[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 133 (Thursday, October 10, 2002)]
[House]
[Pages H7739-H7799]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bonilla). Pursuant to section 3 of House 
Resolution 574, proceedings will now resume on the joint resolution 
(H.J. Res. 114) to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces 
against Iraq.
  The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. When proceedings were postponed on the 
legislative day of Wednesday, October 9, 2002, all time for debate on 
the joint resolution, as amended, under section 1 of House Resolution 
574 had expired.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House 
Report 107-724.


    Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute No. 1 Offered by Ms. Lee

  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment in 
the nature of a substitute.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

       Amendment in the nature of a substitute No. 1 offered by 
     Ms. Lee:
       Strike the preamble and insert in lieu thereof the matter 
     preceding the resolved clause, below, and strike the text and 
     insert in lieu thereof the matter following the resolved 
     clause, below:
       Whereas on April 6, 1991, during the Persian Gulf War, Iraq 
     accepted the provisions

[[Page H7740]]

     of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (April 3, 
     1991) bringing a formal cease-fire into effect;
       Whereas, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 
     687, Iraq unconditionally accepted the destruction, removal, 
     or rendering harmless of ``all chemical and biological 
     weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems 
     and components and all research, development, support and 
     manufacturing facilities related thereto'', and ``all 
     ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and 
     fifty kilometers, and related major parts and repair and 
     production facilities'';
       Whereas, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 
     687, Iraq unconditionally agreed not to acquire or develop 
     any nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapons-usable material, 
     nuclear-related subsystems or components, or nuclear-related 
     research, development, support, or manufacturing facilities;
       Whereas Security Council Resolution 687 calls for the 
     creation of a United Nations special commission to ``carry 
     out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, 
     chemical, and missile capabilities'' and to assist and 
     cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency in 
     carrying out the ``destruction, removal or rendering 
     harmless'' of all nuclear-related items and in developing a 
     plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's 
     compliance;
       Whereas United Nations weapons inspectors (UNSCOM) between 
     1991 and 1998 successfully uncovered and destroyed large 
     stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and production 
     facilities, nuclear weapons research and development 
     facilities, and Scud missiles, despite the fact that the 
     Government of Iraq sought to obstruct their work in numerous 
     ways;
       Whereas in 1998, UNSCOM weapons inspectors were withdrawn 
     from Iraq and have not returned since;
       Whereas Iraq is not in compliance with United Nations 
     Security Council Resolution 687, United Nations Security 
     Council Resolution 1154, and additional United Nations 
     resolutions on inspections, and this noncompliance violates 
     international law and Iraq's ceasefire obligations and 
     potentially endangers United States and regional security 
     interests;
       Whereas the true extent of Iraq's continued development of 
     weapons of mass destruction and the threat posed by such 
     development to the United States and allies in the region are 
     unknown and cannot be known without inspections;
       Whereas the United Nations was established for the purpose 
     of preventing war and resolving disputes between nations 
     through peaceful means, including ``by negotiation, enquiry, 
     mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, 
     resort to regional arrangements, or other peaceful means'';
       Whereas the United Nations remains seized of this matter;
       Whereas the President has called upon the United Nations to 
     take responsibility to assure that Iraq fulfills its 
     obligations to the United Nations under existing United 
     Nations Security Council resolutions;
       Whereas war with Iraq would place the lives of tens of 
     thousands of people at risk, including members of the United 
     States armed forces, Iraqi civilian non-combatants, and 
     civilian populations in neighboring countries;
       Whereas unilateral United States military action against 
     Iraq may undermine cooperative international efforts to 
     reduce international terrorism and to bring to justice those 
     responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001;
       Whereas unilateral United States military action against 
     Iraq may also undermine United States diplomatic relations 
     with countries throughout the Arab and Muslim world and with 
     many other allies;
       Whereas a preemptive unilateral United States first strike 
     could both set a dangerous international precedent and 
     significantly weaken the United Nations as an institution; 
     and
       Whereas the short-term and long-term costs of unilateral 
     United States military action against Iraq and subsequent 
     occupation may be significant in terms of United States 
     casualties, the cost to the United States treasury, and harm 
     to United States diplomatic relations with other countries: 
     Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled, That the 
     United States should work through the United Nations to seek 
     to resolve the matter of ensuring that Iraq is not developing 
     weapons of mass destruction, through mechanisms such as the 
     resumption of weapons inspections, negotiation, enquiry, 
     mediation, regional arrangements, and other peaceful means.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 574, the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee) and the gentleman from Illinois 
(Mr. Hyde) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Ms. LEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, today our Nation is debating the very profound 
question of war and peace and the structure and nature of international 
relations in the 21st century.
  Before us today is the serious and fundamental question of life and 
death: whether or not this Congress will give the President authority 
to commit this Nation to war.
  Always a question of the greatest importance, our decision today is 
further weighted by the fact that we are being asked to sanction a new 
foreign policy doctrine that gives the President the power to launch a 
unilateral and preemptive first strike against Iraq before we have 
utilized our diplomatic options.
  My amendment provides an option and the time to pursue it. Its goal 
is to give the United Nations inspections process a chance to work. It 
provides an option short of war with the objective of protecting the 
American people and the world from any threat posed by Iraqi weapons of 
mass destruction.
  The amendment urges the United States to reengage the diplomatic 
process, and it stresses our government's commitment to eliminating any 
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction through United Nations inspections 
and enhanced containment.
  It emphasizes the potentially dangerous and disastrous long-term 
consequences for the United States of codifying the President's 
announced doctrine of preemption.
  The administration's resolution forecloses alternatives to war before 
we have even tried to pursue them.
  We do not need to rush to war, and we should not rush to war. If what 
we are worried about is the defense of the United States and its 
people, we do not need this resolution.
  If the United States truly faced an imminent attack from anywhere, 
the President has all of the authority in the world to ensure our 
defense based on the Constitution, the War Powers Act and the United 
Nations Charter.
  Our own intelligence agencies report that there is currently little 
chance of chemical and biological attack from Saddam Hussein on U.S. 
forces or territories. But they emphasize that an attack could become 
much more likely if Iraq believes that it is about to be attacked. This 
is a frightening and dangerous potential consequence that requires 
sober thought and careful reflection.
  President Bush's doctrine of preemption violates international law, 
the United Nations Charter and our own long-term security interests. It 
will set a precedent that could come back to haunt us.
  Do we want to see our claim to preemption echoed by other countries 
maintaining that they perceive similar threats? India or Pakistan? 
China or Taiwan? Russia or Georgia?
  I would submit that we would have little moral authority to urge 
other countries to resist launching preemptive strikes themselves. This 
approach threatens to destabilize the Middle East, unleash new forces 
of terrorism and instability and completely derail any prospects for 
peace in the region.
  Unilateralism is not the answer. Iraqi weapons of mass destruction 
are a problem to the world community, and we must confront it and we 
should do so through the United Nations. Multilateralism and steadfast 
commitment to international law should be the guiding principle as we 
move into the 21st century.
  As I said, the purpose of my amendment is to let the United Nations 
do its work. Let us give inspections and other containment mechanisms a 
chance to succeed once again. Inspections did make real progress in 
eliminating weapons of mass destruction in the 1990s despite Saddam 
Hussein's best effort at obstruction and deceit. U.N. inspectors 
destroyed large stockpiles of chemical weapons, missiles and weapons of 
mass destruction. We can and should renew and expand this process.
  In addition to inspections, we should improve border monitoring 
through an enhanced containment system to prevent shipments of nuclear 
materials or other weapons to Iraq. And we should install surveillance 
technology on the border to detect such materials.
  As part of enhanced containment, we should work with the countries 
bordering Iraq and with regional seaports to ensure that United Nations 
Security Council resolutions are enforced, and we should plug holes in 
the current arms embargo blanket. We should also work on 
nonproliferation efforts globally to secure weapons materials.

[[Page H7741]]

  All of these are diplomatic options that we can and should undertake 
and which can lead to success.
  What we are doing today is building the framework for 21st century 
international relations. It will either be a framework of unilateralism 
and insecurity or multilateral cooperation and security. It is our 
choice.
  During the Cold War, the words ``first strike'' filled us with fear. 
They still should.
  I am really appalled that a democracy, our democracy, is 
contemplating taking such a fearsome step and really setting such a 
terrible international precedent that could be devastating for global 
stability and for our own moral authority.
  We are contemplating sending our young men and women to war where 
they will be doing the killing and the dying. And we, as 
representatives of the American people, have no idea where this action 
will take us, where it will end and what price we will pay in terms of 
lives and resources. This too should cause us to pause. We have 
choices, however, and we have an obligation to pursue them, to give 
U.N. inspections and enhanced containment a chance to work.
  What this resolution does state very clearly and firmly is that the 
United States will work to disarm Iraq through United Nations 
inspections and other diplomatic tools. It states that we reject the 
doctrine of preemption, and it reaffirms our commitment to our own 
security and national interests through multilateral diplomacy, not 
unilateral attack.
  I urge you to protect our national interests by giving the United 
Nations a chance by supporting this amendment.
  It does not foreclose any future options.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise in strong opposition to the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute offered by the gentlewoman from California. I certainly do 
not mean to offend her. She is one of the very good Members of the 
House Committee on International Relations, but I think her amendment 
suffers from terminal anemia. It is like slipping someone an aspirin 
who has just been hit by a freight train.
  Let us review Saddam Hussein's pattern of lawlessness. He is 
employing the vast wealth of his country and a legion of capable 
scientists and technicians to develop biological, chemical and nuclear 
weapons at the expense of food and medicine for the women and children 
of Iraq. He invades neighboring countries, and continues his support 
for some of the world's most notorious terrorists and the groups that 
support them.
  In the mid 1990s, U.N. inspectors unearthed detailed drawings for 
constructing a nuclear device. In 1998, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency began dismantling nuclear weapons facilities in Iraq, including 
three uranium enrichment plants. Over the past decade, he subjected 
tens of thousands of political opponents to arbitrary arrest, 
imprisonment, starvation, mutilation and rape.
  On Monday night, President Bush announced that Saddam possesses a 
growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used 
to disburse his stockpile of chemical and biological weapons across 
broad areas.
  While Saddam repeatedly violates the myriad of U.N. Security Council 
resolutions passed since 1991, the world watches, the world waits and 
the world does nothing.
  So how do supporters of the Lee substitute propose to respond to 
Saddam's continuing affront to international law and norms? With 
conciliation and negotiation.
  For 11 years, the international community has attempted to do just 
that. Weapons inspectors have been banned from Iraq since 1998. During 
the 7 years inspectors were permitted in the country, their efforts 
were undermined by Iraqi coercion and cover-up.
  The gentlewoman is certainly correct that the United States should 
work to build an international consensus to ferret out and destroy 
Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. And as we speak, the Bush 
administration is engaging the United Nations to employ arms to force 
Saddam to comply with Security Council resolutions. But in the last 
analysis, the security of the United States cannot be held hostage to a 
failure by the United Nations to act because of a threat of a Security 
Council veto by Russia, China or France.
  The Lee substitute essentially advocates the futile policies of the 
previous decade and fails to recognize the United States as a sovereign 
Nation with an absolute right of self-defense, a right clearly 
recognized by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
  Without a strongly worded Congressional resolution that gives the 
President the flexibility he needs, the Iraqi regime will have no 
incentive to comply with existing or new U.N. resolutions. Only clear 
and direct action of this Congress will send the essential message to 
the United Nations that the current stalemate must end. Only resolute 
action by this Congress can ensure the peace that all of us claim as a 
goal.
  The Lee substitute is a well-intentioned but perilous receipt for 
inaction, based on wishful thinking, and that is what makes it so 
dangerous. We have had more than a decade of obfuscation by Saddam 
Hussein. At what point do the United States and the international 
community say enough? Enough lies, enough evasions, enough duplicity, 
enough fraud, enough deception. Enough.
  I think the time has now come. I urge a no vote on this amendment.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Oregon 
(Mr. DeFazio).
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, this resolution represents neither 
conciliation nor negotiation. It is a resolution for continued 
containment, deterrence, that would be bolstered by intrusive, 
effective, forced, unfettered inspections. They worked before. They can 
work again. The most dispositive report on how effective those 
inspections were came from Tony Blair to the Parliament, and Saddam 
Hussein did not cooperate. He tried to hide the stuff. He could not 
hide it.
  These inspections worked. There was the destruction of 40,000 
munitions for chemical weapons, 2,610 tons of chemical precursors, 
dismantling of their prime chemical weapons development and production 
complex at at-Muthanna, the destruction of 48 SCUD-type missiles, the 
removal and destruction of the infrastructure for the nuclear weapons 
program, including the al-Athir weaponization/testing facility.
  Intrusive, unfettered inspections with our allies will work. This 
cowboy, go-it-alone, to-heck-with-our-allies, to-heck-with-the-rest-of-
the-world principle with an attack before we try this alternative is 
wrong.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Linder).
  Mr. LINDER. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Mr. 
Speaker, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from California. Let us contemplate for a moment the 
ramifications of substituting this amendment for the underlying 
Hastert-Gephardt resolution. If next February Saddam Hussein limits the 
ability of U.N. inspectors to check for weapons of mass destruction, 
the Lee amendment says let's talk. If next April Saddam Hussein kills 
several thousand innocent Iraqi men, women and children using 
biological agents, the Lee amendment says again, let's talk. If next 
June a terrorist attempts to use a crude nuclear device facilitated by 
Iraq against a major U.S. city, the Lee amendment says, let's talk.
  Mr. Speaker, the lack of enforcement contained in this amendment is a 
bit like a senior citizen trying to stop a mugging by suggesting they 
dance the polka. Supporters of this amendment say, let's support the 
return of weapons inspectors to Iraq. We have done that. They say, 
let's go to the U.N. for a solution. We have done that. They say, let's 
engage our allies in this effort. I say again, we have done that.
  Mr. Speaker, what cannot be disputed today is that peace and freedom 
are the ends to which we now seek our means. President Bush has 
demonstrated the courage to lead and to draw a line in the sand. Now is 
the time for Congress to support his leadership. I am proud to join a 
broad bipartisan coalition of Members by standing up to tyranny and 
oppression and opposition to freedom by voting no on this amendment. By 
rejecting this spurious amendment we will ensure that America's promise 
to uphold the rule of law

[[Page H7742]]

and to protect the peace-loving people of the world actually has 
meaning.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Michigan (Ms. Kilpatrick).
  Ms. KILPATRICK. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Lee amendment and as a 
cosponsor of the amendment. The amendment asks what the American people 
want. They want us to work through the United Nations, work through 
that process, and I want to report and you all know the United Nations 
has said yes, we will work with you, we will go in, we will have 
unfettered inspections and we will work and come back. It is not an 
``if'' kind of situation, it is an ``is.'' And the ``is'' is that the 
American people want the United Nations involved and they want the 
inspections to go forward and at a date determined to come back and 
report. Our CIA, our intelligence agency, has reported to this Congress 
and this Nation that there is no imminent threat that Saddam Hussein 
will attack America. He does not have the capability. Let the U.N. 
process work, and that is what the Lee amendment asks.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar).
  (Mr. OBERSTAR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, our Constitution entrusts to Congress 
alone the power to declare war, a power we should invoke with great 
care on evidence of a clear and present danger to our country.
  President Bush has asked Congress to cede that power to him to be 
wielded against Iraq at a time of his choosing, with or without United 
Nations support, in a unilateral, preemptive strike of his own 
determination of the level of threat Iraq poses to our national 
security.
  I will not surrender our constitutional authority. I will not vote 
for the committee resolution which confers upon the President fast-
track war-making power. The President should first win U.N. Security 
Council approval of a new, more rigorous round of arms inspections in 
Iraq.
  If Iraq resists the international inspectors and the mandated 
inspections fail, the President should then obtain a Security Council 
authorization of force, as was done in 1990, following which he should 
ask Congress for approval to wage war against Iraq. The resolution 
offered by the gentlewoman from California respects the Constitution 
and the American people and will give renewed diplomacy a chance.
  The Committee Resolution grants the President a new foreign policy 
and national security tool that charts us on a fundamental departure 
from historic U.S. foreign policy toward a dangerous precedent of first 
strike military authority for future Presidents. Once established, this 
resolution has enormous global consequences and will set the standard 
for other nations to attack preemptively, without restraint.
  This policy is contrary to our entire national tradition. The United 
States did not pursue a policy of first strike military authority 
against the Soviet Union during the Cold War when the Soviets had 
nuclear weapons directed at U.S. cities and military targets. Nor did 
the United States strike first against Iraq in 1990-1991.
  For most U.S. citizens, the real threat to the nation is our 
deteriorating domestic security: unemployment, the loss of retirement 
income, access to affordable prescription drugs, and corporate 
misfeasance and malfeasance that are eroding workers' retirement and 
health care security.
  Our domestic economy is in serious decline. Congress and the 
President should, as our top priority, mobilize investments in 
infrastructure and job training to put the unemployed back to work. We 
have to mount new strategies to counter unfairly-traded imports that 
undermine our national security through loss of jobs and income.
  Earlier this year, the President made important recommendations in 
this Section 201 Steel Remedy plan. Since then, however, he has 
backtracked, granting numerous exemptions to allow significant 
subsidized steel imports to pour into our nation undermining our 
domestic steel and iron ore industries. These are essential national 
security issues.
  Our national security begins with domestic security, expressed in a 
living wage, job security, livable communities, investments in 
education, health care, and transportation that will ensure a better 
future for our nation.
  The Administration's obsession with Iraq has deflected our national 
energies from the need to shore up domestic security. We must not allow 
the pursuit of terrorists at home and abroad, nor vigilance over the 
threat from Iraq divert our attention from critically urgent domestic 
priorities.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Honda).
  Mr. HONDA. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Lee amendment. In effect, 
the Lee amendment says that if there are weapons of mass destruction in 
Iraq, we must work to seek and destroy these weapons with our allies in 
the United Nations.
  The amendment further indicates that we will not provide our stamp of 
approval for a unilateral, preemptive strike unless the administration 
can verify an imminent threat to our Nation.
  Why should we change our national policy from being defenders of 
freedom and democracy to that of first-strike aggressors?
  This amendment does not prevent the President from performing his 
constitutional duties. He is still the commander in chief of this great 
Nation. However, it is our constitutional duty to declare war. We must 
not delegate our authority to declare war to the executive branch.
  Support the Lee amendment.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Green).
  Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, with due respect to the authority of this amendment and 
the preceding speakers, I really believe that adopting this amendment 
would be worse for America than taking no action at all. Adopting this 
amendment would sanction and legitimize the shameful gamesmanship that 
Saddam Hussein has shown for 11 years. Saddam views diplomacy without 
force as his personal game without rules.
  We cannot, we dare not ignore his history.
  Remember, the world builds an Oil for Food program and Saddam Hussein 
turns it into a way to rebuild his military and to amass personal 
wealth. The world builds a no-fly zone to protect innocents from Iraqi 
aggression. Yet Iraqi forces have fired on coalition planes hundreds of 
times this year alone.
  The world demands and Saddam agrees to destroy his biological and 
chemical weapons. Yet every objective observer says he still has them 
and he is building more.
  The world demands and Iraq agrees to bring in international weapons 
inspectors, but when they arrive, they are told that thousands of 
buildings are off limits. They are delayed, they are hassled until they 
go home in frustration.
  Finally, Saddam declares with a smile that he does not support 
terrorism. Yet every day, including today, we learn more and more about 
the training, the resources, the protection that Saddam gives al Qaeda 
and others.
  Mr. Speaker, this amendment, with its ambiguous references to 
negotiation and resumption of weapons inspections, would continue that 
game. In fact, it would have this House legitimize that game.
  The gentlewoman from California speaks of the dangers of war, and she 
is right. War is very dangerous. But the last 11 years have shown that 
giving Saddam Hussein diplomatic cover to build weaponry, terrible 
weaponry, is even more dangerous.
  There is a middle path: diplomacy with teeth. It is the underlying 
resolution that I support. Let us show that we have learned our 
lessons. As many have said here today and yesterday, and will say later 
today, the American people are watching what we do. So is the world.
  Mr. Speaker, I would suggest to you, so is Saddam Hussein. Let us 
show Saddam Hussein that the games are over. They will go on no more.
  Let us vote against and reject the Lee amendment.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. McDermott).
  (Mr. McDERMOTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, we should support the Lee amendment by 
giving unfettered, unconditional support for U.N. inspections for 
disarmament.

[[Page H7743]]

  Our government has a history of undermining the United Nations and 
has been particularly bad regarding Iraq. In 1990, we bribed and 
threatened and punished the Security Council to force a vote endorsing 
our war. We bribed poor countries with cheap Saudi oil. We bribed China 
with diplomatic rehabilitation and new development aid.
  And we told Yemen, the only Arab country on the Council, that its 
vote against our war would be ``the most expensive vote you ever 
cast.'' And then we punished Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab 
world, with a cutoff of our entire $70 million aid package.
  As we try to impose our war again on a reluctant United Nations, I 
fear that the Yemen precedent is being recalled at the U.N. today. I 
hope that our friends and our allies who might be considering a 
different approach in the U.N. will not be intimidated by our 
unilateral abuse of this multilateral institution.
  The President can always call us back, if he is ready. He says he is 
not ready. He says war is not imminent. So why are we giving him such 
an order?
  Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record an article from The Guardian 
entitled ``The U.S. Has Been Seeking to Prevent a Resolution of the 
Iraq Crisis for the Past 8 Years.''

                   [From the Guardian, Oct. 8, 2002]

 The U.S. Has Been Seeking To Prevent a Resolution of the Iraq Crisis 
                        for the Past Eight Years

                          (By George Monbiot)

       There is little that those of us who oppose the coming war 
     with Iraq can now do to prevent it. George Bush has staked 
     his credibility on the project; he has mid-term elections to 
     consider, oil supplies to secure and a flagging war on terror 
     to revive. Our voices are as little heeded in the White House 
     as the singing of the birds.
       Our role is now, perhaps, confined to the modest but 
     necessary task of demonstrating the withdrawal of our 
     consent, while seeking to undermine the moral confidence 
     which could turn the attack on Iraq into a war against all 
     those states perceived to offend US strategic interests. No 
     task is more urgent than to expose the two astonishing lies 
     contained in George Bush's radio address on Saturday, namely 
     that ``the United States does not desire military conflict, 
     because we know the awful nature of war'' and ``we hope that 
     Iraq complies with the world's demands''. Mr. Bush appears to 
     have done everything in his power to prevent Iraq from 
     complying with the world's demands, while ensuring that 
     military conflict becomes inevitable.
       On July 4 this year, Kofi Annan, the secretary-general of 
     the United Nations, began negotiating with Iraq over the 
     return of UN weapons inspectors. Iraq had resisted UN 
     inspections for three and a half years, but now it felt the 
     screw turning, and appeared to be on the point of 
     capitulation. On July 5, the Pentagon leaked its war plan to 
     the New York Times. The US, a Pentagon official revealed, was 
     preparing ``a major air campaign and land invasion'' to 
     ``topple President Saddam Hussein''. The talks immediately 
     collapsed.
       Ten days ago, they were about to resume. Hans Blix, the 
     head of the UN inspections body, was due to meet Iraqi 
     officials in Vienna, to discuss the practicalities of re-
     entering the country. The US Airforce launched bombing raids 
     on Basra, in southern Iraq, destroying a radar system. As the 
     Russian government pointed out, the attack could scarcely 
     have been better designed to scupper the talks. But this time 
     the Iraqis, mindful of the consequences of excluding he 
     inspectors, kept talking. Last Tuesday, they agreed to let 
     the UN back in. The State Department immediately announced, 
     with more candor than elegance, that it would ``go into 
     thwart mode''.
       It wasn't bluffing. The following day, it leaked the draft 
     resolution on inspections it was placing before the UN 
     Security Council. This resembles nothing so much as a plan 
     for unopposed invasion. The decision about which sites should 
     be ``inspected'' would no longer be made buy the UN alone, 
     but also by ``any permanent member of the security council'', 
     such as the United States. The people inspecting these sites 
     could also be chosen by the US, and they would enjoy 
     ``unrestricted rights to free, unrestricted and immediate 
     movement'' within Iraq, ``including unrestricted access to 
     presidential sites''. They would be permitted to establish 
     ``regional bases and operating bases throughout Iraq'', where 
     they would be ``accompanied . . . by sufficient U.S. 
     security forces to protect them''. They would have the 
     right to declare exclusion zones, no-fly zones and 
     ``ground and air transit corridors''. They would be 
     allowed to fly and land as many planes, helicopters and 
     surveillance drones in Iraq as they want, to set up 
     ``encrypted communication'' networks and to seize ``any 
     equipment'' they choose to lay hands on.
       The resolution, in other words, could not have failed to 
     remind Iraq of the alleged infiltration of the U.N. team in 
     1996. Both the Iraqi government and the former inspector 
     Scott Ritter maintain that the weapons inspectors were joined 
     that year by CIA covert operations specialists, who used the 
     U.N.'s special access to collect information and encourage 
     the republican guard to launch a coup. On Thursday, Britain 
     and the United States instructed the weapons inspectors not 
     to enter Iraq until the new resolution has been adopted.
       As Milan Rai's new book War Plan Iraq documents, the U.S. 
     has been undermining disarmament for years. The U.N.'s 
     principal means of persuasion was paragraph 22 of the 
     security council's resolution 687, which promised that 
     economic sanctions would be lifted once Iraq ceased to 
     possess weapons of mass destruction. But in April 1994, 
     Warren Christopher, the U.S. secretary of state, unilaterally 
     withdrew this promise, removing Iraq's main incentive to 
     comply. Three years later his successor, Madeleine Albright, 
     insisted that sanctions would not be lifted while Saddam 
     remained in power.
       The U.S. government maintains that Saddam Hussein expelled 
     the U.N. inspectors from Iraq in 1998, but this is not true. 
     On October 30, 1998, the U.N. rejected a new U.N. proposal by 
     again refusing to lift the oil embargo if Iraq disarmed. On 
     the following day, the Iraqi government announced that it 
     would cease to cooperate with the inspectors. In fact it 
     permitted them to continue working, and over the next six 
     weeks they completed around 300 operations.
       On December 14, Richard Butler, the head of the inspection 
     team, published a curiously contradictory report. The body of 
     the report recorded that over the past month ``the majority 
     of the inspections of facilities and sites under the ongoing 
     monitoring system were carried out with Iraq's cooperation'', 
     but his well-publicized conclusion was that ``no progress'' 
     has been made. Russia and China accused Butler of bias. On 
     December 15, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. warned him that 
     his team should leave Iraq for its own safety. Butler pulled 
     out, and on the following day the U.S. started bombing Iraq.
       From that point on, Saddam Hussein refused to allow U.N. 
     inspectors to return. At the end of last year, Jose Bustani, 
     the head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
     Weapons, proposed a means of resolving the crisis. His 
     organization had not been involved in the messy business of 
     1998, so he offered to send in his own inspectors, and 
     complete the job the U.N. had almost finished. The U.S. 
     responded by demanding Bustani's dismissal.The other member 
     states agreed to depose him only after the United States 
     threatened to destroy the organization if he stayed. Now Hans 
     Blinx, the head of the new U.N. inspectorate, may also be 
     feeling the heat. On Tuesday he insisted that he would take 
     his orders only from the security council. On Thursday, after 
     an hour-long meeting with U.S. officials, he agreed with the 
     Americans that there should be no inspections until a new 
     resolution had been approved.
       For the past eight years the U.S., with Britain's help, 
     appears to have been seeking to prevent a resolution of the 
     crisis in Iraq. It is almost as if Iraq has been kept on ice, 
     as a necessary enemy to be warmed up whenever the occasion 
     demands. Today, as the economy slides and Bin Laden's latest 
     mocking message suggests that the war on terrorism has so far 
     failed, an enemy which can be located and bombed is more 
     necessary than ever. A just war can be pursued only when all 
     peaceful means have been exhausted. In this case, the 
     peaceful means have been averted.

  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Michigan (Ms. Rivers).
  Ms. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution for 
several reasons.
  First, it retains Congress' constitutional authority and obligation 
to publicly act on any commitment of American troops or resources to 
military action. Unlike the other two resolutions before us, it does 
not endow the President with powers that do not exist in the 
Constitution.
  Secondly, it promotes a multilateral solution to the world's 
problems. It repudiates the administration's recently announced 
preemptive doctrine, which would change the United States from a 
worldwide defender of democracy into a first-strike aggressor on the 
world stage.
  Lastly and most importantly, it does not preclude any further action 
by Congress, should circumstances change, despite the hand-wringing 
that has gone on about our inability to deal with future instances.
  Of course, the President is free to come back and ask the Congress 
for action. This is best of the three resolutions before us, and I hope 
my colleagues will support it.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North 
Carolina (Mr. Watt).
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Lee 
amendment and encourage my colleagues to support the amendment.
  I have been very disappointed with a number of my colleagues who have 
suggested to me that the Lee amendment is not viable. I submit to them 
that

[[Page H7744]]

they must not have read what the Lee amendment says.
  It simply says that we resolve that the United States should work 
through the United Nations to seek to resolve the matter of ensuring 
that Iraq is not developing weapons of mass destruction through 
mechanisms such as the resumption of weapons inspections, negotiation, 
inquiry, mediation, regional arrangements and other peaceful means.
  This is a peace resolution, a desire to do everything that is 
reasonably possible through peaceful means before we resort to what is 
really an unviable option, and that unviable option is war.
  I encourage my colleagues to support the amendment to this 
resolution.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Texas 
(Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  (Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend her remarks.)
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, let me thank the distinguished 
gentlewoman from California for yielding time and express the reason 
that I come to this floor because it is with a heavy heart. I remind my 
colleagues, as I know all of them are very conscious of, it is a 
question of life and death. That is why I rise to support the Lee 
amendment, because I believe it does not preclude the constitutional 
duties that this Congress has, and that is the singular duty to declare 
war.
  Might I note in her amendment that she specifically notes that Iraq 
is not in compliance with the United Nations Security Council 
resolution. She acknowledges that the additional United Nations 
resolutions on inspections, that they are in noncompliance and that 
they violate international law. Iraq cease-fire obligations potentially 
endanger the United States and regional security interests.
  We know the dangers of Iraq. But what we also say to this body is 
that the President of the United States has every authority to be able 
to protect the United States upon the basis of imminent danger, of 
immediate danger. But what the President does not have, what we are 
seeking to do is to give him authority for a first strike without the 
constitutional obligation of Congress to declare war. I rise to support 
the Lee amendment.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Woolsey).
  (Ms. WOOLSEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Lee amendment 
because it recognizes that in this time of crisis we have the 
opportunity to pursue a new vision for the world. This vision affirms 
the character of our Nation and refutes mistaken attempts to use 
violence to bring about peace. We have been down that road before. It 
is time to choose a new way. My constituents understand this. They are 
overwhelmingly opposed to the war. In fact, they wish I had more than 
one vote today.
  A woman from Santa Rosa wrote to a local paper asking, and I quote, 
what would war with Iraq accomplish? U.S. aggression would only create 
more homeless and victimized refugees, more hatred of the United States 
by the rest of the world, and the death of our sons and daughters in 
the military. She continues: Violence only creates more violence. The 
United States is the greatest, the most powerful country in the world. 
We have the opportunity to be leaders of peace.
  Mr. Speaker, that is why I support the Lee resolution and oppose 
authorizing force in Iraq.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Filner).
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, the gentlewoman from California is a woman 
of courage, a woman of peace. We thank her for her leadership.
  I heard the gentleman from Illinois, the chairman, earlier worry 
about our status as a sovereign Nation if this motion passes. This is a 
motion which makes our sovereign Nation safer. In the 21st century, the 
wars against terrorism, those wars require and will require 
international cooperation. We cannot go it alone in the 21st century. 
We cannot go it alone in a war against terrorism. We must have the 
world community with us.
  We will be less safe if we do not pass this resolution. America will 
be less safe if we pass the resolution that the President wants. We 
dilute our war against terrorism, we increase the possibility of 
terrorists getting weapons of mass destruction. The al Qaeda I would 
think would be cheering the passage of the underlying resolution 
because the instability of the area, for example, in Pakistan would 
more likely give them a nuclear weapon. Let us work with the 
international community. Let us work with the United Nations. Let us 
follow the path of peace. Let us support the Lee amendment.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), the distinguished ranking 
member of the Committee on International Relations.
  Mr. LANTOS. I want to thank my friend, chairman of the committee, for 
yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I first want to commend my friend and colleague from 
California for her active and valuable contribution to the work of the 
Committee on International Relations and to the work of this House. I 
appreciate the views of my colleague from California and I share her 
view that we must exhaust all diplomatic and peaceful means for 
disarming Saddam Hussein, and we all agree that war can be only our 
very last resort. Indeed, Mr. Speaker, the joint resolution before us 
supports the diplomatic process at the United Nations and it requires 
the President to exhaust all peaceful means before resorting to war. 
Our distinguished Secretary of State, Colin Powell, is working nonstop 
at the United Nations to move towards a peaceful and diplomatic 
resolution of this crisis, and I fully support Secretary Powell's 
efforts.
  However, Mr. Speaker, I strongly believe that our diplomacy will 
achieve its purpose only if the Iraqi regime knows that a sword of 
Damocles hangs over its head. Our joint bipartisan resolution 
represents that statement of resolve.
  I am also concerned that my friend's amendment disregards the very 
serious threat posed by Iraqi sponsorship of international terrorism, 
clearly a serious danger to the security and safety of the United 
States.
  I am convinced, Mr. Speaker, that the bipartisan and bicameral 
agreement reached with the White House is approaching a final decision 
in both the House and the Senate. Our chances of obtaining the support 
of friends and allies will be dramatically increased by our show of 
decisiveness and unity in this House. This is not the time to unravel 
an agreement that is on the verge of ratification. It is for these and 
many other reasons that I regretfully and respectfully oppose the 
gentlewoman's amendment.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Stark).
  (Mr. STARK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to rise in support of the 
resolution, the amendment by my distinguished colleague and neighbor, 
the gentlewoman from California. The reason we should support her 
amendment is very simple. There is absolutely no evidence that any 
thinking person could give that says we are in any danger from Saddam 
Hussein today. You are in more danger from the snipers running around 
in Prince Georges County that we cannot find.
  If you vote against the Lee substitute, you are automatically 
sentencing, some of you old men who have never been in service or never 
worn a uniform like the last speaker, thousands of Americans to sure 
death. You know that the President wants blood. He wants to go to war. 
That is why we are going through this. And so you are giving an 
inexperienced, desperate young man in the White House the execution 
lever to kill thousands of Americans. Some of you did that and you 
could look at the 50,000 names on the wall down on the Mall. And is 
Vietnam still in business? The last time I looked. Don't do it again. 
Support the Lee amendment.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Kingston).
  Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time and wanted to say there is a curious suggestion here that the 
people in the U.N. care more about American

[[Page H7745]]

citizens than their own representatives. That seems to be a theme that 
I am hearing over and over again. Yet, Mr. Speaker, as we debate this, 
there is also a second suggestion, that this resolution today, well 
thought of, well debated not just during the course of the summer and 
the previous months but in fact going back to 1990, that this is 
something new, that suddenly we have decided that Iraq is a problem.
  Mr. Speaker, the Congressional action on Iraq goes back to 1990, to 
the 101st Congress, the 102nd Congress, 103rd, 104th, 105th, 106th and 
now 107th, and there are resolutions after resolutions of instruction, 
of threat, of demands against Iraq and the people because of the 
repression they had. That is just the United States Congress, Mr. 
Speaker. Then let us go to the U.N. itself.
  Keep in mind America is a sovereign Nation. Unlike the supporters of 
this amendment, I do not believe that we need to have the U.N.'s 
permission to defend our own national interests. That is what nations 
do. We cannot get mad at Germany or France if they do not stand up for 
something that is not in their national interest. But I do not think 
the U.N. should interfere with something that is in our national 
interest, because this attack, this terrorist attack that we are 
suffering from, 9-11, happened in the United States of America.
  But, Mr. Speaker, let us also think about Kosovo. This Congress 
agreed for President Clinton to bomb Kosovo because of repression of 
the Muslim population by the largely Christian population, and we in 
America sided with the Muslims. And President Clinton, I do not know 
how the supporters of this amendment voted on that, but he did not sit 
around and say, ``I'd like to take some action in Kosovo. Gee whiz, 
what would the U.N. say?'' I did not hear that cry and hue from the 
supporters of this amendment at that time. But if we were to go to the 
U.N., going back to U.N. Resolution 660, violated; U.N. Resolution 678 
on November 1990; Resolution 686 in March 1991; Resolution 687, April 
1991; Resolution 688, April 1991; Resolution 707, August 15, 1991; 
October 11, 1991, Resolution 715.
  Mr. Speaker, the list goes on and on and on. I would like to submit 
these for the Record. But the reality is that the U.N. has been calling 
for Iraq to act and to comply and to discontinue certain activities 
which they have flagrantly ignored. It is not time to go back to the 
U.N. for one more resolution. If the U.N. was going to act, they would 
have done it. They have had countless opportunities since 1991.
  Mr. Speaker, we have not had weapons inspectors in Iraq since 1998. 
The minimum agreement here between the hawks and the doves, if you 
will, is that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons and is near 
nuclear capability. The minimum agreement is they are anti-American, 
they are dangerous, they are a barbaric regime. The minimum agreement, 
they have violated 16 U.N. resolutions.
  Mr. Speaker, the time to act is now, not waiting on the U.N.
  Mr. Speaker, I include the following material for the Record:

        [From the Congressional Research Service, Oct. 1, 2002]

  Congressional Action on Iraq 1990-2002: A Compilation of Legislation

                          (By Jeremy M. Sharp)


                                Summary

       This report is a compilation of legislation on Iraq from 
     1990 to the present. The list is composed of resolutions and 
     public laws relating to military action and/or diplomatic 
     pressure to be taken against Iraq. The list does not include 
     foreign aid appropriations bills passed since FY 1994 that 
     deny U.S. funds to any nation in violation of the United 
     Nations sanctions regime against Iraq. Also, measures that 
     were not passed only in either the House or the Senate are 
     not included (with the exception of the proposals in the 
     107th Congress). For a more in-depth analysis of U.S. action 
     against Iraq, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq, Compliance, 
     Sanctions and U.S. Policy. This report will be updated as 
     developments unfold.


                 Congressional Action on Iraq 1990-2002

                             101st Congress

                                 House

       H. Con. Res. 382: Expressed the sense of the Congress that 
     the crisis created by Iraq's invasion and occupation of 
     Kuwait must be addressed and resolved on its own terms 
     separately from other conflicts in the region. Passed in the 
     House: October 23, 1990.
       H. J. Res. 658: Supported the actions taken by the 
     President with respect to Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and 
     confirmed United States resolve. Passed in the House: October 
     1, 1990.

                                 Senate

       S. Res. 318: Commended the President for his actions taken 
     against Iraq and called for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces 
     from Kuwait, the freezing of Iraqi assets, the cessation of 
     all arms shipments to Iraq, and the imposition of sanctions 
     against Iraq. Passed in the Senate: August 2, 1990.

                              Public Laws

       P.L. 101-509: (H.R. 5241). Treasury, Postal Service, and 
     General Government Appropriations Act FY 1991 (Section 630). 
     Urged the President to ensure that coalition allies were 
     sharing the burden of collective defense and contributing 
     financially to the war effort. Became public law: November 5, 
     1990.
       P.L. 101-510: (H.R. 4739). Defense Authorization Act FY 
     1991 (Section 1458). Empowered the President to prohibit any 
     and all products of a foreign nation which has violated the 
     economic sanctions against Iraq. Became public law: November 
     5, 1990.
       P.L. 101-513: (H.R. 5114). The Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 
     (Section 586). Imposed a trade embargo on Iraq and called for 
     the imposition and enforcement of multilateral sanctions in 
     accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions. 
     Became public law: November 5, 1990.
       P.L. 101-515: (H.R. 5021). Department of Commerce, Justice, 
     and State Appropriations Act FY 1991 (Section 608 a & b). 
     Restricted the use of funds to approve the licensing for 
     export of any supercomputer to any country whose government 
     is assisting Iraq develop its ballistic missile program, or 
     chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons capability. Became 
     public law: November 5, 1990.

                             102nd Congress

                              Public Laws

       P.L. 102-1: (H.J. Res. 77). Authorization for Use of 
     Military Force Against Iraq Resolution. Gave Congressional 
     authorization to expel Iraq from Kuwait in accordance with 
     United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, which called 
     for the implementation of eleven previous Security Council 
     Resolutions. Became public law: January 12, 1991.
       P.L. 102-138: (H.R. 1415). The Foreign Relations 
     Authorization Act for FY 1992 (Section 301). Stated that the 
     President should propose to the Security Council that members 
     of the Iraqi regime be put on trial for war crimes. Became 
     public law: October 28, 1991.
       P.L. 102-190: (H.R. 2100). Defense Authorization Act for 
     FY1992 (Section 1095). Supported the use of ``all necessary 
     means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization for 
     Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (P.L. 102-1).'' 
     Became public law: December 5, 1991.

                             103rd Congress

                              Public Laws

       P.L. 103-160: (H.R. 2401). Defense Authorization Act FY 
     1994 (Section 1164). Denied defectors of the Iraqi military 
     entry into the United States unless those persons had 
     assisted U.S. or coalition forces and had not committed any 
     war crimes. Became public law: November 30, 1993.
       P.L. 103-236: (H.R. 2333). Foreign Relations Authorization 
     Act FY 1994, 1995 (Section 507). Expressed the sense of 
     Congress that the United States should continue to advocate 
     the maintenance of Iraq's territorial integrity and the 
     transition to a unified, democratic Iraq. Became public law: 
     April 30, 1994.

                             104th Congress

                                 House

       H. Res. 120: Urged the President to take ``all appropriate 
     action'' to secure the release and safe exit from Iraq of 
     American citizens William Barloon and David Daliberti, who 
     had mistakenly crossed Iraq's border and were detained. 
     Passed in the House: April 3, 1995.

                                 Senate

       S. Res. 288: Commended the military action taken by the 
     United States following U.S. air strikes in northern Iraq 
     against Iraqi radar and air defense installations. This 
     action was taken during the brief Kurdish civil war in 1996. 
     Passed in the Senate: September 5, 1996.

                             105th Congress

                                 House

       H. Res. 322: Supported the pursuit of peaceful and 
     diplomatic efforts in seeking Iraqi compliance with United 
     Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding the 
     destruction of Iraq's capability to deliver and produce 
     weapons of mass destruction. However, if such efforts fail, 
     ``multilateral military action or unilateral military action 
     should be taken.'' Passed in the House: November 13, 1997.
       H. Res. 612: Reaffirmed that it should be the policy of the 
     United States to support efforts to remove the regime of 
     Saddam Hussein in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a 
     democratic government to replace that regime. Passed in the 
     House: December 17, 1998.
       H. Con. Res. 137: Expressed concern for the urgent need of 
     a criminal tribunal to try members of the Iraqi regime for 
     war crimes. Passed in the House: January 27, 1998.

                                 Senate

       S. Con. Res. 78: Called for the indictment of Saddam 
     Hussein for war crimes. Passed in the Senate: March 13, 1998.

                              Public Laws

       P.L. 105-174: (H.R. 3579). 1998 Supplemental Appropriations 
     and Rescissions Act (Section 17). Expressed the sense of 
     Congress that none of the funds appropriated or otherwise

[[Page H7746]]

     made available by this act be used for the conduct of 
     offensive operations by the United States Armed Forces 
     against Iraq for the purpose of enforcing compliance with 
     United Nations Security Council Resolutions, unless such 
     operations are specifically authorized by a law enacted after 
     the date of the enactment of this act. Became public law: May 
     1, 1998.
       P.L. 105-235: (S.J. Res. 54). Iraqi Breach of International 
     Obligations. Declared that by evicting weapons inspectors, 
     Iraq was in ``material breach'' of its cease-fire agreement. 
     Urged the President to take ``appropriate action in 
     accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the 
     United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its 
     international obligations.'' Became public law: August 14, 
     1998.
       P.L. 105-338 (H.R. 4655): Iraq Liberation Act of 1988 
     (Section 586). Declared that it should be the policy of the 
     United States to ``support efforts'' to remove Saddam Hussein 
     from power in Iraq and replace him with a democratic 
     government. Authorized the President to provide the Iraqi 
     democratic opposition with assistance for radio and 
     television broadcasting, defense articles and military 
     training, and humanitarian assistance. Became public law: 
     October 31, 1998.

                             107th Congress

                                 House

       H.J. Res. 75: Stated that Iraq's refusal to allow weapons 
     inspectors was a material breach of its international 
     obligations and constituted ``a mounting threat to the United 
     States, its friends and allies, and international peace and 
     security.'' Passed in the House: December 20, 2001.

                                 Senate

       S. 1170 (H.R. 4): Would prohibit the direct or indirect 
     importation of Iraqi-origin petroleum into the United States, 
     notwithstanding action by the Committee established by United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 661 authorizing the 
     export of petroleum products from Iraq in exchange for 
     humanitarian assistance. Last major action: July 12, 2001 
     (Referred to Senate Committee on Finance).
       S. Con. Res. 133: Expresses the sense of Congress that 
     ``the United States should not use force against Iraq, 
     outside of the existing rules of engagement, without specific 
     statutory authorization or a declaration of war under Article 
     I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution of the United 
     States.'' Last major action: July 30, 2002 (Referred to 
     Senate Committee on Foreign Relations).
       S.J. Res. 41: Calls for the ``consideration and vote on a 
     resolution for the use of force of the United States against 
     Iraq before such force is deployed.'' Last major action: July 
     18, 2002 (Referred to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations).


                UNSCR 678--November 29, 1990--VIOLATED!

       Iraq must comply fully with UNSCR 660 (regarding Iraq's 
     illegal invasion of Kuwait) ``and all subsequent relevant 
     resolutions.''
       Authorizes UN Member States ``to use all necessary means to 
     uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent 
     relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and 
     security in the area.''


                  UNSCR 686--March 3, 1991--VIOLATED!

       Iraq must release prisoners detained during the Gulf War.
       Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf 
     War.
       Iraq must accept liability under international law for 
     damages from its illegal invasion of Kuwait.


                  UNSCR 687--April 3, 1991--VIOLATED!

       Iraq must ``unconditionally accept'' the destruction, 
     removal or rendering harmless ``under international 
     supervision'' of all ``chemical and biological weapons and 
     all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and 
     components and all research, development, support and 
     manufacturing facilities.''
       Iraq must ``unconditionally agree not acquire or develop 
     nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material'' or any 
     research, development or manufacturing facilities.
       Iraq must ``unconditionally accept'' the destruction, 
     removal or rendering harmless ``under international 
     supervision'' of all ``ballistic missiles with a range 
     greater than 150 KM and related major parts and repair and 
     production facilities.''
       Iraq must not ``use, develop, construct or acquire'' any 
     weapons of mass destruction.
       Iraq must reaffirm its obligations under the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty.
       Creates the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to 
     verify the elimination of Iraq's chemical and biological 
     weapons programs and mandated that the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency (IAEA) verify elimination of Iraq's nuclear 
     weapons program.
       Iraq must declare fully its weapons of mass destruction 
     programs.
       Iraq must not commit or support terrorism, or allow 
     terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq.
       Iraq must cooperate in accounting for the missing and dead 
     Kuwaitis and others.
       Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf 
     War.


                  UNSCR 688--April 5, 1991--VIOLATED!

       ``Condemns'' repression of Iraqi civilian population, ``the 
     consequences of which threaten international peace and 
     security.''
       Iraq must immediately end repression of its civilian 
     population.
        Iraq must allow immediate access to international 
     humanitarian organizations to those in need of assistance.


                 UNSCR 707--August 15, 1991--VIOLATED!

       ``Condemns'' Iraq's ``serious violation'' of UNSCR 687.
       ``Further condemns'' Iraq's noncompliance with IAEA and its 
     obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
       Iraq must halt nuclear activities of all kinds until the 
     Security Council deems Iraq in full compliance.
       Iraq must make a full, final and complete disclosure of all 
     aspects of its weapons of mass destruction and missile 
     programs.
       Iraq must allow UN and IAEA inspectors immediate, 
     unconditional and unrestricted access.
       Iraq must cease attempts to conceal or move weapons of mass 
     destruction, and related materials and facilities.
       Iraq must allow U.N. and IAEA inspectors to conduct 
     inspection flights throughout Iraq.
       Iraq must provide transportation, medical and logistical 
     support for U.N. and IAEA inspectors.


                 unscr 715--October 11, 1991--VIOLATED!

       Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. and IAEA inspectors.


                 unscr 949--october 15, 1994--violated!

       ``Condemns'' Iraq's recent military deployments toward 
     Kuwait.
       Iraq must not utilize its military or other forces in a 
     hostile manner to threaten its neighbors or U.N. operations 
     in Iraq.
       Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. weapons inspectors.
       Iraq must not enhance its military capability in southern 
     Iraq.


                 unscr 1051--March 27, 1996--violated!

       Iraq must report shipments of dual-use items related to 
     weapons of mass destruction to the U.N. and IAEA.
       Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. and IAEA inspectors and 
     allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.


                  unscr 1060--June 12, 1996--violated!

       ``Deplores'' Iraq's refusal to allow access to U.N. 
     inspectors and Iraq's ``clear violations'' of previous U.N. 
     resolutions.
       Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. weapons inspectors and 
     allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.


                  unscr 1115--June 21, 1997--violated!

       ``Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow 
     access'' to U.N. inspectors, which constitutes a ``clear and 
     flagrant violation'' of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.
       Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. weapons inspectors and 
     allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
       Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted 
     access to Iraqi officials whom U.N. inspectors want to 
     interview.


                unscr 1134--October 23, 1997--violated!

       ``Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow 
     access'' to U.N. inspectors, which constitutes a ``flagrant 
     violation'' of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.
       Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. weapons inspectors and 
     allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
       Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted 
     access to Iraqi officials whom U.N. inspectors want to 
     interview.


                unscr 1137--November 12, 1997--violated!

       ``Condemns the continued violations by Iraq'' of previous 
     U.N. resolutions, including its ``implicit threat to the 
     safety of'' aircraft operated by U.N. inspectors and its 
     tampering with U.N. inspector monitoring equipment.
       Reaffirms Iraq's responsibility to ensure the safety of 
     U.N. inspectors.
       Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. weapons inspectors and 
     allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.


                  unscr 1154--March 2, 1998--violated!

       Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. and IAEA weapons 
     inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and 
     unrestricted access, and notes that any violation would have 
     the ``severest consequences for Iraq.''


                unscr 1194--September 9, 1998--violated!

       ``Condemns the decision by Iraq of 5 August 1998 to suspend 
     cooperation with'' U.N. and IAEA inspectors, which 
     constitutes ``a totally unacceptable contravention'' of its 
     obligations under UNSCR 687, 707, 715, 1060, 1115, and 1154.
       Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. and IAEA weapons 
     inspectors, and allow immediate, unconditional and 
     unrestricted access.


                unscr 1205--November 5, 1998--violated!

       ``Condemns the decision by Iraq of 31 October 1998 to cease 
     cooperation'' with U.N. inspectors as ``a flagrant 
     violation'' of UNSCR 687 and other resolutions.
       Iraq must provide ``immediate, complete and unconditional 
     cooperation'' with U.N. and IAEA inspectors.


                unscr 1284--December 17, 1999--violated!

       Created the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and 
     Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace previous weapon 
     inspection team (UNSCOM).
       Iraq must allow UNMOVIC ``immediate, unconditional and 
     unrestricted access'' to Iraqi officials and facilities.
       Iraq must fulfill its commitment to return Gulf War 
     prisoners.
       Calls on Iraq to distribute humanitarian goods and medical 
     supplies to its people and address the needs of vulnerable 
     Iraqis without discrimination.

  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Payne).

[[Page H7747]]

  (Mr. PAYNE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, give the United Nations inspectors a chance. 
That is what the Lee amendment asks.
  What does it do? It sets out the potential threat posed by Iraq. She 
says that there are dangers and that we must eliminate these weapons of 
mass destruction. But it gives the United Nations inspectors a process 
to go through diplomatically. It rejects the idea, though, of a 
unilateral, preemptive first strike in the absence of a verified 
imminent threat to the United States.
  What it does not do, it does not limit the President's authority if 
we are in danger of a verified, imminent threat. It does not preclude 
pursuing other paths such as those proposed by the gentleman from South 
Carolina (Mr. Spratt).
  Let us make it clear, the Lee amendment simply says, let us push for 
peace, let us destroy those weapons of mass destruction if they are 
there; and we think they are, but let us give diplomacy a chance. Let 
us not be preemptive. Let us not use first strike. Let us try to see 
if, with our power, we can have peace through power.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from North 
Carolina (Mrs. Clayton).
  (Mrs. CLAYTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Mrs. CLAYTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the amendment 
being offered by the gentlewoman from California entitled The 
Alternative to War. It could not be more aptly named. It seeks to 
commit the United States to fully engaging the diplomatic processes and 
to work multilaterally through the United Nations to achieve unfettered 
inspections of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons 
capabilities, disarm and, indeed, dismantle.
  There is no one in this Chamber who does not believe that the world 
would be better off without Saddam Hussein. But the President has not 
made a convincing case that the Hussein regime in Iraq indeed poses an 
immediate threat. In fact, our own intelligence experts tell us that 
the most likely threat of the use of such weapons of mass destruction 
by Iraq would occur if the United States invaded Iraq.
  What that suggests is that we should not be authorizing the President 
to act unilaterally, sending our brave young men and women into harm's 
way. Indeed, the President has most recently said that war should be 
the last resort.
  This amendment certainly puts peace first and puts war as a last 
resort. Support this amendment to the resolution.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Cox).
  Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, it will reward us to read the resolution we are 
being asked to vote upon. It is self-refuting. This resolution would 
have this Congress find that Iraq and Saddam Hussein unconditionally 
accepted U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, their obligation to 
destroy their chemical and biological weapons. That was unconditional.
  The resolution has us find that Iraq unconditionally accepted its 
obligation not to proceed with the development of nuclear weapons. The 
resolution has us find that Iraq agreed to immediate and unconditional 
inspections.
  The resolution goes on to have us find that Iraq has failed to comply 
with these obligations over a period of more than a decade. The 
resolution has us find that Iraq obstructed the inspectors and 
ultimately expelled them in 1998.
  Finally, the resolution has us find that this noncompliance with the 
United Nations Security Council resolutions, including specifically 
Resolution 687, quote, ``endangers U.S. security.''
  That is the preamble in this resolution. That is the predicate. Then 
what would the resolution have us do? Pass yet one more U.N. resolution 
which, by its terms, lacks enforcement. Only a U.N. resolution that 
lacks enforcement would be acceptable if we were to pass the resolution 
that is before us.
  What have we learned in 11 years? Surely, without at least the threat 
of military force, we will get exactly the same result that we have had 
16 times in a row. There is a cost, indeed a much heavier cost of doing 
nothing, of temporizing, of adding a 17th, toothless U.N. resolution to 
the 16 that Saddam Hussein has already violated.
  And to the charge that what we are doing is unilateral, we must say, 
we have already earned the cooperation of Britain, Turkey, Canada, 
Poland, Romania, Israel, Bulgaria, Australia, Singapore, Japan and 
others. If we vote to deny the President of the United States the 
backing of this Congress at this moment and think that then he can win 
the support of other nations, we are delusional.
  All of us must surely hope that the United Nations passes its next 
resolution, that Saddam Hussein will, this time, finally see reason and 
disarm. But as the proverb says, He who lives only by hope will die in 
despair.
  My colleagues, let us unite hope with reason and practicality and a 
willingness to act. Let us defeat this resolution.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Illinois 
(Mr. Jackson).
  (Mr. JACKSON of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. JACKSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Lee 
amendment.
  What is our goal? Our goal is to end the threat of Iraq's weapons of 
mass destruction through comprehensive and unfettered inspections and 
disable their ability to develop or deliver them.
  How do we get there? Until the Lee amendment, most suggested, with a 
military stick. I think a carrot is more likely to succeed.
  What carrot? The carrot of lifting economic sanctions on Iraq in 
exchange for comprehensive and unfettered inspections. Offering to lift 
economic sanctions in exchange for unfettered inspections will rally 
support within Iraq and among our allies.
  This positive incentive to get Iraq to comply has not and is 
currently not being offered by the Congress of the United States. But 
until we make this overture and change our policy of only lifting 
economic sanctions after a regime change, we will not have exhausted 
all peaceful means and alternatives to force.
  Give peace a chance, Mr. Speaker. Nonviolence, negotiations and 
inspections deserve a chance. Lift economic sanctions on the people of 
Iraq in exchange for unfettered inspections in Iraq. It will gain 
support within Iraq and amongst our allies.
  I thank the gentlewoman for offering the amendment.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 seconds to the gentlewoman from the 
Virgin Islands (Mrs. Christensen).
  (Mrs. CHRISTENSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
her remarks.)
  Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Lee amendment 
which would give the U.N. inspections process and multilateral 
diplomacy time and opportunity to work.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Hinchey).
  Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Speaker, the resolution before the House without the 
Lee amendment takes this country and the world on a dangerous and 
potentially tragic course.
  It is so, first of all, because the resolution violates our own 
Constitution because it devolves war-making authority from the Congress 
to the executive branch. It also puts us in violation of our 
commitments to the United Nations.
  But fundamentally it puts us on a dangerous and potentially tragic 
course because if we follow the resolution, if that resolution is 
prosecuted by the administration and attacks Iraq unilaterally, that 
action will galvanize the most fundamental, radical elements of Islam.
  It strengthens Wahhabism and it will bring to their cause tens of 
thousands of new recruits who are prepared to wage war against this 
country in the way it was waged on September 11 of last year. That will 
be the end result of the passage and prosecution of the resolution, 
absent the Lee amendment.
  We must pass this amendment.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon).
  (Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)

[[Page H7748]]

  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this 
amendment. I rise as an educator, a teacher who for 7 years spent my 
time in the schools of Pennsylvania, someone who desperately does not 
want to see war occur.
  But I also understand, Mr. Speaker, that contrary to what we are 
hearing on the other side, there are times when you have to stand up 
and you have to be bold and you have to lay down a marker.
  The reason I ran for public office in the first place was that my 
hometown of 5,000 people had become overwhelmed by the Pagans 
motorcycle gang. Sixty-five of them lived in my neighborhood; all of 
their drug dealing was controlled from my town. If I listened to the 
other side, maybe to solve the problem, I should have got them all in a 
circle, held hands and we should have sang Kum Bay Yah. The problem is, 
the Pagans do not want to sing Kum Bay Yah. The Pagans do not deal in 
reality. The Pagans were only concerned with harming people and selling 
their drugs.

                              {time}  1000

  Saddam Hussein is a pagan. Saddam Hussein does not want to deal in 
realistic terms. We need to give the President the authority to rally 
the world opinion and the U.N. to follow through on not just the 
inspections but on disarming weapons of mass destruction.
  I would say to my colleagues on the other side where were they during 
the 1990s when 37 times, 37 times, we had evidence of technology being 
transferred from Russia and China to Iraq and Iran? Where were they 
when the administration then only imposed sanctions four times? Where 
were they when nine times we saw chemical and biological technology 
being transferred into Iraq and Iran and we sat on our hands? Where 
were they?
  Where were they in 1995 when we caught these going from Russia to 
Iraq? These are guidance systems for missiles, a violation of the NTCR. 
Because Clinton did not want to embarrass Yeltsin we never imposed the 
required sanctions.
  Mr. Speaker, this did not just happen. This technology has been 
flowing for years. Now we have Saddam equipped with chemical and 
biological and potentially nuclear capability. He has missiles which he 
has now enhanced, the same missile that sent 28 young Americans home in 
body bags in 1991.
  Mr. Speaker, everyone wants peace. No one wants war, but there are 
times where we have to stand up and we have to lay down a marker and 
back it up with force just as I had to do as a teacher when I ran for 
mayor and became mayor of my hometown. The pagans did not want to 
listen to reason. The pagans did not want to respond to what was in the 
best interests of the citizens. If I had listened to the other side, 
somehow I would come together and somehow convince them to change their 
ways, and that did not happen. We fought them with force and we won, 
and today my hometown is prospering because the pagans no longer have 
their residence there.
  We have to stand together and show the world with the support of this 
President that we will stand up to the aggression of Saddam, we will 
stand up to his use of chemical agents on his people, we will stand up 
to his potential use of biological weapons, and we will lay the 
foundation for a more peaceful world where the Iraqi people can enjoy 
the benefits of a new government.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Owens).
  (Mr. OWENS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Speaker, this alternative offers a nonviolent and 
diplomatic way to wage the peace. We should be serious about this 
process of waging the peace with U.N. inspections. We should not take a 
bargain basement approach to U.N. inspections. We are willing to talk 
casually about spending billions of dollars for war. Let us spend what 
we need to have these U.N. inspections be credible.
  I refer my colleagues to Nightline of last night, Wednesday, October 
9, where the inspection process was presented in a way which ridiculed 
it and showed that a handful of inspectors, scientists and college 
professors were bullied and harassed and we sent the wrong signal to 
Saddam Hussein about inspections. Let us have inspections, let us 
pursue the diplomatic and the nonviolent alternative with the same 
vigor and seriousness that we will pursue a violent alternative.
  Let us have full administrative support, full logistical support, 
transportation, everything the inspectors need to go in and conduct 
large numbers of inspections all over Iraq at the same time and have a 
chain of command that goes right to the Security Council.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Ohio 
(Mrs. Jones).
  (Mrs. JONES of Ohio asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend her remarks.)
  Mrs. JONES of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, first of all, I want to compliment 
the gentlewoman from California for all of her leadership on this 
issue.
  One of the prior speakers asked where we were in 1991 and pulled out 
all these examples of what war was all about. I do not know where he 
was in 1991, but in 1991 I was back being a prosecutor in Cuyahoga 
County, but had I been here I would have said let us push and continue 
to push to reach a resolution and a peaceful resolution.
  I am not going to down anybody for their religion. I happen to be 
Baptist. I happen to be a Protestant, but whatever it is people are we 
all are a part of this world, and in this United States we talk about 
freedom of religion and our entitlement to be whoever we are, but all 
of us want peace, and if we are the big bully, if we are the big dog on 
the street, then we can afford to be the big dog and sit back and say 
come on to the table, let us use all of our resources.
  I question whether or not the United States has, in fact, in many 
instances, put all of its power to the U.N. to allow the U.N. to be as 
strong as it should be. Support the Lee amendment.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Brown).
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from California for 
yielding me the time.
  For 40 years our policy was to contain and deter Joseph Stalin and 
the Soviets, to detain and deter Fidel Castro and the Cubans, to detain 
and deter and restrain Communist aggression by the Chinese, always 
without invasion. We were able to detain and deter the Soviets and the 
Chinese and the Communists in Cuba without invasion, but if we go first 
strike into Iraq the message to the world and to Putin is he can go 
into Georgia and chase down the Chechnyan rebels and the message to 
China is they can go into Taiwan and they can come down harder on Tibet 
and the message to the Pakistanis and the Indians is they can go into 
Kashmir, maybe even with their nuclear weapons.
  Mr. President, go slow. Mr. President, we need aggressive, unfettered 
inspections in Iraq, complete, thorough, aggressive, unfettered 
inspections. Then go back to the United Nations. War should be a last 
resort.
  Mr. Speaker, I support the Lee amendment.


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bonilla). The Chair reminds Members to 
address the Chair in their remarks and not directly the President when 
addressing the House.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis).
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my colleague 
yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, last evening we completed the work on the Defense 
appropriations bill. That measure is designed to provide the funding 
whereby America is able to carry forward its responsibility in the 
world as the force for peace in our world. I am very pleased with the 
results of that bill, and while we were not discussing this with the 
other body yesterday, I could not help but from time to time watch the 
discussions of this measure on the floor.
  This resolution is a very, very important statement by the American 
Congress. It has been crafted by some of the most capable people in 
both of our bodies, and I want to congratulate the chairman, as well as 
others who have been so involved.

[[Page H7749]]

  I could not help but come to the floor as I watched this discussion 
begin regarding some substitutes for this resolution. I must say, Mr. 
Speaker, it is most important that we reject those alternatives for the 
resolution is designed simply to give our Commander-in-Chief some 
flexibility as he goes forward in projecting our responsibilities for 
peace in the world.
  Indeed, there are those who presume that this automatically means a 
war in Iraq. This resolution does not automatically take us to war. As 
a matter of fact, it is a tool for the Commander-in-Chief to indeed go 
forth with those efforts that are most important in terms of our future 
hopes for peace.
  There is little doubt that America focused again upon the importance 
of our strength as a result of 9/11 just 1 year ago. There is little 
doubt that the world understands that a strong America is very 
important for peace.
  I would suggest to my colleagues that the one thing that we could do 
to undermine that strength is to pass a resolution like this one that 
is before us at this moment. Indeed, my colleagues, there is much 
discussion about what the Commander-in-Chief has not done. In the past, 
there was a lot of discussion about the fact that perhaps his advisers 
were not as good as some would like.
  We look at the Vice President, we look at the Secretary of State, we 
look at the Secretary of Defense. The community not so long ago was 
amazed at how great their strength might be. Do we presume that they 
have not been giving advice and counsel to the Commander-in-Chief?
  Indeed, I believe they have a plan that will strengthen our ability 
to be a force in the world for the good.
  Resolutions like this will take us exactly in the opposite direction. 
Let us not by actions today undermine the President's ability to lead.
  At the same time, let me say that most of my colleagues know that I 
am a strong believer in a bipartisan force in this House. Let us not as 
a result of these votes today have one of our parties be the party 
working with the President for peace and have the other party be the 
party of the United Nations.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. George Miller).
  (Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California asked and was given permission to 
revise and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong 
support of the Lee amendment and commend my colleague from California 
for all of her work on behalf of this peaceful effort to resolve this 
issue.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Illinois 
(Mr. Davis).
  (Mr. DAVIS of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I have been told that he who 
lives by the sword shall eventually die by the sword.
  The first call that I got this morning was from a woman named Barbara 
Mullarkey who said, ``Danny, vote for peace.''
  I rise in strong support of the Lee amendment because it gives me the 
opportunity to vote the will of the people in my Congressional district 
who do not believe that we have made the case to go to war. The 
President has all of the flexibility that he needs to protect us. What 
he does not have is the flexibility to declare war. That flexibility is 
left to this Congress.
  Vote for the Lee amendment. Vote for peace.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Farr).
  Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for 
yielding me the time.
  I rise in support of the Lee amendment, and I am really surprised 
after listening to the debate for the last 17 hours why anybody would 
attack it. Indeed, the Lee amendment and the Lee resolution is the same 
as what the President has in his resolution if we see in section 2 
where the President urges the support of the United States diplomatic 
efforts to strictly enforce through the United Nations, to obtain 
prompt and decisive action by the Security Council in the United 
Nations, that essentially this is the same thing that the Lee amendment 
does.
  It seems to me that anybody who can support the President's amendment 
ought to support the Lee amendment. What the Lee amendment does not do 
is it does not leap before it looks. It says look before we leap into 
war, and I think the message here is very strong, that if the United 
States is going to leap into war before it looks. What kind of trust 
are we going to have with the rest of the arrangements around the world 
with the agreements we have had on treaties and trade treaties? What is 
going to happen to people who are traveling in the country? Is anybody 
going to be able to trust our country because we can say, well, if we 
do not like something we can go it alone?
  It is very wise to support the Lee amendment. It is a good look 
before we leap.


                         Parliamentary Inquiry

  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry. I understand the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) has the right to close?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bonilla). That is correct.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining time.
  My alternative gives the United Nations a chance to do its job while 
we think through the ramifications of our actions, how many lives would 
be lost, what will this cost our economy. It provides a very pragmatic 
opportunity to step back and explain to the American people the 
implications of authorizing a war. It will give us an opportunity to 
explain to the American people what our own intelligence agency means, 
and let me quote this, ``Our intelligence agency says should Saddam 
conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred, the 
probability would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist 
action.''
  Our action today could cause a reaction of catastrophic proportions, 
not only in terms of Saddam Hussein but in the destabilization of the 
Middle East and the setting of a dangerous precedent.
  I plead with my colleagues to oppose this rush to war. It is morally 
wrong, it is financially irresponsible, and it is not in our national 
security interest. We must wait, we must ask these questions, we must 
know what the economic impact is. We must know what this does in terms 
of the loss of lives of our young men and women.
  This is a day that we must urge reflection. We must urge this body to 
become attentive to the unanswered questions that are out there. If our 
own intelligence agencies say to us that authorizing the President's 
resolution to go to war; that is, supporting that effort to wage war, 
could be a provocative act against our country, that it could 
destabilize the region, that it could lead to possible terrorist 
action, that is very terrifying, Mr. Speaker.

                              {time}  1015

  I believe that the House of Representatives must say no to 
establishing this dangerous precedent. We must not rush to war. We must 
give the United Nations time to do its work. Inspections worked in the 
1990s. We must use the time that the United Nations needs, use that 
time for us to think through, to debate, and to be truthful to the 
American people. They deserve it. We need to be truthful with them as 
to what the cost of this rush to war would mean.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield the balance of my time 
to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Buyer).
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the Lee 
amendment. This amendment is another abdication of the United States' 
leadership in the world. It is tantamount to saying that Congress 
should contract out decisions on national security to foreign 
governments: Paris, Beijing, Damascus.
  The United Nations is not an autonomous authority. It is a place to 
conduct diplomacy between nations. Our Nation's security and 
sovereignty are inextricably intertwined. We do not subrogate our 
sovereignty to the United Nations. The United States, as the sole 
remaining superpower, must have a policy of restraint to international 
conflict management, but we

[[Page H7750]]

never give up our ability to act unilaterally in the world if we must 
move into a region to bring stability.
  This amendment ties the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. We should 
never, ever do that. The President has spoken prudently, talking about 
bilateral action, meaning bringing other nations with us. Those who 
have been speaking here for the last hour in support of this amendment 
have been talking as if the United States is somehow wanting to 
unilaterally march off to war. They use the phrase ``give peace a 
chance.''
  Mr. Speaker, we are the peaceful Nation. We want to work 
cooperatively with other nations around the world, and that is what the 
President is going to do. So when my colleagues say ``give peace a 
chance,'' it has been 10 years. We have these 16 U.N. resolutions. Let 
us go back into this regime of the United Nations and weapons 
inspections. When we look at that, the U.N. was and is hesitant to back 
up the violations of these 16 U.N. resolutions. Their response has been 
tepid.
  Also, I would ask my colleagues to look with regard to how the 
inspectors were undermined, as Iraq would appeal directly to the 
sympathetic Council members and to the Secretary General. Iraq worked 
consistently to erode the credibility and the positions of these U.N. 
inspectors over the last 10 years. They would complain to the Security 
Council, and then the challenges of the claims of the weapons 
inspectors would suffice. Unfettered access was strictly a myth. 
Respect for Iraqi concerns relating to national security, sovereignty 
and dignity took precedence over the findings and destroying of 
Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programs. Effectively, the actions 
of the Secretary General, when he intervened, made the Iraqis and the 
inspectors equal in presenting their case before the Security Council.
  With regard to Saddam Hussein's motive for having weapons of mass 
destruction, he believes that they are vital to his power. The regime 
has two experiences in which it feels its very survival is linked to 
the possession of weapons of mass destruction. Deputy Prime Minister 
Tariq Aziz pointed out that hitting cities deep in Iran during the 
Iran-Iraq war with long-range missiles and countering human wave 
attacks with the massive use of chemical munitions saved Iraq in the 
Iran-Iraq war. Moreover, Baghdad believes that its possession of 
biological and chemical weapons during the 1991 Gulf War helped deter 
the United States from marching on to Baghdad.
  Now, that is their dimension. That is their understanding. So Saddam 
will do everything he possibly can to maintain a stockpile of weapons 
of mass destruction. So this thing about give peace a chance, well, we 
have given peace a chance. The President has also used words of saying 
that military force will be the means of last resort.
  So I think the President has been very clear. We will show the United 
States has the resolve and power to stand up against Iraq, seek their 
compliance, force their word in their violations of the cease-fire; but 
if they do not, then the world will act and disarm Saddam Hussein and 
change the regime, if necessary, to bring peace and stability to the 
Middle East as a region.
  We should vote down the Lee amendment and support the sovereignty and 
national dignity of this country.
  Ms. BROWN of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I stand in strong support today of 
the Lee substitute, which I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of. I 
wholeheartedly support the principles of this substitute, and believe 
they contain a much more humane answer to the grave issue of Iraq.
  Like Congresswoman Barbara Lee I urge the United States to re-engage 
in the diplomatic process of diplomacy. I also would like to urge our 
country to remain committed to the UN inspector process. I am also in 
complete agreement with the Lee substitute's premise that there will 
likely be horrific consequences of our actions if the United States 
delivers a first strike against Iraq, particularly without the support 
of the United Nations.
  Like Congresswoman Lee and many of my colleagues in the Congressional 
Black Caucus, I stand in strong opposition to a unilateral first strike 
by the U.S. without a clearly demonstrated and imminent threat of 
attack on the United States. I would also like to emphasize that I 
categorically believe that we must not declare war until every 
diplomatic option is completely exhausted. The Bush Resolution 
authorizes the potential use of force immediately, long before 
diplomatic options have been exhausted or even fully explored. 
Furthermore, a unilateral first-strike would undermine the moral 
authority of the United States, result in substantial loss of life, 
destabilize the Mideast region and undermine the ability of our nation 
to address unmet domestic priorities.
  The President is asking Congress to give him a blank check. And I say 
today Mr. President, that your account, has come back overdrawn. This 
blank check gives him too much power. A blank check that forces 
Congress to waive its constitutional duty to declare war. A blank check 
that lets the President declare war, and not consult Congress until 48 
hours after the attack has begun.
  Not only has the President economically taken us to deficit, but 
there is deficit in his arguments. Why Iraq, and why today??
  You know, in my 10 years of serving in Congress, this is the most 
serious vote I've taken. And I have to say, the Resolution on Iraq the 
White House drafted is intentionally misleading. It misleads the 
American public, the international community, and yes, even the United 
States Congress.
  This is a sad day. Almost as sad as it was 627 days ago when the 
Supreme Court selected George W. Bush as the President. You know, the 
White House talks about dictators, but we haven't done anything to 
correct what has happened right here in the United States. It amazes me 
that we question other governments, when in our own country, we did not 
have a fair election.
  I recently traveled to Russia, China, and South Korea, and believe it 
would be most unfortunate to damage the good will our nation was 
receiving after September 11th because of the Bush Administration's 
reckless actions. We are on our own; NO ONE in the international 
community is behind us.
  I have not seen any new information demonstrating that Iraq poses a 
threat to our country any more now than it did ten years ago, and 
certainly am without reason to believe we should attack unilaterally, 
without the support of the U.N.
  In fact, recent poll numbers released suggest that many Americans do 
not support the way the President is handling the situation with Iraq 
either. Indeed, polls indicates what I imagined all along; namely, that 
a majority of Americans believe President Bush and Congress are 
spending too much time discussing Iraq, while neglecting domestic 
problems like health care and education. Many also said that they did 
not want the United States to act without support from allies and by a 
two to one margin, did not want the U.S. to act before U.N. weapons 
inspectors had an opportunity to enter Iraq and conduct further 
investigations.
  Although the Administration is attempting to convince the American 
public otherwise, they have shown me little evidence of a connection 
between Iraq and 9-11. And little evidence that Iraq poses an immediate 
threat to our country.
  Iraq's government is not democratic, but neither are many other 
countries listed on the State Department's terrorist list: like Iran, 
Syria, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Sudan.
  I reiterate my opposition to this Resolution, and to this war.
  To my colleagues, it is in your hands. I do believe the world has 
good and evil, and what you are about to do here today, will tilt it in 
a negative direction. It will set us on a course, and I hope I'm wrong, 
but it could set us on a course, that our children's children, will pay 
for. That the entire world will pay for. And that will put thousands of 
American soldiers in harm's way.
  Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. CHRISTENSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Lee amendment.
  I am particularly supportive of this amendment because it would place 
the emphasis where it ought to be--which is in multinational diplomacy 
and within the context of a strong commitment to the U.N. inspection 
process--in this important campaign to disarm Iraq and protect our 
allies national security.
  Questions have been raised about our ability to do unfettered and 
complete inspections, and whether or not we were able to find anything 
that Sadaam Hussein did not want us to find the first time around.
  Mr. Speaker, I would say, that if we have not learned from past 
experience with Iraq, and if we do not have the technology to search 
out, find and destroy biological or chemical weapons, or weapons of 
mass destruction, then we are also not prepared to go to war with Iraq.
  Many of us have spoken over the past week about the dangerous 
precedent that would be set by the United States employing a unilateral 
first strike against Iraq. The other grave concern of many which was 
supported by the recently released CIA report, is that whatever weapons 
Sadaam had would be deployed in desperate retaliation bringing 
unimaginable death and destruction to us and our allies.

[[Page H7751]]

  Mr. Speaker and colleagues. We must not set such a dangerous 
precedent, or commit our young men and women to an unjustified 
conflict. We must use our resources to strengthen our economy, and to 
invest in the needs of people here at home, and devote more effort to 
creating the kind of society that will increase U.S. moral authority 
and the respect of our world. And we must not weaken our democracy by 
ceding our authority to the executive branch.
  Vote against H.J. Res. 114, and vote aye on the Lee amendment.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, this amendment recognizes that diplomacy 
is an option that is not yet exhausted. The Administration's Resolution 
makes a number of assertions that are questionable at best; the clauses 
in this Amendment, on the other hand, are indisputable. Surely, we can 
get the United Nations to reinstate newly-empowered weapons inspectors, 
who can keep a step ahead of Baghdad--inspectors that are allowed to 
inspect Saddam's presidential sites without notice. We must build a 
coalition of nations with the support of the United Nations, a 
coalition similar to that formed by the former President Bush.
  It is the duty of responsible nations to give a convincing case to 
the world before embarking on any military action on another country. 
And the world is not convinced. War is a last resort, and is recognized 
as such by Democrat and Republican alike. Because we are not yet at 
that point, I support the Lee amendment.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bonilla). All debate time on this 
amendment has expired.
  The question is on the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 72, 
nays 355, not voting 4, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 452]

                                YEAS--72

     Abercrombie
     Baldwin
     Becerra
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Capuano
     Carson (IN)
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Cummings
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     Delahunt
     Doggett
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Honda
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kilpatrick
     Kucinich
     Lee
     Lewis (GA)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Morella
     Napolitano
     Oberstar
     Owens
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Rivers
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Serrano
     Solis
     Stark
     Tauscher
     Thompson (MS)
     Towns
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Waters
     Watson (CA)
     Watt (NC)
     Woolsey
     Wynn

                               NAYS--355

     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Allen
     Andrews
     Armey
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boozman
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Cardin
     Carson (OK)
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Clement
     Coble
     Collins
     Combest
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frank
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Grucci
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kerns
     Kildee
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kleczka
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Luther
     Lynch
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Menendez
     Mica
     Miller, Dan
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, Jeff
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schaffer
     Schiff
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Toomey
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins (OK)
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Wu
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Clay
     Roukema
     Sandlin
     Stump

                              {time}  1047

  Messrs. SMITH of Texas, KELLER, GRAVES, Ms. CUBIN, Messrs. GREENWOOD, 
EHLERS, GRAHAM, BARTON of Texas, BOYD, DOOLEY of California, WALSH, 
WATKINS of Oklahoma, NETHERCUTT and Mrs. MYRICK changed their vote from 
``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Ms. Sanchez and Mr. Wynn changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the amendment in the nature of a substitute was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bonilla). It is now in order to consider 
amendment No. 2 printed in House Report 107-724.


  Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute No. 2 Offered By Mr. Spratt

  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute which is next made in order by the rule.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment in 
the nature of a substitute.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

       Amendment in the nature of substitute offered by Mr. 
     Spratt:
       Strike the preamble and insert in lieu thereof the matter 
     preceding the resolved clause, below, and strike the text and 
     insert in lieu thereof the matter following the resolved 
     clause, below:


       Whereas the Government of Iraq, without cause or 
     provocation, invaded and occupied the country of Kuwait on 
     August 2, 1990;
       Whereas, in reaction to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, 
     President George H. W. Bush assembled a coalition of nations 
     to liberate Kuwait and to enforce a series of United Nations 
     Security Council resolutions adopted in opposition to Iraq's 
     invasion of Kuwait;
       Whereas the United Nations Security Council passed 
     Resolution 660, condemning the invasion of Kuwait and 
     demanding Iraq's immediate withdrawal, and thereafter passed 
     Resolutions 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 670, 674, and 677, 
     further demanding that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait;
       Whereas the Government of Iraq defied the United Nations, 
     flouting and violating each of these resolutions;

[[Page H7752]]

       Whereas Iraq's defiance resulted in the adoption of United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 678 which authorized the 
     use of all means necessary to repel Iraq from Kuwait and to 
     compel its compliance with the above-referenced resolutions;
       Whereas allied forces, led by the United States, attacked 
     Iraqi forces on January 16, 1991, and drove them out of 
     Kuwait;
       Whereas, after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq 
     entered into a cease-fire agreement sponsored by the United 
     Nations, pursuant to which Iraq agreed--
       (1) to destroy, remove, or render harmless all chemical and 
     biological weapons and stocks of agents and all related 
     subsystems and components and all research, development, 
     support, and manufacturing facilities related thereto;
       (2) to destroy, remove, or render harmless all ballistic 
     missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, and 
     related major parts and production facilities;
       (3) not to acquire or develop any nuclear weapons, nuclear-
     weapons-usable material, nuclear-related subsystems or 
     components, or nuclear-related research, development, 
     support, or manufacturing facilities; and
       (4) to permit immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's 
     biological, chemical, and missile capabilities, and assist 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency in carrying out the 
     destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all nuclear-
     related items and in developing a plan for ongoing monitoring 
     and verification of Iraq's compliance;
       Whereas, in flagrant violation of the cease-fire agreement, 
     Iraq sought to thwart the efforts of arms inspectors to 
     uncover and destroy Iraq's stockpiles of weapons of mass 
     destruction and long-range ballistic missiles, and the means 
     of producing such weapons and missiles;
       Whereas, because of Iraq's demonstrated will to attack 
     neighboring countries and arm itself with weapons of mass 
     destruction, the United Nations Security Council passed 
     Resolutions 687, 707, 715, 1051, 1060, 1115, 1134, 1137, 
     1154, 1194, and 1205, demanding that Iraq destroy all weapons 
     of mass destruction, cease further development of chemical, 
     biological, and nuclear weapons, stop the acquisition of 
     ballistic missiles with a range exceeding 150 kilometers, and 
     end its support of terrorism;
       Whereas Iraq has continued to defy resolutions of the 
     United Nations Security Council and to develop weapons of 
     mass destruction, has not stopped its support of terrorism, 
     has refused to cooperate with arms inspectors of the United 
     Nations, and since December 1998 has barred and denied all 
     such inspectors any access to Iraq;
       Whereas Iraq has materially breached its international 
     obligations by retaining and continuing to develop chemical 
     and biological weapons, by actively seeking a nuclear weapons 
     capability and ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 150 
     kilometers, and by supporting international terrorism;
       Whereas the attacks of September 11, 2001, underscores the 
     extent of the threat posed by international terrorist 
     organizations, and makes clear the gravity of the threat if 
     they obtain access to weapons of mass destruction;
       Whereas the House of Representatives (in H. J. Res. 658 of 
     the 101st Congress and H. Res. 322 in the 105th Congress) and 
     the Senate (in S. Con. Res. 147 of the 101st Congress and S. 
     J. Res. 54 in the 105th Congress) have declared support for 
     international action to halt Iraq's defiance of the United 
     Nations;
       Whereas in the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), Congress 
     called upon ``the President [to] consult closely with the 
     partners of the United States in the Desert Storm coalition 
     and with the members of the United Nations Security Council 
     in order to present a united front of opposition to Iraq's 
     continuing noncompliance with Security Council Resolution 
     687'';
       Whereas in H. Res. 322 of the 105th Congress, the House of 
     Representatives affirmed that the ``current crisis regarding 
     Iraq should be resolved peacefully through diplomatic means, 
     but in a manner which assures full compliance by Iraq with 
     United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding the 
     destruction of Iraq's capability to produce and deliver 
     weapons of mass destruction'';
       Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the 
     United States to ``work with the United Nations Security 
     Council to meet our common challenge'' posed by Iraq and to 
     ``work for the necessary resolutions'', while making clear 
     that ``the Security Council resolutions will be enforced, and 
     the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action 
     will be unavoidable''; and
       Whereas Congress supports the efforts by the President to 
     enforce through the Security Council the United Nations 
     Security Council resolutions referenced above: Now, 
     therefore, be it
       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This joint resolution may be cited as the ``Elimination of 
     Weapons of Mass Destruction from Iraq Resolution''.

     SEC. 2. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the President should be commended for calling upon the 
     United Nations to address the threat to international peace 
     and security posed by Iraq's refusal to meet its disarmament 
     obligations under United Nations Security Council 
     resolutions;
       (2) the President should persist in his efforts to obtain 
     approval of the Security Council for any actions taken 
     against Iraq; and
       (3) the President should continue to seek, and the Security 
     Council should approve, a resolution that--
       (A) demands full and unconditional compliance by the 
     Government of Iraq with all disarmament requirements imposed 
     by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 687, 707, 715, 
     1051, 1060, 1115, 1134, 1154, 1194, and 1205;
       (B) mandates the immediate return to Iraq of United Nations 
     arms inspection teams, empowered with increased staff and 
     resources and unconditional access to all sites they deem 
     necessary to uncover and destroy weapons of mass destruction 
     and ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometers, 
     and the means of producing such weapons and missiles, without 
     regard to any objections or conditions that Iraq may seek to 
     impose; and
       (C) authorizes, if the President deems advisable, a 
     military force, formed under the auspices of the United 
     Nations Security Council but commanded by the United States, 
     to protect and support arms inspectors and make force 
     available in the event that Iraq impedes, resists, or in any 
     way interferes with such inspection teams;
       (4) if the United Nations Security Council fails to pass a 
     resolution that satisfies the conditions of paragraph (3), 
     and if the President determines that use of the United States 
     Armed Forces is necessary to compel Iraq to comply with all 
     such disarmament requirements, the President should seek 
     authorization from Congress to use military force to compel 
     such compliance by invoking the expedited procedures set 
     forth in section 5;
       (5) if the United States must resort to force, the 
     President should endeavor to form a coalition of allies as 
     broadly based as practicable to support and participate with 
     United States Armed Forces, and should also seek multilateral 
     cooperation and assistance, specifically including Arab and 
     Islamic countries, in the post-conflict reconstruction of 
     Iraq; and
       (6) if the United States resorts to force, Congress will 
     provide all possible support to the members of the United 
     States Armed Forces and their families.

     SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION TO USE FORCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH NEW 
                   UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

       The President is authorized to use United States Armed 
     Forces pursuant to any resolution of the United Nations 
     Security Council adopted after September 12, 2002, that 
     provides for the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass 
     destruction and ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 150 
     kilometers, and the means of producing such weapons and 
     missiles. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be 
     construed to prevent or otherwise limit the authority of the 
     Armed Forces to use all appropriate force for self defense 
     and enforcement purposes.

     SEC. 4. PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATIONS.

       In the event that the United Nations Security Council does 
     not adopt a resolution as described in section 3, or in the 
     event that such a resolution is adopted but does not sanction 
     the use of force sufficient to compel Iraq's compliance, and 
     if the President determines that use of the United States 
     Armed Forces is necessary for such compliance, the President 
     should seek authorization from Congress to use military force 
     to compel such compliance by invoking the expedited 
     procedures set forth in section 5 after the President submits 
     to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
     President pro tempore of the Senate a certification that--
       (1)(A) the United States has sought passage by the United 
     Nations Security Council of a resolution described in section 
     3, and the Security Council has failed to pass such a 
     resolution, and no other action taken by the United Nations 
     Security Council has been sufficient to compel Iraq to comply 
     with the Security Council resolutions referred to in section 
     2; or
       (B) the United Nations Security Council has passed a 
     resolution that does not sanction the use of force sufficient 
     to compel compliance, and--
       (i) the United Nations Security Council is unlikely to take 
     further action that will result in Iraq's compliance with 
     such resolution; and
       (ii) the use of military force against Iraq is necessary to 
     compel compliance;
       (2) the use of military force against Iraq will not impair 
     international cooperation in the fight against terrorism or 
     participation in United States military actions undertaken 
     pursuant to Public Law 107-40; and
       (3) the United States is in the process of establishing, or 
     has established, a coalition of other countries as broadly 
     based as practicable to support and participate with the 
     United States in whatever action is taken against Iraq.

     SEC. 5. EXPEDITED CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF JOINT 
                   RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING USE OF FORCE.

       (a) Qualifying Resolution.--(1) This section applies with 
     respect to a joint resolution of the Senate or House of 
     Representatives--
       (A) that is a qualifying resolution as described in 
     paragraph (2); and
       (B) that is introduced (by request) by a qualifying Member 
     not later than the next legislative day after the date of 
     receipt by the Speaker of the House of Representatives

[[Page H7753]]

     and the President pro tempore of the Senate of a 
     certification by the President under section 4.
       (2) For purposes of this section, a qualifying resolution 
     is a joint resolution--
       (A) that does not have a preamble;
       (B) the title of which is the following: ``Joint resolution 
     authorizing the President to use all necessary means, 
     including the Armed Forces of the United States, to compel 
     the Government of Iraq to comply with certain United Nations 
     Security Council resolutions.'' and
       (C) the text of which is as follows: ``The President is 
     authorized to use all necessary and appropriate means, 
     including the Armed Forces of the United States, to compel 
     the Government of Iraq to comply with the disarmament 
     provisions in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
     687, 707, 715, 1051, 1060, 1115, 1134, 1154, 1194, and 1205 
     and with any other resolution of the United Nations Security 
     Council adopted after September 12, 2002, that requires the 
     elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and 
     ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometers, and 
     the means of producing such weapons and missiles.''.
       (3) For purposes of this subsection, a qualifying Member 
     is--
       (A) in the case of the House of Representatives, the 
     majority leader or minority leader of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (B) in the case of the Senate, the majority leader or 
     minority leader of the Senate.
       (b) Placement on Calendar.--Upon introduction in either 
     House of a resolution described in subsection (a), the 
     resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the 
     House involved.
       (c) Consideration in the House of Representatives.--(1) A 
     resolution described in subsection (a) shall be considered in 
     the House of Representatives in accordance with the 
     provisions of this subsection.
       (2) On or after the first legislative day after the day on 
     which such a resolution is introduced, it is in order (even 
     though a previous motion to the same effect has been 
     disagreed to) for any Member of the House of Representatives 
     to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution. 
     All points of order against the resolution (and against 
     consideration of the resolution) are waived. Such a motion is 
     privileged and is not debatable. An amendment to the motion 
     is not in order. It shall not be in order to move to postpone 
     the motion or to proceed to the consideration of other 
     business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion 
     is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a 
     motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is 
     agreed to, the House of Representatives shall immediately 
     proceed to consideration of the resolution without 
     intervening motion, and the resolution shall remain the 
     unfinished business of the House of Representatives until 
     disposed of.
       (3) Debate on the resolution shall be limited to not more 
     than a total of 20 hours, which shall be divided equally 
     between the majority leader and the minority leader or their 
     designees. A motion to further limit debate is not debatable. 
     An amendment to, or motion to recommit, the resolution is not 
     in order.
       (6) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on 
     the resolution, the vote on final passage of the resolution 
     shall occur.
       (7) A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution 
     is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.
       (d) Consideration in Senate.--(1) A resolution described in 
     subsection (a) shall be considered in the Senate in 
     accordance with the provisions of this subsection.
       (2) On or after the first legislative day after the day on 
     which such a resolution is introduced, such a resolution, it 
     is in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect 
     has been disagreed to) for any Member of the Senate to move 
     to proceed to the consideration of the resolution. All points 
     of order against the resolution (and against consideration of 
     the resolution) are waived. The motion is privileged and is 
     not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to 
     a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the 
     consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the 
     vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall 
     not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration 
     of the resolution is agreed to, the Senate shall immediately 
     proceed to consideration of the resolution without 
     intervening motion, order, or other business, and the 
     resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the Senate 
     until disposed of.
       (3) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions 
     and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not 
     more than a total of 20 hours, which shall be divided equally 
     between the majority leader and the minority leader or their 
     designees. A motion to further limit debate is not debatable. 
     An amendment to, or motion to recommit, the resolution is not 
     in order.
       (6) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a 
     resolution and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the 
     debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the 
     Senate, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall 
     occur.
       (7) A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution 
     is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.
       (8) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the 
     application of the rules of the Senate to the procedure 
     relating to a resolution described in subsection (a) shall be 
     decided without debate.
       (e) Action on Measure From Other House.--(1) If, before the 
     passage by one House of a resolution of that House described 
     in subsection (a), that House receives from the other House a 
     resolution described in subsection (a), then the following 
     procedures shall apply:
       (A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred 
     to a committee and may not be considered in the House 
     receiving it except as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii).
       (B) With respect to a resolution described in subsection 
     (a) of the House receiving the resolution--
       (i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no 
     resolution had been received from the other House; but
       (ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution 
     of the other House.
       (2) Upon disposition pursuant to paragraph (1)(B)(ii) of a 
     resolution described in subsection (a) that is received by 
     one House from the other House, it shall no longer be in 
     order to consider such a resolution that was introduced in 
     the receiving House.
       (f) Legislative Day Defined.--For the purposes of this 
     section, with respect to either House of Congress, a 
     legislative day is a calendar day on which that House is in 
     session.
       (g) Section Enacted as Exercise of Rulemaking Power of the 
     Two Houses.--The provisions of this section (other than 
     subsection (h)) are enacted by the Congress--
       (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and, as such, 
     shall be considered as part of the rules of either House and 
     shall supersede other rules only to the extent they are 
     inconsistent therewith; and
       (2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of 
     either House to change the rules (so far as they relate to 
     the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same 
     manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other 
     rule of that House.
       (h) Presidential Recall of Congress.--In the event that 
     Congress is not in session upon submission of a Presidential 
     certification under section 4, the President is authorized to 
     convene a special session of the Congress to allow 
     consideration of a joint resolution under this section.

     SEC. 6. WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Specific Statutory Authorization.--Consistent with 
     section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress 
     declares that--
       (1) section 3 of this joint resolution is intended to 
     constitute specific authorization within the meaning of 
     section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution; and
       (2) if a joint resolution described in section 5(a)(2) is 
     enacted into law, such resolution is intended to constitute 
     specific authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of 
     the War Powers Resolution.
       (b) Applicability of Other Requirements.--Nothing in this 
     resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers 
     Resolution.

     SEC. 7. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

       At least once every 60 days, the President shall transmit 
     to Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint 
     resolution. The President shall include in such report an 
     estimate of expenditures by the United States and allied 
     nations to compel Iraq's compliance with the above referenced 
     United Nations Security Council resolutions and any 
     reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including those actions 
     described in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 
     (Public Law 105-338; 22 U.S.C. 2151 note).

     SEC. 8. INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE.

       Nothing in this joint resolution is intended to derogate or 
     otherwise limit the authority of the President to use 
     military force in self-defense pursuant to the Constitution 
     of the United States and the War Powers Resolution.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 574, the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) and the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Hyde) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 4 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, on grave occasions like this when we pass a war powers 
resolution, surely, surely one of the things we should seek is a broad 
base of support. The amendment I propose in the nature of a substitute 
seeks to broaden the base for this resolution. If we adopt it, I 
believe that H.J. Res. 114 will gain votes and pass this House by an 
even bigger majority.
  I want to make it clear that we have not broadened the appeal of this 
resolution by watering it down. My substitute unflinchingly supports 
the President's campaign and the Security Council for beefing up arms 
inspection and backing them up with force, and if the Iraqis defy the 
new inspectors and the Security Council responds with military action, 
as it should, it authorizes the use of our Armed Forces. It empowers 
President Bush to use our Armed Forces just as his father did in 1991 
in the Persian Gulf War in a military action sanctioned by the Security

[[Page H7754]]

Council. If on the other hand the Iraqis defy the inspectors and the 
Security Council fails to take action, fails to respond, the U.S. will 
be faced with going it alone.
  In these dramatically different circumstances my amendment calls for 
a second vote by the Congress to approve an attack of the use of force, 
but it ensures the President a fast track for its consideration. There 
are various differences between these two resolutions. The preamble is 
different, but this is the key difference, and it is an important 
difference.
  I want to make clear, however, that there is no difference with 
respect to our assessment of Saddam Hussein. Those of us who support 
this substitute see him as a menace and a threat. We agree with the 
President in demanding that the Security Council enforce its resolution 
and allow him no quarter. But for several reasons we do not want to see 
the United States act alone, and this is not just our concern. Over the 
last several weeks we have spent days talking to retired general 
officers who have experience in this field, to General Hoar and General 
Zinni, former commanders of Central Command, to General Clark and 
General Boyd, former Commanders of Europe, and they have agreed on this 
much. If we act alone, they told us, instead of being the United 
Nations versus Iraq, any war that happens, instead of being a war 
legitimated by the U.N. Charter, this will be the United States versus 
Iraq and in some quarters the U.S. versus the Arab and Muslim world. 
That is why one general officer told us ``I fear if we go it alone we 
may pay a terrible price.''
  Point number two, in any conceivable military confrontation with Iraq 
with or without allies, the United States will win. But having allies, 
especially allies in the region, could be a big tactical advantage, 
like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and it will make it easier to achieve 
victory and less costly in money and, most importantly, less costly in 
human life.
  Three, the outcome after the conflict is actually going to be the 
hardest part, and it is far less certain. We do not want to win this 
war only to lose the peace and swell the ranks of terrorists who hate 
us. A broad-based coalition will raise our chances of success even more 
in the post-war period.
  I know that some will say this is an imposition on the President's 
power, a second vote, but in truth it is nothing more than the age-old 
system of checks and balances built in our Constitution. It is one way 
that Congress can say what we believe, that any action against Iraq 
should have the sanction of the Security Council and the support of a 
broad-based coalition, and if it does not, we should have a further say 
on it.
  Others will say that this resolution relies too heavily on the 
Security Council, but let me say, Mr. Speaker, the precedent it follows 
was the precedent set by President Bush in 1991. He turned to the 
United Nations first. He secured a series of resolutions from the 
Security Council that culminated in Resolution 678. He did not threaten 
not to go elsewhere, he went straight to the Security Council. The end 
was a successful military action and I think a model worth emulating. 
My substitute does just that. I urge my colleagues to follow the 
precedent set by President Bush in 1991 and support my substitute 
amendment.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I oppose the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
offered by the gentleman from South Carolina. First and foremost, this 
substitute neither recognizes nor protects American sovereignty. It 
clearly yields to the United Nations the right and obligation to 
protect America. It relies on the U.N. first as a trigger mechanism. 
The President must wait until the U.N. acts or if it does not act or if 
it does not act properly, and God only knows how long that will take, 
then the President must return to Congress for further authorization 
for the use of force. And then once authorization is obtained, the use 
of force is limited to dealing with weapons of mass destruction and 
ballistic missile threats, but what about other threats to the U.S. 
national security such as the use of conventional weapons or Iraqi 
terrorism?
  Iraq is a terrorist nation. Evidence exists that Iraqi operatives met 
with al Qaeda terrorists. This amendment does not allow the President 
to use force now even if an immediate or imminent terrorist threat is 
present. When the U.N. fails to act or does not act properly, the 
President must come back to Congress and seek authorization to use 
military force, but first he must certify to Congress that the U.N. has 
failed to pass a resolution or the U.N. has passed an insufficient 
resolution and the use of military force against Iraq ``will not impair 
international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.'' In other 
words, if a Nation, say Iran, North Korea or Syria, maintains that it 
will no longer cooperate in the war against terrorism, then 
international cooperation has been impaired. How can the President make 
such a certification? At that point is he unable to ask Congress for 
the authorization to use force? Why would we want to have these types 
of roadblocks impeding our President at a time when he is trying to 
defend the national security of the United States? This amendment 
imposes a steeple chase on the President with one hurdle after another.
  In conclusion, this substitute amendment would strike the bipartisan 
agreement that we have worked so hard to bring about and which is 
reflected in House Joint Resolution 114. Its primary focus is on 
approval of the U.N. before any military action can be taken against 
Iraq. It does not recognize the sovereignty of the United States, and 
it fails to acknowledge the President's warning in his speech on Monday 
that the danger from the Iraqi regime is an imminent and urgent threat 
to the United States. I do not propose that we subordinate our foreign 
policy to the Security Council whose permanent members include France, 
China, and Russia, and I urge a no on this amendment in the nature of a 
substitute.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1100

  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to myself to read what 
the text of the resolution would provide: ``The President is authorized 
to use all necessary and appropriate means, including the Armed Forces 
of the United States, to compel Iraq to comply with the disarmament 
provisions of the U.N.,'' and it cites those, ``and any other 
resolution to require the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, 
ballistic missiles and the means of producing such weapons.''
  That is pretty sufficient language.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Missouri 
(Mr. Skelton), the ranking member of the House Committee on Armed 
Services.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, I am happy to rise in support of the proposal by my 
friend and colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).
  Several weeks ago the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) and 
I drafted a resolution for the use of the minority leader, the 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt) in negotiations with the White 
House. That draft contained a number of important principles, focusing 
on the role of the United Nations, on more narrowly defining the threat 
posed by Iraq as to its weapons of mass destruction, and on planning 
for what will be needed after the conflict, if military action should 
be taken.
  These principles do not undermine, rather, they strengthen, American 
national security. Many of these principles have now been included in 
the resolution offered by the Speaker and the gentleman from Missouri 
(Mr. Gephardt).
  On Tuesday night, I expressed my support for that resolution as it 
represents a significant improvement over the original draft submitted 
by the White House. But the Spratt substitute perfects a number of the 
principles contained in the base bill.
  It connects American efforts more strongly to those of the United 
Nations. This resolution urges the President to work with the United 
Nations to enforce Iraqi compliance with its disarmament obligations. 
If the United Nations authorizes the use of force to achieve these 
goals, the Spratt resolution provides immediate congressional

[[Page H7755]]

authorization. But if the United Nations cannot, or will not, act, then 
this Congress must consider the benefits of unilateral action under a 
second resolution using expedited procedures.
  The Spratt resolution does not tie the President's hands. U.S. 
national security will be protected. This resolution sends a strong 
message to Iraq that the Congress insists that it comply with its 
obligations.
  It also sends a strong message to the United Nations and to our 
friends and to our allies all around the world that we are committed to 
acting with them to the greatest extent possible to meet this threat. 
In these ways, the Spratt substitute improves the resolution already 
before us.
  I urge my colleagues to vote with me to support it.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt).
  Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise with some concern in my opposition to this 
resolution, because I have such high regard for my friend, the 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), who just spoke in favor of the 
resolution. But I have read the resolution carefully, and I think this 
is a step backward in all of our actions. It really restricts, rather 
than broadens, the use of force against Iraq that already is authorized 
under current law.
  Section 3 is even narrower than Public Law 102-1, which already 
authorizes the United States to use force to restore international 
peace and security. We are already authorized to stop Iraq from 
supporting terrorism. We are already authorized to prevent Iraq from 
threatening its neighbors. We have already authorized the United States 
to protect Iraq's own civilian population.
  I believe you can read this resolution clearly. All of those things 
would no longer be authorized. I think you cannot even continue to 
enforce the no-fly zone under this resolution.
  Section 3 would require the United States to wait for the United 
Nations Security Council to act before the President could take action 
to protect our national security interests against the dangers of 
weapons of mass destruction posed by Iraq. Even the United Nations 
Security Council approval of section 3 would not authorize the United 
States to act. We would have to have United Nations action, and then we 
would have to have a second vote in this Congress.
  The vote in the Congress is restricted by the substitute.
  This is a step backward. It sends a muddy signal about our resolve. 
It completely replaces the Gephardt-Hastert resolution that is before 
us, and really postpones a critical question to another day.
  We have put this question off too long already. This resolution asks 
us to put it off yet longer. I encourage my colleagues to join me in 
rejecting this Spratt substitute resolution and moving forward to pass 
the Hastert-Gephardt resolution later today.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Arizona (Mr. Pastor).
  (Mr. PASTOR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. PASTOR. Mr. Speaker, I support the Spratt amendment because I 
believe that we should not rush into war without seeking the support of 
our allies. We should not send American troops into combat before 
making a good-faith effort to put U.N. inspectors back into Iraq under 
a more forceful resolution. We should not turn to a policy of 
preemptive attack without first providing a limited time option for 
peaceful resolution of the threat.
  This amendment would authorize the use of U.S. forces in support of a 
new U.N. resolution mandating the elimination by force, if necessary, 
of all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. If the Security Council does 
not pass such a resolution, the amendment calls on the President to 
then seek authorization for unilateral military action.
  The Spratt amendment demonstrates our preference for a peaceful 
solution and coalition support without ruling out unilateral military 
force if it becomes necessary.
  America has long stood behind the principle of exhausting diplomacy 
before resorting to war, and at times like this, we must lead by 
example.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos).
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman of the Committee on 
International Relations for yielding me time.
  First, Mr. Speaker, I want to commend my good friend from South 
Carolina (Mr. Spratt), one of the most valued of this House, on a very 
thoughtful and creative amendment. I believe, however, that the 
amendment would weaken the hand of our Secretary of State in 
international negotiations that are occurring as we speak.
  Every Member of this body prefers a diplomatic and peaceful solution. 
Every Member of this body prefers to have as many nations, friends, 
allies and others come with us as possible. But to enhance the 
prospects for a peaceful solution, both the Security Council and Saddam 
Hussein must perceive that diplomatic failure will lead to military 
action. This amendment fails to convey that critical message.
  Mr. Speaker, the Spratt amendment requires the President to certify 
``that the use of military force against Iraq will not impair 
international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.'' This 
amendment effectively asks the President of the United States to 
certify the unknowable.
  The initial impact of action in Iraq on international cooperation is 
uncertain. It may be argued that it will diminish it or it will enhance 
it. But one thing we are all certain of: Once Iraq is disarmed, 
international cooperation against terrorism will skyrocket, and 
international terrorism itself will have been dealt a severe blow.
  While the principles behind the amendment and the underlying text 
have some similarities, I must oppose the amendment, Mr. Speaker, 
because I believe at this stage we must support the bipartisan-
bicameral agreement reached with the White House.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to reject this well-intentioned 
amendment. It would unravel the agreement which is on the verge of 
ratification, and it would undermine our goal of speaking with a strong 
and united voice.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Nadler).
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, the Spratt resolution would permit the use of military 
force, but only to eliminate the real danger we face, Iraq's possession 
of nuclear or chemical or biological weapons. The President's 
resolution would allow the administration to use military force to seek 
regime change in Iraq, a very dangerous course of action.
  It is one thing to say to Saddam Hussein, we are going to disarm you 
of your weapons of mass destruction. It is another thing to say, we are 
going to kill you, which is what regime change means. Faced with that 
threat, with that assurance, there would be nothing to deter Saddam 
Hussein from deciding, like Sampson in the Philistine temple, that he 
might as well pull down the world around him. Why should he not go down 
in history as an Arab hero by attacking Israel with chemical or 
biological weapons? Israel may then feel well to retaliate, and no one 
can calculate the course of escalation from there.
  Just the other day the Director of the CIA, George Tenet, warned the 
Senate that ``if Saddam Hussein concluded the survival of his regime 
were threatened, he probably would become much less constrained in 
adopting terrorist action.''
  The Spratt substitute is the most effective way to go about disarming 
Saddam Hussein, while avoiding tactics that could very well end up in 
regional conflagration. It grants more limited, but still sufficient, 
power to the administration to meet the threat posed by Iraq's weapons 
program. It allows for the President to use force in conjunction with 
the U.N. if it becomes necessary.
  It does not, however, grant the President a blank check, on the model 
of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, as the main resolution before us 
does.
  I am proud to support this resolution. It maximizes the chances we 
will disarm Saddam Hussein and eliminate the real danger, without 
getting into a major conflagration.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Oxley).

[[Page H7756]]

  (Mr. OXLEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Speaker, let me first say to my friend, the gentleman 
from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), and to all of the participants in this 
historic debate how much I appreciate their leadership and their 
ability to debate this issue in a very courteous and effective manner.
  One hundred thirty-eight Members of this House were present back when 
we debated the original Gulf resolution. Those of us who were here at 
the time, including myself, remember that as one of the historic times 
in this Chamber. We return today in many ways to debate some of the 
very same issues we debated so many years ago.
  All of us, I think, feel a tremendous sense of honor to have an 
opportunity to debate these issues before us. But ultimately the 
substitute offered by my friend from South Carolina fails to put us in 
a position to be as effective as we were back in 1991. Indeed, it 
probably takes us a step backward.
  If you look at the U.N. resolutions, 16 resolutions ultimately in 
that language, there is the ability of the world to go after Saddam 
without another U.N. resolution, without another resolution passed by 
the Congress. Yet the President came to the leadership of our body and 
requested that the Congress give this kind of authority. That is 
exactly what our leadership did.
  My hat is off to the Speaker and to the minority leader, the 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), for coming together and putting 
together a bipartisan resolution that should be supported.
  This is a serious matter, that Saddam Hussein has continued to resist 
our efforts. Let us reject this substitute, pass the underlying 
resolution, stand firm, as we did back some 11 years ago, and send a 
signal that the United States and our allies will perform adequately.

                              {time}  1115

  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Lipinski).
  (Mr. LIPINSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Spratt 
alternative resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of Congressman Spratt's 
alternative to this resolution authorizing military force against Iraq. 
First of all, I would like to say that there is no question that Saddam 
Hussein is evil personified. He is Adolph Hitler and Joseph Stalin 
rolled into one reprehensible dictator. This world would no doubt be a 
better place without him.
  But this record of cruelty does not give a lawful reason to attack 
Iraq without proof that their activities pose an imminent threat to the 
security of the United States. So I must ask: Why must we pass this 
resolution now? I still have not received a clear, convincing answer to 
that question.
  I have asked it, and many other questions of those who support this 
resolution, including the Secretary of State. They have failed to make 
an effective case as to why Congress should authorize a historic shift 
in policy from containment and deterrence to that of pre-emptive 
attacks.
  As far as I know Saddam Hussein has committed no new evil acts, since 
President Bush was sworn into office almost two years ago. Why didn't 
the President ask for this resolution at that time? During his 
campaign, President Bush himself said that the United States should not 
be the ``world's policeman.'' Why the shift in policy? When the 
President first started talking about using military force against 
Iraq, it was said that Saddam Hussein was linked with September 11th, 
but then British and U.S. intelligence revealed that wasn't true. Also, 
when the President first started talking about removing Saddam Hussein, 
he claimed that he had the authority to do so under a 1998 resolution. 
However, now we are here considering the authorization of military 
forces at the President's request. Furthermore, the President was 
prepared to go it alone, and then he decided to ask for the support of 
as many allies as possible, including the United Nations. These are 
just some examples of the mixed messages from the Administration. The 
President's approach to the Iraq situation has had numerous changes in 
a short span of time.
  Due to the President's disjointed approach, the lack of answers to 
many questions that various colleagues and I have, and the fact that 
containment of Saddam Hussein has worked for the past decade, I cannot 
support this resolution.
  I have tried very hard to support the President and this resolution 
because I believe the President is sincere and truly thinks that 
military force is the only way to deal with Saddam Hussein. Perhaps he 
is right, but I cannot in good conscience support military force until 
we first seek U.N. weapons inspections and the support of the 
international community. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to join me in 
supporting Congressman Spratt's substitute resolution.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to respond to the 
arguments made on the other side. First, they claim that this bill 
somehow, even though there is not a word in it, supplants Public Law 
102-1, which has the authority to go after terrorists, which is not 
true, and then they say that we are wrong in saying to the President, 
we do not want to dilute the focus on terrorism; we want you to certify 
to us that if we go to war in Iraq, it will in no way impair our first 
priority, and that is to get al Qaeda. We have to decide which way we 
want to go.
  We say, that is still the law of the land, 102-1. We backed it then, 
we support it now, and we want to make al Qaeda our first priority.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Reyes), a Vietnam veteran and a member of the Committee on Armed 
Services.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  I rise this morning in strong support of this substitute. As I said 
yesterday, many of us know that there is a better way, and the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) has focused our efforts with 
his leadership and with his guidance. He has led the way to a carefully 
constructed and well thought out resolution, one that takes into 
account the dynamic and the potentially dangerous situation in which we 
find ourselves today.
  Unilateral action, Mr. Speaker, would cost billions of dollars and 
possibly thousands of lives. Carelessly stepping into a conflict is not 
something that should be undertaken lightly. I do not think that the 
administration, as I said yesterday, has made the case for this type of 
action. This appropriate resolution supports the President's request of 
the Security Council for arms inspections that is backed by force. This 
resolution authorizes President Bush to use the same Armed Forces of 
the United States as his father did in the Persian Gulf War in military 
action that is sanctioned by the Security Council. If the Iraqis defy 
the inspectors and the U.N. will not authorize force, this Congress 
will expedite a vote for a new resolution to authorize that force.
  Saddam Hussein and his regime are a menace to our security, and I 
agree with the President that the Security Council should enforce 
resolutions and put a stop to his system of ``cheat and retreat.'' The 
Security Council should compel Iraq to destroy its weapons of mass 
destruction and its means of producing such weapons, and if armed force 
is necessary, it should be with their concurrence as well.
  This bill sets the stage for a prudent process to accomplish these 
objectives. More importantly, it emphasizes the tenet that war should 
be a last resort and not a first resort.
  Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to support this resolution.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher).
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this amendment.
  Let us remember those words, and as I hear this debate they come back 
to me: ``Gentlemen may cry `peace,' `peace,' but there is no peace. The 
war has actually begun.''
  Those are the words, of course, of Patrick Henry, who spurred on our 
people to fight for their liberty and fight for our country's security. 
And when all is said and done, America's security and our freedom is in 
the hands of our people. We do not choose to put the future of this 
country and the security of this country into the hands of the United 
Nations. As we debate this amendment, which again puts even more 
responsibility in the hands of the United Nations, let us take a brutal 
look at that organization and what this amendment accomplishes.
  This amendment requires the United States to have the permission of 
the Communist Chinese and gangsters of other regimes to do what is 
necessary

[[Page H7757]]

for our own security. That is ridiculous. Quit idealizing the United 
Nations for what it is not. It is not an international body that is run 
by saints. Instead, it is run by ordinary democratic countries, but 
also by despicable regimes which terrorize their own population.
  Requiring the President, our President to get permission from the 
United Nations means we are requiring our President to make deals with 
governments like the Communist Chinese before doing what is necessary 
for our own security. No wonder the repressed people of China, like the 
Falun Gong, who had their demonstration here yesterday, like the people 
of Tibet, like the people of East Turkistan are afraid that our 
President may well make an agreement with the bosses in Beijing who 
terrorize them at the expense of those people who long for freedom.
  We should not be relying on the United Nations. No, we should be 
relying on our strength and our commitment to those ideals that our 
Founding Fathers set forth so many years ago and have been fought for 
so many times by Americans. Let us remember what George Washington told 
us: ``Put only Americans on guard tonight.''
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Maine (Mr. Allen).
  Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  I wish to respond to some of the comments made just now by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher) and earlier by the 
distinguished chairman of the Committee on International Relations, the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde).
  It is true that this resolution seeks to have the United States first 
act in a multilateral basis through the U.N., but we are not 
transferring the job of protecting Americans to the United Nations. In 
section 8 of this resolution it says, ``inherent right to self-
defense.'' Nothing in this joint resolution, the Spratt substitute, is 
intended to derogate or otherwise limit the authority of the President 
to use military force and self-defense pursuant to the Constitution of 
the United States and the War Powers resolution.
  But there is a reason why we need to act on a multilateral basis. It 
is because if we act against Saddam's weapons of mass destruction 
together with allies, we are less likely to provoke an Islamic 
fundamentalist uprising in the Middle East. We are more likely to 
diminish the number of recruits to Osama bin Laden, not to accentuate 
the number of recruits to terrorist causes.
  Insofar as people have suggested this is a steeple chase or they are 
roadblocks to getting the second resolution passed, it is a week-long 
proposition. Come back, we have the resolution laid out in this 
substitute, there are no amendments, no points of order, it comes to 
the floor, we will have a debate of 20 hours, and it will be done.
  This is critical. This is as important a vote as the vote on final 
passage, and I urge Members to support the Spratt substitute.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Boehner).
  Mr. BOEHNER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Illinois for 
yielding me this time.
  I rise today in strong opposition to the amendment offered by our 
friend, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt). The amendment 
in the nature of a substitute basically puts us in a position of having 
to go to the U.N. and get a resolution of support or, if the U.N. 
cannot act or will not act, requires the Congress to come back and to 
have another vote.
  I think one of the points that is missing in this debate is that it 
seems as though people think the President is not acting in a 
unilateral way.
  We are the only superpower on the face of the Earth. We as a Nation, 
as a result, have a responsibility to lead. I think that the underlying 
resolution does, in fact, strengthen the President's hand to lead and 
to continue to build multilateral support. I believe that the amendment 
offered today basically undercuts the President's ability to continue 
to lead us and to build a multilateral action.
  Secondly, the President is being very deliberate about this. This 
effort has been under way for the last 8 weeks. The President continues 
to consult with Members of Congress in both bodies, continues to work 
with our allies, continues to work with the U.N., and I think all of us 
would agree that the President made a forceful case for action because 
he was at the U.N.
  Again, the amendment that we have before us handcuffs the President 
in terms of his ability to continue to bring about positive action at 
the United Nations.
  Now, we have 16 amendments passed by the United Nations over the last 
11 years dealing with chemical and biological weapons. What makes us 
believe that Saddam Hussein or anyone else who is going to act, if in 
fact the U.N. would ever act? But more importantly, why would we want 
to put the security and the freedom of the people of our country at 
risk or put them in the hands of the U.N. Security Council in hoping, 
maybe, that they will act.
  The fact is in 1991 during the Gulf War we had a debate here and we 
kept hearing the same thing we are hearing now: wait, wait, wait. If we 
had waited any longer in 1991, the Iraqi regime would have been into 
Saudi Arabia and we would have had a much larger crisis than we have. 
The fact is that we have waited for a long time to bring this regime to 
a halt and to take away their threat, and I believe the underlying 
resolution done by the majority leader and the Speaker, along with the 
minority leader, gives the President the strongest hand possible in 
terms of building a multilateral coalition and, most importantly, 
protecting the American people whom we are sent here to represent.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Maine (Mr. Baldacci).
  (Mr. BALDACCI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BALDACCI. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Spratt amendment 
as the right way to security; not having to go it alone, but with the 
help of our allies.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today with a heavy heart. The decision whether or 
not to send our young men and women into war is the most difficult one 
a Member of Congress can face. In considering this matter, I have done 
considerable research, been briefed by the White House, talked with my 
colleagues and listened to the voices of the people of Maine.
  It is clear that Saddam Hussein is a dangerous dictator. He has not 
hesitated to attack his neighbors, and even his own people. Since 
weapons inspectors were forced out of Iraq in 1998, we know that 
Hussein has taken steps to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons 
production capability. We have strong evidence that he is beginning to 
rebuild his nuclear program. Based on all that we have seen, in the 
past and in the present, it is clear that the Iraqi regime is a threat 
to international peace and security.
  I am convinced that it is in the best interests of our Nation and our 
world that we eliminate these weapons of mass destruction. If Hussein 
does not use them directly, I believe there is a good chance that he 
will provide them to other terrorists who will. This situation cannot 
stand.
  The question now before us is how to achieve our common goal of 
disarming Saddam Hussein. I am not supportive of a unilateral pre-
emptive strike. As President bush said on Tuesday night, force must be 
our last resort, not our first. I am convinced that we will be 
strongest if we address this situation with the support of a 
multilateral coalition.
  For that reason, I will be supporting Representative Spratt's 
substitute that calls for just such a multilateral approach. This 
resolution echoes the President's speech in which we urged the adoption 
of a new U.N. resolution that seeks to disarm Hussein, and if that 
resolution proves ineffective, calls for a coalition to disarm him. 
This substitute supports the President's intention to exhaust 
diplomatic approaches to disarming Iraq while still ensuring that he 
will be able to take action against Iraq if these methods prove 
ineffective.
  To me, the most significant difference between Mr. Spratt's approach 
and that of the administration is that Mr. Spratt keeps Congress 
closely involved as the decision-making process moves forward, as is 
consistent with our Constitutional duty. Under the substitute, the 
administration will be required to return to Congress when and if it 
determines that diplomatic avenues have been pursued and have failed. 
At that time, expedited procedures will be in place to authorize 
military action if necessary.
  When we are dealing with issues of this magnitude, I believe that 
there needs to be true consultation between the Congress and the 
administration. Simple notification is not enough. I agree that we need 
to speak with

[[Page H7758]]

one voice, and this substitute gives us the tools to do that.
  The bottom line is that yes, we must take action to protect our 
Nation and, indeed, the world from the weapons of mass destruction that 
Saddam Hussein has developed and continues to pursue. However, 
unilateral action is not, in my opinion, the most effective approach. I 
believe a multilateral approach offers the best chance to effectively 
disarm Saddam Hussein and put an end to his chemical and biological 
weapons programs. It's important for our government to work with other 
nations, and ensure that all non-military avenues have been exhausted, 
before taking action on our own. We should work with the world 
community and the United Nations Security Council. If these efforts 
fail, I support using force in concert with our allies.
  I opposed the President's original resolution, and I commend my 
colleagues who have worked so hard to improve it. The underlying 
resolution has come a long way in addressing my concerns. However, I 
still believe that the Spratt approach is the best one at this time. It 
is a workable resolution, which neither ties the President's hands nor 
promotes unilateral action by the United States. I urge my colleagues 
to support this responsible approach.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Arkansas (Mr. Snyder), also a Vietnam veteran and a member of the 
Committee on Armed Services.
  Mr. SNYDER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Those of us that support this amendment do not believe that we are 
undercutting the President or somehow placing handcuffs on him. What, 
in fact, we believe we are doing is responding to the great common 
sense of the American people, the kind of discussions we all have at 
home and Americans are having all over the country in which they see a 
difference in the factual situations between America going in as an 
international body in cooperation with the United Nations versus 
America having to go it alone because the international community does 
not want to be with us. There are differences in those two scenarios, 
and the differences have different ramifications for the future of 
America's national security.
  In fact, what the Spratt amendment does is give additional powers to 
the President not in the Constitution. It gives him the power to 
schedule this vote through an expedited process.
  I think the Spratt amendment in fact is the kind of approach that the 
American people want us to take, to act in concert with the 
international community and, if that is not successful, to come back 
and expedite a way for a reevaluation by their elected representatives 
as expected by the Constitution.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. Speaker, when you retire from Congress and the great summing up 
comes with your great-grandchildren or great-great-grandchildren, and 
people say, ``What did you do in Congress,'' you say, ``Well, I voted 
to yield sovereignty to the United Nations. I voted to have the 
decision to defend the United States national interests to the Security 
Council, which is composed of five members, three of which are France, 
China, and Russia.''
  What a precedent, to condition our taking action by getting approval 
and by getting a new resolution. What is that, Resolution No. 7,842? 
No, it is only about the seventeenth resolution. A new resolution 
authorizing the United States to defend its national interests?
  This is not a preemptive strike. The shooting has never stopped from 
Desert Storm. There was a cease-fire, not a peace treaty, in February 
of 1991 and, after that, every day they shoot at us in the sky.
  So this is not preemptive, it is just finishing what should have been 
finished several years ago.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Royce).

                              {time}  1130

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this amendment.
  It is clear to me that most Members hope that the administration wins 
support at the United Nations for a robust weapons inspection regime. I 
am one who wishes this. That is the outcome that I think the 
gentleman's amendment aims for, but it does this, however, in a way 
that I believe sets the administration up for failure.
  This amendment expedites congressional consideration of an 
authorization to act against Saddam Hussein should the administration 
be unable to secure an acceptable U.N. inspections resolution. That is 
its second step, but let us think a ways down the road.
  Does this Congress really want to be in the position of spotlighting 
our possible failure at the U.N.? The story line for the second 
congressional deliberation on Iraq this amendment mandates would be 
``Failing at the U.N., Administration Forced to Try Congress Again.'' I 
have a hard time seeing how our Nation could possibly be strengthened 
by that.
  In considering this amendment, we cannot afford wishful thinking 
about the U.N. The fact, often lost in this debate, is that the United 
Nations is a grouping of Nations with often differing political 
interests, some that share our values, others that do not. This is one 
of the reasons that, while working with the Security Council, we must 
always guard against its compromising our national security policy.
  This amendment, in practice, gives the edge to the U.N. Security 
Council over our administration in facing the threat of Saddam. The 
negotiating hand of other Council members would surely be strengthened 
against the administration if they knew that our President would be 
forced to return to Congress if he could not strike a Security Council 
weapons inspections deal. Neither outcome, a weak weapons inspection 
resolution nor if the administration must walk away, a perceived and 
universally noted failure by our country to win at the U.N., is one we 
should be setting our administration up for.
  Secretary of State Powell told the Committee on International 
Relations that his hand at the U.N. would be strengthened by a strong 
congressional authorization for action against Iraq, one, in his words, 
that was not watered down. I know that Secretary Powell has been 
working hard to gain support at the U.N. To kick the congressional 
authorization he seeks down the road, to grant it or even not grant it, 
based upon the U.N. Security Council's schedule and political 
landscape, is a big watering down.
  It is the judgment of the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), the 
chairman, and the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), the ranking 
member, and the majority of Committee on International Relations 
members that the bipartisan resolution we are considering this week is 
the one Secretary Powell needs. That is why I urge the rejection of 
this amendment.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Moran).
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, let me say to my very good 
friends on the other side, this amendment builds on the lessons of 
leadership from our success in the Persian Gulf War. Virtually no 
American lives lost and our specific mission accomplished.
  We want to do just what we did in 1991. President Bush waited until 
after the congressional midterm elections. He secured the United 
Nations Security Council authorization to use international force. We 
had the support of Iraq's Arab neighbors. We did not position this 
country as a target for vengeance from Arab and Muslim extremists, and 
for a decade, we have contained and sanctioned Saddam.
  We are fighting another war today, a war on terrorism, and our 
intelligence agencies tell us these are separate wars. This amendment 
focuses on winning both wars and securing our deserved position as the 
unparalleled leader and inspiration of the free world.
  The rest of the free world is no less determined to protect their 
families and individual liberties. Let us make this war and the war on 
terrorism an international and definitive success.
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, some of our friends today, 
in debate, have suggested that somehow adoption of the Spratt 
resolution would yield American sovereignty to the U.N. or, as one 
speaker put it, would subordinate foreign policy to the Security 
Council.
  Is it not true that under the Spratt resolution the decision of the 
United

[[Page H7759]]

States to back up U.N. inspections, to back up U.N. enforcement 
actions, would be ours to make and that, moreover, those troops would 
remain under U.S. command? Is there any ground for treating this as 
some kind of abdication of sovereignty?
  Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, my friend from North Carolina is absolutely 
right. This amendment strengthens the position, the leadership role of 
the United States. It builds on the lesson of 10 years ago that was a 
success then and should be a success today.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte).
  (Mr. GOODLATTE asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the Chairman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the Spratt substitute. I 
have great respect for the gentleman from South Carolina, but believe 
that this resolution is very misguided. It divides, or bifurcates, 
American foreign policy instead of speaking with one voice.
  Nothing in the resolution put forth by the committee, led by the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) and the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Lantos), prevents the very course of action outlined by the 
gentleman from South Carolina, but I fear that if this resolution 
offered by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) were adopted, 
it would have the opposite effect of that intended by the gentleman; 
and that is because it sends the message that the President, in his 
efforts to get strong United Nations action and support from our 
allies, does not have the support of our own Congress.
  Between the votes on the two resolutions contemplated by the 
gentleman and while the President seeks international support, we will 
in effect be a cacophony of voices rather than speaking with one voice.
  Many Members of Congress have differing opinions on what the U.N. 
resolution should be. It is time to speak to the U.N. with one voice. 
Politics must end at the water's edge.
  In dealing with other Nations and especially with the United Nations, 
the President must have a strong hand. He must be able to say what he 
is authorized to do, if necessary, to push the U.N. to do the right 
thing itself. On the other hand, the Spratt substitute sends the 
message to Saddam Hussein that we are talk without action. He has 
relied upon that state of affairs for the past 12 years.
  This resolution is little different than the 16 U.N. resolutions, all 
without consequences. This resolution demands the truth, but removes 
the consequences. This resolution prevents the President of the United 
States from taking action to protect our national security interests. 
It ties his hands, even to do the limited things we are already doing.
  The Congress needs to speak with one voice. The Congress needs to 
speak now, not later, and the Congress needs to place into the hands of 
the President the necessary tools to implement a unified and effective 
foreign policy.
  I urge my colleagues to reject this substitute.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the 
gentlewoman from Missouri (Mrs. McCarthy).
  (Mrs. McCARTHY of Missouri asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend her remarks.)
  Mrs. McCARTHY of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this 
measure. The Spratt-Moran substitute charts the right and responsible 
course.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Spratt-Moran Substitute to H.J. 
Res. 114. I join the sponsors in commending the President for calling 
upon the United Nations to enforce existing Security Council 
resolutions eliminating weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, as well as 
his seeking approval of a new resolution establishing tougher arms 
inspections. Should force be necessary, this substitute encourages the 
President to make every effort to obtain U.N. Security Council 
approval. It is essential that we execute a multilateral approach to 
Iraq by uniting with our allies as we did this past year in 
Afghanistan, and which we also did in prosecuting Desert Storm with a 
minimal loss of American lives. Indeed, mobilizing a broad coalition of 
nations to join us in Desert Storm helped avoid destabilizing the 
Middle East, something which we may be powerless to prevent if we act 
unilaterally now. It is important to acknowledge that, as with our 
responsibility to nurture and support the effort to democratize and 
help stabilize Afghanistan, it is also in our national interest to make 
a long term commitment to assist in the transition to a new and stable 
democratic government in Iraq. This is the way to build a collective 
security throughout the region and enhance the prospects for a lasting 
peace.
  I concur with the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops that ``the use 
of massive military force to remove the current government of Iraq 
could have incalculable consequences for a civilian population that has 
suffered so much from war, repression, and a debilitating embargo.'' In 
addition to concern for the people of Iraq who have been subjugated by 
Saddam Hussein and his evil regime, we must fully understand that an 
attack on Iraq, particularly without support from the world community, 
may have unintended, negative consequences to our global war on 
terrorism. We must not lose sight of the fact that it is the worldwide 
terrorist network which poses the most immediate danger to the people 
of the United States. We have the support of the world in combating 
terrorism. If we go it alone in Iraq, we risk destroying that support 
and impeding our ability to win the war against terrorism.
  That is reason enough for making a strong and diligent effort to 
obtain support of the U.N. Security Council for an aggressive and 
immediate program of widespread on-site inspections for weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq. The Spratt-Moran Substitute allows the President 
to use our troops to assist the U.N. inspections. Such inspections must 
be executed unrelentingly and must lead to the immediate disarmament of 
Iraq.
  Mr. Speaker, historian Robert Dallek recently noted that during the 
Presidency of Harry Truman our defense policy was one of containment 
and deterrence quite unlike the policy proposed by the current 
administration. President Truman felt that the best way to preserve the 
peace following World War II was to contain our adversaries. Truman 
said, ``There is nothing more foolish than to think that war can be 
stopped by war. You don't `prevent' anything by war except peace.'' Mr. 
Dallek assessed the current administration's policy as ``prevention'' 
by removing a head of state who has the power to do harm to us. Such a 
unilateral act must be justified with facts that convince the American 
people to go it alone. The Spratt-Moran Substitute calls upon the 
President to justify that such force is the only option left available, 
and mandates that the President seek a second vote of the Congress to 
authorize use of our military might if the President determines a 
regime change in Iraq is the goal. I commend my fellow Missourian, Mr. 
Skelton for his efforts to assure that we adhere to our Constitution by 
requiring this second vote.
  Mr. Speaker, we are united in our desire to achieve peace and 
stability in this region. One of the strengths of our country is our 
right to express our views freely and not have our patriotism 
questioned if we disagree with a particular administration or policy. I 
realize my view may not be the prevailing opinion of this body or this 
administration, but I truly believe it represents the view of a 
majority of my constituents given the information that is available to 
us.
  I recognize the tremendous sacrifices of the armed forces in this 
endeavor and I fully support them. The question before us is when and 
how they should be engaged. I support the multilateral approach 
stipulated in the substitute and the call for a vigorous, all 
encompassing inspection program by the U.N., and urge my colleagues to 
adopt the substitute. As anthropologist Margaret Meade wisely noted: 
``We must devise a system in which peace is more rewarding than war.'' 
The Spratt-Moran Substitute charts the right and responsible course.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Fattah).
  (Mr. FATTAH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Spratt amendment.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Spratt Substitute for the 
Use of Force Against Iraq Resolution.
  The Spratt substitute authorizes the use of U.S. armed forces to 
support any new U.N. Security Council resolution that mandates the 
elimination, by force if necessary, of all Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction, long-range ballistic missiles, and the means of producing 
such weapons and missiles. The substitute also calls on the president 
to seek authorization from Congress in the absence of a U.N. Security 
Council resolution sufficient to eliminate by force, if necessary, all 
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
  If we go to war with Iraq, we must do so with the approval of the 
U.N. Security Council, and the general cooperation and support of the 
United Nations. We risk damaging the

[[Page H7760]]

U.N. Security Council's legitimacy as an authoritative body in 
international law if the United States acts unilaterally. If the 
argument for involvement in Iraq is that we lead by example, then we 
signal to the rest of the world that it is okay to ignore the concerns 
voiced by the international community. This will only lead to further 
future conflict. If the United Nations is to impose sanctions, restore 
order, and be an effective international institution, it must have the 
respect and cooperation of the most powerful country in the world.
  Rather than initiating a war with Iraq, let's make an effort to 
achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East between Israel and 
the Palestinians.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Inslee).
  (Mr. INSLEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. INSLEE. Mr. Speaker, America is a great Nation because it always 
at times of toil and tumble has followed great principles.
  We have always matched the might of our Armed Forces with the force 
of our great principles, and it is a great American principle that at 
times of international trouble, we work with the international 
community, not without it. It is a great American principle that we do 
not launch unilateral first strikes without the support of the 
international community and the vote of the U.S. Congress.
  The Spratt resolution follows and upholds those great American 
principles, and the underlying resolution violates them. No Congress 
should give any President a blank check to start a unilateral first 
strike for any reason, anytime, with or without any allies.
  This Nation gave the world the great principles of freedom of speech 
and freedom of religion and ought to lead the Nation in the concept of 
going forward on the arc of human history which is working together for 
mutual security rather than backwards to the law of the jungle.
  I do not want to vote to make it the legacy of this generation of 
American leaders to send us backwards where a strong nation devours the 
weak, and we do not work with the international community.
  There is a practical reason for doing this. As General Hoar, or 
Zinni, I cannot remember which one, said, why would we supercharge 
Osama bin Laden's recruiting efforts with a unilateral first strike?
  The Spratt resolution imbues great American principles. We should 
follow it is the American way.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Larson).
  (Mr. LARSON of Connecticut asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks, and include extraneous material.)
  Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I rise to unite this body and 
the Nation behind the Spratt resolution of which I am a proud 
cosponsor.
  The Spratt resolution both strengthens the President's hand and 
demonstrates national resolve. It preserves the constitutional 
authority that resides with this Congress and does not abdicate our 
role to the United Nations.
  Many have stepped forward, including many notable Republicans, Mr. 
Scowcroft, Mr. Eagleburger, Mr. Baker, and several others, who 
understand the deep importance and abiding concern that many of us on 
this aisle share with not only them, but people all across this Nation.
  Thomas Friedman spoke at a recent book tour about the consequences of 
our doctrine, long term, and its effect, and he was struck by the one 
man in the audience who came up to him and reached into his wallet and 
produced but a picture of his children. It spoke volumes. We need say 
nothing else.
  Support the Spratt alternative.

                     Dick Cheney's Song of America

                          (By David Armstrong)

       Few writers are more ambitious than the writers of 
     government policy papers, and few policy papers are more 
     ambitious than Dick Cheney's masterwork. It has taken several 
     forms over the last decade and is in fact the product of 
     several ghostwriters (notably Paul Wolfowitz and Colin 
     Powell), but Cheney has been consistent in his dedication to 
     the ideas in the documents that bear his name, and he has 
     maintained a close association with the ideologues behind 
     them. Let us, therefore, call Cheney the author, and this 
     series of documents the Plan.
       The Plan was published in unclassified form most recently 
     under the title of Defense Strategy for the 1990s, as Cheney 
     ended his term as secretary of defense under the elder George 
     Bush in early 1993, but it is, like ``Leaves of Grass,'' a 
     perpetually evolving work. It was the controversial Defense 
     Planning Guidance draft of 1992--from which Cheney, 
     unconvincingly, tried to distance himself--and it was the 
     somewhat less aggressive revised draft of that same year. 
     This June it was a presidential lecture in the form of a 
     commencement address at West Point, and in July it was leaked 
     to the press as yet another Defense Planning Guidance (this 
     time under the pen name of Defense Secretary Donald 
     Rumsfeld). It will take its ultimate form, though, as 
     America's new national security strategy--and Cheney et al. 
     will experience what few writers have even dared dream: their 
     words will become our reality.
       The Plan is for the United States to rule the world. The 
     overt theme is unilateralism, but it is ultimately a story of 
     domination. It calls for the United States to maintain its 
     overwhelming military superiority and prevent new rivals from 
     rising up to challenge it on the world stage. It calls for 
     dominion over friends and enemies alike. It says not that the 
     United States must be more powerful, or most powerful, but 
     that it must be absolutely powerful.
       The Plan is disturbing in many ways, and ultimately 
     unworkable. Yet it is being sold now as an answer to the 
     ``new realities'' of the post-September 11 world, even as it 
     was sold previously as the answer to the new realities of the 
     post-Cold War world. For Cheney, the Plan has always been the 
     right answer, no matter how different the questions.
       Cheney's unwavering adherence to the Plan would be amusing, 
     and maybe a little sad, except that it is now our plan. In 
     its pages are the ideas that we now act upon every day with 
     the full might of the United States military. Strangely, few 
     critics have noted that Cheney's work has a long history, or 
     that it was once quite unpopular, or that it was created in 
     reaction to circumstances that are far removed from the ones 
     we now face. But Cheney is a well-known action man. One 
     has to admire, in a way, the Babe Ruth-like sureness of 
     his political work. He pointed to center field ten years 
     ago, and now the ball is sailing over the fence.
       Before the Plan was about domination it was about money. It 
     took shape in late 1989, when the Soviet threat was clearly 
     on the decline, and, with it, public support for a large 
     military establishment. Cheney seemed unable to come to terms 
     with either new reality. He remained deeply suspicious of the 
     Soviets and strongly resisted all efforts to reduce military 
     spending. Democrats in Congress jeered his lack of strategic 
     vision, and a few within the Bush Administration were 
     whispering that Cheney had become an irrelevant factor in 
     structuring a response to the revolutionary changes taking 
     place in the world.
       More adaptable was the up-and-coming General Colin Powell, 
     the newly appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As 
     Ronald Reagan's national security adviser, Powell had seen 
     the changes taking place in the Soviet Union firsthand and 
     was convinced that the ongoing transformation was 
     irreversible. Like Cheney, he wanted to avoid military cuts, 
     but he knew they were inevitable. The best he could do was 
     minimize them, and the best way to do that would be to offer 
     a new security structure that would preserve American 
     military capabilities despite reduced resources.
       Powell and his staff believed that a weakened Soviet Union 
     would result in shifting alliances and regional conflict. The 
     United States was the only nation capable of managing the 
     forces at play in the world; it would have to remain the 
     preeminent military power in order to ensure the peace and 
     shape the emerging order in accordance with American 
     interests. U.S. military strategy, therefore, would have to 
     shift from global containment to managing less-well-defined 
     regional struggles and unforeseen contingencies. To do this, 
     the United States would have to project a military ``forward 
     presence'' around the world; there would be fewer troops but 
     in more places. This plan still would not be cheap, but 
     through careful restructuring and superior technology, the 
     job could be done with 25 percent fewer troops. Powell 
     insisted that maintaining superpower status must be the first 
     priority of the U.S. military. ``We have to put a shingle 
     outside our door saying, `Superpower Lives Here,' no 
     matter what the Soviets do,'' he said at the time. He also 
     insisted that the troop levels be proposed were the bare 
     minimum necessary to do so. This concept would come to be 
     known as the ``Base Force.''
       Powell's work on the subject proved timely. The Berlin Wall 
     fell on November 9, 1989, and five days later Powell had his 
     new strategy ready to present to Cheney. Even as decades of 
     repression were ending in Eastern Europe, however, Cheney 
     still could not abide even the force and budget reductions 
     Powell proposed. Yet he knew that cuts were unavoidable. 
     Having no alternative of his own to offer, therefore, he 
     reluctantly encouraged Powell to present his ideas to the 
     president. Powell did so the next day; Bush made no promises 
     but encouraged him to keep at it.
       Less encouraging was the reaction of Paul Wolfowitz, the 
     undersecretary of defense for policy. A lifelong proponent of 
     the unilateralist, maximum-force approach, he shared Cheney's 
     skepticism about the Eastern Bloc and so put his own staff to 
     work on

[[Page H7761]]

     a competing plan that would somehow accommodate the 
     possibility of Soviet backsliding.
       As Powell and Wolfowitz worked out their strategies, 
     Congress was losing patience. New calls went up for large 
     cuts in defense spending in light of the new global 
     environment. The harshest critique of Pentagon planning came 
     from a usually dependable ally of the military establishment, 
     Georgia Democrat Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed 
     Services committee. Nunn told fellow senators in March 1990 
     that there was a ``threat blank'' in the administration's 
     proposed $295 billion defense budget and that the Pentagon's 
     ``basic assessment of the overall threat to our national 
     security'' was ``rooted in the past.'' The world had changed 
     and yet the ``development of a new military strategy that 
     responds to the changes in the threat has not yet occurred.'' 
     Without that response, no dollars would be forthcoming.
       Nunn's message was clear. Powell and Wolfowitz began 
     filling in the blanks. Powell started promoting a Zen-like 
     new rationale for his Base Force approach. With the 
     Soviets rapidly becoming irrelevant, Powell argued, the 
     United States could no longer assess its military needs on 
     the basis of known threats. Instead, the Pentagon should 
     focus on maintaining the ability to address a wide variety 
     of new and unknown challenges. This shift from a ``threat 
     based'' assessment of military requirements to a 
     ``capability based'' assessment would become a key theme 
     of the Plan. The United States would move from countering 
     Soviet attempts at dominance to ensuring its own 
     dominance. Again, this project would not be cheap.
       Powell's argument, circular though it may have been, proved 
     sufficient to hold off Congress. Winning support among his 
     own colleagues, however, proved more difficult. Cheney 
     remained deeply skeptical about the Soviets, and Wolfowitz 
     was only slowly coming around. To account for future 
     uncertainties, Wolfowitz recommended drawing down U.S. forces 
     to roughly the levels proposed by Powell, but doing so at a 
     much slower pace; seven years as opposed to the four Powell 
     suggested. He also built in a ``crisis response/
     reconstitution'' clause that would allow for reversing the 
     process if events in the Soviet Union, or elsewhere, turned 
     ugly.
       With these now elements in place, Cheney saw something that 
     might work. By combining Powell's concepts with those of 
     Wolfowitz, he could counter congressional criticism that his 
     proposed defense budget was out of line with the new 
     strategic reality, while leaving the door open for future 
     force increases. In late June, Wolfowitz, Powell, and Cheney 
     presented their plan to the president, and within as few 
     weeks Bush was unveiling the new strategy.
       Bush laid out the rationale for the Plan in a speech in 
     Aspen, Colorado, on August 2, 1990. He explained that since 
     the danger of global war had substantially receded, the 
     principal threats to American security would emerge in 
     unexpected quarters. To counter those threats, he said, the 
     United States would increasingly base the size and structure 
     of its forces on the need to respond to ``regional 
     contingencies'' and maintain a peacetime military presence 
     overseas. Meeting that need would require maintaining the 
     capability to quickly deliver American forces to any ``corner 
     of the globe,'' and that would mean retaining many major 
     weapons systems then under attack in Congress as overly 
     costly and unnecessary, including the ``Star Wars'' missile-
     defense program. Despite those massive outlays, Bush insisted 
     that the proposed restructuring would allow the United States 
     to draw down its active forces by 25 percent in the years 
     ahead, the same figure Powell had projected ten months 
     earlier.
       The Plan's debut was well timed. By a remarkable 
     coincidence, Bush revealed it the very day Saddam Hussein's 
     Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait.
       The Gulf War temporarily reduced the pressure to cut 
     military spending. It also diverted attention from some of 
     the Plan's less appealing aspects. In addition, it inspired 
     what would become one of the Plan's key features: the use of 
     ``overwhelming force'' to quickly defeat enemies, a concept 
     since dubbed the Powell Doctrine.
       Once the Iraqi threat was ``contained,'' Wolfowitz returned 
     to his obsession with the Soviets, planning various scenarios 
     involved possible Soviet intervention in regional conflicts. 
     The failure of the hard-liner coup against Gorbachev in 
     August 1991, however, made it apparent that such planning 
     might be unnecessary. Then, in late December, just as the 
     Pentagon was preparing to put the Plan in place, the Soviet 
     Union collapsed.
       With the Soviet Union gone, the United States had a choice. 
     It could capitalize on the euphoria of the moment by 
     nurturing cooperative relations and developing multilateral 
     structures to help guide the global realignment then taking 
     place; or it could consolidate its power and pursue a 
     strategy of unilateralism and global dominance. It chose the 
     latter course.
       In early 1992, as Powell and Cheney campaigned to win 
     congressional support for their augmented Base Force plan, a 
     new logic entered into their appeals. The United States, 
     Powell told members of the House Armed Services Committee, 
     required ``sufficient power'' to ``deter any challenger from 
     ever dreaming of challenging us on the world stage.'' To 
     emphasize the point, he cast the United States in the role of 
     street thug. ``I want to be the bully on the block,'' he 
     said, implanting in the mind of potential opponents that 
     ``there is no future in trying to challenge the armed forces 
     of the United States.''
       As Powell and Cheney were making this new argument in their 
     congressional rounds, Wolfowitz was busy expanding the 
     concept and working to have it incorporated into U.S. policy. 
     During the early months of 1992, Wolfowitz supervised the 
     preparation of an internal Pentagon policy statement used to 
     guide military officials in the preparation of their forces, 
     budgets, and strategies. The classified document, known as 
     the Defense Planning Guidance, depicted a world dominated by 
     the United States, which would maintain its superpower status 
     through a combination of positive guidance and overwhelming 
     military might. the image was one of a heavily armed City on 
     a Hill.
       The DPG stated that the ``first objective'' of U.S. defense 
     strategy was ``to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival.'' 
     Achieving this objective required that the United States 
     ``prevent any hostile power from dominating a region'' of 
     strategic significance. America's new mission would be to 
     convince allies and enemies alike ``that they need not aspire 
     to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to 
     protect their legitimate interests.''
       Another new theme was the use of preemptive military force. 
     The options, the DPG noted, ranged from taking preemptive 
     military action to head off a nuclear, chemical, or 
     biological attack to ``punishing'' or ``threatening 
     punishment of'' aggressors ``through a variety of means,'' 
     including strikes against weapons-manufacturing facilities.
       The DPG also envisioned maintaining a substantial U.S. 
     nuclear arsenal while discouraging the development of nuclear 
     programs in other countries. It depicted a ``U.S.-led system 
     of collective security'' that implicitly precluded the 
     need for rearmament of any king by countries such as 
     Germany and Japan. And it called for the ``early 
     introduction'' of a global missile-defense system that 
     would presumably render all missile-launched weapons, 
     including those of the United States, obsolete. (The 
     United States would, of course, remain the world's 
     dominant military power on the strength of its other 
     weapons systems.)
       The story, in short, was dominance by way of unilateral 
     action and military superiority. While coalitions--such as 
     the one formed during the Gulf War--held ``considerable 
     promise for promoting collective action,'' the draft DPG 
     stated, the United States should expect future alliances to 
     be ``ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond the crisis 
     being confronted, and in many cases carrying only general 
     agreement over the objectives to be accomplished.'' It was 
     essential to create ``the sense that the world order is 
     ultimately backed by the U.S.'' and essential that America 
     position itself ``to act independently when collective action 
     cannot be orchestrated'' or in crisis situation requiring 
     immediate action. ``While the U.S. cannot become the world's 
     policeman,'' the document said, ``we will retain the 
     preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those 
     wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of 
     our allies or friends.'' Among the interests the draft 
     indicated the United States would defend in this manner were 
     ``access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil, 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic 
     missiles, [and] threats to U.S. citizens from terrorism.''
       The DPC was leaked to the New York Times in March 1992. 
     Critics on both the left and the right attacked it 
     immediately. Then-presidential candidate Pat Buchanan 
     portrayed candidate a ``blank check'' to America's allies by 
     suggesting the United States would ``go to war to defend 
     their interests.'' Bill Clinton's deputy campaign manager, 
     George Stephanopoulos, characterized it as an attempt by 
     Pentagon officials to ``find an excuse for big defense 
     budgets instead of downsizing.'' Delaware Senator Joseph 
     Biden criticized the Plan's vision of a ``Pax Americana, a 
     global security system where threats to stability are 
     suppressed or destroyed by U.S. military power.'' Even those 
     who found the document's stated goals commendable feared that 
     its chauvinistic tone could alienate many allies. Cheney 
     responded by attempting to distance himself from the Plan. 
     The Pentagon's spokesman dismissed the leaked document as a 
     ``low-level draft'' and claimed that Cheney had not seen it. 
     Yet a fifteen-page section opened by proclaiming that it 
     constituted ``definitive guidance from the Secretary of 
     Defense.''
       Powell took a more forthright approach to dealing with the 
     flap: he publicly embraced the DPG's core concept. In a TV 
     interview, he said he believed it was ``just fine'' that the 
     United States reign as the world's dominant military power. 
     ``I don't think we should apologize for that,'' he 
     said. Despite bad reviews in the foreign press, Powell 
     insisted that America's European allies were ``not 
     afraid'' of U.S. military might because it was ``power 
     that could be trusted'' and ``will not be misused.''
       Mindful that the draft DPG's overt expression of U.S. 
     dominance might not fly, Powell in the same interview also 
     trotted out a new rationale for the original Base Force plan. 
     He argued that in a post-Soviet world, filled with new 
     dangers, the United States needed the ability to fight on 
     more than one front at a time. ``One of the most 
     destabilizing things we could do,'' he said, ``is to cut our 
     forces so much that if we're tied up in one area of the world 
     . . . and we are not seen to have the ability to influence 
     another area of

[[Page H7762]]

     the world, we might invite just the sort of crisis we're 
     trying to deter.'' This two-war strategy provided a possible 
     answer to Nunn's ``threat blank.'' One unknown enemy wasn't 
     enough to justify lavish defense budgets, but two unknown 
     enemies might do the trick.
       Within a few weeks the Pentagon had come up with a more 
     comprehensive response to the DPG furor. A revised version 
     was leaked to the press that was significantly less strident 
     in tone, though only slightly less strident in fact. While 
     calling for the United States to prevent ``any hostile power 
     from dominating a region critical to our interests,'' the new 
     draft stressed that America would act in concert with its 
     allies--when possible. It also suggested the United Nations 
     might take an expanded role in future political, economic, 
     and security matters, a concept conspicuously absent from the 
     original draft.
       The controversy died down, and, with a presidential 
     campaign under way, the Pentagon did nothing to stir it up 
     again. Following Bush's defeat, however, the Plan reemerged. 
     In January 1993, in his very last days in office. Cheney 
     released a final version. The newly titled Defense Strategy 
     for the 1990s retained the soft touch of the revised draft 
     DPG as well as its darker themes. The goal remained to 
     preclude ``hostile competitors from challenging our critical 
     interests'' and preventing the rise of a new super-power. 
     Although it expressed a ``preference'' for collective 
     responses in meeting such challenges, it made clear that the 
     United States would play the lead role in any alliance. 
     Moreover, it noted that collective action would ``not always 
     be timely.'' Therefore, the United States needed to retain 
     the ability to ``act independently, if necessary.'' To do so 
     would require that the United States maintain its massive 
     military superiority. Others were not encouraged to follow 
     suit. It was kinder, gentler dominance, but it was dominance 
     all the same. And it was this thesis that Cheney and company 
     nailed to the door on their way out.
       The new administration tacitly rejected the heavy-handed, 
     unilateral approach to U.S. primacy favored by Powell, 
     Cheney, and Wolfowitz. Taking office in the relative calm of 
     the early post--Cold War era, Clinton sought to maximize 
     America's existing position of strength and promote its 
     interests through economic diplomacy, multilateral 
     institutions (dominated by the United States), greater 
     international free trade, and the development of allied 
     coalitions, including American-led collective military 
     action. American policy, in short, shifted from global 
     dominance to globalism.
       Clinton also failed to prosecute military campaigns with 
     sufficient vigor to satisfy the defense strategists of the 
     previous administration. Wolfowitz found Clinton's Iraq 
     policy especially infuriating. During the Gulf War, Wolfowitz 
     harshly criticized the decision--endorsed by Powell and 
     Cheney--to end the war once the U.N. mandate of driving 
     Saddam's forces from Kuwait had been fulfilled, leaving the 
     Iraqi dictator in office. He called on the Clinton 
     Administration to finish the job by arming Iraqi opposition 
     forces and sending U.S. ground troops to defense a base of 
     operation for them in the southern region of the country. In 
     a 1996 editorial, Wolfowitz raised the prospect of launching 
     a preemptive attack against Iraq. ``Should we sit idly by,'' 
     he wrote, ``with our passive containment policy and our inept 
     cover operations, and wait until a tyrant possessing large 
     quantities of weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated 
     delivery systems strikes out at us?'' Wolfowitz suggested it 
     was ``necessary'' to ``go beyond the containment strategy.''
       Wolfowitz's objections to Clinton's military tactics were 
     not limited to Iraq. Wolfowitz had endorsed President Bush's 
     decision in late 1992 to intervene in Somalia on a limited 
     humanitarian basis. Clinton later expanded the mission into a 
     broader peacekeeping effort, a move that ended in disaster. 
     With perfect twenty-twenty hindsight, Wolfowitz decried 
     Clinton's decision to send U.S. troops into combat ``where 
     there is no significant U.S. national interest.'' He took a 
     similar stance on Clinton's ill-fated democracy-building 
     effort in Haiti, chastising the president for engaging 
     ``American military prestige'' on an issue'' of the little or 
     no importance'' to U.S. interests. Bosnia presented a more 
     complicated mix of posturing and ideologics. While running 
     for president, Clinton had scolded the Bush Administration 
     for failing to take action to stem the flow of blood in the 
     Balkans. Once in office, however, and chastened by their 
     early misadventures in Somalia and Haiti, Clinton and his 
     advisers struggled to articulate a coherent Bosnia policy. 
     Wolfowitz complained in 1994 of the administration's failure 
     to ``develop an effective course of action.' He personally 
     advocated arming the Bosnian Muslims in their fight against 
     the Serbs. Powell, on the other hand, publicly cautioned 
     against intervention. In 1995 a U.S.-led NATO bombing 
     campaign, combined with a Croat-Muslim ground offensive, 
     forced the Serbs into negotiations, leading to the Dayton 
     Peace Accords. In 1999, as Clinton rounded up support for 
     joint U.S.-NATO action in Kosovo, Wolfowitz hectored the 
     president for failing to act quickly enough.
       After eight years of what Cheney et al. regarded as wrong-
     headed military adventures and pinprick retaliatory strikes, 
     the Clinton Administration--mercifully, in their view--came 
     to an end. With the ascension of George W. Bush to the 
     presidency, the authors of the Plan returned to government, 
     ready to pick up where they had left off. Cheney of course, 
     became vice president, Powell became secretary of state, and 
     Wolfowitz moved into the number two slot at the Pentagon, as 
     Donald Rumsfeld's deputy. Other contributors also 
     returned: Two prominent members of the Wolfowitz team that 
     crafted the original DPG took up posts on Cheney's staff. 
     I. Lewis ``Scooter'' Libby, who served as Wolfowitz's 
     deputy during Bush I, became the vice president's chief of 
     staff and national security adviser. And Eric Edelman, an 
     assistant deputy undersecretary of defense in the first 
     Bush Administration, became a top foreign policy adviser 
     to Cheney.
       Cheney and company had not changed their minds during the 
     Clinton interlude about the correct course for U.S. policy, 
     but they did not initially appear bent on resurrecting the 
     Plan. Rather than present a unified vision of foreign policy 
     to the world, in the early going the administration focused 
     on promoting a series of seemingly unrelated initiatives. 
     Notable among these were missile defense and space-based 
     weaponry, long-standing conservative causes. In addition, a 
     distinct tone of unilateralism emerged as the new 
     administration announced its intent to abandon the Anti-
     Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia in order to pursue 
     missile defense; its opposition to U.S. ratification of an 
     international nuclear-test-ban pact; and its refusal to 
     become a party to an International Criminal Court. It also 
     raised the prospect of ending the self-imposed U.S. 
     moratorium on nuclear testing initiated by the President's 
     father during the 1992 presidential campaign. Moreover, the 
     administration adopted a much tougher diplomatic posture, as 
     evidenced, most notably, by a distinct hardening of relations 
     with both China and North Korea. While none of this was 
     inconsistent with the concept of U.S. dominance, these early 
     actions did not, at the time, seem to add up to a coherent 
     strategy.
       It was only after September 11 that the Plan emerged in 
     full. Within days of the attacks, Wolfowitz and Libby began 
     calling for unilateral military action against Iraq, on the 
     shaky premise that Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network could 
     not have pulled off the assaults without Saddam Hussein's 
     assistance. At the time, Bush rejected such appeals, but 
     Wolfowitz kept pushing and the President soon came around. In 
     his State of the Union address in January, Bush labeled Iraq, 
     Iran, and North Korea an ``axis of evil,'' and warned that he 
     would ``not wait on events'' to prevent them from using 
     weapons of mass destruction against the United States. He 
     reiterated his commitment to preemption in his West Point 
     speech in June. ``If we wait for threats to fully materialize 
     we will have waited too long,'' he said. ``We must take the 
     battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst 
     threats before they emerge.'' Although it was less noted, 
     Bush in that same speech also reintroduced the Plan's central 
     theme. He declared that the United States would prevent the 
     emergence of a rival power by maintaining ``military 
     strengths beyond the challenge.'' With that, the President 
     effectively adopted a strategy his father's administration 
     had developed ten years earlier to ensure that the United 
     States would remain the world's preeminent power. While the 
     headlines screamed ``preemption,'' no one noticed the 
     declaration of the dominance strategy.
       In case there was any doubt about the administration's 
     intentions, the Pentagon's new DPG lays them out. Signed by 
     Wolfowitz's new boss, Donald Rumsfeld, in May and leaked to 
     the Los Angeles Times in July, it contains all the key 
     elements of the original Plan and adds several complementary 
     features. The preemptive strikes envisioned in the original 
     draft DPG are now ``unwarned attacks.'' The old Powell-Cheney 
     notion of military ``forward presence'' is now ``forwarded 
     deterrence.'' The use of overwhelming force to defeat an 
     enemy called for in the Powell Doctrine is now labeled an 
     ``effects based'' approach.
       Some of the names have stayed the same. Missile defense is 
     back, stronger than ever, and the call goes up again for a 
     shift from a ``threat based'' structure to a ``capabilities 
     based'' approach. The new DPG also emphasizes the need to 
     replace the so-called Cold War strategy of preparing to fight 
     two major conflicts simultaneously with what the Los Angeles 
     Times refers to as ``a more complex approach aimed at 
     dominating air and space on several fronts.'' This, despite 
     the fact that Powell had originally conceived--and the first 
     Bush Administration had adopted--the two-war strategy as a 
     means of filling the ``threat blank'' left by the end of the 
     Cold War.
       Rumsfeld's version adds a few new ideas, most impressively 
     the concept of preemptive strikes with nuclear weapons. These 
     would be earth-penetrating nuclear weapons used for attacking 
     ``hardened and deeply buried targets,'' such as command-and-
     control bunkers, missile silos, and heavily fortified 
     underground facilities used to build and store weapons of 
     mass destruction. The concept emerged earlier this year when 
     the administration's Nuclear Posture Review leaked out. At 
     the time, arms-control experts warned that adopting the NPR's 
     recommendations would undercut existing arms-control 
     treaties, do serious harm to nonproliferation efforts, set 
     off new rounds of testing, and dramatically increase the 
     prospectus of nuclear weapons being used in combat. Despite 
     these concerns, the administration appears intent on 
     developing the weapons. In a final flourish, the DPG also 
     directs the military to develop cyber-, laser-,

[[Page H7763]]

     and electronic-warfare capabilities to ensure U.S. dominion 
     over the heavens.
       Rumsfeld spelled out these strategies in Foreign affairs 
     earlier this year, and it is there that he articulated the 
     remaining elements of the Plan; unilateralism and global 
     dominance. Like the revised DPG of 1992, Rumsfeld feigns 
     interest in collective action but ultimately rejects it as 
     impractical. ``Wars can benefit from coalitions,'' he writes, 
     `` but they should not be fought by committee.'' And 
     coalitions, he adds, ``must not determine the mission.'' The 
     implication is the United States will determine the missions 
     and lead the fights. Finally, Rumsfeld expresses the key 
     concept of the Plan: preventing the emergence of rival 
     powers. Like the original draft DPG of 1992, he states that 
     America's goal is to develop and maintain the military 
     strength necessary to ``dissuade'' rivals or adversaries from 
     ``competing.'' with no challengers, and a proposed defense 
     budget of $379 billion for next year, the United States would 
     reign over all its surveys.
       Reaction to the latest edition of the Plan has, thus far, 
     focused on preemption. Commentators parrot the 
     administration's line, portraying the concept of preemptory 
     strikes as a ``new'' strategy aimed at combating terrorism. 
     In an op-ed piece for the Washington Post following Bush's 
     West Point address, former Clinton adviser William Galston 
     described preemption as part of a ``brand-new security 
     doctrine,'' and warned of possible negative diplomatic 
     consequences. Others found the concept more appealing. Loren 
     Thompson of the conservative Lexington Institute hailed the 
     ``Bush Doctrine'' as ``a necessary response to the new 
     dangers that America faces'' and declared it ``the biggest 
     shift in strategic thinking in two generations.'' Wall Street 
     Journal editor Robert Bartley echoed that sentiment, writing 
     that ``no talk of this ilk has been heard from American 
     leaders since John Foster Dulles talked of rolling back the 
     Iron Curtain.''
       Preemption, of course, is just part of the Plan, and the 
     Plan is hardly new. It is a warmed-over version of the 
     strategy Cheney and his coauthors rolled out in 1992 as the 
     answer to the end of the Cold War. Then the goal was global 
     dominance, and it met with bad reviews. Now it is the answer 
     to terrorism. The emphasis is on preemption, and the reviews 
     are generally enthusiastic. Through all of this, the 
     dominance motif remains, though largely undetected.
       This country once rejected ``unwarned'' attacks such as 
     Pearl Harbor as barbarous and unworthy of a civilized nation. 
     Today many cheer the prospect of conducting sneak attacks--
     potentially with nuclear weapons--on piddling powers run by 
     tin-pot despots.
       We also once denounced those who tried to rule the world. 
     Our primary objection (at least officially) to the Soviet 
     Union as its quest for global domination. Through the 
     successful employment of the tools of containment, 
     deterrence, collective security, and diplomacy--the very 
     methods we now reject--we rid ourselves and the world of the 
     Evil Empire. Having done so, we now pursue the very thing for 
     which we opposed it. And now that the Soviet Union is gone, 
     there appears to be no one left to stop us.
       Perhaps, however, there is. The Bush Administration and its 
     loyal opposition seem not to grasp that the quests for 
     dominance generate backlash. Those threatened with preemption 
     may themselves launch preemptory strikes. And even those who 
     are successfully ``preempted'' or dominated may object and 
     find means to strike back. Pursuing such strategies may, 
     paradoxically, result in greater factionalism and rivalry, 
     precisely the things we seek to end.
       Not all Americans share Colin Powell's desire to be ``the 
     bully on the block.'' In fact, some believe that by following 
     a different path the United States has an opportunity to 
     establish a more lasting security environment. As Dartmouth 
     professors Stephen Brooks and William Woblforth wrote 
     recently in Foreign Affairs, ``Unipolarity makes it possible 
     to be the global bully--but it also offers the United States 
     the luxury of being able to look beyond its immediate needs 
     to its own, and the world's, long-term interests. . . . 
     Magnanimity and restraint in the face of temptation are 
     tenets of successful statecraft that have proved their 
     worth.'' Perhaps, in short, we can achieve our desired ends 
     by means other than global domination.
                                  ____


             [From the Wall Street Journal, Aug. 15, 2002]

     Don't Attack Saddam--It Would Undermine our Antiterror Efforts

                          (By Brent Scowcroft)

       Our nation is presently engaged in a debate about whether 
     to launch a war against Iraq. Leaks of various strategies for 
     an attack on Iraq appear with regularity. The Bush 
     administration vows regime change, but states that no 
     decision has been made whether, much less when, to launch an 
     invasion.
       It is beyond dispute that Saddam Hussein is a menace. He 
     terrorizes and brutalizes his own people. He has launched war 
     on two of his neighbors. He devotes enormous effort to 
     rebuilding his military forces and equipping them with 
     weapons of mass destruction. We will all be better off when 
     he is gone.
       That said, we need to think through this issue very 
     carefully. We need to analyze the relationship between Iraq 
     and our other pressing priorities--notably the war on 
     terrorism--as well as the best strategy and tactics available 
     were we to move to change the regime in Baghdad.
       Saddam's strategic objective appears to be to dominate the 
     Persian Gulf, to control oil from the region, or both.
       That clearly poses a real threat to key U.S. interests. But 
     there is scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist 
     organizations, and even less to the Sept. 11 attacks. Indeed 
     Saddam's goals have little in common with the terrorists who 
     threaten us, and there is little incentive for him to make 
     common cause with them.
       He is unlikely to risk his investment in weapons of mass 
     destruction, much less his country, by handing such weapons 
     to terrorists who would use them for their own purposes and 
     leave Baghdad as the return address. Threatening to use these 
     weapons for blackmail--much less their actual use--would open 
     him and his entire regime to a devastating response by the 
     U.S. While Saddam is thoroughly evil, he is above all a 
     power-hungry survivor.
       Saddam is a familiar dictatorial aggressor, with 
     traditional goals for his aggression. There is little 
     evidence to indicate that the United States itself is an 
     object of his aggression. Rather, Saddam's problem with the 
     U.S. appears to be that we stand in the way of his ambitions. 
     He seeks weapons of mass destruction not to arm terrorists, 
     but to deter us from intervening to block his aggressive 
     designs.
       Given Saddam's aggressive regional ambitions, as well as 
     his ruthlessness and unpredictability, it may at some point 
     be wise to remove him from power. Whether and when that point 
     should come ought to depend on overall U.S. national security 
     priorities. Our pre-eminent security priority--underscored 
     repeatedly by the president--is the war on terrorism. An 
     attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if 
     not destroy, the global counterterrorist campaign we have 
     undertaken.
       The United States could certainly defeat the Iraqi military 
     and destroy Saddam's regime. But it would not be a cakewalk. 
     On the contrary, it undoubtedly would be very expensive--with 
     serious consequences for the U.S. and global economy--and 
     could as well be bloody. In fact, Saddam would be likely to 
     conclude he had nothing left to lose, leading him to unleash 
     whatever weapons of mass destruction he possesses.
       Israel would have to expect to be the first casualty, as in 
     1991 when Saddam sought to bring Israel into the Gulf 
     conflict. This time, using weapons of mass destruction, he 
     might succeed, provoking Israel to respond, perhaps with 
     nuclear weapons, unleashing an Armageddon in the Middle East. 
     Finally, if we are to achieve our strategic objectives in 
     Iraq, a military campaign very likely would have to be 
     followed by a large-scale, long-term military occupation.
       But the central point is that any campaign against Iraq, 
     whatever the strategy, cost and risks, is certain to divert 
     us for some indefinite period from our war on terrorism. 
     Worse, there is a virtual consensus in the world against an 
     attack on Iraq at this time. So long as that sentiment 
     persists, it would require the U.S. to pursue a virtual go-
     it-alone strategy against Iraq, making any military 
     operations correspondingly more difficult and expensive. The 
     most serious cost, however, would be to the war on terrorism. 
     Ignoring that clear sentiment would result in a serious 
     degradation in international cooperation with us against 
     terrorism. And make no mistake, we simply cannot win that war 
     without enthusiastic international cooperation, especially on 
     intelligence.
       Possibly the most dire consequences would be the effect in 
     the region. The shared view in the region is that Iraq is 
     principally an obsession of the U.S. The obsession of the 
     region, however, is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If we 
     were seen to be turning our backs on that bitter conflict--
     which the region, rightly or wrongly, perceives to clearly 
     within our power to resolve--in order to go after Iraq, there 
     would be an explosion of outrage against us. We would be seen 
     as ignoring a key interest of the Muslim world in order to 
     satisfy what is seen to be a narrow American interest.
       Even without Israeli involvement, the results could well 
     destabilize Arab regimes in the region, ironically 
     facilitating one of Saddam's strategic objectives. At a 
     minimum, it would stifle any cooperation on terrorism, and 
     could even swell the ranks of the terrorists. Conversely, the 
     more progress we make in the war on terrorism, and the more 
     we are seen to be committed to resolving the Israel-
     Palestinian issue, the greater will be the international 
     support for going after Saddam.
       If we are truly serious about the war on terrorism, it must 
     remain our top priority. However, should Saddam Hussein be 
     found to be clearly implicated in the events of Sept. 11, 
     that could make him a key counterterrorist target, rather 
     than a competing priority, and significantly shift world 
     opinion toward support for regime change.
       In any event, we should be pressing the United Nations 
     Security Council to insist on an effective no-notice 
     inspection regime for Iraq--any time, anywhere, no permission 
     required. On this point, senior administration officials have 
     opined that Saddam Hussein would never agree to such an 
     inspection regime. But if he did, inspections would serve to 
     keep him off balance and under close observation, even if all 
     his weapons of mass destruction capabilities were not 
     uncovered. And if he refused, his rejection could provide the 
     persuasive casus belli which many claim we do not now have. 
     Compelling evidence that Saddam had acquired nuclear-weapons 
     capability could have a similar effect.

[[Page H7764]]

        In sum, if we will act in full awareness of the intimate 
     interrelationship of the key issues in the region, keeping 
     counterterrorism as our foremost priority, there is much 
     potential for success across the entire range of our security 
     interests--including Iraq. If we reject a comprehensive 
     perspective, however, we put at risk our campaign against 
     terrorism as well as stability and security in a vital region 
     of the world.
                                  ____


                [From the New York Times, Aug. 25, 2002]

                    The Right Way To Change a Regime

                        (By James A. Baker III)

       Pinedale, Wyo.--While there may be little evidence that 
     Iraq has ties to Al Qaeda or to the attacks of Sept. 11, 
     there is no question that its present government, under 
     Saddam Hussein, is an outlaw regime, is in violation of 
     United Nations Security Council resolutions, is embarked upon 
     a program of developing weapons of mass destruction and is a 
     threat to peace and stability, both in the Middle East and, 
     because of the risk of proliferation of these weapons, in 
     other parts of the globe. Peace-loving nations have a moral 
     responsibility to fight against the development and 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by rogues like 
     Saddam Hussein. We owe it to our children and grandchildren 
     to do so, and leading that fight is, and must continue to be, 
     an important foreign policy priority for America.
       And thus regime change in Iraq is the policy of the current 
     administration, just as it was the policy of its predecessor. 
     That being the case, the issue for policymakers to resolve is 
     not whether to use military force to achieve this, but how to 
     go about it.
       Covert action has been tried before and failed every time, 
     Iraqi opposition groups are not strong enough to get the job 
     done. It will not happen through internal revolt, either of 
     the army or the civilian population. We would have to be 
     extremely lucky to take out the top leadership through 
     insertion into Iraq of a small rapid-strike force. And this 
     last approach carries significant political risks for the 
     administration, as President Jimmy Carter found out in April 
     1980.
       The only realistic way to effect regime change in Iraq is 
     through the application of military force, including 
     sufficient ground troops to occupy the country (including 
     Baghdad), depose the current leadership and install a 
     successor government. Anyone who thinks we can effect regime 
     change in Iraq with anything less than this is simply not 
     realistic. It cannot be done on the cheap. It will require 
     substantial forces and substantial time to put those forces 
     in place to move. We had over 500,000 Americans, and more 
     soldiers from our many allies, for the Persian Gulf war. 
     There will be casualties, probably quite a few more than in 
     that war, since the Iraqis will be fighting to defend their 
     homeland. Sadly, there also will be civilian deaths. We will 
     face the problem of how long to occupy and administer a big, 
     fractious country and what type of government or 
     administration should follow. Finding Saddam Hussein and his 
     top associates will be difficult. It took us two weeks to 
     locate Manuel Noriega in Panama, a small country where we had 
     military bases.
       Unless we do it in the right way, there will be costs to 
     other Americans foreign policy interests, including our 
     relationships with practically all other Arab countries (and 
     even many of our customary allies in Europe and elsewhere) 
     and perhaps even to our top foreign policy priority, the war 
     on terrorism.
       Finally, there will be the cost to the American taxpayer of 
     a military undertaking of this magnitude. The Persian Gulf 
     war cost somewhere in the range of $60 billion, but we were 
     able to convince our many allies in that effort to bear the 
     brunt of the costs.
       So how should we proceed to effect regime change in Iraq?
       Although the United States could certainly succeed, we 
     should try our best not to have to go it alone, and the 
     president should reject the advice of those who counsel doing 
     so. The costs in all areas will be much greater, as will the 
     political risks, both domestic and international, if we end 
     up going it alone or with only one or two other countries.
       The president should do his best to stop his advisers and 
     their surrogates from playing out their differences publicly 
     and try to get everybody on the same page.
       The United States should advocate the adoption by the 
     United Nations Security Council of a simple and 
     straightforward resolution that Iraq submit to intrusive 
     inspections anytime, anywhere, with no exceptions, and 
     authorizing all necessary means to enforce it. Although it is 
     technically true that the United Nations already has 
     sufficient legal authority to deal with Iraq, the failure to 
     act when Saddam Hussein ejected the inspectors has weakened 
     that authority. Seeking new authorization now is necessary, 
     politically and practically, and will help build 
     international support.
       Some will argue, as was done in 1990, that going for United 
     Nations authority and not getting it will weaken our case. I 
     disagree. By proposing to proceed in such a way, we will be 
     doing the right thing, both politically and substantively. We 
     will occupy the moral high ground and put the burden of 
     supporting an outlaw regime and proliferation of weapons of 
     mass destruction on any countries that vote no. History will 
     be an unkind judge for those who prefer to do business rather 
     than to do the right thing. And even if the administration 
     fails in the Security Council, it is still free--citing 
     Iraq's flouting of the international community's resolutions 
     and perhaps Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which 
     guarantees a nation's right to self-defense--to weigh the 
     costs versus the benefit of going forward alone.
       Others will argue that this approach would give Saddam 
     Hussein a way out because he might agree and then begin the 
     ``cheat-and-retreat'' tactics he used during the first 
     inspection regime. And so we must not be deterred. The first 
     time he resorts to these tactics, we should apply whatever 
     means are necessary to change the regime. And the 
     international community must know during the Security Council 
     debate that this will be our policy.
       We should frankly recognize that our problem in 
     accomplishing regime change in Iraq is made more difficult by 
     the way our policy on the Arab-Israeli dispute is perceived 
     around the world. Sadly, in international politics, as in 
     domestic politics, perception is sometimes more important 
     than reality. We cannot allow our policy toward Iraq to be 
     linked to the Arab-Israeli dispute, as Saddam Hussein will 
     cynically demand, just as he did in 1990 and 1991. But to 
     avoid that, we need to move affirmatively, aggressively, and 
     in a fair and balanced way to implement the president's 
     vision for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, as laid 
     out in his June speech. That means, of course, reform by 
     Palestinians and an end to terror tactics. But it also means 
     withdrawal by Israeli forces to positions occupied before 
     September 2000 and an immediate end to settlement activity.
       If we are to change the regime in Iraq, we will have to 
     occupy the country militarily. The costs of doing so, 
     politically, economically and an terms of casualties, could 
     be great. They will be lessened if the president brings 
     together an international coalition behind the effort. Doing 
     so would also help in achieving the continuing support of the 
     American people, a necessary prerequisite for any successful 
     foreign policy.

  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, the Spratt approach is the correct approach. 
It says that the President, should go to the United Nations, go to Kofi 
Annan and tell him that we authorize President Bush to use all of the 
Armed Forces necessary to eliminate the chemical, the biological and 
the nuclear weapons of Saddam Hussein; and if Kofi Annan and the U.N. 
say, ``no, we will not authorize that,'' then it says that the 
President can come back to the United States Congress immediately, and 
then we would authorize the President to go in to Iraq with any other 
Nation in the world that would want to join us, and we will ensure that 
the chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of Saddam Hussein are 
taken from his possession.
  This is the way to go. If the U.N. says no, then we can say ``yes'' 
but the President has an obligation to go to the United Nations first 
and to find out if Kofi Annan and the U.N. we will not forcibly ensure 
that these weapons of mass destruction are confiscated.
  Vote yes on Spratt.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
California (Mrs. Tauscher).
  Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to state my strong support for the 
gentleman from South Carolina's (Mr. Spratt) substitute.
  As a member of the Committee on Armed Services, I am deeply concerned 
by the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, 
but I also strongly believe that the United States has a responsibility 
as the world's only superpower to set a standard for international 
behavior. We must consider every peaceable alternative and contemplate 
every possible outcome before we turn to force.
  The gentleman from South Carolina's (Mr. Spratt) amendment is 
invaluable because it strengthens America's position at the United 
Nations in support of new Security Council resolutions that Secretary 
Powell is negotiating as we speak.
  The gentleman from South Carolina's (Mr. Spratt) amendment sends a 
strong signal to our allies and to Saddam that the United States is 
committed to defeating the threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction.
  It ensures that our actions have international legitimacy and that, 
just like in 1991, we share the cost of war with our allies instead of 
putting the burden solely on the American people.
  If we are unable to secure resolution at the U.N., it provides for 
expedited congressional consideration of a joint resolution authorizing 
the use of force.
  I encourage my colleagues to vote for the Spratt amendment.

[[Page H7765]]

                              {time}  1145

  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
South Carolina (Mr. Clyburn), my colleague.
  Mr. CLYBURN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from my home State 
for yielding me this time and for his leadership on this and many other 
issues in this body.
  Mr. Speaker, there is not a single Member of this body who does not 
believe Saddam Hussein is a tyrant who has murdered his own people, 
violated U.N. sanctions, and thumbed his nose at the world community. 
However, this body and our Nation are deeply divided as to the proper 
course of action at this juncture.
  My cosponsorship of the Spratt amendment reflects that uncertainty 
among my constituents. The American people and our allies around the 
world have placed calls to my office expressing overwhelming lack of 
support for preemptive military action. Shoot now and ask questions 
later has never been the American way and it should not be it now.
  It is an awesome responsibility to have the power to set events in 
motion that could forever alter another country, an entire region, not 
to mention our Nation's future relationships in the world community. We 
should not put the lives of our youth at risk and further fuel the 
fervor of terrorist actions against our homeland. We should not duck 
our responsibilities as Members of Congress. I believe this substitute 
is the best action to take at this particular juncture.
  Many of us lived through Vietnam and saw its wretched effects on our 
Nation. This is not the time to commit to an unpopular unilateral act 
of aggression, especially one with such great potential for devastating 
consequences.
  Mr. Speaker, just because we can do it does not mean we should.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
  History is an exciting adventure. On April 28, 1999, in this very 
Chamber, right where we are now, this House voted to allow the 
President, President Clinton, without any U.N. resolution, to take 
military action: Bombing in Kosovo. And among those who voted to allow 
the President to do this, without a U.N. resolution, but to go ahead, 
gung ho, was virtually everybody that has spoken on that side of the 
Chamber.
  Absolutely, I applaud them. I do not know what changed them, why they 
now demand we process this through the U.N., but they did not feel that 
way back then, in April of 1999, and I have the rollcall if anybody 
cares to see it. But everybody voted to bomb Kosovo. Now, is that 
because that was President Clinton? There must be some explanation.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Cox).
  Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong agreement with all of the 
essential premises of the Spratt resolution and urge a ``no'' vote 
because of its conclusion. The Spratt resolution, like the Lee 
resolution before it, spells out precisely all of the reasons that we 
are here today; that Saddam Hussein and Iraq have unconditionally 
agreed to destroy all chemical and biological weapons there, ballistic 
missiles, to stop the development and the seeking of nuclear weapons; 
that Iraq unconditionally agreed to immediate inspections.
  The Spratt resolution goes on to say, and would have this Congress 
find, that Iraq and Saddam Hussein have ``flagrantly violated these 
unconditional terms.'' The Spratt resolution goes on to say that Saddam 
Hussein and Iraq are currently supporting international terrorism and 
continuing to develop chemical and biological weapons and actively 
seeking nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles to deliver them. But 
here, unlike the Lee resolution before it, the Spratt resolution does 
not denounce the use of force but rather says that at this time we 
should have a U.N. resolution that expressly authorizes the use of 
force; and, if such a U.N. resolution is adopted, then, by section 3 of 
this Spratt resolution, the Congress today would have anticipatorily 
authorized the use of force, expressly authorized President Bush to use 
military force to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and missiles.
  It even provides an expedited procedure for the President to get 
Congressional authority for war if the U.N. does not act. In short, 
this resolution, an alternative resolution that we are now considering, 
accepts every single premise of House Joint Resolution 114 that is 
supported by President Bush, the Speaker of the House, the Democratic 
leader of the House, the Republican leader of the Senate, and, as of 
today, the Democratic leader of the Senate.
  The Spratt resolution accepts the operative conclusion of House Joint 
Resolution 114 that the authorization of military force is essential. 
It is essential if this time we are to succeed where 16 past U.N. 
resolutions have failed. So the only real difference is that this 
different way of going after all of the same objectives, based on all 
of the same premises, this Rube Goldberg mechanism that we have set up, 
will scuttle the broad agreement that has been reached among the House, 
the Senate, and the executive and legislative branches, this consensus 
that America will stand as one.
  This resolution will jeopardize, in fact, passage of the very U.N. 
resolution that it purports to support.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Levin).
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) is 
right, there are similarities in the two resolutions. The issue, 
though, is whether we are going to emphasize going together or going it 
alone. The difference is whether we are going to emphasize collective 
action, trying the U.N. first, or whether we are going to give to this 
President now the right to act unilaterally, without going back to this 
Congress.
  We will strengthen the voice of the American people and we will speak 
with one voice more under the Spratt resolution because there is a 
division in this House under the resolution that has been brought forth 
on the majority side. If we want to speak with one voice, let us say 
try collective action. If it works, we will have acted together, as we 
did in Bosnia through NATO. If it does not, Mr. President, come back 
here on an expedited basis and we will act. That is the best chance for 
one voice.
  A very vital vote here today will be on the Spratt resolution. I 
think it is the wise way to go and is consonant with where the American 
people are.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi).
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time and for his extraordinary leadership in presenting this option to 
the House of Representatives. I also want to commend him for his 
leadership as a person who speaks for our Armed Services in this 
Congress, his commitment to provide for the common defense, as provided 
for in the Preamble of our Constitution. Today, we are all benefiting 
from his wisdom.
  The Spratt substitute, Mr. Speaker, captures many of the concerns of 
the American people who overwhelmingly support a multilateral approach 
to dealing with Saddam Hussein. The Spratt substitute also honors the 
Constitution when it says that Congress shall declare war.
  Some who have opposed the Spratt substitute have done so on the basis 
that we do not have time to come back to the Congress. This is simply 
not true. As called for in the Spratt substitute, should the Security 
Council fail to act in a satisfactory way, we come back to the 
Congress.
  I want to speak to the issue of time by quoting what is now 
declassified but is contained in a letter from the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency to the chairman of the Senate Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, this letter, signed by George Tenet. 
When asked if Saddam did not feel threatened, is it likely he would 
initiate an attack using a weapon of mass destruction, the Director of 
Central Intelligence responds in this letter and says, ``My judgment 
would be that the probability of him,'' Saddam, ``initiating an attack, 
let me put a time frame on it, in the foreseeable future, given the 
conditions we understand now, the likelihood I think would be low.''
  This is the Director of Central Intelligence saying the likelihood of 
Saddam initiating an attack using weapons of mass destruction, the 
likelihood, would be low. So it is not about time. It is about the 
Constitution. It is about

[[Page H7766]]

this Congress asserting its right to declare war when we are fully 
aware of what the challenges are to us, and it is about respecting the 
United Nations and a multilateral approach, which is safer for our 
troops.
  Force protection. I have been on the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence for 10 years, longer than anyone. My service there is 
coming to an end. But in the time that I have been there, force 
protection is one of our top priorities, to protect the men and women 
in uniform.
  This letter goes on to say, ``If we initiate an attack,'' if he felt 
he was threatened, ``if we initiate an attack and he thought he was in 
extremis or otherwise, what is the likelihood in response to our attack 
that he would use chemical and biological weapons?'' The response, 
``Pretty high.''
  We are placing our young people in harm's way in a way that can be 
avoided by taking a multilateral approach first. I commend the 
gentleman from South Carolina for his leadership. I will support this 
with great pride, and I thank him for giving us that opportunity.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, could I inquire of the Chair how much time I 
have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The gentleman from South 
Carolina (Mr. Spratt) has 4 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Hyde) has 4 minutes remaining.
  Mr. SPRATT. And the gentleman from Illinois has the right to close, 
or do I have the right to close?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) has 
the right to close.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to 
respond to some arguments that have been raised. Let me go back to 
Public Law 102-1; the allegation that somehow, somewhere this bill 
supplants it.
  Far from supplanting that bill, which was the Afghan War Powers Act, 
we reassert in this legislation the primacy of our policy, and that is 
to go after al Qaeda. We do that by saying to the President, before we 
go off in pursuit of another armed objective, military objective, we 
want you to tell us that this is not going to divert our focus from the 
primary objective, which is to get the guys that did what they did in 
New York on 9/11. We do not want to divert or dilute our focus from 
that at all. That is in the centerpiece of this particular bill.
  My good friend, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), has said that 
many of us on this side of the aisle voted for action in Kosovo. I did. 
And I am proud of it because we stopped another butchery in the 
backyard of Europe by doing so. We did not go to the U.N. then, and the 
gentleman knows why. Because the Russians are on the Security Council 
and they would have blocked us.
  Politics and diplomacy is a pragmatic thing. That is why we did not 
go there. But it was multilateral, because it was an undertaking by 
NATO, and we tried to use collective defense in that particular case. 
It simply proves the points.
  Now, let me say something else that I said at the outset because it 
is important. A lot of good people have argued that we are relying too 
much, too heavily on the U.N., and specifically on the Security 
Council, because that is really the body that applies here. But I was 
here in 1991, and when President Bush asked for a vote to go to war in 
the Persian Gulf, I was one of 86 on this side of the aisle who said 
you have got my support, Mr. President.

                              {time}  1200

  But remember what he did then, just days after Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait, President Bush said this invasion will not stand, but he also 
declared his vision was nothing less than a new world order. His words, 
a new world order.
  He turned first to the United Nations and went to the Security 
Council and got the first in a series of resolutions that culminated in 
Resolution 678 which authorized the use of force. President Bush 
obtained all those Security Council resolutions, with our support, but 
without an express war powers resolution until literally days before 
the war began.
  Rather than asserting that he could go it alone, stiffing the 
Security Council, he sought the Security Council approval. He sought 
allies to stand with us and cover approximately $62 billion out of the 
$66 billion total cost of the war. The result, a successful military 
action, a successful diplomacy, and I think a model worth emulating. 
And that is exactly what this resolution does.
  Where does this resolution come from? A couple of weeks ago, we had 
one of the last of the general officers who testified before our 
committee who has experience in this area, Wes Clarke, whom I greatly 
respect. He is certainly no warrior who shrinks from a fight. He was 
always advocating force in Bosnia to straighten out that situation 
there and in the Balkans.
  Here is what he told us. He said, First of all, time is on your side 
right now. Make the maximum advantage of it. First go for beefed-up 
arms inspections, a more truthful inspections program. This will have a 
couple of benefits. It will constrain Saddam, and it will give you 
legitimacy when he ultimately bucks you.
  Secondly, he said, our diplomacy will be further strengthened if we 
have an act adopted by Congress expressing our resolve to use force if 
necessary. But he said the resolution need not at this point authorize 
the use of force. It need simply agree on the intent to authorize the 
use of force if other measures fail.
  Mr. Speaker, that is exactly what we have done, both of those things.
  Finally, he said, If efforts to resolve the problems by the United 
Nations fail, seek the broadest possible coalition to bring force to 
bear.
  We have done what General Clark has recommended. It is embodied in 
this resolution. It follows the precedent set by President Bush. It is 
worthy of every Member's support, and I hope Members will vote for it.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Graham).
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The gentleman from South 
Carolina (Mr. Graham) is recognized for 4 minutes.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Speaker, this is a very worthy, appropriate debate 
and could not be more serious.
  The gentleman from Connecticut, a very good friend of mine whom I 
admire greatly, indicated that, in his opinion, the Spratt resolution 
would strengthen the hand of the President.
  Here is what the President believes. He rejects that. He does not 
believe that the Spratt resolution strengthens his hand.
  He asked us Monday night to come together and speak with one voice. 
What has happened over the last few weeks is amazing, and the American 
public should rejoice in it. The Speaker of the House, the minority 
leader, a group of bipartisan Senators, McCain and Lieberman and 
others, have sat down with the White House and have structured a 
resolution that gives a one-voice approach to a very serious problem 
for our country.
  I am not here to tell Members that they should follow blindly their 
President or their leadership. God knows, I have never been accused of 
that. But in matters such as this, we must try to achieve consensus 
because so much is at stake.
  Many watch what we say and do here. Please do not believe otherwise. 
We will either be stronger, or weaker, in our ability to negotiate and 
to make the world safer. There is strength in Hastert, Gephardt, Hyde 
and Lantos. The strength comes from the Speaker, the minority leader, 
committee chairmen and ranking members and the President reaching 
consensus. No disrespect to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. 
Spratt), but that is strength. The Spratt resolution would show 
weakness.
  It would be a defeat for the House leadership. It would be a defeat 
for our President. Other Members can write the headlines tomorrow. I 
choose not to write that headline because our enemies are watching, and 
they read.
  The Spratt resolution, I think, is ill-advised and ill-structured. To 
suggest that our President is not working with the United Nations would 
be wrong. The Speaker, the minority leader, and a bipartisan group of 
Senators believe he is; and the facts are clear that he is. He is 
working with our allies. He is trying to find a way to disarm this 
terrible, evil person before he does more damage.
  The resolution that the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) is 
asking us to adopt not only would be a

[[Page H7767]]

rejection of this consensus, but it would mandate by U.S. law that the 
United Nations act before the President can act.
  I speak again. The U.S. Congress would be telling the President he 
must go to the U.N. and he must win their political game. We would be 
making our President win a political game that I do not want to put him 
in.
  I believe the resolution is clear on what would be required of the 
President before he could act. U.N. politics takes a dominance in the 
Spratt amendment, not the one we are trying to support here today.
  If he loses the U.N. political battle, the President comes back to 
this body, and just imagine the frenzy. Write those headlines. The 
President comes back a loser in U.N. politics, and the forces in this 
world will seize upon that, and we will be weaker, not stronger, more 
division, a horrible scenario. Please reject it. I know many Members 
want to vote yes/yes. That may be good politics, but it would be bad 
for the country.
  Mr. Speaker, there are forces for good in this world, none greater 
than the U.S. Congress. Use our powers wisely. The world is watching.


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair must remind Members that positions 
of Senators may not be characterized beyond identifying a Senator as a 
sponsor of a measure.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Spratt amendment to 
H.J. Res. 114. I applaud the respected gentleman from South Carolina, 
Mr. Spratt, for his hard work and good sense on this amendment.
  This proposal is not perfect. I also question whether this amendment 
will, in practice, serve as an adequate check on the Administration's 
rush to act unilaterally in Iraq.
  But this Amendment is by far the best option we have on the floor 
today. It recognizes what the other two options on the floor do not: 
that while the U.S. may ultimately need to act alone to disarm Iraq, we 
should do so only if it is absolutely necessary.
  The Spratt Amendment authorizes the use of the U.S. armed forces to 
support any new U.N. Security Council resolution that mandates the 
elimination, by force if necessary, of all Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction.
  If, in the absence of a satisfactory U.N. Security Council 
resolution, the President determines it is necessary to proceed with 
force, it calls on the President to seek the authorization of Congress 
and provides expedited consideration for authorization.
  I firmly believe that military force should not be used until after 
the U.N. inspections. Force should not be used until all diplomatic 
channels have been exercised. And we should clearly understand what 
will be required for rebuilding the country. There are several good 
aspects of the Spratt Resolution worth emphasizing: it discusses force 
in the context of disarming Saddam Hussein, not as regime change; it 
places the burden of enforcing U.N. resolutions on the U.N. Security 
Council; and it allows the U.S. to act if the Security Council does not 
adequately fulfill its responsibility.
  This is a reasoned approach that rejects the use of unilateral 
action, of preemptive action, and preserves the checks and balances 
that are required of our government.
  I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am supporting the Spratt amendment 
because it provides many safeguards to war--it authorizes the use of 
force through a new UN Security Council Resolution; however, should the 
UN not adopt a resolution sanctioning the use of force or not take any 
action at all, the amendment would allow the President, if he deemed 
the UN Security Council's action insufficient, to come to Congress to 
obtain authorization to use the United States Armed Forces against 
Iraq. Most importantly, the Spratt amendment allows Congress to retain 
its rightful role in the constitutional process as the body having the 
authority to declare war.
  The Spratt amendment is an especially important safeguard--becasue it 
would give the United Nations, essentially, the World, time to examine 
the threat that Hussein poses and then, in a sobering fashion, make a 
determination as to whether a new resolution regarding the elimination 
of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction should be adopted or whether to 
use of force is the appropriate response to the threat that Saddam 
Hussein poses.
  We must not move hastily to the sobering decision to use force 
against another country. As it was discovered yesterday, it is now 
known that the CIA has concluded Saddam Hussein is unlikely to initiate 
a chemical or biological attack against the United States. Based on 
this CIA assessment, an attack on Iraq could provide the very thing the 
President claims he is trying to forestall--the use of chemical or 
biological weapons by Saddam.
  I believe it is extremely important that exhaust all avenues of 
peace, make use of all safeguards prior to sending our troops into 
battle. We cannot be injudicious, premature or inaccurate in our 
decision to go to war. The Spratt amendment makes the possibility of a 
unilateral attack on Iraq the last option--not the first. Lets give the 
UN and the U.S. a greater ability work towards a peaceful resolution of 
our concerns with Saddam Hussein.
  Mr. CAPUANO. Mr. Speaker, the substitute amendment introduced by Mr. 
Spratt improves on the base resolution, H.J. Res. 114, because it 
requires that the United States continue working with the United 
Nations to enforce existing Security Council Resolutions and to craft 
stronger resolutions addressing concerns over weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq. Instead of simply handing the President a blank 
check to wage war, this amendment urges the President to continue 
working with the UN Security Council.
  I will vote for the Spratt amendment because I believe it is a better 
alternative than the base resolution. I do not believe that the 
amendment will pass. If it does, however, I will vote No on final 
passage because I do not believe that the Spratt amendment does enough 
to explore all options resorting to war.
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, we face today one of the most important 
questions that can ever come before us as Members of Congress: whether 
to authorize the use of force, and commit the men and women of our 
armed forces to defend liberty and to protect the United States, at the 
possible cost of their lives--and the lives of many in a country far 
from our shores.
  It is an issue Americans care deeply about. I have received hundreds 
of calls during the past few weeks, and many of my constituents are 
raising similar and very serious concerns.
  They are suspicious of the timing of this debate. They see political 
overtones to it, and question whether this vote is being used as 
political purposes.
  Many are worried about the precedent of a preemptive and unilateral 
attack, and how that precedent might be used by other countries looking 
to justify aggressive and hostile acts.
  Others have expressed doubts about the Bush Administration's handling 
of foreign policy. They point to the Administration's abysmal record on 
a series of international efforts, including the Kyoto Protocol, the 
Biological Weapons Convention, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
with Russia. The Administration has created its own credibility problem 
by consistently going its own way instead of being the leader of a 
world coalition.
  Many callers have told me they don't see evidence that Saddam Hussein 
poses a current threat to the United States. They think terrorism by Al 
Qaeda is a greater and more immediate danger, and that Iraq is a 
diversion from our failure to capture Osama bin Laden.
  And over and over I've been told that war should be a last resort. 
Unfortunately, to many of my constituents, the Administration has 
created the perception that war with Iraq is our first and only resort.
  All of those concerns have been on my mind as I've deliberated on 
this vote. I've spent the good part of these last few weeks listening 
to experts from this Administration, from the Clinton Administration, 
and from non-partisan, independent organizations. I've tried to sort 
out what we know to be true and what we just suspect to be true. And 
I've tried to evaluate our best course when faced with the uncertain 
but potentially catastrophic threat that Saddam poses and the 
unpredictable horror a war can bring.

  Eleven years ago, in the face of Saddam's aggression against Kuwait, 
I voted reluctantly to oppose the use of force. I thought then that 
more time should be given to diplomacy, and to the enforcement of 
sanctions against Iraq. But once Congress acted, there was no question 
of the commitment of all of us to the success of Desert Storm. The 
liberation of Kuwait was effected; our casualties were thankfully quite 
small; and stability was, for an extended period of time, restored to 
the region.
  To be certain, many of us thought, and fervently hoped, that the 
crushing military defeat suffered by Saddam would result in his 
overthrow. Other monstrous dictators--such as Milosevic in Serbia--have 
crumbled in the face of far less of an onslaught. It is a mark of 
Saddam's cunning and ruthlessness that he survived the upheavals in his 
country that did unfold after the Gulf War, that he is still in power, 
and that he is still able to oppress his people.
  Whether one agrees or disagrees with the Administration's policy 
towards Iraq, I don't think there can be any question about Saddam's 
conduct. He has systematically violated, over the course of the past 11 
years, every significant U.N. resolution that has demanded that he 
disarm and destroy his chemical and biological weapons, and any nuclear 
capacity. This he has refused to do. He lies and cheats; he snubs the 
mandate and authority of international weapons inspectors; and he games 
the system to keep buying time against enforcement of the just and 
legitimate

[[Page H7768]]

demands of the United Nations, the Security Council, the United States 
and our allies. Those are simply the facts.
  And now, time has run out. It has been four long years since the last 
U.N. weapons inspectors were effectively ejected from Iraq because of 
Saddam's willful noncompliance with an effective inspection regime.
  What Saddam has done in the interim is not known for certain--but 
there is every evidence, from the dossier prepared by the Prime 
Minister of Britain, to President Bush's speech at the United Nations, 
that Saddam has rebuilt substantial chemical and biological weapons 
stocks, and that he is determined to obtain the means necessary to 
produce nuclear weapons. He has ballistic missiles, and more are 
on order. He traffics with other evil people in this world, intent on 
harming the United States, Israel, other nations in the Middle East, 
and our friends across the globe.

  We know Saddam quite well. We know he kills a lot of people, even in 
his own family. We know when he gives his word it cannot be trusted. We 
know he is a shameless propagandist. We recall that he held women and 
children hostage for a time in Baghdad as human shields in 1990 to try 
to deter armed attack to liberate Kuwait. We know what he does to his 
own people in the north and south of his country and what he did to his 
neighbors in Iran and Kuwait.
  We also know that Saddam is the patron saint of the homicide bombers 
in Israel. He pays their families when their youth go to kingdom-come 
from the streets of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. And Iraq, under Saddam, is 
one of only seven nations designated as a state sponsor of terrorism 
because of his aid and training of terrorists, according to the U.S. 
State Department.
  Wehter he is tied in with al-Qaeda is still subject to debate, but 
they share an intense hatred for the United States, Israel, and our 
allies, and in their willingness to attack civilians to achieve their 
purposes.
  In a perfect world the Iraqi people would have been able to seize 
their destiny and liberate their country. In a perfect world the U.N. 
resolutions calling for Saddam's disarmament would have been properly 
enforced.
  But this is not a perfect world, and so today we struggle with how 
best to achieve that disarmament. That is our objective--our debate 
today is over the right means to that necessary end.
  Eleven years ago, the United Nations Security Council approved a 
resolution calling for the liberation of Kuwait, and the disarmament of 
Saddam. This occurred before we voted in Congress to authorize the use 
of force against Iraq in January 1991.
  Eleven years ago, in other words, we in Congress were voting to 
endorse the consensus reached in the United Nations over what the world 
should do to repel Saddam's aggression in the region and provide the 
basis for an Iraq that could not threaten its neighbors via war or 
weapons of mass destruction.
  Today, the order is reversed and it is the Congress that is voting 
first on a resolution of war. And that is being done in the hope that 
it will help force a consensus in the United Nations so that the 
world--not just the United States--can pursue these issues on the 
soundest possible basis, with the strongest degree of support from as 
many nations as possible.
  This is why we have to get this resolution right. And this is why I 
strongly support the substitute, which emphasizes action by the UN and 
the international community. It outlines the importance of working with 
a coalition, and before American lives are placed at risk, exhausting 
all other options through diplomacy and unfettered inspections. We 
should do all we can to secure a Security Council endorsement for an 
invasion of Iraq, and possibly to avoid a war by forcing Saddam to 
abide by the UN requirements for disarmament.
  War must always be a last resort. In my view, Saddam has nearly 
brought us to that point. We have tried containment and sanctions over 
the last ten years, and both have failed. Sanctions hurt the people of 
Iraq and Saddam did not care about them. Inspections have failed 
because he has frustrated the inspectors and eventually forced them out 
of his country four years ago.
  We've tried surgical strikes on his facilities and no fly zones over 
large parts of his territory. He has responded by continuing to try to 
obtain weapons of mass destruction. He has turned the humanitarian 
efforts to allow oil sales for food into a $2 billion pot of money for 
weapons.
  In light of all this, if the UN does not act, it not only leaves 
Saddam unchecked but it undermines, perhaps fatally, the purpose of 
having or supporting a UN in the first place.
  If the UN does not or cannot act, the substitute does nothing to 
compromise the ability of the Congress to authorize the use of force to 
protect America's interests--unilaterally if necessary--if we believe 
it necessary at a later time.
  Under the substitute, we sacrifice none of our sovereignty--none--and 
maximize every opportunity for diplomacy and consensus. The substitute 
correctly recognizes that should we reach the point of last resort, 
that is the time for Congress to declare war.
  For all those reasons, I urge the House of Representatives to adopt 
the substitute and hope it will be the course we follow. It is the 
better choice and is the one most of my constituents and other 
Americans support.

  It is possible, however, that the substitute will be defeated. The 
question, then, is whether to support the Resolution President Bush has 
sent us, as modified through negotiations with Representative Richard 
Gephardt, the House Democratic Leader.
  Although I disagree deeply with much of President Bush's domestic 
policies and some aspects of his foreign policy, I agree with his 
conclusion that we cannot leave Saddam to continue on his present 
course. No one doubts that he is trying to build a nuclear device, and 
when he does, his potential for blackmail to dominate the Persian Gulf 
and Middle East will be enormous, and our efforts to deal with him be 
even more difficult and perilous. The risks of inaction clearly 
outweigh the risks of action.
  Despite my misgivings about the President's approach, I believe it's 
essential that Congress send the strongest bipartisan signal of unity 
possible so the U.N. will act. Some have even suggested that taking the 
threat of force out of the equation might undermine that result.
  In a post September 11 world, it is important we speak with one voice 
and send one message--particularly when the lives of our men and women 
in the armed forces are at stake.
  And it is important that we not send a confused signal to Iraq, so 
that there be no doubt about our resolve.
  Mr. Speaker, the goal I want is decisive U.N. action and the 
effective disarmament of Iraq. The substitute achieves that goal and 
should be approved. But if it is defeated, I believe supporting the 
President's proposal brings us closer to realizing that goal than 
defeating the Resolution.
  For that reason, Mr. Speaker, I will support the President's 
resolution if it is before us.
  Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from South Carolina 
for yielding me this time, and for his important leadership on this 
critical issue and so many others.
  I support the Spratt substitute because it is simply the right 
resolution for this House to adopt.
  It is not soft on Iraq.
  It requires that Saddam's weapons of mass destruction be destroyed.
  It places the decisions Congress must make in their proper order.
  It strengthens the role of the United States to build consensus and 
lead the international community through the U.N. Security Council.
  Most importantly, the Spratt substitute ensures that war, if needed, 
is the last option exercised, not the first.
  And should Congress need to act on a resolution to authorize military 
force, we would at least have the benefit of debating a well-defined 
mission for our troops.
  Unlike the current resolution that provides no clues as to what we 
are actually committing our troops to do, the Spratt substitute ensures 
that we in the United States Congress remain accountable to the 
American people and our Constitutionally-mandated responsibilities.
  The Spratt amendment reflects the successful model used by then-
President Bush in 1991.
  It is a model worth following.
  I ask all my colleagues to support the Spratt substitute.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, the United States is both blessed and 
burdened with enormous power. We have a responsibility to our 
constituents, to our country, and to the world, to ensure that the 
United States wields this power wisely.
  That's why I rise today in support of an amendment offered by 
Representative Spratt of South Carolina, which recognizes the threat 
posed by Iraq and ensures that Congress deals with this threat 
appropriately. This amendment challenges the United Nations to live up 
to its responsibilities by forcing Iraq to abide by its commitments to 
the international community. It places value in multilateral action, 
but also recognizes the reality that sometimes the United States must 
be prepared to act alone. This is an amendment that each of us can 
support with a clear conscience.
  The amendment encourages the President to continue working with the 
U.N. to craft a tough Security Council Resolution that leaves no room 
for Saddam Hussein to delay or impede weapons inspections on his 
territory, under the threat of immediate multilateral force.
  Should the U.N. shirk or fail in its duty, Congress should then 
consider, in an expedited fashion, the authorization of force to be 
used against Iraq. That way, we will vote with the full knowledge that 
all diplomatic efforts have indeed failed. It is at that time and at 
that time alone, that we, as Members of Congress entrusted with the 
solemn and terrible duty to

[[Page H7769]]

send our young men and women to war, should be called upon to cast that 
vote. In short, Congress should vote to authorize force when and only 
when there is no other option.
  We are fortunate to have before us the opportunity to craft a 
sensible and responsible policy for the United States, one that 
reflects, I believe, the very reasonable view of the majority of 
Americans. Americans are not hungry for war. We do not seek conflict, 
but neither do we shrink from our responsibilities. We will go to war 
only when we must--but not a moment before.
  But now Congress is faced with a vote on a resolution that asks us to 
authorize a war that may not be necessary at this particular time. 
That's not how Congress has dealt with issues of war and peace in the 
past, and there's no reason to violate that precedent now. A premature 
authorization of force is inconsistent with the traditions of the 
Congress and the character of this nation.
  Mr. Speaker, we can and must act to deal with the threat posed by 
Saddam Hussein. But Congress should not grant this authority 
prematurely, nor should we seek to do so. The Spratt amendment treats 
this matter with the gravity and circumspection it deserves. I urge my 
colleagues to consider carefully the alternatives before them, to vote 
yes for the Spratt amendment, and no on the majority resolution.
  The question is on the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
offered by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 155, 
nays 270, not voting 6, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 453]

                               YEAS--155

     Allen
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett
     Bartlett
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Borski
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson (IN)
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Fattah
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank
     Gonzalez
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holt
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Inslee
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Kaptur
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     LaTourette
     Levin
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Luther
     Lynch
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Obey
     Olver
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Roybal-Allard
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott
     Sherman
     Simmons
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watson (CA)
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Wu
     Wynn

                               NAYS--270

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Andrews
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barton
     Bass
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berman
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boswell
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carson (OK)
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Clement
     Coble
     Collins
     Combest
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Farr
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Grucci
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Honda
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kerns
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     LaHood
     Lantos
     Latham
     Leach
     Lee
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     Matheson
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Mica
     Miller, Dan
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, Jeff
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Owens
     Oxley
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Royce
     Rush
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Saxton
     Schaffer
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Sullivan
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Towns
     Turner
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins (OK)
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--6

     Barr
     Cooksey
     Fletcher
     Ortiz
     Roukema
     Stump

                              {time}  1228

  Messrs. BAKER, FLAKE, RUSH, SCHAFFER, and Ms. VELAZQUEZ changed their 
vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  So the amendment in the nature of a substitute was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                              {time}  1230

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). It is now in order to proceed 
to a final period of debate on the joint resolution, as amended.
  The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Lantos) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Flake).
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Ehlers).
  (Mr. EHLERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Speaker, casting a vote over whether to authorize 
military action may be the most difficult decision a member of Congress 
is asked to make. It certainly is for me. No matter who the opponent or 
what the circumstances, the consequences of a collective ``yes'' vote 
likely will be the loss of life. But failure to act holds the potential 
of even more terrible outcomes. Such a vote presents an excruciating 
moral dilemma.
  For the past year, our nation has been engaged in a great civic 
debate. How do we protect our nation from those who would do us harm? 
How can we ensure the safety of our children and grandchildren here and 
around the world? Should we take action against potentially hostile 
nations? These are questions without simple answers.
  President George W. Bush asked Congress to grant him the authority to 
take military action against Saddam Hussein and his regime in Iraq as 
part of our war on terrorism. No member of Congress takes such a 
request lightly. We may have different views and concerns, but each of 
us deals with this issue very seriously and solemnly.
  On such issues, persons are often characterized as hawks or doves. I 
am neither. Instead, I seek to be wise as an owl. I listened to the 
concerns voiced by many of my constituents. I wrote President Bush 
informing him of their concerns and seeking answers to their questions 
and mine. I studied Saddam Hussein and his past actions. I sought and 
received extensive briefings from

[[Page H7770]]

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld, the Central Intelligence Agency and others. And, because of 
my scientific background, I also received a detailed scientific 
briefing from civilian officials at the Pentagon about Saddam Hussein's 
weapons capabilities.
  This information has convinced me of several things. Saddam Hussein 
continues to have dangerous, warlike ambitions. He is Hitler-like in 
his methods of repression, especially in gassing his own people. He has 
thumbed his nose at the United Nations by evicting inspectors and using 
the UN's ``oil-for-food'' program to fund weapons rather than feed his 
impoverished people.
  Saddam Hussein continues, in violation of the U.N.'s sanctions and 
the peace agreement he signed, to develop and produce chemical and 
biological weapons for war and terror. Most troubling, he continues to 
develop nuclear weapons and may be as little as a year or two away from 
success. As a nuclear physicist, I know the destructive force of 
nuclear weapons. If a weapon of the type he is developing was detonated 
over Calder Plaza, the blast would devastate all of Grand Rapids and 
the near suburbs, a firestorm would consume the rest of the suburbs and 
a lethal dose of radiation would envelop much of the downwind area. All 
told, upwards of 300,000 people would be killed. Saddam Hussein's 
regime poses a very real threat to the safety of the United States, the 
safety of his own people and, indeed, the safety of the rest of the 
world.
  Early in this debate, I thought President Bush and his advisers were 
seeking to strike Iraq preemptively. But I found they view that as a 
final alternative, not a first step. The Bush Administration continues 
to work with the U.N. and our allies to build a coalition and seek a 
peaceful end to this situation through inspections and disarmament. 
However, we must grant the President the power to take action against 
Iraq because Hussein will not acquiesce until he faces a superior 
force. We may have to put troops on Iraq's border before he will 
comply, but I hope, along with many others in Congress and the 
Administration, that military action ultimately will not be necessary.
  I abhor the idea of the U.S. making a preemptive strike. Our 
philosophy has always been to take the first punch before we act. But 
when the first punch can destroy a city and kill hundreds of thousands 
of people, we must consider ways to stop that first punch.
  I commend President Bush for his recent speeches in which he more 
clearly stated his intentions and reasons for requesting this 
resolution. I also commend him for working with Congress to craft a 
resolution that is not as broad as his original proposal and meets many 
of the concerns raised by Congress and our constituents. The 
legislative process has worked in structuring the approach and limiting 
action to only Iraq.
  And so, after many days and weeks of thoughtful and prayerful 
consideration, I've decided to support this resolution. In this case, 
I've concluded not acting is more dangerous than acting.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to yield 2 minutes to my dear 
friend, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel), the ranking member of 
the Committee on Ways and Means.
  (Mr. RANGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, in June of 2000, President Clinton allowed 
me the great honor to take some veterans back to Korea in commemoration 
of the 50th anniversary of the Korean War. They were all members of the 
Second Infantry Division. We left Fort Lewis, Washington, in July and 
August of 1950, and we had left more men behind dead than came home.
  The raggedy group of veterans that went back, all black because we 
were in a segregated infantry unit, most had not gone to college, and, 
like myself, some had not even finished high school, we thought then 
that we were fighting for our country. But the more education I got, 
the more sophisticated I got, I realized we were fighting for the 
United Nations.
  Then when I became a Member of Congress and I led this same group of 
tattered veterans back to the same battlefields, they asked, why did 
Congress send them to South Korea and expose them to North Korean and 
Chinese warfare? And I had to tell them that this Congress never did 
send them there. No vote was ever taken in this Congress to say that 
they were at war with the people of North Korea or the People's 
Republic of China.
  I made a vow to them, and I am keeping it today, that never will I 
delegate the responsibility of considering the dangers of war. I will 
not leave it to the President, unless he brings me evidence that we are 
in danger. I will not give it to the United Nations, because I do not 
believe that this sacred responsibility should be transferred. And I do 
believe that each and every one of those veterans, if they thought our 
beloved country was in trouble, would be the first to stand up to 
salute the flag and be prepared to destroy what enemy we had, 
preemptive or not.
  I am against this resolution.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Gillmor).
  (Mr. GILLMOR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILLMOR. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution.
  I rise today in strong support of this resolution, authorizing the 
use of the United States Armed Forces against Iraq and the dictatorial 
regime of Saddam Hussein. Our President needs the assurance of this 
body that it will support his actions to keep our nation and the global 
community safe, from the current Iraqi government and its demonstrated 
capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction.
  As the Administration continues its negotiations with members of the 
United Nations Security Council, to compel Iraqi compliance with 
current U.N. resolutions, the rest of the world must know that we stand 
united in our actions. The United States government can not allow 
Saddam Hussein's continued development of chemical and biological 
agents and weapons of mass destruction. These actions are in direct 
violation of Iraq's obligations under the 1991 cease-fire agreement 
that brought an end to the Gulf War.
  I was a member of this body during the 102nd Congress and do not 
consider lightly any congressional action that may lead to the loss of 
American Servicemen's lives, or those of innocent civilians. Let us be 
clear about what we are communicating with this resolution here today. 
Because it is vital to United States' national security, we are 
supporting the President's efforts through the UN Security Council ``to 
ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and 
noncompliance and promptly and strictly'' abides by all relevant 
Security Council resolutions. We are calling for war.
  President Bush has made clear his commitment to work with the United 
Nations to address the common threat posed by the Iraqi regime but we 
can not restrict his options for protecting the American people. I have 
full confidence in our President and Administration to continue 
productive negotiations; and, if the decision is made necessary, lead 
this country in effective military action to bring an end to this clear 
and present danger.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this resolution.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, with great pleasure, I yield 3 minutes to the 
distinguished gentlewoman from Wyoming (Mrs. Cubin)
  Mrs. CUBIN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, as I have traveled through Wyoming, my fellow citizens 
have made their feelings very clear on the threat posed by Saddam 
Hussein, the threat posed by his weapons of mass destruction and the 
threat posed by his support of terrorism.
  They support the President's actions to ensure that Saddam Hussein's 
arsenal of chemical and biological weapons is totally dismantled, his 
ties to terrorist organizations are severed and the people of Iraq are 
given a chance to emerge from Saddam's oppressive shadow. The people of 
Wyoming hope and pray for peace, but they will not accept peace at the 
price of fear.
  Wyoming has a proud history of defending our Nation, from the 
Peacekeeper and the Minuteman missile silos based in our State that 
helped win the Cold War, to our many sons and daughters who made the 
ultimate sacrifice in the defense of liberty.
  One of the first casualties in our war on terror was a young man from 
Cheyenne, Wyoming. His name was John Edmunds. Should we let this threat 
build and tell John Edmunds' widow and his parents, Donn and Mary, that 
his death was in vain, that it did not

[[Page H7771]]

mean anything? How would we explain that we lacked the will to finish 
what we started? By explaining that the U.N. was not ready?
  Saddam Hussein has long been an enemy of humanity and freedom. He has 
murdered his own people with poison gas. He has attempted to 
assassinate an American president. He heaps praise on homicide bombers 
and rewards their families. Right now, as we debate in this Chamber, 
agents work to provide him with nuclear weapons. Should we wait a 
little longer to see if he gets it right this time?
  I understand that some in Congress are concerned about international 
support of his actions. But our first obligation is not to European 
governments like Paris or Berlin. It is to the safety and the security 
of the people of the United States of America.
  In an ideal world, we would not have to go it alone, and I believe we 
will not have to go it alone. But thanks to the likes of Saddam 
Hussein, this is not an ideal world. Saddam has made it clear to the 
world where he stands. Now Congress must let the world know where we 
stand, against him and with our President.
  Mr. Speaker, I end with a final question: Ask yourselves, why does 
Saddam Hussein seek an atom bomb? The people of Wyoming know. I know. I 
believe we all know.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to my good 
friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman), a distinguished 
member of the Committee on International Relations.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I was a fervent opponent of the Vietnam War 
and a strong supporter of sensible detente with the Soviet Union. But 
under today's circumstances, the best way to give peace a chance and to 
save the most lives, American and Iraqi, is for America to stand united 
and for Congress to authorize the President to use force if Saddam does 
not give up his weapons of mass destruction. Confront Saddam now, or 
pay a much heavier price later.
  We dismissed the first World Trade Center bombing as an isolated 
incident. When two embassies were bombed, we failed to see the broader 
implication of those acts. When the USS Cole was attacked, still we did 
not read the handwriting on the wall. It was irrational, we thought, 
that madmen would grow bold enough to attack America on her own shores. 
We wanted to give peace a chance.
  But then came 9/11, and it is time to say ``no more.'' The Democratic 
leader, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), and many of my 
colleagues have told us why a yes vote is necessary.
  We have brought key members of the Clinton national security team to 
the Hill, architects of our past policy to contain Saddam. These 
foreign policy experts from the Democratic Party have told us to a 
person that containment will no longer do the job and that the policy 
we are asked to endorse today is the right one for a peace-loving 
people.
  On the issue of Saddam Hussein, I have some experience. I begged both 
the Reagan and first Bush administrations to stop selling Iraq 
materials and technology that could be used for weapons of mass 
destruction, to put Iraq on the terrorist list, to impose economic 
sanctions. Saddam, with a nuclear weapon, is too horrifying to 
contemplate, too terrifying to tolerate.
  As one who has watched this man for 20 years, let me pose an analogy. 
It is just an analogy, because I reject the unproven efforts to tie 
Saddam to the events of 9/11.
  We are on an airplane, and we know that a few passengers have 
smuggled box cutters on board. We know these passengers have taken 
courses to learn how to fly a jumbo jet. We know that their friends 
have already flown a small plane into a building, killing hundreds of 
their own neighbors. But those armed passengers have not yet lunged for 
the cockpit.
  What should a peace loving people do? We know that people sitting 
near these dangerous passengers could be hurt if we take aggressive 
action. Should we wait until they kill the pilot and take over the 
airplane before we act? Of course not. We admire those with the courage 
to surround the armed passengers and demand that they give up their 
weapons under threat of force. That is what this resolution does.
  Is the threat imminent? Well, surely Saddam has box cutters, Saddam 
has a history of using them, Saddam is in the process of upgrading the 
box cutters, Saddam has boarded the plane with the box cutters.
  Confront Saddam now, or pay a much heavier price later.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 7 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. Watts), the Chairman of our 
Conference.
  Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I rise to support the resolution 
before the House today. Our Nation and our military may very well need 
to right the wrongs being perpetrated from an evil dictatorship in 
Iraq. Saddam Hussein poses a long-term threat that could jeopardize the 
freedoms and the way of life enjoyed by Americans from coast to coast, 
from border to border, a threat that grows more menacing over time.
  I have listened to some of the debate over the last several hours, 
over the last 24 hours. It has been said time and time again that there 
is no evidence that Saddam Hussein is an imminent threat.

                              {time}  1245

  Mr. Speaker, I would say to all that would say that, if you want 
evidence, look no further than September 11, 2001.
  I am pleased the President has sought congressional approval for 
possible military action and has worked diligently with Congress to 
craft a resolution that is both appropriate and constitutional. There 
are very few things Congress is explicitly given the sole authority to 
execute; to declare war is one of them. Article I, section 8 is very 
clear on that point.
  These 24 hours, 24-plus hours reserved for debate on this question is 
more than we debated Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo combined. President Bush 
should be commended for acknowledging Congress's authority with regard 
to any military action in Iraq.
  Mr. Speaker, this leads us to the merits of authorizing such a 
serious action. Putting our Armed Forces into harm's way should never 
be an easy decision for anyone. As one who represents a district with 
two significant Air Force bases and a large Army post, I have talked 
with countless active duty personnel and military families during my 
service here in Congress. The pilots, the airmen, soldiers, and other 
highly trained heroes at Tinker Air Force Base, Altus Air Force Base, 
Fort Sill Army Post are my friends, my neighbors, they are my 
constituents. I care deeply for these brave Americans.
  They understand, like so many across this country, that freedom is 
not free, liberty is not easy, and keeping the peace often requires 
sacrifice. America did not become the leader of the Free World by 
looking the other way to heinous atrocities and unspeakable evils.
  The President told the Nation this past Monday that Iraq has a 
massive stockpile of chemical and biological weapons that has never 
been accounted for, that is capable of killing millions and millions of 
people. Surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding 
facilities it used to produce chemical, biological, and nuclear 
weapons.
  Mark my words on the latter form of destruction. The moment Saddam 
Hussein acquires a nuclear weapon is the moment the world will be in 
even more danger, grave danger. I hope my colleagues will reflect 
deeply on this chilling possibility.
  Some people have pondered whether a military strike in Iraq would be 
just. Will the action of our government constitute a just war? Saint 
Augustine, the father of just war theory said, ``A just war is wont to 
be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or State has to 
be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by 
its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly.''
  This Congress must decide whether the situation in Iraq warrants 
military response. I am with the President. I believe this vote 
supports the just war theory when Saint Augustine wrote, ``We do not 
seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have 
peace.''

[[Page H7772]]

  Saddam Hussein has murdered his own people. His record on human 
rights is abysmal. He has aided and abetted terrorists. He hates 
America, he hates freedom, he hates independence, he hates our allies. 
He hates us.
  Mr. Speaker, at this very hour, we know a tyrant in Iraq is devising 
great evil. We know harm is inevitable if nuclear weapons are indeed 
acquired by Saddam Hussein. As testimony by a former Iraqi scientist 
before the Committee on Armed Services said, as he revealed last week, 
Saddam is on a break-neck pace to acquire those very weapons. I hope my 
colleagues put their trust and confidence in our military, America's 
sons and daughters, who love freedom and love liberty, to wage a worthy 
and just cause.
  Military options are the President's last choice. But we must give 
him the prerogative if the situation in Iraq requires the use of force. 
I urge the House to pass this legislation to support the President, 
support our Armed Forces, and support freedom throughout the world. We 
will prevail. As the President said, we must prevail. Vote ``yes'' on 
this resolution.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to my good 
friend, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Doggett), the ranking member, 
distinguished senior member of the Committee on Ways and Means.
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, to the occasional charge of ``hand-
wringing'' and ``weakness'' leveled at the many of us who are voting 
today against this resolution, perhaps the same could be said of this 
statement: ``Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into 
an occupation of Iraq . . . would have incurred incalculable human and 
political costs. . . . Had we gone the invasion route, the United 
States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly 
hostile land. It would have been a dramatically different--and perhaps 
barren--outcome.''
  But this statement comes from American patriots, our first President 
Bush and his National Security Adviser General Scowcroft, in explaining 
why they rejected the approach some urge today.
  As most Democrats today vote against launching a ground invasion of 
Iraq, we must candidly recognize that some of the most insightful 
arguments supporting our position were advanced by Republicans and 
military leaders like Scowcroft, Schwarzkopf, and Zinni.
  Party affiliations will not be chiseled on the gravestones of young 
Americans who die to win this war, nor on those of the American 
families jeopardized by diverting precious resources from the real war 
on terrorism, nor those harmed by new terrorists provoked by what too 
many will view as a new crusade against Islam.
  Why in the face of overwhelming support do so many of us vote ``no'' 
today? We respond not just to those we represent but, most of all, 
because individually we must answer to the face we see each day in the 
mirror. We must answer to history. We must answer to our children and 
our grandchildren.
  When more than one of every four members of this House cast our vote 
against this ill-considered resolution, we vote not against President 
Bush, who deserves our support and respect, but aware of the 
conflicting advice he is still receiving we say: listen to the voices 
of your better nature. The prudent remains--first, attempt holding Iraq 
accountable through effective, comprehensive international inspections.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter).
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, in 1991 when we went into Iraq, we thought, 
our best projection was that he was 3 to 5 years away from having a 
nuclear device. We found out when we got there that he was actually 
only 6 months to a year away from having a nuclear device. To have 
waited at that time, as many folks proposed, would have been 
disastrous.
  Now, the Committee on Armed Services, Democrats and Republicans, have 
held now three classified briefings inviting every Member of the House 
to participate to see and to understand the weapons of mass destruction 
program that is ongoing and robust and working toward completion right 
now in Iraq with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological systems. 
My own opinion is that there are going to be nuclear devices 
manufactured in Iraq within 24 months.
  To have waited in 1991 would have been disastrous. To wait today 
would be disastrous. We have got one leader, one person elected by all 
the people, our President, who is now our Commander in Chief. It is 
time for us, having been informed, having understood the problem, to 
rally behind him and take up this burden. Let us support this 
resolution.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to my good 
friend, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Frost), our distinguished 
chairman of the Democratic Caucus.
  (Mr. FROST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this bipartisan 
resolution. It provides the best opportunity for a peaceful resolution 
by giving the President the discretion to use force if Iraq does not 
permit full and comprehensive inspections of all sites that could be 
used to develop biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons.
  I hope, as do the American people, that the President will use this 
discretion wisely and that Saddam Hussein will understand that the 
community of nations will not permit him to develop and maintain 
weapons of mass destruction.
  Mr. Speaker, today's vote is a difficult one. Many House Members have 
worn their country's uniform in time of war and have seen the horror of 
battle firsthand. We all understand the sacrifices that we may be 
asking our brave young men and women to make in the months to come.
  As chairman of the Democratic Caucus, I have presided over numerous 
meetings on this subject. I have listened carefully to my colleagues 
and to policy experts who have followed Saddam Hussein's activities 
over the years.
  In the end, I have come to the conclusion that the course set out in 
this resolution is the wisest path for our Nation.
  The resolution makes clear that our first preference is for the 
President to work through the United Nations to obtain multilateral 
support for a tough regime of weapons inspections. It requires the 
President to report back to Congress and to consult with us on an 
ongoing basis. But in the end, it gives the President the authority to 
commit U.S. troops if all diplomatic efforts fail.
  Mr. Speaker, giving the President this discretion is highly 
appropriate. In so doing, we make clear to Saddam Hussein that it is in 
his interests to permit the inspectors full and unfettered access now. 
Should he fail to do so, he will face the full might of the United 
States military, the strongest and finest fighting force in the world 
today.
  Mr. Speaker, no one wants war. We all want peace, and peace is best 
achieved from a position of strength.
  So I want to personally recognize the work of our Democratic leader, 
the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), in narrowing and improving 
the resolution originally offered by the administration. We vote today 
on a better, more focused approach because of the hours he spent 
negotiating with the White House over the final product.
  I want to say a word about the role of the minority in our system of 
government. Some suggest that the minority's role is to automatically 
oppose everything sought by the President. I disagree. The minority can 
play a constructive role by working to improve a Presidential proposal 
and, therefore, helping achieve a national consensus. That is 
particularly true in matters of foreign policy.
  So I urge all of my colleagues, regardless of how my colleagues voted 
on the Spratt or Lee substitutes, to join Democrats and Republicans in 
voting for this bipartisan resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, this bipartisan resolution will send a strong, clear 
signal that America is committed to ending the threat that Saddam 
Hussein poses to the world through democracy, if he will allow it, but 
through military action if he refuses.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to my good 
friend, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.

[[Page H7773]]

Kucinich), a respected member of our caucus.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, more than two millennia ago, the world 
began a shift from the philosophy of an eye for an eye. We were taught 
a new gospel of compassion of doing unto others as you would have them 
do unto you. It is that teaching, that faith and compassion that has 
sustained the human heart and this Nation.
  I believe, as did Washington and Lincoln, that America has been 
favored by divine providence. But what if we lose our connection to our 
source by an abuse of power?
  We are at a dangerous moment in human history when 20 centuries of 
moral teachings are about to be turned upside down. Instead of 
adherence to the Golden Rule, we are being moved toward the rule of 
liquid gold: do unto others before they do unto you.
  No longer are we justified by our faith; we are now justified by our 
fear. Iraq was not responsible for 9-11, but some fear it was. There is 
no proof Iraq worked with al Qaeda to cause 9-11, but some fear it did.
  It is fear which leads us to war. It is fear which leads us to 
believe that we must kill or be killed, fear which leads us to attack 
those who have not attacked us, fear which leads us to ring our Nation 
and the very heavens with weapons of mass destruction.
  The American people need the attention of their government today. 
People who have worked a lifetime are finding the American dream 
slipping away. People who have saved, who have invested wisely are 
suffering because of corruption on Wall Street, the failing economy, 
and the declining stock market.

                              {time}  1300

  People have lost their homes, they have lost their jobs, they have 
lost their chances for a good education for their children. The 
American dream is slipping away, and all the people hear from 
Washington, D.C., is war talk, so loud as to drown out the voices of 
the American people calling for help.
  Seventy years ago, Franklin Roosevelt said, ``We have nothing to fear 
but fear itself,'' calling America to a domestic agenda, a New Deal for 
America. Faith in our country calls us to that again. Faith in our 
country calls us to work with the world community to create peace 
through inspection, not destruction. Faith in our country calls us to 
use our talents and abilities to address the urgent concerns of America 
today.
  Let us not fear our ability to create a new, more peaceful world 
through the science of human relations. Faith, America; courage, 
America; peace, America.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from South Dakota (Mr. Thune).
  Mr. THUNE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Speaker, today Congress faces a momentous decision. We have had a 
spirited and vigorous debate about an issue of the utmost importance to 
this institution, to our government, and to our Nation. In the end, 
each of us must decide for our constituents and for ourselves whether 
or not to support authorizing President Bush to use force against Iraq.
  President Bush has called for an end to the international appeasement 
of Saddam Hussein. He has challenged the world to face up to its 
responsibilities and stop this evil man with his evil designs.
  Clearly, Mr. Speaker, we would all prefer that diplomacy could solve 
this problem. At the same time, we must understand that diplomacy has 
not worked with Iraq. We have been patient over this last decade, yet 
Iraq continues to defy the world community. Saddam has had his 
opportunity. The United States must now determine for itself how we 
should protect our Nation and our citizens.
  It is we, Members of Congress, the President, and the American people 
who should determine the fate of our Nation. Members of Congress have 
the difficult decision of determining whether or not the Nation should 
go to war. As a Member of Congress, I accept my responsibilities to 
weigh the evidence and to vote yea or nay, knowing full well what the 
consequences may be. I take this job seriously, and am willing to do my 
part to protect our Nation and ensure that Americans, both at home and 
abroad, are safe.
  I have concluded that, to protect the lives and safety of our country 
and our people, we must act. Mr. Speaker, it is time to give the 
President the authority he has requested to deal with the imminent 
threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States and to the world. 
I hope that diplomacy will work and that Saddam will finally yield 
unconditionally to international inspections for weapons of mass 
destruction. I also hope that the United Nations will join the United 
States in this effort.
  However, we cannot, as a Nation, make our national security dependent 
upon any other institution, no matter how well-intentioned it may be. 
In the end, the growing coalition of countries supporting our efforts 
will see the overwhelming bipartisan support in the vote today as a 
symbol of the unity and commitment of this Nation to disarming Saddam 
Hussein.
  In the end, our actions today, Mr. Speaker, will be seen as the 
correct course for our Nation and for our world.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this 
resolution and in support of our President as we cast our votes today.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to my good 
friend, the gentleman from Maine (Mr. Allen), a senior member of the 
Committee on Armed Services.
  Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution. Saddam Hussein 
is a tyrant to his own people and a threat to ourselves and to others. 
If this were simply a referendum on him, the vote today would be 
unanimous.
  But the resolution before us raises two questions of fundamental 
importance, questions that are agonizing for Members of this body: 
First, how do we diminish the threat from Iraq without empowering 
Islamic fundamentalism and creating new recruits for terrorist groups; 
and, second, how do we avoid setting a dangerous global precedent for 
other nations to launch unilateral preemptive attacks as a legitimate 
tool of national policy?
  The resolution negotiated between the President and House leadership 
is still a blank check. The Spratt substitute, in its essence, said 
that we are not willing to provide a blank check now for unilateral 
military action, though we are willing to provide or authorize military 
force multilaterally.
  This resolution unwisely justifies action against Iraq under the Bush 
administration's new doctrine of preemption and regime change. This 
justification has the potential to create precedents that will come 
back to haunt us if adopted by our Nation or by others.
  Under the Constitution, the President and Congress share warmaking 
powers. Yet, the underlying resolution represents an abdication of 
Congress' historic role. We cannot look into the future. If we act 
unilaterally, we do not know today what support we might have from some 
allies, how many troops it would take, what the President has in mind. 
A decision to use unilateral force should be postponed to a later date.
  In the war on terrorism, we need more friends and allies and fewer 
enemies. We will get to that place if we first make a commitment to 
working with our allies, and only later, if necessary, authorize the 
use of unilateral force.
  I urge my colleagues not to give our rights away in this Congress, 
and to reject the resolution.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk).
  Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman and my colleague, the 
gentleman from Illinois, for yielding time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, we have seen this movie before: The Inter-Allied Control 
Commission of inspectors were granted full freedom of movement, all 
necessary facilities, documents, and designs. Three hundred thirty-
seven weapons inspectors were deployed in 11 districts.
  They reported that they destroyed 33,384 cannons, 37,211,551 
artillery shells, 87,000 machine guns, and 920 tons of poison gas. In 
sum, they reported 97 percent of artillery and 98 percent of men under 
arms were rendered ineffective.
  These reports were not about Iraq, they were about post World War I 
Germany, and told us not to worry. When

[[Page H7774]]

the Commission finally started reporting on German violations on 
inspections, the leading French diplomat wrote to President Wilson the 
following:
  ``Elements in each of the nations of the League will be quite 
naturally inclined to deny reports disturbing to their peace of mind 
and more or less consciously espouse the cause of the German government 
which will deny the said reports. We must recall the opposition of 
these elements at the time when Germany armed to the teeth and openly 
made ready the aggression of 1870 and 1914.
  ``To sum up, the Germans will deny, their government will discuss, 
and, meanwhile, public opinion will be divided, alarmed, and nervous.''
  In the end, Germany rearmed under the eyes of 300 international 
inspectors. As evidence of violations mounted, the international 
community lost its nerve to impose the will of international law.
  This resolution offers the best hope that Secretary Powell will get 
inspectors, real inspectors, back to Iraq.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to my good 
friend, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the distinguished 
ranking member of our Committee on Armed Services.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, today I speak of duty. This is the third 
time that I have stood at this podium with the question of military 
action in the balance. There is no more serious vote nor more sacred 
duty than this, deciding to ask those who serve this great country to 
go into harm's way.
  So it is a decision that must be taken soberly and deliberately. It 
must be taken mindful of the regional implications, and it must balance 
the risks of not acting with those of not acting prudently.
  Winston Churchill's book ``The Gathering Storm'' details the world's 
slide into holocaust. I point out, Mr. Speaker, that his book is 
subtitled ``How the English-Speaking Peoples, Through Their Unwisdom, 
Carelessness, and Good Nature, Allowed the Wicked to Rearm.'' Many of 
us saw firsthand the consequence of that rearmament. Never again, Mr. 
Speaker, never again.
  The issue of Iraq was never whether evil should be confronted, but 
how. My own questioning began in a letter to the President on September 
4. My concerns were to emphasize multilateral action, understanding the 
implications of using military force for the United States' role in the 
world.
  We must have a plan for the rebuilding of the Iraqi government and 
society if the worst comes to pass and armed conflict is necessary. We 
must ensure that America's commitments to the war on terrorism and to 
other missions throughout the globe will be upheld.
  In short, to paraphrase the great military strategist, Carl von 
Clausewitz, we must not take the first step in this conflict without 
considering the last.
  This resolution, while not perfect, is a vast improvement from that 
originally sent by the White House. To my mind, this resolution makes 
clear Congress's intention that America achieve its goals 
multilaterally if possible. As importantly, it announces our 
determination to stay the course and deal with the aftermath if 
military action is taken.
  Having achieved these clarifications, the question before the House 
is this: Shall we stay the hand of the miscreant, or permit the world's 
worst government to brandish the world's worst weapons?
  I believe that, Mr. Speaker, difficult as it is, there can be only 
one answer. I support the resolution.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Cox).
  Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, as was so horribly demonstrated on September 
11, the greatest threat to our country today comes not from the world's 
greatest powers but, rather, from unstable and dangerous individuals 
scattered across much of the world with nothing more in common than 
their hatred of the United States.
  Some of these individuals are itinerant phantoms, like Osama bin 
Laden. A very few control territory and governments, like Mullah Omar 
and Saddam Hussein.
  It is for this reason that we are forced to deal with Iraq. It is not 
merely that Iraq's brutal and ruthless dictatorship is hostile to 
America, or that it has given comfort to the al Qaeda terrorists, or 
even that it possesses the most gruesome weapons of mass murder.
  Beyond all of this, Iraq's barbaric dictator, like the al Qaeda 
fanatics whom he supports, is unstable and a proven killer. We cannot 
deal with him or the territory that he controls by terror as if it were 
a nation state like any other. It is not. Saddam Hussein does not 
merely possess chemical weapons; he has used them. He does not merely 
mouth hatred for the United States; it is well known that he attempted 
to assassinate our President. He does not merely tolerate global 
terrorism; he is one of its main incubators.
  We must ask, however, is confronting Saddam Hussein worth the cost 
that we will surely have to bear if we are required to make good on our 
threat of force? To that we must answer that there is potentially an 
even heavier cost of temporizing, of doing nothing, of adding a 17th 
toothless U.N. resolution to the 16 that Saddam Hussein that is already 
violated.
  What we learned on September 11 is that turning a blind eye to the 
metastasizing of cancer cells, of terrorist cells, is the costliest 
choice we can make.
  What of our friends and sometime allies, such as, for example, France 
and Russia, who have accused us of going it alone? If we approve this 
resolution today without their prior agreement, will we not simply 
display to Saddam Hussein that the world lacks the international 
agreement that is necessary to win the war on terror?
  To that I am afraid we must answer that if even such great nations as 
France and Russia cannot be convinced to see their own self-interest in 
protecting the civilized world from the likes of Saddam Hussein, then, 
in fact, the war on terrorism will indeed be compromised.
  But this is not the end, it is the beginning. Just as Saddam Hussein 
must know that America is serious, so, too, must our friends and 
allies. If we vote to deny the President the backing of this Congress 
and think that then he can win the support of additional nations, we 
are delusional.
  Mr. Speaker, our purpose is a good one; and we must lead. To save a 
nation from terrorist rule, as with Mullah Omar and Saddam Hussein, 
protects not only the citizens of those countries but our own country 
and the entire world. All of us must hope that when the United Nations 
passes its resolution, Saddam Hussein will this time finally see reason 
and disarm.

                              {time}  1315

  But as the proverb says, he who lives only by hope will die in 
despair. I ask my colleagues to unite hope with reason and practicality 
and willingness to act. Let us support this resolution.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to my 
good friend, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Luther).
  (Mr. LUTHER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LUTHER. Mr. Speaker, the language of the resolution has been 
improved significantly. I will vote to give this administration 
authority, and I ask that this authority be exercised judiciously and 
morally.
  Mr. Speaker, the intense debate we are having is what the American 
people deserve on a subject as serious as the matter before us.
  Like most Americans, I believe Saddam Hussein has chemical and 
biological weapons and that he has stepped up his nuclear program. Left 
unchecked, these activities are a serious threat to Iraq's neighbors 
and to the United States.
  While this alone may not justify military action, we are living in a 
changed world today. The new challenges we face require a new way of 
thinking, and our country's leaders must make every effort to 
anticipate and prevent future attacks on the people of our country.
  I will therefore support the resolution to use force, if necessary, 
to disarm Saddam Hussein. I am concerned that the administration 
initially approached the situation in Iraq in a hasty and simplistic 
manner. While the administration is now pursuing a more responsible 
course of action that could over time unify the American people and the 
world community, I remain concerned about the timing, ultimate 
objectives, international effects, long-term consequences and human 
cost of any large-scale invasion of Iraq.

[[Page H7775]]

  Nevertheless, the language of the resolution has been improved 
significantly since proposed by the administration and Congress will 
have additional opportunities to consult and work with the President in 
the future. In supporting this resolution it is my hope and expectation 
that the President will use his authority in a thoughtful, measured and 
responsible way consistent with the moral leadership America needs to 
provide the world.
  First, the Administration should work in concert with the global 
community, including our allies in the Middle East, to build an 
international coalition in support of our goals, as was successfully 
shown by the first President Bush in the Gulf War. Any plan to go it 
alone has the potential to inflame global mistrust of the United States 
and increase the possibility of renewed terrorist activity.
  Second, our country must get its fiscal house in order as the war on 
terrorism continues. Military action is very costly and common sense 
dictates that our allies and other nations that benefit from ridding 
the world of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction should also share the 
financial burden.
  Third, it is important to have a clear plan and commitment on how to 
ensure stability in the region after our goals in Iraq are achieved. 
Disarming Iraq and removing Saddam Hussein from power without a 
concrete plan to ensure a stable and less hostile new regime would be a 
mistake.
  Finally, the administration must continue to engage the American 
people, Congress, the United Nations and our international allies to 
build support for the disarmament of Iraq. This course is our best hope 
for achieving our goals without war.
  Since coming to Congress in 1994, I have consistently supported an 
activist role for the United States in the world community. I have 
supported giving the administration, regardless of political party and 
despite intense criticism at times, the necessary military authority 
and resources to combat threats to our national security and to promote 
human rights and American values around the globe. I strongly supported 
our country's attacks during the 1990's on military targets in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and the Sudan, and I wholeheartedly supported our country's 
efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo long before the tragedy of September 11th.
  I will vote to give this administration similar authority and I ask 
that this authority be exercised judiciously and morally.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my good friend, the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran), a distinguished member of the 
Committee on Appropriations.
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend from 
California (Mr. Lantos) for yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, there are compelling, fundamental reasons why this body 
should oppose this resolution. With great power comes great 
responsibility, great responsibility to conduct our foreign policy in a 
manner worthy of our world leadership, consistent with the 
international standards of conduct that we have worked so hard to 
establish for the better part of the 20th century. The United States 
must continue to act in a manner that serves as an example to the rest 
of the world.
  Mr. Speaker, this Congress is the people's body. That is why before 
we offer up the lives of our sons and daughters in the cause of war, we 
must have the final say. The amendment that just failed was about 
upholding the integrity of this institution and the U.S. Constitution 
that must guide all our actions. We should be making Saddam Hussein 
irrelevant, not marginalizing the United States Congress. We make him 
irrelevant by disarming him, discovering and destroying all of his 
weapons of mass destruction and his means of delivering them.
  We can accomplish that objective without leaving our allies on the 
sidelines or further inflaming the passions of people, especially in 
the Arab and Muslim world, who do not understand or trust our noble 
intent.
  We are not the only people prepared to sacrifice our lives for the 
family security and individual freedoms that motivate the human race.
  We oppose this resolution for the same reasons the first President 
Bush delayed a comparable debate until after the midterm congressional 
elections a decade ago, why he pressed so hard and successfully for the 
United Nations Security Council's support, and why he successfully 
achieved the support of Iraq's Arab neighbors.
  Mr. Speaker, we do not need a new national security strategy that, 
with a policy of unilateral preemption, tramples the foundation of the 
international rules of law that has been this generation's legacy to 
this small planet. We should be standing on the shoulders of the great 
leaders who have preceded us in this body and who are the true authors 
of our existing national security strategy that remains the best hope 
of peace and progress for all of mankind.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 4 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, I wish to end my part in this great debate as I began in 
tribute to the patriotism of every Member of this body and with special 
thanks to my dear friend and distinguished counterpart on the 
Republican side, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), a combat 
veteran of World War II.
  Over the course of the last 2 days, my colleagues have expressed many 
different views, but all have affirmed their commitment to safeguard 
our national security, to pursue peace and to wage war only as a very 
last resort. The depth and dignity of the debate is worthy of this 
great subject and of our great democracy.
  At the outset, Mr. Speaker, I wish to commend our Democratic leader, 
my good friend, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt). In the 
proud tradition of that great Republican Senator, Arthur Vanderberg, 
half a century ago, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt) 
transcends parties and politics to craft and champion a bipartisan 
resolution that best serves the interest of our Nation. His leadership 
has been a true profile in courage.
  Mr. Speaker, as our debate has shown, none deny the danger posed by 
Saddam Hussein. We differ only in the means of addressing this mounting 
threat; and in doing so, we grapple with two paradoxes. The first is 
the paradox of peace: Faced with an implacable and belligerent foe, how 
do we avert war? The answer, as our resolution affirms, lies not in 
disavowing the use of force, but in authorizing it. It is only when the 
Iraqi dictator is certain of our willingness to wage war, if necessary, 
that peace becomes possible. Saddam, like his mentor, Stalin, and all 
dictators, recoils before strength and pounces on weakness.
  The second paradox, Mr. Speaker, is the paradox of leadership. Faced 
with skepticism from some friends and timid bystanders, how do we form 
the broadest possible coalition to confront Saddam? Publicly, few 
nations have responded to our call to arms against Iraq. Privately, as 
I have learned in innumerable meetings with heads of state, foreign 
ministers and ambassadors from the Arab world and beyond, the United 
States enjoys strong support. Bridging the divide between public 
opposition and private support requires that the United States assert 
leadership. Our joint resolution will demonstrate to the world our 
steadfast resolve. It will convince others that joining us is the best 
hope for securing peace. If we show the courage to lead, others will 
follow.
  To preserve peace, we must authorize force. To build support, we must 
be prepared to lead. Our resolution resolves these paradoxes and 
represents the best means of averting war and of marshaling 
international cooperation. It is for these reasons that I urge support 
for our bipartisan resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, in moments we will be casting our vote and we will make 
history. In so doing, we dare not repeat the history of the last 
century, a history characterized too often by appeasement and inaction 
in the face of tyranny. It is a history that should haunt all of us. 
Let us cast a vote in favor of this resolution. It will be a vote for 
American leadership. It will be a vote for peace.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Kennedy).
  (Mr. KENNEDY of Minnesota asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. KENNEDY of Minnesota. Mr. Speaker, I believe history tells us 
that supporting this resolution and empowering the President for peace 
is the surest chance to removing the threat to America without conflict 
and giving the authority to defend America and freedom, if necessary.
  Mr. Speaker, I would quote Theodore Roosevelt, from a speech he gave 
in 1916 while the rest of the world was engaged in the Great War, ``The 
belief that international public opinion, unbacked by force, has the 
slightest effect in restraining a powerful military nation in any 
course of action has been shown to be a pathetic fallacy.''

[[Page H7776]]

  Mr. Speaker, in the weeks since the Iraq policy debate came to the 
forefront of the national agenda, I have thought long and hard about 
how I would vote if it became my responsibility. This vote is the most 
important vote I will cast since I was elected to serve in Congress.
  As Members of this august body, the people's house, it is the essence 
of our constitutional oath to defend America against all enemies 
foreign and domestic.
  It is at times like these that I reflect on the words of a man who 
inspired me to the cause of public service, John F. Kennedy: ``I do not 
shrink from this responsibility, I welcome it.''
  Mr. Speaker, in framing my thoughts on this momentous debate, I 
looked to history as a guide. I am unable to escape its harsher 
lessons.
  I think of that lone voice in the House of Commons in the 1930s, who 
tried to alert his country to a growing danger. Winston Churchill 
warned against making agreements with an aggressor who had no intention 
of honoring them, all in the name of ``peace.'' Others' reluctance to 
confront a growing evil resulted in countless deaths and untold 
suffering.
  More recently, Ronald Reagan challenged America and the rest of the 
free world to remember its historical roots and stand up to Soviet 
expansionism. With the simple words, ``Evil Empire,'' he succinctly 
characterized the nature of our adversary in the decades-old standoff 
between East and West. Man in the international community believed 
Ronald Reagan's abandonment of detente for his policy of peace through 
strength would bring war. Instead, the Soviet Union collapsed and 
because of the bold stand of an American president, countless millions 
were liberated without a shot being fired and the bright light of 
freedom was able to shine anew.
  The age-old struggle of freedom against tyranny has entered a new 
century. Yet when faced with the choice of negotiating with an 
aggressor in the name of peace, or confronting aggression before it is 
too late, history's lesson is clear.
  Mr. Speaker, it has been our tradition to fight for freedom and 
prosperity, going back to our Republic's infancy and America's lonely 
fight against the Barbary Pirates on the shores of Tripoli.
  It is this chapter of our history that brought to mind the 
undesirable possibility that America would again have to confront evil 
on its own.
  I am relieved that this is not the case in our struggle with Iraq 
with friends and allies like Britain, Italy, Spain, Norway, Denmark, 
Australia, and Qatar publicly stating their support for our efforts to 
rid the world of this great danger.
  Yet, as we now ask the United Nations to act in the name of its own 
relevancy, Mr. Speaker, I think we should ask ourselves, should 
America's ability to defend her citizens be held hostage to countries 
that have more to lose, because of strong commercial ties, and less to 
gain from the liberation of Iraq?
  We should ask ourselves, would Paris or Moscow or Beijing be in 
Saddam Hussein's crosshairs or would it be New York or Washington?
  I have thought seriously about the concerns that dealing with Iraq 
would prove to be a distraction from the War on Terror.
  But it's integral to the war on terror to remove one of the foremost 
sponsors of terrorist activity in the world. It is well known that this 
is a man who subsidizes suicide bombers, providing support to those who 
stand in the way of progress toward Mideast peace.
  The War on Terror's central tenet is, if you stand with the 
terrorists, you will be treated as one.
  Many are rightfully concerned about a long-term American commitment 
in Iraq. But, Mr. Speaker, we are already committed to the region and 
to Iraq. We have stationed a large military force in the region for 
more than a decade. We have maintained a military force throughout the 
Gulf region to keep the peace and enforce no-fly zones. We can and must 
nurture an open and democratic Iraq.
  Some of those whose voices are loudest in protest of an American-led 
liberation of Iraq may themselves fear it will undermine their own 
authoritarian regimes. Is the real fear of Iran's mullahs instability 
or a free Iraq next door?
  What excuses will be left to the leaders of a failed Palestinian 
state once the Saddam regime joins the tyrannies of the 20th century on 
the ash heap of history?
  I have an 18-year-old son I took to college a little over a month 
ago. It never leaves my thoughts what a war means in human terms. but 
no member of this body should forget the consequences of inaction.
  As Theodore Roosevelt said, ``Wars are, of course, as a rule to be 
avoided; but they are far better than certain kinds of peace.''
  For all these reasons, I will pray for peace. But at the same time, 
Mr. Speaker, I will vote to give President Bush the authority to needs 
to defend America, to defend freedom, and keep our people safe. I pray 
that by following history's guide, we will again find peace and freedom 
without using force.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Portman).
  Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. 
Hyde) for yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, as we reach the conclusion of this historic and 
dignified debate, now is the appropriate time to review the facts that 
compel the United States to act in self-defense and in defense of the 
civilized world.
  The fact, Mr. Speaker, is that the Iraqi regime is employing the vast 
wealth of his country to develop biological, chemical and nuclear 
weapons in direct violations of the 1991 cease-fire agreement and in 
violation of numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions.
  The fact is that the Iraqi regime is responsible for two wars against 
its neighbors resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands.
  The fact is that the regime's abuse of the U.N. administered Oil For 
Food Program is creating catastrophic shortages of food and medicine 
for thousands of Iraqi women and children.
  The fact is that the regime's association with terrorists undermines 
stability in the Middle East and threatens the security of the United 
States of America.
  The fact is that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of someone 
who sanctions the wholesale murder, starvation, rape and mutilation of 
ethnic Kurds, Shiite Muslims and other opponents is a clear and present 
danger to the security of the world.
  Does the discovery by U.N. inspectors of detailed drawings for 
constructing a small nuclear device in Saddam's three as-yet-
undismantled uranium enrichment facilities not sufficiently reveal the 
dangerous ambitions of this dictator?
  Time and time again over the course of this debate, Mr. Speaker, 
these facts have been acknowledged by all of those who have spoken. And 
yet opponents of this resolution continue to resist what I believe is 
the obvious conclusion.
  Yes, the President should continue the diplomacy, should work with 
the United Nations to fashion stronger sanctions and a regime of 
coercive inspections. That work is under way as I speak. But what 
incentive does the Iraqi regime have to honor its international 
obligations if Congress fails to give the President the tools he needs 
to compel them to do so? What incentive is there for the United Nations 
to act with courage and conviction if Congress fails to do so?
  Mr. Speaker, we cannot wish this problem away. We must save 
ourselves. We must act. I support the resolution.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to my 
good friend, the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  (Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend her remarks.)
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, because I believe the debate 
on this resolution is a matter of life or death for hundreds of 
thousands of Americans and other innocent persons and believe that it 
should only be done on a declaration of war by this constitutionally 
constituted body, this Congress, I rise to oppose this resolution.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi), my San Francisco neighbor and dear friend, our 
distinguished whip, a person of extraordinary talents and 
qualifications.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished ranking member for 
his recognition and his kind words.
  First, I wish to congratulate all of the Members of the House of 
Representatives for the patriotism that has been demonstrated on this 
floor in the last 2 days. I think the American people saw something 
very special. They saw what we show every day, that people here love 
our country, are committed to its value, and are committed to and 
respect our men and women in uniform.
  I come to this debate, Mr. Speaker, as one at the end of 10 years in 
office on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, where 
stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was one of my 
top priorities. I applaud the President on focusing on this issue and 
on taking the lead to disarm Saddam Hussein.

[[Page H7777]]

  From that perspective, though, of 10 years on the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, I rise in opposition to the resolution on 
national security grounds. The clear and present danger that our 
country faces is terrorism. I say flat out that unilateral use of force 
without first exhausting every diplomatic remedy and other remedies and 
making a case to the American people will be harmful to our war on 
terrorism.
  For the past 13 months, it will be 13 months tomorrow, we have stood 
shoulder to shoulder with President Bush to remove the threat of 
terrorism posed by the al Qaeda. Our work is not done. Osama bin Laden, 
Mullah Omar and the other al Qaeda terrorist leaders have not been 
accounted for. We have unfinished business. We are risking the 
cooperation that we have from over 60 nations of having their 
intelligence and their cooperation in fighting this war on terrorism.

                              {time}  1330

  There are many, many costs involved in this war, and one of them is 
the cost to the war on terrorism. We cannot let this coalition unravel.
  Others have talked about this threat that is posed by Saddam Hussein. 
Yes, he has chemical weapons, he has biological weapons, he is trying 
to get nuclear weapons. This is a threat not only from him but from 
other countries of concern in the past.
  I want to call to the attention of my colleagues a statement about 
Saddam's use of chemical and biological weapons that was just 
declassified and sent to the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence.
  The question is: If we initiate an attack and he thought he was an 
extremist or otherwise, what is the likelihood in response to our 
attack that Saddam Hussein would use chemical and biological weapons? 
This is a letter from George Tenet, the head of the CIA to the 
committee. The response: Pretty high, if we initiate the attack.
  Force protection is our top priority on the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence. We must protect our men and women in 
uniform. They are courageous. They risk their lives for our freedom, 
for our country. We cannot put them in harm's way unless we take every 
measure possible to protect them. So another cost is not only the cost 
on the war on terrorism but in the cost of human lives of our young 
people by making Saddam Hussein the person who determines their fates.
  Another cost is to our economy. The markets do not like war. They do 
not like the uncertainty of war. Our economy is fragile as it is. The 
President has spoken. In his speech the other night, he talked about 
rebuilding Iraq's economy after our invasion. We have problems with our 
own economy. We must focus on building our own economy before we worry 
about Iraq's economy after we invade Iraq.
  So let us do what is proportionate, what is appropriate, which 
mitigates the risk for our young people.
  Another cost in addition to human lives, the cost of terrorism, cost 
to our economy, another cost is to our budget. This cost can be 
unlimited, unlimited. There is no political solution on the ground in 
Iraq. Let us not be fooled by that. So when we go in, the occupation, 
which is now being called liberation, could be interminable and so 
could the amount of money, unlimited that it will cost, $100-, $200 
billion. We will pay any prices to protect the American people, but is 
this the right way to go, to jeopardize in a serious way our young 
people when that can be avoided?
  We respect the judgments of our military leaders. It is a civilian 
decision to go to war, but the military leaders present us with options 
which they know are to be a last resort.
  These costs to the war on terrorism, the loss of life, the cost to 
our economy, the cost in dollars to our budget, these costs must be 
answered for. If we go in, certainly we can show our power to Saddam 
Hussein. If we resolve this issue diplomatically, we can show our 
strength as a great country, as a great country.
  Let us show our greatness. Vote no on this resolution.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 8 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay).
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding me the 
time, and I commend the chairman and the ranking member for the work 
that they have done, not just on this but the whole issue of the war on 
terror.
  Mr. Speaker, Americans have always had to summon courage to disregard 
the timid counsel of those who would mortgage our security to the false 
promises of wishful thinking and appeasement. The perils of complacency 
were driven home to us in September of last year. We saw in tragic 
detail that evil is far more than some abstract concept. No longer 
should America allow dangers to gather and multiply. No longer should 
we stand idle as terrorists and terrorist states plot to murder our 
citizens.
  As a free society, we have to defeat dangers before they ripen. The 
war on terrorism will be fought here at home, unless we summon the will 
to confront evil before it attacks.
  President Bush certainly understands this imperative for action. The 
President is demonstrating the strong, moral leadership to find and 
defeat threats to the United States before they strike. Because once a 
madman like Saddam Hussein is able to deliver his arsenal, whether it 
is chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, there is no telling when an 
American city will be attacked at his direction or with his support.
  A nuclear armed Iraq would soon become the world's largest safe haven 
and refuge for the world's terrorist organizations. Waiting to act 
until after Saddam has nuclear weapons will leave free nations with an 
awful dilemma. Will they, on the one hand, risk nuclear annihilation by 
confronting terrorists in Iraq or will they give in to fear by failing 
to confront these terrorist groups?
  For that reason, regime change in Iraq is a central goal of the war 
on terror. It is vital because a war on terrorism that leaves the 
world's leading purveyor and practitioner of terror in power would be a 
bald failure.
  Some call Hussein a diversion, but far from being a diversion, 
confronting Saddam Hussein is a defining measure of whether we still 
wage the war on terror fully and effectively. It is the difference 
between aggressive action and misguided passivity.
  The question we face today is not whether to go to war, for war was 
thrust upon us. Our only choice is between victory or defeat.
  And let us just be clear about it. In the war on terror, victory 
cannot be secured at a bargaining table.
  Iraq's vile dictator is a central power of the axis of evil. 
President Bush and this Congress are committed to removing the threat 
from Saddam Hussein's terrorist state. Only regime change in Iraq can 
accomplish that objective. Only regime change can remove the danger 
from Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. Only by taking them out of 
his hands and destroying them can we be certain that terror weapons 
will not wind up in the hands of the terrorists.
  Saddam Hussein is seeking the means to murder millions in just a 
single moment. He is trying to spread that grip of fear beyond his own 
borders, and he is consumed with hatred for America.
  But I am not here today to offer that definitive indictment of Iraq's 
tyrant. That has already been very clearly documented and well-
established in this debate.
  In the wicked litany of crimes against humanity, Saddam Hussein has 
composed a scarlet chapter of terror. Our only responsible option is to 
confront this threat before Americans die. Time works to the advantage 
of our enemies, not ours.
  Under our Constitution, America speaks through the United States 
Constitution; and our resolution is very, very clear. The enemies of a 
free and a moral people will find no safe harbor in this world.
  Today, the free world chooses strength over temporizing and timidity. 
Terrorists and tyrants will see that the fruits of their evil will be 
certain destruction by the forces of democracy.
  Now we seek broad support, but I am telling my colleagues that 
fighting this war on terrorism by committee or consensus is a certain 
prescription for defeat. We will defend our country by defeating 
terrorists wherever they may flee around the world.
  None of us take the gravity of this vote and its ramifications 
lightly, but history informs us that the dangers of complacency and 
inaction far outweigh the calculated risks of confronting evil.

[[Page H7778]]

  In the fullness of time, America will be proud that in our hour of 
testing we chose the bold path of action, not the hollow comfort of 
appeasement.
  So let us just take this stand today against tyranny. Let us take 
this stand against terror. Let us take this stand against fear. Let us 
stand with the President of the United States.
  I say to my colleagues, just trust the cherished principles on which 
we were founded. Put faith in freedom and raise our voices and send 
this message to the world: The forces of freedom are on the march and 
terrorists will find no safe harbor in this world.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, it is with great pride in his judgment, 
wisdom and statesmanlike leadership that I yield the balance of our 
time to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), the Democratic 
leader.
  (Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, 26 years ago, I was fortunate to be 
elected by my constituents to serve in this House, and I represent 
today the district in which I was born. I am proud that the people of 
my district trust me to try to represent them every day. It is an honor 
that I feel every day that I walk into this building, that I am 
carrying the hopes and wishes of over a half a million people in 
Missouri, and I know today is a moment of sacred responsibility.
  We come into this building hundreds of times during the year to cast 
very important votes, but on days like today, when we consider how we 
will protect our Nation, our people, the districts we come from and 
represent, these are the days when we must look deep inside and make 
sure that what we are doing is right.
  Our gravest responsibility as legislators is authorizing the 
President to use military force. Part of the majesty of our democracy 
is that we do not entrust this power to one human being, the President, 
but we share it with a co-equal branch of this government; and in a 
democracy, the decision to put American lives on the line or perhaps go 
to war is ultimately a decision of the American people through their 
elected representatives.
  No one wants to go to war. No one wants to put our young men and 
women in harm's way, and I know we hope that our actions today will 
avert war. But our decision is not so simple, because we must weigh the 
dangers of sending our young people into hostilities against the threat 
presented by Iraq to our citizens' safety.
  Every Member of Congress must make their own decision on the level of 
the threat posed by Iraq and what to do to respond to that threat. I 
have said many times to my colleagues that each Member should be guided 
by his or her conscience, free from others trying to politicize the 
issue or questioning others' motives.
  This is an issue of life and death, and the preoccupation by some to 
ascribe political motives to the conclusion of each of us demeans all 
of us and what we are here to do.
  Let me say to my colleagues and my constituents in Missouri why I 
have decided to vote for this resolution.
  First, September 11 has made all the difference. The events of that 
tragic day jolted us to the enduring reality that terrorists not only 
seek to attack our interests abroad but also to strike us here at home. 
We have clear evidence now that they even desire to use weapons of mass 
destruction against us.
  Before 9/11, we experienced the terrorist attacks on Khobar Towers, 
the USS Cole, on two embassies in Africa, but we did not believe it 
would happen here. On 9/11, it did happen here; and it can happen 
again.
  September 11 was the ultimate wake-up call. We must now do everything 
in our power to prevent further terrorist attacks and ensure that an 
attack with a weapon of mass destruction cannot happen. The 
consequences of such an attack are unimaginable. We spent 50 years in a 
Cold War and trillions of dollars deterring a weapon of mass 
destruction attack on the United States by another country. Now we must 
prevent such an attack by terrorists who, unlike our previous 
adversaries, are willing to die.

                              {time}  1345

  In these new circumstances, deterrence well may not work. With these 
new dangers, prevention must work.
  If my colleagues worry about terrorists getting weapons of mass 
destruction or their components from countries, the first candidate we 
must worry about is Iraq. The 12-year history of the U.N. effort to 
disarm Iraq convinces me that Iraq is a problem that must be dealt with 
diplomatically if we can, militarily if we must.
  I did not come to this view overnight. It has, instead, evolved over 
time, as we have learned the facts about the Iraqi regime with clarity. 
As you know, I opposed the use of force against Iran in 1991 in favor 
of giving sanctions more time to work. Others supported force, but 
thought that by dislodging Iraq from Kuwait we would neutralize the 
threat. In hindsight, both of these assessments were wrong.
  In 1991, no one knew the extent to which Saddam Hussein would 
sacrifice the needs of his people in order to sustain his hold on 
power, deceive the international community in order to preserve his 
weapons of mass destruction programs, or take hostile actions against 
U.S. interests in the region.
  Saddam Hussein's track record is too compelling to ignore, and we 
know that he continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, 
including nuclear devices; and he may soon have the ability to use 
nuclear weapons against other nations. I believe we have an obligation 
to protect the United States by preventing him from getting these 
weapons and either using them himself or passing them or their 
components on to terrorists who share his destructive intent.
  As I stated in a speech in June, I believe we must confront the 
threat posed by the current Iraqi regime directly. But given the stakes 
involved, and the potential risks to our security and the region, we 
must proceed carefully and deliberately. That is why I felt it was 
essential to engage in negotiations in order to craft an effective and 
responsible authorization for the use of force, if necessary, so we can 
defend our Nation and enforce U.N. resolutions pertaining to Iraq.
  At the insistence of many of us, the resolution includes a provision 
urging President Bush to continue his efforts to get the U.N. to 
effectively enforce its own resolutions against Iraq. I have told the 
President directly, on numerous occasions, that in my view, and in the 
view of a lot of us, he must do everything he possibly can to achieve 
our objectives with the support of the United Nations. His speech to 
the U.N. on September 12 was an excellent beginning to this effort.
  Exhausting all efforts at the U.N. is essential. But let us remember 
why. We started the U.N. over 50 years ago. We remain the greatest 
advocate of the rule of law, both domestically and internationally. We 
must do everything we can to get the U.N. to succeed. It is in our own 
self-interest to do that. In 1945, Harry Truman told the Senate that 
the creation of the U.N. constituted, in his words, an expression of 
national necessity. He said the U.N. points down the only road to 
enduring peace. He said let us not hesitate to start down that road, 
with God's help, and with firm resolve that we can and will reach our 
goal: peace and security for all Americans.
  Completely bypassing the U.N. would set a dangerous precedent that 
would undoubtedly be used by other countries in the future to our and 
the world's detriment. It is too high a price to pay. I am glad the 
President said in his speech Monday that diplomacy is the first choice 
for resolving this matter.
  This resolution also limits the scope and duration of the President's 
authority to use force. It requires Presidential determinations before 
our Armed Forces may be used against Iraq, including assurances to 
Congress that he has pursued all diplomatic means to address this 
threat and that any military action will not undermine our ongoing 
efforts against terrorism.
  Finally, the bill provides for regular consultation with and 
reporting to Congress on the administration's diplomatic and military 
efforts and, of great importance to all Americans, the planning for 
assistance, reconstruction, and regional stabilization efforts in a 
postconflict Iraq.
  The efforts we must undertake in a postconflict Iraq could be the 
most enduring challenge we face in this entire endeavor, which is 
another reason for doing everything humanly possible to

[[Page H7779]]

work through the U.N. to reach our goals.
  Now a word on what this resolution, in my view, is not. In my view, 
it is not an endorsement or an acceptance of the President's new policy 
of preemption. Iraq is unique, and this resolution is a unique 
response. A full discussion of the President's new preemption policy 
must come at another time. But the acceptance of such a momentous 
change in policy must not be inferred from the language of this 
resolution.
  It is also important to say that, thus far, the President's 
predominant response to 9-11 has been the use of military power. 
Obviously, self-defense requires the use of effective military force. 
But the exercise of military power is not a foreign policy. It is one 
means of implementing foreign policy. In the post-9-11 world, we must 
motivate and inform our citizens about how we construct a foreign 
policy that promotes universal values, improves living standards, 
increases freedom in all countries and, ultimately, prevents thousands 
and thousands of young people across this world from deciding to become 
terrorists. We will never defeat terrorism by dealing with its 
symptoms. We must get to its root causes.
  In anticipation of the serious debate and vote that we have finally 
reached today, I have had many conversations with my colleagues and 
friends in this body, friends and colleagues that I respect deeply. I 
know for many of you this resolution is not what you want, and it is 
true for Democrats and some Republicans. And in some ways it is true 
for me. Many of my colleagues have had compelling arguments and 
important differences with this language. These differences do not 
diminish my respect or my trust for my colleagues as the true 
representatives of the people in this great Nation.
  I believe, as a whole, the resolution incorporates the key notion 
that we want to give diplomacy the best possible opportunity to resolve 
this conflict, but we are prepared to take further steps, if necessary, 
to protect our Nation. I have heard in this debate some Members say 
they love America. I love America. I think every Member of this body 
loves America. That is not the issue. The issue is how to best protect 
America, and I believe this resolution does that.
  I want to say a final word to those watching beyond our borders. To 
our friends around the world, I say thank you for standing with us in 
our time of trial. Your support strengthens the bonds of friendship 
between our people and the people of the world.
  To our enemies, who watch this democratic debate and wonder if 
America speaks with one voice, I say have no doubt. We are united as a 
people in defending ourselves and we debate the best means for doing 
that. Do not mistake our resolve. Do not underestimate our 
determination. Do not misunderstand that we stand here today not as 
arguing Republicans and Democrats but as Americans, using the sacred 
right of free speech and thought and freedom to determine our 
collective course.
  Finally, I thank God for those who have gone before us and used their 
freedom wisely, for those who have died to protect it and have created 
a stronger Nation and a better world because of their bravery. I pray 
that we may act today as wisely and courageously as those who have gone 
before. God bless this House. God bless America.
  Mr. Speaker, as a co-author of H.J. Res. 114, I would like to take 
this opportunity to address certain elements of the joint resolution in 
order to clarify their intent.
  As I stated in a speech I delivered in June, I believe we must 
confront the threat posed by the current Iraqi regime directly. But 
given the stakes involved and the potential risks to our security and 
the region, we must proceed carefully and deliberately.
  That's why I felt it was essential to engage in negotiations in order 
to craft an effective and responsible authorization for the use of 
force if necessary--so we can defend our nation and enforce U.N. 
resolutions pertaining to Iraq.
  At the insistence of many of us, the resolution includes provisions 
urging President Bush to continue his efforts to get the U.N. to 
effectively enforce its resolution against Iraq. I have told the 
President directly, on numerous occasions, that in my view of a lot of 
us, he must do everything he possibly can to achieve our objectives 
with the support of the United Nations. His speech to the U.N. on 
September 12 was an excellent beginning to this effort. Exhausting all 
efforts at the U.N. is essential.
  Completely bypassing the U.N. would set a dangerous precedent that 
would undoubtedly be used by other countries in the future to our and 
the world's detriment. That is too high a price to pay. I am glad the 
President said in his speech Monday that diplomacy is the first choice 
for resolving this critical matter.
  This resolution also limits the scope and duration of the President's 
authority to use force, unlike the Administrations original proposal. 
The resolution and its accompanying report define the threat posed by 
Iraq as consisting primarily of its weapons of mass destruction 
programs and its support for international terrorism. They also note 
that we should continue to press for Iraqi compliance with all 
outstanding U.N. resolutions, but suggest that we only contemplate 
using force to implement those that are relevant to our nation's 
security.
  As for the duration of this authorization, this resolution confines 
it to the continuing threat posed by Iraq; that is, its current and 
ongoing weapons programs and support for terrorists. We do not want 
Congress to provide this or subsequent Presidents with open-ended 
authority to use force against any future threats that Iraq might pose 
to the United States that are not related to its current weapons of 
mass destruction programs and support for international terrorism. The 
President would need to seek a new authorization from Congress to 
respond to any such future threats.
  Third, this resolution requires important presidential determinations 
to Congress before our Armed Forces are used against Iraq. These 
include assurances by the President that he has pursued all diplomatic 
and other peaceful means to address the continuing threat posed by 
Iraq, and that any military action against Iraq will not undermine our 
ongoing efforts against terrorism. These determinations ensure that the 
Executive Branch remains accountable to Congress if it resorts to 
military force, and stays focused on the broader war on terrorism that 
must remain of highest priority.
  Finally, the bill provides for regular consultation with and 
reporting to Congress on the Administration's diplomatic and military 
efforts and, of great importance to all Americans, on the planning for 
assistance, reconstruction and regional stabilization efforts in a 
post-conflict Iraq. The efforts we must undertake in a post-conflict 
Iraq could be the most enduring challenge we face in this entire 
endeavor, which is another reason for doing everything humanly possible 
to work through the U.N. to reach our goals.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Armey), the majority leader.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Illinois for 
yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, let me just take a moment to appreciate this body. I had 
resolved to cherish my last days in this body by being as attentive as 
I could to everything that I had the privilege of experiencing.
  For the past 2 days, I have watched my friends in this body, from 
both sides of the aisle, from both sides of the issue, conduct what has 
to be regarded as one of the greatest debates we have seen in this body 
during my tenure here. I have been struck in the last 2 days with the 
sobriety, the thoughtfulness, the eloquence, and the respect with which 
the countervailing positions have been presented. And I would like to 
say thank you to my colleagues for letting me be part of this debate.
  The distinguished minority leader, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. 
Gephardt), had a sentence in his speech we heard just a minute ago 
where he said we had to see the facts with clarity. To see the facts 
with clarity. This is not an ideological debate. This is not a debate 
about philosophy. This is a debate about the sober business of safety 
in the face of danger, honor in the face of fear, responsibility in the 
face of timidity. We must turn to the facts when we face issues of this 
gravity, and we have done that.
  Intensely, for the last month or so, most of us have been looking at 
the facts that we hoped we would never have to pay attention to. Let me 
just relate some of my travels in this past month through the facts.
  Is Saddam evil? Who could doubt it? The evils that this man 
perpetrates, as described on this floor by our young colleague, the 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan), from a book he read from, strike 
terror in the heart of the worst that we have ever seen before.
  This man is evil. It is an evil that this world should never have to 
observe and that the poor victims, particularly those in Iraq, should 
not have to live with on a daily basis. The atrocities

[[Page H7780]]

are beyond belief, beyond tolerance. And those poor people in Iraq live 
with it each day, afraid to leave their home, afraid to speak at their 
own dinner table, frightened for their children who might be tortured 
in order to punish the parents' careless moment.

                              {time}  1400

  Saddam is evil. That is a fact.
  Does he have dangerous assets? More so than we thought, more so than 
we ever wanted to believe. And does he have an ongoing, consistent 
program and plan to acquire, to enhance those evil assets that are 
described by the term weapons of mass destruction, beyond what any of 
us imagined?
  The acquisition of the weaponry, the resources, the resourcefulness, 
the ability to put together the device that would destroy hundreds of 
thousands in a fell swoop has never been even mitigated against by the 
commitments he made to the U.N. 11 years ago.
  Can he strike our interests, our citizens, our land, and our 
responsibilities with them? Irrefutably, yes. Through the conventional 
means that we recognize and fear, things like SCUD missiles, yes. 
American people, American citizens, American resources in his immediate 
area, through the insidious means that would be deployed by his ongoing 
working relationship with a myriad of evil terrorist organizations, 
yes. Through simple-looking, innocent-looking little suitcases left in 
a train depot, a service station, an airport in Chicago, Illinois. Yes, 
he can strike us, our interests and our responsibilities. I know no 
other way to put that.
  America is the most unique Nation ever in the history of the world. 
We have accepted responsibility for freedom, safety, and dignity of 
people other than ourselves. Those proud nations with those brave 
people that live as islands of freedom and hope within seas of threat 
and terror look for and understand they can depend upon the protection 
of the United States. That is who we are, that is who we have been, our 
heroes, our parents.
  They spent their heroism, they spent their life all too often on 
foreign, distant lands fighting for the freedom of people other than 
themselves. No other nation has ever done that like we have done.
  A nation such as Israel, not exclusively Israel, but right now in the 
world today, at a level of danger that is unparalleled by any other 
nation of the world, Israel struggles for its freedom, safety and 
dignity; and it is in imminent, immediate danger by a strike from 
Saddam Hussein. And that represents a responsibility we have, not only 
to what role we have played in the world, not only to our heroes who 
have acted it out and sacrificed, but to the character of this Nation 
that we cherish and protect.
  I have said it as clearly as I can. To me, an attack on Israel is an 
attack on America; and it is imminently in danger.
  Will he do so? Who can doubt that? He has a record of having done so 
that is deplorable in the most evil and insidious ways. The question is 
when will he do so; not will he do so.
  Why does one violate one's own commitments to the world, to the 
United Nations accord with resolve, and consistently acquire these 
resources if you have no intent to use them? Why do you deny your own 
citizens the resources for food and shelter and clothing and health 
care in order to divert that to the expenditure on weapons of mass 
destruction and instruments of horror if you do not intend to use them? 
Why would he deny his own clear volitions in actions past if he had the 
resources to strike? Saddam will strike.
  Is action against Saddam compliant with the character of our great 
Nation? I struggled with this. It was a hurdle for me for a long time. 
It all gets involved with this question of preemptive strike.
  First of all, it is not a preemptive strike. This is a man who has 
consistently been in violation of his own commitments to the world for 
11 years. As I put it, this snake is out of his hole. We are not 
striking an innocent here, we are correcting an error of complacency. 
So it is not a question of a new doctrine.
  But even if we were to examine the doctrine of preemptive strike, let 
us not forget the Cuban missile crisis. An embargo on the high seas is 
an act of war, and the threat to us I would submit was not as dangerous 
as it was at that time, and it was certainly not so insidious as it is 
today.
  There have been other instances in our history. When necessary, 
America does what it needs to do to keep America safe. America does 
have a pride which is exhibited in movies like ``13 Days'' for the 
courage that was displayed when the action was necessary.
  There is an argument that this is a diversion from the war on 
terrorism. If we are going to conduct a war on terrorism, then we must 
stop that person who is most likely and most able to arm the terrorists 
with those things which will frighten us the most. A strike on Saddam 
is an integral part, a necessary part, of the war on terrorism.
  Now we turn to questions about our ability. Can we be swift and 
decisive and conduct this operation with minimal risk to the brave men 
and women that we ask to carry it out?
  It is possible. We saw that in Desert Storm. It is even more possible 
now. It will be a difficult operation, and our people will be at risk. 
But we have the resources and the resourcefulness, and we have the 
ability to plan and execute an operation that rids the world of this 
scourge conducted by our young men and women and their allies in such a 
manner to keep them at minimal risk.
  That is all we can do, the moral imperative that we have, when we ask 
our brave young men and women who have volunteered to serve this Nation 
and the world in the cause of freedom, to take the field of danger, we 
have an obligation, and we can say we can construct the plan, outfit 
you in such a way, support you in such a manner that you can carry out 
this deed with minimal risk. We can do that. We will do that. We have 
an administration. We have a Secretary of Defense that respects our 
people.
  Should we vote this resolution that says in effect that we, the 
Congress of the United States, the representation of the people of the 
United States, say, Mr. President, we trust you and we rely on you in a 
dangerous time to be our Commander-in-Chief and to use the resources we 
place at your disposal? Yes, even by two bills we will vote on later 
today, to protect freedom? The answer is, yes.
  Mr. President, we are about to give you a great trust. Those brave 
young men and women who have volunteered in our Nation's military 
services of their own free will to take their place in history 
alongside the American heroes of the past deserve our respect and our 
support, Mr. President. We trust that you will plan for them, use them, 
care for them, and be guided by your own notion of tender mercies.
  But we also have an obligation to the parents, the children, the 
siblings, the grandparents of those brave young men and women. We lend 
our children to the cause of liberty. I have said so many times. I do 
not care if he is 240 pounds of solid muscle, the brightest kid in the 
class, when he puts on that uniform, he is my baby and I have fear, and 
I demand that you treat him properly as his Commander-in-Chief.
  We all have that right to expect. Can we expect that from this 
President? I would say so.
  Mr. Speaker, I was speaking yesterday with the gentleman from Indiana 
(Mr. Buyer), who remembered embarking for Desert Storm, saying good-bye 
to his family. At the last moment, he approached his father, proud 
veteran of the Korean War with his veteran's hat. His proud father put 
his hands on Steve's shoulder and looked at him and said, ``You are the 
best I have to give.''
  Mr. President, we trust to you the best we have to give. Use them 
well so they can come home and say to our grandchildren, Sleep safely, 
my baby.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, the President has asked this Congress to 
support action that foresees the possibility of sending our loved 
ones--our sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, friends and 
neighbors--into combat in a foreign land. No more serious a decision 
ever faces Congress.
  The threat that we confront is Saddam Hussein. Saddam is in a 
category of his own. No other head-of-state has been the subject of an 
11-year international campaign to disarm and sanction him. He has 
invaded two of his neighbors, assassinated 16 of his own family 
members, tried to assassinate former President Bush, lied about his 
weapons buildup, fired missiles at Israel, and gassed his own people. 
The prospect that such a despot has

[[Page H7781]]

biological and chemical weapons--anthrax, sarin gas, smallpox--and is 
nearing nuclear capability is a looming threat to millions.
  We as a nation have the responsibility to stop him.
  I would have preferred that we proceed in the manner outlined in the 
Spratt substitute, which would have given the President all the 
authority needed at this time to disarm Saddam. The Spratt substitute 
would have allowed the UN to proceed with tough ``anytime-anywhere'' 
inspections, given the UN the military backing to make those 
inspections work, and ensured that Saddam Hussein lost his capacity to 
threaten the world.
  Unfortunately, the Spratt substitute failed, and we are now faced 
with a vote, up or down, on the broader resolution negotiated between 
the White House, Minority Leader Gephardt, and others.
  This too would accomplish the goal of giving the President sufficient 
authority to enforce UN resolutions regarding Iraq, particularly those 
that address the continuing threat posed by Iraq's possession and 
development of chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities.
  Although this is a broader resolution than the Spratt resolution, I 
will vote for it because it represents the best remaining hope of 
disarming Saddam. While the resolution does not require it, the 
President has said that it is his intention to continue to work towards 
a new UN resolution that can make the inspections program effective.
  The President initially resisted going to the UN, but he changed 
course. He initially resisted coming to Congress to explain his purpose 
and to seek our support, but he changed course. We should respect the 
distance he has traveled towards a multilateral, measured process that 
includes the UN. We should support him as long as he remains on that 
course.
  I do so today knowing full well this administration's record on the 
issue of nonproliferation, arms control and multilateral treaties has 
often been incomprehensible. At times he has spoken and acted as if he 
would prefer to act without allies and without the UN. Several weeks 
ago, the President announced a strategic doctrine that embraces the 
``preemptive use of force'' as its touchstone. This new Bush Doctrine 
is dangerous and destabilizing in its own right. It makes it harder to 
hold together the fragile international coalition on which we rely for 
success in the ongoing war on terror.
  The contradictions and double-standards that define his non-
proliferation policy are particularly troubling. His ``Axis of Evil'' 
speech, for example, lumped together Iraq, Iran and North Korea in a 
turn of the phrase that is hard to untie. They have all been accused of 
attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Yet our response in 
Iran is not to use force, but to complain to the Russians about their 
sale of reactors to Iran that could facilitate the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons. And in North Korea, our response is to make our own 
sale of nuclear reactors to that country. The President has also failed 
to seek Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban, pursued new 
nuclear weapons like the earth penetrating warheads, and turned his 
back on the biological weapons convention. This makes no sense and 
belies a lack of any coherent policy at all.
  It is certainly true that George W. Bush is not the first president 
to be self-contradictory regarding weapons of mass destruction. I have 
spent considerable effort during the last 26 years working to prevent 
the constant undermining of nonproliferation policy by both Democratic 
and Republican administrations. The Carter Administration shipped 
nuclear fuel to India notwithstanding that countries' ongoing 
undeclared nuclear weapons program. The Reagan Administration condemned 
Israel in the UN for destroying Saddam's Osirak nuclear reactor. The 
same administration promoted nuclear trade with the apartheid regime in 
South Africa. Both President Reagan and President Clinton allowed trade 
with Communist China to trump efforts to stop China from retransferring 
nuclear materials and technology to Pakistan.
  Now it is the Bush administration that fails to connect the dots of 
weapons proliferation. When he promotes nuclear reprocessing, or 
tritium production for bombs in commercial reactors, he undermines 
nonproliferation. When he allows the export of sensitive nuclear 
technology, discards the comprehensive test ban treaty, or fails to 
negotiate progressive measures leading to global disarmament--as 
mandated by Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--he 
strengthens the proliferators.
  These decisions come back to haunt us when, as now, we find that 
diplomatic options are exhausted and the use of force appears 
necessary.
  But even as our overall nonproliferation policy keeps lurching from 
side to side, the United States and the international community have, 
in the particular case of Iraq, remained focused for more than a decade 
on the very real menace of Saddam's drive to acquire and use weapons of 
mass destruction against his perceived enemies.
  Now, after 11 years of insufficient inspections and sanctions, we 
cannot stand idle. Something has to change. We have nearly exhausted 
the non-violent alternatives. The sanctions are contributing to a 
significant loss of innocent life daily. Saddam has built up his 
chemical and biological weapons capacities during this period and he 
has missiles to deliver a nuclear payload and the money to buy it. It 
is apparent that but for our demonstration of resolve to follow through 
the UN-sponsored goal of disarming him, Saddam Hussein intends to make 
good on his pledge to acquire nuclear weapons.
  I wish the resort to force were unnecessary and, if the inspections 
can be made effective, armed conflict can still be avoided. But while 
force is a last resort, is an option that cannot be ruled out if we 
intend to deal effectively with Saddam Hussein.
  Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Mr. Speaker, like my colleagues of both parties 
and in both chambers, the national debate on whether or not to go to 
war with Iraq, and under what circumstances, has weighed heavily on my 
mind and heart.
  For, clearly, sending the young men and women of our armed forces 
into harm's way is one of the most serious and far reaching decisions a 
member of Congress will ever have to make.
  Like all Americans, I take pride in the fact that we are a peaceful 
nation, but one that will defend itself if needed against real and 
imminent dangers.
  Like all Americans, I take very seriously our responsibility as the 
world's global superpower, and realize how our words and actions can 
have huge repercussions throughout the world.
  For that reason, I attended briefings and studied the materials 
provided us. I have listened to the administration, my constituents, my 
colleagues on both sides of the issue, both sides of the aisle, and 
both sides of this Congress, and I remain deeply concerned about our 
march to war without a supportive coalition, nor a clear and moral 
justification.
  Before making a final decision on how to cast my vote, I also asked 
myself, as a mother, what would I want our nation's leaders to do 
before sending my son, my daughter or any loved one to war.
  While I support our President's efforts to keep our nation and the 
world safe, I firmly believe that the President has not made the case 
for granting him the far-reaching power to declare preemptive and 
unilateral war against Iraq.
  There is no question that Sadam Hussein is a dangerous and 
unconscionable dictator with little regard for human life. And, there 
is no question that he must be disarmed and removed from power.
  The facts presented thus far however, do not support the premise that 
Sadam is an immediate danger to our country. For that reason, I believe 
it is in the best interest of our nation and our American troops to 
make every possible effort to prevent war by exhausting diplomatic 
efforts, by giving United Nations weapons inspectors the resources and 
opportunity to perform their work, and by establishing a United Nations 
Security Council multilateral coalition to use force if necessary.
  If this fails, the President can then bring his case to Congress on 
the need to initiate a unilateral pre-emptive strike against Iraq 
because a blank check authorization for military force at this time is 
unacceptable. I cannot in good conscience support the administration's 
request for near `carte blanche' authority to wage war when the case to 
do so has not been justified.
  I will, however, support the resolutions of my colleagues 
Representative Barbara Lee and Representative John Spratt. The Lee 
resolution urges congress to work with the United Nations using all 
peaceful means possible to resolve the issue of Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction. The Spratt resolution includes similar requirements with 
regard to the United Nations, but also authorizes the use of force if 
the United Nations efforts fail.
  The Spratt resolution brings responsibility and accountability to our 
effort to protect our country against Sadam Hussein, and makes the 
Administration and the Congress joint partners in any military action 
against Iraq. The Spratt proposal honors our nation's fundamental 
system of checks and balances.
  And, makes it possible for me to say to my constituents, and our sons 
and daughters: ``I did everything in my power to keep you from harm's 
way.''
  Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, on behalf of the people of Guam, I would 
like to express my support for President Bush and the international 
community in forcefully addressing the threat posed by Saddam Hussein 
and his regime in Iraq. In this regard, I strongly support the efforts 
of the President to seek and secure unconditional Iraqi compliance with 
full-fledged arms inspections. His seeking United Nations renewal and 
approval of these efforts

[[Page H7782]]

is to be commended and supported by this Congress. However, while I 
believe that the United States must act to disarm Iraq, I hope that we 
do not do so alone. I support efforts to gain as much international 
backing as possible to meet our disarmament objective. We must act 
alone only if absolutely necessary and only after the international 
community has been given the full opportunity to support this important 
cause.
  In the course of debate on this important issue, I believe that I 
must also express my concerns about the impact that an impending armed 
conflict in the Middle East will have on my home island of Guam. As the 
Member of Congress representing a district located closest to the area 
of concern and to the theater of operation that our Armed Forces may be 
increasingly engaged in as a result of this resolution, I remain 
acutely aware of the challenges we find ourselves confronted with 
today. As I indicated on the House floor last week, these challenges do 
not affect all communities around the country in the same way. The 
people of Guam will undoubtedly feel the effects of a decision to use 
force against Iraq in many disproportionate ways. History proves this 
to be the case.
  Servicemen and women from Guam will likely find themselves 
contributing to the war effort in higher numbers per capita than most 
other U.S. jurisdictions. Sadly, this may result in higher casualties 
for our service members than it would for other communities. During 
each major war of the last century, World War I, World War II, Korea, 
Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War, Guam endured disproportionate 
military casualties of native sons per capita in the United States. 
Today, our people serve disproportionately in high numbers in the armed 
services. While this demonstrates our support for the nation's 
military, it also underscores our vulnerability to war's 
disproportionate effects on our community.
  Although, we would inevitably witness a build-up in military activity 
on our island, the economy of Guam would be adversely impacted by any 
decision to go to war. We are directly economically challenged by this 
impending armed conflict because our economy is primarily based on 
tourism. Eighty percent of our visitors come from Japan and nothing is 
more disconcerting to Japanese tourists than the prospect of war and 
conflict. If the situation which occurred in Guam immediately after the 
Gulf War crisis or immediately after September 11 of last year again 
unfolds as a result of an armed conflict with Iraq, we will see a 
dramatic downturn in visitor arrivals which in turn will further weaken 
our struggling economy.
  However, despite these probable disproportionate effects, for which 
we will prepare to cope with, I stand in strong support to the use of 
force should Saddam Hussein continue to pose an imminent threat to 
regional and world peace and security. His efforts to produce weapons 
of mass destruction are just as troubling to us in Guam as they are for 
the rest of the country. His weapons of mass destruction stockpile and 
capability must be permanently eliminated. His threatening and 
deplorable behavior must be confronted and stopped. His flagrant 
violation of international law must be directly dealt with and his 
disarmament obligation must be compelled. As a member of the House 
Armed Services Committee, I understand, through voluminous testimony 
that has been presented to the committee over the past few weeks, that 
this is a matter of serious importance that demands our immediate 
action.
  Guam has time and time again done its part to support the foreign and 
military policy of the United States in the Western Pacific region. In 
1975, more than 115,000 evacuees from the fall of Vietnam were 
repatriated via Guam as part of Operation New Life. In 1996, 6,600 
Kurdish refugees who feared retaliation by Saddam Hussein were housed 
and comforted on Guam as part of Operation Pacific Haven. In the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Guam has 
served as a vital part of our national effort to protect our homeland 
and an essential military base in the war against terrorism. Combat 
aircraft capable of intercepting and diverting any unauthorized or 
threatening aircraft that would approach the continental United States 
from the Pacific, was quickly positioned on Guam as part of Operational 
Noble Eagle. Andersen Air Force Base has served as a critical air 
bridge for airlift in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Here 
again, we find ourselves ready to support the nation during this urgent 
situation, ready to do our part in the effort to further rid the world 
of terror.
  As our country prepares to address the threat posed by Saddam Hussein 
and his regime, I want to reiterate the people of Guam's support for 
our troops and Guam's role to assist our nation in our national 
security needs in the Western Pacific region.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, thank you for the opportunity to offer 
my support for Mr. Spratt's Amendment to the proposed Joint resolution. 
Its emphasis--on international action, the role of the United Nations 
and diplomatic means to achieve full compliance with multinational 
efforts to destroy Iraq's capability to produce and deliver weapons of 
mass destruction--is exactly right.
  This amendment includes key elements of the proposal for compulsory 
arms inspections put forward by the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace to the House International Relations Committee. I 
was impressed with the wisdom of that third approach then, and I am 
now.
  This Amendment recognizes and honors Congress' role in the initiation 
of war and in monitoring its conduct. It rightly places our actions 
within a broader multi-lateral framework and calls on the international 
community, particularly Arab and Islamic countries, to work with the 
United States in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq.
  For all these reasons, I urge adoption of the Amendment offered by 
the gentleman from South Carolina.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, the more one hears of this debate in Congress 
and among the American people, the more puzzling it is that the 
approach in the Spratt resolution was not adopted.
  The Spratt Resolution states clearly the need to act to totally 
disarm Saddam Hussein of his weapons of mass destruction.
  It authorized the Use of U.S. Armed Forces within the framework of 
international collective action as embodied in U.N. Security Council 
resolutions seeking to disarm Iraq and providing for force by member 
states to ensure compliance.
  If that collective international effort fails, the Spratt resolution 
spelled out an expedited procedure for the President to seek the 
authorization to proceed unilaterally in a war against Iraq.
  So, why not the Spratt resolution?
  It would have far more effectively achieved the goal of the President 
that we speak today with one voice.
  The approach in the Spratt resolution would have maximized the 
chances of success in disarming Saddam Hussein and minimized the 
potential adverse consequences for the U.S. in going it alone, in terms 
of reactions throughout the world, stability in the region, cooperation 
in the war against terrorism and in broad participation in the 
aftermath of a war in Iraq.
  It would keep the pressure on the U.N. to act, avoiding the 
inconsistency in the Administration's approach of saying to the U.N. 
``act,'' ``be relevant,'' ``hold Iraq to account'' but potentially 
taking it off the hook in advance because the U.S. will go it alone.
  While emphasizing collective action, the Spratt alternative 
explicitly did not bind the U.S. to whatever is done by the U.N., but 
leaves the U.S. what it must have, final say over its policies and 
actions. We are not ceding to the U.N. We are leading the world as the 
remaining superpower.
  So why not Spratt?
  Because its emphasis is on achieving collective action rather than 
proceeding unilaterally. The resistance of the Administration to that 
approach is consistent with the general strategy laid out in its new 
doctrine stated a few weeks ago, our use of pre-emptive first strikes 
in situations short of imminent danger with only cursory effort to 
proceed collectively. It is that very backdrop for the Administration's 
approach on Iraq that should make us all pause.
  Or, because Spratt does state clearly the objective is total 
disarmament of all weapons of mass destruction. While sometimes 
implying otherwise, the President's speech earlier this week make clear 
that the Administration sine qua non is regime change, whatever the 
success in disarming Saddam Hussein. That also must give us pause.
  We should not blur these important differences.
  These are the reasons that I voted for the Spratt resolution and 
opposed the Administration's resolution.
  Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, today I rise in support of the bipartisan 
resolution to authorize the use of military force against Iraq.
  When President Bush addressed the nation following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th, he made it entirely clear that the United 
States would not tolerate nations that harbor terrorists. Like the 
President, I believe a nation that provides a safe-haven for the likes 
of al-Qaeda is no different than the terrorist themselves. We know 
Saddam Hussein harbors terrorists in Iraq, funds terrorist training 
camps, and supports the families of suicide bombers.
  He possesses and continues to develop biological and chemical weapons 
and seeks to build a nuclear bomb. We know he will try to use this bomb 
against the United States or our allies if he gets his hands on one. He 
already has unleashed biological and chemical weapons upon his own 
people, killing thousands. What more do we need to know? We must stand 
ready to take action before it is too late.
  I want to make clear to every American, especially the folks in my 
home state of Louisiana, that this decision to possibly send our

[[Page H7783]]

young service men and women into harms way is not about settling 
unfinished business. Nor is it about oil or taking control of Iraqi oil 
fields. This is about a grave and present threat against our people, 
today.
  Saddam Hussein is a tyrannical dictator who hates America and who 
will use any means possible to attack us if given the opportunity. We 
cannot allow Saddam that opportunity. Our only option is to take every 
precaution to ensure the safety of our citizens.
  Whether the next direct threat against the United States comes in the 
form of retaliation from Iraq or from any other terrorist entity, we 
must be prepared for the possibility of a biological or chemical attack 
against Americans, here or abroad. Today, I can say with confidence 
that America's public health emergency system is better prepared to 
respond to such an attack as a result of the comprehensive bioterrorism 
preparedness bill that I worked hard to help write and enact.
  This sweeping legislation, signed into law by the President in June, 
dramatically improves our nation's ability to respond swiftly and 
effectively to new and emerging terrorist threats. This major milestone 
covers everything from public health preparedness and improvements, to 
enhancing controls on deadly biological agents, to protecting our food, 
drug, and drinking water supplies and improving communications between 
all levels of government, public health officials, first responders and 
health providers.
  Mr. Speaker, this threat to our national security is one we can 
conquer. We have the means, and I believe as the President does that 
``we must act now before waiting for final proof--the smoking gun--that 
could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.''
  Mr. OSE. Mr. Speaker, my greatest responsibility as a Member of 
Congress is to protect America against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic. This responsibility includes taking preemptive action, if 
necessary, to protect our homeland and national security interests. On 
September 14, 2001, Congress adopted a resolution that authorized the 
President to take such action.
  Iraq must follow the terms it agreed to at the end of the Gulf War, 
cease its attacks on U.S. and other peacekeepers in the region, end its 
promotion of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and end its 
persecution of its own people. Should Iraq continue to ignore the 12 
U.N. Resolutions and the agreements he made at the end of the Gulf War, 
I will support President Bush in the actions he sees necessary to 
ensure the safety of our citizens, as well as our allies and interests 
abroad. The vote today makes clear to Saddam Hussein that time for Iraq 
to finally meet the requirements of the international community has run 
out.
  Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I want to take just a few minutes to 
outline my thoughts on the Resolution before the House today and the 
reasons why I have decided I must vote in its favor.
  Throughout the past few months, I have been supportive of efforts 
that would allow our nation to first pursue Iraq's compliance with 
existing U.N. resolutions and eventually engage our allies in a united 
effort to force a regime change in Iraq. Early discussions and versions 
of the Congressional Resolution on which we are about to vote had very 
broad authorities for the President associated with the threat posed by 
Iraq--something that caused concern for me and many of my colleagues on 
both sides of the political aisle.
  As more evidence of Iraq's growing ability to develop and deliver 
weapons of mass destruction has emerged, I think it is clear that the 
patience required to avoid armed conflict must be balanced against the 
severe and catastrophic consequences of waiting too long to act. We 
simply cannot wait to act, either with the United Nations or 
unilaterally, until Iraq actually uses its weapons of mass destruction 
against its enemies or completes its development of a working nuclear 
weapon. I believe a recent dossier on Iraq, written by the British 
Government, clearly illustrates the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. 
Among its findings were the following:
  Iraq has continued to develop chemical and biological weapons, 
including anthrax, mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, and VX nerve gas;
  Iraq has military plans for the use of chemical and biological 
weapons, some of which are deployable within 45 minutes;
  Iraq has developed mobile laboratories for the production of 
biological weapons;
  Iraq has tried to covertly acquire technology and materials for use 
in the production of nuclear weapons;
  Iraq has sought uranium from South Africa despite having no active 
civil nuclear power program that might need it;
  Iraq is in various stages of development and deployment of a number 
of missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction 
over vast distances; and
  Iraq has learned a great deal from past experiences with weapons 
inspections and has undertaken an aggressive program to conceal 
sensitive equipment and documentation in the event weapons inspectors 
return in the future.
  To even the most cynical critic of armed conflict, these realities 
have to represent a clear and present danger to the security of the 
middle-east and an undeniable threat to the security interests of the 
United States.
  I think it is also important to note that the development and 
possession of these weapons of mass destruction by Iraq are in direct 
violation of international law. Iraq, under a variety of U.N. 
resolutions, is required to destroy its vast inventory of these weapons 
under the supervision of the United Nations. Sadly, this is not the 
only way in which Iraq has violated its international obligations. In 
2002 alone, Iraqi forces have fired on U.S. and British pilots 406 
times and continue this hostility every day. In addition, recently 
released classified photos shows Iraq rebuilding its weapons factories 
and U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice recently revealed 
that Iraq provided training to al-Qaida in chemical weapons development 
and trained terrorists--information corroborated in the British 
Dossier.
  I want to commend President Bush and leaders of both parties of 
Congress, including House Speaker Dennis J. Hastert and House Minority 
Leader Richard Gephardt, for working together, setting political 
differences aside, and drafting the Resolution before us today. I 
firmly believe this Resolution provides the President the authority he 
needs to protect the American people and the rest of the world from 
Saddam Hussein's growing appetite for weapons of mass destruction--
including nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Resolution leaves open 
the possibility for a peaceful end to this international crisis and 
places the responsibility for avoiding armed conflict directly on 
Saddam Hussein. His actions over the coming weeks will determine 
whether the United States, Great Britain, and a number of our allies 
are forced to act to protect the world from his own aggression.
  Specifically, the Resolution:
  Authorizes the President to defend the U.S. by military force against 
threats from Iraq, and enforce existing U.N. Security Council 
resolutions;
  Requires the President to determine that further diplomacy 
initiatives will not adequately protect our national security;
  Requires a report to Congress at least every 60 days on the status of 
efforts to protect the U.S.;
  Authorizes action by the President consistent with the War Powers 
Resolution; and
  Contains a sense of Congress resolution supporting the President's 
efforts to obtain a U.N. Security Council resolution to ensure that 
Iraq immediately complies with all relevant Security Council 
resolutions.
  I want to report that this Resolution is not the blank check for war 
that some of its opponents are portraying it to be. In fact, this 
Resolution leaves plenty of room for a peaceful resolution to this 
conflict, urges cooperation with the United Nations and our allies, and 
ensures Congress's constitutional role is protected.
  While I have been a proponent of seeking the participation of our 
allies in any action we might take against Iraq, I think it is 
important to remember that we have the right to act unilaterally in the 
defense of our nation and its interests. This resolution protects that 
right while recognizing the importance of securing the cooperation of 
the international community.
  Although I feel it is regrettable that we are now at a point where we 
must consider armed conflict with Iraq to protect the world from its 
aggression, it is impossible to ignore any longer the devastating risks 
of continued inaction. Saddam Hussein is solely responsible for 
bringing the United States and the international community to this 
point. While I remain hopeful we can find a peaceful resolution to this 
dispute, the overwhelming body of evidence points to only one 
conclusion--Saddam Hussein must be disarmed immediately through either 
his actions or our own.
  For that reason, Mr. Speaker, I will vote in support of the 
Resolution before us today and stand behind President Bush in his 
efforts to protect our nation from the horrors Saddam Hussein seems 
committed to unleashing on his enemies and the world.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, this past Sunday during a pancake breakfast at 
a firehouse in my hometown, one of my constituents sat down with me. 
``Why have we gotten into this headlong rush into war,'' he asked? Why 
haven't we first exhausted all the other possibilities for dealing with 
Saddam?'' His questions reflected both my feelings and those of so many 
other Americans: Where is the pressing need to send our Nation, our 
servicemen and women, into a potentially bloody, costly war that could 
threaten rather than strengthen our national security?
  I will vote ``no'' on this resolution.
  It is true that Saddam Hussein has for years presented a threat to 
his own people, to the Middle East, to the world. His relentless 
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is unconscionable. We have a 
legal and a moral obligation to hold him accountable for his flagrant

[[Page H7784]]

violation of international law and his maniacal disregard for human 
decency.
  I applaud the President for refocusing international attention on the 
Iraqi threat. This is something that I have followed with concern since 
I worked in the State Department 15 years ago on nuclear 
nonproliferation. However, I believe it is at the least premature, and 
more likely contrary to our national interest, for Congress to 
authorize military action against Iraq now.
  As I reviewed the arguments for and against this resolution, I found 
myself returning repeatedly to some basic questions. Would unilateral 
American military action against Iraq reduce the threat that Saddam 
Hussein poses? In other words, would a Saddam facing certain 
destruction be less likely or more likely to unleash his weapons of 
mass destruction on his neighbors, his own people, or on Americans? 
Will an attack against Iraq strengthen or weaken our more pressing 
effort to combat al Qaeda and global terrorism? Will it bolster our 
ability to promote our many other national security interests around 
the world and make Americans more secure? I believe the answer to all 
of these questions is a resounding no.
  Why should we undertake action that makes more likely the very thing 
we want to prevent? A cornered Saddam Hussein could release his arsenal 
of chemical, biological, and possible nuclear weapons on American 
soldiers or on his neighbors in the region, including Israel. The CIA 
recently reported that Iraq is more likely to initiate a chemical or 
biological attack on the United States if Saddam concludes that a U.S.-
led invasion can no longer be deterred.
  In addition, I am also concerned that a unilateral American invasion 
of Iraq would send a destabilizing shockwave throughout the Middle East 
and ignite violent anti-Americanism, giving rise to future threats to 
our national security. While I have no doubt that we can successfully 
depose Saddam Hussein, I am concerned that the act of extinguishing 
Saddam would inflame, rather than diminish, the terrorist threat to the 
United States. And the ensuing anti-American sentiment could 
reinvigorate the terrorists' pursuit of the loose nuclear weapons in 
the former Soviet Union--a greater threat than Iraq, I might add, one 
that American has largely neglected.
  The Administration has tried and failed to prove that Saddam's regime 
is a grave and immediate threat to American security. It has also 
simply failed to explain to the American public what our 
responsibilities would be in a post-Saddam Iraq. How will we guarantee 
the security of our soldiers and the Iraqi people? How will we 
guarantee the success of a democratic transition? How many hundreds of 
billions of dollars would it cost to rebuild Iraq?
  This resolution would give the President a blank check, in the words 
of many of my constituents, and would allow him to use Iraq to launch a 
new military and diplomatic doctrine. By taking unilateral, preemptive 
military action against Iraq, we would set a dangerous precedent that 
would threaten the international order.
  Instead, we can and should take the lead in eliminating the threat 
posed by Saddam Hussein not by taking unilateral military action. If we 
consult actively with our allies in the region, with NATO, with the 
U.N. Security Council, we will be able to undertake effective 
inspections and end Saddam's threat. I do not believe that we need the 
permission of our allies to take action, but I do believe that we need 
their partnership to be successful in the long run.
  As the world's leading power, we should use the full diplomatic force 
at our disposal to work with our allies to get inspectors back into 
Iraq without any preconditions--including access to Saddam's 
presidential palaces. We can and we will disarm Iraq and end Saddam's 
threat. The United Nations and the international community may 
recognize the need to take military action. The American people will 
understand and be prepared for that possibility. Now, they are not. 
Now, they are saying that, for the United States, war should and must 
always be our last resort.
  Mr. MALONEY of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the 
Spratt substitute to H.J. Res. 114, the Hastert/Gephardt resolution 
authorizing military action against Iraq. Nearly all of us agree that 
Saddam Hussein is a mass murderer who is in control of biological and 
chemical weapons of mass destruction--and reaching for nuclear weapons 
as well. The Spratt substitute recognizes the grave threat that Saddam 
Hussein poses to security in the Middle East and around the world. The 
Spratt substitute authorizes the use of force through a prudent 
multinational approach. In contrast, the Hastert/Gephardt resolution, 
which I will oppose, authorizes unilateral military action on the part 
of the United States without first making sure that all possible steps 
have been taken to organize multinational, world-wide support against 
Saddam Hussein.
  I also note that I am opposed to the substitute amendment offered by 
Representative Lee of California, but for the opposite reason. That 
resolution does not re-enforce our commitment to wage the critically 
important War on Terrorism, nor does it set out any path that would 
require Saddam Hussein to rid his regime of weapons of mass 
destruction. While it is clearly a mistake to act in haste, it would be 
an even worse mistake to not act at all.
  As Connecticut's senior member on the House Armed Services Committee, 
as well as a member of the Committee's Special Oversight Panel on 
Terrorism, I want to share my deep concern regarding four key issues 
relating to the Hastert/Gephardt resolution on Iraq.
  First, it would be a fundamental abdication of American leadership 
if, before taking action against Iraq, we don't make every effort to 
bring the family of nations with us, just as we did in the first Gulf 
War, and have done in the War on Terrorism. Unilateral action by this 
nation against Iraq raises very disturbing issues, including the 
reaction of other Arab states, which could further destabilize the 
Middle East, incite further terrorist hatred against us, and even 
potentially metastasize the Middle East conflict into the ongoing 
nuclear standout between Pakistan and India. Only a cohesive 
multinational approach, most preferably under the authority of the 
United Nations, would minimize these risks.
  Second, it seems unlikely that unilateral war with Iraq can be 
carried out without an adverse impact on the War on Terrorism. America 
certainly has the ability to do militarily almost anything it wants. 
The issue is prudence not capability. As President Abraham Lincoln said 
during the middle of the American Civil War, when England was looking 
to pick a fight with the United States, it is best to fight ``One war 
at a time.'' We have successfully built a global coalition to fight 
terrorism. Many nations, some even traditionally hostile to our 
interests, have assisted in our efforts to destroy the al Qa'ida 
network, and bring to justice the perpetrators of the September 11 
attacks. This work should remain the first priority of national 
security. A unilateral attack on Iraq will destroy that coalition, and 
make it much more difficult--perhaps even impossible--for us to 
complete our anti-terrorism efforts. Many Arab nations would break with 
our coalition, and nations like Russia and China, even France, might 
well follow suit.
  Third, a less than fully multinational approach increases the chance 
that Saddam Hussein will use weapons of mass destruction against us. In 
a letter dated October 7, 2002, to the Senate Intelligence Committee, 
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency said, ``Saddam might 
decide that the extreme step of assisting Islamist terrorists in 
conducting a WMD attack against the United States would be his last 
chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with 
him.'' Should we act unilaterally, the United States would expose 
ourselves to the greatly increased likelihood of a weapons of mass 
destruction attack. Saddam Hussein cannot achieve the same kind of 
``vengeance'' in attacking a coalition that includes fellow Arab 
states. We can best mitigate the threat of Saddam Hussein using weapons 
of mass destruction against us by having our actions endorsed by the 
U.N. Security Council and by operating in cooperation with the nations 
of the region. That is also the strategy that appears to be most likely 
to produce a resolution of the matter without Saddam Hussein using 
force of any kind. Saddam Hussein, facing a united, determined 
opposition coalition of nations would be more likely to assent to real 
inspections and disarmament if his only alternative was total defeat, 
including his being stripped of the ability to single out the United 
States for vengeance.
  Fourth, and finally, we need a clear exit strategy for any military 
engagement. The commitment to disarm Iraq and oust Saddam Hussein 
brings with it, according to the best military estimates, at least a 
decade of occupation and engagement in the stability and security of 
that country. I have great pride and confidence in our military and its 
capabilities, but there is a large danger in devoting them to such a 
huge task while other major threats still persist around the world, 
including North Korea and Iran, the other two nations of the ``Axis of 
Evil.'' Operating in conjunction with the United Nations will provide 
our forces with such a clear exit strategy. Specifically, U.N. 
peacekeeping forces will be put in place following the liberation of 
Iraq. The U.N. can then help bring Iraq back into the community of law-
abiding nations, which is a task properly and fully within its mission.
  I have based these decisions on the series of briefings I have 
attended as a member of the House Armed Services Committee, numerous 
conversations with constituents and my colleagues, and my own best 
judgment of what is patriotically both in the long and short-term 
interests of our country. I have listened intently to all sides in the 
debate, most recently meeting this morning with Secretary Rumsfeld at 
the Pentagon.
  Having carried out the due consideration that this issue demands, I 
conclude that I cannot support the Hastert/Gephardt resolution that 
would allow a pre-emptive unilateral attack without requiring that 
every effort at a

[[Page H7785]]

multinational approach had been exhausted. I therefore urge my 
colleagues to join me in supporting the strong, but prudent and 
responsible, Spratt substitute that authorizes the use of force, but 
assures that such force (1) is carried out in concurrence with the 
community of nations, or (2) failing to secure such concurrence, is 
specifically authorized in the cold light of a future day reserved for 
that purpose. Any more open-ended resolution, including that offered by 
Speaker Hastert and Leader Gephardt, does not provide the thorough, 
specific review and deliberation that the authorization of war demands 
of the Congress of the United States.
  I conclude by expressing my heartfelt appreciation, shared by my 
colleagues on all sides of this debate, for our men and women in 
uniform. Whatever the decision made today, I stand in full support of 
our dedicated and courageous service men and women who may well soon 
find themselves in harm's way. As a member of the Armed Services 
Committee, I re-affirm to them, and all Americans, my commitment to 
make sure that they continue to be the best trained, best equipped, and 
best led military force in the world. I pray them God's speed and 
protection in all that they do.
  Mr. HOUGHTON. Mr. Speaker, this is an important--no, a critical 
debate. It is right that we have it. I stand here as one who enlisted 
in the Marine Corps in 1994, voted for Desert Storm, and has always 
believed that the first federal dollar spent each year should go to the 
military. These men and women provide for our ultimately security.
  However, I am prepared to vote against this particular resolution. It 
will not be a happy vote. I will be in the minority. I sadly will not 
stand with my President, a man I admire so much. Yet as with literally 
the thousands of votes cast in this chamber, I've found that following 
one's instinct is the most honest, if not always the most politically 
popular, approach.
  What we're discussing is all unknown territory. We're talking about 
the future--and that talk, out of necessity, means guesses, estimates, 
and personal interpretation. The one thing we do know is that since 
September 11, 2001, we are living in a new world. It's an unsettling 
world requiring different defenses--secrecy, stealth operations, armies 
without uniforms--but maybe of greatest importance, an adhesive-like 
working relationship with our friends.
  Following 9/11 we were told that the enemy was terrorism in all its 
forms. The al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden would be hunted down, Afghanistan 
was to be stabilized and rebuilt, and we were to work closely with our 
allies and near-allies. We could not go it alone.
  Now we hear that priorities have changed. Iraq is the prime target. 
Saddam Hussein is a heinous criminal, with frightening weapons. And I 
believe all that. But the question remains: what does this have to do 
with terrorism, our original objective? There is little evidence that 
Iraq had anything to do with 9/11.
  I happen to be a hawk on Iraq. Saddam Hussein is a disturbed, 
dangerous leader. We should deal with him. But absent any immediate 
threat, our eye ought to be on the security of the American people. The 
fight is against terrorism in all the emerging subtle forms and that 
has little to do with Saddam Hussein. So without finishing what we 
started and with no sure knowledge that he is near producing nuclear 
weapons, why is it that within the last few months we recalibrate our 
objectives? War would be hugely costly. We already are in deep deficit. 
We are not backed by the essential allies, and we could easily unleash 
additional terrorism.
  Last weekend I spent a whole day with Jewish and Palestinian 
representatives. One Arab comment was, ``The Iraqis hate Saddam 
Hussein, but remember they hate the United States more.''
  Iraq is one of the few secular countries in the Middle East. 
Unleashing, without careful ground work, the hatred of two mortal 
internal enemies--the Sunnis and the Shi'ites--could produce another 
angry fundamentalist state.
  The bill in front of us says, ``The President is authorized to use 
the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary 
and appropriate . . .''
  I have the greatest respect for the President. And you know what? He 
may be right. But I am given the opportunity to express my opinion and 
to cast my vote. I feel uncertain at this time, in this place, 
sanctioning that authority.
  Unilateralism scares me. We haven't shown a lot of patience since the 
President's speech to the U.N. Our historic rule of thumb has been to 
bring people together, not divide them. This war will not be a cake 
walk. People fight differently in defense of their homeland, their 
families. I worry about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and our lack 
of attention to it.
  I think we've got the cart before the horse. Let the U.N. first work 
its will.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, a right decision at the wrong time is a wrong 
decision. Why don't we win the war against terrorism before we start 
another fight?
  Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, during this Congress I have been honored to 
serve as Vice Chairman of the Government Reform Committee's 
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International 
Relations. Under Chairman Shays' leadership our Subcommittee has 
conducted at least 14 hearings and briefings, many of them well before 
September 11, 2001, which addressed in some measure the threat from the 
proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
  Congress has recently conducted hearings on who missed the signals 
leading to 9/11. The signals of the potential for an even greater 
catastrophe have been writ large before our subcommittee over the past 
two years of testimony. These hearings provided ample evidence 
establishing that Iraq is one of the premier consumers--if not the--
premier consumer of the components and precursors of weapons of mass 
destruction. This unprecedented build-up serves no positive purpose, 
but rather demonstrates an attempt to dominate the region and threaten 
our peaceful interests. Let me share with you just a few examples:
  1. Iraq is seeking to purchase chemical weapons agent precursors and 
applicable production equipment, and is making an effort to hide 
activities at the Fallujah plant, which was one of Iraq's chemical 
weapons production facilities before the Gulf War.
  2. At Fallujah and three other plants, Iraq now has chlorine 
production capacity far higher than any civilian need for water 
treatment, and the evidence indicates that some of its chlorine imports 
are being diverted for military purposes.
  3. Saddam Hussein is continuing to seek and develop biological 
weapons. In 2001, an Iraqi defector, Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, said 
he had visited twenty secret facilities for chemical, biological and 
nuclear weapons. Mr. Saeed, a civil engineer, supported his claims with 
stacks of Iraqi government contracts, complete with technical 
specifications.
  4. Saddam Hussein is continuing to seek and develop nuclear weapons. 
A new repot released on September 9, 2002, from the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies--an independent research organization--
concludes that Saddam Hussein could build a nuclear bomb within months 
if he were able to obtain fissile material.
  5. Saddam Hussein is continuing to seek and develop prohibited long-
range, ballistic missiles. Iraq is believed to be developing ballistic 
missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers--as prohibited by the 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. Discrepancies identified by 
UNSCOM in Saddam Hussein's declarations suggest that Iraq retains a 
small force of Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of 
launchers and warheads.
  6. There is ample evidence that Saddam Hussein is using his 
Presidential palace sites to hide prohibited WMD and missile 
technologies. In December 1997 Richard Butler reported to the U.N. 
Security Council that Iraq had created a new category of sites, 
``Presidential'' and ``sovereign'' from which it claimed that UNSCOM 
inspectors would henceforth be barred. The terms of the ceasefire in 
1991 foresaw no such limitations. However, Iraq consistently refused to 
allow UNSCOM inspectors access to any of these eight Presidential 
sites. Many of these so-called ``palaces'' are in fact large compounds, 
which are an integral part of Iraqi counter-measures designed to hide 
prohibited weapons and material.
  7. To implement the agreement that ended the gulf war the United 
Nations Security Council passed a number of resolutions demanding that 
President Saddam Hussein stop pursuing weapons of mass destruction and 
allow inspectors total access to his country to verify his compliance. 
In 1998 Saddam Hussein suspended cooperation with the U.N. inspectors. 
The U.N. General Assembly has subsequently failed to enforce the 
sixteen (16) existing Security Council Resolutions that Iraq has 
violated. While the United States is working with our allies to craft 
yet another resolution for consideration by the Security Council, it 
should be noted that the Saddam Hussein regime has already rejected 
this proposal before it has even been brought before the Security 
Council.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a particularly difficult decision for me, 
because I recognize that it is largely the men and women of my 
generation, those in their twenties or younger, who will fight this 
war--if war comes. Today, Marine Lance Cpl. Antonio J. Sledd, 20 rests 
in honor under our flag somewhere between Kuwait and his home in 
Hillsborough County, Florida. We would be remiss in our 
responsibilities if we do not acknowledge that there will be a cost, 
and there is a price being paid this very day, by America's young 
defenders and their families.
  Opponents of military action against Iraq argue that until it is 
clear that Iraq poses an imminent threat, the United States should 
continue to contain and deter Saddam Hussein. Our hearings have 
demonstrated that Saddam

[[Page H7786]]

Hussein is not deterred, and that the threat posed by his regime's 
continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology 
is in fact imminent. Today, we are at the point, very much as the 
democracies of the world once were in their great confrontation with 
Hitler, where we have a choice to confront or appease an aggressor. I 
intend to vote in favor of House Joint Resolution 114 and support 
President Bush in his decision to confront Saddam Hussein and end the 
threat to the United States, and the world, posed by Iraq's development 
of weapons of mass destruction.
  Mr. HILLEARY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Hastert-
Gephardt Iraq resolution, in opposition to the Spratt and Lee 
amendments, and in strong support of our President.
  I do not take this action lightly. No one enjoys the idea of placing 
sons and daughters of America in harm's way. Twelve years ago, while 
serving as an Air Force C-130 navigator, I was one of those troops on 
the receiving end of a resolution like this one. I know it was an 
agonizing decision for many members of Congress. I know many members 
are struggling with this resolution here today. And I have received 
phone calls, letters, and emails from many concerned Tennesseans on 
both sides of this issue.
  To all of them, I would offer the advice Margaret Thatcher gave 
President George H.W. Bush in 1990: ``Now is no time to get wobbly.'' 
The resolution Congress passed before Desert Storm was right, both for 
America and for the world. This one is too.
  The Spratt amendment and the Lee amendment would each tie the 
President's hands, subjecting U.S. foreign policy to the dictates of 
the U.N. Security Council. United Nations opposition to removing the 
corrupt Iraqi regime in 1991 is a major reason why we're here today. I 
am not comfortable with China, Russia, and France having a veto on 
American security decisions. America is a peaceful nation, but when our 
freedom and security have been challenged in the past, we have 
consistently done whatever it took to protect our way of life. We are 
challenged again today, and America must take the lead against this 
tyranny.
  I take issue with those who call any action in Iraq ``a preemptive 
strike''. It is surely not. For Saddam, the gulf war has never ended. 
In the past two years, forces at his command have fired over 1,600 
times at American and British planes patrolling the no-fly zone Saddam 
agreed to at the end of the gulf war. They've fired at our pilots more 
than 60 times since September 18th, the day Saddam promised to ``allow 
the return of United Nations inspectors without conditions.''
  By using chemical weapons to kill thousands of his own people, Saddam 
has proven his ruthlessness. In invading Iran and Kuwait, he has shown 
his inclination toward aggression and his ambition for dominating the 
region. In violating 16 United Nations resolutions, he has consistently 
lied to the world and refused to allow the Iraqi people to join the 
ranks of civilized nations.

  Now, financed by his immense oil wealth, Saddam has relentlessly 
pursued building nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These 
weapons in the hands of a ruthless tyrant like Saddam Hussein present a 
direct threat we cannot ignore. He could launch an attack on Israel 
that plunges many nations into war. He could also use them as blackmail 
as he pursues domination of the Middle East. But his main threat to 
America is as a supplier.
  Intelligence reports have indicated that Saddam's people have been in 
contact with al-Qaeda operatives. We know they share a common interest 
in harming America and the West. If Saddam provides al-Qaeda with the 
weapons of mass destruction they desire but cannot make themselves, 
they will find a way to transport those weapons into this country. And 
the magnitude of the subsequent attack and its casualties would rival 
or exceed anything we experienced on September 11th, December 7th, or 
any other tragic date in our history.
  Remember President Bush's words from his State of the Union speech 
earlier this year. ``America will do what is necessary to ensure our 
Nation's security. We will be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. 
I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, 
as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not 
permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the 
world's most destructive weapons.''
  President Bush and his national security team may find a way short of 
war that may force Saddam to disarm. An overwhelming vote for this 
resolution could actually help the President avoid war while protecting 
our citizens, by making it clear to Saddam that we are united and 
complete disarmament is his only way out. During his speech in 
Cincinnati this past Monday, President Bush made clear that war is not 
his first option, but his last. But given Saddam's history, that last 
option may be the only way to avoid the greater danger of nuclear, 
biological or chemical weapons falling into the hands of those who will 
use them against America.
  The situation we face is not all that unlike the situation Europe 
faced with the rise of another previously defeated enemy, Germany. 
Winston Churchill's pleas throughout the 1930's that Europe deal with 
Hitler early fell on deaf ears. Western Europe's negligence was 
followed by fear, appeasement, and eventually, the most destructive war 
in history.
  This President is determined not to allow history to repeat itself. 
The American people now face a clear choice--whether to put our head in 
the sand--or draw a line in it. We will choose action over fear. The 
President is right--in this battle, time in not on our side. But 
freedom is. And in the end, victory will be as well. I strongly support 
this resolution, and I will encourage all Americans to do the same. My 
God bless our country, our President, and our men and women in uniform 
at this critical time.
  Mr. PLATTS. Mr. Speaker, just off the rotunda of the U.S. Capitol 
building stands a statue of a fellow Pennsylvanian by the name of John 
Muhlenberg. In early 1776, this 29 year-old Lutheran Minister gave a 
sermon in Woodstock, Virginia in which he called upon the men of his 
congregation to join him in fighting for our Nation's independence. 
Quoting the Book of Ecclesiastes, Pastor Muhlenberg said: ``There is an 
appointed time for everything. And there is a time for every event 
under heaven . . . A time for war and a time for peace.'' Contending 
that the time for war had arrived, Pastor Muhlenberg then concluded his 
sermon by casting off his clerical robes to reveal the uniform of a 
Continental Army officer. Pastor Muhlenberg went on to serve as a 
general in the Continental Army.
  More than a century and a half later, in an address at Chautauqua, 
New York in 1936, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt stated, ``I hate 
war.'' Yet, after Pearl Harbor roused our nation from a slumbering 
isolationism, President Roosevelt knew that the time for war had come. 
The actions of Pastor Muhlenberg and President Roosevelt remind us 
that, from the very beginning of our great Nation to modern times, war 
is always regrettable, but sometimes necessary to protect the lives of 
our citizens and to secure the important principles for which our 
Nation stands.
  As our Nation now seeks to address the very serious and immediate 
threat that Saddam Hussein's regime poses to American lives, both 
abroad and here at home, it remains to be seen whether war will be a 
necessary part of our Nation's efforts. I certainly hope and pray that 
it will not. Unfortunately, however, Saddam Hussein's actions, past and 
present, do not provide much reason to believe that my hopes and 
prayers will be fulfilled.
  If diplomacy is to have any chance of success, Saddam Hussein must 
fully and unequivocally understand that, if necessary, the United 
States and other peace-loving nations will no longer stand idly by 
while he further enhances his chemical and biological weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and aggressively pursues the production of nuclear 
weapons. Saddam Hussein must understand that, if necessary, we will use 
military force to eliminate the threat that his weapons pose to our 
citizens.
  It is thus imperative for the United States Congress to pass 
legislation authorizing President George Bush to use military force to 
``defend the national security of the United States against the 
continuing threat posed by Iraq'' and to ``enforce all relevant United 
Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.'' I therefore join 
my Republican and Democrat colleagues in voting in favor of this 
legislation, House Joint Resolution 114. Importantly, H.R. Res. 114 
requires that, prior to using military force against Saddam Hussein's 
regime, President Bush must officially determine that further reliance 
on ``diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either will not 
adequately protect the national security of the United States'' or will 
not likely ``lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations 
Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.'' Such determination must 
be shared with the House and Senate.
  My decision to support H.J. Res. 114 followed much deliberation and 
was the product of countless hours of careful review of information 
from many sources. I have fully considered the views and concerns of 
hundreds of 19th District residents. As a member of the House 
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International 
Relations, I have participated in numerous classified briefings with 
various Administration officials, including Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, and Deputy Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency John McLaughlin. I have also met overseas 
and in Washington with leaders of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a 
coalition of Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurdish Iraqi dissidents seeking to 
liberate

[[Page H7787]]

their people from Saddam Hussein's oppressive rule. Although very 
diverse in their backgrounds, they are united in a common belief that 
Saddam Hussein's military regime must be replaced with a more humane 
government. My interactions with the INC representatives leads me to 
believe that the removal of Saddam Hussein will be embraced 
enthusiastically by the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people--just 
as the people of Afghanistan embraced their liberation from the 
Taliban.
  My challenge is to fully explain my support for H.J. Res. 114 when 
much of the most important factual basis for this extremely serious 
decision is classified information. While I cannot legally share such 
classified material publicly, I can frankly and honestly state that my 
review of said material has wholly convinced me that Saddam Hussein's 
military regime poses a grave threat to the safety and security of 
American citizens, including here at home. There is compelling evidence 
of Iraq's biological and chemical capabilities and Saddam Hussein's 
intended use of such weapons. There is also strong evidence of his 
pursuit of nuclear weapons. Of significant concern is Iraq's growing 
fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are capable of dispensing 
biological or chemical weapons. As President Bush stated in his recent 
address to the Nation, our intelligence information indicates that 
Saddam Hussein is ``exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions 
targeting the United States.''
  Please allow me to address various actions by Iraq over the past 11 
years that are in the public domain. First, Iraq has a long record of 
abetting terrorist groups. For example, Hussein has regularly praised 
Palestinian suicide bombers who have taken the lives of countless 
innocent civilians, including American citizens. He has also 
financially rewarded the families of said suicide bombers. Although no 
direct Iraqi involvement in the September 11 attacks has been proven, 
there is also strong evidence that Iraq is serving as a safe harbor for 
al Qaeda terrorists since the fall of the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan.
  Second, as part of the United Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement 
following the liberation of Kuwait, Iraq agreed to dismantle its 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and allow inspections to 
ensure its compliance with the agreement. Iraq has been in continuous 
violation of the cease-fire terms, playing ``cat-and-mouse'' games with 
United Nations inspectors while continuing to develop WMD. Since 
weapons inspectors were effectively expelled in 1998, Iraq has been 
completely free to continue its pursuit of developing WMD and the means 
to deliver them. Saddam Hussein has used chemical WMD in the past 
against a neighboring country, Iran, as well as against his own people, 
including innocent children.
  Third, Saddam Hussein has demonstrated his continuing hostility 
towards the United States by attempting to assassinate former President 
George Bush in 1993 and firing regularly on U.S. aircraft attempting to 
enforce United Nations-sanctioned ``no fly zones'' in northern and 
southern Iraq, the only protection that the persecuted people in those 
regions possess. In fact, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. 
and other allied aircraft enforcing the ``no fly zones'' have been 
fired upon several thousand times by Iraqi military units.
  Fourth, Saddam Hussein has engaged in heinous human rights violations 
against his own people. He has intimated political opponents by 
ordering the systematic rape of wives and mothers of said opponents and 
he has forced parents to watch their children be tortured as a means of 
political coercion.
  ``Finally, it is important to note that `'regime change'' in Iraq is 
not a new policy adopted by the Bush Administration. Rather, the Iraq 
Liberation Act, which states that it is the policy of the United States 
government ``to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam 
Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic 
government to replace that regime,'' was enacted in 1998. Sponsored by 
Congressman Ben Gilman in the House and Senators Trent Lott and Joseph 
Lieberman in the Senate, the Iraq Liberation Act passed the House by a 
vote of 360-38 and the Senate unanimously. President Bill Clinton 
signed this act into law on October 31, 1998.
  If the use of military force against Saddam Hussein's regime does 
prove to be necessary to protect our Nation's security, such military 
action must be carefully designed to minimize the risk of injury and 
death to Iraqi civilians and American military personnel. The enemy is 
the regime of Saddam Hussein, not the Iraqi people.
   Ideally, President Bush, working hand-in-hand with our allies and 
the United Nation's Security Council, will be successful in fully 
addressing the threat that Saddam Hussein and his military regime pose 
to world peace and to our Nation's security without having to resort to 
military force. But if diplomatic efforts fail to truly eliminate this 
grave threat to American lives, then we must be prepared to act 
decisively, just as our forefathers did during the Revolutionary War 
and World War II.
  President Bush well captured the challenge before us when he stated, 
``As Americans, we want peace. We work and sacrifice for peace. But 
there can be no peace if our security depends on the will and whims of 
a ruthless and aggressive dictator.''
  Mr. OTTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my support for House 
Joint Resolution 114, authorizing the use of United States Armed Forces 
against Iraq. After careful consideration of the information provided 
by the President it is clear that the threat posed by the current Iraqi 
regime can no longer be tolerated.
  Thousands of my constituents have contacted me about this resolution, 
and many have expressed the earnest hope that war can be avoided. I 
share that hope, and urge our President to use every means short of war 
to persuade Iraq to end their violations of Security Council 
resolutions, to stop developing weapons of mass destruction, and to 
allow their people to live in peace and freedom. Unfortunately, the 
current regime has shown no willingness to do any of these things.
  The Iraqi regime, controlled by Saddam Hussein and his family, is 
unique in its level of violence, both against its own people and its 
neighbors. Since Mr. Hussein came to power he has invaded both Iran and 
Kuwait. He has fired ballistic missiles against Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
and Israel. He has sponsored terrorist attacks against American 
citizens and Iraqi dissidents abroad.
  The Hussein regime is also unique in its unquenched thirst for 
weapons of mass destruction. Iraq has used chemical weapons against its 
own people and Iran. It has developed biological weapons. Most 
disturbingly, Iraq seeks to acquire nuclear weapons.
  Some have said that the Iraqi weapons problem can be solved by 
inspections, but Iraq consistently hindered international inspections 
when they allowed them, and since 1998 has not permitted them at all. 
Meanwhile they go ahead with their research program funded by illegal 
oil smuggling.
  An Iraq armed with nuclear armed ballistic missiles would not only be 
the dominant military power of the Middle East, but it would be the 
natural ally of all states and groups that oppose the United States. We 
cannot allow unbridled power into the hands of such an unscrupulous 
regime. America's future cannot be made dependent on a regime armed 
with the ultimate weapon.
  The Iraqi regime led by Saddam Hussein is based on the ruthless use 
of force, and only responds to the use of force by those it threatens. 
If force must be used to resolve this crisis, we must ask ourselves: 
Should we use it now to defend peace and freedom, or later to avenge 
the murder of innocent men, women, and children by Saddam Hussein's 
weapons of mass destruction. I believe that the answer to this question 
is clear and that our President is correct. I urge my colleagues to 
join me in voting for House Joint Resolution 114.
  I am grateful for those allies such as the United Kingdom, the Czech 
Republic, and others who are standing with us, and remain hopeful that 
other nations will join our cause. I ask our President to seek the 
support of as many nations and international organizations as possible, 
and to make available whatever additional intelligence or security they 
need. I also must reiterate that our quarrel is with the Iraqi regime, 
not its people. As we move forward I urge my fellow Americans to remain 
tolerant of their neighbors and to avoid any action based on the 
ethnicity or religious persuasion of others. I also urge all Americans, 
and all sides in this debate, to support our troops who may be called 
upon to enforce this resolution and defend their country.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, we are standing at the abyss of a 
horrifying war. President Bush himself told us Monday night that this 
war was neither ``imminent nor unavoidable.'' And yet we are pushing, 
hurrying, racing against time to give the President our approval of a 
future war, a war without limits or boundaries, a war waged because the 
President thinks diplomacy has failed.
  I do not believe diplomacy has failed. And I do not believe we have 
to go to war. President Bush's speech was designed to frighten the 
American people, and to intimidate the United Nations. It wasn't 
address to us, the Congress, because President Bush and his advisers 
already believe that they have our backing. But they don't have the 
backing of the American people. The pools tell us that. Our 
constituents tell us that. The phone calls and faxes and emails and 
letters to our offices, running 100 to one, 500 to one against this 
war, all tell us that. I, for one, am not afraid. And I do not think my 
colleagues in the House and in the Senate should be afraid either. We 
should not be afraid of standing up to an unnecessary war. We should 
not be afraid to stand up to a President when he is wrong. We should 
not be afraid of the American people; they are right.
  President Bush tells us how important it is, for his campaign to win 
support in the United

[[Page H7788]]

Nations, that we here in the United States speak with one voice. But we 
do not have only one voice; we cannot and will not lend our voices to 
support a war that we know is wrong. When my colleagues and I went to 
Iraq, we went to tell the Iraqis that they must allow free and 
unfettered U.N. inspections. We went to investigate the situation 
facing Iraqi civilians after 12 years of crippling economic sanctions. 
And we went knowing that our democracy is strengthened when we see, and 
hear, and learn and debate all sides. We didn't have to go to Iraq to 
know why we're against going to war against Iraq. There are plenty of 
reasons back home to oppose this juggernaut towards a unilateral 
preemptive strike on Iraq.
  The first reason is that disarmament should be on top of our Iraq 
agenda. And getting the United Nations inspectors back in should be the 
first step towards accomplishing that task. The U.N. must be allowed to 
take the lead; their inspectors were already close to finishing work on 
the technical arrangements so they could get to work right away. Iraq 
had proposed the inspection team arrive as early as October 16th.
  Initial meetings between Iraqi and U.N. officials were held in March 
of this year to begin discussions about the return of inspectors to 
Iraq after they had been excluded for almost four years. Further 
meetings were held in May and again on the 4th of July. That July 
meeting was particularly useful, coming in the context of growing 
international pressure on Iraq and seeming to set the stage for the 
serious possibility of inspectors returning to Baghdad. But the next 
day, July 5th, the Pentagon leaked its latest provocative war plan to 
the New York Times, calling for a major air attack and land invasion to 
``topple Saddam Hussein.'' The Iraqis pulled back.
  But pressure continued to build, and in August the Iraqi Parliament 
invited members of Congress to come to Baghdad with inspectors of our 
choosing and to look for ourselves. On September 13th I went to New 
York to meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, and told him I 
would accept his invitation to Iraq with the understanding that the 
inspectors I would choose to accompany me would be the UNMOVIC 
inspectors themselves. We talked about the absolute necessity of the 
U.N. resuming unfettered inspections in Iraq, and he said they were 
ready for such inspections, and they understood that if no weapons were 
found the Security Council would lift the economic sanctions. I made no 
promises except to say I would come. Forty-eight hours later, on 
September 16, Sabri told Kofi Annan that Iraq was prepared to accept 
the inspectors back into Iraq.
  Unfortunately, instead of welcoming this development, it became clear 
that the Bush administration was not prepared to take Iraq's ``yes'' 
for an answer. The State Department's answer to the long-delayed Iraqi 
acquiescence was to announce that it was now in ``thwart mode,'' 
determined to prevent the inspections from going forward.
  There has been no solid information regarding Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction since UNSCOM and IAEA arms inspectors left Iraq in December 
1998 in advance of the U.S. Desert Fox bombing operation. Prior to 
leaving, the last report (November 1998) of the UNSCOM chief Richard 
Butler stated explicitly that although they had been hindered by Iraqi 
non-compliance in carrying out a small number of inspections, ``the 
majority of the inspections of facilities and sites under the ongoing 
monitoring system were carried out with Iraq's cooperation.'' the IAEA 
report was unequivocal that Iraq no longer had a viable nuclear 
program. The UNSCOM report was less definitive, but months earlier, in 
March 1998, UNSCOM Chief Richard Butler said that his team was 
satisfied there was no longer any nuclear or long-range missile 
capability in Iraq, and that UNSCOM was ``very close'' to completing 
the chemical and biological phases.
  Since that time, there have been no verifiable report regarding 
Iraq's WMD programs. It is important to get inspectors back into Iraq, 
but U.S. threats for years made that virtually impossible by setting a 
``negative incentive'' in place. This pattern has been underway for 
years. It began when then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
announced in April 1994 that the U.S. was no longer bound by the U.N. 
resolution's language promising an end to sanctions when disarmament of 
Iraq's WMD programs was complete. Similarly, in 1997 Christopher's 
successor, Madeleine Albright, affirmed that economic sanctions would 
remain as long as Saddam Hussein was in power--regardless of the U.N. 
position linking sanctions only to the WMD programs. So Baghdad was 
told that sanctions would remain regardless of Iraqi compliance with 
U.N. disarmament requirements. Similarly, the U.S. message today is 
that a U.S. military strike will likely take place regardless of Iraq's 
compliance with U.N. resolutions regarding inspections, so they have no 
reason to implement their own obligations. If the United States refuses 
to abide by the requirements of U.N. resolutions and the rule of 
international law, why are we surprised when an embattled and 
tyrannical government does the same thing?

  Inspections remain vitally important. Throughout the 1980s the U.S. 
sent to Baghdad a lethal assortment of high-quality germ seed stock for 
anthrax, botulism, E. coli, and a host of other deadly diseases. It is 
certainly possible that scraps of Iraq's earlier biological and 
chemical weapons programs remain in existence, but their shelf life is 
likely only three or four years. More significantly, since it is also 
possible (though we have see no evidence) that Iraq has manufactured 
additional chemical or biological weapons material, Iraq has no 
delivery system capable of using them against the U.S. or U.S. allies. 
The notion that the U.S. must go to war against Iraq because of the 
existence of tiny amounts of biological material, insufficient for use 
in missiles or other strategic weapons and which the U.S. itself 
provided during the years of the U.S.-Iraq alliance in the 1980s, is 
simply unacceptable.
  Regarding the nuclear level threat, the IAEA confirmed in 1998 that 
Iraq had no viable nuclear weapons program. Despite constant 
allegations, we still have seen no clear evidence that Iraq is anywhere 
close to being able to manufacture a nuclear weapon. The breathless 
claim that ``if it obtained sufficient missile material and massive 
external assistance'' Iraq could manufacture a nuclear weapon in one 
year is simply spurious. The same statement could be said for Cameroon 
or Vanuatu--that's why we have military sanctions and that's why we 
ought to hold the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other disarmament 
treaties in much higher regard.
  Pretty much the whole world believes that inspections and disarmament 
should be our goal--not the overthrow of the government in Iraq. The 
Bush administration knows it is isolated in the world on this issue: to 
say that the U.S. goal is regime overthrow, rather than disarmament 
would violate the UN Charter.
  The second reason we should oppose this war has to do with its impact 
on our relations with allies all over the world. There is virtually no 
international support, at the governmental or public level, for a U.S. 
attack on Iraq. Our closest allies throughout Europe, in Canada, and 
elsewhere, have made clear their opposition to a military invasion. 
While they recognize the Iraqi regime as a brutal, undemocratic regime, 
they do not support a unilateral preemptive military assault as an 
appropriate response to that regime. Our European friends are pleading 
with us not to go to war, reminding us that disarmament, starting with 
inspections, is their goal. Russia and China say the same thing. Are we 
to simply ignore our friends' opinions and go it alone?
  Throughout the Middle East, the Arab states, including our closest 
allies, have made unequivocal their opposition to an invasion of Iraq. 
Even Kuwait, once the target of Iraqi military occupation and 
ostensibly the most vulnerable to Iraqi threats, has moved to normalize 
its relations with Baghdad. The Arab League-sponsored rapprochement 
between Iraq and Kuwait at the March 2002 Arab Summit is now underway, 
including such long-overdue moves as the return of Kuwait's national 
archives. Iraq has now repaired its relation with every Arab country, 
and not a single one of Iraq's neighbors publicly supports a U.S. war. 
Turkey has refused to publicly announce its agreement to allow use of 
its air bases, and Jordan and other Arab countries have made clear 
their urgent plea for the U.S. to abjure a military attack on Iraq.
  Again, it is certain unlikely that a single government in the region 
would ultimately stand against a U.S. demand for base rights, use of 
airspace or overflight rights, or access to any other facilities. The 
question we must answer therefore is not whether our allies will 
ultimately accede to our wishes, but just how high a price are we 
prepared to exact from our allies? Virtually every Arab government, 
especially those most closely tied to the U.S. (Jordan and Egypt, 
perhaps even Saudi Arabia) will face dramatically escalated popular 
opposition. The existing crisis of legitimacy faced by these non-
representative regimes, absolute monarchies and president-for-life 
style democratics, will be seriously exacerbated by a U.S. invasion of 
Iraq. Region-wide instability may be expected to result, and some of 
those governments might even face the possibility of being overthrown.
  In the entire Middle East region, only Israel supports the U.S. 
build-up to war in Iraq. Prime Minister Sharon has made no secret of 
his view that the chaos caused by a U.S. attack on Iraq might well 
provide him with the opportunity for a large-scale escalation against 
the Palestinians.
  When President Bush repeats his mantra that ``you are either with us 
or with the terrorists,'' no government in the world wants to stand 
defiant. But a foreign policy based on international coercion and our 
allies' fear of retaliation for noncompliance, is not a policy that 
will protect Americans and our place in the world.

[[Page H7789]]

  Still another reason to oppose this has to do with the human toll. 
During the Vietnam war, I was lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy 
Medical Corps. My job, as a psychiatrist, was to treat young soldiers 
who returned from that war terribly damaged by what they saw and what 
they suffered. I carry those memories with me still.
  While official estimates of casualties among U.S. service personnel 
are not public, we can be certain they will be much higher than in the 
current war in Afghanistan. We do know, from Pentagon estimates of two 
years ago, the likely death toll among Iraqi civilians: about 10,000 
Iraqi civilians would be killed.
  The most recent leaked military plan for invading Iraq, the so-called 
``inside-out'' plan based on a relatively small contingent of U.S. 
ground troops with heavy reliance on air strikes, would focus first and 
primarily on Baghdad. In fact, all of the leaked military plans begin 
with air assaults on Baghdad. The Iraqi capital is described as being 
ringed with Saddam Hussein's crack troops and studded with anti-
aircraft batteries. Those charges may or may not be true. But what is 
never mentioned in the military planning documents is the inconvenient 
fact that Baghdad is also a crowded city of five million or more 
people; a heavy air bombardment would cause the equivalent human 
catastrophe of--and look very similar to--a heavy air bombardment of 
Los Angeles.
  And it is here that my trip to Iraq taught me a great deal. It 
reminded me again of the costs of war. I remembered again what Iraqis 
would suffer with this war. My colleagues and I visited hospitals, 
where we saw young cancer patients dying before their mothers eyes from 
lack of chemotherapy drugs.
  Further, the destruction of civilian infrastructure such as water, 
electrical and communications equipment, would lead to tens, perhaps 
hundreds of thousands of more civilian deaths, particularly among 
children, the aged and others of the most vulnerable sectors. We can 
anticipate that such targeted attacks would be justified by claims of 
``dual use.'' But if we look back to the last U.S. war with Iraq, we 
know that the Pentagon planned and carried out studies ahead of time, 
documenting the likely impact on civilians of specific attacks. In one 
case, Pentagon planners anticipated that striking Iraq's civilian 
infrastructure would cause ``Increased incidence of diseases [that] 
will be attributable to degradation of normal preventive medicine, 
waste disposal, water purification/distribution, electricity, and 
decreased ability to control disease outbreaks. . . .'' The Defense 
Intelligence Agency's document (posted on the Pentagon's Gulflink 
website), is titled ``Disease Information--Subject: Effects of Bombing 
on Disease Occurrence in Baghdad'' and is dated 22 January 1991, just 
six days after the war began. It itemized the likely outbreaks of 
diseases to include: ``acute diarrhea'' brought on by bacteria such as 
E. coli, shigella, and salmonella, or by protozao such as giardia, 
which will affect ``particularly children,'' or by rotavirus, which 
will also affect ``particularly children.'' And despite this advance 
knowledge, the bombing of the water treatment systems proceeded, and 
indeed, according to UNICEF figures, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, 
``particularly children,'' died from the effects of dirty water. Just 
as predicted.
  I traveled with my colleagues to the southern city of Basra, where we 
heard from physicians that the first question new mothers ask after 
giving birth is not whether the baby is a boy or a girl, but whether it 
is normal or not--because the rates of birth defects are so high. Many 
think those high rates of birth defects, skyrocketing rates of leukemia 
and other cancers, have something to do with the depleted uranium 
weapons our military used so efficiently during the war 12 years ago.
  Many of our own Gulf War veterans--and their children--are also 
suffering higher than normal rates of cancers and birth defects. And 
the Veterans Administration medical care budget has just been slashed. 
Do we want to go to war again, a war that will cost perhaps $60 to $100 
billion, and create a whole new generation of wounded veterans, along 
with too many who will not come home at all? We have not yet heard an 
answer from the Pentagon to the question of how they plan to protect 
our men and women in uniform--as well as vulnerable Iraqi civilians--
from the danger of depleted uranium weapons. So far the Pentagon has 
still not conducted the full-scale scientific study of the impact of DU 
on the human body. We should not go to war to use our troops as guinea 
pigs again.
  I oppose this war because it is a war of empire, not of legitimate 
self-defense. We claim to be a nation of laws. But too often we are 
prepared to put aside the requirements of international law and the 
United Nations Charter to which we hold other nations appropriately 
accountable.
  When it comes to policy on Iraq, the U.S. has a history of sidelining 
the central role that should be played by the United Nations. This 
increasingly unilateralist trajectory is one of the main reasons for 
the growing international antagonism towards the U.S. By imposing its 
will on the Security Council--insisting on the continuation of economic 
sanctions when virtually every other country wants to lift them, 
announcing its intention to ignore the UN in deciding whether to go to 
war against Iraq--the U.S. isolates us from our allies, antagonizes our 
friends, and sets our nation apart from the international systems of 
laws that govern the rest of the world. This does not help, but rather 
undermines, our long-term security interests.
  International law does not allow for preemptive military strikes, 
except in the case of extreme emergency to prevent an immediate attack. 
President Bush himself told us on October 7th that war with Iraq is 
``neither imminent nor unavoidable.'' Therefore it does not qualify as 
self-defense under the UN Charter. We simply do not have the right--no 
country does--to launch a war against another country that has not 
attacked us. If the Pentagon had been able to scramble a jet to take 
down the second plane flying into the World Trade Center last 
September, that would be a legal us of preemptive self defense. An 
attack on Iraq--which does not have the capacity, and has not for a 
decade or more shown any specific intention or plan or effort to attack 
the U.S.--violates international law and the UN Charter.
  The Charter, in Article 51, outlines the terms under which a Member 
State of the United Nations may use force in self-defense. That Article 
acknowledges a nation's ``inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense If an armed attack occurs against a member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.'' [Emphasis added.] The 
Charter does not allow military force to be used absent an armed attack 
having occurred.
  Some administration spokespeople are fond of a sound bit that says 
``the UN Charter is not a suicide pact.'' Others like to remind us that 
Iraq (and other nations) routinely violate the Charter. Both statements 
are true. But the United States has not been attacked by Iraq, and no 
evidence has been brought forward that Iraq is anywhere close to being 
able to carry out such an attack. The U.S. is the strongest 
international power--in terms of global military reach, economic, 
cultural, diplomatic and political power--that has ever existed 
throughout history. If the United States--with such massive global 
power--does not recognize the UN Charter and international law as the 
foundation of global security and hold ourselves accountable to them, 
how can we expect others to do so?

  President Bush's October 7th speech was clearly designed to frighten 
the American people. Once again that speech disingenuously linked the 
true horror and legitimate fear of the September 11th attacks with an 
implied connection to Iraq. The events of September 11 must never 
happen again, the president proclaims, and we will go to war against 
Iraq to make sure that they don't.
  Few of us in the Congress, and too few journalists and pundits, stood 
to challenge that claim, to remind the American people that no link has 
been shown between Iraq and the events of September 11th. That there is 
a war against terrorism that has so far failed to find the perpetrators 
of those events. That of all the four thousand or more people killed in 
Afghanistan, not one of them was named Osama bin Laden.
  It is now clear that (despite intensive investigative efforts) there 
is simply no evidence as yet of any Iraqi involvement in the terror 
attacks of September 11. The most popular theory, of a Prague-based 
collaboration between one of the 9/11 terrorists and an Iraqi official, 
has collapsed. On July 17th, the Prague Post quoted the director 
general of the Czech foreign intelligence service UZSI (Office of 
Foreign Relations and Information), Frantisek Bublan, denying the much-
touted meeting between Mohamed Atta, one of the 9/11 hijackers, and an 
Iraqi agent. The Czech Republic simply had no evidence that such a 
meeting ever took place, he said.
  More significantly, the Iraqi regime's brutal treatment of its own 
population has generally not extended to international terrorist 
attacks. The State Department's own compilation of terrorist activity 
in its 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism, released May 2002, does not 
document a single serious act of international terrorism by Iraq. 
Almost all references are to political statements.
  We are told that we must go to war preemptively against Iraq because 
Baghdad might, some time in the future, succeed in crafting a dangerous 
weapon and might, some time in the future, give that weapon to a 
terrorist group--maybe Osama bin Laden--who might, some time in the 
future, use that weapon against the U.S. The problem with this 
analysis, aside from the fact that preemptive strikes are illegal under 
international law, is that it ignores the widely known historic 
antagonism between Iraq and bin Laden. According to the New York Times, 
``shortly after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in 1990, Osama bin

[[Page H7790]]

Laden approached Prince Saltan bin Abdelaziz al-Saud, the Saudi defense 
minister, with an unusual proposition. .  .  . Arriving with maps and 
many diagrams, Mr. bin Laden told Prince Sultan that the kingdom could 
avoid the indignity of allowing an army of American unbelievers to 
enter the kingdom to repel Iraq from Kuwait. He could lead the fight 
himself, he said, at the head of a group of former mujahideen that he 
said could number 100,000 men.''\2\ Even if bin Laden's claim to be 
able to provide those troops was clearly false, bin Laden's hostility 
towards the ruthlessly secular Iraq remained evident. There is no 
evidence that that has changed.
  Ironically, an attack on Iraq would increase the threat to U.S. 
citizens throughout the Middle East and beyond, as another generation 
of young Iraqis come to identify Americans only as the pilots of high-
flying jet bombers and as troops occupying their country. While today 
American citizens face no problems from ordinary people in the streets 
of Baghdad or elsewhere in Iraq, as I found during my visit to Iraq in 
September 2002, that situation would likely change in the wake of a 
U.S. attack on Iraq. In other countries throughout the Middle East, 
already palpable anger directed at U.S. threats would dramatically 
escalate and would provide a new recruiting tool for extremist elements 
bent on harm to U.S. interests or U.S. citizens. It would become far 
more risky for U.S. citizens to travel abroad.
  Many accusations have been made regarding the role of oil in this 
war. What is clear is that the public statements of some in the private 
sector match the undenied whispers of others, such as administration 
figures themselves. those statements include the intention to render 
null and void all existing oil exploration contracts signed between 
Iraq and various national oil companies, particularly those of France 
and Russia, when the current Iraqi regime is replaced after a U.S. war. 
I do not want to support a war partly designed to redraft the global 
oil markets in the interest of undermining French or Russian oil 
companies and privileging our own.
  Any of us who are serious about opposing this war must also be 
serious about alternatives to war. We must take seriously the threat of 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Disarmament must be on top of our 
agenda. We must support the weapons inspection team, not undermining 
it. We must support the United Nations, not threatening it with 
irrelevance if its member states don't agree with our war.
  And we should go beyond the existing efforts to get serious about 
military sanctions. Denying Iraq access to weapons is not sufficient, 
nor can it be maintained as long as Iraq is surrounded by some of the 
most over-armed states in the world. U.S. weapons shipments to all 
countries in the region aggravate this situation and, as the biggest 
arms exporter in the world, the U.S. can change it.
  We can expand the application of military sanctions as defined in UN 
Resolution 687. Military sanctions against Iraq should be tightened--by 
expanding them to a system of regional military sanctions, thus 
lowering the volatility of this already arms-glutted region. Article 14 
of resolution 687--the same resolution that calls for sanctions, 
inspections and destruction of Iraq's WMD programs--points the way. It 
recognizes that the disarmament of Iraq should be seen as a step 
towards ``the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from 
weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the 
objective of a global ban on chemical weapons.

  We are told we must attack Iraq preemptively so that it can never 
obtain nuclear weapons. While we know from IAEA inspectors that Iraq's 
nuclear program was destroyed by the end of 1998, we do not know what 
has developed since. We do know, however, a few things. We know that 
nuclear facilities are of necessity large, visible to surveillance 
satellites, and detectable by a host of telltale chemical and 
radiological footprints. Such facilities cannot be mounted on the back 
of a pick-up truck. Our intelligence indicates that Iraq does not have 
access to fissile material, without which any nuclear program is a 
hollow shell. And we know where fissile material is. Protection of all 
nuclear material, including insuring continuity of the funding for 
protection of Russian nuclear material, must be an on-going priority.
  We should note that U.S. officials are threatening a war against 
Iraq, a country known not to possess nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, 
the administration is continuing appropriate negotiations with North 
Korea, which does have something much closer to nuclear weapons 
capacity. Backed by IAEA inspections, the model of negotiations and 
inspections is exactly what the U.S. should be proposing for Iraq.
  And what about ``the day after''? There is no democratic opposition 
ready to take over in Iraq. Far more likely than the creation of an 
indigenous, popularly-supported democratic Iraqi government, would be 
the replacement of the current regime with one virtually 
indistinguishable from it except for the man at the top. In February 
2002 Newsweek magazine profiled the five leaders said to be on 
Washington's short list of candidates to replace Saddam Hussein. The 
Administration has not publicly issued such a list of its own, but it 
certainly typifies the model the U.S. has in mind. All five of the 
candidates were high-ranking officials within the Iraqi military until 
the mid-1990s. All five have been linked to the use of chemical weapons 
by the military; at least one admits it. The legitimacy of going to war 
against a country to replace a brutal military leader with another 
brutal leader must be challenged.
  And whoever is installed in Baghdad by victorious U.S. troops, it is 
certain that a long and possibly bloody occupation would follow. The 
price would be high; Iraqis know better than we do how their government 
has systematically denied them civil and political rights. But they 
hold us responsible for stripping them of their economic and social 
rights--the right to sufficient food, clear water, education, medical 
care--that together form the other side of the human rights equation. 
Economic sanctions have devastated Iraqi society. After twelve years 
those in Washington who believe that Iraqis accept the popular inside-
the-Beltway mantra that ``sanctions aren't responsible, Saddam Hussein 
is responsible'' for hunger and deprivation in Iraq, are engaged in 
wishful thinking. The notion that everyone in Iraq will welcome as 
``liberators'' those whom most Iraqis hold responsible for 12 years of 
crippling sanctions is simply naive. Basing military strategy on such 
wishful speculation becomes very dangerous--in particular for U.S. 
troops themselves.
  An U.S. invasion of Iraq would risk the lives of U.S. military 
personnel and kill potentially thousands of Iraqi civilians, it is not 
surprising that many U.S. military officers, including some within the 
Joint Chief's of Staff, are publicly opposed to a new war against Iraq. 
such an attack would violate international law and the UN Charter, and 
isolate us from our friends and allies around the world. An invasion 
would complicate the return of UN arms inspectors, and will cost 
billions of dollars urgently needed at home. And at the end of the day, 
an invasion will not insure stability, let alone democracy, in Iraq or 
the rest of the volatile Middle east region. Rather, it will put 
American civilians at greater risk than they are today.
  We need disarmament, not a war for empire, oil, or ``regime change.'' 
We need the UN inspectors to go in and finish their work. Until they 
do, we simply don't know what weapons Iraq has or doesn't have.
  Let us not go to war, in pursuit of oil or the blandishments of 
empire. War is too important and its consequences too disastrous.
  Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island. Mr. Speaker, the resolution before us 
requires us to make an enormously difficult decision. There are many 
cases to be made against Iraq and Saddam Hussein, but the only one that 
justifies this debate is the danger Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, 
and particularly its nuclear program, pose to the United States. 
Recognizing this danger, however, does not inform the appropriate 
response, and in this extremely complex situation, finding the right 
response is not easy.


                            a grave decision

  There is no greater responsibility for a Member of Congress than 
voting whether to initiate war. This is a responsibility I take very 
seriously. For the last several weeks I have immersed myself in the 
details of the situation with Iraq. I have consulted with experts and 
people whole opinions I value. I have spoken with Rhode Island veterans 
and have considered the opinions of the more than 1,100 constituents 
who have contacted me on this matter. I have received a number of 
security and intelligence briefings from Administration officials, the 
National Security Advisor, the Director of Central Intelligence, 
Defense Department officials and military leaders. I have been 
carefully deliberating, weighing the potential risks of a war with Iraq 
against the inevitable danger of a nuclear-armed Iraq.
  In considering the options, I have paid careful attention to the 
position of President Bush, to his speech this week and his other 
statement on Iraq. Since September 11, I have consistently supported 
the President's efforts to safeguard our national security and 
eliminate the threat of terrorism. I believe he deserves great credit 
for rallying the American people to a new challenge and building 
strength from tragedy.
  While giving special consideration to the request of the Commander-
in-Chief, I must also exercise my own judgment on this most critical 
life and death question of war. One of the great strengths of a 
democracy is that decisions that emerge from the marketplace of ideas 
tend to be stronger, for they have been challenged and questioned. If 
we do not question and do not challenge, if we do not carefully 
deliberate, we weaken rather than strengthen our nation's purpose.
  It is for this reason that the Framers of our Constitution, in their 
wisdom, gave the power

[[Page H7791]]

to declare war to Congress. Congress represents the voice of the 
people, and it is only the people of a democracy who should have the 
power to send their sons and daughters to war. I therefore feel that it 
is incumbent upon every Member of Congress, indeed on every citizen, to 
carefully weigh the factors counseling for and against war with Iraq 
and make a decision accordingly.
  After much deliberation, I have concluded that the dangers of an Iraq 
armed with nuclear weapons are so significant that we have no choice 
but to act. At the same time, I recognize that a U.S. war with Iraq 
could complicate our struggle against terrorism and create new, serious 
risks. It is therefore clear that we must make every effort to enlist 
the United Nations in our effort to disarm Iraq and address that 
threat. Whether we accomplish our goals through diplomacy or by arms, 
our course will be less dangerous if the world community is with us. I 
will support the bipartisan resolution negotiated by President Bush and 
House leaders because I believe it represents our best hope for 
delivering the multilateral coalition we seek to eliminate the threat 
posed by Iraq's nuclear weapons program.


                        the threat posed by iraq

  In his address to the nation this week, his speech to the United 
Nations, and his other statements, President Bush has clearly and 
forcefully articulated Iraq's threat to U.S. security. Saddam Hussein 
unquestionably is one of the world's most detestable tyrants. He 
harbors a deep hostility towards the United States and an unquenchable 
thirst for conquest and power. He has demonstrated that he does not 
view weapons of mass destruction merely as deterrents, but rather as 
offensive weapons to be used to further his quest for power and give 
him leverage over the United States.
  Given this record, it is a national security imperative that he not 
develop a nuclear weapon. Nuclear non-proliferation is a longstanding 
objective of this country, but nowhere is it more critical than Iraq. 
Saddam Hussein has made clear that he believes a nuclear weapon would 
give him the ability to act with impunity. The experts I have spoken 
with from former Middle East envoy Dennis Ross to former Ambassador to 
the United Nations Richard Holbrooke to members of the current 
Administration believe that the risk of terrorism would increase 
substantially after Iraq obtained nuclear capability. Iraq would then 
be more apt to provide shelter, technology, and weapons to terrorists 
targeting the U.S. The large chemical and biological weapons stockpiles 
would pose a much greater risk to our security at that point then they 
do now. A nuclear Iraq would be an enormous danger to the U.S. and be a 
major setback in our war on terrorism.
  Not only would the direct threat to the U.S. be intolerable, but 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iraq would roil an already volatile 
region. Saddam Hussein's hegemonic ambitions for the Gulf region 
virtually ensure that he would resume his military adventurism if he 
believed he had a deterrent to U.S. action. Hussein said after the Gulf 
War that his greatest regret was not waiting to invade Kuwait until 
after he had acquired a nuclear weapon.
  Experts like Jim Steinberg, former Deputy National Security Advisor 
to President Clinton, have predicted an arms race in the Middle East in 
response to the threat of a resurgent Iraq. Countries like Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, and Turkey would feel a need to counter Iraq's new 
strategic advantage.
  In a region as unstable as the Middle East, the prospects of a 
nuclear arms race should make us all shudder.
  Of course, the most ominous threat is that Iraq would pass nuclear 
technology to terrorists. September 11th showed us that there are 
people willing to do the unspeakable. The spectre of nuclear terrorism, 
which previously seemed remote and only theoretically frightening, has 
suddenly become a real and horrible possibility. We can no longer count 
on those Cold War limits that we assumed even our enemies shared. With 
this new, visceral understanding, who is willing to take the risk that 
a nuclear-armed Iraq will not share its weapons? The degree of 
cooperation between Iraq and al Qaeda, and other terrorists targeting 
the U.S. is unclear, but if we wait for that unholy alliance to form, 
we will have waited too long.
  Unfortunately, the possibility that Iraq might develop a nuclear 
weapon is not remote. Its nuclear program has been disrupted but never 
fully dismantled. Current intelligence suggests that Iraq could have a 
functional bomb within a year of acquiring a sufficient quantity of 
highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Given the potential of acquiring 
these materials from the crumbling infrastructure of the former Soviet 
Union's arsenal, we cannot assume that a willing buyer will find no 
seller.
  The people with whom I have spoken who know the region best, from the 
current Administration, from the Clinton Administration, and those who 
have spent lifetimes studying the Middle East, are nearly unanimous in 
concluding that we simply cannot allow Iraq to acquire nuclear 
capability. The risks of nuclear terrorism, of the potentially 
catastrophic destabilization of a Middle East arms race, and of future 
nuclear war in the region are all too real. Our national security will 
be severely compromised if we do not prevent Iraq's development of 
nuclear weapons.
  Many have asked, why now? For eleven years we have relied on 
containment and deterrence to respond to Iraq. But Kenneth Pollack, a 
former CIA analyst of Iraq, has explained that Saddam Hussein's history 
suggests a streak of irrationality that makes these policies unreliable 
given the stakes. Whether because he is sheltered from the facts by 
underlings who tell him what he wants to hear or simply unbalanced, 
Hussein has repeatedly and dramatically misjudged the reactions his 
actions would generate. From his 1974 attack on Iranian-supported Kurds 
that provoked a military response by Iran leading to Iraqi territorial 
concessions, to his ill-fated war with Iran in 1980, to the invasion of 
Kuwait, he has consistently miscalculated. Deterrence is predicated on 
rational actors operating with similar sets of assumptions. These 
examples raise serious questions about whether we can expect Hussein to 
make rational choices, and that is a risk we cannot take when the use 
of nuclear weapons hang in the balance.
  President Bush has convincingly articulated the danger that Saddam 
Hussein poses and his long history of undermining security in the 
Middle East and throughout the world cannot be denied. We must act to 
disarm Iraq, and we must act soon, before he acquires nuclear weapons 
and before he writes the next chapter in a long history of irrational 
and highly destructive aggression. The question is how we act.


                          freedom is not free

  The first choice is, of course, a diplomatic solution. The goal is a 
new U.N. resolution that will convince Saddam Hussein that he cannot 
avoid complying with international law. We must appreciate, however, 
that given Hussein's history, this process may well end in 
confrontation. And so we also need to understand the many implications 
of a war in Iraq.
  We know, as is inscribed at the Korean War Memorial, that freedom is 
not free. There are times that we are called upon to sacrifice to 
protect our values, our homeland, and our way of life. When our 
national security is at stake, we will not hesitate to make the 
necessary sacrifice. But we know from painful experience the 
consequences of launching a war without first establishing the 
political will to see it through, and the American people have to know 
what sacrifices they may be called upon to make.
  Obviously, the risks of war would be most directly borne by the 
courageous men and women who were our Nation's uniform. I know that 
they stand prepared to go and fight wherever their Commander-in-Chief 
sends them. I have made it a priority during my eight years in Congress 
to ensure that they are the best-trained, best-equipped, most effective 
fighting force in the history of the world, so that if we have to send 
them into harm's way, we know they will be victorious.
  Regarding a war with Iraq, we have not been told what to expect in 
the way of call-ups, casualties, length of combat, and the like. Some 
experts predict that the Iraqi military will overthrow Hussein rather 
than face destruction and possible war crimes prosecutions. It is my 
greatest hope that they prove correct. But we need to be prepared for 
the possibility of combat involving chemical or biological attacks. We 
may face block-by-block, building-by-building combat in Iraqi cities 
that, in the words of General Joseph P. Hoar, the former commander-in-
chief of the U.S. Central Command whose area of responsibility includes 
Iraq, could resemble the last fifteen minutes of ``Saving Private 
Ryan.'' Planning conservatively, we have to assume that we may face a 
months-long guerrilla campaign and that casualties may be far higher 
than in the Gulf War.
  Our armed forces are unquestionably prepared to carry out this and 
any mission they might be given. Should they be called upon, they will 
have my unconditional support for the duration of any armed conflict. I 
will do my utmost to give the men and women who put their lives on 
the line to defend our nation whatever they need to accomplish their 
mission. We should not send them into battle, however, until the 
American people have been fully prepared for the cost in American lives 
that we may pay for victory.

  The American people must also be better prepared for the long-term 
consequences of action in Iraq. Even if the war goes quickly and the 
worst-case scenarios do not play out, there is a consensus that an 
extended American presence in Iraq will be required to maintain 
stability in that ethnically and politically divided country. It is 
critical that a centralized, unified Iraq emerge, and we cannot leave 
that outcome to chance. If we win the war but do not win the peace, the 
great risks we take and blood we shed will be for naught.
  American troops will, at least initially, be responsible for 
protecting Iraq's borders with

[[Page H7792]]

Iran and Syria, governing tinder-boxes on the brink of civil war, like 
the city of Kirkuk, and preventing revenge-induced massacres in the 
Shiite south. The economic costs will be high and the risks to our 
troops serious. Although specifics may vary depending on the breadth 
and impact of the war, under virtually any scenario we face the 
prospect of a major, long-term reconstitution of Iraq in dollars, 
energy, attention, and most importantly, lives.
  I know that we are capable of meeting the challenge of rebuilding 
Iraq, just as we are capable of meeting the military challenges. Like 
possible economic and budgetary implications, these are not 
considerations which will deter us from acting to protect our national 
security, but they are consequences of war that we must be prepared to 
realize.


          War in Iraq and the impact on anti-terrorism efforts

  As great a danger as Iraq represents, we should not pursue military 
action there without considering its impact on the wider war on 
terrorism that we are currently fighting. As many thoughtful 
commentators have noted, a war in Iraq carries its own dangers above 
and beyond the immediate risks to our soldiers, sailors, and airmen.
  The fight against Al Qaeda is not only a military engagement at this 
point, but even more so, a law enforcement and intelligence operation. 
Unilateral war with Iraq runs the risk of drying up critical support in 
the war on terrorism. We need the cooperation of foreign governments in 
countries like Yemen and Pakistan to find and detain Al Qaeda's 
leadership. The arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh in Pakistan last month is 
the perfect example. A suspected ringleader in the planning of the 
September 11th attacks, he is now providing us with valuable 
intelligence. If what is perceived to be an American imperialistic 
attack on Iraq costs us allies in our struggle against terrorism, it 
could become much more difficult for us to thwart future terrorist 
attacks.
  While an Iraqi war could cause some governments to stop working as 
closely with us, more troubling is the prospect that I could cause 
massive destabilization in the Middle East and surrounding areas. The 
first President Bush's National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, and 
others have cautioned that a war in Iraq could metastasize into a 
regional war. If Iraq attacks Israel and Israel responds as promised, 
the smoldering Israeli-Arab conflict could explode. Turkey, Syria, and 
Iran all have substantial Kurdish populations and could be drawn into 
war.
  A geopolitical nightmare scenario is President Musharraf's government 
in Pakistan toppling and a radical Islamic regime taking control of 
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Experts have said his grip on power is 
somewhat shaky. Could an American attack on Iraq prompt large street 
demonstrations in Pakistan? Could that in turn lead to Musharraf's 
downfall?
  Middle East experts are even more concerned about the impact of a war 
on the moderate government of Jordan's King Abdullah. Not only could a 
change of governments there cost us a reliable ally in the fight 
against terrorism, but it could lead to a cataclysm whose ripple 
effects would harm us in other ways. Jordan is one of the few countries 
that has signed a peace treaty with Israel. But half of its population 
is made up of Palestinian refugees. If Jordan were to fall into the 
hands of a radical government, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could 
explode into a multi-front war. An Arab-Israeli war is the surest way 
to inflame Islamic militants.
  Even without a deterioration of the Israeli-Palestinian situation, 
General Wesley Clark, the former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, 
warned the Senate Armed Services Committee that a unilateral war by the 
United Sates on Iraq would ``supercharge'' Al Qaeda's recruitment. 
There are a billion Muslims in the world, some of whom unfortunately 
harbor a great distrust of the United States. Saddam Hussein and Al 
Qaeda and their sympathizers would portray a U.S. attack on Iraq as an 
attack on Islam, and many would view it that way.
  We can assume that in the event of war, Hussein will place anti-
aircraft guns and other military targets in mosques, schools, 
hospitals, and residential neighborhoods. In order to win, the U.S. 
military may be forced to strike these sites, and al-Jezeera would 
likely broadcast daily images of U.S. bombs destroying important 
cultural, religious, and other apparently civilian buildings. Military 
victory could well come at the cost of an enormous public relations 
defeat, one which make us an army of new enemies willing to take their 
own lives to inflict pain on Americans.
  It is also far from clear that war with Iraq will reduce the threat 
of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons being used against Americans 
or our allies. A newly released CIA report details the danger that an 
attack on Iraq could lead Hussein to aid terrorists in chemical or 
biological attack as a way to exact a last measure of revenge.
  We know that Iraq has mobile labs producing these potentially 
devastating weapons. Can we be sure that our troops would eliminate 
them before he had a chance to launch weapons at Israel or put them in 
the hands of terrorists? For that matter, can we be sure they are not 
already in the hands of Iraqi agents or other terrorists outside of 
Iraq, awaiting a signal to use them? When you corner a dangerous 
animal, you have to expect it to lash out. A war to disarm Hussein may 
paradoxically increase rather than decrease Americans' vulnerability to 
those very weapons.

  If there is one lesson of warfare that has been true throughout human 
history, it is that wars have unintended consequences. Writing 2400 
years ago, the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu, called this 
uncertainty the ``fog of war.'' We ignore this timeless truth of 
warfare at our peril. It would be the hubris of the world's lone 
superpower to assume that our plans will be carried out exactly as we 
foresee them.


                minimizing threats in iraq and elsewhere

  While these dangers are real and caution us against war, inaction 
still leaves us with the prospect of a nuclear Iraq in the relatively 
near future. Through no choice of our own we have entered a minefield. 
On one side lies the danger of Iraq with nuclear weapons. On the other, 
an unfinished war against fanatics who hide in shadows and who may be 
inadvertently strengthened by our actions in Iraq. We need to pick our 
way carefully through this minefield, making every effort to minimize 
the risks on both sides.
  Obviously, our best option is to disarm Iraq without resort to war. 
This outcome can only happen if the world unites in pressuring Iraq to 
comply with UN resolutions. For this reason, I am pleased that the 
President has brought our case to the United Nations and has been 
aggressively pursuing a new, forceful resolution in the Security 
Council. The Security Council should pass a new resolution, giving 
weapons inspectors truly unfettered access to any site in Iraq at any 
time with no conditions. I believe any new resolution should be backed 
up with the realistic threat of force.
  But it must act quickly. If the UN is to remain a credible 
international agent of stability, it must, as the President has 
insisted, begin disarming Iraq in a matter of days and weeks not months 
and years. Sandy Berger, President Clinton's National Security Advisor, 
has told me that we can expect an inspections and disarmament regime to 
take several years. Given the timeline for Iraq's development of a 
nuclear weapon, the window for diplomatic action is therefore very 
small. If we want a peaceful option to prevail, we must set down that 
road immediately.
  We can hope that Saddam Hussein will recognize that he has lost the 
battle for world opinion and will capitulate to international law by 
giving up his weapons of mass destruction. Even if diplomacy fails, 
however, our national security would be much better protected if we 
forcibly disarm Iraq at the head of a multilateral coalition rather 
than on our own.
  As the first President Bush realized, perceptions are critically 
important in global diplomacy. A number of the dangers war poses to our 
efforts against terrorism are exacerbated by a perception, warranted or 
not, that the United States is using its military dominance to bully 
Arabs or Muslims. If, on the other hand, the U.S. is seen exhausting 
diplomatic efforts and any conflict is between Iraq and the community 
of nations rather than just the sole superpower, a war at that point is 
less likely to undermine American efforts to combat terrorism.
  A multilateral war with Iraq would do less to diminish the support we 
have received from Muslim nations in the war on terrorism. It would be 
less risky to our fragile allies in the region. It would be harder for 
the terrorists and anti-American propagandists to use to inflame young 
Muslims to attack the United States.
  We seek the auspices of the United Nations not because we must, but 
because doing so is in the nation's best interest. As President Kennedy 
said forty years ago during the Cuban Missile Crisis, ``This nation is 
prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace, and 
our own proposals for a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum--
in the Organization of American States, in the United Nations, or in 
any other meeting that could be useful--without limiting our freedom of 
action.''
  We will not defer decisions of our national security to the United 
Nations, but where it is useful we should take advantage of the 
international structures that our nation was instrumental in creating. 
In this case, it is in the overwhelming best interest of the United 
States to push the UN to disarm Iraq, and I therefore stand foursquare 
behind President Bush's efforts to push the Security Council to address 
Iraq's lawlessness.


               the debate in the house of representatives

  These are the considerations I have been weighing over the past 
several weeks and upon which I will cast my vote in Congress. My 
decision is based on grave concerns about the prospect of a nuclear-
armed Iraq and

[[Page H7793]]

equally serious fears that a war with Iraq will create new, highly 
dangerous risks of terrorism. I will vote for the resolution I feel is 
most likely to lead to a multilateral disarmament of Iraq, which is the 
best route to safeguard our national security.
  I was troubled by the first draft of the resolution sent to Congress 
because it was an extremely broad mandate that authorized any action 
not only to disarm Iraq and enforce UN resolutions, but to ``restore 
peace and stability in the region.'' The process of deliberation has 
worked, however, Bipartisan, bicameral negotiations have subsequently 
improved the resolution and led to a more thorough discussion of the 
complex factors that must inform this decision.
  The new resolution now requires the President to exhaust diplomatic 
efforts before resorting to force. Equally important, it authorizes the 
use of force in Iraq only upon certification by the President that such 
action will not undermine the international war on terrorism. We walk a 
fine line between the risks of a rogue Iraq on one side and hindering 
our war on terrorism on the other. These two features of the new 
resolution ensure that our Iraq policy walks that line if at all 
possible.

  President Bush has made it clear that his preferred option is to lead 
the United Nations in enforcing its own resolutions. Secretary of State 
Colin Powell and others in the Administration are working to convince a 
reluctant Security Council that a new resolution with teeth, 
authorizing unconditional access by inspectors to any site in Iraq is 
the surest way to avoid armed conflict. Secretary Powell, his 
predecessor, Madeleine Albright, the U.S. ambassador to the UN in the 
Clinton Administration, Richard Holbrooke, and others have told me that 
to persuade the international community to follow us, the President 
needs as strong a hand as possible.
  Those of us who strongly believe that America's safest path among the 
dangers that confront us is a multilateral approach and who want to 
avoid war must show the world that our nation is resolute in its 
determination to respond to the threat in Iraq. We know that Saddam 
Hussein will capitulate only if he senses that the only alternative is 
destruction. A clear declaration of our unity and our determination to 
eliminate the Iraqi threat to our own security and that of the 
community of nations is the best way to the multilateral, diplomatic 
solution that we seek.
  I remain convinced that a unilateral attack by the United States on 
Iraq creates grave threats to the security of our people, even while it 
eliminates others. But I also agree with the President that a failure 
to confront Saddam Hussein now, before he has nuclear capabilities, 
would be a colossal mistake. To maximize our national security, we must 
balance these two dangerous and uncertain possibilities. The resolution 
before the United States Congress ensures that, to as great an extent 
possible, that precarious balance is struck. Through its focus on 
diplomacy, its concern for the broader war on terrorism, and the 
resolve it communicates to the rest of the world, it is the most likely 
vehicle to the multilateral, diplomatic disarmament of Iraq that I and 
most Americans seek. I will, therefore, vote for the resolution in the 
most fervent hope that the force it authorizes should never have to be 
used.
  Mr. WELLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution to 
Authorize the Use of the United States Armed Forces Against Iraq. This 
resolution grants to the President all the authority he needs to 
protect U.S. national security interests--including the use of military 
force if necessary--against the threat posed by Iraq.
  After more than a decade of deception and defiance since the end of 
the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein poses a new and growing threat to the 
world. He has deceived and defied the will and resolutions of the 
United Nations Security Council through many means including; 
continuing to seek and develop chemical, biological, and nuclear 
weapons; brutalizing the Iraqi people, using chemical weapons against 
his own people and committing gross human rights violations and crimes 
against humanity; and supporting international terrorism.
  Saddam Hussein's evil regime wields a massive stockpile of chemical 
and biological weapons that remains unaccounted for and is capable of 
killing millions of innocent people. Evidence also reveals that Iraq is 
rebuilding facilities that it has used to produce chemical and 
biological weapons--and to develop nuclear weapons technology.
  The facts are clear--Saddam Hussein desperately wants a nuclear 
weapon--and the wretched history of his evil regime demonstrates that 
he will use it.
  This threat grows more dangerous with the knowledge of ties between 
Hussein and Al-Qaida. Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network share a 
common enemy--the United States of America and its allies in the War on 
Terror. After September 11th, Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully 
celebrated the terrorist attacks on America. But Saddam Hussein doesn't 
limit his involvement in the death of innocents to merely cheering from 
the sidelines. In April 2002, Saddam Hussein increased from $10,000 to 
$25,000 his regime's payment to families of Palestinian homicide 
bombers. He continues to encourage violence in the Middle East and 
hopes his funding will help the violence to continue.
  I urge my colleagues to speak with one voice in support of this 
bipartisan resolution. While use of military force should be used as a 
last resort we must support the President and speak with one voice. 
History has taught us that we can not wait. We must act now.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.J. Res. 114, to 
provide authorization for the use of military force against Iraq. While 
I hope and pray President Bush does not have to commit our troops to 
such action, I believe that he must have the authority he needs to 
protect U.S. national security interests.
  The events of September 11th showed us that we are not protected from 
an attack on our homeland. A first strike made with weapons of mass 
destruction can result in millions dead, and the U.S. must be prepared 
to act preemptively.
  I did not reach this conclusion easily, Mr. Speaker. But in a world 
with biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, a first strike 
capability carries with it the possibility that it will be the last 
strike, with millions left dead in its wake.
  There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein possesses and continues to 
cultivate weapons of mass destruction; the U.N. weapons inspectors were 
thrown out of Iraq four years ago for a reason. In addition, we know 
that he is violating the U.N.'s oil-for-food program to the tune of 
several billion dollars a year; rather than feeding innocent Iraqi 
citizens, this is money that is undoubtedly being spent on the 
development of weapons of mass destruction. And we know that if he is 
able to buy a softball-sized amount of plutonium on the black market, 
he will have a nuclear weapon within a year.
  Some of my colleagues ask why we must act against this threat in 
particular, when there are many other threats of a grave and serious 
nature confronting us as we wage a global war against terror. The 
answer is that this threat is unique; an evil dictator has gathered 
together the most serious dangers of our time in one place. In Iraq we 
see Saddam stockpiling weapons of mass destruction, and I trust I need 
not remind anyone that he has used such weapons already, against his 
own people. In addition, he has tried to dominate the Middle East, 2nd 
has struck other nations in the region, including our ally Israel, 
without warning.
  Some of my colleagues have suggested that disarming Hussein will 
dilute the war against al-Qaeda, but I believe that the opposite is 
true; these dual goals are inextricably linked. We know that Saddam has 
harbored and trained high-level al-Qaeda who fled to Iraq after we 
invaded Afghanistan. Indeed, there can be no doubt that Saddam and al-
Qaeda share a common enemy: The United States of America, and the 
freedom we represent. And let me be clear: either could attack us at 
any time.
  Keeping this in mind, it seems to me that we, as guardians of 
freedom, have an awesome responsibility to act to ensure that Saddam 
Hussein cannot carry out such a first strike against the United States 
or our allies.
  Mr. Speaker, some of my colleagues object to this Resolution because 
we do not have a groundswell of international support for military 
intervention. The distinguished Chairman of the international Relations 
Committee has highlighted the key question as regards this issue: on 
whom does the final responsibility for protecting ourselves rest? Is it 
ours or do we share it with others?
  While there is no doubt that unqualified support from the United 
Nations is preferable, we must be prepared to defend ourselves alone. 
We must never allow the foreign policy of our country to be dictated by 
those entities that may or may not have U.S. interests at heart.
  Mr. Speaker, the Resolution before us does not mandate military 
intervention in Iraq. It does, however, give President Bush clear 
authority to invade Iraq should he determine that Saddam is not 
complying with the conditions we have laid before him. Chief among 
these conditions is full and unfettered weapons inspections; if Saddam 
fails to comply, as has been the unfortunate historical trend, we will 
have no choice but to take action. Our security demands it.
  Mr. Speaker, the world community watching this debate ought not 
conclude that respectful disagreements on the Floor of this House 
divide us; on the contrary, we find strength through an open airing of 
all views. We never take this privilege for granted, and we need look 
no further than to Iraq to understand why.
  Let us not forget those who continue to suffer under the evil hand of 
Saddam. To take just one example, the more than one and a half million 
Assyrians in Iraq have been displaced from their ancestral homes, 
tortured,

[[Page H7794]]

raped, murdered and caused to suffer every conceivable degradation at 
the hands of the Hussein regime. They have much to lose in any failed 
effort to remove Saddam, yet they fully support President Bush.
  And they certainly will not stand alone. As President Bush noted in 
his address to the nation on Monday, ``When these demands are met, the 
first and greatest benefit will come to Iraqi men, women and children. 
The oppression of Kurds, Assyrians, Turkmen, Shi'a, Sunnis and others 
will be lifted. The long captivity of Iraq will end, and an era of new 
hope will begin.'' In other words, as in Afghanistan, when given hope, 
an oppressed people will rise up and seize the opportunity for freedom.
  At the end of this debate, Congress will speak with one voice. I have 
no doubt that the world will witness the same expression of unity as 
was demonstrated by Americans across the country following the attacks 
on September 11th. I find comfort in the knowledge that this unity 
represents a promise that we will never back down from preserving our 
freedoms and protecting our homeland from those who wish to destroy us, 
and our way of life.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, we are about to set the course 
for our nation's foreign policy that will impact the rest of this 
century, and we are about to decide the destiny of many of our young 
men and women.
  There is not doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein poses a real threat 
to the United States. He has violated every U.N. Security Council 
Resolution and has committed unspeakable atrocities against his own 
people. If there is an axis of evil, then Saddam Hussein is its 
lynchpin. However, the question before the Congress today is not 
whether or not Saddam Hussein is a threat. The question is what do we 
do about it? And when? And how?
  To begin, war must be the last option, not the first solution. We 
must demonstrate to the world that we will continue to exhaust 
diplomatic and peaceful options to protect our security and national 
interests.
  As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, we must demand a 
Resolution that allows unhampered--any time any place--access to any 
and all areas within Iraq for inspection, and we must equip the 
inspection teams with thousands of coalition forces to ensure both 
their protection and the United Nations' commitment to peace.
  A preemptive strike will have serious repercussions on the entire 
Middle East region. While the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is 
obvious, it is equally obvious that any aggressive actions taken by the 
United States will prompt Saddam Hussein to strike back not only on the 
U.S. directly, but also on our allies and interests in the region, and 
specifically, Israel.
  The provocation of an Iraqi strike by the U.S. is the last thing we 
should be doing as Israel continues to seek peace with the 
Palestinians, Syria, and Lebanon. Should Iraq attack Israel, as it did 
in 1991, Israel will respond--and who can blame them?
  This won't be a war that Israel has asked for, but it may well be one 
they are forced to engage in. I do not want to have to explain to my 
constituents why I voted for a war that guarantees the injury or death 
of Israelis.
  While there is not doubt in my mind that the U.S. can prosecute a war 
to successful conclusion, I remind the Commander in Chief that the men 
and women of our Armed Forces are already fully engaged in a war on 
terrorism.
  In addition to that war, we have military commitments in Japan, 
Germany, and South Korea. We also have over 3 thousand troops in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, almost 5 thousand in Saudi Arabia, over 4 thousand in 
Kuwait, and another 5 thousand in Serbia, to name a few. How will a war 
with Iraq, and make no mistake, this will be a full-fledged war, affect 
our peacekeeping and peace enforcement obligations in these and other 
parts of the world?
  H.J. Res 114 lacks even the barest essentials for good foreign policy 
and is bereft of any consideration of global politics. It does not 
include any short or long term planning. I submitted an amendment in 
the nature of a substitute that authorized the use of U.S. Armed Forces 
against Iraq, and my Resolution included a number of preconditions that 
the President would have been forced to follow, prior to receiving 
authority from Congress to engage U.S. troops in war.
  Those preconditions included verification that all peaceful means to 
obtain compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions have been 
exhausted, a commitment that the war on terrorism remain the nation's 
highest priority, a plan for stabilizing a free Iraq, and a commitment 
to protect the health and safety of the Iraqi people. I am sorry that 
the full House was not to permitted to vote on my proposal.
  We are about to determine the destiny of far too many of our nation's 
young men and women. We must be absolutely certain that peaceful 
options have been exhausted and that we have achievable goals for 
stability in the region.
  I am not yet certain that we have these plans or have exhausted these 
options. I will not support H.J. Res 114, or any other Resolution that 
authorizes a preemptive military strike against another nation, until 
these preconditions have been met. I urge my colleagues to adhere to 
these same standards.
  Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, 12 years ago, I came to this floor and 
voted, with a heavy heart, to authorize military action against Iraq 
after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Sadly, I rise today to support 
another resolution which once again authorizes the use of military 
force against Iraq and Saddam Hussein.
  I think everyone agrees that military action, especially unilateral 
action, should never be undertaken lightly, and that judicious thought 
must be given to the consequences of such action. While I strongly 
believe that diplomacy is always preferable, it has become clear to me 
that we can no longer afford to ignore the threat posed by Saddam 
Hussein and his brutal regime.
  It has been well documented by previous speakers today that since the 
end of the Persian Gulf War, the threats posed by Iraq have actually 
increased rather than diminished. For more than a decade, Saddam has 
persisted in violating numerous United Nations resolutions designed to 
ensure that Iraq does not pose a threat to international peace and 
security. At the same time, he has consistently tried to circumvent 
U.N. economic sanctions against his brutal regime. Iraq continues to 
breach its international obligations by pursuing its efforts to develop 
a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively 
seeking nuclear weapons capability and supporting and harboring 
terrorist organizations.
  Given his abysmal record for violating international obligations, 
there is no reason to believe that Saddam can be trusted to abide by 
his most recent promises for cooperation. Rather than making a true 
commitment to international peace, his latest statements are nothing 
more than ruse designed to give him ore time to further strengthen his 
own arsenal of weapons to use against us and our allies.
  We cannot sit idly by and let Saddam Hussein wreck havoc on the 
world. Nor can we afford to wait until another terrorist attack claims 
the lives of more innocent Americans. History has taught us that there 
are severe consequences for inaction against a brutal dictator.
  The United States is unique because it is the only country whose very 
existence was based on an idea--the idea of freedom; it is an idea that 
must be constantly guarded. It is a noble but a fragile thing that can 
be stolen or snuffed out if not protected.
  Mr. Speaker, I sincerely hope that the use of military force can be 
avoided but we cannot shy away from it out of fear. Giving the 
president the authority to use military force as a last resort may be 
the best way to avoid actually having to us it at all.
  I urge my colleagues to support H.J. Res. 114.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise this evening to speak 
about the question of life or death as we have considered the steps we 
will take to deal with the problem of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.
  The Constitution was not created for us to be silent. It is a body of 
law that provides the roadmap of democracy in this country, and like 
any roadmap, it is designed to be followed.
  Saddam Hussein is indeed an evil man. He has harmed his own people in 
the past, and cannot be trusted in the future to live peacefully with 
his neighbors in the region. I fully support efforts to disarm Iraq 
pursuant to the resolutions passed in the aftermath of the gulf war, 
and I do not rule out the possibility that military action might be 
needed in the future to defend the United States.
  Right now, however, we are moving too far too quickly with many 
alarmist representations yet undocumented. There is no proof that our 
Nation is in imminent danger, because if there were, every single 
member of this body would rightfully expect and approve of the 
President acting immediately to protect the country.
  It is not too late for peace. With tough weapons inspections and 
strict adherence to the Security Council resolutions dealing with 
weapons of mass destruction, war can still be averted if we are willing 
to pursue aggressive diplomacy. Since we are a just nation, we should 
wield our power judiciously--restraining where possible for the greater 
good.
  We should make good on the promise to the people that we made in the 
passage of the 1998 Iraqi Liberation Act. We should do all that we can 
to assist the people of Iraq because as President Dwight Eisenhower 
said, ``I like to believe that people in the long run are going to do 
more to promote peace than our governments. Indeed, I think that people 
want peace so much that one of these days, governments had better get 
out of the way and let them have it.''
  Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, all Members of Congress agree that Saddam 
Hussein is a dangerous and tyrannical man. He is the enemy of the 
United States and all other civilized nations and his ability to wage 
biological

[[Page H7795]]

and chemical warfare must eventually be extinguished. But this can and 
must be accomplished without imperiling the security of our citizens or 
the moral integrity that has characterized the United States as the 
greatest democracy in the world.
  Mr. Speaker, Congress cannot abdicate its responsibility in the 
decision to wage war and invade another country. This resolution makes 
possible a unilateral declaration of war against Iraq based on the sole 
determination of the President. He can do this without exhausting 
multi-national efforts and for any reason he deems appropriate. This is 
an overly broad delegation of authority from the legislative branch to 
the executive branch which is contrary to Constitutional authority.
  Mr. Speaker, the substitute offered by Congressman Spratt, which 
failed today, would have told the United Nations, Saddam Hussein and 
the entire world that the United States insists on unrestricted 
inspections, an abbreviated and absolute inspection timetable, strict 
standards of verification and accountability, and disarmament by any 
appropriate means at the proper time. Under this substitute, failure to 
accomplish these goals under U.N. auspices would have resulted in a 
vote in the U.S. Congress on whether to proceed unilaterally. This 
approach was the superior, more reasoned choice . . . both in 
responsibly protecting the American people and remaining faithful to 
Congress' Constitutional duties.
  Mr. Speaker, it has been said that a smart man wins a war, a wise man 
avoids a war. Today Congress did not act wisely.
  Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Speaker, many years from now, when those so 
inclined decide to examine the Congress of this era, I am confident 
that they will find ours to be a thoughtful, involved House, one that 
judiciously examined every issue essential to the defense and freedom 
of our Nation and her allies.
  For 3 days, members marched to the floor to offer their support for, 
or opposition to, this bipartisan resolution. Indeed, the true essence 
of democracy has been displayed on the floor of the House of 
Representatives. I am proud to have been a part of the dialogue 
concerning this important issue of our time.
  And it was with much deliberation, consultation, and discussion that 
I came to support the resolution authorizing the use of military force 
against Iraq if that force becomes necessary and if all other means of 
eliminating this threat fail.
  Let me be clear. This is not a declaration of war from the Congress. 
This was Congress ensuring that the President has the authority he 
needs to deal with the very real threat of Iraq.
  Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a threat. He is the epitome of 
malevolence. Indeed, the record of this murderous regime has been 
outlined forcefully in this body, and by our Commander in Chief.
  Saddam has used weapons of mass destruction against his own people. 
He waged war with Iran; he invaded Kuwait. For the last 11 years he has 
defied the will of the entire planet as expressed in resolutions by the 
United Nations Security Council.
  I know of no thinking person who argues against the profound 
necessity of eliminating Saddam's weapons technology. We all agree on 
the menace he poses and desire a world where he is not a factor.
  Saddam Hussein's repeated defiance when it comes to permitting 
weapons inspections is a strong indication that his regime poses a very 
real threat to the civilized world right now.
  Ultimately, I believe that Saddam Hussein is dangerous. Dangerous in 
his country, dangerous to his region, and dangerous to the United 
States. Therefore I feel that giving the President the authority to use 
force against Iraq is an important matter of international-national 
security. Iraq poses an immediate biological and chemical threat to 
50,000 American troops in the Middle East. This exacerbates the already 
enormous instability in the region.
  However, I do not give the President this authority without 
reservation. To be sure, in my view, there are still important 
lingering questions that demand further discussion from the President 
and this Administration.
  For example, should military force be required, when what? After the 
intervention, how will the situation likely evolve?
  Why have more nations thus far chosen not to join us in this 
coalition against the threat of Saddam? How will we share the costs of 
war with those allies who have joined with us?
  If Iraq is truly part of our war on terror, what about those other 
nations that seem to fit this criteria of harboring terrorists and 
possessing weapons of mass destruction? Will we address those threats 
next, and if so, how? The President must be prepared to answer this 
question of why Iraq and not others.
  Further, we must make absolutely certain that whatever is done in 
Iraq does not negatively impact the broader war that we authorized 12 
months ago--the war on terrorism. Al Queada has already taken thousands 
of our sons and daughters, fathers and mothers. We cannot waver one bit 
in our pursuit of those who attacked this nation on September 11, 2001.
  An we must continually emphasize that our nation must work with its 
allies. It is critical that we try to attain as much international 
support as possible. Working together with other nations on this front 
will expedite the intervention process and enhance the chances for 
post-war success.
  It is this last point that I find absolutely critical. That is why I 
was a cosponsor of the Spratt substitute resolution. It mandated the 
administration to fully work through the possibility of securing a new 
resolution from the United Nations Security Council calling for the 
disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction before any pursuit of 
unilateral action.
  Although I am disappointed that the mandate of the Spratt substitute 
did not pass, I am confident that as long as Congress exercises 
thorough oversight, then the president will proceed judiciously.
  The resolution that passed the House today was negotiated with the 
Democratic leadership. This was a bipartisan compromise, incorporating 
may provisions that were left out of the President's initial draft 
proposal. President Bush has shown good faith thus far in his dealings 
with our party. It is time to unite behind our commander-in-chief.
  Nobody wants this conflict to end up in war. Nobody fails to 
comprehend the gravity of this decision. Nobody wants one American 
soldier to be in harm's way.
  In fact, we all hope that through the use of other means, including 
exhausting our diplomatic options, Iraq can be disarmed such that the 
world community determines that force is not necessary.
  But shall that avenue fail, our nation must be prepared to protect 
its citizens fully and completely from those who wish us harm.
  Indeed, it is imperative that the United States speaks with one voice 
to Saddam Hussein. There can be no ambiguity in our resolve to protect 
and defend this nation, and the House accomplished this today.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this important 
resolution. Mr. Speaker, I represent Fort Campbell, home of the 101st 
Airborne. These brave men and women may likely be among the first 
soldiers called into duty in the event we go to war with Iraq. The 
101st was called into service during Operation Desert Storm, and more 
recently they continue to serve their country with pride in 
Afghanistan.
  Saddam Hussein is an evil man who cannot be trusted. Almost everyone 
in this esteemed body agrees with that statement. If we allow Saddam to 
develop or obtain weapons of mass destruction, how then will we be able 
to stop him? As the President said on Monday night, we don't fully know 
what his weapons capabilities are, and we need to have our inspectors 
go to Iraq to find out. If Saddam continues to defy the will of the 
United Nations Security Council and of the global community, we must 
act.
  No one wants to go to war with Iraq. I would prefer that the men and 
women at Fort Campbell, who I represent, not be forced to leave their 
families. However, I know that they are ready for another ``rendezvous 
with destiny'' should they be called upon.
  Four years ago, an overwhelming majority of this House, including 
many of those who now speak out against action in Iraq, voted to make 
regime change in Iraq the official policy of our government. What has 
changed since then? Has Saddam allowed weapons inspectors full 
unfettered access in Iraq? Has he destroyed his weapons of mass 
destruction and stopped programs to develop these weapons? The answer 
is no.
  Saddam has defied the U.N. Security Council and the global community 
by ignoring countless U.N. resolutions. Our Commander-in-Chief has 
called upon this great body to give him the authority to hold Saddam 
accountable. We must Act.
  After World War II, when what some have deemed our ``greatest 
generation'' fought for freedom in Europe and in the Pacific, we 
promised ourselves ``never again.'' Never again would we allow 
tyrannical dictators to threaten the global peace and to use unjust and 
immoral force against his own or other people. Unfortunately, again may 
be happening. I know that this generation will live up to its calling, 
and someday, we may just be calling those brave men and women our 
greatest generation.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this resolution. It is 
not only important for our security, but for the security of the entire 
free world.
  Mr. MOORE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution.
  Because this action could ultimately send our sons and daughters to 
war, my decision to support this resolution is one I have considered 
very carefully. I have spent the past several months gathering 
information from experts

[[Page H7796]]

in this and previous administrations, from other experts in the field, 
and from my constituents in Kansas. I have spoken to community leaders, 
religious leaders, and my family.
  When I began this process, I stated my belief that the President 
should present to Congress, the American people, and the international 
community a compelling case for intervention in Iraq. I have been 
presented with evidence and intelligence--some of it classified--
regarding the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. I am convinced that we 
must take action to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.
  This resolution is not the same as the measure originally proposed by 
the White House. The resolution is a compromise agreed to by the 
President and Democratic and Republican leaders in Congress. It 
requires that the President exhaust all diplomatic options and notify 
Congress before implementing military action. Diplomacy must be our 
Nation's first priority in resolving the crisis in Iraq. I hope the use 
of force won't be necessary. But in order for diplomacy to be 
successful, the threat to use force must be credible.
  The resolution also encourages the President to work with our allies 
and the United Nations in dealing with Saddam. We were successful in 
the Persian Gulf War and, more recently, in Afghanistan by working 
cooperatively with our allies and the United Nations. That policy 
should guide the President and Congress as we confront the threat from 
Iraq.
  As a father and grandfather, this decision that could send our sons 
and daughters to war is the most difficult one I have faced as your 
congressman. But we must confront Saddam's threat to our security. And 
we must keep America safe. The resolution allows us to do that.
  There is no question that Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass 
destruction in the form of chemical and biological weapons. There is 
also no question that he is working to develop a nuclear capability. He 
could be in possession of a working nuclear device in a matter of 
several months to a few years.
  There is also no question that Saddam has shown a willingness to use 
weapons of mass destruction against other countries and his own people. 
And there is growing evidence of his willingness to share his weapons 
with terrorists and rogue agents who might use those weapons against 
America.
  Saddam's aggressive nature knows few bounds. He represents a clear 
and present danger to the United States, our citizens, and our 
interests in the world. Based upon the evidence and intelligence I have 
reviewed, I believe Iraq presents a clear threat to the United States. 
I will support and vote for the use of force resolution the President 
and congressional leadership agreed to on October 2. This measure gives 
the President the authority he needs to enforce the U.N. resolutions 
Iraq has violated, while limiting the scope and duration of the 
authority to address the current threats posed by Iraq.
  There's an old saying: ``Politics stops at the water's edge.'' That 
is the case here. We must show the world that we are united in our 
determination to protect our Nation and our people from threat posed by 
Iraq.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, this past Sunday during a pancake breakfast at 
a firehouse in my hometown, one of my constituents approached me. ``Why 
have we gotten into this headlong rush into war,'' he asked? ``Why 
haven't we first exhausted all the other possibilities for dealing with 
Saddam?'' His questions reflected both my feelings and those of so many 
other Americans: Where is the pressing need to send our Nation, our 
servicemen and women, into a potentially bloody, costly war that could 
threaten rather than strengthen our national security?
  I will vote ``no'' on this resolution.
  It is true that Saddam Hussein has for years presented a threat to 
his own people, to the Middle East, to the world. His relentless 
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is unconscionable. We have a 
legal and a moral obligation to hold him accountable for his flagrant 
violation of international law and his maniacal disregard for human 
decency.
  I applaud the President for refocusing international attention on the 
Iraqi threat. This is something that I have followed with concern since 
I worked in the State Department 15 years ago on nuclear 
nonproliferation. However, I believe it is at the least premature, and 
more likely contrary to our national interest, for Congress to 
authorize military action against Iraq now.
  As I reviewed the arguments for and against this resolution, I found 
myself returning repeatedly to some basic questions. Would unilateral 
American military action against Iraq reduce the threat that Saddam 
Hussein poses? In other words, would a Saddam facing certain 
destruction be less likely or more likely to unleash his weapons of 
mass destruction on his neighbors, his own people, or on Americans? 
Will an attack against Iraq strengthen our greater and more pressing 
effort to combat al Qaeda and global terrorism? Will it bolster our 
ability to promote our many other national security interests around 
the world and make Americans more secure? I believe the answer to all 
of these questions is a resounding no.
  Why should we undertake action that makes more likely the very thing 
we want to prevent? A cornered Saddam Hussein could release his arsenal 
of chemical, biological, and possible nuclear weapons on American 
soldiers or on his neighbors in the region, including Israel. The CIA 
recently reported that Iraq is much more likely to initiate a chemical 
or biological attack on the United States if Saddam concludes that a 
U.S.-led invasion can no longer be deterred.
  In addition, I am also concerned that an American invasion of Iraq 
would send a destabilizing shockwave throughout the Middle East and 
ignite violent anti-Americanism, giving rise to future threats to our 
national security. While I have no doubt that we would successfully 
depose Saddam Hussein, I am concerned that the act of extinguishing 
Saddam would inflame, rather than diminish, the terrorist threat to the 
United States. And the ensuing anti-American sentiment could 
reinvigorate the terrorists' pursuit of the loose nuclear weapons in 
the former Soviet Union--a greater threat than Iraq, I might add, one 
that America has largely neglected.
  The Administration has tried and failed to prove that Saddam's regime 
is a grave and immediate threat to American security. It has also 
simply failed to explain to the American public what our 
responsibilities would be in a post-Saddam Iraq. How will we guarantee 
the security of our soldiers and the Iraqi people? How will we 
guarantee the success of a democratic transition? How many hundreds of 
billions of dollars would it cost to rebuild Iraq?
  This resolution would give the President a blank check, in the words 
of many of my constituents, and would allow him to use Iraq to launch a 
new military and diplomatic doctrine. By taking unilateral, preemptive 
military action against Iraq, we would set a dangerous precedent that 
would threaten the international order. Instead, we can and should take 
the lead in eliminating the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, not by 
taking unilateral military action. If we consult actively with our 
allies in the region, with NATO, with the U.N. Security Counsel, we 
will be able to undertake effective inspections and end Saddam's 
threat. I do not believe that we need the permission of our allies to 
take action, but I do believe that we need their partnership to be 
successful in the long run.
  As the world's leading power, we should use the full diplomatic force 
at our disposal to work with our allies to get inspectors back into 
Iraq without any preconditions--including access to Saddam's 
presidential palaces. We can and we will disarm Iraq and end Saddam's 
threat. The United Nations and the international community may 
recognize the need to take military action. The American people will 
understand and be prepared for that possibility. Now, they are not. 
Now, they are saying that, for the United States, war should and must 
always be our last resort.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). All time for debate has 
expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 574, the previous question is ordered on 
the joint resolution, as amended.
  The question is on engrossment and third reading of the joint 
resolution.
  The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a third 
time, and was read the third time.


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair notes a disturbance in the gallery 
in violation of the rules of the House and directs the Sergeant-at-Arms 
to restore order.


               Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Kucinich

  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the joint 
resolution?
  Mr. KUCINICH. I am, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Kucinich moves to recommit the joint resolution H.J. 
     Res. 114 to the Committee on International Relations with 
     instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith 
     with the following amendment:
       Page 9, after line 2, insert the following:
       (c) Additional Requirement.--Prior to the exercise of the 
     authority granted in subsection (a) to use force, the 
     President shall transmit to Congress a report, in 
     unclassified form, that addresses the impact of such use of 
     force on the national security interests of the United 
     States. The report shall contain, at a minimum, the 
     following:
       (1)(A) An estimate of the costs associated with military 
     action against Iraq, as determined by the Secretary of 
     Defense, and an

[[Page H7797]]

     estimate of the costs associated with the reconstruction of 
     Iraq, as determined by the Secretary of State.
       (B) An estimate by the Director of the Office of Management 
     and Budget of any additional funding to pay the costs 
     referred to in subparagraph (A) to be derived from one of 
     more of the following:
       (i) Offsetting reductions in other Federal programs.
       (ii) Increases in Federal revenues.
       (iii) Increases in public borrowing.
       (2) An analysis by the Secretary of the Treasury of the 
     impact on the United States economy likely to result from 
     military action against Iraq, including the impact on the 
     gross domestic product, the unemployment rate, the Federal 
     Funds rate, and the financial markets.
       (3) An estimate by the Secretary of Energy of any change in 
     the price of crude oil and downstream products likely to 
     result from military action against Iraq and an analysis of 
     the impact of such change on the United States economy.
       (4) A comprehensive plan developed by the Secretary of the 
     Treasury and the Secretary of State for United States 
     financial and political commitment to provide short-term 
     humanitarian assistance to the people of Iraq and to provide 
     long-term economic and political stabilization assistance for 
     Iraq.
       (5) An assurance by the Secretary of Defense that all 
     United States Armed Forces to be deployed pursuant to the 
     exercise of authority granted in subsection (a) have been 
     provided with equipment to protect against chemical and 
     biological agents (A) in levels sufficient to meet minimum 
     required levels previously established by the Department of 
     Defense, and (B) in conditions that are neither defective nor 
     expired.
       (6) An estimate by the Secretary of Defense of the number 
     of United States military casualties and Iraqi civilian 
     casualties that would result from military action against 
     Iraq, including an estimate of the number of such casualties 
     that would result from military actions in and around 
     Baghdad.
       (7) A comprehensive statement by the Secretary of the 
     Defense and the Secretary of State that details the nature 
     and extent of the international support for military action 
     against Iraq, and the effects, if any, military action 
     against Iraq would have on the broader war on terrorism, 
     including, but not limited to, the effect on the support of 
     United States allies in the Middle East.
       (8) An analysis by the Inspector General of the Department 
     of Defense, the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency, and the Comptroller General of the assertions of the 
     intelligence community with respect to Iraq's current 
     capability to produce and deliver weapons of mass 
     destruction. In the preceding sentence, the term 
     ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947.
       (9) A comprehensive analysis by the Secretary of State of 
     the effect on the stability of Iraq and the region of any 
     change in the government of Iraq that may occur as the result 
     of United States military action, including, but not limited 
     to, the effect on the national aspirations of the Kurds, 
     Turkey and its continued support for United States policy in 
     the region, the economic and political impact on Jordan and 
     the stability of the Jordanian Monarchy, and the economic and 
     political stability of Saudi Arabia.
       (10) A comprehensive analysis by the Secretary of State of 
     the long-term impact of a preemptive first strike attack by 
     United States Armed Forces against Iraq on the stability of 
     the United States and the world. The analysis should include, 
     but not be limited to, the impact on regional conflicts 
     involving the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia, 
     Pakistan and India, Israel and the Palestinians, and the 
     People's Republic of China and Taiwan. The analysis should 
     also include the long-term impact on the United States of the 
     international sentiment that a preemptive first strike attack 
     by United States Armed Forces against Iraq would breach 
     international law.
       Page 9, line 3, strike ``(c)'' and insert ``(d)''.

  Mr. KUCINICH (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
consent that the motion to recommit be considered as read and printed 
in the Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Ohio?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) is 
recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion to recommit.

                              {time}  1415

  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Lee).
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the motion to recommit.
  We know that for every action there is a reaction. We do not know 
what danger lies before us. Every American has the right to know what 
price in terms of human lives and economic resources that they will 
have to pay. We owe them some answers. This is about life or death. We 
owe them answers to the questions the gentleman from Ohio has raised 
and will raise, and far more. In a democracy the people have a right to 
know.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Ohio (Mr. Brown), my colleague and neighbor.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time.
  In the Committee on International Relations, I offered this language 
embodied in the Kucinich recommittal motion: if we give the President 
the authority to radically change, to radically change, our decades-old 
military doctrine of containment and deterrence, we need answers to 
questions the American people are asking. If we strike Iraq on our own, 
will our coalition against terrorism fracture? Most of our allies in 
the war on terror oppose U.S. unilateral action against Iraq. And what 
will a unilateral strike tell the world? Does it embolden Russia to 
attack Georgia to chase down Chechneyan rebels? Does it set an 
international precedent for China to go into Taiwan or to deal even 
more harshly with Tibet? Does it embolden India, Pakistan, or both, 
each with nuclear weapons from going to war to protect their interests 
in Kashmir? And if we win a unilateral war, will we be responsible for 
unilaterally rebuilding Iraq?
  This Congress should not authorize the use of force unless the 
administration can detail what it plans to do and how we deal with the 
consequences of our actions. Vote ``yes'' on the recommittal motion.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3\1/2\ minutes.
  The joint resolution, H.J. Res. 114, gives the President the 
authority to use all necessary force at his discretion. This motion to 
recommit is neutral on this central point. And I know there are people 
on both sides of the aisle, on both sides of the proposition before us, 
who are interested in knowing that, that that resolution does not take 
a position on the underlying bill. But with power comes responsibility, 
and in a democracy the responsibility is to the people. This motion to 
recommit would assign the administration with the responsibility to 
inform the American people on key questions raised by a use of force in 
Iraq, questions that Members on both sides of this proposition have 
raised.
  The American people want to know what will use of force in Iraq cost, 
and how will it be paid for. With budget cuts? With more borrowing? 
With tax increases? The American people want to know what financial 
commitment the administration is making to address humanitarian 
consequences of a use of force in Iraq. The American people want to 
know what impact will the use of force in Iraq have on the economy of 
the United States and on the important price of oil. The American 
people want to know how a use of force in Iraq will affect efforts to 
prevent further terrorist attacks. The American people want to know 
these things because they know that ultimately they will be required to 
pay the price. They are entitled to answers, and the motion to recommit 
ensures that they will get those answers before they get the bill.
  Mr. Speaker, as the ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee on National 
Security, Veterans' Affairs and International Relations of the 
Committee on Government Reform, I have sat in on several meetings where 
the Department of Defense, Inspector General, and the General 
Accounting Office have informed the Congress that 250,000 biological 
and chemical protective suits are defective; 250,000 of these suits are 
defective, but the Department of Defense cannot account for them. This 
motion before us would help protect our troops by requiring assurance 
that the United States Armed Forces deployed have been provided with 
functioning equipment to protect against chemical and biological agents 
in sufficient levels and that this equipment is not defective. Mr. 
Speaker, this becomes particularly urgent since the Central 
Intelligence Agency has just informed the Congress that if the United 
States invades Iraq, Saddam Hussein can be expected to use whatever 
biological or chemical weapons he may have.
  Whatever our position on the war, I am certain that we want to 
protect our troops who would be called upon to put their lives on the 
line to protect this

[[Page H7798]]

country. This is an example of the information which the American 
people have a right to know.
  Mr. Speaker, this has been an important debate for our Nation. People 
on both sides of this proposition as to whether or not the United 
States should pursue action against Iraq are doing the best they can to 
represent our country. All of us love our country; but our love of 
country should include our desire to get answers on behalf of our 
constituents, answers on behalf of those who would be called to serve 
overseas. So it is in that spirit that I ask my colleagues on both 
sides of the aisle and both sides of this proposition to join in 
support of this motion to recommit with instructions.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). Is the gentleman from Illinois 
(Mr. Hyde) opposed to the motion to recommit?
  Mr. HYDE. I certainly am, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I oppose the motion to recommit; and if 
anybody wants detailed reasons, I suggest they read it. It sets up 
roadblocks that I think are virtually insurmountable.
  In the thousands of words we have heard in the last couple of days 
uttered on Iraq, a few important truths emerge. First, Saddam Hussein 
is a very dangerous person. The history of his regime is one of 
unrestrained violence against Iran, against Kuwait, against the Kurds, 
against the Shias, and against others whose only offense is to oppose 
his despotic regime. Secondly, he hates America. Thirdly, he is making 
a feverish attempt to arm with weapons of immeasurable destructive 
capacity; and when he is ready, he will use them.
  Do you remember the first time you saw the films of the mushroom 
cloud engulfing Hiroshima and then you learned about the deadly effect 
of radiation on humans? That was 1945. Does the fact that modern 
thermal nuclear weapons would unleash a thousand times the destructive 
power of Hiroshima worry you at all? You might ask why are we debating 
this resolution at this moment in time. The answer should be apparent: 
September 11, which was more than a wake-up call. It shook us out of a 
long, deep sleep and held us by the throat. It taught us there are 
people in the world willing to destroy themselves to gratify their 
hatred and we had better take them seriously.
  We tend to visualize what we call weapons of mass destruction in 
terms of bombs reducing buildings to rubble, but missiles can carry 
bombs with chemical and biological agents that can poison a city as 
well as destroy its infrastructure. Either way, it is death and 
destruction on a horrendous scale. Is such an attack imminent? Did we 
know Pearl Harbor was imminent? Did we know the World Trade Center 
attacks were imminent? The willingness to destroy must never marry the 
capability to destroy. And Santayana was right, those who do not read 
history are condemned to relive it.
  In a book written sometime after, I suppose, in the 1940's by William 
C. Bullit, who was our first ambassador to Russia appointed by 
President Roosevelt called ``The Great Globe Itself,'' he said: ``To 
beat our swords into plowshares while the spiritual descendants of 
Genghis Khan stalk the earth is to die and leave no descendants.''
  The world looks to us for leadership. The world looks to us for 
strength and resolve. We make no demands for territory or commercial 
advantage. All we want is a peaceful world. ``If you love peace, 
prepare for war,'' said the ancient Romans. There are ideals and ideas 
worth fighting for. They are the civilizing forces that make life worth 
living, that respect the dignity that is every person's entitlement. 
Those ideals and principles are under attack and we must defend them. 
By supporting the President, we send a message to the forces of 
conquest and chaos that America, the West, is not as decadent as they 
may think. Support the President.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered on the motion to recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 101, 
nays 325, not voting 5, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 454]

                               YEAS--101

     Allen
     Baldwin
     Barrett
     Becerra
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Capuano
     Carson (IN)
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Frank
     Green (TX)
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kaptur
     Kilpatrick
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     Lee
     Lewis (GA)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Miller, George
     Moran (VA)
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Rangel
     Rodriguez
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Slaughter
     Solis
     Stark
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Watson (CA)
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Wexler
     Woolsey
     Wu

                               NAYS--325

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Andrews
     Armey
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boozman
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Cardin
     Carson (OK)
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Clement
     Coble
     Collins
     Combest
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Grucci
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kanjorski
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kerns
     Kildee
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Luther
     Lynch
     Maloney (CT)
     Manzullo
     Mascara
     Matheson
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Menendez
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, Dan
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, Jeff
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Schaffer
     Schiff
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano

[[Page H7799]]


     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Turner
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Waters
     Watkins (OK)
     Watts (OK)
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Gutierrez
     McKinney
     Ortiz
     Roukema
     Stump

                              {time}  1447

  Messrs. BAIRD, GOSS, LATHAM, PORTMAN, GARY G. MILLER of California, 
SMITH of Michigan, and LUTHER, and Mrs. NORTHUP changed their vote from 
``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Mr. RODRIGUEZ, Ms. DeGETTE, and Mr. MATSUI changed their vote from 
``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the motion to recommit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 454 I inadvertently voted 
``nay''. I intended to vote ``yea''.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The question is on the passage 
of the joint resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 296, 
nays 133, not voting 3, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 455]

                               YEAS--296

     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Andrews
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boozman
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carson (OK)
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Clement
     Coble
     Collins
     Combest
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis (FL)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Grucci
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hart
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Horn
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kanjorski
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kerns
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Luther
     Lynch
     Maloney (NY)
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matheson
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Mica
     Miller, Dan
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, Jeff
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pascrell
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Roemer
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Schaffer
     Schiff
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Sullivan
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Turner
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins (OK)
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--133

     Abercrombie
     Allen
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barrett
     Becerra
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson (IN)
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Frank
     Gonzalez
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kaptur
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Maloney (CT)
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Serrano
     Slaughter
     Snyder
     Solis
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watson (CA)
     Watt (NC)
     Woolsey
     Wu

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Ortiz
     Roukema
     Stump

                              {time}  1505

  So the joint resolution was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________