[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 124 (Thursday, September 26, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9355-S9361]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
THE ECONOMY AND IRAQ
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to speak. I
want to address a growing disconnect that I detect between what I am
hearing in my home State of New Mexico and much of what I am hearing
and reading here in Washington, DC. Frankly, I begin to worry when we
are talking about one thing in Washington while the people we represent
at home are talking about other things, or talking about them in
different ways--in coffee klatsches, in barber shops, in various
settings.
[[Page S9356]]
What do I mean by that? I mean in Washington in recent weeks the
drumbeat has been about how we need to prepare for and pursue an attack
on Iraq, and how the United Nations had better get its act together to
pursue this effort in weeks rather than months or we would unilaterally
act in its place.
In my State, there is talk about Iraq. Frankly, there is a great deal
of concern about what is being planned and what is being contemplated,
on what timetable. But the main issue I hear from people in my State
relates to the economy and what is happening in the economy. Why would
the economy be a major issue in New Mexico, somebody might ask? One
reason is the article that appeared in the Albuquerque Journal
yesterday with a headline that says, ``New Mexico Tops U.S. for Poverty
in 2001.''
It indicates the poverty rate for the U.S. was at 11.7 percent last
year, and in my State it was 17.7 percent of our population living
below the poverty line. The median income for the same period dropped
over $700 between 2000 and 2001. Income levels fell for every group.
This is according to the U.S. Census. This is not some group with an
axe to grind. This was the U.S. Census that reported that income levels
fell for every group except the very richest and the very poorest. So
that is one reason people are concerned about the economy.
Another reason is because of what is happening to their pension
plans, to their 401(k)s. I heard a discussion a week or so ago where I
thought one of the commentators made a very good point. He said there
will be an October surprise this year. As we approach elections in this
country there is always a concern on the part of people who watch the
political comings and goings that there will be an October surprise;
something will be done in October to try to change the outcome of the
election. In fact, this commentator said there will be an October
surprise, but the surprise will be when each person opens their
quarterly report showing where their retirement savings now stand,
where they stand in their 401(k). They will see a dramatic decline in
the amount of retirement savings that they have because of what is
happening in the economy.
More and more people are worried that nobody in Washington--and this
is what I begin to pick up in my State--there is a concern that no one
in Washington seems concerned. No one seems concerned about the
economy. There is no talk about any strategy to improve the economy.
There is no plan to improve the economy.
To hear the pronouncements that have come out of the administration
in recent weeks and months, you would think the economy is just fine,
that everything is humming right along. At least we are no longer
hearing from the Secretary of Treasury and others that we are on the
cusp of a rebound in the economy. That talk has faded. But certainly
there is no talk about any plan or any suggestion about how we are
going to strengthen the U.S. economy. And the fact that we are not
talking about it is of concern.
It is possible I am just reading the wrong newspapers, watching the
wrong TV reports. Maybe there is something being planned. Maybe there
is some strategy that is being developed in the administration. I have
not seen it. I hope there is. My strong belief, though, is that the
administration's basic position on the economy is: Stay the course.
The problem with staying the course is this is not a very good course
for the average American. It is not a very good course for the average
person in my State. So I hope we will begin to hear something here in
Washington about this issue which is dominating the discussion in my
home State.
Let me also say something about this threatened war in Iraq.
Obviously, Americans want to deal with any imminent threat to our
Nation's security. I think much more so are we ready to do that after
the catastrophe of 9/11. If weapons of mass destruction have been
developed or are being developed with the intent to use those against
us or against our allies, then that is a threat that requires us to
act. I think there is general agreement on it.
We all share the goal of wanting to eliminate the threat of these
weapons. But the question we need to debate is the means for
accomplishing the goal. So far the means that the administration has
insisted upon and put forward is a so-called regime change. That is the
means. We are going to pursue a regime change. That is an interesting
phrase. That is a euphemism for attacking Iraq, killing or capturing
Saddam Hussein and his cadre of leaders, and replacing them with the
leadership of our choice. There are some potential problems with
pursuing that particular means to deal with these weapons of mass
destruction. Let me just mention a few of those problems which have
been discussed by others but need to be discussed even more.
One is what is the precedent we are setting? This is not a normal
course for our country to pursue, attacking and invading another
country without some imminent threat being demonstrated.
Second, the implications: What are the implications of such action
for our relations with other Arab countries?
Third, what is the cost to us in resources? One figure we heard from
the administration was $100 billion. What is the cost? What is the cost
in American lives we must anticipate?
The question is, who would constitute the successor government if we
are going to displace this government and put in place a government
more to our liking; who would that be?
The questions of how large and how prolonged a commitment do the
American people want to make to the rebuilding of Iraq, to bringing
reforms to Iraq, the effect of such an attack on world oil markets and
the price of oil, the spikes in the price of oil that might occur and
what that might do to our own economy, are legitimate.
They are questions people in my State are concerned about and they
are questions we need to have fully considered in Washington.
We need to look at other possible means besides just the simple
approach of regime change. One set of ideas that has been put forward
recently, that I think deserves attention and I want to just call it to
the attention of my colleagues today, is a paper prepared by Jessica
Mathews, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
entitled, ``A New Approach, Coercive Inspections.''
This is a serious proposal and one that deserves serious attention.
Essentially, the idea is that if our primary goal is to deal with
weapons of mass destruction and the threat that those weapons pose when
held by Iraq, then we need to consider, perhaps, a middle ground
between the unacceptable status quo, which none of us like, and this
idea of full-scale invasion of Iraq in order to change the regime. It
proposes a third approach. It proposes a new regime of coercive
international inspections where we would have a multinational military
force created by the Security Council, which we would participate in,
and which would be there to ensure that inspections take place as the
U.N. has indicated they would. There would be several advantages if we
were able to pursue that kind of option.
It would have the advantage of assuring our allies that we want to
work with them and not go it alone. It would assure the world that our
priority is what we say it is, and that is eliminating the threat of
weapons of mass destruction, not just evening old scores with Saddam
Hussein. It avoids military conflict, if the goal of weapons inspection
and weapons destruction can be achieved without military conflict. It
reserves the option of force being used.
Frankly, pursuing a course such as this on Iraq would allow us to
tone down the saber rattling, to calm anxieties here at home and in the
world community. I think there is a great benefit that can be achieved
from that, not only in our relations with our allies but I believe the
economy also would benefit from believing we are pursuing a more
measured course such as is described in this paper.
This is not the only proposal for how we should proceed. Maybe it is
not the best, but it is certainly a serious proposal and one we should
consider before we rush to authorize the President to use any and all
force to bring justice and peace to that region of the world.
In conclusion, people in my State want to know what is going to
happen on the economy, what this Government is going to do to help them
pursue a
[[Page S9357]]
better life and have greater economic opportunity in the future. They
also, with regard to Iraq, expect us to think before we act. They
hope--I hope--this President and this administration are not so
committed to a single course of action that serious discussion and
serious consideration of proposals such as this are precluded.
Mr. President, I appreciate the time and I yield the floor.
I ask unanimous consent the paper to which I referred be printed in
the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
The papers in this collection grew out of discussions held
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace from late
April to late July of this year. The discussions included top
regional and military experts, former inspectors with dozens
of man-years' experience in Iraq, and individuals with
intimate knowledge of the diplomatic situation at the United
Nations.
A New Approach: Coercive Inspections
(By Jessica T. Matthews, President, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace)
The summary proposal that follows draws heavily on the
expertise of all those who participated in the Carnegie
discussions on Iraq and on the individually authored papers.
Further explanation and greater detail on virtually every
point, especially the proposal's military aspects, can be
found therein.
With rising emphasis in recent months, the president has
made clear that the United States' number one concern in Iraq
is its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). No link
has yet been found between Baghdad's assertively secular
regime and radical Islamist terrorists. There is much else
about the Iraqi government that is fiercely objectionable but
nothing that presents an imminent threat to the region, the
United States, or the world. Thus, the United States' primary
goal is, and should be, to deal with the WMD threat.
In light of what is now a four-year-long absence of
international inspectors from the country, it has been widely
assumed that the United States has only two options regarding
that threat: continue to do nothing to find and destroy
Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile programs,
or pursue covert action or a full-scale military operation to
overthrow Saddam Hussein. At best, the latter would be a
unilateral initiative with grudging partners.
This paper proposes a third approach, a middle ground
between an unacceptable status quo that allows Iraqi WMD
programs to continue and the enormous costs and risks of an
invasion. It proposes a new regime of coercive international
inspections. A powerful, multinational military force,
created by the UN Security Council, would enable UN and
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection teams to
carry out ``comply or else'' inspections. The ``or else'' is
overthrow of the regime. The burden of choosing war is placed
squarely on Saddam Hussein. The middle-ground option is a
radical change from the earlier international inspection
effort in which the playing field was tilted steeply in
Iraq's favor. It requires a military commitment sufficient to
pose a credible threat to Iraq and would take a vigorous
diplomatic initiative on Washington's part to launch. Long-
term success would require sustained unity of purpose among
the major powers. These difficulties make this approach
attractive only in comparison to the alternatives, but in
that light, its virtues emerge sharply.
Inspections backed by a force authorized by the UN Security
Council would carry unimpeachable legitimacy and command
broad international support. The effort would therefore
strengthen, rather than undermine, the cooperation the United
States needs for long-term success in the war against
terrorism. It would avoid setting a dangerous precedent of a
unilateral right to attack in ``preventive self-defense.''
Although not likely to be welcomed by Iraq's neighbors, it
would be their clear choice over war. Regional assistance
(basing, over-flight rights, and so on) should therefore be
more forthcoming. If successful, it would reduce Iraq's WMD
threat to negligible levels. If a failure, it would lay an
operational and political basis for a transition to a war
to oust Saddam. The United States would be seen to have
worked through the United Nations with the rest of the
world rather than alone, and Iraq's intent would have been
cleanly tested and found wanting. Baghdad would be
isolated. In these circumstances, the risks to the region
of a war to overthrow Iraq's government-from domestic
pressure on shaky governments (Pakistan) to government
misreading U.S. intentions (Iran) to heightened Arab and
Islamic anger toward the United States-would be sharply
diminished.
Compared to a war aimed at regime change, the approach
greatly reduces the risk of Saddam's using whatever WMD he
has (probably against Israel) while a force aimed at his
destruction is being assembled. On the political front,
coercive inspections avoid the looming question of what
regime would replace the current government. It would also
avoid the risks of persistent instability in Iraq, its
possible disintegration into Shia, Suni, and Kurdish regions,
and the need to station tens of thousands of U.S. troops in
the country for what could be a very long time.
A year ago, the approach would have been impossible. Since
then, however, four factors have combined to make it
achievable: Greatly increased concern about WMD in the wake
of September 11; Iraq's continued lies and intransigence even
after major reform of the UN sanctions regime; Russia's
embrace of the United States after the September 11 attacks,
and the Bush administration's threats of unilateral military
action, which have opened a political space that did not
exist before.
Together, these changes have restored a consensus among the
Security Council's five permanent members (P-5) regarding the
need for action on Iraq's WMD that has not existed for the
past five years.
core premises
Several key premises underlie the new approach.
Inspections can work. In their first five years, the United
Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), which was
responsible for inspecting and disarming Iraq's chemical,
biological, and missile materials and capacities, and the
IAEA Iraq Action Team, which did the same for Iraq's nuclear
ones, achieved substantial successes. With sufficient human
and technological resources, time, and political support,
inspections can reduce Iraq's WMD threat, if not to zero, to
a negligible level. (The term inspections encompasses a
resumed discovery and disarmament phase and intrusive,
ongoing monitoring and verification extending to dual-use
facilities and the activities of key individuals.)
Saddam Hussein's overhelming priority is to stay in power.
He will wilingly give up pursuit of WMD, but he will do so if
convinced that the only alternative is his certain
destruction and that of his regime.
A credible and continuing military threat involving
substantial forces on Iraq's borders will be necessary both
to get the inspectors back into Iraq and to enable them to do
their job. The record from 1991 to the present makes clear
that Iraq views UN WMD inspections as war by other means.
There is no reason to expect this to change. Sanctions,
inducements, negotiations, or periodic air strikes will
not suffice to restore effective inspection. Negotiations
in the present circumstances only serve Baghdad's goals of
delay and diversion.
The UNSOM/IAEA successes also critically depended on unity
of purpose within the UN Security Council. No amount of
military force will be effective without unwavering political
resolve behind it. Effective inspections cannot be
reestablished until a way forward is found that the manor
powers and key regional states can support under the UN
Charter.
negotiating coercive inspections
From roughly 1997 until recently, determined Iraqi
diplomacy succeeded in dividing the P-5. Today, principally
due to Iraq's behavior, Russia's new geopolitical stance, and
U.S.-led reform of the sanctions regime, a limited consensus
has reemerged. There is now agreement that Iraq has not met
its obligations under UN Resolution 687 (which created the
inspections regime) and that there is a need for the return
of inspectors to Iraq. There is also support behind the new,
yet-to-be tested inspection team known as the UN Monitoring,
Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC, created in
December 1999 under Resolution 1284). Because three members
of the P-5 abstained on the vote to create UNMOVIC, this
development is particularly noteworthy. The May 2002 adoption
of a revised sanctions plan was further evidence of a still
fragile but real and evolving convergence of view on the
Security Council.
Perhaps paradoxically, U.S. threats to act unilaterally
against Iraq have the potential to strengthen this limited
consensus. France, Russia, and China strongly share the view
that only the Security Council can authorize the use of a
force--a view to which Great Britain is also sympathetic. All
four know that after eleven years of the United Nations'
handling of the issue, a U.S. decision to act unilaterally
against Iraq would be a tremendous blow to the authority of
the institution and the Security Council in particular. They
want to avoid any further marginalization of the Council
since that would translate into a diminution of their
individual influence. Thus, U.S. threats provide these four
countries with a shared interest in finding a formula for the
use of force against Iraq that would be effective, acceptable
to the United States, and able to be authorized by the
Council as a whole. That formula could be found in a
resolution authorizing multinational enforcement action to
enable UNMOVIC to carry out its mandate.
Achieving such an outcome would require a tremendous
diplomatic effort on Washington's part. That, however, should
to be a seen as a serious deterrent. Achieving desired
outcomes without resort to war is, in the first instance,
what power is for. Launching the middle-ground approach would
amount, in effect, to Washington and the rest of the P-5 re-
seizing the diplomatic initiative from Baghdad.
The critical element will be that the United States makes
clear that it forswears unilateral military action against
Iraq for as long as international inspections are working.
The United States would have to convince Iraq and others that
this is not a perfunctory bow to international opinion
preparatory to an invasion and that the United States' intent
is to see inspections succeed, not a ruse to have them
quickly fail. If Iraq
[[Page S9358]]
is not convinced, it would have no reason to comply; indeed,
quite the reverse because Baghdad would need whatever WMD it
has to deter or fight with a U.S. attack. Given the past
history, many countries will be deeply skeptical. To succeed,
Washington will have to be steady, unequivocal, and
unambiguous on this point.
This does not mean that Washington need alter its
declaratory policy favoring regime change in Iraq. Its stance
would be that the United States continues to support regime
change but will not take action to force it while Iraq is in
full compliance with international inspections. There would
be nothing unusual in such a position. The United States has,
for example, had a declaratory policy for regime change in
Cuba for more than forty years.
Beyond the Security Council, U.S. diplomacy will need to
recognize the significant differences in strategic interests
among the states in the region. Some want a strong Iraq to
offset Iran. Others fear a prosperous, pro-West Iraq
producing oil to its full potential. Many fear and oppose
U.S. military dominance in the region. Virtually all,
however, agree that Iraq should be free of WMD, and they
universally fear the instability that is likely to accompany
a violent overthrow of the Iraqi government.
Moreover, notwithstanding the substantial U.S. presence
required for enforced inspections and what will be widely
felt to be an unfair double standard (acting against Iraq's
WMD but not against Israel's), public opinion throughout the
region would certainly be less aroused by multlaellateral
inspections than by a unilateral U.S. invasion.
Thus, if faced with a choice between a war to achieve
regime change and an armed, multilateral effort to eradicate
Iraq's WMD, all the region's governments are likely to share
a clear preference for the latter.
implementing coercive inspections
Under the coercive inspections plan, the Security Council
would authorize the creation of an Inspections Implementation
Force (IIF) to act as the enforcement arm for UNMOVIC and the
IAEA task force. Under the new resolution, the inspections
process is transformed from a game of cat and mouse
punctuated by diversions and manufactured crises, in which
conditions heavily favor Iraqi obstruction, into a last
chance, ``comply or else'' operation. The inspection teams
would return to Iraq accompanied by a military arm strong
enough to force immediate entry into any site at any time
with complete security for the inspection team. No terms
would be negotiated regarding the dates, duration, or
modalities of inspection. If Iraq chose not to accept, or
established a record of noncompliance, the U.S. regime-change
option or, better, a UN authorization of ``use of all
necessary means'' would come into play.
Overall control is vested in the civilian executive
chairman of the inspection teams. He would determine what
sites will be inspected, without interference for the
Security Council, and whether military forces should
accompany any particular inspection. Some inspections--for
example, personnel interviews--may be better conducted
without any accompanying force; others will require maximum
insurance of prompt entry and protection. The size and
composition of the accompanying force would be the decision
of the IIF commander, and its employment would be under his
command.
The IIF must be strong and mobile enough to support full
inspection of any site, including socalled sensitive sites
and those previously designated as off limits. ``No-fly'' and
``no-drive'' zones near to-be-inspected sites would be
imposed with minimal advance notice to Baghdad. Violations of
these bans would subject the opposing forces to attack.
Robust operational and communications security would allow
surprise inspections. In the event surprise fails
and ``spontaneous'' gatherings of civilians attempt to
impede inspections, rapid response riot control units must
be available.
The IIF must be highly mobile, composed principally of air
and armored cavalry units. It might include an armored
cavalry regiment or equivalent on the Jordan-Iraq border, an
air-mobile brigade in eastern Turkey, and two or more
brigades and corps-sized infrastructure based in Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait. Air support including fighter and fighterbomber
aircraft and continuous air and ground surveillance, provided
by AWACS and JSTARS, will be required. The IIF must have a
highly sophisticated intelligence capability. Iraq has become
quite experienced in concealment and in its ability to
penetrate and mislead inspection teams. It has had four
unimpeded years to construct new underground sites, build
mobile facilities, alter records, and so on. To overcome that
advantage and ensure military success, the force must be
equipped with the full range of reconnaissance, surveillance,
listening, encryption, and photo interpretation capabilities.
The bulk of the force will be U.S. For critical political
reasons, however, the IIF must be as multinational as
possible and as small as practicable. Its design and
composition should strive to make clear that the IIF is not a
U.S. invasion force in disguise, but a UN enforcement force.
Optimally, it would include, at a minimum, elements from all
of the P-5, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, as well as
others in the region.
Consistent with the IIF's mandate and UN origin, Washington
will have to rigorously resist the temptation to use the
force's access and the information it collects for purposes
unrelated to its job. Nothing will more quickly sow division
within the Security Council than excesses in this regard.
Operationally, on the civilian front, experts disagree as
to whether UNMOVIC's mandate contains disabling weaknesses.
Although some provisions could certainly be improved, it
would be unwise to attempt to renegotiate Resolution 1284.
Some of its weaknesses can be overcome in practice by tacit
agreement (some have already been), some will be met by the
vastly greater technological capabilities conferred by the
IIF, and some can be corrected through the language of the
IIF resolution. Four factors are critical:
Adequate time. The inspection process must not be placed
under any arbitrary deadline because that would provide
Baghdad with an enormous incentive for delay. It is in
everyone's interest to complete the disarmament phase of the
job as quickly as possible, but timelines cannot be fixed in
advance.
Experienced personnel. UNMOVIC must not be forced to climb
a learning curve as UNSCOM did but must be ready to operate
with maximum effectiveness from the outset. To do so, it must
be able to take full advantage of individuals with
irreplaceable, on-the-ground experience.
Provision for two-way intelligence sharing with national
governments. UNSCOM experience proves that provision for
intelligence sharing with national governments is
indispensable. Inspectors need must information not available
from open sources or commercial satellites and prompt, direct
access to defectors. For their part, intelligence agencies
will not provide a flow of information without feedback on
its value and accuracy. It must be accepted by all
governments that such interactions are necessary and that the
dialogue between providers and users would be on a strictly
confidential, bilateral basis, protected from other
governemnts. The individual in charge of information
collection and assessment on the inspection team should
have an intelligence background and command the trust of
those governments that provide the bulk of the
intelligence.
Ability to track Iraqi procurement activities outside the
country. UNSCOM discovered covert transactions between Iraq
and more than 500 companies from more than 40 countries
between 1993 and 1998. Successful inspections would
absolutely depend, therefore, on the team's authority to
track procurement efforts both inside and outside Iraq,
including at Iraqi embassies abroad. Accordingly, UNMOVIC
should include a staff of specially trained customs experts,
and inspections would need to include relevant ministries,
commercial banks, and trading companies. As with military
intelligence, tracking Iraqi procurement must not be used to
collect unrelated commercial and technical intelligence or
impede legal trade.
conclusion
War should never be undertaken until the alternatives have
been exhausted. In this case that moral imperative is
buttressed by the very real possibility that a war to
overthrow Saddam Hussein, even if successful in doing so,
could subtract more from U.S. security and long-term
political interests that it adds.
Political chaos in Iraq or an equally bad successor regime
committed to WMD to prevent an invasion from ever happening
again, possibly horrible costs to Israel, greater enmity
toward the United States among Arab and other Muslim publics,
a severe blow to the authority of the United Nations and the
Security Council, and a giant step by the United States
toward-in Zbigniew Brzezinski's phrase-political self-
isolation are just some of the costs, in addition to
potentially severe economic impacts and the loss of American
and innocent Iraqi lives, that must be weighed.
In this case alternative does exist. It blends the
imperative for military threat against a regime that has
learned how to divide and conquer the major powers with the
legitimacy of UN sanction and multilateral action.
Technically and operationally, it is less demanding than a
war. Diplomatically, it requires a much greater effort for a
greater gain. The message of an unswerving international
determination to halt WMD proliferation will be heard far
beyond Iraq. The only real question is can the major powers
see their mutual interest, act together, and stay the course?
Who is more determined--Iraq or the P-5?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the
Senator from Vermont is recognized.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am fortunate to represent a State whose
citizens have long been involved in international affairs. Whether
through military or diplomatic service, volunteering for the Peace
Corps, studying abroad, or because we live on a great international
border, Vermonters have strong views about these issues.
I was in Vermont this past weekend, and as always I had the
opportunity to speak to many Vermonters from all walks of life. I can
say, beyond any doubt, that Vermonters across the political spectrum
are very concerned about our policy toward Iraq.
They are worried that we are shifting our focus away from ending the
violence in the Middle East, eliminating
[[Page S9359]]
al-Qaida, and rebuilding Afghanistan even though that Herculean task
has barely begun.
The President has sent to Congress a proposed resolution for the use
of military force against Iraq. It would permit the President to take
any action whatsoever to ``defend the national security interests of
the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore
international peace and security in the region.''
While I hope this is the beginning of a consultative, bipartisan
process to produce a sensible resolution and to act on it at the
appropriate time, the current proposal is an extraordinarily over-
broad, open-ended resolution that would authorize the President to send
American troops not only into war against Iraq, but also against any
nation in the Gulf or Middle East region, however one defines it.
Declaring war, or providing the authority to wage war, is the single
most important responsibility given to Congress under the Constitution.
As history has shown, wars inevitably have unforeseen, terrible
consequences, especially for innocent civilians.
Blank-check resolutions, such as the one the President proposes, can
likewise be misinterpreted or used in ways that we do not intend or
expect. It has happened before, in ways that many people, including
Members of Congress, came to regret. That is why a thorough debate is
so necessary. And that is also why this Vermonter will not vote for a
blank check for this President or any President. My conscience and the
Constitution do not allow it.
The timing of the debate is also important. Congress is being asked
to send Americans into battle, even though diplomatic efforts have not
yet been exhausted. Nor do we have a complete assessment by U.S.
intelligence agencies of the threat that Iraq poses to the United
States.
I will have more to say when the debate on the resolution occurs. But
I do want to take a few minutes to share some initial thoughts as we
begin to consider this difficult question.
The question we face is not whether Saddam Hussein is a menace to his
people, to his neighbors and to our national security interests. The
Iraqi regime has already invaded Iran and Kuwait, gassed members of its
own population, and repeatedly flouted international conventions
against armed aggression. It is clear that Iraq has tried to develop a
range of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons, with which Iraq might threaten the entire Gulf
region.
I would like to see Saddam Hussein gone as much as anyone. But the
question is, how immediate is this threat and what is the best way to
deal with it, without undercutting our principal goal of protecting the
American people from terrorism, promoting peace in the Middle East, and
other important U.S. national security priorities?
Some administration officials have suggested that to ask questions
about going to war in Iraq is somehow unpatriotic, or indicative of a
lack of concern about national security. That is nothing more than
election year partisan politics at its worst. These questions are being
asked by Americans in every State of the Union.
Until recently our focus has been, rightly so, on destroying al-Qaida
and other terrorist networks. While that challenge has already cost
billions of dollars and continues to occupy the attention and resources
of the Department of Defense and the U.S. intelligence community, the
administration has suddenly shifted gears and is now rushing headlong
toward war with Iraq.
Some have argued that Congress must act now to strengthen the
President's hand as the administration negotiates at the United
Nations.
But what we would really be saying is that regardless of what the
Security Council does, we have already decided to go our own way. I
contrast that with the situation in 1990 when the United States
successfully assembled a broad international coalition to fight the
Gulf War. The Congress passed a resolution only after the U.N. acted.
President Bush deserves credit for focusing the world's attention on
international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. I have said
this over and over again. But the process that has brought us to the
brink of preparing for war with Iraq has been notable for its
confusion.
The statements of administration officials have been fraught with
inconsistencies. They claim to speak for the American people, but
average Americans are urging the administration to proceed cautiously
on Iraq and to work with the United Nations and the Congress. Our
allies are confused and angry about the way this has been handled. Our
friends in the Middle East are fearful of what lies ahead.
Fortunately, the President heeded calls to go to the United Nations,
and in his speech to the General Assembly he described in great detail
Saddam Hussein's long history of deception and defiance of U.N.
resolutions. I commended that speech. I am also pleased that it focused
on enforcing those resolutions, especially concerning weapons of mass
destruction.
But the American people need to hear more than generalized
accusations and threatening ultimatums. They need to know the scope and
urgency of the problem, Saddam's current and future capabilities, the
options for solving the problem, and the short and long-term
implications of each course of action, including the very real dangers
of unintended consequences.
I agree with the President when he says that Saddam Hussein cannot be
trusted and that disarming Iraq is the goal. But the first way to try
to accomplish this is not through precipitous, unilateral military
action. Rather, it is by building an alliance and working through the
United Nations.
Earlier this week, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General John Shalikashvili, warned the administration of the dangers of
attacking Iraq without the backing of the United Nations:
We are a global nation with global interests, and
undermining the credibility of the United Nations does very
little to help provide stability and security and safety to
the rest of the world, where we have to operate for economic
reasons and political reasons.
Working through the United Nations to readmit the weapons inspectors
could be effective in disarming Iraq. Rolf Ekeus the former executive
chairman of UNSCOM, has stated:
International weapons inspectors, if properly backed up by
international force, can unearth Saddam Hussein's weapons
programs. If we believe that Iraq would be much less of a
threat without such weapons, the obvious thing is to focus on
getting rid of the weapons. Doing that through an inspection
team is not only the most effective way, but would cost less
in lives and destruction than an invasion.
A study by the Carnegie Endowment, co-authored by former U.S.
military and United Nations officials, supports this view: ``With
sufficient human and technological resources, time, and political
support, inspections can reduce Iraq's [weapons of mass destruction]
threat, if not to zero, to a negligible level.''
There are distinct advantages to this approach. For one, if Iraq
again refuses to comply with U.N. demands, there will be a much
stronger case for more forceful action.
It would also help mitigate potential damage to our relations with
other nations whose support we need to achieve other important U.S.
goals, such as capturing terrorists or promoting peace in the Middle
East.
Diplomacy is often tedious. It does not usually make the headlines or
the evening news, and much has been made of our past diplomatic
failures. But history has shown over and over that diplomacy can not
only protect our national interests, it can also enhance the
effectiveness of military force when force becomes necessary.
Many experts believe that, despite deception by the Iraqis, the U.N.
inspection process destroyed much of the Iraqi weapons program, and new
inspections could succeed in substantially disarming Saddam. However,
the U.N. regime broke down when Saddam Hussein starting blocking the
inspections and the Security Council was divided on how to respond.
I support the unconditional return of inspectors backed up by an
international military force. But, the world must not repeat the
mistakes of 1998. We have already seen some troubling signs of
diplomatic double talk from the Iraqis, particularly on the issue of
unimpeded access for the inspectors. The international community cannot
tolerate deception and defiance on the part of the Iraqis, and
Secretary Powell is right to push for a new U.N. resolution.
[[Page S9360]]
Other members of the Security Council should join United States and
British efforts to craft a strong new resolution with a deadline for
Iraqi compliance. The U.N. has a responsibility to enforce its demands.
If the U.N. does not act to ensure that the inspection regime is
effectively structured, we will end up back where we were in 1998.
Saddam will play the same cat and mouse game, the U.N. will look
toothless, and we will be not be able to destroy the Iraqi weapons
program.
We need a strengthened inspection regime that has preexisting
authority from the Security Council to deploy military force to back up
the inspectors if there is resistance from Iraq. I hope that the
Administration works with the United Nations, not so much the other way
around, to make this happen.
If Iraq resists the inspections, and the President decides to use
military force, then the procedure is clear. He can seek a declaration
of war from the Congress, and the Congress can vote. But voting on such
a resolution at this time would be premature.
A decision to invade Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein should be based on
a complete assessment of Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction,
and the threat Iraq poses to the United States. What is the evidence--
as opposed to assertions and assumptions--that Iraq is close to
acquiring a nuclear weapon? What is the evidence that Iraq is capable
of launching, or has any intention of launching, an attack against us
or one of our allies?
And there are more questions that are as yet unanswered. What is the
evidence that Saddam Hussein wants to commit suicide, which such an
attack would guarantee? Why is containment, a strategy which kept the
Soviet Union with its thousands of nuclear warheads and chemical and
biological weapons at bay for 40 years, not valid for Saddam Hussein, a
cold, calculating tyrant who cares above all about staying in power?
I am not sure how these questions can be answered without an updated
National Intelligence Estimate. As the Washington Post has reported,
there are conflicting views within the intelligence community on Iraq,
and without this estimate, which pulls together the different
assessments by various parts of the intelligence community, Congress is
being asked to give a blank check without all of the facts. I am not
going to write a blank check under any circumstances and I am certainly
not going to do it with less than all of the facts.
We also must assess whether an attack could spin out of control and
draw the entire Middle East into war. As Secretary Rumsfeld
acknowledged, an Iraqi attack on Israel could spark a deadly spiral of
escalation in which Israeli retaliation prompts responses from other
Arab states. Israel has a right of self-defense, and Prime Minister
Sharon has said that Israel would retaliate. At the very least, it
would further inflame Arab populations whose governments are key to
bringing lasting peace to the Middle East and reducing the breeding
grounds for extremist Islamic fundamentalism and international
terrorism. Some of those breeding grounds are within the borders of
some of our closest friends in the region and we should not lose sight
of that.
We also must fully assess the costs of a war. The Gulf War cost tens
of billions of dollars, but ultimately other nations helped to defray
those costs. The President's Economic Adviser said that this war could
cost as much as two hundred billion dollars, and that assumes it does
not spread beyond Iraq.
As the combat in Afghanistan showed, once again, we have the finest
fighting forces in the world. We can be confident that we would win a
war with Iraq, but there would be American lives lost, especially if
Iraq lures U.S. troops into urban combat.
We have to remember that it is one thing to topple a regime, but it
is equally important, and sometimes far more difficult, to rebuild a
country to prevent it from becoming engulfed by factional fighting. If
these nations cannot successfully rebuild, then they will once again
become havens for terrorists.
The President would need to show that a post-Saddam Iraq would not be
a continual source of instability and conflict in the region. While
Iraq has a strong civil society that might be able to become a
democracy, in the chaos of a post-Saddam Iraq another dictator could
rise to the top or the country could splinter into ethnic or religious
conflict.
To ensure that this does not happen, does the administration foresee
basing thousands of U.S. troops in Iraq after the war, and if so, for
how many years and for how many billions of dollars at a time when the
U.S. economy is weakening, the Federal deficit is growing, and poverty
is increasing here at home?
Is the administration committed to investing the resources it is
going to take to rebuild Iraq, even when we are falling short of what
is needed in Afghanistan?
In Afghanistan, the Taliban was vanquished with a minimum of U.S.
casualties, but destroying al-Qaida, which is the primary goal of our
efforts in Afghanistan, is proving far more difficult. We are told that
while al-Qaida's leadership has been badly disrupted, its members have
dispersed widely. Although there is a growing belief that Osama bin
Laden is dead, we have no proof.
In addition, the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is critical.
There are thousands of homeless Afghans and a real threat of widespread
hunger or famine this winter. There are families who lost loved ones or
their homes were destroyed in the violence perpetrated by the Taliban,
years of civil war, or from mistakes made during military operations by
U.S. and coalition forces.
Yet the administration, despite calls by President Bush for a
Marshall plan, did not ask for a single cent for Afghanistan for fiscal
year 2003. In addition, $94 million for humanitarian, refugee, and
reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan, which Congress added in the
supplemental appropriations bill, was not deemed an emergency by the
President.
Some relief organizations have already been told that they may have
to shut down programs for lack of funds. This is happening in a country
that so desperately needs the most basic staples such as water,
education and medical help. Afghans who have returned to their homes
from outside the country may become refugees once again.
Many other nations have yet to fulfill pledges of assistance to
Afghanistan, but if the President is serious about a Marshall Plan, and
I believe he is right, then we need to do much more to help rebuild
that country.
Yet, as we continue to face difficult challenges in Afghanistan and
hunting down members of al-Qaida, not to mention a number of challenges
here at home such as the economy, we are suddenly being thrust into a
debate about Iraq. It is a debate that will have lasting consequences
for our standing in the world as a country that recognizes the
importance of multilateral solutions to global problems and that
respects international law.
General Wesley Clark, who headed the successful U.S. and NATO
military campaign in Kosovo, recently addressed this problem directly,
when he wrote:
The longer this war [on terrorism] goes on--and by all
accounts, it will go on for years--the more our success will
depend on the willing cooperation and active participation of
our allies to root out terrorist cells in Europe and Asia, to
cut off funding and support of terrorists and to deal with
Saddam Hussein and other threats. We are far more likely to
gain the support we need by working through international
institutions than outside of them.
The world cannot ignore Saddam Hussein. I can envision circumstances
which would cause me to support the use of force against Iraq, if we
cannot obtain unimpeded access for U.N. inspectors or the United States
is threatened with imminent harm.
But like many Vermonters, based on what I know today, I believe that
in order to solve this problem without potentially creating more
enemies over the long run, we must act deliberately, not precipitously.
The President has taken the first step, by seeking support from the
United Nations. Let us give that process time. If it fails, then we can
cross that bridge when we come to it.
But I am reminded of my first year as a U.S. Senator. The year was
1975, and there were still 60 or 70 Senators here who had voted for the
Tonkin Gulf resolution a decade earlier. That vote was 88-2, and many
of those Senators,
[[Page S9361]]
Democrats and Republicans, spoke of that vote as the greatest mistake
of their careers.
That resolution was adopted hastily after reports of a minor incident
which may, in fact, not have occurred at all. It was interpreted by
both the Johnson and Nixon administrations as carte blanche to wage war
in Vietnam for over a decade, ultimately involving over half a million
American troops and resulting in the deaths of over 58,000 Americans.
I am not suggesting that the administration is trying to deceive
Congress or the American people, and I recognize that the situation in
Iraq today is very different from Vietnam in 1964. But we learned some
painful and important lessons back then. And one that is as relevant
today as it was 38 years ago, is that the Senate should never give up
its constitutional rights, responsibilities, and authority to the
executive branch. It should never shrink from its Constitutional
responsibilities, especially when the lives of American servicemen and
women are at stake.
So when we consider the resolution on Iraq, I hope we will remember
those lessons, because under no circumstances should the Congress pass
a blank check and let the administration fill in the amount later. The
Constitution does not allow that, and I will not do that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from
South Dakota is recognized.
____________________