriving in this country. There is no reason 
to expect that with a concerted effort by the U.S. and other democratic 
nations that Iraq cannot join Israel as the only other Middle Eastern 
democracy.
  But perhaps most important, benign neglect is not morally acceptable. 
Looking the other way will not and cannot improve the situation in Iraq 
and the threat Saddam Hussein poses to the world. There is a parallel 
between today's situation and the situation that confronted the 
civilized Western World of the 1930s. In that era, democratic leaders 
sought to appease the ambitions of Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 
World War II, the Holocaust and millions of military and civilian 
casualties are the outcome of that deferral of action.
  President Bush's effort to compel compliance with applicable U.N. 
Security Council resolutions is our best chance for peaceful 
disarmament. Not one speaker here in the Senate has indicated that the 
status quo is acceptable or reasonable. It is painfully clear that one 
way or another we--preferably the U.S. in concert with our allies and 
the support of the United Nations--must deal with Saddam and his threat 
to our interests, our allies' interests, the stability of the Middle 
East and the interests of the civilized world.

[[Page S10332]]

  In conclusion, given the events of September 11th, given the past 
transgressions of Saddam Hussein, and given the threat posed to the 
world by his weapons of mass destruction programs, it is imperative 
that we provide President Bush with the strongest hand possible to seek 
compliance with all applicable U.N. Security Council resolutions. The 
attacks of September 11th and the fateful decisions not taken in the 
1930s illustrate that there is a cost to not taking corrective action 
in a prompt and decisive fashion.
  It is my sincere hope that this resolution will rally the United 
Nations Security Council to draft a strong resolution forcing the 
disarmament of Saddam Hussein and his regime of terror. If the U.N. 
fails to act, the U.S. must do what is in the best interest of our 
national security interests and disarm Saddam Hussein. Today represents 
our best opportunity for peaceful disarmament disarmament on our terms 
and according to standards established by the U.N. and other civilized 
nations. To do or expect anything less is to shirk our moral obligation 
to meet the national security obligations of our country.
  It is for this reason that I will vote in favor of the bipartisan 
resolution which is before us now.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, we have a dilemma where we recognize 
that one individual, who has repeatedly defied the will of the 
international community, almost certainly has control over a 
concentration of weapons of mass destruction.
  We have already seen this individual's willingness to use these 
weapons against his own people and against Iranian forces during the 
Iran-Iraq war.
  So the question is, is it inevitable that sooner or later Saddam 
Hussein will again use weapons of mass destruction, and if so, against 
whom?
  There is concern that if the United States and her allies use force 
against Iraq, Saddam will attempt to use his weapons of mass 
destruction in order to remain in power. It is a legitimate concern and 
one that must not be taken lightly.
  But I ask my colleagues, if we are hesitant now, how hesitant will we 
be when Saddam Hussein possesses a nuclear capability? And what will 
Saddam do when he knows we are unwilling to take action?
  We have seen Saddam's willingness to invade his neighbors--Iran and 
Kuwait. How much farther would Saddam have gone had he not been stopped 
by U.S.-led coalition forces?
  In 1981, Israeli aircraft destroyed an Iraqi military reactor capable 
of producing nuclear weapons in a surprise, preemptive strike. Israel 
faced tremendous criticism from the world, but a decade later, during 
the gulf war, allied forces did not face a nuclear weapon capability 
from Iraq.
  Last month, Secretary Rumsfeld testified before the Senate Armed 
Forces Committee that prior to Operation Desert Storm, the best 
intelligence estimates were that Iraq was at least 5 to 7 years away 
from having nuclear weapons. Yet, when coalition forces entered Iraq, 
we found that Iraq was 6 months to one year away, not 5 to 7 years.
  How close is Saddam today from acquiring nuclear weapons capability? 
We don't know. We have not been able to place weapons inspectors in 
Iraq since 1998. Recent reports indicate one to five years, but just 
like 1991, we don't know for sure.
  We do know that Saddam Hussein has developed weapons of mass 
destruction--weapons such as anthrax, VX, sarin and mustard gas. Are 
these weapons a country would use to defend itself? Or are these the 
weapons of an aggressor that would go to whatever means necessary to 
prevail?
  And let's not forget about the threat of proliferation--the threat of 
Saddam sharing these weapons with like minded terrorist organizations 
who would not hesitate to use them against the United States and our 
allies.
  Had we known in advance the tragic events of September 11, 2001, 
there is no doubt that the United States would have taken preemptive 
action against the al-Qaida terrorist network.
  Every month, every year that Saddam Hussein remains in defiance of 
U.N. Security Council resolutions, we face an even larger, more deadly 
threat to the security of this great nation. As the President has said, 
to ignore these threats is to encourage them.
  I am hopeful that the use of military action will not be necessary. 
That Saddam Hussein will fulfill the requirements of the United Nations 
Security Council. That he will allow full and unobstructed access to 
U.N. weapons inspectors to destroy all of Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction. But past history does not give much cause for hope.
  In the 11 years since the Persian Gulf War, Saddam Hussein has 
blatantly ignored 16 U.N. Security Council Resolutions calling for the 
total destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Eleven years; 
16 Resolutions.
  This is not a game. We are currently in a limited war with Iraq. So 
far in 2002, Iraq has fired on Allied fighter planes 409 times, 14 
times this past weekend alone. Iraqi forces have fired anti-aircraft 
artillery 1,000 times, launched 600 rockets and fired nearly 60 
surface-to-air missiles. Since Iraq set a letter accepting the return 
of weapons inspectors on September 16, they have fired on Allied forces 
70 times.
  The time for appeasement is over. We have seen the policy of 
appeasement prove ineffectual in the past. The League of Nations was 
unable to stop Germany from rearming itself and threatening her 
neighbors. Its policy of appeasement only served to advance Hitler's 
ambitions.
  The United Nations now finds itself in a similar situation. It can 
choose to either enforce its own resolutions passed by the Security 
Council, or find itself irrelevant in the view of the world.
  The U.N. Security Council is expected to soon take up its 17th 
resolution regarding Iraq. They deserve to hear, not just from the 
President of the United States, but the Congress of the United States 
as well.
  We can wait. We can react after the fact. But at what point do we 
act? When do we recognize that Saddam is a threat, that he does train 
al-Qaida, that he does fund the terrorists? At a certain point in time, 
we have to face reality.
  What if we left this session of the Congress without authorizing the 
President to take the appropriate action needed to defend the national 
security of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq?
  How would we feel if--God forbid--Saddam was to take action and take 
American lives? We would feel we had been derelict in our obligation.
  We have an obligation to provide for the security of the people of 
the United States. Do we follow a policy of appeasement?
  Allowing Saddam Hussein to continue to build his weapons of mass 
destruction?
  To continue to play a cat and mouse game of allowing weapons 
inspectors in, only to place conditions on their actions?
  To continue to defy the international community, without fear of 
reprisal?
  To take the chance that those terrorist networks that Saddam supports 
will not take action against the United States--with Saddam's weapons 
of mass destruction?
  It is oil that built Iraq and it is oil dollars that keep Saddam in 
power.
  Oil dollars fund the weapons, the research, and the training camps 
for terrorists that give Saddam a global reach.
  Do we continue to import hundreds of thousands of barrels of oil from 
Iraq each day? In September 2002, it is estimated the U.S. imported 
550,000 barrels a day. In September of 2001, we imported 1.2 million 
barrels a day--and broke an 11 year record.
  The GAO reports Saddam received $6.6 billion in illegal revenue 
through smuggled oil since 1997, $1.5 billion in 2001 alone.
  The number of vessels smuggling oil has dramatically risen in the 
past few months. In June through August, the Multi-national 
Interception Force boarded 297 vessels--nearly 100 per month--with 
225,000 barrels of oil. Prior to that, the boarded an average of 12 
vessels per month.
  This is the Iraqi oil that powers our economy, fuels our school 
buses, and provides jet fuel for our fighters.
  No longer should Iraq count on the United States to fund its regime.
  We must pass an energy bill that helps reduce our dangerous 
dependence on Iraq. America must not be held victim to the whims of 
Saudi kings and Middle Eastern dictators.

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  We have an obligation to the American people. We have an obligation 
to send a strong, unified voice to the United Nations--Congress and the 
President, hand in hand--that it is time to stop appeasing Saddam.
  It is time to enforce the multitude of resolutions already passed and 
it is time to remove the deadly threat posed by Saddam Hussein.
  And if the United Nations is not willing to enforce its own 
resolutions, if the United Nations is not willing to make itself 
relevant, then the United States must not be afraid to stand up, to 
ensure that the national security of the United States is not 
endangered by the actions of Saddam Hussein.
  I support this resolution. It is time to send a clear message to 
Saddam that we will no longer stand by while he develops these weapons 
that threaten the stability of the region, while he continues to defy 
the will of the international community, and while he poses a threat to 
the national security of the United States.
  We cannot afford the risks of inaction. Not after the lessons we have 
learned from September 11.
  Mrs. LINCOLN. Mr. President, I rise today as the Mother of two sons 
as well as a proud member of this body.
  I have come to my decision on this grave matter after going to every 
length to gather as much information as I could, then weighing it 
carefully with the general sentiment in my state that we should be very 
thoughtful. My constituents want us to consider the consequences of 
war.
  I have asked the same questions of the President and his national 
security team that my constituents asked me. I understand that there 
are no easy choices when confronting a menace like Saddam Hussein. I 
have decided to support the Lieberman-Bayh resolution because I believe 
it gives the President the authority to act with military force if 
necessary while holding him accountable for a preferred, peaceful 
solution.
  I look at my sons every day and wonder what kind of a world we are 
creating for them. I am sad that September 11, 2001 has forever changed 
our perspective on their future and ours. I regret that I cannot be 
sure that my boys will always be safe from terrorism. But, I am ever 
more resolved that we have a responsibility to eliminate the Saddam 
Husseins and Osama bin Ladens of the world. These are people who bear 
an irrational hatred toward America and the liberty and justice that we 
stand for. They have converted that hatred into weapons stockpiles and 
terrorist networks that threaten our way of life. We cannot stand idly 
by while they gain strength and underestimate our resolve.
  Today, I make a difficult choice. I choose to give our President the 
authority to take military action against Iraq if necessary because I 
believe him when he says he does not want to go to war. I take our 
President at his word that disarming Saddam Hussein peacefully is his 
first choice. I support the notion that a unified Congress sends a 
strong message to our allies and gives our Secretary of State more 
leverage as he negotiates a new and tougher U.N. resolution that 
mandates weapons inspections in Iraq with military consequences if 
Saddam resists.
  Saddam Hussein is a ruthless dictator. He has set himself apart from 
dictators of the past by using biological weapons against his own 
people. He has used them before and I don't want to be left with regret 
if he were to use them against our military or diplomatic personnel 
overseas, or even our allies. Our objective must be to disarm him 
before he can unleash his arsenal of chemical and biological weapons or 
before he can complete work on a nuclear weapon.
  The time has come to no longer abide the threat that Saddam Hussein 
brings to everything that is good in this world. The time has come to 
eliminate his tools of destruction. Whether we do it alone or with the 
support of our allies, there can be no question that disarmament of 
Iraq cannot happen without the significant involvement, in fact the 
leadership, of the United States.
  So I have concluded that Saddam Hussein understands only one kind of 
communication. A strongly worded U.N. resolution with the solid 
military backing of the Security Council may change his mind about 
cooperating. If it doesn't, he must know that his evil and treachery 
will have consequences.
  Today I believe that the risk of doing nothing outweighs the risk of 
taking action. President Bush has pledged to me and the nation that he 
will exhaust a peaceful solution before resorting to a military 
solution. And I intend to hold him to his word.
  I vote for this resolution with a heavy heart but also with the 
knowledge that we can't have it both ways. We cannot wish terrorism 
away without taking the necessary steps to ensure that our country, and 
certainly our children, are safe and free.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, we face no more serious decision in our 
democracy than whether to go to war. America's values and interests are 
served best if war is a last resort. I do not believe America should go 
to war against Iraq unless and until other reasonable alternatives are 
exhausted, and I will vote against this resolution authorizing the use 
of force against Iraq.
  Too often in this debate, we have failed to address the real effects 
of unilateral war with Iraq. The more we debate the war, the more we 
learn of the danger of going to war alone, the danger that it will 
cause to our urgent war against al-Qaida and terrorism, the danger that 
Saddam may be provoked into using his weapons of mass destruction 
against us or against Israel, the danger that allies we need will 
refuse to support us on other major challenges in the years ahead, and 
the dangerous new instability that could be caused in that volatile 
region if we go to war alone.
  Because the threat of Saddam is real, I commend President Bush for 
taking America's case to the United Nations. We have a better prospect 
of disarming Iraq with the world behind us, than with our allies on the 
sidelines, or even at odds with our mission.
  As we approach a vote on this important question, I offer the 
strongest possible affirmation that good and decent people on all sides 
of this debate who may in the end stand on opposing sides of this 
decision, are equally committed to our national security.
  The life and death issue of war and peace is too important to be left 
to politics. And I disagree with those who suggest that this fateful 
issue cannot or should not be contested vigorously, publicly, and all 
across America. When it is the people's sons and daughters who will 
risk and even lose their lives, then the people should hear and be 
heard, speak and be listened to.
  But there is a difference between honest public dialogue and partisan 
appeals. There is a difference between questioning policy and 
questioning motives. There are Republicans and Democrats who support 
the immediate use of force, and Republicans and Democrats who have 
raised doubts and dissented.
  In this serious time for America and many American families, no one 
should poison the public square by attacking the patriotism of 
opponents, or by assailing proponents as more interested in the cause 
of politics than in the merits of their cause. I reject this, as should 
we all.
  Let me say it plainly: I not only concede, but I am convinced that 
President Bush believes genuinely in the course he urges upon us. And 
let me say with the same plainness: Those who agree with that course 
have an equal obligation--to resist any temptation to convert 
patriotism into politics. It is possible to love America while 
concluding that it is not now wise to go to war. The standard that 
should guide us is especially clear when lives are on the line: We must 
ask what is right for country and not party.
  That is the true spirit of September 11, not unthinking unanimity, 
but a clear-minded unity in or determination to defeat terrorism, to 
defend our values and the value of life itself.
  Just a year ago, the American people and the Congress rallied behind 
the President and our Armed Forces as we went to war in Afghanistan. 
al-Qaida and the Taliban protectors who gave them sanctuary in 
Afghanistan posed a clear, present and continuing danger. The need to 
destroy al-Qaida was urgent and undeniable.
  In the months that followed September 11, the Bush administration 
marshaled an international coalition. Today, 90 countries are enlisted 
in the effort, from providing troops to providing law enforcement, 
intelligence, and other critical support.

[[Page S10334]]

  But I am concerned that using force against Iraq before other means 
are tried will sorely test both the integrity and effectiveness of the 
coalition. Just one year into the campaign against al-Qaida, the 
administration is shifting focus, resources and energy to Iraq. The 
change is priority is coming before we have fully eliminated the threat 
from al-Qaida, before we know whether Osama bin Laden is dead or alive, 
and before we can be assured that the fragile post-Taiban government in 
Afghanistan will consolidate its authority.
  No one disputes that America has lasting and important interests in 
the Persian Gulf, or that Iraq poses a significant challenge to U.S. 
interests. There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein's regime is a serious 
danger, that he is tyrant, and that his pursuit of lethal weapons of 
mass destruction cannot be tolerated. The question is not whether he 
should be disarmed, but how.
  How can we best achieve this objective in a way that minimizes the 
risks to our country? How can we ignore the danger to our young men and 
women in uniform, to our ally Israel, to regional stability, the 
international community, and victory against terrorism?
  There is clearly a threat from Iraq, and there is clearly a danger, 
but the administration has not made a convincing case that we face such 
an imminent threat to our national security that a unilateral American 
strike and an immediate war are necessary.
  Nor has the administration laid out the cost in blood and treasure of 
this operation.
  With all the talk of war, the administration has not explicitly 
acknowledged, let alone explained to the American people, the immense 
post-war commitment that will be required to create a stable Iraq.
  The President's challenge to the United Nations requires a renewed 
effort to enforce the will of the international community to disarm 
Saddam. Resorting to war is not America's only or best ocurse at this 
juncture. There are realistic alternatives between doing nothing and 
declaring unilateral or immediate war. War should be a last resort. Let 
us follow that course, and the world will be with us--even if, in the 
end, we have to move to the ultimate sanction of armed conflict.
  The Bush administration says America can fight a war in Iraq without 
undermining our most pressing national security priority, the war 
against Al-Qaida. But I believe it is inevitable that a war in Iraq 
without serious international support will weaken our effort to ensure 
that Al-Qaida terrorists can never, never, never threaten American 
lives again.
  Unfortunately, the threat from al-Qaida is still imminent. The 
Nation's armed forces and law enforcement are on constant high alert. 
America may have broken up the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan and 
scattered its operatives across many lands. But we have not broken its 
will to kill Americans.
  As I said earlier, we still don't know the fate, the location, or the 
operational capacity of Osama bin Laden himself. But we do know that 
al-Qaida is still there, and still here in America, and will do all it 
can to strike at America's heart and heartland again. But we don't know 
when, where, or how this may happen.
  On March 12, CIA Director Tenet testified before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee that al-Qaida remains ``the most immediate and 
serious threat'' to our country, ``despite the progress we have made in 
Afghanistan and in disrupting the network elsewhere.''
  Even with the Taliban out of power, Afghanistan remains fragile. 
Security remains tenuous. Warlords still dominate many regions. Our 
reconstruction effort, which is vital to long-term stability and 
security, is halting and inadequate. Some al-Qaida operatives, no one 
knows how many, have faded into the general population. Terrorist 
attacks are on the rise. President Karzai, who has already survived one 
assassination attempt, is still struggling to solidify his hold on 
power. And although neighboring Pakistan has been our ally, its 
stability is far from certain.
  We know all this, and we also know that it is an open secret in 
Washington that the Nation's uniformed military leadership is skeptical 
about the wisdom of war with Iraq. They share the concern that it may 
adversely affect the ongoing war against al-Qaida and the continuing 
effort in Afghanistan by draining resources and armed forces already 
stretched so thin that many Reservists have been called for a second 
year of duty, and record numbers of service members have been kept on 
active duty beyond their obligated service.
  They said that spy satellite, reconnaissance aircraft and other 
intelligence analysts with regional or linguistic expertise would have 
to be reassigned.
  To succeed in our global war against al-Qaida and terrorism, the 
United States depends on military, law enforcement, and intelligence 
support from many other nations. We depend on Russia and countries in 
the former Soviet Union that border Afghanistan for military 
cooperation. We depend on countries from Portugal to Pakistan to the 
Philippines for information about al-Qaida's plans and intentions. 
Because of these relationships, terrorist plots are being foiled and 
al-Qaida operatives are being arrested.
  Support from our allies has been indispensable in the war on 
terrorism, and has had real results: In December 2001, Singapore 
officials arrested 13 members of a group with ties to al-Qaida that had 
planned to bomb the U.S. embassy and U.S. commercial and military 
targets in Singapore. Malaysia has arrested nearly 50 suspected al-
Qaida terrorists since September 11th. In March 2002, a joint U.S.-
Pakistani police operation arrested 29 al-Qaida suspects, believed to 
include Abu Zubayday, a key bin Laden deputy. In May 2002, Morocco 
arrested three alleged al-Qaida members in connection with a plot to 
attack American and British naval ships in the Straits of Gibraltar. In 
June, Moroccan authorities also detained Abu Zubair, nicknamed ``the 
bear''--a top associate of Abu Zubaydah. In June 2002, Saudi Arabia 
arrested seven al-Qaida members on suspicion of planning terrorist 
attacks. One of them, a Sudanese, had allegedly been involved in a 
missile attack near a Saudi airbase used by U.S. forces. The United 
States has worked closely with Yemen to combat terrorism, and the 
Yemeni government recently reported that it is holding 85 suspects 
accused of links to al-Qaida and other militant groups.
  These arrests may seem small in number. But we know only too well 
that only 19 al-Qaida terrorists were responsible for the murder of 
nearly 3000 Americans on September 11.
  It is far from clear that these essential relationships, which are 
yielding tangible law enforcement results, will survive the strain of 
unilateral war with Iraq that comes before the alternatives are tried, 
or without the support of an international coalition.
  A largely unilateral American war that is widely perceived in the 
Muslim world as untimely or unjust could worsen not lessen the threat 
of terrorism. War with Iraq before a genuine attempt at inspection and 
disarmament, or without genuine international support, could swell the 
ranks of al-Qaida sympathizers and trigger an escalation in terrorist 
acts. As General Clark told the Senate Armed Services Committee, it 
would ``super-charge recruiting for al-Qaida.
  General Hoar advised the Committee on September 232 that America's 
first and primary effort should be to defeat al-Qaida. In a September 
10th article, General Clark wrote: ``Unilateral U.S. action today would 
disrupt the war against al-Qaida.'' We ignore such wisdom and advice 
from many of the best of our military at our own peril.
  We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and 
developing weapons of mass destruction. Our intelligence community is 
deeply concerned about the acquisition of such weapons by Iran, North 
Korea, Libya, Syria and other nations. But information from the 
intelligence community over the past six months does not point to Iraq 
as an imminent threat to the United States or a major proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.
  In public hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 
March, CIA Director George Tenet described Iraq as a threat but not as 
a proliferator, saying that Saddam Hussein, and I quote, ``is 
determined to thwart U.N. sanctions, press ahead

[[Page S10335]]

with weapons of mass destruction, and resurrect the military force he 
had before the Gulf War.'' That is unacceptable, but it is also 
possible that it could be stopped short of war.
  In recent weeks, in briefings and in hearings in the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, I have seen no persuasive evidence that Saddam is 
not today deterred from attacking U.S. interests by America's 
overwhelming military superiority.

  I have heard no persuasive evidence that Saddam is on the threshold 
of acquiring the nuclear weapons he has sought for more than 20 years.
  And the Administration has offered no persuasive evidence that Saddam 
would transfer chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction to 
al-Qaida or any other terrorist organization. As General Joseph Hoar, 
the former Commander of Central Command told the members of the Armed 
Services Committee, a case has not been made to connect al-Qaida and 
Iraq.
  To the contrary, there is no clear and convincing pattern of Iraqi 
relations with either al-Qaida or the Taliban.
  Moreover, in August, former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft 
wrote that there is ``scant evidence'' linking Saddam Hussein to 
terrorist organizations, and ``even less to the September 11 attacks.'' 
He concluded that Saddam would not regard it as in his interest to risk 
his country or his investment in weapons of mass destruction by 
transferring them to terrorists who would use them and ``leave Baghdad 
as the return address.''
  Some who advocate military action against Iraq assert that air 
strikes will do the job quickly and decisively, and that the operation 
will be complete in 72 hours. But there is again no persuasive evidence 
that air strikes alone over the course of several days will 
incapacitate Saddam and destroy his weapons of mass destruction. 
Experts have informed us that we do not have sufficient intelligence 
about military targets in Iraq. Saddam may well hide his most lethal 
weapons in mosques, schools and hospitals. If our forces attempt to 
strike such targets, untold numbers of Iraqi civilians could be killed.
  In the gulf war, many of Saddam's soldiers quickly retreated because 
they did not believe the invasion of Kuwait was justified. But when 
Iraq's survival is at stake, it is more likely that they will fight to 
the end. Saddam and his military may well abandon the desert, retreat 
to Baghdad, and engage in urban, guerrilla warfare.
  Many believe that our armed forces may need to occupy Baghdad, which 
has over 5 million residents. In our September 23 hearing, General 
Clark told the committee that we would need a large military force and 
a plan for urban warfare. General Hoar said that our military would 
have to be prepared to fight block by block in Baghdad, and that we 
could lose a battalion of soldiers a day in casualties. Urban fighting 
would, he said, look like the last brutal 15 minutes of the movie 
``Saving Private Ryan.''
  We know that the senior military leadership is concerned about the 
long-term consequences of an occupation. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld 
testified in September that if force were used in Iraq, disarmament 
would take some period of time. As he said, ``one would think there 
would have to be a military presence, undoubtedly a coalition presence 
or a U.N. presence, for a period of time.
  In fact, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the cost of 
an occupation force would be $1 billion to $4 billion a month, 
depending on the size of the force, and military experts have suggested 
that up to 200,000 peace keepers might be needed for the occupation. 
However, and let me emphasize this, the Congressional Budget Office 
concluded that current U.S. Army forces would be unable to support the 
needed troop rotations for a prolonged 200,000-person occupation.
  I do not accept the idea that trying other alternatives is either 
futile or perilous--that the risks of waiting are greater than the 
risks of war. Indeed, in launching a war against Iraq now, the United 
States may precipitate the very threat that we are intent on 
preventing--weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists. If 
Saddam's regime and his very survival are threatened, then his view of 
his interests may be profoundly altered: He may decide he has nothing 
to lose by using weapons of mass destruction himself or by sharing them 
with terrorists.
  Indeed, in an October 7 letter to Senator Graham, Chairman of the 
Senate Intelligence committee, CIA Director George Tenet stated this 
risk. He said, ``Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of 
conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or C.B.W. against the 
United States.''
  In discussing the scenario of a military attack, the CIA Director 
said, ``Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer 
be deterred, he probably would become much less constrained in adopting 
terrorist actions . . . Saddam might decide that the extreme step of 
assisting Islamist terrorists in conducting a W.M.D. attack against the 
United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a 
large number of victims with him.
  In the same letter, the CIA declassified an exchange between Senator 
Levin and a senior intelligence witness. When asked about the 
likelihood of Saddam using weapons of mass destruction without 
provocation, the intelligence witness said, ``My judgment would be that 
the probability of him initiating an attack . . .  in the foreseeable 
future, given the conditions we understand now, the likelihood I think 
would be low.'' When asked about the likelihood that Saddam would use 
weapons of mass destruction if he thought his regime was in danger, the 
witness said, ``Pretty high, in my view.''
  Before the Gulf War in 1991, Secretary of State James Baker met with 
the Iraqis and threatened Hussein with ``catastrophe'' if he employed 
weapons of mass destruction. In that war, although Saddam launched 39 
Scud missiles at Israel, he did not use the chemical or biological 
weapons he had.
  If Saddam's regime and survival are threatened, he will have nothing 
to lose, and may use everything at his disposal. Israeli Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon has announced that instead of its forbearance in the 1991 
gulf war, this time Israel will respond if attacked. If weapons of mass 
destruction land on Israeli soil, killing innocent civilians, the 
experts I have consulted believe Israel will retaliate, and possibly 
with nuclear weapons.
  This escalation, spiraling out of control, could draw the Arab world 
into a regional war in which our Arab allies side with Iraq, against 
the United States and against Israel. And that would represent a 
fundamental threat to Israel, to the region, to the world economy and 
international order.
  Nor can we rule out the possibility that Saddam would assault 
American force with chemical or biological weapons. Despite advances in 
protecting our troops, we may not yet have the capability to safeguard 
all of them. The Congressional General Accounting Office published a 
report on October 1 which clearly suggests that our forces are not 
adequately prepared for a chemical or biological attack, even though 
the Defense Department has been taking significant actions to provide 
such protection.

  The GAO emphasizes the importance of chemical and biological defense 
training, the medical readiness of units to conduct operations in a 
contaminated environment, and the critical need for an adequate supply 
of required protective gear.
  Our forces are already stretched thin in other ways. Our soldiers, 
sailors, airmen and Marines are serving their country with great 
distinction. Just under 70,000 Reservists and National Guardsmen have 
been mobilized for the war against terrorism. Many reservists who were 
initially recalled for the war in Afghanistan have been either de-
mobilized or extended for a second year. They are concerned about the 
impact a war against Iraq will have on their families and on their 
jobs. Many employers who are struggling in the current sagging economy 
are also deeply concerned about the stability of their workforce. These 
patriotic Americans are willing to sacrifice, but they deserve to know 
that all reasonable alternatives to war have been exhausted.
  If we embark upon a premature or unilateral military campaign against 
Iraq, or a campaign only with Britain, our forces will have to serve in 
even greater numbers, for longer periods,

[[Page S10336]]

and with graver risks. Our force strength will be stretched even 
thinner. If in the end we must go to war, the burden should be shared 
with allies, and an alliance is less likely if war becomes an immediate 
response.
  Even with the major technological gains demonstrated in Afghanistan, 
the logistics and manpower required in a war with Iraq would be 
extraordinarily challenging if we could not marshal a real coalition of 
regional and international allies. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Richard Myers, told the Senate Armed Services Committee 
two week ago that because of the high demand placed on some of our 
forces, coalition partners would be necessary to mitigate the risk of 
war in Iraq.
  President Bush made the right decision on September 12 when he 
expressed America's willingness to work with the United Nations to 
prevent Iraq from using chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. The 
President's address to the General Assembly challenging the United 
Nations to enforce its long list of Security Council Resolutions on 
Iraq was powerful, and for me, it was persuasive.
  The President reports important progress has been made in urging many 
nations to join us in insisting that Saddam Hussein's regime be held 
accountable. The meetings already held between the U.N. and the Iraqi 
government on resuming inspections reflects the new international 
resolve to ensure that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are 
identified and destroyed. Yet, the resolution before us would allow the 
President to go it alone against Iraq without seeing our U.N. 
initiative through, and without exhausting the alternatives.
  To maintain the credibility he built when he went to the U.N., the 
President must follow the logic of his own argument. Before we go to 
war, we should give the international community to chance to meet the 
President's challenge, to renew its resolve to disarm Saddam Hussein 
completely and effectively.
  Some have argued that inspections have already been tried, and that 
they have failed. They argue that the international community has 
exhausted the option of inspections, and that immediate war is now 
justified. I disagree.
  I have spoken to former inspectors and non-proliferation experts who 
are convinced that 7 years of inspections significantly impeded 
Saddam's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, they 
are convinced that inspections can work effectively again.
  According to Rolf Ekeus, who served as the executive chairman of the 
U.N. Special Commission on Iraq from 1991 to 1997, inspectors ensured 
that not much was left of Iraq's once massive weapons programs at the 
time they departed.
  In fact, the seven years of inspections that took place until 1998 
succeeded in virtually eliminating Saddam's ability to develop a 
nuclear weapon in Iraq during that period. Even with Iraq's 
obstructions, those inspections resulted in the demolition of large 
quantities of chemical and biological weapons. The inspection program, 
before its forced termination in 1998, had accomplished far more 
disarmament than the gulf war itself.
  President Bush acknowledged the successes of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, or I.A.E.A., in thwarting Saddam's nuclear ambitions in 
his October 7 address to the Nation. He said, ``Before being barred 
from Iraq in 1998, the International Atomic Energy Agency dismantled 
extensive nuclear weapons-related facilities, including three uranium-
enrichment sites.''
  A CIA assessment, released to the public in October 2002, says: 
``Before its departure from Iraq, the IAEA made significant strides 
toward dismantling Iraq's nuclear weapons program and unearthing the 
nature and scope of Iraq's past nuclear activities.''
  Even the assessment of Iraq's WMD program published by the British 
Government to demand action in the United Nations against Iraq 
acknowledges the success of inspections. It says: ``Despite the conduct 
of the Iraqi authorities towards them, both, the UN, and the IAEA 
Action Team have valuable records of achievement in discovering and 
exposing Iraq's biological weapons program and destroying very large 
quantities of chemical weapons stocks and missiles as well as the 
infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme.''
  Among the U.N.'s significant achievements cited in the assessment 
are: The destruction of 40,000 munitions for chemical weapons, 2,610 
tons of chemical precursors, and 411 tons of chemical warfare agent. 
The dismantling of Iraq's prime chemical weapons development production 
complex. The destruction of 48 Scud-type missiles, 11 mobile launchers 
and 56 sites, 30 warheads filled with chemical agents, and 20 
conventional warheads. The destruction of the al-Hakam biological 
weapons facility and a range of production equipment. The removal and 
destruction of the infrastructure of the nuclear weapons program, 
including a weaponization and testing facility.
  Experts on inspections advise that it would be extremely hard for 
Iraq to carry on an active and even secret WMD program while 
inspections are being conducted, especially with the inspection 
technology that has been developed over the last ten years. One former 
nuclear inspector told me that he found it hard to keep Iraqi 
scientists quiet about Iraq's nuclear program, once they started to 
talk.
  Given these assessments, there is every reason to believe that 
unrestricted and unconditional inspections can again be effective in 
ensuring the destruction of weapons of mass destruction. It is an 
option that must be given a clear chance before going to war again.
  So this should be the first aim of our policy, to get U.N. inspectors 
back into Iraq without conditions. I hope the Security Council will 
approve a new resolution requiring the Government of Iraq to accept 
unlimited and unconditional inspections and the destruction of any 
weapons of mass destruction.
  The resolution should set a short timetable for the resumption of 
inspections. I would hope that inspections could resume, at the latest, 
by the end of October.
  The resolution should also require the head of the U.N. inspection 
team to report to the Security Council every two weeks. No delaying 
tactics should be tolerated, and if they occur, Saddam should know that 
he will lose his last chance to avoid war.
  The Security Council Resolution should authorize the use of force, if 
the inspection process is unsatisfactory. And there should be no doubt 
in Baghdad that the United States Congress would then be prepared to 
authorize force as well.
  The return of inspectors with unfettered access and the ability to 
destroy what they find not only could remove any weapons of mass 
destruction from Saddam's arsenal. They could also be more effective 
than an immediate or unilateral war in ensuring that these deadly 
weapons would not fall into terrorist hands.
  Before going to war again, we should seek to resume the inspections 
now--and set a non-negotiable demand of no obstruction, no delay, no 
more weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
  We know that our actions against Iraq do not occur in a vacuum. The 
world is watching. The Administration's decisions to abandon the Kyoto 
Protocol on global warming, to unilaterally withdraw from the ABM 
Treaty, and to reject ratification of the Treaty on the International 
Criminal Court have left the unmistakable impression across the globe 
that the United States wants to write its own international rules.
  In February, Secretary of State Powell testified that there was 
significant concern among the Europeans earlier last year about 
``unbridled U.S. unilateralism,'' because ``the U.S. was going off on 
its own without a care for the rest of the world.'' Further unilateral 
action on our part, especially on the all-important issue of war, could 
trigger a new global anti-Americanism that causes peoples and 
governments to question our motives and actions on a wide range of 
issues.
  We should not embark on a unilateral war, without fully considering 
the potentially destabilizing impact on our allies in the region.
  If we insist on attacking Iraq alone without the clear support of the 
international community, we could inflame anti-Americanism in the 
predominantly Muslim countries throughout the Middle East and South 
Asia. In an article this month in the New York Times, an expert at the 
Brookings Institution wrote that regardless of our

[[Page S10337]]

real objectives, most Arabs and Muslims will see ``American 
imperialism'' in a war with Iraq.
  This expert says that a war with Iraq would ``render the Middle East 
more . . . unstable than it is today.'' Middle Eastern leaders could be 
faced with mass street protests over a highly unpopular American 
strike.
  Jordan's King Abdullah, who is a trusted friend of America, is deeply 
concerned that war will inflame the large Palestinian population and 
inflame Islamic views. Iraq is one of Jordan's largest trading 
partners, and King Abdullah is understandably concerned about a 
potentially devastating impact on the Jordanian economy. Some experts 
have suggested that King Abdullah may lose power if war breaks out. 
Already the Jordanian Government is working actively to discourage 
popular outbursts against war with Iraq.
  In Egypt, President Mubarak is concerned that war with Iraq will 
further ignite strong Islamist sentiment.
  We also need to consider the possibility that Iran would try to 
increase its strength and influence in Southern Iraq in a post-Saddam 
era. More than 50 percent of the Iraqi population is Shiite, just as in 
Iran, and if the Iranian Government senses a vacuum, it very well might 
try to increase its influence in Iraq.
  The United States must clearly act to defend our national security 
against an imminent threat. In doing so, the President will have the 
full support of Congress and the American people. But when an imminent 
threat does not exist, and when reasonable alternatives are available, 
as they are now, we must use them before resorting to war.
  What can be gained here is success and in the event of failure, 
greater credibility for an armed response, greater international 
support, and the prospect of victory with less loss of American life.
  So what is to be lost by pursuing this policy before Congress 
authorizes sending young Americans into another and in this case 
perhaps unnecessary war?
  Even the case against Saddam is, in important respects, a case 
against immediate or unilateral war. If Prime Minister Blair is correct 
in saying that Iraq can launch chemical or biological warheads in 45 
minutes, what kind of sense does it make to put our soldiers in the 
path of that danger without exhausting every reasonable means to disarm 
Iraq through the United Nations?
  Clearly we must halt Saddam Hussein's quest for weapons of mass 
destruction. Yes, we may reach the point where our only choice is 
conflict with like-minded allies at our side, if not in a multilateral 
action authorized by the Security Council. But we are not there yet.
  The evidence does not take us there; events do not compel us there 
and both the war against terrorism and our wider interests in the 
region and the world summon us to a course that is sensible, graduated, 
and genuinely strong--not because it moves swiftly to battle, but 
because it moves resolutely to the objective of disarming Iraq 
peacefully if possible, and militarily if necessary.
  In his October 7 address to the nation, President Bush said 
Congressional approval of a resolution authorizing the use of force 
does not mean that war with Iraq is ``imminent or unavoidable.'' The 
President himself has not decided that our nation should go to war. 
Yet, Congress is being asked to authorize war now. He may decide not to 
use that authority. But this resolution leaves it to the President to 
make the decision on his own, without further recourse to Congress or 
to the American people.
  The power to declare war is the most solemn responsibility given to 
Congress by the Constitution. We must not delegate that responsibility 
to the President in advance.
  Let me close by recalling the events of an autumn of danger four 
decades ago. When missiles were discovered in Cuba--missiles more 
threatening to us than anything Saddam has today, some in the highest 
councils of government urged an immediate and unilateral strike. 
Instead the United States took its case to the United Nations, won the 
endorsement of the Organization of American States, and brought along 
even our most skeptical allies. We imposed a blockade, demanded 
inspection, and insisted on the removal of the missiles.
  When an earlier President outlined that choice to the American people 
and the world, he spoke of it in realistic terms not with a sense that 
the first step would necessarily be the final step, but with a resolve 
that it must be tried.
  As he said then, ``Action is required . . . and these actions [now] 
may only be the beginning. We will not prematurely or unnecessarily 
risk the costs of . . . war--but neither will we shrink from that risk 
at any time it must be faced.''
  In 2002, we too can and must be both resolute and measured. In that 
way, the United States prevailed without war in the greatest 
confrontation of the Cold War. Now, on Iraq, let us build international 
support, try the United Nations, and pursue disarmament before we turn 
to armed conflict.
  Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I rise today to offer my support for the 
pending resolution. I am pleased to be a cosponsor of the Lieberman-
Warner-McCain resolution because I believe it is in our national 
security interests to deal with the threat posed by Iraq. The world 
would be a far safer place without Saddam Hussein, and as long as he 
remains in power, he will continue to be a threat to the region, to the 
United States, and to his own people.
  Saddam Hussein is a destabilizing force in the Middle East. A quick 
review of history reveals he has invaded two of his neighbors--Iran and 
Kuwait--causing massive destruction, killing hundreds of thousands of 
people, and bankrupting his country. During the gulf war, he launched 
ballistic missiles at civilian populations in Israel. He opposes the 
Middle East peace process and has provided financial rewards to the 
families of suicide bombers. He supports organizations engaged in 
terrorism and committed to the overthrow of governments within the 
region. It is clear that Saddam Hussein is an opponent of stability in 
the Middle East, and our efforts to build a lasting peace in the region 
is in jeopardy as long as he remains in power.
  In addition to being a threat to his neighbors, Saddam Hussein is a 
threat to the United States and to our vital national security 
interests. There can be no doubt that Iraq has continued its drive to 
develop weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. 
After the gulf war, Saddam Hussein agreed to open up his country to 
international inspectors, to destroy his weapons stockpiles, and to 
halt all weapons of mass destruction development programs. Despite near 
continual obstruction by Iraq, international weapons inspectors were 
able to uncover a portion of his extensive chemical and biological 
weapons, and gain vital information about his effort to develop nuclear 
weapons.
  However, the weapons inspectors' progress was thwarted when Saddam 
Hussein forced them to leave the country in 1998. For 4 years, he has 
been able to pursue chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons 
capabilities outside the watchful eye of the international community. 
While Iraq has agreed to allow the weapons inspectors to return, I am 
skeptical that Saddam Hussein will keep his word and allow unfettered 
access to suspect sites. Already there are indications that the 
agreement under which the inspectors will return allows Iraq to forbid 
entrance into certain key locations. Without full and guaranteed access 
to all sites, this inspection regime is likely to fail and prove to be 
just another delaying tactic.
  Saddam Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction is in 
itself a threat to the United States, but equally concerning is his 
ties to international terrorism. It is clear that Iraq is in violation 
of its obligation to renounce terrorism and to halt its support for 
terrorist organizations. Recently, the Bush administration announced 
that it has evidence linking Saddam Hussein with international 
terrorists. A link between Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction 
and al-Qaida terrorists would be the gravest threat facing our Nation 
and would require immediate action by the United States.
  Given this threat, and the fact that Iraq is in violation of 16 
separate United Nations Security Council resolutions, the United States 
is well within its rights to act militarily to protect

[[Page S10338]]

the safety of the American people. I disagree with those who argue our 
actions must be tied to prior approval by the United Nations. The 
defense of our Nation should not be dictated by other countries or 
international organizations. If necessary, the United States should be 
prepared to act alone.
  However, I strongly support efforts to build international support 
prior to military action against Iraq. The support of our allies, and 
the international community as a whole, will increase the chances of 
success for our policy in Iraq and in the ongoing fight against global 
terrorism. One reason why I support the pending resolution is that I 
believe a strong vote by Congress will signal our national unity and 
make it more likely that the President will succeed in creating a 
strong international coalition.
  While much of our focus has been on preparing for possible military 
action against Iraq, and working with the international community to 
resume inspections of Iraq's suspected weapons of mass destruction 
sites, I believe we must also begin the process of planning for a post-
Saddam Hussein Iraq. As a part of this, we must begin to talk to the 
Iraqi people and enlist their support in the fight against Saddam 
Hussein. There can be no doubt that no one has suffered more from 
Saddam Hussein's regime than the people of Iraq.
  The list of crimes Saddam Hussein has perpetrated against his own 
citizens is shocking. Since 1997, he has killed over 2,500 prisoners--
many of whom were jailed simply for their opposition to his regime. He 
has repressed both the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south 
by causing environmental devastation, demolishing homes, destroying 
villages, and creating hundreds of thousands of internally displaced 
people throughout the country. In 1988 in the village of Halabja, he 
used chemical weapons to kill more than 5,000 innocent Iraqi civilians. 
And while thousands of his people starve, Saddam Hussein diverts much 
needed food and medicine from the U.N.'s Oil for Food Program for his 
own enrichment.
  Given his history, the Iraqi people should no doubt welcome the end 
of Saddam Hussein's brutal regime. We should ask for their support in 
ousting Saddam by assuring them that our goal is nothing short of 
helping them establish a functioning, democratic society. Iraq enjoys a 
wealth of natural resources and a well-educated, innovative population. 
The Iraqi people may well thrive once they are allowed to harness the 
power of democracy and free markets.
  I believe we can succeed in helping the Iraqi people create a better 
country. It will be difficult and will take a long-term commitment from 
the United States. But ultimately, the success of our efforts in Iraq 
will be judged by our ability to make sure that Saddam Hussein is not 
simply replaced by another dictator who will pursue weapons of mass 
destruction, invade his neighbors, and support global terrorism.
  This vote has particular significance to me. My son, Brooks, is 
currently serving in the 101st Airborne. The 101st is one of the Army 
divisions that has been identified by military leaders as likely to 
prosecute the war against Iraq. I know that a vote in favor of this 
resolution may be a vote to send my own son to war. Given this, I do 
not take this vote lightly. I am very proud of my son, and of the 
thousands of South Dakotans serving in our Armed Forces, and I know 
they are prepared to do what is necessary to protect the United States.
  I will vote for this resolution because I know putting a stop to 
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program and ending Saddam Hussein's 
brutal dictatorship is in our national security interests and vital to 
protecting the American people. While this approach is not without 
danger, the greatest danger of all would be in a failure of the U.S. 
and the world community to act in a decisive and urgent manner.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, what weapons, exactly, does Saddam 
Hussein have, and what could he do with them? When we are talking about 
this dangerous dictator, that is not a hypothetical question. We can 
see what he has done already with the chemicals he has developed. We 
don't have to imagine; we need only extrapolate.
  Saddam Hussein not only has large and growing stockpiles of chemical 
and biological weapons. He alone among the dictators of the world has 
shown a willingness to use them.
  In the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi troops repeatedly used poison gas, 
including mustard gas and the nerve agent sarin, against Iranian 
soldiers. And Saddam has repeatedly attacked Kurds in the north with 
chemical weapons, namely nerve agents and mustard gas, the most 
horrifying single attack coming in Halabja in 1988.
  It is one thing to see nations accumulate dangerous weapons for 
purely deterrent and defensive purposes. It is another entirely to see 
a dictator develop such weapons and deploy them to murder opponents of 
his regime and wage offensive war against a neighbor.
  That is why we must look with special scrutiny on Saddam's 
stockpiles.
  When the U.N. inspectors were forced out of Iraq in 1998, here is 
what was unaccounted for: up to 360 tons of bulk chemical warfare 
agents, including one and a half tons of VX nerve agent; up to 3,00 
tons of precursor chemicals; growth media sufficient to produce 26,000 
liters of anthrax spores; and over 30,000 special munitions for 
delivery of chemical and biological agents.
  Those are just the leftovers that we know about. Then add to that all 
the deadly weapons that Saddam has been cooking up over the last 11 
years. We know Iraq continues to produce chemical agents for chemical 
weapons. We know Saddam has rebuilt previously destroyed production 
plants across Iraq. We know he has retained the key personnel formerly 
engaged in the chemical weapons program. He has mustard gas, VX nerve 
agent, and a range of other chemical weapons.
  The record repeats itself with biological weapons. Intelligence shows 
us that production has continued. Facilities formerly used for 
biological weapons have been rebuilt. Equipment has been purchased. And 
Saddam has retained the personnel who worked on it before the gulf war. 
Indeed, UNSCOM found that Iraq was working to build mobile biological 
weapons facilities which are easier to conceal. It appears that they 
now have such facilities. The biological agents we believe Iraq can 
produce include anthrax, botulinum, toxin, aflatoxin and ricin.
  Perhaps we recite the litany, ``chemical, biological, working on 
nuclear,'' so often that it loses some of its meaning. British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair has warned against us developing a kind of ``word 
fatigue'' when it comes to these weapons, and I take that warning to 
heart.
  ``New Yorker'' writer Jeffrey Goldberg has traveled to the region and 
done significant reporting on Saddam's capabilities and his 
intentions--on his deadly weapons and his brutal will. Let me read a 
piece Mr. Goldberg wrote in the online magazine Slate that puts 
Saddam's possession of at least one of these toxins in sharp relief. I 
quote:

       In 1995, the government of Saddam Hussein admitted to 
     United Nations weapons inspectors that its scientists had 
     weaponized a biological agent called aflatoxin. Charles 
     Duelfer, the former deputy executive chairman of the now--
     defunct UNSCOM, told me earlier this year that the Iraqi 
     admission was startling because aflatoxin has no possible 
     battlefield use. Aflatoxin, which is made from fungi that 
     occur in moldy grains, does only one thing well: It causes 
     liver cancer. In fact, it induces it particularly well in 
     children. Its effects are far from immediate. The joke among 
     weapons inspectors is that aflatoxin would stop a lieutenant 
     from making colonel, but it would not stop soldiers from 
     advancing across a battlefield.
       I quoted Duelfer, in an article that appeared in the New 
     Yorker, saying that ``we kept pressing the Iraqis to discuss 
     the concept of use of aflatoxin.'' They never came up with an 
     adequate explanation, he said. They did admit, however, that 
     they had loaded aflatoxin into two warheads capable of being 
     fitted onto Scud missiles.

  Richard Spertzel, who was the chief biological weapons inspector for 
UNSCOM, told me that aflatoxin is ``a devilish weapon. From a moral 
standpoint, aflatoxin is the cruelest weapons, it means watching 
children die slowly of liver cancer.''
  Spertzel went on to say that, to his knowledge, Iraq is the only 
country ever to weaponize aflatoxin.

       In an advertisement that appeared in the New York Times on 
     Tuesday, a group of worthies called upon the American people 
     to summon the courage to question the war plans of President 
     Bush. The advertisement, which was sponsored by Common Cause, 
     asks, in reference to the Saddam regime, ``Of all the 
     repugnant dictatorships, why this one?'' . . .

[[Page S10339]]

       . . . There are, of course, many repugnant dictators in the 
     world; a dozen or so in the Middle East alone. But Saddam 
     Hussein is a figure of singular repugnance, and singular 
     danger. To review: There is no dictator in power anywhere in 
     the world who has, so far in his career, invaded two 
     neighboring countries; fired ballistic missiles at the 
     civilians of two other neighboring countries; tried to have 
     assassinated an ex-president of the United States; harbored 
     al-Quaida fugitives; attacked civilians with chemical 
     weapons; attacked the soldiers of an enemy country with 
     chemical weapons; conducted biological weapons experiments on 
     human subjects; committed genocide; and then there is, of 
     course, the matter of the weaponized aflatoxin, a tool of 
     mass murder and nothing else.
       I do not know how any thinking person could believe that 
     Saddam Hussein is a run-of-the-mill dictator. No one else 
     comes close . . . to matching his extraordinary and 
     variegated record of malevolence.
       Earlier this year, while traveling across northern Iraq, I 
     interviewed more than 100 survivors of Saddam's campaign of 
     chemical genocide. I will not recite the statistics, or 
     recount the horror stories here, except to say that I met 
     enough barren and cancer-ridden women in Iraqi Kurdistan to 
     last me several lifetimes.
       So: Saddam Hussein is uniquely evil, the only ruler in 
     power today--and the first one since Hitler--to commit 
     chemical genocide. Is that enough of a reason to remove him 
     from power? I would say yes, if ``never again'' is in fact 
     actually to mean ``never again.''

  That is why every day this man remains in power is a day of danger 
for the American people, the Iraqi people, and, indeed, the people of 
the world.
  Let me give you one more example that is as disturbing as aflatoxin. 
It is botulinum toxin, the cause of botulism, which comes from bacteria 
found in the soil. After the gulf war, United Nations weapons 
inspectors found that Iraq had produced tons of botulinum toxin, some 
of it loaded into missiles and bombs. Let me repeat. Years ago, 
inspectors found tons, some of it weaponized. So we know Saddam has 
experience with this weapon.
  For smallpox, there is a vaccine. Anthrax and other bacterial agents 
can be treated with antibiotics. But botulism is a toxin, a poisonous 
chemical made by bacteria. Let than a handful of pure botulinum toxin, 
evenly dispersed in an aerosol, would be enough to kill more than a 
million people. The only treatment for botulism poisoning is an anti-
toxin made from horse serum, and it only works about half the time.
  There is a horror story for every biological or chemical agent in 
this man's arsenal. I don't need to go through them all. We only need 
to understand that these horror stories could come true if we do not 
confront Saddam's devious designs.
  Some insist, and I don't understand this claim, that chemical and 
biological weapons aren't all that troubling. They say we need only 
really worry about nuclear weapons.
  Given what I have just explained, I think that is a dangerous 
assumption. But assume for a moment that Saddam has no chemical weapons 
and no biological weapons. Would there be cause for forceful United 
Nations action, and, failing that, American military action?
  I say, yes, without a doubt.
  There is now a consensus belief that Saddam could have an atomic 
weapon within months of acquiring fissile material. Based on the best 
estimates, his regime could manufacture the fuel itself within as 
little as 3 years. There is no way to measure now long it might take 
Saddam to acquire the fuel from an outside source. He could be 
attempting to do so as we speak. Indeed, it would be naive to assume 
otherwise.
  This leads to a critical question, and perhaps the threshold question 
in the debate. How long do my fellow Senators suggest we wait? Until we 
know, beyond dispute, if there is ever such evidence beyond dispute, 
that Saddam is 1 month away from obtaining a nuclear weapon and the 
means to deliver it? Until we know beyond dispute that he is a week 
away? Or perhaps we should wait until he has it?
  In 1996, the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, reported that 
Iraq had all the materials for a bomb except for the fissile material 
itself--either plutonium or highly enriched uranium. It is now 6 years 
later.
  The debate about whether Saddam is an ``imminent'' threat is an 
interesting one. What better defines imminence than the facts that I 
have just outlined?
  In fact, we must admit that the only conclusive proof of imminence 
could come in the hindsight, when innocents are sorting through the 
rubble and counting the injured or the dead. As National Security 
Advisor Condaleeza Rice said, the smoking gun could be a mushroom 
cloud. Or add to that a yellow cloud of mustard gas, an invisible cloud 
of sarin gas, or the slow and silent spread of smallpox.
  I know, despite all this evidence, much of which is beyond dispute, 
some say, ``There is no new evidence.''
  I have two answers to that. One, we don't need new evidence. The 
existing evidence of his capabilities and intent is more than enough to 
paint a poisonous picture.
  Two, there is, in fact, new evidence. For instance, the fact that, 
once acquiring fissile material, Saddam will be just months of 
developing a nuclear weapon, is new. And it underlines the urgency of 
defanging this dictator immediately.
  In fact, here is a brief review what we know about what Saddam has 
done since the departure of the U.N. weapons inspections in 1998. 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair laid this out to the Parliament last 
month.
  Since 1998, we know that Saddam has sought or attempted to buy: 
specialized vacuum pumps, the type needed for the gas centrifuge to 
enrich uranium; an entire magnet production lien of the type for use in 
the motors and top bearings of gas centrifuges; dual use products such 
as Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride and fluoride gas; a filament winding 
machine, which can be used to manufacture carbon fiber gas centrifuge 
rotors; 60,000 or more specialized aluminum tubes, which are subject to 
strict controls due to their potential use in the construction of gas 
centrifuges.
  And Saddam has been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium, 
though we do not know whether he has been successful. Key personnel 
from his old nuclear weapons program are at work again. Iraq claims 
that this is for a civil nuclear power program but it has no nuclear 
powerplants.

  We can search for the most innocuous possible explanation, of each 
and every disturbing piece of evidence, or we can look realistically at 
the totality of the evidence.
  And what about delivery systems?
  Iraq is supposed to only have limited missile capability for 
conventional weaponry. But we know that a significant number of longer-
range missiles were concealed from the previous inspectors, including 
up to 20 extended range Scud missiles. We know that 2001, Iraq's plans 
entered a new stage and that now, the regime's development of weapons 
with a range over 600 miles. Hundreds of key personnel are working on 
the delivery systems.
  The danger will not abate unless we make it abate. it will only grow. 
And we will be forced to simply wait and see how, when, and against 
whom Saddam will use these weapons.
  What more do we need to know?
  Some say that removing Saddam Hussein from power would compromise the 
wider war against terrorism. But to me, the two are inextricably 
linked.
  First, remember that Iraq under Saddam is one of only seven nations 
in the world to be designated by our State Department as a state 
sponsor of terrorism. He provides aid, funding, and training to 
terrorists who have killed Americans and others. He hosted the Abu 
Nidal Organization, whose leader was found dead in Baghdad in August. 
He gives money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers.
  Second, Saddam himself meets the definition of a terrorist, someone 
who attacks civilians to achieve a political purpose. He has done so 
repeatedly against the Kurds in the north of Iraq, as well as against 
the Shi'a in the south. If he is willing to kill thousands of Iraqis, 
how many Americans or Europeans do we think he considers expendable?
  Third, though the relationship between al-Qaida and Saddam's regime 
is a subject of intense debate within the intelligence community, we do 
have evidence of meetings between Iraqi officials and leaders of al-
Qaida, and some testimony that Iraqi agents helped train al-Qaida 
operatives to use chemical and biological weapons. We also know that 
senior leaders of al-Qaida have been and are now harbored in Iraq.
  It is not speculation to suggest that Iraq might pass chemical, 
biological,

[[Page S10340]]

or nuclear weapons to terrorists. It is realism.
  There are other state sponsors of terrorism, all of which pose 
serious dangers to the security of America and the world.
  But Saddam's is the only regime that combines a record of supporting 
terrorists with a history of killing and torturing dissidents, 
ambitions to dominate his region, growing stockpiles of chemical and 
biological weapons and a willingness to use them. That is why the 
danger he poses rises above the rest on the topography of terror.
  In my view, if we remove his pernicious influence from the Middle 
East and free the Iraqi people to determine their own destiny, we will 
transform the politics of the region, and advance the war against 
terrorism, not set it back as some have suggested.
  In April 1917, in requesting a congressional declaration to enter 
what was then known as the Great War, Woodrow Wilson said, ``We act 
without animus, not in enmity toward a people or with the desire to 
bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed 
opposition to an irresponsible government which has thrown aside all 
considerations of humanity and of right and is running amuck.''
  The same can be said if and when we must confront Saddam's brutal 
regime. We will not be fighting the Iraqi people. Our goal, to the 
contrary, will be to liberate the Iraqi people from tyranny even as we 
remove the threat from this rabid regime.
  But we must prove that good and decent intent not only on the day we 
commit arms, if we must, on the day we win. We must prove our 
commitment to building a better nation for the Iraqi people on the day 
after the day after, and the day after that, when we will face, and 
help the Iraqi people to face, the broad range of humanitarian, 
economic, diplomatic, and political problems that will no doubt present 
themselves.
  The wars we wage are measured by the quality of the peace that 
follows.
  I know that some fear the future of Iraq post-Saddam. They fear the 
risks, the responsibilities, and the costs, so much that those fears of 
tomorrow lead them to justify inaction today. To me, post-Saddam Iraq 
is not a burden to be shunned but an opportunity to be seized. It must 
become a signal to the world, particularly the Islamic world, of our 
Nation's best intentions.

  Indeed, post-Suddam Iraq will be a test of America and our values. We 
have barely earned a passing grade on our first test, in post-Taliban 
Afghanistan. We cannot afford to scrape and slip by again, because this 
time the stakes are higher, the stage larger, and the consequences of 
failure even more dire.
  How do we lay the foundation for a civil and open society after the 
fighting stops and the likely celebrations in the streets subside?
  First, we must we invest in Iraq's security. Some will be tempted to 
shortchange our post-Saddam commitment by whittling down a security 
presence to the smallest possible size we think we can get away with, 
or by pulling our forces out the first open window.
  But we must learn from Afghanistan, where, despite a brilliant 
military victory and early movements toward a stable and civil society, 
some big mistakes have been made.
  Perhaps due to the Bush administration's stated aversion to nation 
building, we failed to establish a peacekeeping presence strong enough 
or geographically wide enough to tame the factionalism and ethnic 
conflict that have plagued Afghanistan for years. We failed to get 
ready to deal with the decrepit state of the nation's infrastructure 
caused by the long civil war that preceded our involvement. And, though 
our nations assisted us in our military victory, we did not leverage 
their investment to give them sufficient stake in a responsibility in a 
long-term peace.
  As a result, the situation on the ground in Afghanistan is tenuous 
today. Warlords control the countryside. Hamid Karzai's rule in Kabul 
is uncertain. His ministers have been assassinated. Karzai himself came 
within a hair's breath of assassination. Have we lost the peace? No. 
But the current instability can, if left to fester, give rise to 
terrorism. oppression, and civil war.
  It is not too late to correct our course. That is why Senator Hagel 
and I have sponsored the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, 
currently before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The bill would 
commit to the country's stability, security, and democratic development 
by investing $2.5 billion over 4 years in economic, political, and 
humanitarian assistance, including a half billion dollars toward an 
enterprise fund for business development and job creation and $300 
million in military and security assistance for police training and 
crime control. It would also urge President Bush to expand the 
international security force beyond Kabul, and, if that decision were 
made, would authorize $1 billion over the next two years to make that 
possible. This is extremely important legislation that deserves broad 
legislative and public support.
  Now we must hear from the administration that they are ready with 
specific plans for Iraq that will not repeat the mistakes of 
Afghanistan.
  In fact, we have to face the fact that the best-case military 
scenario--the rapid collapse of the Iraqi military and the swift 
capture or elimination of Saddam--would also present the most 
challenging security scenario.
  The three most immediate security objectives will be securing all 
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons sites and relevant personnel, 
tracking down Saddam's remaining secret police, and preventing 
potential Iranian military interference.
  Simultaneously, among the Iraqi people at large, U.S. forces must be 
ready immediately to shift gears to post-conflict operations, helping 
to restore order and handling humanitarian emergencies. Despite its 
tremendous training and talent, our military needs more specialized 
teams to take on this crucial job.
  The administration should also work with non-governmental 
organizations to recruit Iraqi-American and other Arab-American 
volunteers who can help peacekeepers and humanitarian organizations 
communicate with the Iraqi people, distribute supplies, assist in 
healthcare delivery, and do other critical jobs. A similar volunteer 
program worked in the Balkans and can work again in Iraq.
  Like the military campaign itself, stabilizing post-Saddam Iraq and 
tending to the Iraqi people will be aided dramatically if the United 
States is part of a international coalition, especially one that 
includes Muslim and Arab nations. That will make clear to Iraqis and 
the world that our enemy is Saddam and not the Iraqi people, and just 
as Saddam is a threat to the world, securing and rebuilding Iraq is the 
duty of the world.
  The bottom line is this: While Afghanistan's growing instability is 
deeply troubling, allowing post-Saddam Iraq, which abuts Syria and 
Iran, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, Kuwait and Turkey, to fall into civil 
war or into the hands of another dictator would be disastrous. If post-
Saddam Iraq unravels, as Afghanistan is at risk of doing, so will the 
credibility and the effectiveness of our wider war against terrorism. 
And we will be that much closer to a global civilization war.
  Once security and stability are established in post-Saddam Iraq, we 
must begin to establish the foundation for democratic governance and 
the rule of law. I am pleased that the Bush administration has begun 
bringing key opposition groups together to lay what a foundation for an 
honest, effective, and representative government. Iraq is a divided 
nation, with at least three key regions and three key religious, 
ethnic, and political factions. But let's be clear. Post-Saddam Iraqi 
governance will take more than a couple of conference calls to get 
right.
  And we must be very careful here. Our goal is not replacing Baghdad 
with New York on the Tigris. We do not want an American client state, 
and we can't expect a democracy that overnight looks exactly like ours. 
We must be realistic. This process will require the sustained guidance, 
partnership, and investment of our nation and our allies, working with 
the Iraqi people.
  The war against terrorism, including this effort to disarm Iraq, is 
like no other war we have waged.
  If we are true to our principles, we can again make the world a safer 
and better place, not only for us Americans but for people in Iraq and 
throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, who deserve the freedom and 
opportunity that we declared at the birth of our Nation

[[Page S10341]]

226 years ago: the endowment each human being receives at birth from 
our Creator.
  Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the 
Lieberman-Warner resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. 
This resolution gives President Bush the flexibility he needs to 
address the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, including the authority to 
use military force as he deems appropriate, without ceding too much 
authority to the executive to wage war outside Iraq. I applaud Senators 
Lieberman, Warner, McCain, and so many others who have worked with 
President Bush to reach an agreement on this critical issue.
  I support the President's policy of regime change in Iraq to 
eliminate the threat Saddam poses to the U.S. and the world, and agree 
that time is of the essence. I was concerned that the administration's 
initial draft resolution was too broad, and called for tighter 
parameters on the Presidential mandate. The resolution now before us 
addresses my concerns by confining the scope of possible military 
action to Iraq, rather than the entire Middle East region.
  Only last month we commemorated the one-year anniversary of the 
deadliest terrorist attack in our history. Today, we face a threat from 
a regime that would not hesitate to use weapons of mass destruction 
against our friends and allies, or against the United States itself, or 
transfer these weapons to terrorist groups that target Americans.
  Saddam Hussein's track record is well-known to all. He ordered the 
use of chemical weapons--including sarin, VX, tabun, and mustard 
agents--against his own people, killing tens of thousands of innocent 
civilians. His regime invaded two neighbors and threatened others. In 
1991, his troops were prepared to invade other countries, had they not 
been thwarted by the U.S.-led international coalition. His regime 
launched ballistic missiles at four of its neighbors--Israel, Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, and Bahrain. He ordered the assassination of opponents in 
Iraq and abroad, including a former president of the United States. His 
regime beat and tortured American POWs and used them as human shields 
during the 1991 Persian gulf war. His military continues to fire at 
U.S. and coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones in northern and 
southern Iraq.
  Based on the information presented to me in classified briefings, I 
share President Bush's assessment that Iraqi disarmament must be the 
objective. Weapon inspections alone will not achieve this goal, and a 
lengthy inspections regime could inadvertently give Saddam more time to 
stockpile and conceal weapons of mass destruction. After eleven years 
of lies and deception, we cannot expect that Saddam will reverse course 
and willingly disarm. Clearly, regime change in Iraq is the only way to 
end the threat Saddam Hussein poses to the United States and the world.
  What has brought us to this point?
  On March 3, 1991, Iraq, having been forced to abandon the territory 
it overran in Kuwait, agreed to the terms of a cease-fire offered by 
the allied forces. Since the cease-fire, Iraq has repeatedly violated a 
series of Security Council resolutions designed to ensure that Iraq 
submits to U.N. inspections, abides by the cease-fire agreement, 
dismantles its extensive weapons of mass destruction programs, and 
returns Kuwaiti and other nations' POWs, missing persons, and property 
seized during the gulf war. The United Nations has found Iraq in 
``material breach of cease-fire terms'' on seven occasions, and Iraq 
remains in violation of the cease-fire to this very day.
  For seven and one-half years, Saddam Hussein played a cat-and-mouse 
game with U.N. inspectors. The Iraqi regime misled, lied, intimidated, 
and physically obstructed the inspectors; and Iraqi scientists who 
provided in formation to the inspectors disappeared, most likely into 
Saddam's dungeons and execution chambers. The inspectors uncovered an 
enormous amount of biological and chemical weapons materials and 
production facilities, but by their own account they could not find 
everything. And any success they may have had was in large measure 
because Saddam feared a renewed military offensive by the United 
States. Finally, on November 11, 1998, following Iraq's announcement 
that it was prohibiting all U.N. inspections, weapons inspections in 
Iraq ceased. Under increasing international pressure, Iraq again agreed 
to allow inspectors full access, but then resumed obstructing their 
operations, and the United Nations withdrew the inspectors on December 
15, 1998. Over the next 4 years, Iraq refused to admit weapons 
inspectors under the terms set forth by the Security Council.
  Iraq has had 4 years to refine its techniques of deception. It defies 
common sense to suggest that a hundred or even a thousand U.N. 
inspectors could, with any assurance, succeed in finding small WMD 
stockpiles and facilities in a country the size of the state of 
California. Many former U.N. inspectors who experienced first-hand 
Iraq's lies and deceptions have come to the same conclusion.
  We know that Saddam has chemical and biological weapons, and is 
developing nuclear weapons. These weapons would immediately threaten 
U.S. troops and our friends and allies in the region. A Saddam Hussein 
with nuclear weapons would radically alter the balance of power in the 
Middle East, requiring a profound shift in the deployment of American 
forces and undermine our ability to respond to other potential threats 
around the globe.
  Saddam has worked with terrorist networks for many years. He harbored 
Abu Nidal, and is reportedly providing safe have to Abdul Rahman Yasin, 
a key participant in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Saddam has 
himself ordered acts of terror. He shares many objectives with groups 
like al-Qaida, and may decide to use terrorists to conceal his 
responsibility for an attack on the United States.
  For 11 years, Saddam Hussein has thumbed his nose at the 
international community. Would it be prudent to continue what has 
failed for 11 long years? Would it be wise to give Saddam more time, 
which we know he will devote to realizing his greatest dream--to obtain 
the nuclear weapons that would allow him to dominate the Middle East 
with all of its oil and threaten to drive the United States out of a 
region that is vital to our security?

  Never in our history have we been in a position where we could be 
blackmailed, under the threat of nuclear war, into withdrawing support 
for our closest allies or sacrificing our national security to prevent 
the death of millions. And yet this is the danger we face in as little 
as one year if we do not act to remove this looming threat. Time is not 
on our side; it is on the side of Saddam Hussein. We cannot wait for a 
smoking gun, because a gun smokes only after it is fired, and the smoke 
of a nuclear blast would mean that we are too late.
  I applaud the President's decision to seek international support for 
regime change in Iraq, but U.S. action should not hinge on the 
endorsement of the United Nations. The United States is leading a 
coalition of international allies in the war on terror, not the other 
way around.
  In the case of Iraq, U.S. national security interests should not be 
sacrificed if the U.N. cannot be persuaded of the urgency of this 
threat. It would be preferable to have U.N. support, but we have to be 
prepared to go it alone if necessary. We cannot give the United Nations 
veto power over our decisions to protect our national interests.
  I remain concerned about our planning for the future of Iraq if we 
succeed in removing Saddam Hussein from power. Administration officials 
have presented a vision of a post-Saddam Iraq that is peaceful, 
democratic, and unified. Defeating the Iraqi military on the 
battlefield will not be easy, but ensuring a stable and friendly post-
Saddam Iraq will pose even greater challenges, requiring careful 
planning by the administration in concert with our allies in the 
region. Iraq could rapidly slide into long-term political instability 
or even bloody war upon the collapse of the Baathist regime.
  Iraq's population is made up of three main components: the Kurdish 
speaking people in the north, the Arab Sunnis in the center, and the 
Arab Shiites in the south who make up a majority--some 60 percent--of 
the entire population of the country. Many Shiites desire a theocratic 
government similar to that in neighboring Iran. The Kurdish leadership 
in the north may recognize that independence is an impossible dream, 
but their experience of ten years of self-government will

[[Page S10342]]

make their reintegration into a unified Iraq problematic at best. Arab 
Sunnis, fearing retaliation from the long-oppressed Shiite majority, 
may use the Sunni-dominated Iraqi military to keep the Shiites from 
gaining power. And while the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would involve 
the likely end to the Iraqi Republican Guard, the regular Iraqi army 
may remain to play a critical role in a post-Saddam Iraq. Yet the Iraqi 
army may become a den of coup-plotters; after all, Iraq endured a 
succession of bloody coups from 1953 until Saddam Hussein's ascent to 
power in the late 1970s.
  Our military planning should be guided by an awareness that how 
Saddam's regime falls will shape the Iraq that follows. At some point 
the American people will need to know the nature and extent of 
America's commitment to a post-Saddam Iraq. How long will our troops be 
on the ground in Iraq? What material and financial resources will we be 
asked to provide to Iraq? What responsibility will the United States 
have to maintain peace in the region? What help will we get from our 
allies in rebuilding Iraq?
  President Bush has exercised great leadership at a critical time in 
our history. I am proud to be a part of the debate we are having today 
in this chamber, which is a powerful demonstration of our democratic 
institutions. Ours is a nation that is slow to anger. Americans abhor 
war. I vote in support of this resolution, but hope and pray that the 
President, united with Congress, will succeed in averting war.
  There is no question in my mind that we must disarm Saddam, and that 
time is running out. Clearly, there are risks involved. But I believe 
the risks of doing nothing are far greater.
  I yield that floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the cloture motion 
is vitiated on Senate Joint Resolution 45.
  The clerk will read the joint resolution for the third time.
  The joint resolution was read the third time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
proceed to the consideration of House Joint Resolution 114.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A joint resolution (H.J. Res. 114) to authorize the use of 
     United States Armed Forces against Iraq.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read House Joint Resolution 114 
for a third time.
  The joint resolution was read the third time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution having been read the 
third time, the question is, Shall the joint resolution pass?
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 77, nays 23, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 237 Leg.]

                                YEAS--77

     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Campbell
     Cantwell
     Carnahan
     Carper
     Cleland
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Collins
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Edwards
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Johnson
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Voinovich
     Warner

                                NAYS--23

     Akaka
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Dayton
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Graham
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Kennedy
     Leahy
     Levin
     Mikulski
     Murray
     Reed
     Sarbanes
     Stabenow
     Wellstone
     Wyden
  The joint resolution (H.J. Res. 114) was passed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the preamble is 
agreed to.
  Under the previous order, S.J. Res. 45, as amended, is indefinitely 
postponed.


                  Unanimous Consent Agreement--S. 3009

  Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 619, S. 3009, a 
bill to provide a 13-week extension for unemployment compensation, and 
that the bill be read the third time and passed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. LINCOLN). Is there objection?
  Mr. NICKLES. Madam President, reserving the right to object--and I 
shall object--this is not a 13-week extension, it is a 26-week 
extension, plus an additional 7 weeks for some States. It changes the 
threshold. It costs $17 billion. A clean extension would be $7 billion.
  I will be happy to work with my colleagues to come up with something 
more reasonable and affordable. This bill before us, S. 3009, is not. 
Therefore, I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

                          ____________________