[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 124 (Thursday, September 26, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9412-S9413]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise to comment on the 
administration's ``discussion draft'' of a resolution authorizing the 
use of force against Iraq.
  This proposal is unacceptable. The administration has been talking 
about war in Iraq for quite some time now. Surely they had the time to 
draft a more careful, thoughtful proposal than the irresponsibly broad 
and sweeping language that they sent to Congress.
  Apparently the administration put forward such broad language as a 
negotiating tactic--asking for everything in the hopes of getting 
merely a lot.
  But we are not haggling over a used car. We are making decisions that 
could send young Americans to war and decisions that could have far-
reaching consequences for the global campaign against terrorism and for 
America's role in the world in the twenty-first century.
  To put forth such irresponsible language is to suggest that the 
President actually wants the authority to do anything he pleases in the 
Middle East--and that suggestion is likely to raise tensions in an 
already explosive region. To pepper the resolution with so many 
completely different justifications for taking action signals a lack of 
seriousness of purpose, and it obscures the nature of the mission on 
the table. And then to insist on immediate action while remaining 
largely incapable of pointing to any imminent threat and unwilling to 
flesh out the operation actually being proposed reveals a troubling 
approach to our national security.
  The administration has a responsibility to define what the threat is. 
Is it a link between the Iraqi Government and al-Qaida, or is it Iraq's 
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction?
  So far I certainly would conclude that there is insufficient evidence 
to support the first charge about al-Qaida, but the administration 
keeps using it whenever they feel like without information. Why? Are 
they trying to gloss over the real possibility that this focus on Iraq, 
if not managed with diplomatic skill, will, indeed, do harm to the 
global campaign against terrorism?
  The threat we know is real--Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction or WMD--is unquestionably a very serious issue. What is the 
mission? Is the mission on the table disarmament or is it regime 
change? Has anyone heard a credible plan for securing the weapons of 
mass destruction sites as part of a

[[Page S9413]]

military operation in Iraq? Has anyone heard any credible plan for what 
steps the United States intends to take to ensure that weapons of mass 
destruction do not remain a problem in Iraq beyond the facile ``get rid 
of Saddam Hussein'' rallying cry?
  Saddam Hussein is a vile man with a reckless and brutal history, and 
I have no problem agreeing that the United States should support regime 
change. I agree with those who assert that Americans, Iraqis, and the 
people of the Middle East would be much better off if he were no longer 
in power. But he is not the sole personification of a destabilizing WMD 
program. Once Hussein's control is absent, we have either a group of 
independent, self-interested actors with access to WMD or an unknown 
quantity of a new regime. We may face a period of some chaos, wherein a 
violent power struggle ensues as actors maneuver to succeed Saddam.
  Has anyone heard the administration articulate its plan for the day 
after? Is the administration talking about a long-term occupation? If 
we act unilaterally, that could mean a vast number of Americans on the 
ground in a region where, sadly, we are often regarded as an 
imperialistic enemy.
  Given the disarray in Afghanistan and the less than concerted 
American response to it, why should anyone believe that we will take 
Iraq more seriously? Certainly, it is undesirable for the United States 
to do this alone, to occupy a Middle Eastern country, and make our 
troops the target of anti-American sentiment.
  Of course, Mr. President, I am sure you and I would agree, none of 
these concerns is a rationale for inaction. Let me repeat that. None of 
these concerns is a rationale for inaction. This is not about being a 
hawk or a dove. This is not about believing that Saddam Hussein is 
somehow misunderstood. He is a monster. Iraq's weapons programs are 
real, and only a fool would believe that the United States should 
simply hope for the best and allow recent trends to continue.
  Equally, Mr. President, only a person lacking in wisdom would send 
American troops wading into this mire with a half-baked plan premised 
on the notion that the Iraqis will welcome us with open arms; that 
somehow the WMD threat will disappear with Saddam, and that U.S. 
military action to overthrow the Government of Iraq will somehow bring 
the winds of democratic change throughout the entire Middle Eastern 
region.
  We do not make decisions crucial to our national security on a leap 
of faith. Congress is the body constitutionally responsible for 
authorizing the use of our military forces in such a matter. We cannot 
duck these tough issues by simply assuring our constituents that 
somehow the administration will ``work it out.'' That is not good 
enough. We must not fail to demand a policy that makes sense.

  Let me be clear about another important point: Maybe a policy that 
makes sense involves the United Nations, but maybe it does not. It is 
less important whether our actions have a formal U.N. seal of approval. 
What is important is whether or not action has international support. 
More important still is whether or not action will promote 
international hostility toward the United States.
  In the context of this debate on Iraq, we are being asked to embrace 
a sweeping new national doctrine. I am troubled by the administration's 
emphasis on preemption and by its suggestion that, in effect, 
deterrence and containment are obsolete. What the administration is 
talking about in Iraq really sounds much more like prevention, and I 
wonder if they are not using these terms, ``preemption'' and 
``prevention'' interchangeably. Preemption is knowing that an enemy 
plans an attack and not waiting to defend oneself.
  Prevention is believing that another may possibly someday attack, or 
may desire to attack, and justifying the immediate use of force on 
those grounds. It is the difference between having information to 
suggest that an attack is imminent and believing that a given 
government is antagonistic toward the United States and continues to 
build up its military capacity.
  It is the difference between having intelligence indicating that a 
country is in negotiations with an unquestionably hostile and violent 
enemy like al-Qaida to provide them with weapons of mass destruction 
and worrying, on the other hand, that someday that country might engage 
in such negotiations.
  Of course, prevention does have an important role in our national 
security planning. It certainly should. We should use a range of tools 
in a focused way to tackle prevention--diplomatic, sometimes 
multilateral, economic. That is one of the core elements of any foreign 
policy, and I stand ready to work with my President and my colleagues 
to bolster those preventive measures and to work on the long-term 
aspects of prevention, including meaningful and sustained engagement in 
places that have been far too neglected.
  Unilaterally using our military might to pursue a policy of 
prevention around the world is not likely to be seen as self-defense 
abroad, and I am not at all certain that casting ourselves in this role 
will make the United States any safer. Would a world in which the most 
powerful countries use military force in this fashion be a safer world? 
Would it be the kind of world in which our national values could 
thrive? Would it be one in which terrorism would wither or would it be 
one in which terrorist recruits will increase in number every day?
  Announcing that we intend to play by our own rules, which look as if 
we will make up as we go along, may not be conducive to building a 
strong global coalition against terrorism, and it may not be conducive 
to combating the anti-American propaganda that passes for news in so 
much of the world.
  Fundamentally, I think broadly applying this new doctrine is at odds 
with our historical national character. We will defend ourselves 
fiercely if attacked, but we are not looking for a fight. To put it 
plainly: Our country historically has not sought to use force to make 
over the world as we see fit.
  I am also concerned this approach may be seen as a green light for 
other countries to engage in their own preemptive or preventive 
campaigns. Is the United States really eager to see a world in which 
such campaigns are launched in South Asia or by China or are we willing 
to say this strategy is suitable for us but dangerous in the hands of 
anybody else?
  The United States does have to rethink our approach to security 
threats in the wake of September 11, but it is highly questionable to 
suggest that containment is dead, that deterrence is dead, particularly 
in cases in which the threat in question is associated with a state and 
not nonstate actors, and it is highly questionable to embark on this 
sweeping strategy of preventive military operations.
  So as we seek to debate Iraq and other issues critical to our 
national security, I intend to ask questions, to demand answers, and to 
keep our global campaign against terrorism at the very top of the 
priority list. This Senate is responsible to all of the citizens of the 
United States, to the core values of this country, and to future 
generations of Americans. We will not flinch from defending ourselves 
and protecting our national security, but we will not take action that 
subordinates what this country stands for. It is a tall order, but I am 
confident that America will rise to the occasion.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, is the Senate in a period of morning 
business?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. We are not.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask, therefore, unanimous consent the 
Senate proceed to a period of morning business, with Senators allowed 
to speak therein for a period of 5 minutes each.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

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