[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 132 (Wednesday, October 9, 2002)]
[House]
[Pages H7706-H7735]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002

  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, it is with pleasure I yield 5 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Becerra), a member of the Committee on 
Ways and Means.
  Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Speaker, any nation engaged in a program of building weapons of 
mass destruction presents a danger to international peace and 
stability. Any leader who flouts the rule of law is a menace to liberty 
and democracy.
  In my mind, the President has made a strong case that Iraq must 
disarm, pursuant to the United Nations resolutions enacted following 
the close of the Persian Gulf War. But the President did not convince 
me that we should go to war and go it alone, nor has he made the case 
that we should change our longstanding policy and defy international 
law and commit to a first strike.
  The threat posed by Iraq is a threat which confronts the entire 
world, not just America. This resolution before us gives the President 
authorization to send American troops into Iraq to strike unilaterally 
and, indeed, to strike first. Congress has never before granted this 
extraordinary power to any previous President. We can address the 
threat posed by Saddam Hussein without expanding Presidential authority 
beyond constitutional standards.
  A declaration of war is the ultimate act of humankind. It presumes to 
endow the declarant with the right to kill. In many instances, it 
amounts to a sentence of death, not just for the guilty but for the 
innocent as well, whether civilian or soldier. In measurable respects, 
that is why the Framers of our Constitution wisely assigned the power 
to commit America to war not to the President but to the people's 
democratic representatives in Congress.
  The President should approach Congress and ask for a declaration of 
war when and only when he determines that war is unavoidable. The 
resolution before us leaves the question of war open-ended by both 
expressing support for diplomacy and authorizing the President to use 
force when he feels it is the correct course of action. Yet, in his own 
words, President Bush stated that ``war is not unavoidable.'' So why, 
then, is he insisting on being given now, today, the power to go to 
war?
  We are the lone superpower economically and militarily in the world. 
Our words have meaning, our actions have consequences beyond what we 
can see.
  The implications of a unilateral first strike authorization for war 
are chilling. A unilateral attack could lead the world into another 
dangerous era of polarization and create worldwide instability. It 
would also set a dangerous precedent that could have a devastating 
impact on international norms.
  Consider India and Pakistan, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia and 
Chechnya, Cyprus, Taiwan, Colombia, Northern Ireland, Central Africa. 
How might the people or the government in any of these countries which 
are engaged in or at the brink of hostilities interpret this resolution 
today? Why should not other countries adopt the President's unilateral 
and first strike policy to address conflicts or threats themselves? 
Would not a unilateral attack galvanize other potential enemies around 
the globe to strike at the United States and our interests?
  In our efforts to focus on what the President described as a grave 
and gathering danger thousands of miles away in Iraq, let us not lose 
sight of the dangers which are grave and present, not gathering but 
present, here at home: the al Qaeda plots targeting our airports, our 
water treatment facilities, our nuclear power plants, our agricultural 
crops.
  Just this Tuesday, CIA director George Tenet told Congress that 
Saddam Hussein, if provoked by fears that an attack by the United 
States was imminent, might help Islamic extremists launch an attack on 
the United States with weapons of mass destruction. We must consider 
how our actions may impact on the safety of the American people. The 
answer may not be always what we expect.
  We must also ask, will the death and destruction it takes to 
eliminate a sovereign, albeit rogue government, lead to good will by 
the Iraqi people toward America and Americans?
  Well, let us look at the record. During the Gulf War of 1999, we 
dropped some 250,000 bombs, many of them smart bombs, over a 6-week 
period on Iraqi forces. That is close to 6,000 bombs per day. We 
deployed over 500,000 troops. The war cost over $80 billion. None of 
that money was spent on reconstruction in Kuwait, and all of this is 
what it took simply to expel Iraq from tiny Kuwait.
  And what is our, and for that matter the world's, recent record on 
supporting post-war reconstruction? Ask the people of Bosnia and of 
Kosovo, and now ask the Afghanis.
  Certainly there are situations where the United States must prepare 
or be prepared to act alone. I voted in September, 2001, to give the 
President that power to punish those who attacked this Nation on 
September 11. But the question is, are we at the point on the question 
of Iraq to go to war without international support?
  Mr. Speaker, the President was clear in his speech on Monday. Iraq 
can lead us down a dangerous course, but I believe it is time for us to 
recognize that if we do this, we do this together, not alone.
  Let us vote for the separate resolution, go the right way and send a 
good message, not just to Iraq but to the rest of the world.
  Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, in order to have the dialogue stay focused, I think we 
need to periodically look at the threat.
  We have no doubt in this body. Speakers on both sides of the aisle 
have repeated the need to deal with someone who has used mustard gas 
and other agents against his own people. There is no question in this 
body about the war crimes committed by this dictator.
  But when we talk about the threat not being imminent, I just want to 
read from an unclassified document something for us all to focus on as 
we again talk about do we or do we not empower the President to deal 
with all the cards in his hand, not missing the one of potential 
military action.
  ``Mustard gas, potential agents based on best estimates, 200 metric 
tons; sarin gas, 200 metric tons; VX, up to 200 metric tons; and 
anthrax, at least 8,500 liters. That is 2,245 gallons, but it could be 
as much as 10-fold that, 22,457 gallons of anthrax.
  We all know in this body all too well what an almost infinitesimal 
amount in an envelope can do. I hope that we will think about this as 
we talk about whether or not to empower the President to have all the 
full force of our military at his disposal in negotiations.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Eshoo), a member of the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce.

[[Page H7707]]

  Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for 
yielding time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, the Congress is now debating the most serious and 
sobering of issues, whether we go to war, war against Iraq. We do this 
as we stand on the threshold of a new century.
  I believe this debate is as much about voting to declare war as it is 
about what kind of country we are and what we want our country to be in 
the future. This resolution of war is an extraordinary and unwise 
departure from our history of a principled American tradition, that we 
stand foursquare against unprovoked attacks and for a foreign policy of 
deterrence.
  The Bush doctrine reverses this policy and sets forth that the United 
States of America has the unrestricted right to attack other nations. 
This resolution trades deterrence for preemption. This resolution trade 
multilateralism for unilateralism.
  This go-it-alone policy has become the imprimatur of this 
administration. We have witnessed their abrogation of nearly every 
international treaty they inherited from previous Republican and 
Democratic administrations.
  This administration has allowed the underfunding of the Nunn-Lugar 
law, leaving the tools of terrorists unprotected and up for grabs 
across the former Soviet Union.
  This administration has withdrawn from the ABM Treaty, withdrawn from 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, withdrawn from START II, rejected 
the Biological Weapons Convention, and rejected the International 
Criminal Court.
  This administration makes war the first and only option, rather than 
a last resort. It has, in one brief summer and fall, upended decades of 
our time-tested, tenacious foreign policy of deterrence, which has 
served our Nation and the world so well.

                              {time}  2330

  The President has not answered the haunting questions of thousands of 
my constituents and the American people. Why now? How many troops will 
we need to wage this war? What will it cost? How long will we be there? 
What is the plan to manage the chaos in the aftermath of regime change; 
and, finally, how will it affect the war on terrorism?
  Respected military leaders and statesmen have testified to Congress 
about their deep concerns with preemption and unilateralism. These 
experts have seriously undercut the President's case of what Saddam 
Hussein has and the President's remedy to deal with it. And classified 
briefings have raised more questions than answers.
  Today's newspapers were filled with the information that our own 
intelligence agencies have concluded that Saddam Hussein is unlikely to 
initiate a chemical or biological attack against the United States. Not 
one of us carries a brief for Saddam Hussein. We know what he has done 
and we know how he rules. We know about his accumulation of chemical 
and biological weapons and the other weapons that threaten his 
neighbors and us.
  Our answer today, send a thousand troops of weapons inspectors to 
Iraq. This time they must have unrestricted access to everything and 
with deadlines to achieve disarmament. The world community will watch 
and as we disarm him. He will loosen the noose he holds.
  We can be tough and principled as we have been in the past. We can 
bring other nations with us and when we do, Saddam will know he cannot 
dodge or be deceitful any longer. That is why I support the Spratt 
resolution which calls for action only if the U.N. determines action is 
required and the President seeks approval from the Congress.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, when the framers wrote our Constitution, their 
vision spoke to the innermost yearnings of every human being, then, 
over the centuries, and now. They created what I have called the best 
idea that is ever been born: democracy. Their call is the same today in 
this new century that we lead through the enduring strength of our 
democratic principles backed by the might we possess. Today our 
Constitution and my conscience beckon me to oppose the President's 
resolution for war. I shall vote against the resolution and I urge my 
colleagues to do so as well.
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Larson), a member of the Committee on Armed Services.
  (Mr. LARSON of Connecticut asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks, and include extraneous material.)
  Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in an effort to unite this body behind the Spratt 
resolution. I oppose House Joint Resolution 114 because this resolution 
sets a dangerous new precedent in foreign policy, a policy of 
preemptive first strikes and go-it-alone unilateralism. This is a 
radical departure from long-standing United States policy of 
deterrence, diplomacy, containment and collective security. We are 
drifting away from the successful coalition-building of former-
President George Bush in Desert Storm and our current President's 
administration's coalition that is currently prosecuting the war on 
terror in Afghanistan.
  We are united behind the President in his continued prosecution of 
this war on terror, a mission we need to relentlessly pursue and not be 
deterred from. We are united behind the President in our efforts before 
the United Nations, and strongly support a tough, new, robust, 
unfettered weapons inspection process that is currently being 
negotiated by Colin Powell. We are in unanimous agreement about the 
brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, the atrocities he has 
perpetuated against other nations and his own people, and the need to 
remove him. We stand united behind our men and women of our armed 
services no matter the outcome of the vote.
  Where we differ is not whether, but how, we address this threat. As 
former Secretary of State Jim Baker points out it is not whether to use 
military force to achieve this, but how we go about it. While we 
address the near-term danger presented by Saddam Hussein, we must be 
equally mindful of the dangerous long-term consequences of first-
strike, go-it-alone policy. To that extent, there is a notable divide 
in past and current Bush administrations and within this Congress and 
amongst people across this Nation.
  This divide stems from those advocating the abandonment of long-
standing policy in favor of going it alone. This is not about the use 
of force. I voted for the use of force in Kosovo and in Afghanistan. It 
is about the preemptive and unilateral use of force. The United States 
is the undisputed preeminent military, social and economic leader in 
the world; but there are many issues we simply cannot solve alone. 
Issues like the environment, disease and global economic stability are 
but a few examples and only further underscore the problematic concerns 
of our ongoing debate about going alone.
  There is no question that we have the military might or that we will 
prevail against Iraq or any nation. But what lingers is whether we have 
the restraint as the world's lone superpower to lead by the rule of law 
and use our terrible swift swords only as a last resort.
  The goal of the administration is to isolate Saddam Hussein and bring 
about his demise. In the process we must make sure that it is not the 
United States that is isolated and alone. For even with all our 
military might and resources, we cannot solve all the global problems 
by ourselves. The internationalist wing of the Republican Party best 
expressed the perils of preemption, in going it alone in Brent 
Scowcroft, the former National Security Advisor to both President Ford 
and former President Bush, who has argued that attacking Iraq will take 
away from the effort against the war on terror and do long-term damage 
to the stability needed in the Middle East.
  Retired generals like Norman Schwarzkopf and Secretary of State 
Eagleburger, hardly appeasers, come down on the side of caution and 
coalition building. General Zinni, retired Commander in Chief of U.S. 
Central Command, talks about the need to be intensely involved in the 
peace process between Israel and Palestine. In staying focused on Osama 
bin Laden and al Qaeda, he wonders aloud about those in the 
administration who have never served in the military who seem so 
anxious to place our troops in harm's way; and those in the 
administration

[[Page H7708]]

who characterize heroes like General Wesley Clark, former Commander in 
Chief of the U.S. European Command, who urged the two-step approach of 
the Spratt resolution and calls them dreamers.
  This is a time that the President, Congress, and the people need to 
be united. It is why we have introduced the Spratt resolution. This 
resolution strengthens the President's hand and demonstrates national 
resolve. It preserves the constitutional authority that resides with 
Congress and does not abrogate our role to the executive branch.
  The people in my district feel strongly about this and have spoken 
out in town hall meetings. They are deeply opposed to a go-it-alone 
policy; and while understanding the potential threat posed by Saddam, 
they want us to pursue the course the President outlined before the 
United Nations.
  Make no mistake, there is broad support for the President and 
implicit understanding of the awesome responsibility he bears as 
Commander in Chief. There is also an equal expectation that elected 
representatives will ask the tough questions and will measure the 
consequences and collateral damage of our actions. Our system is one of 
checks and balances; and clearly from my perspective, the use of force 
preemptively and unilaterally needs to be held in check, debated, 
discussed and not rubber stamped in a climate of fear and crisis.
  The people's House must question the unintended consequences of this 
new policy. What are those consequences? What will be the collateral 
damage associated with preemptive unilateral attacks?
  I say it can be said no better than our Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, 
Robert Jordan, when I asked him if we were facing a gathering storm in 
the Middle East. He replied, no, Congressman, you are from New England. 
Surely you have read the book or seen the movie. This is not a 
gathering storm. This has all the makings of the perfect storm.
  Our relationship with our allies in the Middle East in the 
prosecution of the war on terrorist is fragile. There is great unrest 
in the region from economic instability to religious fanatics spewing 
hate towards the United States. A preemptive unilateral attack on 
Saddam Hussein could accomplish what Osama bin Laden failed to do, and 
that is unite the Islamic world in a jihad against the United States. 
Going it alone may well bring down a tin pan dictator, but will the 
consequences of that be the recruitment of tens of thousands of new 
terrorists bound for our shores?

                              {time}  2340

  Thomas Friedman, noted New York Times columnist, spoke at a recent 
book tour about the long-term consequences of our doctrine, and I was 
struck by the reaction of a man who simply reached into his wallet and 
showed a picture to Friedman of his children.
  Nothing else need be said. Support the Spratt amendment.
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Honda), a member of the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure.
  (Mr. HONDA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HONDA. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for 
yielding me the time.
  I rise this evening as Congress considers one of the most difficult 
decisions a nation must make. President Bush and leaders from the House 
negotiated a resolution to authorize the use of force against Iraq. 
However, this new resolution still allows the President to launch a 
unilateral, preemptive attack without providing any evidence to 
Congress that the U.S. is under imminent threat.
  The President says that he is willing to go it alone against Iraq as 
a last resort, but there is no mechanism in this resolution to ensure 
that it is just that, a last resort.
  Let one thing be clear. A vote for this resolution is more than an 
authorization for use of force. It is a declaration of war, and I will 
oppose it.
  We all agree that it is critical for the United States and the world 
community to ensure that Saddam Hussein is not developing weapons of 
mass destruction. I believe we can accomplish this goal by working with 
the U.N. Security Council to gain consensus on a tough and effective 
plan to gain unfettered access to inspect Iraq facilities. A powerful 
multinational force created by the U.N. would carry legitimacy and 
strong support in the United States and abroad. If the U.N. does not 
heed our call to action, then other options should be explored.
  As of today, it is clear that the administration has yet to exhaust 
diplomatic options.
  Many generals, military strategists and Republican policy-makers have 
expressed reservations with President Bush's approach to Iraq. Iraq 
does not exist in a vacuum. The decisions our government makes relative 
to Iraq will have consequences that will extend to all corners of the 
world, as well as potentially destabilize the Middle East. Will the 
concentration of our Armed Forces in Iraq limit our resources for a war 
against al Qaeda?
  Additionally, experts agree that a war against Iraq will be much 
different than the Gulf War. Intensive, urban combat against an 
entrenched force is likely. How many thousands of American lives is the 
administration willing to imperil? What are the long-term plans for the 
stabilization of Iraq, and how many billions of dollars will this cost 
American taxpayers?
  After September 11, the United States made great strides with the 
international community in our war against terror. A unilateral effort 
by the United States would not only weaken our relationship with our 
allies but also will increase resentment in the volatile Middle East 
and further embolden anti-American opinion throughout the world.
  We must rid Saddam Hussein of any weapons of mass destruction. 
However, I urge the administration to continue to work with the U.N. to 
gain support for a tough resolution with an accompanying national 
multinational force, if necessary. Diplomatic efforts must continue. 
This war can still be avoided; and, as such, I cannot vote to put 
American lives and innocent civilians in harm's way, straight from our 
war against terror, or create uncertainty that could further hamper our 
struggling economy.
  I will not support this resolution.
  Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 7 minutes to the 
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Leach), a member of the Committee on 
International Relations, in fact, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
East Asia and the Pacific and a man who has great insight into this 
region.
  (Mr. LEACH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, as all Members know, this resolution involves 
a difficult set of decisions that neither the Congress nor the 
executive can duck. Anyone who is not conflicted in their judgment is 
not thinking seriously.
  For myself, I have enormous regard for our President and great 
respect for his sworn policy advisers, but I have come to the 
conclusion that this resolution misfits the times and the 
circumstances. There may be a case for a regime change, but not for war 
against Iraq and its people.
  Because time is brief, I would like to emphasize three points:
  One, given the events of 9/11, a doctrine of preemption has a modicum 
of legitimacy. But the greater our power, the more important it is to 
use it with restraint. Otherwise, it will be seen as hubristic, with a 
strong prospect of counterproductive ramifications. Engaging in war the 
wrong way can too easily jeopardize the underlying conflict against 
terrorism and undercut core American values and leadership around the 
world.
  Two, there are many so-called end game elements that have not been 
adequately addressed. They range from the dilemma of street combat to 
problems of postwar governance to worldwide Muslim reaction.
  Three, and most profoundly, this resolution is based on a 
misunderstanding of modern science as it applies to weapons of war. The 
assumption is that there is a compelling case to preempt a nuclear 
weapons program, but what is little understood is that Iraq already 
controls a weapon of mass destruction more dangerous than nuclear 
bombs,

[[Page H7709]]

biological agents, and what is underestimated is the nature of his 
likely response to outside intervention.
  The tactical assumption is that Saddam will be on the defensive with 
an American and British attack, but the likelihood is that, as 
troubling as end game problems are, the ``beginning conflict'' issues 
may be the most difficult ever confronted in the region and possibly in 
all of modern warfare. When a cornered tyrant is confronted with the 
use or lose option with his weapons of mass destruction and is isolated 
in the Arab world unless he launches a jihad against Israel, it is not 
hard to imagine what he will choose.
  Israel has never faced a graver challenge to its survival. The 
likelihood is that weapons of mass destruction, including biological 
agents, will be immediately unleashed in the event of Western 
intervention in Iraq. In the Gulf War, Saddam launched some 40 Scud 
missiles against Israel, none with biological agents. Today, he has 
mobile labs, tons of such agents and an assortment of means to deliver 
them.
  It is true that his stockpiles could be larger in years to come, but 
Members must understand that the difference between a few and a few 
hundred tons of anthrax or plague may not be determinative. These are 
living organisms that can multiply. They can invade a region and 
potentially the planet.
  The most important issue is not the distinction between the various 
resolutions before us, each should be defeated, but the need to rethink 
our responsibilities in the manner in which they are carried out. 
Regime change can be peaceful, it can be discreetly violent, but it 
need not necessarily entail war.
  Over the last half century America's led the world in approaches 
expanding international law and building up international institutions. 
The best chance we have to defeat terrorism and the anarchy it seeks is 
to widen the application of law and the institutions, including 
international ones that make law more plausible, acceptable and, in the 
end, enforceable.
  Strategies of going it alone, doctrines of unilateralism must be 
reviewed with care. Nothing plays more into the hands of terrorists 
than America lashing out. Nothing is more difficult for them than 
international solidarity. Americans would be wise to craft strategies 
which are based on our original revolutionary appeal to a decent 
respect for the opinions of mankind.
  We used to have a doctrine of MAD, mutually assured destruction, 
between United States and the USSR. No one seriously contemplated 
aggression because of the consequences.
  Today, for the first time in human history, we have a doctrine of 
mutually assured destruction between two smaller countries, Iraq and 
Israel, one with biological weapons, the other nuclear. The problem is 
that an American intervention could easily trigger an Iraqi biological 
attack on Israel which could be met by a nuclear response. Not only 
would we be the potential precipitating actor but our troops would be 
caught in crosswinds and crossfire.

                              {time}  2350

  This is a strategic precipice we should step back from.
  The United States today faces a series of challenges unprecedented in 
our history.
  The 20th century was symbolized by three great international 
struggles: World War I and the challenge of aggressive nationalism, 
World War II and the battle against fascism, and the Cold War challenge 
of defeating communism.
  Now the United States is confronted with the menace of international 
terrorism, a phenomenon as old as recorded history, but with elements 
that are new because of the potential for access to weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), the manipulation of religious precepts, and the 
transnational character of international terrorism in a globalized 
world.
  At issue today is the potential crystallization of these challenges 
in the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, and the appropriate response of 
the United States and the world community.
  In American history explaining what we do and why we do it is 
important. Our first revolutionary document, the Declaration of 
Independence, was an exposition of political philosophy and an 
explanation of grievances that compelled Americans to act. Today, in a 
world in which rumor and paranoia and distrust is pervasive, we are 
obligated to be precise in laying out our objectives and the rationale 
for military or other actions.
  In this regard, there is in Eastern history a hallowed intellectual 
methodology for determining when a particular military intervention may 
be considered ethical. This doctrine, developed by ecclesiastics and 
jurists, followed by statesmen, instinctively accepted by the peoples 
of many countries in tradition and right, is the doctrine of just war. 
What is this doctrine? Briefly, it holds that for war to be considered 
just, it must be animated by a just cause and informed by righteous 
intention, that it be undertaken by lawful political authority and only 
as a last resort, and that resort to force be proportionate to the 
nature of the wrongs committed.
  The just war issue is relevant for two interrelated reasons. First, 
the issue of war involves the gravest of moral questions. Second, not 
merely the theory but the history of international relations since the 
First World War embodies distinctions between just and unjust causes of 
war. The Covenant of the League of Nations, the United Nations Charter, 
and the Charter of the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg all reject the 
doctrine of realpolitik, the anarchical notion that ours is a Hobbesian 
world where might makes right.
  Although there is a ``realist'' school of international relations 
theory which asserts that raw national interest considerations alone 
should govern all policy making, the more progressive view is that 
modern world politics are founded upon a conception of international 
society analogous to the laws and customs of coercion in domestic 
societies, that resort to violence in international affairs must be 
regarded either as response to lawful police action or crime. In other 
words, resort to armed force in international affairs is legitimate 
only if it is used on behalf or in service to the fundamental 
principles and purposes undergirding international law.

  Thus the moral philosopher Michael Walzer observes that ``aggression 
is the name we give to the crime of war.'' Indeed, the founders of the 
United Nations were determined, in the words of the Charter, ``to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . . and to ensure, by 
the acceptance of the principles and the institution of methods, that 
armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.'' 
Similarly, the Charter obligates the Member States of the UN to 
``settle their international disputes by peaceful means,'' as well as 
``refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations'' (Articles 2(3) and 2(4)). Instead, the Charter 
attempts to enshrine a system of collective security in which the 
security Council is authorized to ``determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression'' and to 
``decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain international 
peace and security'' (Article 39).
  In postwar American diplomacy, the classic exposition of this 
principle was stated by President Truman in October 1945, when he 
declared that the fundamentals of American foreign policy would rest in 
part on the proposition ``that the preservation of peace between 
nations requires a United Nations Organization comprised of all the 
peace-loving nations of the world who are willing to use force if 
necessary to insure peace.''
  The concept of international law enforcement through collective 
security, therefore, is embodied in the UN Charter and is an integral 
part of international law, as well as--through the Supremacy Clause--
the law of the United States.
  Here, the constitutional duty of Congress is clear. Not only does the 
Constitution vest the power to declare war in Congress, but also it 
further contemplates that a status or condition fairly described by 
armed hostility between the U.S. and another state--whether a declared 
or undeclared war--must be legislatively authorized.
  The framers of the Constitution believed that the gravest of all 
governmental decision--the making of war--should not be the 
responsibility of a single individual. It should be taken by a 
democratically elected, geographically and socially balanced 
legislature after careful debate and deliberation. It would either be 
tyrannical or irresponsible for a Congress of, by, and for the people 
to shirk its responsibility and transfer the power to make war to the 
Presidency. In America, after all, process is our most important 
product.
  In this context, neither the Congress nor the Executive can duck the 
fundamental question of Constitutional fidelity.
  Perspective is always difficult to apply to events of the day, but it 
would appear that in wake of the events of 9/11 a watershed in American 
history occurred. A concerned terrorist attack was perpetrated against 
our institutions, people, and way of life. The imperative to respond is 
clear. Less clear how and against whom.

  In the period following 9/11 the Executive Branch began to articulate 
a bold new doctrine

[[Page H7710]]

of national security, both to shape our response to the new dangers of 
international terrorism and to define a new vision of leadership for 
the United States in world affairs.
  According to this new national security concept, the United States 
should be prepared to act decisively and unilaterally to eliminate 
potential terrorist threats. Because suicidal terrorists use anarchist 
techniques rather than rely on traditional armies, the case for America 
to reserve the right to take preemptive, anticipatory military action 
in the name of self-defense must be considered. In practical terms, 
since terrorist groups may either be assisted by foreign powers, or 
seek sanctuary in weak countries with limited control of their own 
borders, the option to intervene in another nation-state to constrain 
rogue behavior cannot be ruled out. Likewise, the doctrine contemplates 
the need to counter the threat that certain despotic regimes--like 
those the President labeled as evil: Iran, Iraq and North Korea--may 
develop or actually possess weapons of mass destruction and threaten to 
use them or put them in the hands of terrorists. In addition, because 
our own power is so disproportionate, and because the threat from 
international terrorists so grave, the strategy suggests that America 
need no longer be constrained in its actions by international rules, 
treaties, and even traditional security partnerships.
  While elements of the new doctrine are not new, the public 
articulation of a doctrine of preemption is in fact a novel departure. 
In terms of precedents, the Congressional Research Service reports that 
the U.S. ``has never, to date, engaged in a `preemptive' military 
attack against another nation. Nor has the U.S. ever attacked another 
nation militarily prior to its having first been attacked or prior to 
U.S. citizens or interests having first been attacked, with the 
singular exception of the Spanish-American War.'' The latter being 
unique, in that the principal stated goal of U.S. military action was 
to compel Spain to grant Cuba its political independence.
  There is of course ample precedent for the United States using its 
military to intervene in other nations to support our national security 
interests. Citing the Monroe Doctrine, which outlined American 
objection to European colonialism in this hemisphere, the United States 
intervened repeatedly in the Caribbean and Central America in the 19th 
and 20th centuries. In addition, the U.S. employed overt military force 
to seek regime change in Mexico in 1914 and Panama in 1989, as well as 
covert action in Iran and Central America in the 1950s.
  Of greater historical relevance, the most significant instance in 
which the U.S. seriously contemplated preemptive military action was 
during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. Despite the 
introduction by the Soviet Union of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles 
into Cuba that could threaten most of the eastern United States, 
President Kennedy considered and rejected preemptive options, imposed a 
U.S. military ``quarantine'' around Cuba, and ultimately reached a 
peaceful diplomatic solution.
  Hence it is imperative that Congress and the American people debate 
the long-term foreign policy consequences of a potential, largely 
unilateral, strike against Iraq that may well not be supported by many 
of our historic allies. It is also crucial that Congress review the 
logic and implications of a new global strategy apparently premised on 
go-it-alone interventionist themes which, if taken to extreme, could 
erode the foundation of the rule-based, post-World War II international 
system the United States largely helped to create.
  While the threat of transnational terrorism self-evidently requires a 
robust response, the implication of the United States using its 
extraordinary power and authority at this critical juncture in world 
history to ensconce and legitimize the principle of preemption as a 
basis for conduct in international relations is profound. One need only 
to contemplate the application of this principle by others elsewhere, 
such as South Asia, the Taiwan Strait, or the Middle East, to grasp its 
potential reach.
  It is suggested to many around the world that the United States may 
be disproportionately relying on military power rather than the 
strength of law and persuasion to attempt to ``lock in'' a favorable 
order that commands the allegiance of others. In the language of 
political scientists, our new approach could suggest a strategy less of 
transformation than dictation.
  The question is not simply whether the new doctrine of preemption has 
a modicum of legitimacy--the events of 9/11 suggest it does--but 
whether it is applied with proper judgment and appropriate restraint. 
The greater the power, the more important it is used with care. 
Otherwise, the danger is the use of force will be viewed as hubristic 
with its application likely to be counterproductive. Iraq is a case in 
point. The goal of regime change must involve an approach that enhances 
rather than retards international support for core American values like 
democracy and respect for individual rights. Engaging in war the wrong 
way can jeopardize the outcome not only of the underlying conflict 
against terrorism but American leadership on a host of international 
issues from arms control to commerce to the environment.
  Unilateralist approaches sow unease and distrust of American power 
and American motives from Brussels to Johannesburg, from Sao Paulo and 
to Seoul. They dissipate reservoirs of good will for the United States 
and reduce, rather than expand, the pool of cooperation that we can 
draw on in the future.
  The nature of the foreign policy challenges we face--curbing the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, eliminating terrorism, 
combating the spread of diseases like HIV/AIDs, promoting free trade 
and market economics, advancing respect for human rights and the rule 
of law--cannot be met by one country, no matter how powerful, acting 
alone.
  Three years ago in one of the most irrational acts of the Senate in 
the 20th century a comprehensive test ban (CTB) was turned down. Upon 
taking office, the Bush Administration concurred in this judgment, and 
then in a little noticed decision rejected a protocol that had been 
long in negotiation to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
(BWC) which would have added new verification provisions to that 
treaty. Ironically, if a CTB had been ratified, there would be more 
worldwide support for U.S. efforts to deter small states from obtaining 
nuclear arms and if the BWC protocol had been adopted the case for 
inspectors entering Iraq would be iron clad.

  Count me among those who believe Saddam Sussein must be removed from 
office and his weapons of mass destruction destroyed, but also as one 
who is concerned with the unilateral veer in American foreign policy. 
We cannot lead the world unless we pay attention and, to the maximum 
degree appropriate, give respect to the judgments and opinions of 
others.
  Policeman for the world is a lonely beat. It makes us a target. More, 
not less, vulnerable.
  Leadership requires resolve; it also demands restraint, and an 
understanding that there are both prudential and real limits to 
America's unparalleled power. Likewise leadership requires magnanimity, 
an understanding of what causes people to rebel, and an uplifting, 
inclusive vision of a world order which realistically deals with the 
causes of conflict.
  At issue with the Iraqi crisis is less an outcome where individual 
nation-states may be winners or losers, but one in which the 
international system has an enormous stake. From challenge springs 
opportunity. Hopefully, once the storm clouds have passed, the 
international community will be able to conclude that the United 
Nations has functioned as its founders intended. But if this conflict 
is not resolved in a way that upholds the authority and the credibility 
of the United Nations, our current international structure will be 
seriously deranged and grievously jeopardized.
  In this regard, as the prospect for conflict increases, the danger of 
unintended martyrdom also rises. The United States must be careful to 
ensure that its policies do not turn a tin-horn Hitler into an Islamic 
Allende.
  Hence I would urge the Administration to make it clear to Saddam that 
in the event he continues to defy the will of the United Nations he 
will inevitably find himself in the docket before Nuremberg-like 
proceedings--either the newly established International Criminal Court 
or perhaps an ad hoc tribunal--for egregious violations of 
internationally recognized human rights and arms control conventions.
  Potentates, whether petty or mighty, who through violation of 
international law attempt to take the world hostage must be held 
accountable.
  Likewise, the U.S. and UN should make clear that if any individual in 
Iraq participates in usage or unleashing of a weapon of mass 
destruction, they also will be held accountable as war criminals.
  Tragically, the United States has not been able to become a party to 
the new ICC, which will be the first permanent international court with 
jurisdiction to prosecute the most heinous individual violators of 
human rights--genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
  By background, the United Nations, many human rights organizations, 
and many U.S. allies have expressed support for the new court. The 
Administration, however, has renounced any U.S. obligations under the 
treaty.
  Although the U.S. has valid concerns about the ICC--chiefly that the 
ICC might become politicized and capriciously assert jurisdiction over 
U.S. soldiers or high officials charged with ``war crimes''--our 
belligerent opposition to the Court also carries obvious downside risks 
to American leadership.
  America's well-deserved reputation as a champion for human rights and 
extension of the rule of law has been called in question. Our efforts 
to play hardball in the UN Security Council by threatening to withhold 
support for UN peacekeeping missions unless the U.S. is granted 
immunity from the ICC alienated friends and allies abroad. The 
withholding of

[[Page H7711]]

military assistance to members of the ICC may be seen as an attempt to 
undermine the court and influence the decisions of other countries to 
join the ICC. By demanding special treatment in the form of immunity 
from the ICC, the United States is seen as bolstering the perception of 
its preference for a unilateral approach to world affairs and a 
determination to operate in the world exclusively on our own terms. As 
a result, U.S. efforts to build coalitions in support for the war 
against terrorism as well as the enforcement of UN resolutions against 
Iraq may have been impaired.
  As an early advocate for the establishment of a permanent 
international criminal court based on balanced recognition of 
international statutes, I confess to being chagrined both at the 
inability of the international community to accommodate legitimate 
American concerns, and the all-or-nothing approach of our government 
that has left us without effective means to ensure that the ICC 
operates in ways that are consistent both with credible rule-of-law 
principles and with sensitivity to U.S. interests designed to advance 
democratic governance.
  The problem is that as a great power called upon to intervene in 
areas of the world or disputes such as the Balkans, Afghanistan and 
troubled areas of the Middle East, the U.S. is vulnerable to charges 
being leveled against actions which we might reasonably consider to be 
peacekeeping, but another power or government might charge to be 
something very different. For instance, what would happen if Serbia 
were to bring a case against an American naval pilot when such a pilot 
is operating under both a U.S. and NATO mandate? The President has 
suggested we should, exclusive of all other countries, be allowed to 
veto over applicability of international law with regard to the ICC. 
Many other countries, including strong U.S. allies, have angst about 
this demand because they see this approach as establishing the 
principle of one country being entitled to operate above the law.
  This is not an irresolvable dilemma. When the ICC treaty was under 
negotiation, it was the assumption of many that the Security Council 
where all the permanent members have a veto would play a determinative 
role in bringing matters better the ICC. If such was the case, the 
United States because of its veto power within the Security Council 
could fully protect itself as could the other permanent members. 
Unfortunately, because the past administration played an ambivalent 
role in development of the treaty, it failed to get the nuances right. 
This common sense approach was not adopted and the Bush administration 
was put in the embarrassing position of objecting to an important 
treaty because of the failed diplomacy of its predecessor.

  Based on discussions with European officials it is my understanding 
that there may be an inclination to seek a reasonable compromise on 
treaty language, even at this late date. It would appear to be an 
umbrage to many countries to craft a provision excluding the United 
States alone from ICC jurisdiction, but it would seem reasonable on a 
process basis to return to a Security Council role. On this basis the 
U.S. and the international community could be credibly protected.
  The court would function as a treaty organization founded on state 
consent, while respecting Security Council authority to refer any 
matters affecting international peace and security to the court's 
jurisdiction. This approach has the advantage that it does not make a 
pure exception for the United States. Understandable concerns of some 
countries about inequitable protection of the nationals of permanent 
members of the Council would need to be balanced against the enhanced 
durability and legitimacy of the court. A protocol to the Treaty 
ensconcing this approach should be actively pursued today.
  Laws, to be effective, must constrain governments in their foreign 
policies as well as individuals in domestic acts. In order to hold 
governments accountable there must be individual accountability at the 
highest as well as lowest levels of society. Justice must be brought to 
the international frontier or life for too many will, in Hobbes' 
piercing phrase, continue to be ``nasty, brutish, and short.''
  The central issue in classic just-war theory is the cause question. 
Just-war theorists from Augustine to Grotius typically referred to an 
offense that was a just cause for war as an ``injuria,'' a term that 
meant both injury and injustice. There were three generally accepted 
just causes of war: defense against aggression, recovery of property, 
and punishment. Wars waged for the first cause were by their nature 
defensive. Wars taken to avenge injustice and to punish the 
perpetrators of injustice were offensive in the sense that defense of 
one's own territory was not necessarily at issue.
  It is sometimes forgotten that the United States is engaged in 
military combat operations over Iraq almost every day, maintaining 
``no-fly'' zones over the northern and southern parts of the country. A 
decision by Iraq to ban almost all U.N. inspections on October 31, 
1998, led the U.S. and Britain to conduct a 4-day air operation against 
Iraq on December 16-20, 1998 (Operation Desert Fox). The two allies 
launched approximately 415 missiles and dropped more than 600 bombs 
targeted at Iraqi military and logistical facilities. Since the 
December 1998 operation, the U.S. and Britain have carried out air 
strikes against Iraqi air defense units and installations on a frequent 
basis, in response to Iraqi attempts to target allied aircraft 
enforcing the no-fly zones. However, to launch a full-scale military 
invasion of Iraq, fully considering its potential consequences, based 
solely on violations of the no-fly zones would appear to be out of 
proportion to the offense occasioning it.
  A potentially more compelling basis for just cause would be action 
undertaken in self-defense, in this case anticipatory self-defense.
  Although the UN Charter is premised on the concept of collective 
security, it is important to recognize that the Charter also recognizes 
the right of nations to use force for the purpose of self-defense. 
Article 51 provides that nothing in the Charter ``shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense'' in the event 
of ``armed attack.'' The question, of course is what constitutes armed 
attacks.
  In this regard, no American administration has ever sought to give an 
expansive interpretation to the definition of an armed attack. Indeed, 
none of our interventions since the end of World War II have relied for 
justification on the doctrine of preemptive attack.
  Tellingly, when the United States was directly threatened during the 
1962 Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy did not invoke any notion 
of ``anticipatory self-defense.'' While the risks of nuclear 
conflagration were high, the president's legal arguments were 
conservative: the imposition of a naval quarantine was justified by 
reference to the regional peacekeeping provisions of the U.N. Charter. 
More recently, when America has claimed self-defense, it has been in 
less controversial settings--citing a clearly defined threat to U.S. 
citizens or, after September 11, the need prevent a second attack by 
hostile terrorists.
  Rather than expanding the scope of preemptive attack, American 
statesmen have historically played leading roles in carefully limiting 
the doctrine.
  The classic formulation of the right of preemptive attack was 
provided by secretary of State Daniel Webster. In 1837, the British 
sought to stamp out a simmering revolt in Canada that had received 
support from private militias in the Untied States. To cut off this 
source of support, British troops launched a night raid into New York, 
burning an American ship and sending it over Niagara falls.
  Some five years later, Secretary of State Webster reached an 
agreement with the Foreign Office that prohibited future cross-border 
raids. Preemptive force under customary international law could be 
justified only if there was a ``necessity of self-defense, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation,'' and if the use of force in such circumstance were 
proportional to the threat--not ``unreasonable or excessive.'' 
Webster's formulation remains the core sense of international law 
today.
  Some might object that these standards are unreasonable and 
inappropriate for a new era of global insecurity hallmarked by the 
threat of stateless terrorism. On the other hand, it surely cannot be 
in our interest to legitimize war by hunch. The danger is that new 
standards we seek to reserve exclusively for our use become legitimate 
as well for other nations--such as Russia, China, India and Pakistan. 
Do we want to empower others to claim that issues relating to self-
defense are not a proper subject of international concern, but are 
solely unilateral national decisions unreviewable by any state or 
multilateral organization? Without clear standards, whenever a nation 
believes that its interests, which it is prepared to characterize as 
vital, are threatened, then its use of force in response would become 
permissible.

  As to the precise nature of the threat posed by Saddam, the 
historical record is well-known. Saddam Hussein is a menace to his own 
people and a continuing threat to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. 
Saddam is without question an international criminal with a long rap-
sheet.
  He began successive wars of aggression against Iran and Kuwait, 
amassed a large inventory of chemical and biological weapons in 
violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and has 
feverishly sought to build nuclear arms in violation of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). On the orders of Saddam Hussein, his 
army committed some of the worst war crimes in half a century, gassing 
Kurdish villages and killing thousands of innocent civilians. Even 
after its defeat in the Persian Gulf War, Saddam sought to hide and 
even reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction in violation of 
numerous UN Security Council Resolutions. There is little dissent, 
therefore, from the proposition that the Iraqi regime represents a 
continuing threat to the region and a challenge to international

[[Page H7712]]

order. Indeed, regime change has been the official policy of the United 
States under two presidents, Bill Clinton and George Bush, since 1998.
  What is the urgency of the current threat from Saddam Hussein? 
Despite some uncertainties, a great deal is known about Iraqi military 
capabilities, particularly its conventional forces.
  Despite the loss of some 40 percent of its army and air force as a 
result of the Gulf War, Iraq remains a major military power by regional 
standards. Iraq still has armed forces with around 425,000 men, with 
some 2,200 main battle tanks, 3,700 other armored vehicles, and 2,400 
major artillery pieces. It also has 300 combat aircraft with potential 
operational status.
  By all accounts, sanctions and the impact of the Gulf War have had a 
substantial negative impact. The regime's inability to recapitalize and 
modernize its armed forces means that much of its nominally large 
military capacity is either obsolescent or obsolete, with doubtful 
combat readiness, and will be difficult to sustain in combat.
  Much more ominous are Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. By way of 
background, UN Security Resolution 687, passed in April 1991, 
established the formal cease-fire between Coalition forces and Iraq. 
Key among the terms was the prohibition against Iraq retaining, 
acquiring, or developing WMD and long range missiles. In addition, 
there was a demand that Iraq unconditionally accept the destruction, 
removal or rendering harmless its WMD under international supervision. 
However, from the start of United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) 
in 1991 through their termination in 1999 Iraq engaged in the 
techniques of deception and denial in order to conceal the full extent 
of its WMD programs. Although there were some successes in defeating 
Iraq's concealment efforts, many other failed.
  In December 1999, one year after UNSCOM left, the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 1284, reaffirming all previous UN Security Council 
resolutions, disbanding UNSCOM, and establishing the UN Monitoring, 
Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). Until September 16, 
Iraq had rejected resolution 1284 on the grounds that it does not set a 
clear timetable or criteria for lifting sanctions. Although the Iraqi 
position may well be a ruse, Baghdad now claims with semantic waffling 
to be willing to allow the return of weapons inspectors without 
conditions.

  As is well known, on the eve of the Gulf War, and in violation of its 
commitments under the NPT, Iraq was on the verge of producing 
significant amounts of heavily enriched uranium that would have allowed 
it within two or three years to produce a nuclear weapon. Fortunately, 
the Gulf War heavily damaged Iraq's nuclear facilities. By the end of 
UN inspections in 1998, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
was confident that Iraq's indigenous nuclear weapons program had not 
produced more than a few grams of weapons useable material. However, 
Iraq's nuclear potential was not completely eliminated. The scientific 
and technical expertise of Iraq's nuclear program survived, and Baghdad 
has tried to keep its core nuclear teams in place working on various 
civilian projects.
  Publicily available consensus analysis produced by the London 
Institute of International Strategic Studies and others suggests that: 
Iraq does not possess facilities to produce fissile material in 
sufficient amounts for nuclear weapons, that it would require several 
years and extensive foreign assistance to build such fissile material 
production facilities, but that it could assemble nuclear weapons 
within several months to perhaps one or two years if it could obtain 
relevant fissile material.
  Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq produced Biological Weapons (BW) agents 
in volume. Subsequent to it invasion of Kuwait, Baghdad accelerated 
large scale BW agent production and assembled rudimentary BW munitions. 
These weapons were distributed to military units, who were delegated to 
use them if allied forces advanced on Baghdad or used nuclear weapons. 
Most of the regime's key BW facilities, which had been hidden from 
Western intelligence agencies, escaped attack during the Persian Gulf 
conflict. But in violation of the BWC that Iraq ratified as a condition 
of the 1991 Gulf War cease-fire agreement, Saddam continued to conceal 
his BW program until 1995. Since December 1998 when UN inspectors left 
the country, there has been virtually no verifiable information about 
the status of Iraq's BW program.
  Credible, public reports suggest Iraq can produce new stocks of bulk 
BW agent, including botulinum toxin and anthrax. BW agent could be 
delivered by short range munitions including artillery shells. Delivery 
by ballistic missile is more problematic. Refurbished L-29 trainer 
aircraft could operate as weapons-carrying unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) with a range of over 600km. Such UAVs might be considerably more 
effective than ballistic missiles in delivering CBW. Commando and 
terrorist attack is also possible.
  The best estimates of the current situation suggest that: (1) Iraq 
has retained substantial growth media and BW agent (perhaps thousands 
of liters of anthrax) from pre 1991 stocks, and the regime is capable 
of resuming BW agent production on short notice at existing civilian 
facilities and in new mobile laboratories; (2) it could have produced 
thousands of liters of anthrax, botulinum toxin and other agents since 
1998, but actual stocks are unknown.
  As is well known, Iraq used chemical weapons extensively against 
Iranian troops from 1982-1988. In the years immediately prior to the 
Gulf War, Iraq made further progress in developing binary chemical 
munitions, producing and weaponizing the advanced nerve agent, VX. The 
Gulf War however devastated Iraq's primary CW production facilities and 
a large portion of its stockpile of CW munitions.
  Through 1998, UNSCOM was able to dispose of large quantities of CW 
munitions, bulk agent, precursors and production equipment that were 
not destroyed in combat. In addition, unless Iraq has managed to 
modernize its 1990-era special warheads, its ability to disseminate 
effectively CW agent on ballistic missiles is questionable, since so 
much agent would be destroyed on impact. Iraq's known ability to marry 
chemical warheads to its rocket and artillery pieces (with ranges up to 
about 18.5 miles) could complicate operations for opposing forces, who 
would be required to wear protective gear.
  The best publicly available assessment of the current situation is 
that: (1) Iraq has probably retained a few hundred tons of mustard and 
precursors for a few hundred tons of sarin/cyclosarin and perhaps 
similar amounts of VX from pre-1991 stocks; (2) it is capable of 
resuming CW production on short notice (months) from existing civilian 
facilities; and (3) it could have produced hundreds of tons of agent 
(mustard and nerve agents) since 1998. Actual stocks, however, are not 
known.
  Iraq of course prohibited by UN Resolutions from possessing ballistic 
missiles with a range greater than 150km. In the 1970s Iraq began to 
import Scud B missiles with a range of 300km from the Soviet Union and 
acquired roughly 820. In the 1980s Iraq worked to modify the Scud 
missiles in order to double their range. The new missile, called the al 
Hussein, with a range of 650km, was used during the war against Iran. 
In the wake of the Gulf War, much of Iraq's missile infrastructure lay 
in ruins. Moreover, the U. S. and U. K., during Operation Desert Fox in 
December 1998, attacked a number of missile related facilities.
  During the inspections period Iraq continued to conduct small scale 
covert research and development on proscribed missiles. In addition, 
Iraq continued missile related procurement efforts. UNSCOM attempted to 
account for all imported missiles and for indigenously produced 
missiles, but that accounting was incomplete. It is prudent to assume 
that Iraq has been able to retain some of its proscribed missiles. 
Also, it is likely that Iraqi engineers will have been able to increase 
the range in its short-range al Samoud missiles to 200km with a few 
hundred kilograms payload suitable for CBW delivery.
  The publicly available estimates of Iraq's missile capabilities 
suggest that: (1) Iraq has probably retained a small force of about a 
dozen 650km range al-Hussein missiles, which could be armed with CBW 
warheads, capable of striking Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and 
Kuwait; (2) the Iraqi regime does not possess facilities to produce 
long range missiles and it would require several years and extensive 
foreign assistance to construct such facilities; (3) it may have a 
small number of al Samoud missiles with ranges of up to 200km able to 
strike Kuwait but only if deployed within the southern no fly zone; (4) 
Iraq is capable of manufacturing rudimentary CBW warheads, while its 
development of more advanced designs is unknown; and (5) Iraq has been 
developing very small unmanned aircraft suitable for CBW delivery.

  According to the Department of State, Iraq is also a state sponsor of 
terrorism. Saddam Hussein's brutal regime has provided headquarters, 
operating bases, training camps, and other support to terrorist groups 
fighting the governments of neighboring Turkey and Iran, as well as to 
hard-line Palestinian groups. During the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam also 
commissioned several failed terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities. After 
the war, Saddam attempted to assassinate former President Bush. More 
recently, the question of Iraq's link to terrorism has become more 
urgent with Saddam's determination to develop weapons of mass 
destruction, which could be shared with terrorists.
  At the present time, there is no hard evidence linking Saddam to the 
9/11 attacks, and Iraq denies any involvement. However, his government 
expressed sympathy for those who attacked us and some Iraq watchers 
suspect Saddam was at least indirectly involved. In this regard, Czech 
officials reported last

[[Page H7713]]

year that Muhammad Atta, one of the September 11 ringleaders, met an 
Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague months before the hijackings, but 
U.S. and Czech officials subsequently cast doubt on whether such a 
meeting ever happened. Some militants trained in Taliban-run 
Afghanistan are helping Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish extremist group that 
Suddam uses to harass his own Kurdish foes. Finally, al-Qaeda members 
fleeing Afghanistan have reportedly hid in northern Iraq, but in areas 
beyond Saddam's control. In addition, evidence has recently come to 
public light suggesting a wider array of contacts between al-Qaeda and 
the Iraqi regime than had previously been know, including hospital care 
for an al-Qaeda leader.
  In this context, the case for military intervention at this time 
rests on three key assumptions: that the containment of Iraq through 
sanctions is a failed policy; that the Cold War concept of deterrence 
is no longer a viable strategy for dealing with an erratic Iraqi 
leadership potentially allied with al-Qaeda or other terrorists; and 
that new unrestricted weapons inspections, even if Saddam were to agree 
to them, are unlikely to be effective.
  There is perhaps a fourth, albeit often unstated basis for 
intervention: that deposing Saddam and establishing a democratic, 
western-oriented government in Baghdad would decisively reshape the 
politics of the region in a manner highly beneficial to the United 
States, by delegitimizing the forces of radicalism and creating a 
powerful model of Islamic modernity and moderation.
  Taken together, these assumptions make a compelling case for the 
United States and the United Nations to seek, both through the 
enforcement of existing resolutions as well as the enactment of one or 
more additional resolutions, Iraq's complete and unconditional 
compliance with all relevant UN resolutions, particularly those 
demanding the disarmament of its weapons of mass destruction.
  To paraphrase the just war theologian Michael Walzer in his 
discussion of the ethics of Israel's preemptive intervention against 
Egypt in 1967 and an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, Saddam Hussein, 
through his continued efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction 
and their means of delivery has demonstrated a manifest capability and 
intent to injure, and a degree of active preparation that makes that 
intent a positive danger. The great judgmental question is, to again 
cite Walzer, whether in the current situation waiting, or doing 
anything other than military engaging, magnifies the risk.

  It is perhaps likely, even highly likely, that Saddam will ultimately 
refuse to meet the demands of the world community. Particularly if this 
is the case, authorization by the Security Council for regime change 
would be an appropriate response. But there is little evidence that 
suggests the immediate, urgent ``necessity of self-defense,'' so 
instant, and overwhelming, as to leave the United States no choice of 
means, and no moment for deliberation. The case for regime change is 
compelling, but precipitating a change in leadership is different than 
going to war with a country and its people.
  Containment through targeted sanctions--in effect, coercive arms 
control--is fraying, in part because of irresolution on the part of key 
members of the U.N. Security Council, such as Russia and France, and 
because both Iraq and key regional states profit from sanctions-
busting. According to the General Accounting Office, Iraq may have 
earned as much as $2.2 billion last year in illicit exports and oil 
surcharges. Over time, the breakdown in containment would almost 
certainly create conditions under which Iraq could produce a nuclear 
weapon.
  Nevertheless, flawed as sanctions may be, published reports in the 
press this summer suggested many senior U.S. military officers believed 
that Saddam Hussein poses little immediate threat and have concluded 
that the United States should for the time being continue its policy of 
containment rather than intervening directly.
  Can Saddam be deterred from aggressive action now and in the future, 
particularly if he is able to successfully accelerate development of 
weapons of mass destruction? The evidence is mixed. During the Persian 
Gulf War, he refrained from using weapons of mass destruction because 
of American and Israeli threats of nuclear retaliation. He was likewise 
deterred from again attempting to attack Kuwait in 1994.
  Yet he is so hostile to the United States and Israel, so bent on 
regional domination, his frames of reference and decision-making 
processes so opaque, and possibly irrational, and his ties to 
international terrorism such as obvious source of concern, that it is 
at best an open question whether a nuclear-armed Saddam is ultimately 
deterrable. In the long run, it is highly probable that no American 
president can afford to take that risk.
  As to inspections, the evidence suggests that an intrusive 
inspections regime can produce positive results, but can never be fully 
reliable or completely effective. In their first five years, the United 
Nations Special Commission in Iraq (UNSCOM) made some progress toward 
inspecting and disarming Iraq's chemical, biological, and missile 
materials and capabilities. The so-called IAEA Action Team, did the 
same for Iraq's nuclear program. The main problem was that UNSCOM was 
never allowed to fully scan the country or finish its work. Since the 
Iraqi government terminated its work four years ago, the country has 
been free of monitoring and inspection.

  Just war doctrine focuses on right intentions and prospects for 
success. Intentions and goals matter in war. A nation should only wage 
war for the cause of justice, rather than for self-interest or 
aggrandizement. The issue of intention must be balanced with concern 
for practicalities as well as consequences, both of which should be 
considered before declaring war. The decision to go to war must be 
essentially protective; the goal of war is to obtain a just and durable 
peace. The ancillary requirement that there must be prospects for 
success means that the use of arms must not produce negative effects 
and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated.
  In this case the risks of inaction are real; the risks of action 
extraordinary. The only certainty is that any military action involving 
a great power will bring about unintended consequences. It is a 
distinct possibility but not certainty that conflict with Saddam will 
be short and decisive, as it was during the Gulf War. It is also 
possible that a new regime can be found and put in place with as much 
ability and legitimacy as in Afghanistan.
  On the other hand, one should always hope for the best but plan for 
the worst. America's greatest living statesman, George F. Kennan, 
recently made the sage observation that ``war has a momentum of its 
own, and it carries you away from all thoughtful intentions when you 
get into it. Today, if we went into Iraq . . . you know where you 
begin. You never know where you are going to end.''
  Many have expressed concern about the ``end game''--the difficulty of 
potential street combat, of establishing legitimate government, of 
dealing with the long-term implications for American interests in the 
Muslim world of an intervention in Iraq. But concern for the ``end 
game'' should not cloud the enormous difficulties of the ``beginning 
game.'' What happens when a strike commences?
  What happens to our ability to secure cooperation in the long-term 
campaign against global terrorism? What about American leadership in 
the global economy?
  From an operational perspective, the assumption in some quarters 
appears to be that once we initiate conflict Saddam will be on the 
defensive, hunkering down, perhaps waging defensive guerrilla warfare 
in the cities and countryside, while the United States and its allies 
enjoy the initiative.
  This may be the case, but Saddam has had a lot of time to strategize 
on how to maximize American casualties, energize potential support 
outside Iraq--including terrorists--and increase his martyrdom.
  My concern is that Israel may be underestimating the potentially 
devastating effects of a biological weapons assault while the United 
States may be understanding the potential of a pan-Muslim backlash.
  In terms of military pitfalls for the United States, one 
``nightmare'' scenario involves determined resistance in Baghdad and 
perhaps other major cities by the Iraqi Republican Guard. Should we be 
compelled to engage, the casualties on both sides, including civilians, 
could be substantial.
  But the greatest danger that we cannot ignore is the possibility that 
a campaign against Iraq expands into a wider conflict within the Arab 
world against Israel. Indeed, it is virtually inconceivable that 
military intervention against Iraq will not cause an immediate 
retaliatory strike against Israel. In the Gulf War, Iraq sent 39 scud 
missiles against Israel--missiles that could have been but were not 
tipped with chemical weapons. Chemical weapons were used with some 
devastation in World War I and in closed settings with gruesome 
ramifications in the Holocaust. Today the vastly greater danger is 
biological agents. Biological weapons pose a danger thousands of times 
greater than chemical weapons. The delivery of such weapons on 
missiles, unmanned aircraft, by hand and or through the mail could be 
traumatic for Israel and world society. Likewise, if Iraq were to 
launch any kind of weapons of mass destruction against Israel, Israel 
would have to seriously consider a retaliatory response, perhaps 
including nuclear weapons.
  It is also conceivable that action against Iraq, particularly a 
prolonged campaign with significant civilian casualties, could spark 
outrage in the Muslim world, and unleash a new surge of anti-
Americanism. While there is little support for Saddam Hussein outside 
of Iraq, there is extraordinary opposition to America going to war 
against a Muslim country. Terrorism around the world could be 
supercharged. Even without Israeli involvement, friendly governments in 
Jordan, Pakistan and

[[Page H7714]]

Saudi Arabia might be destabilized. A multi-year, multi-decade or 
multi-century conflict could ensue.
  Should Saddam's hold on power or his personal security be in imminent 
jeopardy, it would appear probable that he may utilize the techniques 
of terrorism--possibly including weapons of mass destruction--to defend 
his regime and wreak revenge on his enemies.
  In addition, it is also conceivable that new dangers would emerge 
with a feeble or hostile successor regime. Chaos, bloodshed and revenge 
might follow. Weapons of mass destruction might fall into a greater 
number of hands. An unstable Iraq could be a haven for terrorists and a 
continuing threat to regional peace.
  Indeed, it is impressive how little, not how much we know, especially 
attitudinally in Iraq and the Muslim world about the potential of 
American intervention in Iraq. To what extent will support be 
manifested for Saddam? Will there be disorder, chaos, bloodshed and 
revenge? Will the Shia turn on the Sunni minority. Will the Kurds seek 
an independent state?
  Moreover, it is important to ponder whether an invasion of Iraq would 
worsen rather than reduce the threat of terrorists gaining control of 
weapons of mass destruction. Saddam could decide to disperse his 
weapons stockpiles, and the scientists who build them, into the hands 
of global terrorists. Even if he did not order such, in the chaos of 
war it is conceivable that individual Iraqi commanders and scientists 
might make their own profit-oriented accommodation with terrorists.
  More broadly, it is by no means clear that regime change in Iraq, 
even if successfully carried out, will significantly diminish the 
threat from Islamic extremists who share little in common with Saddam 
Hussein.
  Hence the need for the United States to pursue a vigorous two-pronged 
approach in the Middle East: intensified efforts to resolve the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and greater focus on economic development 
and democratization in the region.
  The importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian standoff cannot 
be underestimated. We know from attitudinal surveys that Muslims 
generally like Americans and admire American culture. Many have chosen 
to immigrate to the United States. They do not, however, trust our 
government. To win the war on terrorism we will have to convince 
Muslims throughout the world that we are, in fact, favor justice and 
the creation of just societies everywhere.
  All Americans understand we share a common concern for the fate of 
the Israeli people and the viability of the Israeli state. The 
commitment of the United States to Israel must be bedrock. We must 
support Israel and help bring peace and stability to the region. There 
must be continuity of commitment, but there must also be recognition of 
opportunities to lead. Unfortunately, critical opportunities have been 
lost in partial measure because Presidents were imperfectly skilled and 
in some cases wanted to operate in relationship to timing they hoped to 
control rather than in relationship to circumstances and events in the 
region.
  For example, optimism surrounded the Oslo accord precipitated by 
President Bush's father. Yet the United States lagged in efforts to 
push immediately thereafter the logical steps that should have been 
taken to create a long-term framework for peace. To his credit, 
President Clinton pressed at the end of his administration for a 
breakthrough agreement. At Camp David, Arafat turned his back on the 
most forthcoming peace proposal Israel has ever formally made. The 
tragedy of Arafat was not that he had to accept every parameter of the 
proposal put forward by Prime Minister Barak, but that he failed to 
make a counteroffer, thereby destroying prospects for peace, implicitly 
thumbing his nose at Israel and the prestige of the American 
presidency.
  Following the breakdown of the Camp David talks in July 2000, and the 
subsequent outbreak of violence on September 28, the sides nevertheless 
agreed to continue negotiations at lower levels during December and 
January 2001 at the Egyptian town of Taba. As President Clinton left 
office, Barak's government had but a few weeks of life left before the 
election that brought Ariel Sharon to power. The outbreak of the 
violence had made it unlikely that Israelis would approve any proposal 
of concessions to the Palestinians in a referendum. Nonetheless, both 
sides hammered out proposals that came much closer to each other's 
positions than before.
  No official summaries of the proposals were issued, but subsequent 
leaks provided some details. The Palestinians, according to Israeli 
sources, agreed to a map that would allow Israel to keep most of its 
settlements and about 4 percent of the territory.
  But given the short time left to the Barak government, the 
preoccupation with the transition in Washington, and the continuing 
violence, the proposals came to nothing. Both sides had agreed that the 
proposals would be binding only if they resulted in an agreement. The 
joint communique noted, however, that foundations had been laid for 
future discussions.

  The new administration held that President Clinton had attempted to 
negotiate on his time frame and increased tension by seeking a 
resolution that was not ripe. My sense is that the Bush team was half 
right. President Clinton had pressed on his time frame but erred by 
being tardy instead of premature. If pressed two or three years earlier 
by the Clinton Administration, the Barak approach would have been more 
sympathically received. And if the Taba framework had been immediately 
pressed on the parties by the new Bush foreign policy team which was 
initially so well received in the Arab world, quite possibly a 
breakthrough agreement could have been made.
  Two opportunities for resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian issue, 
one in this and the other in the prior Administration, were not grasped 
and this circumstance hangs like dangling fruit to terrorists the world 
over.
  The major US foreign policy concern in the region must be resolution 
of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. All administrations at all times must 
dedicate themselves to this challenge. In this context, the need to 
achieve peace between Israel and the Palestinians is of far greater 
significance than waging war with Iraq. Whether we like it or not, 
whether it is fair or rational or not, we are simply in a far better 
position to deal in whatever way we choose with Iraq after an Israeli-
Palestinian settlement. It is a far less favorable circumstance if we 
attempt to deal with Iraq beforehand.
  Some contend that Israel is in a far stronger strategic position if 
the United States quickly and successfully disarms Iraq. This may be 
the case. But no country carries greater risks during the conflict and 
in its aftermath than Israel if intervention proves messy, if Iraq is 
able to unleash an attack on Israel.
  In the Middle East, there are two sets of value scales. From a 
Western perspective, the case for creating and protecting the state of 
Israel because of the history of pogroms and the Holocaust is 
compelling. From a Muslim perspective, an argument can be made that 
Arab peoples have a historical claim to parts of the Holy Land and its 
holy places and no responsibility for the Holocaust. The challenge is 
to take these juxtaposed value systems and reach a reconciliation both 
sides can respect and live with on a long-term basis. My sense is that 
somewhere around the points laid on the table at Camp David and Taba 
there is a basis for a credible resolution, but it is very doubtful 
given the current state of enmity and distrust between the parties 
between the parties that slow-paced, partial steps can lead 
incrementally to a larger vision of peace and accommodation.
  Nation-building was used pejoratively during the last campaign, but 
America has no choice but do more ourselves and to press our allies 
much more forthrightly for assistance to Afghanistan, a country in 
which we effected a constructive change of government. For all the 
unfortunate consequences that can sometimes befall policy, we are most 
fortunate to have a leader in charge that the world can respect. This 
circumstance, however, may change quickly based on reaction to actions 
inside and outside of Afghanistan. A U.S. war with a Muslim country 
will have wide consequences elsewhere, some good, some bad, most 
unpredictable.

  Here it should be noted that there has been relatively little 
discussion about the commitments, likely to be of a long-term 
character, that Washington must undertake after a military campaign 
against Iraq. The term ``regime change'' does not adequately describe 
the full scope of what we expect to achieve as a result of a military 
campaign in Iraq. We would be expected to work with Iraqis, including 
those outside Iraq, to both develop a new constitutional structrue as 
well as find credible post-Saddam leadership--leadership that hopefully 
would share our objectives with respect to the elimination of weapons 
of mass destruction, development of democratic institutions, etc. We 
will almost certainly need substantial forces on the ground in order to 
prevent bloodletting, secure important economic and military assets, 
and prevent possible Iranian meddling. And although Iraq has 
substantial oil reserves and therefore a better resource base than 
Afghanistan from which to assist in financing reconstruction, the costs 
of humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation could nevertheless be in 
the billions of dollars.
  We lack firm estimates of the domestic cost to the U.S. of a 
potential conflict. Seat of the pants White House estiamtes range from 
$100 billion to $200 billion, with the price of oil estimated to rise 
to perhaps $30 a barrel for some unknown period of time. More recently, 
the Congressional Budget Office estimated that fighting a war with Iraq 
could cost the U.S. between $6 and $9 billion a month, with preparing 
for a conflict and terminating it later adding other $14 billion to $20 
billion to the total.
  The 1991 Persian Gulf War cost $60 billion in 1991 dollars, with the 
brunt picked up by

[[Page H7715]]

our friends and allies, notably the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
Japan. It is unlikely there will be comparable help in defraying the 
costs of a military action and any subsequent nation-building in Iraq.
  Our war aims with Iraq also need clarification. The goal of the U.S. 
should not be the total disarmament of Iraq, as some appeared to have 
call for, but the elimination of his weapons of mass destruction. 
Disarmament implies that Iraq cannot have an army, a proposition no 
sovereign state is likely to accept. Indeed, Western policy in the 
region for decades advocated a balance of power, not vacuum of power. 
The reason to distinguish the elimination of weapons of mass 
destruction versus total disarmament is more than theoretical. U.S. 
policy should be based on establishing a strong unitary Iraq with a 
professional army accountable to democratic forces. As we proceed 
toward possible invasion, the goal should be to seek the Iraq army to 
identify with the United States, not Saddam.
  The challenge is to make it clear that our goal is more democracy, 
prosperity, and the uplifting of Iraqi society, one which can lead the 
Muslim world with a model of modern democracy and prosperity.
  Saddam is a rogue leader, but Iraqis are not a rogue people. Care 
must be taken to distinguish the leadership from the country itself. No 
country or peoples are intrinsically evil, though individual leaders 
such as Saddam can clearly be malevolent.

  In historical terms, Saddam is a Stalinist. The case for regime 
change is real, but the prospect of our demolishing Iraqi society or 
Saddam blowing up his own country's infrastructure--bridges and oil 
fields--is not a happy one. Perhaps the prospect of such a catastrophe 
will lead to regime change precipitated internally, which could be the 
maximum outcome for all.
  In Just War theory, the criterion of right authority determines who 
is to decide whether or not resorting to war is justified.
  Reasonable men and women can agree in a ``just war'' context on the 
moral and legal authority of the President, acting with the express 
authorization of the Congress of the United States, to initiate a 
police action to enforce international law.
  Likewise, reasonable men and women generally ought to be able to 
agree on the moral and legal authority of the Security Council to 
authorize the enforcement of UN resolutions requiring a country to 
abide by international conventions on weapons of mass destruction.
  It should be self-evident that while a country like the United States 
has an obligation to protect its citizens without a formal UN 
resolution, it is vastly preferable for American strategy to be based 
on formal international support.
  UN support would impress upon Saddam Hussein that he is not just 
facing a United States Administration, but the will of the world 
community. Security Council endorsement would bolster American security 
by helping make it politically possible for others to join in enforcing 
international law and by undercutting the legal and moral base of those 
who might object.
  In this context, the President is to be commended for taking the case 
to the United Nations. He is to be commended for endeavoring to reach 
out to the world community by deciding that the United States should 
rejoin UNESCO. He is to be commended for laying out the challenges Iraq 
poses to the world community and to the region. He is further to be 
commended to bringing his case to the Congress.
  Words matter. Care must be taken in their use. Words lead to 
processes that sometimes make careful judgments difficult to obtain. At 
this time, for instance, the case for regime change is powerful. But 
this does not necessarily mean that urgency for military intervention, 
even with UN authorization, is compelling. There have been too many 
instances in history where leaders have boxed themselves in with words, 
and when actions tied to words may cause, domino fashion, further 
actions to transpire which might not be contemplated or warranted by 
the initial statements made.
  Utterance restraint is an attribute that has received less attention 
and less approval than should be the case in statesmanship. In this 
context, the unintended consequence of describing countries as evil and 
personalizing strategic doctrines must be recognized.
  In Vietnam, for instance, the basis for our engagement stemmed more 
from a domino theory of decision-making than the more widely discussed 
domino government-toppling potential. When American presidents make 
statements, policy decisions can result which lead to actions which may 
not fit the circumstance in which the statement was originally framed.
  More recently, in the Balkans, America got involved after giving a 
series of warnings that if Serbia didn't go along with the Rambouillet 
Accord, the United States and NATO would intervene. The United States 
made threats which were not taken seriously by adversaries which led to 
intervention that might not have occurred if the warnings weren't made. 
The decisions to intervene was made in part because of a concern about 
preserving presidential credibility, and the need to make a particular 
president's words meaningful, despite the fact that few Americans knew 
the president had made statements in this arena.
  In the case before us it is suggested that authorization for use of 
force may cause others to act in such a way as to make use of force 
unnecessary. But the greater problem seems to me to be problem of a 
leader who pushes for authorization and then faces the question of 
follow through. The logic is force may not be inevitable but its 
authorization surely makes a decision for restraint difficult.
  There is a thin line between the exercise of superpower 
responsibility and the prospect of superpower folly. The timing, 
perhaps more than the substance of this resolution is in doubt. 
Judgment and timing must go hand in hand. It may have been a mistake 
back in 1991 not to have pursued Saddam because of our assumption that 
the Iraqi people would come to their senses and replace him. But that 
failure to act does not necessarily legitimize assumptions that 
intervention today can legally be carried out in the context of 
resolutions both Congress and the UN applied a dozen years ago. The 
greatest legal case against Saddam relates less to Security Council 
resolutions than his development of biological weapons which contravene 
international law and jeopardizes the health of the region.
  In general, the criterion of last resort has a common sense 
interpretation in which it functions as a reminder that the resort to 
violence must be, to a significant degree, reluctant. It enjoins us to 
make serious efforts at peaceful resolutions of our political problems 
before going down the path of war. The term ``peaceful'' is itself open 
to varied interpretations, but is usually taken to include a 
comprehensive range of nonviolent methods that may involve `'coercive 
diplomacy,'' including sanctions of an economic and political 
character.
  The principle of proportionality evaluates the effects or ends of 
war. In this regard, proportionality is `'counting the costs'' or cost-
benefit analysis. In just was theory this principle insists that there 
be due proportion, that is, less evil following from acting rather than 
not acting in the manner contemplated. War is not justifiable if it 
will produce more death and destruction that it prevents. Understood 
properly, proportion has the potential for overriding just cause.
  Although Iraq is clearly a menace, there is little evidence to 
suggest that it poses a direct and immediate threat to the vital 
interests of the United States sufficiently grave as to lead to no 
other credible alternative to war. As former NATO commander General 
Wesley Clark testified before congress, ``There is nothing that 
indicates that in the immediate--the next hours--the next days--that 
there is going to be nuclear missiles put on launch pads to go against 
our forces or our allies in the region. And so I think there is, based 
on all the evidence available, sufficient time to work through the 
diplomacy of this.''

  Former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft argued this summer 
in the Wall Street Journal, that Saddam's strategic objectives appear 
to be to dominate the Persian Gulf, to control oil from the region, or 
both. This clearly poses a real threat to U.S. interests. But there is 
little hard evidence to suggest Saddam has close ties to al-Qaeda, and 
even less to the 9/11 attacks. Given Saddam's psychology and 
aspirations, Scowcroft considers it unlikely that he would be willing 
to risk his investment in weapons of mass destruction by handing them 
over to terrorists who could use them for their own purposes ``and 
leave Baghdad as the return address.'' Saddam, Scrowcroft suggests, 
seeks weapons of mass destruction not to arm terrorists, but to deter 
us from intervening to block his aggressive designs.
  In addition, as of this moment, with current sanctions in place and 
the Security Council contemplating reintroducing weapons inspectors 
under existing of new UN resolutions, it cannot credibly be claimed 
that America or the world have exhausted non-violent alternatives.
  I accept in principle that military intervention against Iraq might 
be considered legitimate law enforcement under just war doctrine. What 
I do not accept is that it is justified at this time because of the 
disproportionately horrendous consequences such action may precipitate.
  The reason I am doubtful relates less to the risks to American 
national interests which accompany intervention in the Muslim world, as 
real and as large as I believe them to be, but principally because of 
the risks invasion may pose to civilization itself.
  As I have listened to various proponents, the efficacy of military 
intervention is based on the assumption that a cornered tyrant will not 
initiate the use of weapons of mass destruction, providing the U.S. and 
others the opportunity to destroy or otherwise seize effective control 
of such weapons before Baghdad can issue orders to strike.

[[Page H7716]]

  This assumption may represent the most dangerous intelligence 
estimate and the frailest tactical assumption in human history.
  What is known is that Saddam Hussein controls tons of biological 
agents. What is known is that he is attempting to develop a nuclear 
explosive device, and while it is unlikely, it is conceivable he may 
control such a weapon today. Even if we assume our intelligence to be 
correct and his nuclear capacity is yet to be achieved, we can be sure 
he has a BW capacity, portable and hidden. We know he has the means of 
delivery.
  Therefore, intervention assumes Saddam's delayed contemplation of BW 
usage. But what if Saddam is prepared to use BW immediately? What if he 
seeks wider Arab support by attempting to engage Israel? And what if 
Israeli leadership responds proportionately, perhaps 
disproportionately?

  If biological agents are released in Haifa or Tel Aviv, the prospect 
of a nuclear response is not remote. American troops could be caught in 
the crossfire and crosswind of two sets of weapons of mass destruction 
coming from different sources, each equally dangerous. Is not the next 
6-8 weeks the most dangerous in the history of the region?
  Before any strike, it would seem to me the U.S. must know the 
location of every biological weapon cache in Iraq and have a clear plan 
and capacity to destroy or control these weapons within minutes of the 
initiation of military action. Absent that capability, military 
intervention would be based upon inadequate intelligence and a 
potentially catastrophic misjudgment of intent.
  The risks are extraordinary. However, it is suggested that as large 
as the risks are today, they will be graver in subsequent years. 
Surely, it is said, we cannot allow Saddam's weapons of mass 
destruction to deter the United States from taking necessary action.
  This line of argument has substantial merit. But it does not 
necessarily provide a compelling rationale to intervene today. The 
reason it doesn't is because of a lack of understanding of the danger 
of biological agents. Pounds or ounces of biological agents, such as 
plague or anthrax, can be devastating. Saddam Hussein controls tons. 
Given these quantities, adding more does not make him that much more 
dangerous.
  While a shield may be technologically feasible to develop to shoot 
down a missile that leaves the earth's orbit, there is no such thing as 
a biological shield. Delivery systems can be rudimentary and multi-
faceted.
  The coming conflict with Iraq is not only symptomatic of the problem 
of terrorism but arguably stands as the most difficult confrontation in 
world history. If biological weapons through usage are legitimized as 
instruments of war, the survival of man is in desperate jeopardy. While 
the Middle East contains many conflicts rooted in differing approaches 
to faith, the Iraq issue is fundamentally different. It has far more to 
do with the conjunction of science and despotism than a clash of 
civilizations.
  The reason the United States led the world community in the 
development of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the 1970s 
to prevent the development, production, and stockpiling of biological 
weapons is that we came to the conclusion not only that the use of 
biological weapons could jeopardize society itself but we also decided 
that even experimenting with these weapons was too dangerous in the 
world's most sophisticated scientific community. It is a public health 
trauma of unprecedented proportions to stockpile these agents, let 
alone use them in war.
  In this context, the case that Iraqi leadership is lawless is 
compelling. And the case for lawful regime change is real. But we are 
courting unprecedented danger to the American national interest and the 
existence of the state of Israel to move from a policy of containment 
and deterrence to a policy of military intervention that may actually 
precipitate usage of such horrendous weapons of mass destruction.
  Based upon the mendacity of leadership in Iraq, it is hard not to 
provide our President with full discretionary support. The problem is 
that this resolution contemplates an act of war of unprecedented 
consequences. The logic of its words leads to consequences too awful to 
contemplate. I must vote no.
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Oregon (Ms. Hooley), a member of the Committee on the Budget.
  Ms. HOOLEY of Oregon. Mr. Speaker, the September 11 attack claimed 
the lives of thousands of Americans, and dozens more have perished in 
our war against terrorism. Just yesterday, a U.S. Marine was killed in 
Kuwait by al Qaeda-trained terrorists. According to press reports, our 
Marine was killed in a supposedly secure area, and Kuwaiti authorities 
are baffled over how the terrorists were able to carry out their 
murder.
  I bring up the death of this Marine because it should serve as a 
reminder that there are no guarantees in war. We must think through the 
consequences of a war in Iraq and get answers to our questions. Because 
if we do not ask the tough questions now, in a few short weeks, while 
Americans are comfortably at home doing their last- minute holiday 
shopping, hundreds of thousands of our troops are going to be deployed 
to another combat zone. That, in turn, makes each and every one of us 
taking part in this debate responsible for our national security and 
the welfare of our troops.
  This vote is undoubtedly one of the most important that many of us 
will ever cast. This is not a vote on whether the President of the 
United States should be able to broaden our war against terrorism to 
include Saddam Hussein. It is a vote on whether now is the best time to 
attack, given that we do not yet have a new U.N. Security Council 
resolution or the support of our closest friends and allies in the 
international community. It is a vote on whether now is the best time 
to attack given that we have not used the full weight of our economic 
and diplomatic might to avert a war. It is a vote on whether we proceed 
with war when we have not determined what its objectives are, how long 
it will last, how much it will cost, or what kind of a regime will be 
set up afterwards.
  This is not Desert Storm, where Iraq invaded Kuwait, where we had 
clear goals and the support of the international community, and we only 
paid about 10 percent of the cost of that war.
  Mr. Speaker, I would not raise any of these questions if Congress had 
been informed that Iraq posed an imminent threat to the security of the 
United States. We have not received that information. And I have many 
more unanswered questions, such as: How will the war affect our 
economy? How will the war affect our homeland security? What happens to 
international cooperation in our hunt for terrorists? What happens if 
Iraq lashes out at Israel? Are we prepared to recast our military as an 
army of occupation for the entire Middle East?
  I am raising these questions because they are the same ones posed to 
me every weekend back in Oregon. While there has been a lively debate 
on this resolution, it has been far from persuasive. Nobody seems to 
have the answers. And, trust me, I have tried, through briefings, 
through talking to experts, through going through classified materials. 
At this time, I cannot go home with a clear conscience and explain why 
I voted to broaden this war with so many questions left unanswered.
  So I will oppose the resolution. And for those who have committed 
themselves to voting for this measure, please consider asking these 
tough questions. It is easier to ask questions before we go to war, not 
after we commit ourselves and our young people to battle. When we have 
received answers to our questions, and when we have received assurances 
that we have tried everything, and that the only way left to nullify 
Iraq's threat to our national security is military action, only then 
would I vote to use force.
  We do not have the answers to the questions. We do not have those 
assurances, and so I will vote ``no'' and urge my colleagues to do the 
same.
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Millender-McDonald), a spokesperson really for justice.
  Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished 
gentleman from New Jersey for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I join with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle in 
this historic debate with some trepidation and troubled feelings. I 
have been marshaling views, like many of my esteemed colleagues, not 
only to contribute to this dialogue but, more poignantly, to try to 
make sense of what lies ahead for our great country.
  Each Member has been consumed with this very critical issue. I am 
sure that none of us wants a war, as we know its great cost in human 
capital. Therefore, we must go the extra mile necessary to exhaust all 
possibilities before America commits to force. That is why this debate 
is so critical. And the implications of our decision that follows will 
have such portent, not only for us but also for the parents of

[[Page H7717]]

the young men and women whom we ask to make perhaps the greatest 
sacrifice.
  Until this past weekend, I was quite undecided as to how to respond 
to the President's insistence on moving against Iraq, and I took 
particular notice of the open-ended nature of the original draft 
resolution. Now, as the result of ongoing discussions with the 
leadership of the House and Senate, he has thought twice in seeking 
unilateral authority. Instead, this revised resolution allows for a 
preemptive use of force against Iraq and for his reporting to Congress 
after the fact. In short, Mr. Speaker, more questions were raised in my 
mind than answers given.
  In the past, I have voted to support legislation designed to protect 
America's security. After 9-11, I was a clear and avid supporter of 
many pieces of legislation to support the President. Thus, I believe it 
is clear to all observers that I am a woman of conscience and not 
afraid to go on record when this Nation is faced with a clear and 
present danger to our way of life, our liberties, and our security.
  I too believe that the world is dealing with a tyrannical dictator in 
Iraq and that he should not be allowed to terrorize neighboring states 
nor his own citizens. Saddam Hussein must and should be stopped. But 
how? What is the best and most appropriate way to contain him and 
destroy his unbridled power? Is it by having the U.S. go alone to 
confront this geopolitical problem that has a far-reaching impact on 
the entire world?
  That is why this debate needs to be thorough and public, Mr. Speaker. 
We must look at the long-term domestic and international consequences 
and policy implications of intervening in Iraq. Before a declaration of 
war can be proclaimed, there must be an accounting of the cost both at 
home and abroad.
  In his talk to the American people this past Monday, the President 
upped the ante, so to speak, and I, for one, was pleased to hear him 
say that war is the last resort. We must not forget that we are already 
fighting a war in Afghanistan and are deeply obligated to help bring 
security and reconstruction to that country. The costs are great, more 
than $1 billion a month. Can we continue to meet such expenditures? How 
long will our commitments continue there? Can we afford to fight two 
wars? What is the exit strategy after we go into Iraq when there is 
none in place for Afghanistan as yet?
  Mr. Speaker, many of my constituents have overwhelmingly called me to 
let me know they do not stand for having their sons and daughters go to 
war and return home in body bags until all possible diplomatic avenues 
have been exhausted. They want to see us, the political leaders of this 
great country, commit ourselves to working with the United Nations in 
every conceivable manner to exercise international action against a 
tyrant in Iraq. They want to see us enter into a rigorous international 
alliance under the U.N.'s banner to force the dismantling of Iraq's 
massive weaponry through a comprehensive inspection system.
  The American people are not fools. They know that war with Iraq 
inevitably will mean that their domestic priorities would suffer from a 
lack of attention and resources. Our unfinished business on health 
care, prescription drugs, welfare reform, and a faltering economy, due 
in large part to corporate greed and malfeasance, and the President's 
top tax cut, would remain on the back burner.

                              {time}  0000

  I agree that Iraq has carried out regression on its own people and 
has not met its obligations under the U.N. resolutions.
  Mr. Speaker, I will not be supporting this resolution.
  Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield 40 minutes to 
the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Payne), and ask that he may control 
that time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Shuster). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California for yielding me 
the additional time. We appreciate the cooperation from the other side.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. 
Baird), a member of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
  Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Speaker, the Constitution of the United States 
reserves to the Congress of the United States the authority to declare 
war. That is as it should be, for no more weighty matter confronts a 
nation, and it is fitting in a Republic that a decision such as this be 
made by the people's representatives.
  Let us be clear. Saddam Hussein is a dangerous, malicious dictator. 
He has committed multiple atrocities, both towards his own people and 
others in the Middle East. He has refused to comply with U.N. 
resolutions or to allow weapons inspectors to fully identify and 
destroy his arsenal of chemical, biological and potential nuclear 
weapons. He has circumvented economic sanctions and has spent money 
from oil sales on weapons systems and personal luxuries for himself and 
his political cronies, rather than on the Iraqi people.
  Given those facts, I believe we must increase the pressure on Iraq 
and insist on expanded weapons inspections with much greater resources 
and no restrictions. This should be done through a multinational effort 
coordinated through the United Nations and with the support of allies 
and other nations throughout the world.
  The United States is absolutely right to insist on this and to take 
the lead in this effort. With international support, the United States 
stands the greatest chance for a successful outcome; and if military 
intervention is necessary, the number of casualties will be reduced and 
the regional repercussions will be lessened.
  That is why I will support the Spratt amendment authorizing the 
President to seek international support for expanded inspections; and 
if Saddam Hussein refuses to comply with such inspections and an 
international coalition exists, the President would be authorized to 
commit U.S. military resources under U.S. command.
  If, however, it is not possible to achieve a multinational coalition, 
in those circumstances the risks, the costs, and the international 
implications of a unilateral attack will be far more severe. Such an 
attack may be necessary, but before taking that step, the President 
should return to the Congress, explain why agreements have not been 
reached. And if in his judgment force is still necessary, he should, 
consistent with Article I of the Constitution, seek the authorization 
of the Congress for military force.
  Throughout the discussions of war with Iraq, I have asked fundamental 
questions: What threat is posed by Iraq now and in the future? What is 
the military strategy for reducing that threat? What will the cost of 
that strategy be in human casualties on all sides? What are the 
international implications and potential regional scenarios that might 
be developed, and what is our long term strategy for the region?
  I believe the first question has been answered. It is apparent that, 
while the threat to our own Nation may not be imminent, if allowed to 
go on Saddam Hussein will eventually develop even more dangerous 
weapons. Beyond that, however, the remaining questions have not been 
fully addressed. For each of the issues I have raised, and many others 
have as well, the potential risks and costs would be dramatically 
greater if the U.S. acts unilaterally rather than in a multinational 
effort.
  Even some of our strongest allies have indicated they would not 
support us militarily or financially if we go it alone. Yet the risks, 
costs and consequences of unilateral action have not been adequately 
explained to the American people. Whatever course is chosen, I believe 
we will not solve the problem of international terrorism or weapons of 
mass destruction solely by attacking Saddam Hussein or solely through 
the broad use of military force. I understand well the impulse and the 
desire to do something and do it now to reduce the threat and fear 
created by September 11, and I believe it may yet be necessary to 
disarm Saddam Hussein, but we must all recognize that there is no 
course of action without risk or that we will eliminate all risk in the 
future.
  Ultimately, we must look at the source of international conflicts; 
and

[[Page H7718]]

we must work to reduce the perceptions and the real conditions that 
allow terrorists and others to foment hatred toward our Nation. If we 
do not understand and deal with how our actions are perceived 
internationally, we will run the risk of defeating Saddam Hussein only 
to foster new threats and new hatreds elsewhere.
  We can and must dedicate ourselves to the battle against terrorism, 
and we can and must hope the pressure applied to the Iraqi regime will 
bring about change and greater security. But as we seek that end, we 
must not neglect the challenges we face here at home; and we must not 
neglect our responsibility to address those challenges with honesty, 
forthrightness, and a sense of justice, fairness and a sense of shared 
sacrifice befitting a truly great Nation in times such as these.
  The President of the United States and all Members of Congress have 
dedicated their hearts, minds and souls to protecting the safety and 
well-being of the American people. There are legitimate differences 
about how to achieve that in these times; but whatever the result of 
this vote, let no one question the motives, the courage, or the 
patriotism of those who will make this fateful decision.
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Barrett), a member of the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce.
  Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, President Bush spoke on Monday 
night about the many threats Saddam Hussein poses to international 
security and why the President believes he should have the authority to 
launch a preemptive, unilateral attack on Iraq to force a regime change 
in that nation.
  While I respect the President and his sincerity in seeking this 
authority, I am not convinced that such an attack is in the best 
interest of our Nation.
  We all agree that Saddam Hussein is a dangerous man, yet that is not 
the topic under discussion here tonight. We are debating whether a 
unilateral military invasion is the best way to address the threats 
posed by Iraq. I must vote no on this grave issue because I am not 
persuaded that a preemptive, unilateral attack is the most effective 
way to control Saddam Hussein.
  I agree with President Bush that the United States, in conjunction 
with our allies in Europe and the Middle East, must make a new effort 
to readmit a weapons inspectors into Iraq. A new inspection policy must 
give U.N. personnel unfettered access to any and every facility and 
have the ability to conduct unannounced surprise inspections. This new 
effort needs the full and vigorous cooperation of the U.N., NATO and 
nations in the Middle East. A united front is essential to success, and 
the international community must join the U.S. in enforcing U.N. 
resolutions.
  As we survey the international community, however, nations in Europe 
and the Middle East, including key allies, range from lukewarm to 
downright hostile to the idea of launching a solo strike against Iraq. 
Many nations would react negatively to such an action, viewing such a 
preemptive U.S. attack as overly aggressive.
  The world's response to our attack could easily include a global 
anti-American backlash, severely hampering our ability to fight the war 
on terrorism, build security and peace in the Middle East, and protect 
vital U.S. interests. We must not forget that the war on terror 
requires the support and cooperation of our key allies in the Middle 
East, Europe and around the world. We rely on these nations to root out 
terror cells within their borders and share with us important 
information.
  We must also remember that since the end of the Gulf War the U.S. has 
kept a close eye on Iraq. We have maintained a strong military presence 
in the region, imposed sanctions, conducted thousands of military 
flights over no-fly zones, and focused our intelligence community on 
Baghdad. We have made clear that any misbehavior by Saddam would be met 
immediately by overwhelming force. As a result of our deterrence, 
Saddam Hussein has not attacked Saudi Arabia, Israel, Kuwait or others 
since the Gulf War because he knows that such a move would bring the 
full weight of the U.S. and the world upon him. His desire to cling to 
power supersedes his hunger for conquest.
  If we strike first, we change that dynamic. Knowing his survival 
would be at stake, Saddam would have a powerful incentive to use every 
weapon in his arsenal to defeat American troops. He might target 
Israel, hoping to fan the flames of conflict between Israel and the 
Arab world to create chaos in the region.
  I am concerned that our preemptive unilateral strike would trigger 
the very events we hope to avoid: regional war, rampant instability, 
and use of weapons of mass destruction.
  We also must recognize that a preemptive unilateral attack against 
Iraq would represent a major shift in American diplomatic and strategic 
thinking.

                              {time}  0010

  For nearly 50 years we relied upon deterrence to check upon Soviet 
expansionism. Deterrence brought us victory in the Cold War without 
having to fight a hot shooting war under the shadow of nuclear 
annihilation. That same strategy has kept Iraq at bay for more than a 
decade.
  Now that doctrine is on the verge of being discarded. The potential 
consequence of such a shift in strategic thinking includes an 
emboldened China moving against Taiwan, Russia acting aggressively 
against the nations of her former empire, and India and Pakistan 
attacking each other with nuclear weapons.
  There are several other critical questions to which we have heard 
very few answers. We must have a clear plan on how an attack on Iraq 
would transpire, including identifying our military options, 
determining our strategy to change the regime, calculating the 
potential casualties, and estimating how much an operation would cost 
and how it would be funded. We must also see a plan to build democratic 
and free market institutions in a post-Saddam Iraq. History teaches us 
that how we win the peace is just as critical as how we win war. Thus 
far these critical issues have received scant attention.
  The international community has an important obligation to ensure 
that Saddam Hussein cannot repeat the aggression of his past; and as 
the world's most powerful country, we have a commitment to lead. 
Through U.N. inspections, continued monitoring, and increased scrutiny 
of Bagdad we can meet that responsibility. We cannot, however, move in 
a unilateral manner that could jeopardize the peace and security of the 
Middle East if not the world. I must vote ``no'' on H.J. Resolution 114 
and urge my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Scott), one of our top constitutional lawyers in this 
House.
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, if our goal is to disarm Iraq, I believe the best way to 
accomplish that goal would be to utilize the strategy articulated a few 
weeks ago by Secretary of State Colin Powell, that is, to reinstate, 
utilizing established rules and supported by multilateral military 
force if necessary. This policy has the best chance of working, and it 
has the support of the international community. If military force is 
needed to enforce the inspections, it will be targeted, focused, and 
not requiring a massive invasion force. It will be unlikely to provoke 
widespread warfare all over the Middle East; and it is just as likely 
to fulfill the goal of disarming Iraq as widespread bombing.
  If on the other hand we merely start dropping bombs, how do we even 
know where to bomb if we have not inspected first? If we do know where 
the weapons are, those locations can be placed first on the inspection 
list, and if there is any resistance to the inspection, multilateral 
military force could be targeted on those sites.
  But today we are discussing a resolution authorizing the use of force 
before the inspectors have even had an opportunity to do their jobs. 
This resolution represents the last opportunity for Congress to have a 
meaningful input in the decision to go to war, and unfortunately there 
are many problems and unanswered questions with granting this authority 
now.
  The first problem is that although the resolution suggests that the 
President first try to work with the U.N., that provision is 
unenforceable. This is a problem especially because the President has 
already stated that he did not

[[Page H7719]]

need the United Nations, and this resolution allows the President to 
just notify Congress that, based on the authority granted in this 
resolution, he has decided to attack Iraq. Furthermore, the broad 
authority granted in this resolution is inappropriate because of the 
timing of this vote, less than a month before the election.
  Twelve years ago under the first President Bush, the vote to use 
military force in the Persian Gulf was taken after the election. The 
timing of this resolution also raises questions because there is 
nothing shown to be urgent about the situation in Iraq. If the 
President discovers that the U.S. is in imminent danger, he is already 
authorized to defend the Nation and no one would expect him to wait for 
a congressional resolution. If the argument is that the urgency was 
created a year ago on September 11, the evidence supporting the 
connection between 9-11 and Iraq is at best tenuous.
  In addition to these problems, granting the authority in the 
resolution is premature because many questions are unanswered. For 
example, what plans have been made for the governance of Iraq after we 
win the war? And what chance is there that a regime change will create 
any better situation than we have now? And to the extent that Iraq has 
chemical and biological weapons, is it a good idea to invade Iraq and 
place our troops right in harm's way? And what will the war cost, and 
how will we pay for it?
  Eighteen months ago we had the largest budget surplus in American 
history. Today even without the cost of a war, we are approaching the 
largest deficit in American history with huge deficits already 
projected for the next 10 years. So what is the plan to pay for the 
war? Are we going to cut funds for education and health care? Are we 
going to raise taxes, or will we just run up additional deficits? And 
what will the domino effect be? If we attack Iraq, Iraq may attack 
Israel, Israel will attack back, and then everyone in the Middle East 
will choose sides, and how will that make us better off than we are 
now?
  If we are to make progress against terrorism, we have to recognize 
that hate is as big an enemy as complex weapons. That hatred may 
increase because others will resent the fact that we have chosen to 
apply rules to others that we are unwilling to have applied to us. We 
would not tolerate applying regime change to the United States, nor 
would we accept preemptive strikes as an acceptable international 
policy. The CIA has now reported that the chance that Iraq will use 
chemical or biological weapons has actually increased since all of the 
talk about a war began.
  Mr. Speaker, all of these problems persist and questions remain 
unanswered, and they lead to the same basic uncertainty. What is the 
plan both before and after the war and what are the consequences? Some 
have argued that a vote against the resolution is a vote to do nothing. 
That is not true. We should act, but based on the information we now 
have, I believe the wisest course is to proceed with the strategy 
proposed by Colin Powell, and that is U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq 
enforced with multilateral military power. That strategy has the 
support of the international community. It is most likely to actually 
disarm Iraq; it does not require a massive unilateral invasion force; 
and it reduces the risk of provoking widespread armed conflict in the 
Middle East and terrorism in the United States.
  I therefore urge my fellow Members to vote against the resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, these votes on the Iraq resolution pose difficult 
questions for all of us. A large part of the difficulty is caused by 
the Administration's inconsistent policies on what we should do, when 
we should do it, and whose approval we need. Not many days ago, the 
Administration articulated the policy that it could proceed 
unilaterally, without U.N. support, and without Congressional approval, 
to attack Iraq, with a preemptive strike, without the necessity of an 
imminent threat to the United States, for the purpose of ``regime 
change''. On one recent Sunday, Vice President Cheney and Secretary of 
State Powell articulated inconsistent descriptions of the 
Administration's policy. This resolution, which the Administration is 
now supporting, repudiates the initial Administration policy by 
requiring the Administration to seek both U.N. cooperation and 
Congressional approval. Last weekend, the Boston Globe began an article 
on the Administration's position on Iraq with the sentence ``As 
administration officials struggle to reach an agreement with U.S. 
allies about Iraq, President Bush has been shifting his rhetoric in 
favor of less aggressive language that emphasizes disarming Saddam 
Hussein rather than ousting him.'' So because of these constant 
changes, formulating a response to the Administration's position has 
been difficult.
  The first question we must address is this: what is the goal? If the 
goal is to disarm Iraq, I believe that the best way to accomplish that 
goal would be to utilize the strategy articulated a few weeks ago by 
Secretary of State Powell: reinstate U.N. inspections, utilizing the 
established rules, supported by multilateral military force, if 
necessary. This policy has the best chance of working. At a minimum, it 
is an important first step. And it has the support of the international 
community. If military force is needed to enforce the inspections, it 
will be targeted, focused and not requiring a massive invasion force; 
it would be unlikely to provoke widespread warfare all over the Middle 
East; and it is also just as likely to fulfill the goal of disarming 
Iraq as widespread bombing.
  If, on the other hand, you merely start dropping bombs--how do you 
even know where to bomb, if you haven't inspected first? If you do know 
where the weapons are, those locations could be placed first on the 
inspection list, and if there is any resistance to the inspection, 
multilateral military force could be targeted to those sites.
  But today we are discussing a resolution authorizing the use of 
force, before inspectors have had an opportunity to do their jobs. 
Unlike the first Administration resolution offered a few days ago, this 
resolution does require the President to cooperate with Congress and to 
try to work with the U.N. This resolution is not as broad as the 
previous draft. It is limited to Iraq, not the entire Middle East, but 
it still gives the President the authority to attack, if he determines 
it to be necessary and appropriate.
  This resolution represents the last opportunity for Congress to have 
meaningful input in the decision to go to war. And unfortunately there 
are many problems and unanswered questions with granting this authority 
now.
  The first problem is that although the resolution suggests that the 
President try to work with the U.N., the provision is unenforceable. 
The President merely has to notify Congress, if he chooses to launch an 
attack. If we are truly interested in making sure that the President 
fully exhausts diplomatic efforts before using force, then the 
resolution should not authorize a military attack without a subsequent 
statement from Congress.
  There is a consensus in the United States that we should work with 
the U.N. to the extent possible. But after this vote, Congress will 
have no opportunity to require meaningful efforts to seek cooperation 
with the U.N. This is a problem especially because the President has 
already state his disdain for the U.N. by saying at first that he 
didn't need the U.N., and when he finally sought U.N. support, he 
implied that if they failed to support the United States, he would 
proceed to attack without them. Furthermore, the Administration is now 
insisting on new, unprecedented rules for inspections, a position which 
may provoke Iraq into resisting the inspections and creating an 
unnecessary impasse at the U.N. A more prudent strategy would be to 
require the President to come back to Congress and explain that he made 
the good faith effort to work with the U.N.--rather than allowing the 
President to just notify Congress that based on the authority granted 
in this resolution, he had decided to attack Iraq.
  Furthermore, the broad authority granted by this resolution is 
inappropriate, because of the timing of this vote--less than a month 
before the election. This problem is magnified by the fact that nearly 
all of the President's statements on the need for this resolution have 
been made at partisan political fundraisers, where he attacks 
Democratic officeholders. Twelve years ago--under the first President 
Bush--the vote to use military force in the Persian Gulf was taken 
after the election. That would be a good model to follow, because then 
members voted without the interests of personal political 
considerations competing with the national interests.
  The timing of the vote on this resolution also raises questions 
because there is nothing urgent about the situation with Iraq. We have 
the same information now that we had 2 years ago. For example, we have 
known that Iraq has had the capability to build biological and chemical 
weapons for years; in fact we know this because they bought some of the 
materials from the United States. Furthermore, no case has been made 
that there is an imminent threat to the United States. So why is it 
essential for the President to have the authority to attack Iraq now? 
If the President discovers that the United States is in imminent 
danger, he is already authorized to defend the nation, and no one would 
expect him to wait for a Congressional Resolution. So what is different 
now? If the argument is that the urgency was

[[Page H7720]]

created a year ago on September 11th, the evidence supporting the 
connection between 9/11 and Iraq is at best tenuous. So what is the 
urgency to authorize force right before the election?
  Another problem with the broad authority granted in the resolution is 
that this issue appears to be personal for the President. He admitted 
as much when he described Saddam Hussein as ``the man who tried to kill 
my Dad.'' The United States should not go to war to settle a personal 
vendetta.
  In addition to these problems, granting the authority in the 
resolution is premature because many questions are unanswered. For 
example, if the President uses the authority granted in this resolution 
and attacks Iraq, what plans have been made for the governance of Iraq 
after we win the war.
  And what chance is there that a regime change will create any better 
situation than we have now. We cannot forget that the United States was 
involved in the regime change in Cuba in which Batista was kicked out 
and we ended up with Castro. So why isn't it likely that Iraq will 
select someone who hates us even more than Saddam Hussein.
  And other questions need to be addressed, such as, to the extent that 
Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, is it a good idea to invade 
Iraq and put our troops right in harm's way. ``And what will the war 
cost and how will we pay for it? There is no question that we are 
willing to pay whatever it costs to be successful in the war, but we 
can't ignore the questions of ``how long'' and ``how much money.'' 
Eighteen months ago, we had the largest budget surplus in American 
history. Today, even without the costs of a war, we are approaching the 
largest deficit in American history, with huge deficits projected for 
the next 10 years. The direct costs of the war have been estimated at 
$100 billion; the indirect costs, such as higher oil costs, have not 
even been estimated. And so, what will we be giving up in terms of 
being able to fund education and health care and other needs here in 
the United States? Or is the plan to raise taxes? Or is the plan to 
just run up more deficits?
  What will be the domino effect? If we attack Iraq, Iraq will attack 
Israel, Israel will attack back, and then everyone in the Middle East 
will choose sides. How will that make us better off than we are now, 
especially in our fight against terrorism?
  And in the end, what will we have won? In making progress against 
terrorism, we have to recognize that hate is as much of an enemy as 
complex weapons. The weapons used to cause mass destruction on 9/11 
were boxcutters. Firearms and explosives are easily available in the 
United States and can be used against buildings or modes of 
transportation. If the result of the war is that others hate us worse 
than they do now, then we have to understand that suicide bombings in 
the United States may increase.
  Moreover, that hatred may increase because others will resent that we 
have chosen to apply rules to others that we are unwilling to have 
applied to us. We would certainly not tolerate another country applying 
``regime change'' to the United States. And we would never approve of 
preemptive strikes when there is no imminent threat as an acceptable 
international policy. Recently, the Administration threatened Iraqi 
military personnel with trials as war criminals; but the U.S. policy is 
not to subject our personnel to the jurisdiction of international 
criminal tribunals. The CIA has now reported that the chance that Iraq 
will use chemical or biological weapons has actually increased since 
all of the talk about war began.
  Mr. Speaker, all of these problems persist and questions remain 
unanswered, and they lead to the same basic uncertainty--what is the 
plan, both before and after the war, and what are the consequences. 
Some have argued that a vote against the Resolution is a vote to do 
nothing. That is not true. We should act, but based on the information 
we have now, I believe the wisest course is to proceed with the 
strategy proposed by Secretary of State Powell--U.N. weapons 
inspections in Iraq enforced with multilateral military power. That 
strategy has the support of the international community; it is most 
likely to actually disarm Iraq; it does not require a massive, 
unilateral invasion force; and it reduces the risk of provoking 
widespread armed conflict in the Middle East and terrorism in the 
United States.
  I therefore urge my fellow members to vote against this resolution.
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Inslee), a member of the Committee on Financial 
Services.
  (Mr. INSLEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. INSLEE. Mr. Speaker, at its heart this debate tonight is not 
about Saddam Hussein. That debate is finished. We know that he is a 
tyrant and a thug. The debate tonight is about what our vision of 
America in this new age of new threats should be, and the one thing we 
should all agree on is America is the greatest Nation on Earth because 
it has always hued to certain principles. It has always matched the 
might of its Armed Forces with the force of its principles. It has 
never resorted through trial and tumult and storm to shortcuts even in 
times of difficulty.
  And there are three principles that we should think about tonight: 
number one, it is an American principle that we engage the 
international community in a system of mutual security and 
international law; number two, it is an American principle that 
countries do not engage in first strikes absent international accord or 
truly imminent threat; number three, it is an American principle that 
the United States Congress is the group that makes the declaration of 
war. And unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, this resolution violates every 
single one of those basic tenets of American democracy.
  They have put some legislative lipstick on it. They put some nice 
fuzzy language around it. But ultimately it violates this rule: no 
Congress should give any President a blank check to start a unilateral, 
ill-timed war, to let him start a war for any reason at any time with 
or without any allies. And in doing so, these principles are violated.
  Let me address the first one, the basic principle that America stands 
for international cooperation, and this has been a bipartisan principle 
for decades in this country. Republican and Democratic Presidents alike 
have worked with the international community to develop international 
law, international support systems; and we have led the Nation in doing 
so.

                              {time}  0020

  We have led the Nation, because a world where countries can strike 
one another without international support, without a true imminent 
threat, is a law of the jungle. This Nation, even in today's threat, 
should lead the world forward to international law, rather than 
backward to the law of the jungle.
  This concept is more important after September 11 than less, and it 
is more important because of what the generals have told us, General 
Hoar, General Zinni, General Clark. We need to heed their advice, 
because what they have told us is simple and alarming.
  They have told us that if we engage in a unilateral attack in the 
Middle East, it has the capacity of supercharging Osama bin Laden's 
recruitment efforts. There is no victory in the destruction of one 
tyrant while breeding 10,000 terrorists. It is true that a unilateral 
attack that inflames the Middle East has the capacity of reducing our 
security rather than increasing it. This violates an American 
principle.
  Second, we have a principle of honoring our troops. We do not owe 
Saddam Hussein any more time. We do not owe Saddam Hussein anything. 
But we owe the soldiers and sailors and our sons and our daughters who 
we would send into the streets of Baghdad the ultimate effort to go the 
last mile to see if we can resolve the disarmament, and the total 
disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, before war. We owe our 
soldiers and sailors to make war the last option, not the first step.
  I got a letter from a mother from Wenatchee, Washington, this week 
making one plea to me that when I took this vote, to say that she 
understood her son could be involved in a sacrifice at the cause of 
liberty, but not until every option is exhausted, and every option has 
not been exhausted. That is why we should pass the separate resolution, 
which will call for the President to go to the United Nations, get a 
tough, certain, guaranteed disarmament effort, and get this job done.
  Third, we are a people who keep our eye on the ball. We have a 
principle in this Nation of not becoming distracted, and we do not know 
why we should take our eye off the ball, off the threat of al Qaeda, 
which 1 month ago was listed as a high threat of repeated terrorist 
attacks in this Nation, and go put our precious resources in dealing 
with what the CIA yesterday said was a low threat of terrorist 
activities. It does not make sense to the American people to do that.
  So for those purposes and those principles, international 
cooperation, honoring our troops, and keeping our eye

[[Page H7721]]

on the ball, Mr. Speaker, we should reject this resolution and pass the 
Spratt amendment. This is the American way.
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Cummings), a member of the Committee on Transportation 
and Infrastructure.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Speaker, this Nation once again considers a course of action that 
will define our moral standing in the history of free peoples. I agree 
that America should speak with one voice in response to the challenges 
to international peace, security, and human rights posed by the regime 
in Iraq. That voice must be founded on the most fundamental of moral 
principles: the sanctity of human life.
  The value of human life has been the basis for the settled, 
bipartisan international policy toward Iraq that we in this Congress 
have expressed in the past. In 1998, Congress reflected a strong, 
unified voice when we voted to support legislation that noted Iraq's 
violation of U.N. disarmament demands to eliminate all weapons of mass 
destruction, as well as their development.
  In that same year, we also enacted the Iraq Liberation Act that 
authorized U.S. support for Iraqi liberation forces in their efforts to 
replace the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. We did so because Saddam 
Hussein has proven himself to be a serious threat to regional stability 
in the Middle East, a growing threat to the United States, and a leader 
who deserves to be tried in an international tribunal for crimes 
against humanity. However, we did not authorize the unilateral use of 
U.S. military forces towards that end.
  Neither the American people nor their elected representatives have 
wavered in our support for the values of human rights, security, 
international stability, and democracy reflected in those 1998 
congressional resolutions.
  However, as we consider this resolution, we must not forget one 
essential fact. As the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has concluded, we have seen 
no evidence or no intelligence to suggest that Iraq indeed poses an 
imminent threat to our Nation. In the absence of an imminent threat to 
the United States, I cannot support the resolution proposed by the Bush 
administration that would authorize preemptive military strikes by the 
U.S. forces to enforce all relevant U.N. resolutions, some of which 
deal with issues other than Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
  I agree with the senior Senator from West Virginia, who has observed 
that the President's proposed resolution is dangerously hasty, 
redefines the nature of defense, and reinterprets the Constitution to 
suit the will of the executive branch.
  The resolution proposed by the administration would codify the 
doctrine of preemption, the assertion that America has the unilateral 
right to attack a nation that has not attacked us. This, in my view, 
would be a precedent with disastrous consequences. A unilateral first 
strike would almost certainly result in substantial loss of life, both 
among American troops and among Iraqi civilians. A unilateral first 
strike would undermine the moral authority of the United States and 
could set a devastating international precedent that we could then see 
echoed in conflicts between India and Pakistan, Russia and Georgia, 
China and Taiwan, and in many other corners of the world.
  In addition, unilateral U.S. action may well destabilize the Middle 
East, harming the international cooperation that we need to defend 
America against terrorism.
  Experts tell us that the United States might have to remain in Iraq 
for a decade, a commitment requiring international support and 
engagement.
  Finally, the economic costs of going it alone would undermine the 
ability of our Nation to address our unmet domestic priorities.
  Although this resolution would authorize the President to take this 
Nation to war, it is not a declaration of war, it is a blank check to 
use force without the moral or political authority of a declaration of 
war. Congress must not abandon its authority under the Constitution. 
This resolution would do just that.
  The course of action that is more consistent with the values and 
security interests of the United States is to support a multinational 
collective security strategy towards the threats to regional peace and 
international stability that are posed by the regime in Iraq. The 
administration has indicated some progress within the United Nations 
Security Council towards that goal. I join the President in urging all 
members of the Council to act with due diligence.
  I also join in the position advanced by our colleague, the gentleman 
from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), who has proposed that we once again 
authorize U.S. military support for a renewed and strengthened U.N. 
Security Council resolution that demands true disarmament by Iraq. This 
is a threat that the civilized world must face together. The regime of 
Saddam Hussein, after all, is the world's problem as well as our own.
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Louisiana (Mr. Jefferson), a member of the Committee on Ways and Means.
  Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time 
to me.
  Mr. Speaker, our Nation is on the verge of opening a new front in the 
global war on terror. It is a front fraught with peril. It is a front 
that may send thousands of young Americans, men and women, to uproot a 
ruthless dictator that has committed unspeakable acts against his own 
people and wrought havoc on the world.
  No decision is more difficult, more wrenching for a U.S. President, 
the Congress, or the American people than to commit our soldiers and 
our Nation's prestige to a military conflagration. It is for this 
reason that we must consider all possible diplomatic and military 
options short of war.
  As noted 19th century French author Guy de Maupassant wrote, ``Every 
government has as much of a duty to avoid war as a ship's captain has 
to avoid a shipwreck.''
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the Spratt substitute 
to House Joint Resolution 114. It offers the best and most certain way 
to achieve our objectives of disarming Iraq of weapons of mass 
destruction and the best chance of avoiding a hasty decision to go to 
war. It is a sensible, prudent approach to managing the use of force by 
our country.
  Eleven years ago, then President George Bush created one of the most 
impressive multinational coalitions that the world has ever seen. He 
very wisely determined that it was not in our Nation's interest to act 
unilaterally to liberate Kuwait.
  The Spratt substitute is informed by that experience. It limits the 
opportunity of our current President for unilateral action to liberate 
Iraq.
  I am pleased that President George W. Bush has engaged the U.N. 
during the current crisis. I am grateful that he has recognized that 
our Nation should work with the United Nations Security Council and 
allow weapons inspections to go forward and this process to occur.

                              {time}  0030

  I am relieved the President said that war is not inevitable. And I am 
encouraged that he has said that he would give a diplomatic course to 
disarm Iraq through a U.N. process every chance to work ahead of using 
force.
  Mr. Speaker, the Spratt resolution guarantees the President's stated 
intentions are made law. As set forth in the Spratt substitute, our 
Armed Forces should take action only against Iraq only in conjunction 
with a new U.N. Security Council resolution that calls for the complete 
elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
  If the U.N. Security Council resolution is violated or the U.N. does 
not act, the President would need approval from Congress for unilateral 
action, and then only after making certain important certifications to 
Congress. Thus, this vote would occur only if the President has 
certified that further U.N. action is not forthcoming, force remains 
the only viable option, a broadbased international coalition is being 
formed, and the global war on terrorism would not be adversely affected 
by an Iraqi invasion.
  Mr. Speaker, there is no such thing as prudent haste. It is an 
understatement to say that we should take the

[[Page H7722]]

time for calm deliberation by the Congress in a proceeding 
uncomplicated by any question other than whether we should commit to a 
course of action that may cost a heavy toll in human lives, hundreds of 
billions of dollars, and the good will of the international community.
  I urge support of the Spratt substitute. But what is our course if 
Spratt is not adopted? What then is the best course for us to address 
the threat of terrorism and the threat of the use of chemical and 
biological weapons in the hands of a brutal dictator? What is our best 
chance to evoke the response from Iraq that will lead to unfettered 
weapons inspections and eventual disarmament?
  With long and careful thought I have come to the conclusion that the 
leadership of Iraq will only submit to a credible disarmament process 
based on inspections if it is faced with a credible threat of the use 
of force. It is the use of force authorization that I pray will never 
be used. And it is the use of force authorization that should never be 
used unilaterally. After Spratt, H.J. Res. 114 provides the only 
remaining prudent chance to stem these new threats of unthinkable 
horrific terror that our Nation and the world now face, threats that we 
are now only just beginning to understand. It is a chance that I 
believe our country through this Congress must commit to take at this 
time.
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt), who has been a very active Member on this 
resolution.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I wish to commend my colleague from New 
Jersey (Mr. Payne) for his perseverance. I know he has been here until 
the wee hours of the morning last night and this evening. And for those 
of us who oppose the underlying resolution, we are indeed in his debt. 
And I also want to thank him for his leadership within our caucus, not 
just simply on this particular issue but on many issues, particularly 
in terms of the continent of Africa. He is certainly someone who 
commands our respect.
  Mr. Speaker, I think it is important to bring to the attention of the 
House disturbing reports that have recently appeared in the national 
press about alleged efforts to tailor intelligence information about 
Iraqi intentions and capabilities to fill the contours of 
administration policy. And I wish to note two particular stories from 
today's Washington Post and yesterday's Miami Herald.
  Mr. Speaker, I will insert the articles now in the Record.

                [From the Washington Post, Oct. 9, 2002]

                    Analysts Discount Attack by Iraq

                            (By Dana Priest)

       Unprovoked by a U.S. military campaign, Iraqi President 
     Saddam Hussein is unlikely to initiate a chemical or 
     biological attack against the United States, intelligence 
     agencies concluded in a classified report given to select 
     senators last week.
       However, the report added, ``should Saddam conclude that a 
     US-led attack could no longer be deterred,'' he might launch 
     a chemical-biological counterattack. Hussein might ``decide 
     that the extreme step of assisting Islamist terrorists in 
     conducting a WMD [weapons of mass destruction] attack against 
     the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance 
     by taking a large number of victims with him.''
       The assessment was first made in a classified National 
     Intelligence Estimate, which includes the analysis and 
     opinions of all relevant U.S. intelligence agencies, that was 
     given to the Senate intelligence committee last week. A 
     declassified ``white paper'' on Iraq was released days later. 
     At the urging of the committee, which is controlled by 
     Democrats, additional portions of the intelligence report 
     were declassified by the CIA Monday and released last night.
       With lawmakers poised to vote this week on a resolution 
     giving President Bush authority to attack Iraq, the new 
     intelligence report offers grist both for supporters and 
     critics of the administration's policy. The CIA assessment 
     appears to suggest that an attack on Iraq could provoke the 
     very thing the President has said he is trying to forestall: 
     the use of chemical or biological weapons by Hussein.
       But the CIA also declassified other elements of analysis 
     that seem to back up the President's assertion that Iraq has 
     active ties to al Qaeda--a growing feature of the 
     administration's case for considering military action.
       Among the intelligence assessments linking Iraq with al 
     Qaeda is ``credible reporting'' that the group's ``leaders 
     sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD 
     capabilities,'' according to a letter to senators from CIA 
     Director George T. Tenet.
       Tenet added: ``Iraq's increasing support to extremist 
     Palestinians, coupled with growing indications of a 
     relationship'' with al Qaeda, ``suggest Baghdad's links to 
     terrorists will increase, even absent U.S. military action.''
       In his speech to the nation Monday night, Bush said: ``Iraq 
     could decide on any given day to provide a biological or 
     chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual 
     terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could allow the Iraqi 
     regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints.''
       The letter's release shed light on a behind-the-scenes 
     battle over Iraq-related intelligence. The CIA's detailed, 
     unvarnished view of the threat posed by Iraq is central, say 
     many lawmakers, to how they will vote on the matter. Yet an 
     increasing number of intelligence officials, including former 
     and current intelligence agency employees, are concerned the 
     agency is tailoring its public stance to fit the 
     administration's views.
       The CIA works for the president, but its role is to provide 
     him with information untainted by political agendas.
       Caught in the tug of war over intelligence, say former 
     intelligence officials familiar with current CIA intelligence 
     and analysis on Iraq, have been the CIA's rank and file and, 
     to some extent, Tenet.
       There is a tremendous amount of pressure on the CIA to 
     substantiate positions that have already been adopted by the 
     administration,'' said Vincent M. Cannistraro, former head of 
     counterterrorism at the CIA.
       Tenet last night released a statement meant to dispel 
     assertions that the letter contained new information that 
     would undercut the case Bush made Monday night.
       ``There is no inconsistency between our view of Saddam's 
     growing threat and the view as expressed by the President in 
     his speech,'' the statement read. ``Although we think the 
     chances of Saddam initiating a WMD attack at this moment are 
     low--in part because it would constitute an admission that he 
     possesses WMD--there is no question that the likelihood of 
     Saddam using WMD against the United States or our allies in 
     the region for blackmail, deterrence, or otherwise grows as 
     his arsenal continues to build.''
       In explaining why the items in the letter were not also 
     released before, Tenet said he did not want to provide 
     ``Saddam a blueprint of our intelligence capabilities and 
     shortcomings, or with insight into our expectations of how he 
     will and will not act.''
       Still, he noted, the agency could nevertheless declassify 
     further information not previously disclosed. Included in his 
     letter were snippets of an Oct. 2 closed-door session.
       Included in that was questioning by Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-
     Mich.), in which he asked an unnamed intelligence official 
     whether it ``is likely that [Hussein] would initiate an 
     attack using a weapon of mass destruction?''
       The official answered: ``... in the foreseeable future, 
     given the conditions we understand now, the likelihood I 
     think would be low.''
       Levin asked: ``If we initiate an attack and he thought he 
     was in extremis ... what's the likelihood in response to our 
     attack that he would use chemical or biological weapons?''
       The answer came: ``Pretty high, in my view.''
       In his letter, Tenet responded to senators' questions about 
     Iraq's connections to al Qaeda. ``We have solid reporting of 
     senior-level contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda going back a 
     decade,'' Tenet wrote. ``Credible information'' also 
     indicates that Iraq and al Qaeda ``have discussed safe haven 
     and reciprocal non-aggression.''
                                  ____


                 [From The Miami Herald, Oct. 8, 2002]

    Dissent Over Going to War Grows Among U.S. Government Officials

      (By Warren P. Strobel, Jonathan S. Landay and John Walcott)

       Washington.--While President Bush marshals congressional 
     and international support for invading Iraq, a growing number 
     of military officers, intelligence professionals and 
     diplomats in his own government privately have deep 
     misgivings about the administration's double-time march 
     toward war.a
       These officials charge that administration hawks have 
     exaggerated evidence of the threat that Iraqi leader Saddam 
     Hussein poses--including distorting his links to the al Qaeda 
     terrorist network--have overstated the extent of 
     international support for attacking Iraq and have downplayed 
     the potential repercussions of a new war in the Middle East.
       They charge that the administration squelches dissenting 
     views and that intelligence analysts are under intense 
     pressure to produce reports supporting the White House's 
     argument that Hussein poses such an immediate threat to the 
     United States that preemptive military action is necessary.
       ``Analysts at the working level in the intelligence 
     community are feeling very strong pressure from the Pentagon 
     to cook the intelligence books,'' said one official, speaking 
     on condition of anonymity.


                              VIEWS ECHOED

       A dozen other officials echoed his views in interviews with 
     the Knight Ridder Washington Bureau.
       They cited recent suggestions by Defense Secretary Donald 
     Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice that 
     Hussein and Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network are working 
     together.
       Rumsfeld said on Sept. 26 that the U.S. government has 
     ``bulletproof'' confirmation

[[Page H7723]]

     of links between Iraq and al Qaeda members, including ``solid 
     evidence'' that members of the terrorist network maintain a 
     presence in Iraq.
       The facts are much less conclusive. Officials said 
     Rumsfeld's statement was based in part on intercepted 
     telephone calls in which an al Qaeda member who apparently 
     was passing through Baghdad was overheard calling friends or 
     relatives, intelligence officials said.
       The intercepts provide no evidence that the suspected 
     terrorist was working with the Iraqi regime or that he was 
     working on a terrorist operation while he was in Iraq, they 
     said.
       In his Monday night speech, President Bush said a senior al 
     Qaeda leader received medical treatment in Baghdad this 
     year--implying larger cooperation--but he offered no evidence 
     of complicity in any plot between the terrorist and Hussein's 
     regime.
       Rumsfeld also suggested that the Iraqi regime has offered 
     safe haven to bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed 
     Omar.
       While technically true, that too is misleading. 
     Intelligence reports said the Iraqi ambassador to Turkey, a 
     longtime intelligence officer, made the offer during a visit 
     to Afghanistan in late 1998, after the United States attacked 
     al Qaeda training camps with cruise missiles to retaliate for 
     the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. But 
     officials said the same intelligence reports said bin Laden 
     rejected the offer because he didn't want Hussein to control 
     his group.


                           NO IRONCLAD PROOF

       In fact, the officials said, there's no ironclad evidence 
     that the Iraqi regime and the terrorist network are working 
     together, or that Hussein has ever contemplated giving 
     chemical or biological weapons to al Qaeda, with whom he has 
     deep ideological differences.
       None of the dissenting officials, who work in a number of 
     different agencies, would agree to speak publicly. But many 
     of them have long experience in the Middle East and South 
     Asia, and all spoke in similar terms about their unease with 
     the way that U.S. political leaders are dealing with Iraq.
       All agreed that Hussein is a threat who eventually must be 
     dealt with, and none flatly opposes military action. But, 
     they say, the U.S. government has no dramatic new knowledge 
     about the Iraqi leader that justifies Bush's urgent call to 
     arms.
       ``I've seen nothing that's compelling,'' said one military 
     officer who has access to intelligence reports.
       Some lawmakers have voiced similar concerns after receiving 
     CIA briefings.
       Sen. Richard Durbin, D-I11., said some information he had 
     seen did not support Bush's portrayal of the Iraqi threat.
       ``Its troubling to have classified information that 
     contradicts statements made by the administration,'' Durbin 
     said, ``There's more they should share with the public.''
       Florida's Sen. Bob Graham, chairman of the Senate 
     Intelligence Committee, last week expressed frustration with 
     the information he was receiving from the CIA and questioned 
     the need to elevate Iraq to ``our No. 1 threat.''
       In his Monday night speech, Bush stressed that if Hussein 
     gained control of radioactive material no bigger than ``a 
     softball'' he could build a nuclear weapon sufficient to 
     intimidate his region, blackmail the world and covertly arm 
     terrorists. But a senior administration intelligence official 
     notes that Hussein has sought such highly enriched uranium 
     for many years without success, and there is no evidence that 
     he has it now.
       Moreover, the senior official said, Hussein has no way to 
     deliver a nuclear weapon against a U.S. target.
       ``Give them a nuclear weapon and you have the problem of 
     delivery. Give them delivery, even clandestine, and you have 
     a problem of plausible denial. Does anyone think that a 
     nuclear weapon detonating in a Ryder truck or tramp freighter 
     would not automatically trigger a response that would include 
     Iraq, Iran, North Korea?'' the intelligence official asked.
       Here are some other examples of questionable statements:
       Vice President Dick Cheney said in late August that Iraq 
     might have nuclear weapons ``fairly soon.''
       A CIA report released Friday said it could take Iraq until 
     the last half of the decade to produce a nuclear weapon, 
     unless it could acquire bomb-grade uranium of plutonium on 
     the black market.
       Also in August, Rumsfeld suggested that al Qaeda operatives 
     fleeing Afghanistan were taking refuge in Iraq with Hussein's 
     assistance.
       Rumsfeld apparently was referring to about 150 members of 
     the militant Islamic group Ansar al Islam (Supporters of 
     Islam) who have taken refuge in Kurdish areas of northern 
     Iraq. One of America's would-be Kurdish allies controls that 
     part of the country, however, not Hussein.


                            WALKOVER NOTION

       Current and former military officers also question the view 
     sometimes expressed by Cheney, Rumsfeld and their civilian 
     advisors in and out of the U.S. government that an American-
     led campaign against the Iraqi military would be a walkover.
       ``It is an article of faith among those with no military 
     experience that the Iraqi military is low-hanging fruit,'' 
     one intelligence officer said.
       He challenged that notion, citing the U.S. experience in 
     Somalia, where militiamen took thousands of casualties in 
     1993 but still managed to kill U.S. soldiers and force an 
     American withdrawal.
       Iraqi commanders, some officials warned, also could unleash 
     chemical or biological weapons--although the American 
     military is warning them they could face war crimes charges 
     if they do--or U.S. airstrikes could do so inadvertently.
       Hussein also might try to strike Israel or Saudi Arabia 
     with Scud missiles tipped with chemical or biological 
     weapons.

  Mr. Speaker, the Herald story states, and I am quoting now, ``that a 
growing number of military officers, intelligence professionals and 
diplomats within the administration have deep misgivings about the 
march toward war.'' The story continues, and again I am quoting from 
the Miami Herald, ``These officials charge that the administration 
hawks have exaggerated evidence of the threat that the Iraqi leader 
Saddam Hussein poses, including distorting his links to the al Qaeda 
terrorist network. They have overstated the extent of international 
support for attacking Iraq and have downplayed the potential 
repercussions of a new war in the Middle East. They charge that the 
administration squelches dissenting views and that intelligence 
analysts are under intense pressure to produce reports supporting the 
White House's arguments that Hussein poses such an immediate threat to 
the United States that preemptive military action is necessary. 
`Analysts at the working level in the intelligence community are 
feeling very strong pressure from the Pentagon to cook the intelligence 
books,' said one official speaking on the condition of anonymity.''
  The article goes on to note that, again, I am quoting, ``a dozen 
officials echoed his views.''
  Now today's Washington Post discusses what it calls a ``behind-the-
scenes battle over Iraq-related intelligence.'' And, again, I am 
quoting: ``The CIA's detailed, unvarnished view of the threat posed by 
Iraq is central, say many lawmakers, as to how they will vote on the 
matter. Yet, increasing numbers of intelligence officials, including 
former and current intelligence agency employees are concerned the 
agency is tailoring its public stance to fit the administration's 
views.''
  The article goes on to quote a former head of counterterrorism of the 
CIA, one Vincent Cannistraro, who says that ``there is a tremendous 
amount of pressure on the CIA to substantiate positions that have 
already been adopted by the administration.''
  I submit, Mr. Speaker, that if these reports are accurate, they 
represent a dangerous state of affairs. When we began our debate on 
this resolution yesterday morning, we did not have the benefit of 
declassified intelligence estimates released only last night, which 
indicate that Saddam Hussein is unlikely to initiate a chemical or 
biological attack against the United States unless he concludes that a 
U.S.-led attack is inevitable. Such contradictions between classified 
information in the administration's public statements make it very 
difficult for Congress to have a meaningful debate. It puts those few 
Members of Congress who have access to this information as members of 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in a truly awkward 
position and leaves the rest of us and the American people in the dark.
  Senator Graham, who chairs the Senate Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, has said that the classified information he has received 
does not tally with the public statements of the administration. But, 
of course, he is not permitted to explain why. Based on what he knows, 
he has described the focus on Iraq as a distraction from the war on 
terrorism that allows Syria and Iran, countries which should be at the 
forefront of any intelligence effort against state sponsors of 
terrorism, off the hook.
  Let me conclude by saying that we cannot discharge our constitutional 
responsibilities by allowing the administration to control the flow of 
information and simply trusting that they know what they are doing. 
That is an unacceptable situation in a democracy, Mr. Speaker. And that 
is not what the founders had in mind when they gave Congress, not the 
President, the power to declare war.
  Mr. Speaker, what is the responsibility of a great power? Sometimes 
it is to act when others cannot, or will not, do so. Sometimes it is to 
refrain from acting when others would, so

[[Page H7724]]

as not to set a dangerous precedent that others might follow. Always it 
is to recognize that for better or worse our actions shape the rules by 
which the international system operates. The rule of law is a fragile 
thing. And through our actions, we either strengthen or erode it.
  If you think this is merely a theoretical concern, let me share with 
you an article from last Sunday's New York Times. It is by Stephen 
Sestanovich, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and 
professor international diplomacy at Columbia University.
  The article is entitled, ``Putin Has His Own Candidate for Pre-
emption.'' It described the efforts of senior Russian officials to co-
opt the rhetoric of the Bush Administration in their war of 
intimidation against the neighboring Republic of Georgia, where some 
Chechen fighters have taken refuge. Allow me to quote a few lines:
  ``On the eve of President Bush's Sept. 12 speech to the United 
Nations on Iraq, Mr. Putin wrote Secretary General Kofi Annan charging 
that Georgia's passivity toward Chechen fighters on its territory 
violated Security Council resolutions. Russia might therefore have to 
act unilaterally. The chief of Russia's general staff insisted that Mr. 
Shevardnadze was `in no way' different from Mullah Omar of the 
Taliban.''
  ``The Russian defense minister announced that no United Nations vote 
was needed to attack Georgia. One Russian newspaper published military 
plans to occupy all of Georgia--and thereby `dictate the terms' of its 
future existence as a state. The headline: `Pre-emption Moscow-Style.' 
''
  Such are the dangers of unilateral assertions of power by the leader 
of the free world. Such are the risks that other nations with 
aggressive intentions may use stale evidence and ill-defined 
allegations to settle local grievances.
  This is not to deny that there are times when it is necessary to 
strike first against an enemy who poses a ``clear and present danger'' 
to the safety and security of the Nation. The Constitution is not a 
suicide pact, as Justice Jackson famously said. And the same is true of 
the international legal order. We are not compelled to stand by and 
allow ourselves to be attacked before we can lawfully take action.
  But any nation that engages in the preemptive use of force bears a 
heavy burden of showing that its actions were justified by the nature 
of the threat confronting it.
  The principles that apply were formulated by none other than Daniel 
Webster, who was Secretary of State when the British launched a 
surprise attack on an American ship, the Caroline, in 1837.
  Webster set forth the two conditions that must exist: first, the need 
for self-defense must be ``instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice 
of means and no moment for deliberation.'' And second, the degree of 
force used must be proportionate to the threat.
  The resolution before us permits the President to take us into war 
without satisfying either of these requirements. It imposes no 
obligation upon him to show that the danger is truly immediate and the 
use of force truly necessary. Indeed, it speaks of a ``continuing 
threat,'' which suggests an ongoing situation of indefinite duration. 
And it imposes no requirement that U.S. military actions be measured or 
proportionate to the threat we face.
  In short, the resolution offers no rationale for the exercise of its 
broad grant of authority. Nor has the President provided one.
  Last night, President Bush presented his case for a preemptive 
military strike against Iraq. I studied his speech with care, hoping 
that he would set forth clear and convincing evidence of the threat he 
perceives.
  The speech offered ample evidence that Saddam Hussein is a 
bloodthirsty tyrant who has terrorized his own people and endangered 
his neighbors.
  The speech offered ample evidence that Saddam Hussein has defied 
Security Council resolutions for 11 years by continuing to develop 
weapons of mass destruction.
  And the speech made clear--in case anyone doubted it--that Saddam 
Hussein is deeply hostile to American interests.
  What the speech failed to demonstrate is that Saddam Hussein poses a 
threat to America or vital U.S. interests that--Webster's words--is 
``instant, overwhelming, . . . leaving no choice of means and no moment 
for deliberation.''
  In fact, it demonstrated just the opposite. The President did not 
say, ``Saddam Hussein presents an imminent threat to the United 
States.'' He said, ``The danger is . . . significant and it only grows 
worse with time.''
  That is an argument for containment. It is an argument for coercive 
measures, including unconditional inspections, disarmament, and the 
freezing of assets. It may even be an argument for sanctions. But it is 
not an argument for launching an unprovoked military attack.


                            nuclear weapons

  The President stated that the Iraqi regime has continued to pursue 
the development of nuclear weapons, and could one day soon be in a 
position to threaten America or the Middle East. He cited the Cuban 
missile crisis as precedent for a preemptive strike to contain that 
danger.
  But the missile crisis involved the imposition of a naval quarantine 
to interdict the delivery of nuclear missiles capable of hitting the 
United States--as clear an example of a proportionate response to an 
imminent threat as can be imagined. In the present situation, the CIA's 
best estimate is that Iraq ``will probably have a nuclear weapon during 
this decade.''
  Perhaps anticipating that some future administration might one day 
cite the missile crisis to justify preemptive military action, 
President Kennedy's own legal adviser expressly distinguished the Cuban 
missiles from what he called ``threatening deployments or 
demonstrations that do not have imminent attack as their purpose or 
probable outcome.''


                    chemical and biological weapons

  The President noted that Saddam Hussein has used chemical agents 
against civilian populations in his own country. This is true. It is 
also true that these attacks last occurred some 14 years ago--with the 
full knowledge of a U.S. government that did nothing to prevent them.
  What is the imminent threat that such weapons might be used against 
the United States? The President didn't say. He said that Saddam 
Hussein ``could decide on any given day to provide a biological or 
chemical weapon to a terrorist group.'' Indeed he could. So could any 
number of other nations, from Iran to North Korea.
  But the historical record suggests that he can be deterred from 
deploying these weapons. One the eve of Operation Desert Storm, 
Secretary of State Baker notified Iraq that any use of its weapons of 
mass destruction would result in a devastating American response. And 
the weapons were never used.
  In fact, according to declassified intelligence estimates released 
only last night, Saddam is unlikely to initiate a chemical or 
biological attack against the United States unless he concludes that 
``U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred.'' In other words, Saddam 
will unleash his arsenal only when he is facing annihilation--with 
nothing left to lose.


                         support for terrorism

  The President claimed that Saddam Hussein has links to international 
terrorism that justify a preemptive strike against his regime. What is 
the evidence? The President offered four arguments. First, he said that 
Iraq and al-Qaida ``share a common enemy--the United States of 
America.'' Well, the United States and Iraq share a common enemy--Iran. 
But that's hardly evidence that we support Iraqi aggression.
  Second, he said that the Iraqi regime ``gleefully celebrated the 
terrorist attacks on America.'' This is hardly admirable, but it is 
also hardly evidence that they were behind the attacks. Any more than 
others who shared such sentiments elsewhere in the Arab world.
  The President's last two arguments are more serious: that Iraq is 
continuing to finance terror in the Middle East and has continued to 
associate with leaders of al-Qaida, offering them safe harbor, medical 
treatment, and training in terrorist techniques. Yet assuming that 
these allegations are correct, they argue, not for invasion, but for 
treating Iraq as we treat the many other countries that provide various 
kinds of support for terrorism but against whom we are not making plans 
for war.
  I do not mean to minimize these concerns. They are serious and 
deserve to be addressed, whether they occur in Iraq or in any other 
country--especially one in which internal repression, the appetite for 
conquest, and the possession of advanced weaponry go hand in hand.
  I applaud the President's demand for immediate Iraqi compliance with 
Security Council resolutions. I would support a resolution that 
authorizes the limited use of our Armed Forces in support of 
international efforts to locate and dismantle Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction should Iraq fail to comply.
  Such a resolution would achieve the President's desire that we ``tell 
the United Nations and all nations that America speaks with one 
voice.''
  Instead, the President insists on a resolution that goes further. 
That authorizes the President to ``use the Armed Forces as he 
determines to be necessary and appropriate.''
  The President says that ``approving this resolution does not mean 
that military action is imminent or unavoidable.'' If so, I am relieved 
to hear it. But if military action is imminent or unavoidable.'' If so, 
I am relieved to hear it. But if military action is not imminent, then 
the broad language that would authorize it premature.
  If the American people are satisfied that our cause is just and war 
is forced upon us, they will do what needs to be done. But before we 
risk the lives of our soldiers and countless innocent Iraqi civilians, 
before we divert untold billions of dollars from our other battles, 
before

[[Page H7725]]

we forfeit the moral authority that has distinguished America among the 
family of nations, we had better be sure we've taken every reasonable 
step to resolve this crisis without bloodshed.
  Until then, I cannot support a resolution that gives the President a 
blank check to launch a military strike that meets none of the legal 
requirements for preemptive action. We have been down that road before. 
It is not a lesson we should have to learn again. And it's not the kind 
of example that the United States should set for the world.

                              {time}  0040

  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining time.
  Let me conclude by thanking the majority for the kindness and the 
thoughtfulness that they have given us. The gentleman from Illinois 
(Mr. Hyde) should be commended, as I mentioned earlier, a gentleman 
always, but to allow everyone to have a word to say.
  The past 2 days with over 24 hours of debate has been an historic 
time in this House. A debate has endured that will be noted and will be 
long-remembered what was said here. We have debated fundamental changes 
in the manner in which this country operates, first strike preemptive. 
Definitely a new course of action for this Nation.
  Of course, first strikes are nothing new. In the medieval times there 
were many, France into Germany, Spain into Italy. In 1918, Germany 
entered France. December 7, Japan attacked the United States. So there 
has been preemptive strikes but never the greatest Nation in the world 
taking a decision to make first strikes preemptive, and so this is a 
new day for this great Nation.
  The Framers of the Constitution, the Jeffersons and the Adams and 
Washingtons and Hamiltons, said let us be careful about power. We do 
not want a king or emperor or dictator, and, therefore, let us give the 
power of war to the Congress.
  Here we are abdicating that responsibility and giving the right to 
declare war to one person, to say it is his decision to do what he 
wants and he has 48 hours to tell us later what he has done. Another 
principle that we have changed.
  We jeopardize a coalition because I believe right now our number one 
fight is the battle against terror. The al Qaeda cells that are in this 
country and in 50 other countries and a false feeling of security will 
emerge when we attack Iraq if that is done, and Americans will, 
therefore, believe that there is a sense of security now and al Qaeda 
is gone. There is definitely a difference between the al Qaeda cells 
and the government of Iraq, and so we are leading people down a wrong 
path to believe that a defeat of Iraq, therefore, eliminates the war on 
terror.
  We have heard recently that there is a connection between al Qaeda 
and the government of Iraq. This only was revealed in the last week or 
so. Many wonder where this information is coming from and whether, in 
fact, it is indeed true. And, once again, we should not lull our people 
into a false feeling of security when we look over there and say Iraq 
is done, we are safe again, when the war on terror will still be here.
  So we talk about a new concept, regime change, Saddam Hussein should 
go. This is a tall order. How do we do it? How long do we stay? How 
dangerous will it be? How costly will it be? How are we going to 
rehabilitate Afghanistan? We have not drilled the pumps to reach the 
low water tables as we promised. We have not started construction of 
schools as we said. We have not built the hospitals as we promised, but 
now we will go into Iraq and for how much? What will the cost be? $100 
billion? $200 billion? No one really knows.
  As the DOW has dropped from close to 11,000 down to close to 7,000, 
almost a 40 percent drop, how can we fund this? We spend $1 billion a 
day today on a $350 billion defense budget, with another couple of 
hundred billion dollars on the side. How can we do it with the unmet 
needs of PELL grants and student loans, the needs for prescription drug 
benefits for seniors and section 8 housing, vouchers funding for 
elementary and secondary schools in the leave no child behind 
legislation? How do we deal with that?
  So as we move to vote we should engage the U.N., we should encourage 
them and support the inspectors to find and destroy those biological 
and chemical weapons of mass destruction. We should leave no stone 
unturned. We should go unfettered. We should demand that, and I believe 
then we can have the avoidance of war. We should attempt to avoid war 
at any cost. I do not believe that the United States is eliminating the 
danger of the al Qaeda cells in this country by us having a war and 
attack on Iraq.
  I would like to say that we are a mighty powerful country. Let us use 
our power and might. We love this country. In school I used to recite 
the poem, This is my country, land of my birth; this is my country, the 
grandest on earth; and I pledge thee my allegiance, America the bold, 
because this is my country to have and to hold.
  Let us not misuse the power that we have, but let us be sure that 
Saddam Hussein is contained, that this world is free of tyrants like 
that. Let us support the inspectors going in.
  Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.
  Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining time.
  Mr. Speaker, as I close, I would like to thank the gentleman from New 
Jersey. This has been, in fact, a long debate. It has been spirited at 
times, but, in fact, it has always lived up to the gravity of what we 
are considering, and we owe that in no small part to the gentleman from 
New Jersey.
  The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) has empowered me to close, and 
I take that as a very unusual thing for a freshman and something that 
is pretty important for somebody who not only supports this resolution 
but who supports this resolution often to the dismay of other Arab 
Americans.
  My family emigrated from the Middle East, one side of my family 
emigrated from the Middle East, and I bear an Arab surname, and so for 
me and I think for many people who are going to support this resolution 
tomorrow, this has to be a special case. We are not pushing an 11-year 
or 12-year war to the brink of a final military conflict lightly.
  I would call the Speaker's attentions to these advertisements that 
came out of Baghdad September 11 and a year after September 11 as just 
another example of what is different about Saddam Hussein's regime.
  After September 11, both as a member of the Committee on 
International Relations and I believe as one of the Members of this 
body whose ancestry goes back to the Middle East, I was visited by not 
just one but every single ambassador from the Middle East represented 
in this country. In every case they expressed their horror, their 
sympathy and distanced themselves from the terrible events of September 
11; and they did so in private, not intending to do it for the camera, 
but so that I would understand. And I am sure they visited virtually 
every other Member so they would understand that that is not what the 
Arab people are about, that is not what Arab society, one of the great 
societies that helped create the world as we know it today, is about.
  It is not what the Iraqi people are about, and to put out propaganda 
in the Baghdad press talking about September 11 being Allah's revenge, 
in fact, says it all about this regime.
  Saddam Hussein and his party and his almost 30-year rule has been all 
about killing and violence and hatred. He is not alone, but he is in a 
league of his own. And as we close for tonight and we move into 
tomorrow's short debates of 1 hour and final passage probably by 
midday, I hope that all of us will remember that this is not about Arab 
people, not in this country and not anywhere in the world.
  The need to empower the President to take this action, should it 
become necessary, is all about the uniqueness of this administration of 
Saddam Hussein and the actions he has taken in the past, he takes in 
the present, and we are quite certain that if that regime is not 
changed or replaced, he will take in the future.
  I say as one Arab American to the many Arab Americans and Muslim 
Americans in this country and perhaps to the Arabs around the world, 
America and particularly my community in America has absolutely no 
hatred and no willingness to participate in anything that is adverse to 
the Arab people.

[[Page H7726]]

                              {time}  0050

  But we do have to insist that the kind of tyranny that has gone on in 
Iraq for so many decades must in fact stop, either by Saddam Hussein 
living up to his obligations under the U.N. resolutions or his being 
driven from power and an Arab leader who will respect the rule of law 
and who will provide the kind of fairness for his own people can be 
found.
  Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight with a heavy heart but with 
determined resolve. A member of Congress faces no more important debate 
than authorizing the President to use military force.
  Just over a year ago, Mr. Speaker, the eyes of the world were opened 
to the depths to which evil men will descend in order to put fear in 
the hearts and minds of peace loving people.
  In the post-September 11th world, Americans now understand that there 
are those who have no regard for human life, and that they will kill 
the innocent in untold numbers to achieve evil goals.
  We now also know that sometimes our Nation must act to prevent that 
which may happen in the future.
  Which brings us to Saddam Hussein and Iraq's pursuit of weapons of 
mass destruction.
  Saddam has a unique brand of state-sponsored terror that threatens 
the world like no other.
  Unchecked, he pursues chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and 
has demonstrated the capacity to use them.
  Among dictators and despots, his record stands by itself: he has 
brutally murdered and repressed his own people, he has used chemical 
weapons against his neighbors and his countrymen including women and 
children, he has launched unprovoked attacks on other nations, he 
sponsored an assassination attempt on former President Bush, he harbors 
terrorists including members of Al Qaeda, and he defies the will of the 
United Nations and the international community by refusing to disarm 
and continuing to develop every conceivable weapons of mass destruction 
known to man.
  That is why it is critical that the United States asserts its unique 
leadership role in the international community and put an end to 
Saddam's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.
  Now is the time to work within the United Nations Security Council to 
move a tough Resolution calling for the complete disarmament of Iraq's 
weapons of mass destruction under threat of force by a global 
coalition.
  It must be the policy of the United States to exhaust all forms of 
diplomacy within the United Nations and other appropriate forums before 
considering any other course of action relative to disarming Iraq.
  And if that diplomacy fails, then we must act with the broadest 
coalition of nations as possible to force the disarmament of Saddam's 
weapons of mass destruction.
  Mr. Speaker, the strategy that Secretary Powell briefed me on that we 
are pursuing with the U.N. Security Council is precisely the reason why 
I am such a strong supporter of the Alternative being offered by John 
Spratt of South Carolina.
  The Spratt Alternative authorizes the use of U.S. military force in 
pursuit of a Security Council-sanctioned effort to disarm Iraq, by 
force if necessary.
  That is what Secretary Powell and the Administration are pushing for 
within the U.N. right now and that is what the Congress should be 
supporting.
  This alternatives makes clear that if the Security Council fails to 
take action that Congress will act immediately to vote on authorizing 
the President to use unilateral, if necessary, force against Iraq to 
disarm.
  We are also considering the underlying resolution that provides the 
President with the authority to use force in accordance with United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions and unilaterally.
  It is a significantly broader authorization than the Spratt 
Alternative. However, changes have been made including: (1) support for 
and prioritization of U.S. diplomatic efforts at the U.N.; (2) limiting 
the scope of the authorization to Iraq only; (3) requiring presidential 
determinations to Congress before the president may use force; (4) and 
requiring the President to consult with and report to Congress 
throughout this process.
  I had hoped that there would have been more opportunity for the House 
to improve on the underlying resolution during the course of this 
historic debate.
  However, I was deeply encouraged by the President's words Monday 
night when he said, ``Approving this resolution does not mean that 
military action is imminent or unavoidable.''
  Likewise, I was deeply encouraged by my meeting yesterday with 
Secretary Powell in which he spelled out in detail our strategy for 
action within the U.N. Security Council.
  I take both President Bush and Secretary Powell at their word. In the 
coming days, weeks and months, I plan on holding them to their words.
  As a Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee, I've seen 
the bravery of our men and women in uniform.
  In fact, I was able to visit many earlier this year in Afghanistan 
and I was struck by their determination to secure the peace for that 
nation thousands of miles from home.
  It pains me that more families may be missing their loved ones soon.
  Nevertheless, let there be no doubt that Saddam Hussein's unfettered 
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction are a real and growing threat to 
the United States and the international community, and that whatever 
course others may take--America will defend herself.
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak against this 
resolution. We all recognize that Suddam Hussein is a tyrant and that 
he is a dangerous enemy. The question is whether this resolution is the 
right way to address the threats presented by his regime.
  The Administration says that Iraq presents an imminent threat to the 
United States, that unless we give the President carte blanche to 
launch a unilateral, preemptive attack, we will be subject to attack by 
weapons of mass destruction. No one needs to convince us of the horror 
of weapons of mass destruction or the evil intentions of Saddam 
Hussein. But does that justify the blank check this resolution gives 
the President? We have listened to the testimony, read the briefs, and 
weighed the arguments presented by the Administration. In my view, they 
have yet to prove their case. They have presented no credible evidence 
that the United States faces imminent attack. They have presented no 
credible evidence that Iraq was involved in the September 11th 
terrorist attacks or that it is giving material aid to those involved 
in those attacks.
  Are we setting the bar too high? I don't think so. The evidence of 
imminent threat should be credible, conclusive and irrefutable if we 
are talking about the United States unleashing the dogs of war. 
Striking the first blow is unprecedented in American history. It has 
always been a point of honor that the United States does not start 
wars. If we are going to depart from a fundamental principle that has 
guided U.S. foreign policy for more than 200 years, the evidence of 
necessity must be iron clad.
  This is much more than a point of pride. It is not an abstract 
argument. Through this action, the world's only remaining superpower is 
asserting a principle that the nations of the world--including the 
United States--have struggled to consign to the past. We have rejected 
the old idea that any nation which claims to feel threatened or 
aggrieved can unilaterally and preemptively attack another without the 
sanction of the international community. The power to initiate war is 
no longer untrammeled and absolute. Think for a moment of the precedent 
we are setting, of the pandora's box we are opening. What if, tomorrow, 
India or Pakistan says the other constitutes an unacceptable threat? 
Would this justify one of these nuclear-armed countries attacking the 
other? What about China and Taiwan? What about any number of other 
countries whose relations with a neighbor are beset with tension, 
suspicion, threats, and insecurity?
  More immediately, what about our relations with our allies, the 
nations on which we depend to help us keep the peace and bear the 
burden of protecting our interests? We should be careful not to 
initiate a new age of American unilateralism that leaves us without 
allies. The Administration thinks they are dispensable in the case of 
Iraq. Maybe they are. But if our alliances fray and disintegrate, it is 
certain that there will come a time when we do need them. Will they be 
there for us? Maybe, maybe not. But one thing we can be sure of: it is 
foolhardy in the extreme to ignore our allies' importance to the system 
of international relations and the maintenance of America's prosperity 
and national security interests.
  I have every confidence that our troops will display the bravery and 
professionalism we have come to expect from them. But the consequences 
of a U.S. victory are liable to be a huge burden for the United States. 
We will have taken on the responsibly for peace and order, for feeding 
and sustaining an entire population, and guaranteeing the territorial 
integrity of Iraq. All this in the context of a population which may or 
may not be receptive to the presence of our armed forces. We will have 
to counter the centrifugal dynamics that drive the Kurds in the north 
and the Shiites in the south away from the Iraqi state. We will be 
responsible for defending Iraq's long border with Iran against 
incursions. We are talking about committing tens of thousands of 
troops, perhaps hundreds of billions of dollars, for many years, maybe 
decades.
  And what will be the impact of an invasion in the rest of the Muslim 
world? The reaction will not be an outpouring of support for the United 
States. It will feed the flames of fanaticism. It could well 
destabilize Egypt, Jordan and other friendly nations. Are we prepared 
to commit more troops, more money, more prestige to shoring up these 
governments?

[[Page H7727]]

  Finally, let me offer some observations as a member of the Armed 
Services Committee. Implications of a war against Iraq will reverberate 
at every level of the Department of Defense. Problematic issues the 
military faces today--global international commitments, increased 
personnel tempo, and over-reliance on the Reserves and National Guard--
will only be exacerbated when military requirements for Iraq are thrown 
in the mix.
  Of foremost concern is the inevitable enormous strain on military 
manpower. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld testified before the 
Armed Services Committee that no increase in troop end strength is 
necessary to carry out an invasion and peacekeeping activities in Iraq. 
No one else whom our Committee spoke to held this opinion. In fact, 
retired flag officers and distinguished military analysts all agreed 
that increased end strength was imperative for the ultimate success of 
our reconstruction of Iraq.
  And the personnel problem extends far beyond the full time, active 
duty forces. Since the Persian Gulf war, our reliance on the Reserves 
and National Guard has grown to the point where it would be impossible 
for DoD to meet its worldwide commitments without the presence of these 
units. Reservists and Guardsmen no longer talk about the rare 
mobilization in support of a national emergency; rather, some units 
routinely deploy overseas alongside their active duty counterparts. How 
long can we continue to call upon these volunteers to shoulder more 
than their fair share? How long can we ask civilian employers and 
families of our Guard and Reserve to carry on without them? I sincerely 
hope that one of the first orders of business in the 108th Congress is 
a comprehensive overhaul of our military personnel system in order to 
ease the stress on our citizen soldiers. Otherwise, our Reservists and 
Guardsmen are sure to vote with their feet.
  These considerations do not exhaust the questions raised by the 
prospect of an attack on Iraq. Serious as they are, the most serious 
questions of all are the ones none of us can anticipate. War has a way 
of creating new dynamics and unleashing new forces in the world. All 
too frequently, those consequences are inimical to the interests of 
established powers. Those who see the dawn of a new era of peace, 
stability and democracy in the Middle East as a result of a strike 
against Iraq would do well to think again.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution.
  The threat from Iraq is very real and increasingly dangerous. Saddam 
Hussein's belligerent intentions and his possession and ongoing 
development of weapons of mass destruction to fulfill those intentions 
make him a clear and present danger to the United States and the world.
  Particularly worrisome is the evidence of Iraq's UAV capability. 
Iraq's ability to use unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver biological 
and chemical weapons far outside its national borders represents a 
qualitative increase in the danger it poses.
  History demonstrates Saddam Hussein's willingness to use such weapons 
against unarmed civilians, including his own people. And it 
demonstrates his unhesitating instincts to invade his neighbors--Iran 
and Kuwait--and to attack Israel.
  That he appears, to quote Director Tenet's recent letter, to be 
``drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks'' does not 
persuade me that he won't.
  He is impulsive, irrational, vicious, and cruel.
  Unchecked, he will only grow stronger as he develops capability to 
match his disdain for America and his Middle East neighbors.
  History shows that had Israel not destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor in 
1981, Saddam Hussein would now have nuclear capability. But he did not 
cease his nuclear ambitions. Had coalition military forces not swept 
through Iraq in 1991, he would have possessed nuclear weapons by 1993.
  The CIA now reports that Iraq is one year away from a functional 
nuclear device once it acquires missile material. Waiting one hour, one 
day, one month in such an environment, as some suggest, is too risky.
  We have to act now because the U.N. resolutions following the gulf 
war have not contained the Iraqi threat.
  With the passage of time, international resolve to enforce United 
Nations resolutions has weakened.
  This resolution will demonstrate to the U.N. American resolve to act 
if necessary, but preferably in a peaceful and multilateral way.
  The strong and forceful language in this resolution will help 
Secretary Powell persuade his counterparts at the U.N. and around the 
globe to join us.
  The resolution we are considering is greatly improved from the draft 
the Administration proposed and I commend Leader Gephardt for 
negotiating these improvements.
  This resolution narrows the scope of action to the threats to 
national security posed by Iraq and enforcing compliance with U.N. 
Resolutions.
  This resolution stresses a strong preference for peaceful and 
diplomatic action, authorizing the use of force only if all peaceful 
options have failed.
  This resolution requires the President to comply with the War Powers 
Act and report regularly to Congress should military action become 
necessary, as well as after the use of force is completed.
  This resolution addresses post-disarmament Iraq and the role of the 
United States and international community in rebuilding.
  And of crucial importance, this resolution requires the President to 
certify to Congress that action in Iraq will not dilute our ability to 
wage the war on terrorism.
  Removing WMD from Iraq is an important priority, but it cannot 
replace our counterterrorism efforts at home and abroad. We must ensure 
that we do not divert attention from protecting our homeland--beginning 
with the creation of a Department of Homeland Security.
  We must also strengthen and expand programs and policies aimed at 
stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their 
components. The ready availability of matieral for chemical, biological 
and nuclear weapons, and the know-how to make them, has allowed Iraq to 
rebuild rapidly since 1991 and the expulsion of inspectors in 1998. But 
nonproliferation programs have been underfunded at a time when they 
need to be expanded.
  If we don't stop the flow of scientists and materials for weapons of 
mass destruction, we will soon be faced with another Iraq. The axis of 
evil will grow to include more states. We will encounter the nightmare 
scenario of nuclear-armed terrorist groups, capable of blackmailing or 
attacking our cities and citizens from within, with little hope of 
deterrence or diplomacy to stop them.
  Sentiment in my district is high--both in favor and opposition to 
this resolution. I thank my constituents for sharing their views with 
me. I have listened carefully, learned as much as I could, and now it 
is time to lead.
  Like all my colleagues, I fervently hope that the U.S. will not need 
to use force. But the best chance to avoid military action is to show 
the U.N. and Iraq that we will not flinch from it.
  Giving diplomatic efforts every chance is the right policy and this 
resolution gives diplomacy its maximum chance to succeed.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, September 11, 2001, brought to 
light a horror that the American people and the world had up until then 
only seen in movies. On that day, we learned, as a nation, what it 
means to be terrorized. The nineteen men who hijacked airliners and 
used them as guided missiles showed us that even on our home soil 
Americans are not shielded from the reach of terrorism. Bearing in 
mind, we must continue to defend against these forces of evil and those 
who support them. We cannot spend the rest of our lives in fear. I 
support this resolution in order to protect the life of every American, 
at home and abroad, I also believe it offers the best chance for peace 
because it clearly communicates U.S. resolve to Saddam Hussein and 
makes clear that his continued refusal to disarm will be his undoing.
  Mr. Speaker, granting the authority to send our brave men and women 
in uniform overseas to fight in hostile territory is the most difficult 
decision we make in Congress. That was true last year and it remains 
true today. Since the beginning of the first mission in Afghanistan on 
October 7, 2001, our military men and women have fought terrorists and 
disrupted their networks, liberated a country, and brought the prospect 
of peace and democracy to a nation that had not seen either in decades. 
While our military campaign in Afghanistan is slowly coming to a close, 
we must not lose sight of our primary objective, to rid the world of 
terrorists and those who sustain them. Saddam Hussein and his regime in 
Iraq fit this description.
  Mr. Speaker, after sifting through the evidence, reviewing the facts, 
and probing the Administration, I am convinced Saddam Hussein's regime 
is a clear and present threat to the security of the United States and 
our allies. Since he came to power in Iraq in 1979, Hussein has waged 
war on his neighbors and terrorized his own people with chemical 
weapons. He has allowed terrorists groups, such as al Qaeda, to operate 
safety in Iraq. He has supported terrorist actions by compensating the 
families of Palestinian suicide bombers for their attacks on innocent 
Israeli citizens. He orders his military to fire missiles and artillery 
on U.S. and a coalition aircraft that patrol the U.N.-imposed no-fly 
zones that protect Kurd and Shi'a Muslims in Northern and Southern 
Iraq, respectively. He has attempted to assassinate a former U.S. 
President. Moreover, he has violated the basic human rights of his 
people, causing them to live in fear and poverty, while he builds 
Presidential palaces and lives of life of luxury. Currently, there is 
nothing stopping him from using weapons of mass destruction against the 
United States and our allies, or from giving them to terrorists.

[[Page H7728]]

  After the gulf war in 1991, Saddam Hussein agreed to abide by United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 686, 687, and 688. By agreeing to 
these resolutions, Hussein was required to, among other things: allow 
international weapons inspectors to oversee the destruction of his 
weapons of mass destruction; not develop new weapons of mass 
destruction; destroy all of his ballistic missiles with a range greater 
than 150 kilometers; stop support for terrorism and prevent terrorist 
organizations from operating within Iraq; help account for missing 
Kuwaitis and other individuals; return stolen Kuwaiti property and bear 
the financial liability for damage from the gulf war; and end his 
repression of the Iraqi people. Mr. Speaker, he has taken none of these 
required actions.

  As a matter of fact, over the past decade, Saddam Hussein has shown 
nothing but contempt for the United Nations and its member-states. In 
all, Hussein has violated sixteen critical U.N. resolutions. It became 
obvious that Hussein had no intention of cooperating with the U.N. when 
Iraq ceased cooperation with weapons inspectors on October 31, 1998, 
after several years of evading, deceiving, and even harassing U.N. 
weapons inspectors. This flagrant violation of U.N. Resolution 687 
prompted the passage of U.N. Resolution 1205, which called on Iraq to 
continue ``immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation'' with 
U.N. weapons inspectors. These events led to the Clinton Administration 
signing the Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998 into law, which clarifies the 
official position of the United States as promoting regime change in 
Iraq. Regardless, it has been four years since weapons inspectors last 
visited Iraq. There is no doubt that within this time Hussein has 
reinvigorated his weapons programs, and according to the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, an independent research center based 
in London, there is little doubt that Hussein's nuclear capabilities 
are within reach.
  If Saddam Hussein persists in violating U.N. Security Council 
resolutions and refuses to disarm and the use of force becomes our only 
option, then the goal of military action should not just be to remove 
weapons of mass destruction from Iraq. Military action must also have 
the end result of removing Hussein from power. In the end, nothing 
short of a regime change will liberate the Iraqi people, whom Saddam 
Hussein has repressed for more than two decades. Since April of 1991, 
Hussein has continued to ignore U.N. Resolution 688, which requires him 
to allow immediate access to international humanitarian organizations 
to help those in need of assistance in Iraq. Furthermore, Hussein 
punishes his people by diverting funds from the U.N.'s ``oil-for-food'' 
program to pay for his weapons programs. I believe Saddam Hussein will 
continue to do what he has done so effectively in the past: violate the 
basic human rights of every Iraqi citizen.
  I would now like to read to you the following excerpt from the book 
The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq by Kenneth M. 
Pollack. Mr. Pollack, a former analyst on Iraq for the Central 
Intelligence Agency who served on the National Security Council during 
the Clinton Administration, is one of the foremost experts on Saddam 
Hussein and the Iraqi regime.

       This is a regime that will gouge out the eyes of children 
     to force confessions from their parents and grandparents. 
     This is a regime that will crush all of the bones in the feet 
     of a two-year-old-girl to force her mother to divulge her 
     father's whereabouts. This is a regime that will hold a 
     nursing baby at arm's length from its mother and allow the 
     child to starve to death to force the mother to confess. This 
     is a regime that will burn a person's limbs off to force him 
     to confess or comply. This is a regime that will slowly 
     lower its victims into huge vats of acid, either to break 
     their will or simply as a means of execution. This is a 
     regime that applies electric shocks to the bodies of its 
     victims, particularly their genitals, with great 
     creativity. This is a regime that in [the year] 2000 
     decreed that the crime of criticizing the regime (which 
     can be as harmless as suggesting that Saddam's clothing 
     does not match) would be punished by cutting out the 
     offender's tongue. This is a regime that practices 
     systematic rape against its female victims. This is a 
     regime that will drag in a man's wife, daughter, or other 
     female relative and repeatedly rape her in front of him. 
     This is a regime that will force a white-hot metal rod 
     into a person's anus or other orifices. This is a regime 
     that employs thalium poisoning, widely considered one of 
     the most excruciating ways to die. This is a regime that 
     will behead a young mother in the street in front of her 
     house and children because her husband was suspected of 
     opposing the regime. This is a regime that used chemical 
     warfare on its own Kurdish citizens--not just on the 
     fifteen thousand killed and maimed at Halabja but on 
     scores of other villages all across Kurdistan. This is a 
     regime that tested chemical and biological warfare agents 
     on Iranian prisoners of war, using the POWs in controlled 
     experiments to determine the best ways to disperse the 
     agents to inflict the greatest damage.
       This is the fate that awaits thousands of Iraqis each year. 
     The roughest estimates are that over the last twenty years 
     more than two hundred thousand people have disappeared into 
     Saddam's prison system, never to be heard from again. 
     Hundreds of thousands of others were taken away and, after 
     unforgettable bouts of torture that left them psychologically 
     and often physically mangled, eventually were released or 
     escaped. To give a sense of scale, just the numbers of Iraqis 
     never heard from again would be equivalent to about 2.5 
     million Americans suffering such a fate.

  It is true that Iraq has said publicly that it will allow weapons 
inspectors to return. While some members of the United Nations believe 
Iraq is taking the necessary steps to rectify its past transgressions, 
Iraq has placed several conditions that can only hamstring the U.N.'s 
efforts. If the U.N. bows to Hussein's demands, the legitimacy of the 
entire organization could be called into question.
  The purpose of this resolution is to authorize the President to use 
such force as may be necessary to protect the national security of the 
United States from threats posed by Iraq and to enforce U.N. 
Resolutions. Yet even more clear than this language is the message it 
sends. This resolution sends the message of resolve. It shows that we 
are resolved to protect ourselves and our allies with whatever means 
are necessary. And, it is precisely because of this message that we 
open up the possibility of a peaceful settlement to this great threat. 
To be clear, after eleven years of dealing with Iraq one thing is 
certain: Saddam Hussein is motivated only when he finds he has no other 
options. This resolution demonstrates our unity behind action, should 
he fail to meet the demands of the international community. Without it, 
we can be assured that Hussein's Iraq will continue stockpiling and 
developing weapons of mass death, providing safe haven for terrorists, 
and tormenting his own people. Meanwhile, the danger for American and 
our allies will grow even worse.
  Additionally, we seem to be experiencing quite a logjam in the U.N. I 
believe that passage of this resolution will help break that impasse 
and secure a meaningful and direct resolution from the U.N., which will 
help build a larger multilateral coalition around this just cause. If 
these last attempts at a peaceful solution do fail, then we must show 
that we are resolved to act to rid the world of this great threat.
  Mr. Speaker, war should always take a backseat to peace. I still hold 
out hope that a peaceful solution can be reached. Unfortunately, time 
and time again, Saddam Hussein has forsaken his opportunities for 
peace. He is aggressively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and build 
up his other weapons of mass destruction. The longer he is allowed to 
make progress on these deadly projects, the greater the threat to us--
including the threat that Iraq could supply terrorists with weapons of 
mass destruction. If Hussein refuses to comply, the United States must 
take action, or risk the use of biological, chemical, or nuclear 
weapons against us on our own soil.
  Mr. WALSH. Mr. Speaker, the decision before the Congress this week is 
whether or not to give the President the option to use force with Iraq 
if all else fails. It is similar to the one before the Congress early 
in my career when the elder Bush was in the White House. The main 
difference was that Iraq had invaded a sovereign nation, Kuwait, to the 
outrage of the world community.
  The world agreed that Iraq was the aggressor and must be driven out. 
The U.N. voted for precisely that and we led the effort. Although much 
clearer in circumstance, it was an extremely difficult decision.
  Today things are not quite so clear. There has been no invasion and 
there, at least at the moment of this writing, is no U.N. sanction for 
military action.
  The arguments are more like piling straws on a camel's back. Saddam 
Hussein is a murderer of his own people. He is a warmonger, witness 
Kuwait, Iran and the Kurds in his own country. He aggressively pursues 
the development of nuclear weapons. Remember Israel bombed an Iraqi 
nuclear facility many years ago. Hussein still pursues that goal. He 
has accumulated thousands of liters of chemical and biological weapons 
and is not afraid to use them, in fact he has used them against Iran 
and his own people. He planned an attempted assassination of an 
American president. He defies U.N. resolutions that ended the '91 Gulf 
War, which called for the destruction of all weapons of mass 
destruction. He refused to allow weapons inspectors to do their job and 
threatened and intimidated them at every turn.
  Now we are told that Iraq may have become a weapons supermarket for 
terrorism. Some al Qaeda leaders are there and other terrorist 
organizations have close ties; i.e. Abu Nidal. We are told that Hussein 
provides $25,000 to each family of the suicide bombers who attack 
Israel. And we can't forget that during the Gulf War Hussein rained 
Scud missiles down on innocent Israeli civilians in Tel Aviv and other 
communities. Iraq now is working to extend the range of their missiles.

[[Page H7729]]

  Now, under the threat of U.S. action, Hussein agrees to let weapons 
inspectors back into his country. Can there be any doubt that the only 
thing this man responds to is the threat of deadly force? One is 
tempted to believe Hussein is now prepared to admit weapons inspectors. 
And indeed we should and must let that scenario play out before any act 
of war. But the skeptic in me doesn't believe a word that he says. 
History is a wonderful teacher and we all know this man's history.
  The U.N. has shown itself to be incapable and unwilling to enforce 
its own resolutions. As a guarantor of world peace they have a 
checkered past at best. Without having the threat of military 
intervention, the U.N. is a paper tiger. I have long been a supporter 
of the U.N. I believe that the nations of the world must have a forum 
in which to settle their differences but when a tyrant like Hussein 
thumbs his nose at the world, something isn't right.
  One last point, since the 9/11 attack on our country we have been 
pouring over the coals, literally and figuratively. One by one we have 
connected the dots that led to the attack. We have seen the threat that 
connects the plans to do great harm to our country and our people.
  The President in these past weeks has connected the dots for us. He 
has pointed to Iraq with great alarm and tried to help us to understand 
the threat. It is real. What we don't know is how imminent and what 
shape the threat will take.
  After much thought and prayer and consultation with my constituents 
and with people I love and trust, I have decided to support the 
resolution before the House. Not because I want to go to war. I don't, 
I remember the last one. I remember meeting with Marsha Connor, the 
mother of Patrick Connor of Marcellus who was killed in action. It was 
heartbreaking.
  But if we don't give the President that option, Saddam Hussein and 
Iraq will continue to grow more troublesome and if they ever develop a 
nuclear weapon it would be horrific. I'll vote for the resolution but I 
will implore the President not to use force unless all else fails. 
Negotiation, weapons inspectors, and U.N. sanctions should come first.
  And if we do indeed go, we should do so with the other nations of the 
world who should feel as threatened as we.
  Mrs. McCARTHY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House 
Joint Resolution 114 and the need to protect the United States from any 
threat posed by Iraq. However, my support for the resolution is coupled 
with several concerns associated with potential unilateral action 
against Iraq.
  The September 11 attacks on the United States demonstrated the will 
of misguided, vengeful leaders whose determination to harm Americans 
seem boundless. Clearly, Saddam Hussein is one of these leaders. This 
dictator harbors terrorists, invokes chemical warfare upon his own 
people and openly defies United Nations Security Council Resolutions. 
His support of international terrorism, and pursuit of stockpiling 
weapons of mass destruction poses not only a threat to the United 
States, but also to the world.
  Since 1998, this body has voted on four separate measures that 
appropriate funds for Iraqi opposition forces, as well as call upon 
Iraq to allow U.N. inspectors immediate, unconditional and unrestricted 
access to areas they wish to inspect. Today's resolution takes a step 
further and acknowledges that sanctions, weapons inspection and 
containment have failed. It recognizes that Iraq and Saddam Hussein 
present an unrelenting hostility to the United States. And we know when 
it comes to the United States, Hussein has a very prolific partner in 
hate: al Qaeda. In fact, Saddam Hussein has openly praised the 
September 11 attacks.
  The resolution before us authorizes United States military force 
under two circumstances: (1) In order to defend our national security 
against a threat by Iraq, and (2) enforce U.N. Security Council 
Resolutions relevant to Iraq.
  Disarming Iraq is necessary to ensure our national security. I was 
encouraged to hear President Bush emphasize that Iraq can avoid 
military force if all weapons of mass destruction are destroyed. I hope 
that Saddam Hussein will heed this advice.
  I was also encouraged to hear President Bush stress the importance of 
seeking a coalition, as I believe the support of the United Nations 
Security Council is critical. The President must persist in his efforts 
with the U.N. to approve a tougher inspection resolution. If inspection 
efforts fail, a U.N.-sanctioned military force is the best course of 
action, as it would garner support in neighboring countries, and 
enhance the chances of post-war success. If the U.N. were to fail to 
authorize force, then the President should come back to Congress and 
let us have a say about whether we go in unilaterally.
  Finally, I was glad to hear the President pledge to rebuild a post-
war Iraqi economy. This is very important, as the cost of military 
action must not only be weighed economically, but regionally.
  Although this is one of the most difficult votes a Member of Congress 
will cast, I'm afraid it is an inevitable action needed to protect the 
United States from Iraq and the destructive weapons it seeks to acquire 
and use.
  Today, each and every member will vote their conscience. Regardless 
of how we each vote, at the end of the day we must remember one thing: 
that we represent the people of the United States and we must come 
together as a body, and a people, just as we did on September 11.
  Mr. SERRANO. Mr. Speaker, today I find myself standing here on the 
floor of the House with anguish in my heart. I have read and listened 
to all sides, and I have struggled to understand why our great nation 
would want to contemplate going to war.
  When September 11th, 2001, happened, I was in New York City, and as 
the enormity of what terrorism could do to my City hit me, I was 
stunned. Then I wept for all of those innocent people who were simply 
doing their jobs and living their lives, who in one moment of hate lost 
their lives. There has, however, not been any conclusive evidence that 
links al Qaida, those responsible for the tragedy of September 11th, 
with Iraq.
  Some question whether those who oppose this resolution are forgetting 
those who died on September 11th; some question our patriotism. Though 
I should not have to affirm my patriotism, I say simply that I love my 
country, I love my city of New York, and I am not afraid to deal with 
those who attacked it. It is the most basic of our purposes as a 
national government, to defend our nation. But here we speak of a 
different matter.
  I am certainly pleased that the President now recognizes that he must 
secure the approval of the Congress before taking our nation to war. 
This is progress and what our Constitution requires. However, if our 
ultimate goal is to disarm Iraq of all chemical and biological weapons, 
how does giving our President this right to go to war accomplish that 
goal? Wouldn't working with the United Nations to implement a program 
of rigorous inspections move us closer to our goal? I believe that 
force should always be used as a last resort, and never as the first 
way to accomplish a goal.
  The new doctrine announced by the President, that the United States 
has the right to engage in a preemptive strike, which he seeks to 
implement through this resolution, frightens me and establishes a 
troubling precedent. This is a doctrine better left unused. It 
contravenes a half century of developed international law, of which the 
United States has been a champion. Taking this idea to its logical 
conclusion means that India and Pakistan, for instance, nations with 
nuclear weapons and a history of conflict, may no longer feel bound by 
the limitations on the use of force that have been agreed to by the 
family of nations. The United Nations will become irrelevant and the 
checks and balances that membership in the United Nations places on the 
member states will no longer apply. Even if we strike and successfully 
defeat Iraq militarily, will this make our nation a safer place to 
live?
  The Bush Administration often talks about ``regime change'' in Iraq 
and the need to remove Saddam Hussein from power. In 1991 we decided 
against regime change because of concern about the overall stability of 
the region. What has happened since that time that has changed the 
goals of a military action?

  As a nation we need to plan and think beyond what passage of this 
resolution and a military victory would mean. The United States would 
need to spend at least the next ten years involved in an occupation, 
reconstruction, and re-building effort. This will require a serious 
commitment of American resources and troops. Are we ready to commit to 
the rebuilding that will follow military action?
  As a nation have we carefully considered what the impact of a 
unilateral attack by the United States would be on Israel? If 
everything that has been attributed to Hussein this evening is true, 
are we prepared to guarantee the stability of the entire region when 
Hussein finds himself threatened and decides to strike out at his 
neighbors?
  Our State Department is actively involved in trying to improve the 
image of the United States in the Arab world and particularly among 
young Arab men and women. We do not want them to perceive the United 
States as an enemy. When we engage as a nation in a unilateral military 
action against an Arab nation, an action that our allies are cautioning 
against, how will the United States be viewed in the Arab world? 
Perhaps the result will be an increase in al Qaida's membership and a 
renewed hatred toward Americans.
  The United States is founded on the principles of justice and due 
process. If we disregard these principles and adopt a unilateral, macho 
and aggressive stance, we lose our moral authority in the world. 
Seeking the consensus of nations does not weaken us or expose us to 
danger; instead, it fortifies us and brings to our cause the strength 
of our allies.

[[Page H7730]]

We want nations to look at us with respect and not fear, outrage, and 
scorn. It is time for us to take the lead in removing all weapons from 
Iraq, but in a way that embraces other nations instead of isolating us 
from them.
  I will vote against this resolution, which permits a unilateral 
military attack, because I do not believe that the President has made a 
convincing case or provided sufficient evidence to merit its passage. 
However, let me also make it clear that my vote against this 
resolution, which I do not believe will make our nation any safer, 
should not in any way imply that I think the men and women in our armed 
services are anything less than heroes. They are courageous and brave.
  So I end this speech as I began it, with great sadness. I cannot 
agree with the course that our great nation is embarking on, one that 
brings the threat of war closer and the goal of peace further away.
  Mr. GARY G. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, as Saddam Hussein 
continues to defy the United States and the world, the avenue of 
options available in dealing with Hussein shrinks with every step he 
takes toward attaining nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. 
It is clear that Hussein does not aspire to acquire these weapons for 
the sake of self-defense. The goal of these weapons is aggression. This 
is not a man of peace. This is a man of war. He has made a mockery of 
the agreement ending the first Persian Gulf War, and now he holds out 
hope that he can continue to manipulate the world to hold on to power. 
And he intends to hold power and use it till he is successful in 
acquiring weapons of mass destruction and with it, the ability to bully 
and destabilize the Gulf region.
  Hussein intends to use the currency of these weapons to hold hostage 
the entire region. What then? Some argue that if the attack is not on 
the U.S. (which we cannot guarantee), we should not get involved. But 
who believes that if he again invades another country that the United 
States will be able to sit on its hands as the stability of the Middle 
East unravels? If he uses these weapons against his neighbors, where 
will this nation be on moral ground to allow him to continue without 
reprisal? Appeasement will not be an option. Further, who believes that 
our country is better positioned fighting a nuclear armed Hussein than 
one that is currently without that capability? Who believes that the 
welfare of our men and women in uniform is better served in having them 
face an enemy with nuclear weapons than one who has not yet been 
successful in doing so? The answer is no one. With that being said, the 
urgency of dealing with Hussein is ever increasing.
  If Hussein attacks, the most brilliant diplomatic minds combined will 
not be able to bring a peaceful end. However well intended those hopes 
may be, eleven years of defiance have shown that peaceful talks and 
negotiations are not an option for Hussein. Rather, they are an 
opportunity to a man who does not deserve to lead the Iraqi people and 
who we cannot continue to appease.
  Between 1987-1989, he ordered the deaths of the Kurdish population by 
the tens of thousands--indescriminately spraying their villages with 
poisonous gas. He has proven his imperialist nature through a path of 
destruction against Kuwait. He has allowed the Iraqi people to starve 
in favor of diverting resources to maintaining his grip on ruling Iraq. 
He has engaged in the periodic shake-up of his own administration, 
brutally eliminating threats to his reign of power. He has suppressed 
every effort of democracy and change in Iraq with bloodied and 
unremorseful hands. Saddam Hussein has committed acts so far beyond the 
pail of decency and acceptability that it leaves one to wonder in shock 
why we have waited so long to end this madman's career of carnage.

  Our nation stands for freedom and humanity and because it does, we 
had hoped we could reason with Hussein. We hoped he would comply with 
the conditions of the peace agreement ending the Persian Gulf War. In 
the 1990s, we hoped he would end the shenanigans of denying access to 
inspection teams and end his lies and deceit by ending his weapons 
program. In all these things, Saddam Hussein failed. Through no lack of 
effort, we have given diplomacy a chance.
  No Saddam Hussein wants to fool the world again. And it is the job of 
this body to ensure that he does not. We have exhausted all reasonable 
efforts to deal with an unreasonable madman. We have risked all too 
much in the hope of peace, only to have these efforts manipulated by a 
illusional director. It has not been our President, but Saddam Hussein 
himself that has made the most compelling case for the need for his 
removal. Saddam Hussein has in his actions, told the world that he is a 
threat, that he is dangerous, and that he will never be able to be held 
accountable unless removed.
  We can wait no longer as with each passing day, Saddam Hussein draws 
closer to attaining unclear weapons and he exponentially increases the 
threat he poses to this nation, our allies, and peace and stability. We 
owe to the future generations not to make the mistake of holding out 
hope for Hussein. We must act with diligence to protect this country 
and we must act decisively.
  Let this be clear that this country loves freedom and loves peace. We 
deserve (and the Iraqi people deserve) more than to be held in fear by 
a ruthless dictator whose actions have been unconscionable and continue 
to pose a threat to humankind. We know what Hussein is capable of and 
it is time to end the nightmare that he has unleashed on his people and 
bring a complete end to his imperialist aspirations. Therefore, I 
strongly urge an aye on this resolution.
  Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Speaker, in view of Iraq's history of violence, 
deception and hostility, and the mounting evidence about its pursuit of 
powerful weapons, our objective must be the disarmament of Iraq and the 
fundamental reform of its current political leadership.
  The Administration and many members of this body realize that this 
task is one that must be undertaken to protect America and its 
citizens. As we have learned, failing to recognize the seriousness of 
threats posed by our enemies can have grave consequences. I support 
this resolution because it is critical to our national security.
  It does not obligate us to carry out military action, but it makes 
clear to Iraq and all nations the depth of our commitment to 
extinguishing the threat, and ensures that the Administration has every 
option available to achieve our objectives, including the use of 
military force.
  There is a looming menace to America, and we ought not delay our 
efforts to neutralize it.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.J. Res. 114, 
which expresses the support of Congress for the Administration's 
efforts to enforce the United Nations Security Council resolutions 
mandating the disarmament of Iraq. Passage of this measure by the 
Congress will authorize the President to use American military forces 
to defend the national security of the United States against the 
continuing threat posed by Iraq.
  Let me state at the outset that it is my judgment that the situation 
in Iraq is very serious and very perilous. I have served on the Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee for 24 years, and on the Intelligence 
Committee for eight of those years. I have thus had a continuing 
interest in the campaign of deceit waged by Iraqi President Saddam 
Hussein ever since the day he agreed to abandon his weapons of mass 
destruction following the Gulf War. Based on the briefings I have had, 
and based on the information provided by our intelligence agencies to 
Members of Congress, I now believe there is credible evidence that 
Saddam Hussein has developed sophisticated chemical and biological 
weapons, and that he me be close to developing a nuclear weapon. And 
furthermore, I believe he will not hesitate to use these and any other 
weapons he has in his arsenal against America and against our ships and 
bases in the Middle East region.
  The CIA's most recent report on Iraq clearly indicates that, after 
the ejection of weapons inspectors in 1998, Iraq continued its chemical 
weapons program, energized its missile program, and invested more 
heavily in biological weapons. Furthermore, Iraq's growing ability to 
sell oil--despite the ban--increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance 
weapons of mass destruction programs. Using these funds, it largely has 
rebuilt the missile and biological weapons facilities that were damaged 
during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and 
biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production. The 
Iraqis have also exceeded UN range limits of 150 kilometers for their 
ballistic missiles and they are also developing unmanned aerial 
vehicles, which would allow for a more effective and more lethal means 
to deliver biological and chemical warfare agents.

  Beyond these weapons programs, there is the question of nuclear 
weapons. In 1991, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy 
Agency uncovered a secret Iraqi effort to build nuclear weapons after 
they intercepted a shipment of trucks loaded with huge electromagnetic 
isotope separators used to make weapons-grade uranium. These inspectors 
remained on the ground, working with U.N. arms inspectors, until the 
day they were thrown out of Iraq by Saddam Hussein, flagrantly 
violating the terms of the disarmament agreements he signed to save 
himself in the Gulf War cease fire. Since 1998, there is credible 
evidence that he has attempted to purchase uranium and the hardware 
necessary to produce the kind of weapon that could inflict infinitely 
greater damage than any of the destruction we witnessed on September 
11th of last year. There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein represents 
a growing menace. In the four years since he expelled United Nations 
arms inspectors from Iraq, he has become an emboldened dictator whose 
hatred of the United States has only grown stronger as he has regained 
his military capability.

[[Page H7731]]

  I believe that it is extremely important that we continue our 
diplomatic efforts to gain international support for action. Saddam 
Hussein has blatantly violated 16 important UN Resolutions as he has 
continued the arms buildup he pledged to curtail. With the growing 
threat of those weapons, with the assistance Iraq is providing to 
terrorist groups--including al Qaeda--and with the compelling need to 
assert the authority of the international community, President Bush has 
appropriately urged the UN to enforce the sanctions that its members 
have approved over the last 11 years. I believe H.J. Res. 114--by 
showing Congress's strong support for the President's position on the 
issue--will substantially strengthen our effort to develop a consensus 
at the United Nations for a new and stronger resolution demanding the 
verifiable removal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
  I believe that it is important, in the language of our Joint 
Resolution in Congress, to emphasize that we are determined in this 
cause: that if these efforts to build an international coalition within 
the United Nations are not successful, we believe that the United 
States must still take action, joined by the British and other nations 
who support us already, to ensure that Iraq is never able to use the 
weapons of mass destruction it has and those it is actively developing. 
In my judgment, the possibility of Saddam Hussein using these weapons 
against U.S. targets or our allies in the region justifies the 
commitment of American military forces, however much I truly hope that 
diplomatic efforts can succeed and that war can be avoided.
  Mr. Speaker, for our own safety and national security, I believe that 
we should support the position that the President expressed at the 
United Nations last month. It is time for action. We can no longer 
ignore the reality of what Saddam Hussein is doing and we should no 
longer postpone our response to the growing dangers of this weapons 
programs. I urge my colleagues to vote for H.J.Res. 114.
  Mr. DeMINT. Mr. Speaker, Saddam Hussein has repeatedly demonstrated 
he is a threat to peaceful nations around the world. He has the money 
to finance his hostile intentions, he has the capabilities to blackmail 
nations with the use of weapons of mass destruction, and has shown a 
willingness to use them.
  Everyday our pilots in the northern and southern no-fly zones of Iraq 
are the targets of Iraqi fire. Perhaps even more frightening, Saddam 
Hussein continues to develop and stockpile weapons of mass destruction 
and actively support international terrorism--both in violation of bona 
fide international agreements. In fact, in all of his actions, Hussein 
has demonstrated a persistent refusal to comply with every U.N. 
Security Council resolution in force regarding his country.
  U.N. Resolutions called for Saddam to end both his WMD programs and 
his support for terrorism. Yet, before Hussein kicked them out of Iraq 
in 1998, weapons inspection teams could testify to the large amount of 
research, development, and materials associated with nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons--despite Iraq's success in concealing 
the extent of its capabilities. However, Hussein did manage to hide a 
great deal from these inspectors, and it was not until defectors shared 
crucial information about hidden stockpiles that Saddam programs were 
set back, but never completely shut down. Now some people say we should 
have new inspections and do nothing else, believing this time that 
inspectors will be able to do what they could not before--identify and 
dismantle Iraq's WMD capabilities. Sadly, recent history teaches us 
otherwise.
  The same can be said about Iraq's involvement with terrorism. Hussein 
continues to maintain his ties with terrorist organizations. Today his 
terrorist training camps continue to breed more people intent on 
harming prosperous, free, and democratic nations around the world--and 
endangering innocent civilians in the process.
  Hussein also targets innocent civilians in his own country in 
violation of U.N. Security Resolutions. For example, the U.N. oil-for-
food program allows Iraq to sell enough oil to provide its citizens 
sufficient food and medicine to sustain a decent standard of living. 
However, the profits from the oil never make it to the Iraqi people; 
instead Saddam funnels this money into his weapons programs. He then 
bolsters his programs with illegal proceeds from smuggled oil.
  In light of these actions, it is clear that the world has a problem 
with Saddam and the international community agrees. Yet instead of 
action, many people want to limit the United States to building broad 
coalitions and placing international pressure on Saddam. Unfortunately, 
history--and the past ten years--has shown us that no amount of 
international pressure can stop a dictator with such disregard for 
international agreements and no diplomatic coalition can change his 
contempt for human life.
  For decades Saddam Hussein has brutally trampled on freedom and 
muzzled the self-expression of his people. He has threatened his 
neighbors, supported terrorists, and stockpiled weapons of mass 
destruction. We cannot remove ourselves from the struggle between 
freedom and tyranny--good and evil. Saddam Hussein is already engaged 
in a battle, and he has been firing shots for the past decade. Doing 
nothing is not an option.
  With this resolution, Congress acknowledges that something must be 
done and expresses full support for the President. President Bush's 
speech on Monday demonstrated that he--like the rest of us--does not 
want to go to war. And the fact that President Bush waited almost a 
month before using force in Afghanistan makes obvious his desire to 
build coalitions and utilize every peaceful opportunity to end 
international disagreement before resorting to war.
  However, he also understands the United States carries an incredible 
burden of leadership in the world. For this reason when he took office, 
President Bush assembled one of the finest national security teams this 
nation has ever seen. They have proven their leadership in previous 
military conflicts and understand the cost of military action. Their 
role in the war on terrorism has also demonstrated how much they care 
about U.S. troops and the loss of life for anyone involved--both 
military and civilian. Now is the time to have faith in the President's 
proven leadership and allow him and his advisors to implement the 
strategy that finally ends the threat Saddam poses to the free world.
  Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, today I rise in strong support 
of House Joint Resolution 114, authorizing the President to employ the 
use of our Armed Forces against Iraq, and urge its adoption by this 
Chamber. For the past 2 days, the House of Representatives has had 
under consideration one of the most serious resolutions it is capable 
of adopting and, like my colleagues, I take it very seriously. Some 
have argued that this resolution is not necessary, that Iraq poses no 
immediate danger to the United States or any other nation, and that we 
should not employ military force against a sadistic terrorist regime 
that displays not the slightest regard for human life. Mr. Speaker, I 
disagree.
  For the past 10 years, Saddam Hussein had developed and stockpiled 
chemical and biological weapons and continued to construct facilities 
capable of producing nuclear weapons. Evidence of this and other 
destructive activities on the part of Saddam Hussein is overwhelming. 
Mr. Speaker, for the sake of our Nation's safety and that of our 
neighbors and allies we cannot ignore this problem any longer. Either 
Saddam Hussein gives the U.N. weapons inspectors full, un-fettered, and 
unconditional access to all Iraqi facilities or the United States will 
take action to disarm him.
  I applaud President Bush, who has prudently and methodically made a 
strong case for why the United States has the moral and political 
authority to take action against Iraq, if necessary. Mr. Speaker, we 
are at the end of the line and words and international declarations 
will no longer do against a dictator who has nothing but contempt for 
the freedom-loving world and his own people.
  In addition to its stockpile of weapons of mass destruction, Saddam 
Hussein has repeatedly violated the Persian Gulf War cease-fire 
agreement, snubbed numerous U.N. resolutions, brutalized and killed his 
own people, plotted to assassinate a former U.S. President, and has 
aided and harbored members of terrorists cells, including al-Qaida. 
Clearly, we must act.
  Mr. Speaker, the foremost responsibility of government is to ensure 
the safety and security of its citizens. We demand safety and security 
in our neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces; we should expect the 
same in the international community as well. Although I remain hopeful 
that this conflict with Iraq can be resolved peacefully, I am prepared, 
for the sake of our Nation's security, to employ force. This resolution 
is not, as some have stated, a ``blank check'' for the President. 
Congress has and will continue to maintain its constitutional 
prerogatives if armed conflict with Iraq should ensue, but as a nation, 
we have the right to take action. Thus, I urge the adoption of House 
Joint Resolution 114.
  Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Speaker, today, we are debating the most fundamental 
issues we face as a Congress and as a country. Today we are debating 
whether to send America's sons and daughters into harm's way, whether a 
threat exists to America's security and whether we need to act now or 
wait. We have no more grave responsibility as legislators than 
defending our Nation and democratic way of life.
  American foreign policy has had a single objective since the 
foundation of our republic. That objective has been to defend our 
independence and freedoms. Over the years the policies America has 
followed have changed to meet the changing threat.
  During America's first century we followed a policy of staying out of 
foreign conflicts, comfortable in the security offered by two oceans.

[[Page H7732]]

The Monroe Doctrine represented the first expansion of American policy 
in its vigorous assertion of America's right to ensure that no foreign 
power intervenes in our hemisphere. The last century saw a further 
expansion of American power as we acted to prevent any hostile power or 
ideology from dominating the eastern hemisphere and threatening our 
continued independence.
  Today, we face a new challenge, a homicidal dictator striving to 
acquire the means to threaten our civilization and kill millions of our 
fellow Americans. Saddam Hussein already has the means; he only lacks 
the material needed to build an atomic bomb. It has been widely 
reported that he could build a bomb within a year were he to acquire 
certain materials. A nuclear armed Saddam Hussein would represent a 
clear and present danger to our nation.
  No one who has objectively looked at the facts, no one who has seen 
the Kurdish villagers gassed on Saddam Hussein's order, no one who 
remembers the invasion and looting of Kuwait, no one looking at the 
facts can doubt that a nuclear Saddam Hussein would be a threat to our 
Nation and civilization.
  Given these facts I think it is important we understand what we are 
debating today. We are not debating whether a nuclear Saddam Hussein is 
a threat. No honest analysis can deny that. We are not debating how to 
confront Saddam Hussein. No one wants war and it is my earnest hope 
that our actions today will convince Saddam Hussein that he must disarm 
and give up his goal of acquiring nuclear weapons. However, we can only 
succeed in avoiding war if Saddam Hussein is convinced that he risks 
war and the destruction of his regime if he continues to defy us.
  What we are debating today is timing. Do we confront Saddam Hussein 
today or wait. Do we act now when he does not possess nuclear weapons 
or wait until he does. Common sense tells us that the risky course is 
to wait. Our responsibility as legislators dictates we act against any 
threat to our independence. Opponents of this resolution say the risks 
are too great and that there is too much that is unknown, but the risks 
of not acting are far greater and the unknown far more terrifying.
  Let us remain true to previous generations of Americans who have been 
vigilant in protecting our freedom and vote for this resolution. Let us 
live up to the expectations set by the Founding Fathers and support 
this resolution.
  Mr. HERGER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the resolution 
before us today. The principle purpose of the resolution is to 
authorize the use of military force--if deemed necessary--to remove 
Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. The Hussein regime poses a direct 
threat to the security of the United States and our partners in the 
world. And this threat must not be allowed to stand.
  In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, Saddam Hussein agreed to 
numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions--16 of them--as 
conditions of his political survival. Now, almost 12-years later, 
Iraq's leader has failed outright to comply with these terms of peace. 
Hussein has continued to stockpile weapons of mass destruction, 
subjected the people of Iraq to squalor and starvation, openly 
sponsored terrorist attacks, and has in all ways defied the 
international community. He has lied repeatedly and there is no doubt 
that he cannot be trusted.
  Yet still, many wonder if Saddam's distant rogue regime is a real 
threat to our national security, and the safety of American citizens?
  To answer this question we need look no further than the horrors of 
9-11 and how terrorists from afar were able to strike at America. 
Hussein's hatred of our country has been made plain. Despite our best 
efforts at border security, it is conceivable that terrorists, 
sponsored by Hussein, might smuggle Iraqi weapons into the United 
States for use in an attack against our citizens.
  Our intelligence reports confirm this threat as real. Iraq maintains 
an extensive stockpile of sophisticated chemical and biological 
weapons, and is continuing in its program to develop nuclear weapons 
and the means to deliver them. We also know that Iraq supports 
terrorist groups and encourages violence against Israel with cash 
payments to the families of suicide bombers. Under Hussein's regime, 
Iraq has become a new safe-harbor for al-Qaeda and other terrorist 
groups.
  Just as we must vote to pass the resolution before us, so too must 
the United Nations reaffirm its importance in the global theater, 
approving the use of force against Iraq. As in the Gulf War, a unified 
coalition effort from the beginning would help foster consensus to 
rebuild Iraq and reconstitute a new Iraqi government following military 
action.
  As we prepare for what may be an inevitable war scenario in Iraq, we 
must acknowledge the possible outcomes of such an action, both positive 
and negative.
  Our objective would be to eliminate the threat posed by Hussein's 
regime, and thereby create a more stabile political environment in the 
Middle East. Still, the decision to commit American troops to the 
battlefield is never easy. In addition, there are also other 
considerations, such as, if we are successful in our mission, what 
happens next? What kind of force will it take to successfully see 
through a transition in Iraq and foster a new democracy?
  While these possibilities must be considered when weighing any 
action, the immediate issue is clear: Iraq is a threat that must be 
dealt with swiftly.
  I firmly believe that our President will make the right decision, in 
the best interest of the United States, and I have the utmost 
confidence in the integrity of his counsel. Mr. Speaker--at times we 
must be willing to use force to protect the security of our people and 
of our Nation.
  Now is one of those times.
  I would like to thank my colleagues in the House for introducing this 
strong resolution, and would like to urge all to stand by the President 
and vote for its passage.
  Mr. GREENWOOD. Mr. Speaker, more than 200 years ago, the first 
President of the United States addressed the Nation's first Congress 
with these prophetic words, ``the preservation of the sacred fire of 
liberty and the destiny of the Republican model of government are . . . 
finally, staked on the experiment entrusted to the hands of the 
American people.''
  Now we find ourselves in a new century, confronted by new trials.
  We have withstood attempts at invasion, survived a bloody civil war, 
endured two world wars and prevailed in the long twilight struggle 
President Kennedy spoke of more than forty years ago.
  Ten years ago, confronted by the specter of Kuwait brutally overrun 
by Iraqi forces, the United Nations and the United States led a 
coalition of more than 28 nations in a war of liberation.
  Then President Bush plainly outlined our war aims. ``Our objectives'' 
he said ``are clear. Saddam Hussein's forces will leave Kuwait. The 
legitimate Government of Kuwait will be restored. . . . and Kuwait will 
once again be free.'' All of this was achieved.
  He then went on to say that once peace was restored, it was our 
Nation's hope, ``that Iraq will live as a peaceful and cooperative 
member of the family of nations.'' this hope has gone unfulfilled.
  And so, in Franklin Roosevelt's words, ``there has come a time, in 
the midst of swift happenings, to pause for a moment and take stock--to 
recall what our place in history has been, and to rediscover what we 
are and what we may be. There is no greater example of what we are than 
how we responded to the terrible events of September 11.
  Confronted with a massacre of innocent lives; the attack on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the horror of the instruments of 
modern technology being used as the means of our destruction, we did 
not falter.
  In the weeks and months since, we have buried our dead, cared for our 
wounded, aided the widows and orphans, improved our defenses and taken 
the war to our enemy.
  Now we are asked to do more.
  Over the past few months, I have agonized, along with many of my 
neighbors and constituents, on the degree of threat the renegade regime 
in Iraq represents to our safety and security.
  It is for these and other reasons that I set the bar so high on what 
I would require before I would embrace any presidential action that 
included the use of force to remove Hussein and his henchmen from 
power.
  The most compelling reason, as I wrote to my constituents was the 
realization that, ``any decision to finally remove Hussein and his 
regime, once begun, could not be permitted to fail.

  For those reasons, I urged the administration to work to promote a 
regime change short of the use of the military option.
  I went on to argue that, should those efforts fail, then it was 
incumbent upon the administration to make their case to the United 
Nations, to the American people and to Congress before inaugurating any 
major military undertaking against Iraq.
  This they have done. Now it is time for us to decide. I will vote 
``yes'' on this resolution.
  While I still hold out some hope that by its passage the United 
Nations will be empowered, to force Iraq to comply with the will of the 
international community, that they eliminate all their weapons of mass 
destruction, I bear too great a responsibility to allow my actions to 
be governed by that hope alone.
  As a Member of Congress, I must act upon information I possess in a 
way that most clearly protects our people and our way of life. And what 
I know is this. Should the U.N. fail in its mission, we will have very 
little choice but to act.
  I am now persuaded that, left to his own devices, Saddam Hussein will 
not be content until he has the means to murder his own people and the 
people of many nations with the most horrible weapons of war. This we 
cannot permit.
  Neither can we permit him to cause the kind of world economic 
blackmail and chaos that

[[Page H7733]]

could ensue, should he be allowed to continue his arms build-up. As 
President Eisenhower once observed, ``We are linked to all free peoples 
not merely by a noble idea but by a simple need. No free people can for 
long cling to any privilege or enjoy and safety in economic solitude.''
  I do not take this step lightly. To knowingly spend the precious 
blood of our sons and daughters and the wealth of this peaceable 
people, even in the noblest cause, is a burden no sensible man desires. 
But, in the end, our place in the world as the pre-eminent champion of 
human rights and human liberty leaves us very little choice.
  At the close of his 3rd Inaugural Address, on the eve of our Nation's 
being drawn into the Second World War, Franklin Roosevelt spoke these 
words, ``In the face of great perils never before encountered, our 
strong purpose is to protect and to perpetuate the integrity of 
democracy. For this we muster the spirit of America, and the faith of 
America. We do not retreat. We are not content to stand still. As 
Americans, we go forward, in the service of country. . . .''
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution. It is 
both reasonable and necessary.
  At its essence, our debate is about the critical need to ensure 
Saddam Hussein fully understands our resolve to protect our citizens 
and to promote peace around the world. There is no question we would 
all prefer it if the path ahead did not include military action. 
Unfortunately, Saddam Hussein may not allow us that option.
  The President and other members of his administration have provided a 
sober, convincing picture of the threats our nation faces from Iraq's 
current regime. As the President said earlier this week, ``While there 
are many dangers in the world, the threat from Iraq stands alone 
because it gathers the most serious dangers of our age in one place.''
  And this ``one place'' is led by an evil, evil dictator who directs 
his intense hatred toward America, Americans, our interests and our 
allies.
  Iraq's leadership has continued to aggressively pursue the 
development of weapons of mass destruction to add to his arsenal. We've 
all talked about these weapons but it's worth spelling out what they 
can be: chemical weapons, biological weapons and even nuclear weapons. 
Saddam Hussein has shown his cruel willingness to use such devastating 
weapons against his own citizens and his neighboring countries in the 
past. I sincerely doubt he's had a change of heart.
  We must also not ignore the support of terrorism found in Hussein's 
Iraq. September 11, 2001 was a horrific reminder that terrorists are 
serious in their intent to harm Americans. This step is a continuation 
of the war against terrorism that our nation has been forced to 
undertake.
  It is Saddam Hussein himself who provides the final proof that we 
must act. He has a robust history of disregard of the international 
community and its laws. Time and again, he has willingly and defied the 
United Nations and the world community by ignoring the agreements he 
has made. He has constructed a wall of delay and deception that at 
times is as thick as the cloud of black smoke from the malicious oil 
fires that greeted our troops in 1991 as they liberated Kuwait.
  It's obvious that Iraq's current regime presents problems not just 
for the United States, but problems for international peace and 
stability. We can not deny the seriousness of the situation, and I 
believe America should provide its leadership for the sake of peace and 
justice.
  The President has earned our confidence through his leadership since 
last fall's terrorist attacks. The President is determined to pursue a 
course of action with regard to Iraq that will both ensure our own 
nation's security and promote international stability and I support his 
efforts.
  At the same time, I want to make it clear that I respect those who 
have sincere opposing views on the question before us. The freedom to 
disagree is one among many freedoms that we are vigorously trying to 
preserve and I would never want that to change. Few in Iraq who 
disagree with Saddam Hussein can share their opinions openly.
  The resolution we are considering makes it clear that America prefers 
to find solutions together with the United Nations and other 
international leaders. It also provides authority for the President to 
use force if diplomatic or other peaceful means are not effective. It 
preserves America's right to act on its own as we must in self-defense 
of our nation's interests.
  Mr. Speaker, the first major vote I took as a Member of Congress in 
1991 was to support the international coalition's effort to liberate 
Kuwait from Iraqi aggressors. No one wanted war then, but it was 
necessary. No one wants war now. We don't seek it. It is my fervent 
hope that war with Iraq may yet be avoided. And it may. But our shared 
and firm commitment to the security of our nation should not be 
questioned by Saddam Hussein or the world community.
  Mr. DOOLEY of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of 
H.J. Res. 114, the bipartisan resolution authorizing the use of 
military force against Iraq.
  Like most Americans, I understand that our security is threatened by 
rogue nations suspected of crafting biological and chemical weapons, 
and by those who seek access to nuclear weapons. I am convinced that 
Iraq is building an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, following 
repeated refusals, over many years, to comply with United Nations 
weapons inspections. I believe it is our responsibility to ensure that 
Saddam Hussein is no longer positioned to pose a major and imminent 
threat to U.S. national security. I further believe that the President 
should have the authority to use force against Iraq, if he deems it 
necessary.
  Ms. CARSON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, let's get this straight: a 
preemptive war is a war nonetheless, a war the would-be preemptor 
starts.
  According to our Congressional Budget Office, the aggressive war the 
President wants to start against Iraq would cost our taxpayers between 
$6 and $9 billion a month. With most people's retirement accounts in 
the tank, the Federal accounts drenched in red ink and so many people 
out of work, don't we have better and less violently fatal ways to 
spend money?
  Despite our using parts of Iraq for bombing practice over a ten year 
period, Iraq hasn't attacked us. But if we carried out a campaign to 
destroy the regime entirely, what would Saddam have to lose by trying 
to sneak biological weapons into the U.S.? As we have seen in 
Afghanistan, it is not physically possible for us to bottle up a 
country so that no one can slip away.
  A preemptive strike without U.N. Security Council compliance is, by 
definition, aggression and a treaty violation. A duly entered into 
treaty is the law of the land. Moreover, the mandate of our 
Constitution is that Congress alone has the authority to start a war. 
And the Constitution does not permit Congress to delegate any part of 
that authority to the President as this proposed resolution would do. 
In discussing that Constitutional provision (Art. 1, Sec. 8, Clause 
11), Congressman Abraham Lincoln wrote in part:

       Allow a President to invade a neighboring nation whenever 
     he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and you 
     allow him to do so whenever he may choose to say he deems it 
     necessary for such purpose--and you allow him to make war at 
     pleasure.

  There are twenty million people in Iraq not named Hussein. An 
invasion would kill untold thousands of those already weakened people.
  On Saturday the President said, ``We must do everything we can to 
disarm this man before he hurts one single American.'' Could that 
possibly mean that the President believes the American soldiers who 
would be slaughtered in the war he wants to start against Iraq would 
not be ``hurt.'' Should such stark horror be so casually inflicted on 
so many young Americans on such flimsy and dubious evidence?
  Let's get another thing straight: the al-Qaida did not invent 
terrorism; it is anything but ``a new kind of war.'' It went on during 
the reconstruction period in America and periodically since.
  Not long ago, President Reagan and Vice-President Bush were telling 
us one of the good things about their then-friend Hussein was that he 
was secular and not a religious fanatic. Now suddenly this President 
Bush is telling us that Hussein is in cahoots with religious fanatics 
who, even the most casual student of the mideast knows, hate Hussein's 
guts and would be delighted to overthrow him. Bear in mind that the 
Bush/Hussein friendship was still going strong after both the Hussein 
invasion of Iran and his use of gas weapons against his own people.
  For 40 years, the Soviet Union was our adversary and was armed to the 
teeth with awesome nuclear weapons with intercontinental capability 
that made Hussein the pipsqueak he is. The Soviet Union also 
slaughtered millions of its own people and invaded neighboring 
countries. The Soviets were our Saddam Hussein of the time. But no U.S. 
``preemptive war.'' Not necessary because the Soviets knew use of 
nuclear weapons would mean their suicide.
  For the sake of argument, let's say Hussein had primitive nuclear 
weapons now, which he almost certainly does not. He and his gang aren't 
so dumb that they don't know use of such weapons would mean that he and 
his ``grizzly gang'' would be vaporized within minutes by our awesome 
nuclear capability.
  So why war now? Mr. Rove, the White House politics man, is on record 
as saying that war is good for his party to win elections. Is this, 
then, a political question or a moral one?
  One of the greatest dangers to an American soldier is a poor economy 
at election time.
  In good conscience, I cannot cast my constituents' vote for this 
latter-day Gulf of Tonkin

[[Page H7734]]

Resolution. It is said that the only thing we learn from history is 
that we do not learn from history.
  Mrs. BONO. Mr. speaker, since coming to Washington, I have taken part 
in many significant and historical debates. Most of the time, 
Republicans and Democrats have been at odds with one another. But last 
week, as I and a group of my Democrat and Republican colleagues, 
discussed this issue with the President of the United States in the 
Cabinet Room of the White House, I felt a sense of purpose and 
bipartisanship that made me proud to serve as a Member of Congress.
  To grant our President the authority to use force against the regime 
of Saddam Hussein as a last resort is not a vote I take lightly. 
However, over the course of our nation's young history, there have been 
many times when I wish we had been able to prevent a variety of 
calamities. From the assault on Pearl Harbor to the terrorist attacks 
of 9-11, we have been reminded time and time again that we do not live 
in splendid isolation.
  It is for this reason we must consider taking up arms yet again to 
defend ourselves. While I realize the human cost of war on both sides 
is sobering, the cost of inaction in this case could far exceed our 
worst fears.
  Saddam Hussein has used weapons of mass destruction on his own 
people. He has used them against the Iranians. There is no question in 
my mind that this international outlaw has a diabolical drive to 
acquire nuclear weapons to use against our Nation and our allies. If we 
do not act now, we will have put the lives of our citizens at risk and 
we will have failed our future generations. We will go down in history 
as having given up our principals out of fear. History will not forgive 
us.
  Our World War II generation of men and women, under the leadership 
and strength of FDR and Churchill, fought and died to give us the 
freedoms we enjoy today. It is now up to us to rise to this new threat. 
While I believe we must work with our allies to exhaust all reasonable 
diplomatic means, we must also be prepared to take military action to 
defend our country from a tyrant who can unleash a reign of terror upon 
the civilized world never before seen.
  Mr. Speaker, it was quite significant for so many of us with such 
varied backgrounds and philosophies to come together with the President 
in the Cabinet Room last week. We were able to prove that national 
security is an issue that transcends party lines and sends a signal to 
our aggressors that we will stand firm and united in order to protect 
our country and her citizens.
  The world is watching us. The United States and this Congress cannot 
be afraid to lead and defend. We have a sacred obligation to our people 
and our way of life.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, just a few short weeks ago, I 
believed the President's focus on unilateral U.S. action raised more 
questions than it answered. Chief among my concerns were issues such as 
international support, the existence of a clear and present danger to 
the United States, conditions for maximizing success and minimizing 
casualties, and the effect of unilateral action of Middle East 
stability.
  I was pleased to see the President listen to these concerns, work 
closely with the Congress, and produce the bipartisan resolution 
currently under debate in the House. One thing is clear, the strength 
of our Republic, our commitment to debate, democracy and freedom is as 
strong today as in any time in our Nation's history.
  Like most Americans, I have wrestled with the question of how to 
neutralize the threat of Saddam Hussein. During my travels in Michigan, 
thousands of constituents have shared their concerns about a unilateral 
and full-scale American invasion of Iraq. In fact, I continue to share 
those very concerns.
  This week, I will cast the toughest vote of my time in public 
service--a vote that may commit American men and women to a war against 
Iraq and its brutal dictator. This is a war in which lives surely will 
be lost. The first time I faced such a tough decision was in giving the 
President authority to send troops into Afghanistan to hunt down the 
terrorist who attacked our Nation on September 11, 2001.
  As we all are learning, the face of war is changing. Formal 
declarations of war by our enemies are going the way of trench warfare 
and cavalry charges--relics of a different era. The resolution 
currently before Congress reflects that changing reality.
  Today's enemies do not distinguish between civilian and military 
targets. Today's enemies are just as likely to use chemical and 
biological weapons as bullets and bombs. These are the very real 
threats posed by modern enemies that do not allow us to wait for an 
attack of catastrophic proportions.
  Going to war, however, requires more than recognizing the threat. It 
is the immediacy of these threats that pose a clear and present danger 
to U.S. citizens. This was underscored in my recent briefings at the 
White House with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, CIA 
Director George Tenet, and other military intelligence and foreign 
policy experts. Their information, some of it classified, reinforced 
the very real threat Saddam poses with nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons, and his willingness to use them. Even against the United 
States.
  A great deal of soul searching has gone into the process that began 
with talk about the U.S. attacking Iraq and has now come to an 
agreement on four very important points:

  (1) Multilateral Action. Last month, after returning from a Middle 
East trip, it was absolutely clear that Saddam's neighbors who know him 
best, fear him deeply and would shed few tears if he were removed from 
power. However, the region's leaders, especially Saudi Arabia, were 
concerned about the fragile future of the Middle East. They want Saddam 
removed, but through a strong alliance, not one-on-one, America versus 
Saddam. This bipartisan congressional resolution authorizes President 
Bush to ``obtain prompt and decisive action'' by the United Nations 
Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of ``delay, 
evasion and noncompliance'' with all relevant international 
resolutions.
  (2) Force As Last Resort. The Bush administration and our allies must 
exhaust all diplomatic efforts before resorting to armed force in Iraq. 
The resolution provides that President Bush must certify to Congress, 
before any military strike, if feasible, or within 48 hours of a U.S. 
attack, that diplomatic and other peaceful means alone are inadequate 
to protect Americans from Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. If 
America must go to war against a regime that threatens our lives, it 
will not happen until all other possible solutions have been exhausted.
  (3) Congressional Oversight. In addition to the certification to 
Congress before a military strike, this resolution requires President 
Bush to report to Congress every 60 days on ``matters relevant'' to the 
confrontation with Iraq.
  (4) Retaining American Sovereignty. While the resolution authorizes 
the United States to work through a U.N. Security Council resolution, 
no American sovereignty is forfeited. If all efforts fail and the 
national security of the United States is under direct threat by Iraq, 
the resolution authorizes the President to use the Armed Forces of the 
United States as he determines ``necessary and proper'' in order to 
defend America.
  God Bless America!
  Mr. PASTOR. Mr. Speaker, I am committed to the war against terrorism, 
and believe that stopping Saddam Hussein from developing weapons of 
mass destruction is a necessary part of that effort. At this time, 
however, I believe it is premature to authorize a unilateral attack on 
Iraq.
  Working with the international community is the surest means of 
addressing this threat effectively, sharing costs and resources, and 
ensuring stability in Iraq and throughout the Middle East in the event 
of a regime change. While the President has spoken of the value of a 
coalition effort, the resolution before the House today undermines the 
importance of our allies and of maintaining the momentum of 
international cooperation in the wider war on terrorism.
  I support the Spratt amendment to the resolution. This amendment 
would authorize the use of U.S. forces in support of a new U.N. 
Security Council resolution mandating the elimination, by force if 
necessary, of all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and means of 
producing such weapons. Should the Security Council fail to produce 
such a resolution, the amendment calls on the President to then seek 
authorization for unilateral military action. In this way, the 
amendment emphasizes our preference for a peaceful solution and 
coalition support while recognizing that military force and unilateral 
action may be appropriate at some point.
  We should not rush into war without the support of our allies. We 
should not send American troops into combat before making a good faith 
effort to put U.N. inspectors back into Iraq, under a more forceful 
resolution. We should not turn to a policy of preemptive attack, which 
we have so long and so rightly condemned, without first providing a 
limited-time option for peaceful resolution of the threat. America has 
long stood behind the principle of exhausting diplomacy before 
resorting to war, and at times like this we must lead by example.
  Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support H.J. Res. 114, a 
resolution granting President Bush the authorization to use military 
force against Iraq. Never in my 8 years as a Member of Congress has 
there been a vote with as far reaching consequences as this one.
  I am under no illusions. War is a serious matter with the real 
possibility of casualties. I have given this decision a great deal of 
thought, have sought wise counsel and have spent much time in prayer. 
It is with a heavy heart that I have come to the conclusion that 
military action against Iraq may be our only option.

[[Page H7735]]

  For more than a decade the United States has been working with the 
United Nations and the international community to use diplomatic means 
to bring a peaceful solution to the troubling situation in Iraq. We had 
all hoped Saddam Hussein and his regime would ultimately comply with 
what the United Nations has demanded. Instead, he has violated, 
disregarded and openly flouted the 16 U.N. resolutions.
  We now know Saddam Hussein is actively seeking nuclear weapons 
capability, and with fissile material, could build one within a year. A 
nuclear strike made against us or our allies in the region could result 
in millions dead. Either Saddam Hussein acquires a nuclear weapon, or 
we ensure he is stopped. Additionally, Hussein may have the propensity 
to sell or given nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations one he had 
acquired them. This could have devastating results.
  Traditional nuclear deterrence and containment will not be effective 
with this regime. Hussein has consistently shown no moral concern for 
the Iraqi people. Instead, he has a record of acting with selfish deeds 
of violence against his own family and people. He has mortgaged 
everything in an effort to obtain nuclear weapon capability. In 
fighting international sanctions, he has forfeited $180 billion in oil 
revenue, impoverished many of his people and allowed degradation of his 
military forces.
  Saddam Hussein has already shown the propensity to use chemical 
weapons on his neighbors in the region and on his own people, and he 
continues to possess and develop significant chemical and biological 
weapons capability. One source indicates that Saddam Hussein has 
already used chemical and biological weapons 250 times.
  In addition to these threats, the Iraqi regime continues to aid and 
harbor international terrorist organizations, including groups that 
have threatened the lives and safety of American citizens.
  I have had the opportunity to participate in several classified 
briefings led by President Bush, National Security Advisor Condoleezza 
Rice and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin. I am 
convinced that Iraq poses an unquestionable and near-term threat to the 
peace and security of the United States and our allies abroad.
  We can not allow those who wish harm on the United States, and have 
the propensity to deliver that harm, to acquire weapons of terror and 
mass destruction. Inaction on our part could lead to the massive loss 
of innocent lives. The ten-year cat and mouse game Hussein has played 
with weapons inspectors must come to an end. There is too much at 
stake, and time is rapidly dwindling.
  I believe it is in the national security interest of the United 
States to prevent Saddam Hussein from obtaining a nuclear weapon and to 
prosecute the war on terrorism, including Iraq's support for 
international terrorist groups.
  President Bush must continue his efforts to get support from the 
United Nations Security Council and must exhaust all reasonable 
diplomatic options available in hopes of avoiding war. However, if 
Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime continue to rebuff the 
international community and threaten the peace and security of the 
United States, we must take swift and decisive action. To do anything 
less would be immoral and irresponsible.
  Mr. Speaker, I support this resolution and urge my colleagues on both 
sides of the isle to do the same.
  Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Shuster). Pursuant to section 3 of House 
Resolution 574, the Chair postpones further consideration of the joint 
resolution until the legislative day of Thursday, October 10, 2002.

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