[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 124 (Thursday, September 26, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9355-S9361]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                          THE ECONOMY AND IRAQ

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to speak. I 
want to address a growing disconnect that I detect between what I am 
hearing in my home State of New Mexico and much of what I am hearing 
and reading here in Washington, DC. Frankly, I begin to worry when we 
are talking about one thing in Washington while the people we represent 
at home are talking about other things, or talking about them in 
different ways--in coffee klatsches, in barber shops, in various 
settings.

[[Page S9356]]

  What do I mean by that? I mean in Washington in recent weeks the 
drumbeat has been about how we need to prepare for and pursue an attack 
on Iraq, and how the United Nations had better get its act together to 
pursue this effort in weeks rather than months or we would unilaterally 
act in its place.
  In my State, there is talk about Iraq. Frankly, there is a great deal 
of concern about what is being planned and what is being contemplated, 
on what timetable. But the main issue I hear from people in my State 
relates to the economy and what is happening in the economy. Why would 
the economy be a major issue in New Mexico, somebody might ask? One 
reason is the article that appeared in the Albuquerque Journal 
yesterday with a headline that says, ``New Mexico Tops U.S. for Poverty 
in 2001.''
  It indicates the poverty rate for the U.S. was at 11.7 percent last 
year, and in my State it was 17.7 percent of our population living 
below the poverty line. The median income for the same period dropped 
over $700 between 2000 and 2001. Income levels fell for every group. 
This is according to the U.S. Census. This is not some group with an 
axe to grind. This was the U.S. Census that reported that income levels 
fell for every group except the very richest and the very poorest. So 
that is one reason people are concerned about the economy.
  Another reason is because of what is happening to their pension 
plans, to their 401(k)s. I heard a discussion a week or so ago where I 
thought one of the commentators made a very good point. He said there 
will be an October surprise this year. As we approach elections in this 
country there is always a concern on the part of people who watch the 
political comings and goings that there will be an October surprise; 
something will be done in October to try to change the outcome of the 
election. In fact, this commentator said there will be an October 
surprise, but the surprise will be when each person opens their 
quarterly report showing where their retirement savings now stand, 
where they stand in their 401(k). They will see a dramatic decline in 
the amount of retirement savings that they have because of what is 
happening in the economy.
  More and more people are worried that nobody in Washington--and this 
is what I begin to pick up in my State--there is a concern that no one 
in Washington seems concerned. No one seems concerned about the 
economy. There is no talk about any strategy to improve the economy. 
There is no plan to improve the economy.
  To hear the pronouncements that have come out of the administration 
in recent weeks and months, you would think the economy is just fine, 
that everything is humming right along. At least we are no longer 
hearing from the Secretary of Treasury and others that we are on the 
cusp of a rebound in the economy. That talk has faded. But certainly 
there is no talk about any plan or any suggestion about how we are 
going to strengthen the U.S. economy. And the fact that we are not 
talking about it is of concern.
  It is possible I am just reading the wrong newspapers, watching the 
wrong TV reports. Maybe there is something being planned. Maybe there 
is some strategy that is being developed in the administration. I have 
not seen it. I hope there is. My strong belief, though, is that the 
administration's basic position on the economy is: Stay the course.

  The problem with staying the course is this is not a very good course 
for the average American. It is not a very good course for the average 
person in my State. So I hope we will begin to hear something here in 
Washington about this issue which is dominating the discussion in my 
home State.
  Let me also say something about this threatened war in Iraq. 
Obviously, Americans want to deal with any imminent threat to our 
Nation's security. I think much more so are we ready to do that after 
the catastrophe of 9/11. If weapons of mass destruction have been 
developed or are being developed with the intent to use those against 
us or against our allies, then that is a threat that requires us to 
act. I think there is general agreement on it.
  We all share the goal of wanting to eliminate the threat of these 
weapons. But the question we need to debate is the means for 
accomplishing the goal. So far the means that the administration has 
insisted upon and put forward is a so-called regime change. That is the 
means. We are going to pursue a regime change. That is an interesting 
phrase. That is a euphemism for attacking Iraq, killing or capturing 
Saddam Hussein and his cadre of leaders, and replacing them with the 
leadership of our choice. There are some potential problems with 
pursuing that particular means to deal with these weapons of mass 
destruction. Let me just mention a few of those problems which have 
been discussed by others but need to be discussed even more.
  One is what is the precedent we are setting? This is not a normal 
course for our country to pursue, attacking and invading another 
country without some imminent threat being demonstrated.
  Second, the implications: What are the implications of such action 
for our relations with other Arab countries?
  Third, what is the cost to us in resources? One figure we heard from 
the administration was $100 billion. What is the cost? What is the cost 
in American lives we must anticipate?
  The question is, who would constitute the successor government if we 
are going to displace this government and put in place a government 
more to our liking; who would that be?
  The questions of how large and how prolonged a commitment do the 
American people want to make to the rebuilding of Iraq, to bringing 
reforms to Iraq, the effect of such an attack on world oil markets and 
the price of oil, the spikes in the price of oil that might occur and 
what that might do to our own economy, are legitimate.
  They are questions people in my State are concerned about and they 
are questions we need to have fully considered in Washington.
  We need to look at other possible means besides just the simple 
approach of regime change. One set of ideas that has been put forward 
recently, that I think deserves attention and I want to just call it to 
the attention of my colleagues today, is a paper prepared by Jessica 
Mathews, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
entitled, ``A New Approach, Coercive Inspections.''
  This is a serious proposal and one that deserves serious attention. 
Essentially, the idea is that if our primary goal is to deal with 
weapons of mass destruction and the threat that those weapons pose when 
held by Iraq, then we need to consider, perhaps, a middle ground 
between the unacceptable status quo, which none of us like, and this 
idea of full-scale invasion of Iraq in order to change the regime. It 
proposes a third approach. It proposes a new regime of coercive 
international inspections where we would have a multinational military 
force created by the Security Council, which we would participate in, 
and which would be there to ensure that inspections take place as the 
U.N. has indicated they would. There would be several advantages if we 
were able to pursue that kind of option.
  It would have the advantage of assuring our allies that we want to 
work with them and not go it alone. It would assure the world that our 
priority is what we say it is, and that is eliminating the threat of 
weapons of mass destruction, not just evening old scores with Saddam 
Hussein. It avoids military conflict, if the goal of weapons inspection 
and weapons destruction can be achieved without military conflict. It 
reserves the option of force being used.

  Frankly, pursuing a course such as this on Iraq would allow us to 
tone down the saber rattling, to calm anxieties here at home and in the 
world community. I think there is a great benefit that can be achieved 
from that, not only in our relations with our allies but I believe the 
economy also would benefit from believing we are pursuing a more 
measured course such as is described in this paper.
  This is not the only proposal for how we should proceed. Maybe it is 
not the best, but it is certainly a serious proposal and one we should 
consider before we rush to authorize the President to use any and all 
force to bring justice and peace to that region of the world.
  In conclusion, people in my State want to know what is going to 
happen on the economy, what this Government is going to do to help them 
pursue a

[[Page S9357]]

better life and have greater economic opportunity in the future. They 
also, with regard to Iraq, expect us to think before we act. They 
hope--I hope--this President and this administration are not so 
committed to a single course of action that serious discussion and 
serious consideration of proposals such as this are precluded.
  Mr. President, I appreciate the time and I yield the floor.
  I ask unanimous consent the paper to which I referred be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       The papers in this collection grew out of discussions held 
     at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace from late 
     April to late July of this year. The discussions included top 
     regional and military experts, former inspectors with dozens 
     of man-years' experience in Iraq, and individuals with 
     intimate knowledge of the diplomatic situation at the United 
     Nations.

                  A New Approach: Coercive Inspections

      (By Jessica T. Matthews, President, Carnegie Endowment for 
                          International Peace)

       The summary proposal that follows draws heavily on the 
     expertise of all those who participated in the Carnegie 
     discussions on Iraq and on the individually authored papers. 
     Further explanation and greater detail on virtually every 
     point, especially the proposal's military aspects, can be 
     found therein.
       With rising emphasis in recent months, the president has 
     made clear that the United States' number one concern in Iraq 
     is its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). No link 
     has yet been found between Baghdad's assertively secular 
     regime and radical Islamist terrorists. There is much else 
     about the Iraqi government that is fiercely objectionable but 
     nothing that presents an imminent threat to the region, the 
     United States, or the world. Thus, the United States' primary 
     goal is, and should be, to deal with the WMD threat.
       In light of what is now a four-year-long absence of 
     international inspectors from the country, it has been widely 
     assumed that the United States has only two options regarding 
     that threat: continue to do nothing to find and destroy 
     Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile programs, 
     or pursue covert action or a full-scale military operation to 
     overthrow Saddam Hussein. At best, the latter would be a 
     unilateral initiative with grudging partners.
       This paper proposes a third approach, a middle ground 
     between an unacceptable status quo that allows Iraqi WMD 
     programs to continue and the enormous costs and risks of an 
     invasion. It proposes a new regime of coercive international 
     inspections. A powerful, multinational military force, 
     created by the UN Security Council, would enable UN and 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection teams to 
     carry out ``comply or else'' inspections. The ``or else'' is 
     overthrow of the regime. The burden of choosing war is placed 
     squarely on Saddam Hussein. The middle-ground option is a 
     radical change from the earlier international inspection 
     effort in which the playing field was tilted steeply in 
     Iraq's favor. It requires a military commitment sufficient to 
     pose a credible threat to Iraq and would take a vigorous 
     diplomatic initiative on Washington's part to launch. Long-
     term success would require sustained unity of purpose among 
     the major powers. These difficulties make this approach 
     attractive only in comparison to the alternatives, but in 
     that light, its virtues emerge sharply.
       Inspections backed by a force authorized by the UN Security 
     Council would carry unimpeachable legitimacy and command 
     broad international support. The effort would therefore 
     strengthen, rather than undermine, the cooperation the United 
     States needs for long-term success in the war against 
     terrorism. It would avoid setting a dangerous precedent of a 
     unilateral right to attack in ``preventive self-defense.'' 
     Although not likely to be welcomed by Iraq's neighbors, it 
     would be their clear choice over war. Regional assistance 
     (basing, over-flight rights, and so on) should therefore be 
     more forthcoming. If successful, it would reduce Iraq's WMD 
     threat to negligible levels. If a failure, it would lay an 
     operational and political basis for a transition to a war 
     to oust Saddam. The United States would be seen to have 
     worked through the United Nations with the rest of the 
     world rather than alone, and Iraq's intent would have been 
     cleanly tested and found wanting. Baghdad would be 
     isolated. In these circumstances, the risks to the region 
     of a war to overthrow Iraq's government-from domestic 
     pressure on shaky governments (Pakistan) to government 
     misreading U.S. intentions (Iran) to heightened Arab and 
     Islamic anger toward the United States-would be sharply 
     diminished.
       Compared to a war aimed at regime change, the approach 
     greatly reduces the risk of Saddam's using whatever WMD he 
     has (probably against Israel) while a force aimed at his 
     destruction is being assembled. On the political front, 
     coercive inspections avoid the looming question of what 
     regime would replace the current government. It would also 
     avoid the risks of persistent instability in Iraq, its 
     possible disintegration into Shia, Suni, and Kurdish regions, 
     and the need to station tens of thousands of U.S. troops in 
     the country for what could be a very long time.
       A year ago, the approach would have been impossible. Since 
     then, however, four factors have combined to make it 
     achievable: Greatly increased concern about WMD in the wake 
     of September 11; Iraq's continued lies and intransigence even 
     after major reform of the UN sanctions regime; Russia's 
     embrace of the United States after the September 11 attacks, 
     and the Bush administration's threats of unilateral military 
     action, which have opened a political space that did not 
     exist before.
       Together, these changes have restored a consensus among the 
     Security Council's five permanent members (P-5) regarding the 
     need for action on Iraq's WMD that has not existed for the 
     past five years.


                             core premises

       Several key premises underlie the new approach.
       Inspections can work. In their first five years, the United 
     Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), which was 
     responsible for inspecting and disarming Iraq's chemical, 
     biological, and missile materials and capacities, and the 
     IAEA Iraq Action Team, which did the same for Iraq's nuclear 
     ones, achieved substantial successes. With sufficient human 
     and technological resources, time, and political support, 
     inspections can reduce Iraq's WMD threat, if not to zero, to 
     a negligible level. (The term inspections encompasses a 
     resumed discovery and disarmament phase and intrusive, 
     ongoing monitoring and verification extending to dual-use 
     facilities and the activities of key individuals.)
       Saddam Hussein's overhelming priority is to stay in power. 
     He will wilingly give up pursuit of WMD, but he will do so if 
     convinced that the only alternative is his certain 
     destruction and that of his regime.
       A credible and continuing military threat involving 
     substantial forces on Iraq's borders will be necessary both 
     to get the inspectors back into Iraq and to enable them to do 
     their job. The record from 1991 to the present makes clear 
     that Iraq views UN WMD inspections as war by other means. 
     There is no reason to expect this to change. Sanctions, 
     inducements, negotiations, or periodic air strikes will 
     not suffice to restore effective inspection. Negotiations 
     in the present circumstances only serve Baghdad's goals of 
     delay and diversion.
       The UNSOM/IAEA successes also critically depended on unity 
     of purpose within the UN Security Council. No amount of 
     military force will be effective without unwavering political 
     resolve behind it. Effective inspections cannot be 
     reestablished until a way forward is found that the manor 
     powers and key regional states can support under the UN 
     Charter.


                    negotiating coercive inspections

       From roughly 1997 until recently, determined Iraqi 
     diplomacy succeeded in dividing the P-5. Today, principally 
     due to Iraq's behavior, Russia's new geopolitical stance, and 
     U.S.-led reform of the sanctions regime, a limited consensus 
     has reemerged. There is now agreement that Iraq has not met 
     its obligations under UN Resolution 687 (which created the 
     inspections regime) and that there is a need for the return 
     of inspectors to Iraq. There is also support behind the new, 
     yet-to-be tested inspection team known as the UN Monitoring, 
     Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC, created in 
     December 1999 under Resolution 1284). Because three members 
     of the P-5 abstained on the vote to create UNMOVIC, this 
     development is particularly noteworthy. The May 2002 adoption 
     of a revised sanctions plan was further evidence of a still 
     fragile but real and evolving convergence of view on the 
     Security Council.
       Perhaps paradoxically, U.S. threats to act unilaterally 
     against Iraq have the potential to strengthen this limited 
     consensus. France, Russia, and China strongly share the view 
     that only the Security Council can authorize the use of a 
     force--a view to which Great Britain is also sympathetic. All 
     four know that after eleven years of the United Nations' 
     handling of the issue, a U.S. decision to act unilaterally 
     against Iraq would be a tremendous blow to the authority of 
     the institution and the Security Council in particular. They 
     want to avoid any further marginalization of the Council 
     since that would translate into a diminution of their 
     individual influence. Thus, U.S. threats provide these four 
     countries with a shared interest in finding a formula for the 
     use of force against Iraq that would be effective, acceptable 
     to the United States, and able to be authorized by the 
     Council as a whole. That formula could be found in a 
     resolution authorizing multinational enforcement action to 
     enable UNMOVIC to carry out its mandate.
       Achieving such an outcome would require a tremendous 
     diplomatic effort on Washington's part. That, however, should 
     to be a seen as a serious deterrent. Achieving desired 
     outcomes without resort to war is, in the first instance, 
     what power is for. Launching the middle-ground approach would 
     amount, in effect, to Washington and the rest of the P-5 re-
     seizing the diplomatic initiative from Baghdad.
       The critical element will be that the United States makes 
     clear that it forswears unilateral military action against 
     Iraq for as long as international inspections are working. 
     The United States would have to convince Iraq and others that 
     this is not a perfunctory bow to international opinion 
     preparatory to an invasion and that the United States' intent 
     is to see inspections succeed, not a ruse to have them 
     quickly fail. If Iraq

[[Page S9358]]

     is not convinced, it would have no reason to comply; indeed, 
     quite the reverse because Baghdad would need whatever WMD it 
     has to deter or fight with a U.S. attack. Given the past 
     history, many countries will be deeply skeptical. To succeed, 
     Washington will have to be steady, unequivocal, and 
     unambiguous on this point.
       This does not mean that Washington need alter its 
     declaratory policy favoring regime change in Iraq. Its stance 
     would be that the United States continues to support regime 
     change but will not take action to force it while Iraq is in 
     full compliance with international inspections. There would 
     be nothing unusual in such a position. The United States has, 
     for example, had a declaratory policy for regime change in 
     Cuba for more than forty years.
       Beyond the Security Council, U.S. diplomacy will need to 
     recognize the significant differences in strategic interests 
     among the states in the region. Some want a strong Iraq to 
     offset Iran. Others fear a prosperous, pro-West Iraq 
     producing oil to its full potential. Many fear and oppose 
     U.S. military dominance in the region. Virtually all, 
     however, agree that Iraq should be free of WMD, and they 
     universally fear the instability that is likely to accompany 
     a violent overthrow of the Iraqi government.
       Moreover, notwithstanding the substantial U.S. presence 
     required for enforced inspections and what will be widely 
     felt to be an unfair double standard (acting against Iraq's 
     WMD but not against Israel's), public opinion throughout the 
     region would certainly be less aroused by multlaellateral 
     inspections than by a unilateral U.S. invasion.
       Thus, if faced with a choice between a war to achieve 
     regime change and an armed, multilateral effort to eradicate 
     Iraq's WMD, all the region's governments are likely to share 
     a clear preference for the latter.


                   implementing coercive inspections

       Under the coercive inspections plan, the Security Council 
     would authorize the creation of an Inspections Implementation 
     Force (IIF) to act as the enforcement arm for UNMOVIC and the 
     IAEA task force. Under the new resolution, the inspections 
     process is transformed from a game of cat and mouse 
     punctuated by diversions and manufactured crises, in which 
     conditions heavily favor Iraqi obstruction, into a last 
     chance, ``comply or else'' operation. The inspection teams 
     would return to Iraq accompanied by a military arm strong 
     enough to force immediate entry into any site at any time 
     with complete security for the inspection team. No terms 
     would be negotiated regarding the dates, duration, or 
     modalities of inspection. If Iraq chose not to accept, or 
     established a record of noncompliance, the U.S. regime-change 
     option or, better, a UN authorization of ``use of all 
     necessary means'' would come into play.
       Overall control is vested in the civilian executive 
     chairman of the inspection teams. He would determine what 
     sites will be inspected, without interference for the 
     Security Council, and whether military forces should 
     accompany any particular inspection. Some inspections--for 
     example, personnel interviews--may be better conducted 
     without any accompanying force; others will require maximum 
     insurance of prompt entry and protection. The size and 
     composition of the accompanying force would be the decision 
     of the IIF commander, and its employment would be under his 
     command.
       The IIF must be strong and mobile enough to support full 
     inspection of any site, including socalled sensitive sites 
     and those previously designated as off limits. ``No-fly'' and 
     ``no-drive'' zones near to-be-inspected sites would be 
     imposed with minimal advance notice to Baghdad. Violations of 
     these bans would subject the opposing forces to attack. 
     Robust operational and communications security would allow 
     surprise inspections. In the event surprise fails 
     and ``spontaneous'' gatherings of civilians attempt to 
     impede inspections, rapid response riot control units must 
     be available.
       The IIF must be highly mobile, composed principally of air 
     and armored cavalry units. It might include an armored 
     cavalry regiment or equivalent on the Jordan-Iraq border, an 
     air-mobile brigade in eastern Turkey, and two or more 
     brigades and corps-sized infrastructure based in Saudi Arabia 
     and Kuwait. Air support including fighter and fighterbomber 
     aircraft and continuous air and ground surveillance, provided 
     by AWACS and JSTARS, will be required. The IIF must have a 
     highly sophisticated intelligence capability. Iraq has become 
     quite experienced in concealment and in its ability to 
     penetrate and mislead inspection teams. It has had four 
     unimpeded years to construct new underground sites, build 
     mobile facilities, alter records, and so on. To overcome that 
     advantage and ensure military success, the force must be 
     equipped with the full range of reconnaissance, surveillance, 
     listening, encryption, and photo interpretation capabilities.
       The bulk of the force will be U.S. For critical political 
     reasons, however, the IIF must be as multinational as 
     possible and as small as practicable. Its design and 
     composition should strive to make clear that the IIF is not a 
     U.S. invasion force in disguise, but a UN enforcement force. 
     Optimally, it would include, at a minimum, elements from all 
     of the P-5, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, as well as 
     others in the region.
       Consistent with the IIF's mandate and UN origin, Washington 
     will have to rigorously resist the temptation to use the 
     force's access and the information it collects for purposes 
     unrelated to its job. Nothing will more quickly sow division 
     within the Security Council than excesses in this regard.
       Operationally, on the civilian front, experts disagree as 
     to whether UNMOVIC's mandate contains disabling weaknesses. 
     Although some provisions could certainly be improved, it 
     would be unwise to attempt to renegotiate Resolution 1284. 
     Some of its weaknesses can be overcome in practice by tacit 
     agreement (some have already been), some will be met by the 
     vastly greater technological capabilities conferred by the 
     IIF, and some can be corrected through the language of the 
     IIF resolution. Four factors are critical:
       Adequate time. The inspection process must not be placed 
     under any arbitrary deadline because that would provide 
     Baghdad with an enormous incentive for delay. It is in 
     everyone's interest to complete the disarmament phase of the 
     job as quickly as possible, but timelines cannot be fixed in 
     advance.
       Experienced personnel. UNMOVIC must not be forced to climb 
     a learning curve as UNSCOM did but must be ready to operate 
     with maximum effectiveness from the outset. To do so, it must 
     be able to take full advantage of individuals with 
     irreplaceable, on-the-ground experience.
       Provision for two-way intelligence sharing with national 
     governments. UNSCOM experience proves that provision for 
     intelligence sharing with national governments is 
     indispensable. Inspectors need must information not available 
     from open sources or commercial satellites and prompt, direct 
     access to defectors. For their part, intelligence agencies 
     will not provide a flow of information without feedback on 
     its value and accuracy. It must be accepted by all 
     governments that such interactions are necessary and that the 
     dialogue between providers and users would be on a strictly 
     confidential, bilateral basis, protected from other 
     governemnts. The individual in charge of information 
     collection and assessment on the inspection team should 
     have an intelligence background and command the trust of 
     those governments that provide the bulk of the 
     intelligence.
       Ability to track Iraqi procurement activities outside the 
     country. UNSCOM discovered covert transactions between Iraq 
     and more than 500 companies from more than 40 countries 
     between 1993 and 1998. Successful inspections would 
     absolutely depend, therefore, on the team's authority to 
     track procurement efforts both inside and outside Iraq, 
     including at Iraqi embassies abroad. Accordingly, UNMOVIC 
     should include a staff of specially trained customs experts, 
     and inspections would need to include relevant ministries, 
     commercial banks, and trading companies. As with military 
     intelligence, tracking Iraqi procurement must not be used to 
     collect unrelated commercial and technical intelligence or 
     impede legal trade.


                               conclusion

       War should never be undertaken until the alternatives have 
     been exhausted. In this case that moral imperative is 
     buttressed by the very real possibility that a war to 
     overthrow Saddam Hussein, even if successful in doing so, 
     could subtract more from U.S. security and long-term 
     political interests that it adds.
       Political chaos in Iraq or an equally bad successor regime 
     committed to WMD to prevent an invasion from ever happening 
     again, possibly horrible costs to Israel, greater enmity 
     toward the United States among Arab and other Muslim publics, 
     a severe blow to the authority of the United Nations and the 
     Security Council, and a giant step by the United States 
     toward-in Zbigniew Brzezinski's phrase-political self-
     isolation are just some of the costs, in addition to 
     potentially severe economic impacts and the loss of American 
     and innocent Iraqi lives, that must be weighed.
       In this case alternative does exist. It blends the 
     imperative for military threat against a regime that has 
     learned how to divide and conquer the major powers with the 
     legitimacy of UN sanction and multilateral action. 
     Technically and operationally, it is less demanding than a 
     war. Diplomatically, it requires a much greater effort for a 
     greater gain. The message of an unswerving international 
     determination to halt WMD proliferation will be heard far 
     beyond Iraq. The only real question is can the major powers 
     see their mutual interest, act together, and stay the course? 
     Who is more determined--Iraq or the P-5?

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the 
Senator from Vermont is recognized.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am fortunate to represent a State whose 
citizens have long been involved in international affairs. Whether 
through military or diplomatic service, volunteering for the Peace 
Corps, studying abroad, or because we live on a great international 
border, Vermonters have strong views about these issues.
  I was in Vermont this past weekend, and as always I had the 
opportunity to speak to many Vermonters from all walks of life. I can 
say, beyond any doubt, that Vermonters across the political spectrum 
are very concerned about our policy toward Iraq.
  They are worried that we are shifting our focus away from ending the 
violence in the Middle East, eliminating

[[Page S9359]]

al-Qaida, and rebuilding Afghanistan even though that Herculean task 
has barely begun.
  The President has sent to Congress a proposed resolution for the use 
of military force against Iraq. It would permit the President to take 
any action whatsoever to ``defend the national security interests of 
the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore 
international peace and security in the region.''
  While I hope this is the beginning of a consultative, bipartisan 
process to produce a sensible resolution and to act on it at the 
appropriate time, the current proposal is an extraordinarily over-
broad, open-ended resolution that would authorize the President to send 
American troops not only into war against Iraq, but also against any 
nation in the Gulf or Middle East region, however one defines it.
  Declaring war, or providing the authority to wage war, is the single 
most important responsibility given to Congress under the Constitution. 
As history has shown, wars inevitably have unforeseen, terrible 
consequences, especially for innocent civilians.
  Blank-check resolutions, such as the one the President proposes, can 
likewise be misinterpreted or used in ways that we do not intend or 
expect. It has happened before, in ways that many people, including 
Members of Congress, came to regret. That is why a thorough debate is 
so necessary. And that is also why this Vermonter will not vote for a 
blank check for this President or any President. My conscience and the 
Constitution do not allow it.
  The timing of the debate is also important. Congress is being asked 
to send Americans into battle, even though diplomatic efforts have not 
yet been exhausted. Nor do we have a complete assessment by U.S. 
intelligence agencies of the threat that Iraq poses to the United 
States.
  I will have more to say when the debate on the resolution occurs. But 
I do want to take a few minutes to share some initial thoughts as we 
begin to consider this difficult question.
  The question we face is not whether Saddam Hussein is a menace to his 
people, to his neighbors and to our national security interests. The 
Iraqi regime has already invaded Iran and Kuwait, gassed members of its 
own population, and repeatedly flouted international conventions 
against armed aggression. It is clear that Iraq has tried to develop a 
range of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons, with which Iraq might threaten the entire Gulf 
region.
  I would like to see Saddam Hussein gone as much as anyone. But the 
question is, how immediate is this threat and what is the best way to 
deal with it, without undercutting our principal goal of protecting the 
American people from terrorism, promoting peace in the Middle East, and 
other important U.S. national security priorities?
  Some administration officials have suggested that to ask questions 
about going to war in Iraq is somehow unpatriotic, or indicative of a 
lack of concern about national security. That is nothing more than 
election year partisan politics at its worst. These questions are being 
asked by Americans in every State of the Union.
  Until recently our focus has been, rightly so, on destroying al-Qaida 
and other terrorist networks. While that challenge has already cost 
billions of dollars and continues to occupy the attention and resources 
of the Department of Defense and the U.S. intelligence community, the 
administration has suddenly shifted gears and is now rushing headlong 
toward war with Iraq.
  Some have argued that Congress must act now to strengthen the 
President's hand as the administration negotiates at the United 
Nations.

  But what we would really be saying is that regardless of what the 
Security Council does, we have already decided to go our own way. I 
contrast that with the situation in 1990 when the United States 
successfully assembled a broad international coalition to fight the 
Gulf War. The Congress passed a resolution only after the U.N. acted.
  President Bush deserves credit for focusing the world's attention on 
international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. I have said 
this over and over again. But the process that has brought us to the 
brink of preparing for war with Iraq has been notable for its 
confusion.
  The statements of administration officials have been fraught with 
inconsistencies. They claim to speak for the American people, but 
average Americans are urging the administration to proceed cautiously 
on Iraq and to work with the United Nations and the Congress. Our 
allies are confused and angry about the way this has been handled. Our 
friends in the Middle East are fearful of what lies ahead.
  Fortunately, the President heeded calls to go to the United Nations, 
and in his speech to the General Assembly he described in great detail 
Saddam Hussein's long history of deception and defiance of U.N. 
resolutions. I commended that speech. I am also pleased that it focused 
on enforcing those resolutions, especially concerning weapons of mass 
destruction.
  But the American people need to hear more than generalized 
accusations and threatening ultimatums. They need to know the scope and 
urgency of the problem, Saddam's current and future capabilities, the 
options for solving the problem, and the short and long-term 
implications of each course of action, including the very real dangers 
of unintended consequences.
  I agree with the President when he says that Saddam Hussein cannot be 
trusted and that disarming Iraq is the goal. But the first way to try 
to accomplish this is not through precipitous, unilateral military 
action. Rather, it is by building an alliance and working through the 
United Nations.
  Earlier this week, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General John Shalikashvili, warned the administration of the dangers of 
attacking Iraq without the backing of the United Nations:

       We are a global nation with global interests, and 
     undermining the credibility of the United Nations does very 
     little to help provide stability and security and safety to 
     the rest of the world, where we have to operate for economic 
     reasons and political reasons.

  Working through the United Nations to readmit the weapons inspectors 
could be effective in disarming Iraq. Rolf Ekeus the former executive 
chairman of UNSCOM, has stated:

       International weapons inspectors, if properly backed up by 
     international force, can unearth Saddam Hussein's weapons 
     programs. If we believe that Iraq would be much less of a 
     threat without such weapons, the obvious thing is to focus on 
     getting rid of the weapons. Doing that through an inspection 
     team is not only the most effective way, but would cost less 
     in lives and destruction than an invasion.

  A study by the Carnegie Endowment, co-authored by former U.S. 
military and United Nations officials, supports this view: ``With 
sufficient human and technological resources, time, and political 
support, inspections can reduce Iraq's [weapons of mass destruction] 
threat, if not to zero, to a negligible level.''
  There are distinct advantages to this approach. For one, if Iraq 
again refuses to comply with U.N. demands, there will be a much 
stronger case for more forceful action.
  It would also help mitigate potential damage to our relations with 
other nations whose support we need to achieve other important U.S. 
goals, such as capturing terrorists or promoting peace in the Middle 
East.
  Diplomacy is often tedious. It does not usually make the headlines or 
the evening news, and much has been made of our past diplomatic 
failures. But history has shown over and over that diplomacy can not 
only protect our national interests, it can also enhance the 
effectiveness of military force when force becomes necessary.
  Many experts believe that, despite deception by the Iraqis, the U.N. 
inspection process destroyed much of the Iraqi weapons program, and new 
inspections could succeed in substantially disarming Saddam. However, 
the U.N. regime broke down when Saddam Hussein starting blocking the 
inspections and the Security Council was divided on how to respond.
  I support the unconditional return of inspectors backed up by an 
international military force. But, the world must not repeat the 
mistakes of 1998. We have already seen some troubling signs of 
diplomatic double talk from the Iraqis, particularly on the issue of 
unimpeded access for the inspectors. The international community cannot 
tolerate deception and defiance on the part of the Iraqis, and 
Secretary Powell is right to push for a new U.N. resolution.

[[Page S9360]]

  Other members of the Security Council should join United States and 
British efforts to craft a strong new resolution with a deadline for 
Iraqi compliance. The U.N. has a responsibility to enforce its demands. 
If the U.N. does not act to ensure that the inspection regime is 
effectively structured, we will end up back where we were in 1998. 
Saddam will play the same cat and mouse game, the U.N. will look 
toothless, and we will be not be able to destroy the Iraqi weapons 
program.
  We need a strengthened inspection regime that has preexisting 
authority from the Security Council to deploy military force to back up 
the inspectors if there is resistance from Iraq. I hope that the 
Administration works with the United Nations, not so much the other way 
around, to make this happen.
  If Iraq resists the inspections, and the President decides to use 
military force, then the procedure is clear. He can seek a declaration 
of war from the Congress, and the Congress can vote. But voting on such 
a resolution at this time would be premature.

  A decision to invade Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein should be based on 
a complete assessment of Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, 
and the threat Iraq poses to the United States. What is the evidence--
as opposed to assertions and assumptions--that Iraq is close to 
acquiring a nuclear weapon? What is the evidence that Iraq is capable 
of launching, or has any intention of launching, an attack against us 
or one of our allies?
  And there are more questions that are as yet unanswered. What is the 
evidence that Saddam Hussein wants to commit suicide, which such an 
attack would guarantee? Why is containment, a strategy which kept the 
Soviet Union with its thousands of nuclear warheads and chemical and 
biological weapons at bay for 40 years, not valid for Saddam Hussein, a 
cold, calculating tyrant who cares above all about staying in power?
  I am not sure how these questions can be answered without an updated 
National Intelligence Estimate. As the Washington Post has reported, 
there are conflicting views within the intelligence community on Iraq, 
and without this estimate, which pulls together the different 
assessments by various parts of the intelligence community, Congress is 
being asked to give a blank check without all of the facts. I am not 
going to write a blank check under any circumstances and I am certainly 
not going to do it with less than all of the facts.
  We also must assess whether an attack could spin out of control and 
draw the entire Middle East into war. As Secretary Rumsfeld 
acknowledged, an Iraqi attack on Israel could spark a deadly spiral of 
escalation in which Israeli retaliation prompts responses from other 
Arab states. Israel has a right of self-defense, and Prime Minister 
Sharon has said that Israel would retaliate. At the very least, it 
would further inflame Arab populations whose governments are key to 
bringing lasting peace to the Middle East and reducing the breeding 
grounds for extremist Islamic fundamentalism and international 
terrorism. Some of those breeding grounds are within the borders of 
some of our closest friends in the region and we should not lose sight 
of that.
  We also must fully assess the costs of a war. The Gulf War cost tens 
of billions of dollars, but ultimately other nations helped to defray 
those costs. The President's Economic Adviser said that this war could 
cost as much as two hundred billion dollars, and that assumes it does 
not spread beyond Iraq.
  As the combat in Afghanistan showed, once again, we have the finest 
fighting forces in the world. We can be confident that we would win a 
war with Iraq, but there would be American lives lost, especially if 
Iraq lures U.S. troops into urban combat.
  We have to remember that it is one thing to topple a regime, but it 
is equally important, and sometimes far more difficult, to rebuild a 
country to prevent it from becoming engulfed by factional fighting. If 
these nations cannot successfully rebuild, then they will once again 
become havens for terrorists.
  The President would need to show that a post-Saddam Iraq would not be 
a continual source of instability and conflict in the region. While 
Iraq has a strong civil society that might be able to become a 
democracy, in the chaos of a post-Saddam Iraq another dictator could 
rise to the top or the country could splinter into ethnic or religious 
conflict.
  To ensure that this does not happen, does the administration foresee 
basing thousands of U.S. troops in Iraq after the war, and if so, for 
how many years and for how many billions of dollars at a time when the 
U.S. economy is weakening, the Federal deficit is growing, and poverty 
is increasing here at home?
  Is the administration committed to investing the resources it is 
going to take to rebuild Iraq, even when we are falling short of what 
is needed in Afghanistan?
  In Afghanistan, the Taliban was vanquished with a minimum of U.S. 
casualties, but destroying al-Qaida, which is the primary goal of our 
efforts in Afghanistan, is proving far more difficult. We are told that 
while al-Qaida's leadership has been badly disrupted, its members have 
dispersed widely. Although there is a growing belief that Osama bin 
Laden is dead, we have no proof.
  In addition, the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is critical. 
There are thousands of homeless Afghans and a real threat of widespread 
hunger or famine this winter. There are families who lost loved ones or 
their homes were destroyed in the violence perpetrated by the Taliban, 
years of civil war, or from mistakes made during military operations by 
U.S. and coalition forces.
  Yet the administration, despite calls by President Bush for a 
Marshall plan, did not ask for a single cent for Afghanistan for fiscal 
year 2003. In addition, $94 million for humanitarian, refugee, and 
reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan, which Congress added in the 
supplemental appropriations bill, was not deemed an emergency by the 
President.
  Some relief organizations have already been told that they may have 
to shut down programs for lack of funds. This is happening in a country 
that so desperately needs the most basic staples such as water, 
education and medical help. Afghans who have returned to their homes 
from outside the country may become refugees once again.
  Many other nations have yet to fulfill pledges of assistance to 
Afghanistan, but if the President is serious about a Marshall Plan, and 
I believe he is right, then we need to do much more to help rebuild 
that country.
  Yet, as we continue to face difficult challenges in Afghanistan and 
hunting down members of al-Qaida, not to mention a number of challenges 
here at home such as the economy, we are suddenly being thrust into a 
debate about Iraq. It is a debate that will have lasting consequences 
for our standing in the world as a country that recognizes the 
importance of multilateral solutions to global problems and that 
respects international law.
  General Wesley Clark, who headed the successful U.S. and NATO 
military campaign in Kosovo, recently addressed this problem directly, 
when he wrote:

       The longer this war [on terrorism] goes on--and by all 
     accounts, it will go on for years--the more our success will 
     depend on the willing cooperation and active participation of 
     our allies to root out terrorist cells in Europe and Asia, to 
     cut off funding and support of terrorists and to deal with 
     Saddam Hussein and other threats. We are far more likely to 
     gain the support we need by working through international 
     institutions than outside of them.

  The world cannot ignore Saddam Hussein. I can envision circumstances 
which would cause me to support the use of force against Iraq, if we 
cannot obtain unimpeded access for U.N. inspectors or the United States 
is threatened with imminent harm.
  But like many Vermonters, based on what I know today, I believe that 
in order to solve this problem without potentially creating more 
enemies over the long run, we must act deliberately, not precipitously.
  The President has taken the first step, by seeking support from the 
United Nations. Let us give that process time. If it fails, then we can 
cross that bridge when we come to it.
  But I am reminded of my first year as a U.S. Senator. The year was 
1975, and there were still 60 or 70 Senators here who had voted for the 
Tonkin Gulf resolution a decade earlier. That vote was 88-2, and many 
of those Senators,

[[Page S9361]]

Democrats and Republicans, spoke of that vote as the greatest mistake 
of their careers.
  That resolution was adopted hastily after reports of a minor incident 
which may, in fact, not have occurred at all. It was interpreted by 
both the Johnson and Nixon administrations as carte blanche to wage war 
in Vietnam for over a decade, ultimately involving over half a million 
American troops and resulting in the deaths of over 58,000 Americans.
  I am not suggesting that the administration is trying to deceive 
Congress or the American people, and I recognize that the situation in 
Iraq today is very different from Vietnam in 1964. But we learned some 
painful and important lessons back then. And one that is as relevant 
today as it was 38 years ago, is that the Senate should never give up 
its constitutional rights, responsibilities, and authority to the 
executive branch. It should never shrink from its Constitutional 
responsibilities, especially when the lives of American servicemen and 
women are at stake.
  So when we consider the resolution on Iraq, I hope we will remember 
those lessons, because under no circumstances should the Congress pass 
a blank check and let the administration fill in the amount later. The 
Constitution does not allow that, and I will not do that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
South Dakota is recognized.

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