[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 125 (Monday, September 30, 2002)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1685-E1688]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             MISSLE DEFENSE

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. BOB SCHAFFER

                              of colorado

                    in the house of representatives

                      Thursday, September 26, 2002

  Mr. SCHAFFER. Mr. Speaker, I respectfully submit the following 
correspondence for the

[[Page E1686]]

Record regarding America's security. It conveys my objections to the 
Defense Science Board's recent report favoring a ground-based over a 
space-based missile defense system. As America stands in the face of 
growing threats of long-range ballistic missile attack, I consider the 
subject matter particularly timely.

                                     House of Representatives,

                                               September 25, 2002.
       Re ``Missile Defense Choices Sought''--Defense Science 
     Board

     Congressman Bob Stump,
     Chairman, House Armed Services Committee,
     House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Bob: A troubling Washington Post article appeared on 
     September 3, 2002 relaying the principal points of a study 
     conducted by the Defense Science Board to develop the 
     architecture for the ballistic missile defense program of the 
     Bush administration. Evidently under pressure to focus the 
     program on achieving a narrow set of initial capabilities to 
     reach deployment--believing this narrow focus to be the key 
     to building a defense in an evolutionary approach--the 
     Defense Science Board has discredited itself in embracing the 
     plans and architecture for a ground-based defense while 
     ignoring the advantages and feasibility of a space-based 
     defense.
       Its program has already redefined the architecture of the 
     Bush administration's ballistic missile defense. It is 
     becoming less a product of the president's well-stated vision 
     on missile defense and more a carryover of the plans and 
     programs of the preceding Clinton administration, which 
     focused on building a limited defense comprised of ground-
     based interceptors deployed at a site in Alaska. It would 
     have the potential for adding new sites.
       With the exception of deploying the interceptors in Alaska 
     rather than near an ICBM field or Washington D.C., it is a 
     program for building an ABM Treaty-compliant defense, 
     notwithstanding the Bush administration's withdrawal from 
     that treaty. In its treatment of theater missile defense 
     programs, the Board seems to be abandoning the comprehensive 
     architecture articulated by President Bush in deference to 
     the planning of the Clinton administration that sought to 
     develop a reduced number of theater missile defense programs, 
     although it hopes to utilize Navy Theater Wide in a national 
     missile defense.
       The Defense Science Board is presenting a conclusion made 
     after the fact. It is not a study of ballistic missile 
     defense architectures. It is a study supporting the decision 
     of the previous Clinton administration to build an ABM 
     Treaty-compliant defense with the exception of deployment in 
     Alaska.
       Such a defense would be expensive and relatively 
     ineffective. The Clinton administration was fully aware its 
     decision to build a ground-based, as opposed to a space-based 
     defense, would result in forfeiting the technical advantages 
     that accrue from deployment in space.
       The Clinton administration adhered to the strategy of 
     Mutual Assured Destruction introduced in the 1960's by 
     Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. Mutual Assured Destruction 
     required that the United States leave itself vulnerable to 
     destruction carried by ballistic missiles to support 
     Clinton's decision not to deploy a national ballistic missile 
     defense. Under Mutual Assured Destruction, the ballistic 
     missile assumed the role of an ultimate, indestructible 
     weapon.
       As often happens to pet theories, the continued viability 
     of Mutual Assured Destruction was viewed as more important 
     than the defense of the American people. It became more 
     important for ballistic missiles to remain indestructible 
     than to build a defense against those missiles. Mutual 
     Assured Destruction thus created and reflected a wellspring 
     of opposition toward the development of ballistic missile 
     defenses and advanced technology for space.
       Mutual Assured Destruction reflected a belief commonly held 
     by ``arms control'' advocates that slowing down the pace of 
     technological development would slow down the arms race. As 
     the deployment of a ballistic missile defense would involve 
     the application and development of advanced technology, 
     especially technology for space, it would be criticized by 
     those who wanted to ``demilitarize'' space, leaving space as 
     an open avenue for ballistic missiles to carry weapons of 
     mass destruction.
       As feared by ``arms control'' proponents, the deployment of 
     a space-based ballistic missile defense called for by 
     President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative resulted in a 
     technological surge, which benefited the economy while 
     providing improved defensive capabilities. The development of 
     space spurs the development of new technology. However, 
     rather than create a new arms race, the Strategic Defense 
     Initiative helped end the Cold War, and provided a new focus 
     on the development of precision weapons rather than the 
     construction of more weapons of mass destruction.
       Mr. Chairman, the Defense Science Board has limited 
     discussion as to how and why the Clinton administration 
     decided to support the deployment of a ground-based over a 
     space-based defense. Moreover, it has not questioned why, or 
     even whether, the Bush administration has consented to 
     Clinton's philosophy on this important matter.
       In reaching their decision to support the deployment of a 
     ground-based over a space-based ballistic missile defense, 
     the Board is ignoring the revolutionary advantages provided 
     by a space-based defense, which include global coverage, a 
     boost-phase interception capability, and multiple 
     opportunities for intercepting a missile.
       You are aware, of course, how in 1993 the Clinton 
     administration implemented its vision to take the stars out 
     of ``Star Wars'' by terminating the Brilliant Pebbles space-
     based interceptor after it was fully approved as a Major 
     Defense Acquisition Program in 1991, and cutting the Space 
     Based Laser Program when it had reached a stage of 
     technological maturity, enabling it to be considered for 
     deployment. In 1995, three contractors prepared an estimate 
     for building a Space-Based Laser defense, clearly indicating 
     its technological feasibility.
       Space-based ballistic missile defenses have been feasible 
     for years, and would be more effective and less costly than a 
     ground-based defense as noted by former SDIO Director 
     Ambassador Henry F. Cooper and others. The Defense Science 
     Board, however, focused on building a narrow set of initial 
     capabilities in order to achieve deployment, which apparently 
     stemmed from a belief that a ballistic missile defense must 
     be built as an evolutionary capability, virtually precluding 
     the use of space-based defenses.
       Despite the protestations of the Clinton administration in 
     presenting its 3+3 plan to develop and deploy a national 
     missile defense that would be ABM Treaty-compliant requiring 
     the use of ground-based interceptors (and which would cost 
     only $5-6 billion, less than the Strategic Defense Initiative 
     Organization's estimate of $22-24 billion in Fiscal Year 1991 
     dollars for an initial deployment of ground-based 
     interceptors at a single site), the Congress is now facing 
     the ramifications of having bought into narrow plans to build 
     a ground-based interceptor defense.
       To respond to issues surrounding the cost of a ground-based 
     defense and its effectiveness, which should invite 
     considerable comment and discussion, the Defense Science 
     Board is presenting as a conclusion that a ground-based 
     defense is the only feasible architecture, and requires an 
     evolutionary approach that starts by focusing on achieving a 
     narrow set of initial capabilities--the deployment of a very 
     limited defense. The article noted the findings of the 
     Defense Science Board seemingly reflected the thinking of Air 
     Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, Director of the Missile Defense 
     Agency. It was not an independent review, apparently.
       Essentially, the findings of the Defense Science Board were 
     pre-ordained by the limitations of the ABM Treaty, including 
     those limitations unilaterally placed on U.S. ballistic 
     missile defense programs by those who wished to liberally 
     apply the treaty. The limited capability of a ground-based 
     interceptor defense requires that its progress be measured by 
     an evolutionary approach with a narrow set of initial 
     capabilities.
       By expressing a belief that a ballistic missile defense 
     must be built in an evolutionary approach where a network is 
     assembled ``a piece at a time when it's ready,'' the 
     feasibility of building a ballistic missile defense was 
     redefined to accommodate the special views of General Kadish. 
     This approach engenders itself to the construction of a 
     single site of ground-based interceptors where additional 
     sites could be added a piece at a time as their construction 
     is finished. However, it is an inappropriate abridgement of 
     design, reflecting an inherent bias against space.
       To illustrate the differences in initial capability between 
     deploying an evolutionary ground-based defense over a 
     revolutionary space-based defense, the two defenses may be 
     contrasted in terms of the capability that would result from 
     an initial deployment. The ground-based approach would first 
     call for deploying perhaps 100 interceptors at Alaska. This 
     defense would provide limited protection against ballistic 
     missiles coming in over the North Polar Region, presumably 
     originating from North Korea. It may result in the defense 
     having two shots at a missile during the mid-course phase.
       In contrast, an initial deployment of 1,000 Brilliant 
     Pebbles could provide global coverage, have a potential boost 
     phase interception capability, and offer repeated shots at a 
     missile--more than two in a shoot-look-shoot sequence.
       In addition, a Brilliant Pebbles defense would be capable 
     of intercepting ballistic missiles of all types--long, 
     intermediate, and short-range down to ranges of about 300 
     miles--in even theater defense applications. This same 
     capability for theater defense would not exist for the 
     ground-based interceptor defense.
       Alternatively, an initial deployment of 12 Space-Based 
     Lasers could provide global coverage, boost-phase 
     interception, and a powerful ability to discriminate decoys 
     during the mid-course phase not duplicated by a ground-based 
     defense. Similar to Brilliant Pebbles, Space-Based Lasers 
     could engage ballistic missiles of all types, down to ranges 
     as short as 75 miles. Either space-based defense--Brilliant 
     Pebbles or Space-Based Lasers--would provide a broader set of 
     initial capabilities than the initial deployment of 100 
     ground-based interceptors in Alaska.
       I repeat the observation that Brilliant Pebbles had been 
     fully approved as a Major Defense Acquisition Program in 
     1992. Progress on the Space-Based Laser was close behind but 
     only lacked funding--the 1995 proposal for building a Space-
     Based Laser defense being one sign of its technological 
     maturity. The principle should be clear. Deployment in space 
     leverages the advantages to be obtained in an initial 
     deployment. It provides a broader set of initial capabilities 
     than can be

[[Page E1687]]

     achieved by a ground-based defense, and the technology has 
     been feasible for years.
       Another key principle for building an effective defense 
     needs to be discussed--multiple layers, preferably capable of 
     independent operation. An evolutionary ground-based defense 
     can do very little to build a multiple layer defense. It may 
     build larger, faster interceptors to attempt boost phase 
     interception, and may build more sites. It lacks, however, 
     the inherent advantages of a space-based defense where it can 
     engage a missile during its boost phase and entire mid-course 
     phase. In addition, a ground-based defense lacks the ability 
     to use high-energy lasers and particle beams to intercept 
     ballistic missiles during their boost phase, discriminate 
     decoys, and for particle beams, internally destroy the 
     warhead elements during the mid-course phase.
       A key difference needs to be noted in how a space-based 
     defense can use a distributed architecture for the command 
     and control of independent, yet coordinated, layers, instead 
     of requiring a centralized approach used in a ground-based 
     defense. Unlike a ground-based defense, a space-based defense 
     provides an autonomous operation capability, taking advantage 
     of advances in computers. This type of architecture would be 
     less susceptible to countermeasures directed against a 
     centralized command-and-control center.
       In addition, a space-based defense using Brilliant Pebbles 
     and Space-Based Lasers would provide a complementary ability 
     between the different layers. Space-Based Lasers could 
     provide Brilliant Pebbles with key mid-course phase-
     discrimination information. Brilliant Pebbles could provide a 
     mid-course phase defense capability. This multiple-layer 
     defense employing different technologies and lethality 
     mechanisms would be harder to defeat than a defense comprised 
     solely of ground-based interceptors. Adding a layer of 
     particle beams, which would provide a third method of 
     lethality against ballistic missiles, would further improve 
     the robustness of the defense.
       The use of space for defense, science, or commercial 
     purposes is an issue that transcends party line or division. 
     It is neither Republican nor Democratic. The current 
     ambiguity in administering the Missile Defense Agency 
     compared to the Strategy Defense Initiative begun by 
     President Reagan should be proof. Space is a broad and 
     encompassing issue, including vision for its use and the 
     development of technology. As noted, the development of space 
     spurs the development of technology. A pro-space policy will 
     necessarily support the development of advanced technology, 
     benefiting the economy.
       That the Missile Defense Agency and Defense Science Board 
     are unable to advance the advantages and feasibility of a 
     space-based defense after the United States developed 
     Brilliant Pebbles and Space-Based Laser technology, and 
     considering the over forty years experience the United States 
     has had in developing space systems, is a statement of policy 
     that opposes the use of space. The technology has existed for 
     a decade to build a highly effective space-based ballistic 
     missile defense. This policy of opposition to space may 
     reflect a belief unable to comprehend a systems approach in 
     building a multiple-layer defense, and unable to comprehend 
     the revolutionary development of space-based defenses. Either 
     omission is inexcusable.
       The issues facing Congress over the deployment of a 
     ballistic-missile defense transcend party line. The issue is 
     space--whether Congress will confront the failings of the 
     past administrations to develop space-based defenses. To 
     remain silent is to tacitly embrace a policy of technological 
     and military mediocrity, allowing the United States to be 
     overtaken by China, which has made no secret of its ambitions 
     for space, seeking to claim it as its ``fourth territory'' 
     and making plans to build a space station and colonize the 
     Moon.
       Since the end of the Strategic Defense Initiative nearly a 
     decade ago, the progress of the Ballistic Missile Defense 
     Organization and Missile Defense Agency in deploying 
     ballistic-missile defenses has been feeble. After nearly ten 
     years, all that has come out is an initial deployment of PAC-
     3, a short range interceptor. Israel has benefited more from 
     the Strategic Defense Initiative than the United States, 
     achieving an operational deployment of the Arrow. This sad 
     state of affairs will continue as long as the United States 
     has no bold vision to put a ballistic-missile defense in 
     space.
       The United States will continue to develop an inferior 
     ballistic-missile defense as long as it chooses to ignore the 
     inherent and invaluable benefits of space. Its ballistic-
     missile defense programs will continue to swirl in 
     controversy and increase in cost. More studies and more 
     reviews will be created to answer an endless stream of 
     questions, and demonstrate the seeming inability of the 
     Missile Defense Agency to decide upon a final architecture, 
     being unable to reconcile itself to taking advantage of the 
     benefits that accrue from deployment in space.
       The Defense Science Board supports the idea of building a 
     ship-based ballistic missile defense--Navy Theater Wide. It 
     concluded, however, that for Navy Theater Wide to participate 
     in a national missile defense, it needed to develop a much 
     faster interceptor than the Standard Missile-3. This 
     solution, however, apparently neglected how Navy Theater Wide 
     was an application of the LEAP (Lightweight Exo-atmospheric 
     Projectile) technology developed for Brilliant Pebbles. Navy 
     Theater Wide was an application of technology developed for a 
     space-based defense! Had this understanding been present, the 
     technical solution would have been clearer and more elegant.
       The Defense Science Board should have recommended a restart 
     of Brilliant Pebbles attended with a program for developing a 
     second-generation Brilliant Pebbles that would reflect a new 
     emphasis on miniaturization. The miniaturization of Brilliant 
     Pebbles made it possible for LEAP technology to be applied to 
     the Navy for ballistic-missile defense. Going back to the 
     origin of Navy Theater Wide--going back to space--would 
     provide a better solution than attempting to force the Navy 
     to accommodate a more muscular interceptor. While some degree 
     of effort would be needed to develop a faster interceptor, 
     miniaturization of the payload would simplify that problem, 
     and provide spin-offs into other ballistic missile defense 
     programs using hit-to-kill technology.
       The article is grossly misleading in saying, ``work on 
     space-based systems has remained beset by technical problems 
     and congressional opposition.'' While there is little doubt 
     about the technical challenges involved in developing space-
     based defenses, the article does not impart how space based 
     ballistic missile defense technology was developed a decade 
     ago. Both Brilliant Pebbles and the Space-Based Laser were 
     noted for being well run programs. Space-based defenses have 
     not been deployed because of opposition to the use of space 
     as a matter of policy, not feasibility.
       Notably, the article quoted one informed source as saying, 
     ``If you're going to meet the guidance to get something 
     deployed, you're going to have to do some things faster than 
     most of the panel thought that space-based could be done.'' 
     However, as Brilliant Pebbles was approved for acquisition a 
     decade ago, the correct statement is that a deep prejudice 
     exists against the use of space for ballistic-missile 
     defense, blinding even members of the scientific community 
     who would not come to terms with the fact that space-based 
     defenses were ready to move into their acquisition phase a 
     decade ago. The question of whether space-based defenses 
     could be deployed was settled years ago. The United States 
     simply does not wish to defend itself using the advantages of 
     a space-based defense.
       It was very shocking that the Defense Science Board 
     remained silent, unable to oppose the apparent plans of the 
     Missile Defense Agency to disassemble the infrastructure and 
     technology for the Space-Based Laser. The lack of 
     professional integrity is most disturbing. The Missile 
     Defense Agency deserves the very harshest of criticism for 
     its plans to eliminate two decades of technological progress 
     in building a highly effective defense, using Space-Based 
     Lasers. It would ordinarily be thought that scientists would 
     support science and technology, rather than remain voiceless 
     over a deliberate regression.
       Furthermore, it is unusual the Defense Science Board was 
     unable to offer any opinion or suggestions for the technical 
     difficulties encountered in completing the development of the 
     Navy Area Wide interceptor, particularly its forward-looking 
     fuze incorporating an infrared seeker and short-range radar. 
     Some type of technical opinion would have been in order.
       In conclusion Mr. Chairman, nearly two decades ago the 
     Strategic Defense Initiative investigated and developed a 
     number of different technologies for ballistic-missile 
     defense. It studied the architecture of various ballistic-
     missile defenses. The results favored the deployment of 
     space-based defenses, and recommended a multiple-layer 
     approach involving technologies such as Brilliant Pebbles and 
     Space-Based Lasers. Other technologies showed promise, 
     including high-energy particle beams. While a ground-based 
     defense would form a final, reserve layer, the front lines of 
     the defense would be found in space.
       On the contrary, the advent of the Clinton administration 
     and its opposition to space-based defenses from a Democratic-
     controlled Congress of ten years ago wrought a perilous error 
     of strategy as the United States turned its back on space. 
     Instead of pursuing a space-based defense with Brilliant 
     Pebbles, Space-based Lasers, and developing other advanced 
     technologies, the United States chose to chase its tail 
     around the deployment of an expensive and relatively 
     ineffective ground-based defense, seeking to find refuge in 
     the ABM Treaty and Mutual Assured Destruction.
       This error of strategy haunts us today. Despite the bold 
     and perceptive public pronouncements of President Bush, 
     others in his administration seem to be moving us in a 
     different direction evidently beholden to the programs and 
     policies of the Clinton administration. I am inclined to 
     believe our president would prefer something other than a 
     technological regression of U.S. defense capabilities, not 
     the recommendation to turn America's back on using the 
     advantages of space for a ballistic-missile defense. This is 
     unconscionable when the United States faces an increasinging 
     threat from ballistic missiles. Space, not the ground, is the 
     battlefield of the ballistic missile. We must place our 
     defenses in space. In so doing, we will realize the defensive 
     advantages that accrue from space, and the development of a 
     space-based defense will spur the development of

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     advanced technology, benefiting the economy.
           Very truly yours,
                                                     Bob Schaffer,
                                 Member of Congress from Colorado.

     

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