[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 120 (Friday, September 20, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8987-S8998]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                          HOW SADDAM HAPPENED

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, yesterday, at a hearing of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, I asked a question of the Secretary of Defense. I 
referred to a Newsweek article that will appear in the September 23, 
2002, edition. That article reads as follows. It is not overly lengthy. 
I shall read it. Beginning on page 35 of Newsweek, here is what the 
article says:

       America helped make a monster. What to do with him--and 
     what happens after he is gone--has haunted us for a quarter 
     century.

  The article is written by Christopher Dickey and Evan Thomas. It 
reads as follows:

       The last time Donald Rumsfeld saw Saddam Hussein, he gave 
     him a cordial handshake. The date was almost 20 years ago, 
     Dec. 20, 1983; an official Iraqi television crew recorded the 
     historic moment.
       The once and future Defense secretary, at the time a 
     private citizen, had been sent by President Ronald Reagan to 
     Baghdad as a special envoy. Saddam Hussein, armed with a 
     pistol on his hip, seemed ``vigorous and confident,'' 
     according to a now declassified State Department cable 
     obtained by Newsweek. Rumsfeld ``conveyed the President's 
     greetings and expressed his pleasure at being in Baghdad,'' 
     wrote the notetaker. Then the two men got down to business, 
     talking about the need to improve relations between their two 
     countries.
       Like most foreign-policy insiders, Rumsfeld was aware that 
     Saddam was a murderous thug who supported terrorists and was 
     trying to build a nuclear weapon. (The Israelis had already 
     bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osirak.) But at the time, 
     America's big worry was Iran, not Iraq. The Reagan 
     administration feared that the Iranian revolutionaries who 
     had overthrown the shah (and taken hostage American diplomats 
     for 444 days in 1979-81) would overrun the Middle East and 
     its vital oilfields. On the--theory that the enemy of my 
     enemy is my friend, the Reaganites were seeking to support 
     Iraq in a long and bloody war against Iran. The meeting 
     between Rumsfeld and Saddam was consequential: for the next 
     five years, until Iran finally capitulated, the United States 
     backed Saddam's armies with military intelligence, economic 
     aid and covert supplies of munitions.
       Rumsfeld is not the first American diplomat to wish for the 
     demise of a former ally. After all, before the cold war, the 
     Soviet Union was America's partner against Hitler in World 
     War II. In the real world, as the saying goes, nations have 
     no permanent friends, just permanent interests. Nonetheless, 
     Rumsfeld's long-ago interlude with Saddam is a reminder that 
     today's friend can be tomorrow's mortal threat. As President 
     George W. Bush and his war cabinet ponder Saddam's 
     successor's regime, they would do well to contemplate how and 
     why the last three presidents allowed the Butcher of Baghdad 
     to stay in power so long.
       The history of America's relations with Saddam is one of 
     the sorrier tales in American foreign policy. Time and again, 
     America turned a blind eye to Saddam's predations, saw him as 
     the lesser evil or flinched at the chance to unseat him. No 
     single policymaker or administration deserves blame for 
     creating, or at least tolerating, a monster; many of their 
     decisions seemed reasonable at the time. Even so, there are 
     moments in this clumsy dance with the Devil that make one 
     cringe. It is hard to believe that, during most of the 1980s, 
     America knowingly permitted the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission 
     to import bacterial cultures that might be used to build 
     biological weapons.

  Let me read that again:

       It is hard to believe that, during most of the 1980s, 
     America knowingly permitted the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission 
     to import bacterial cultures that might be used to build 
     biological weapons. But it happened.
       America's past stumbles, while embarrassing, are not an 
     argument for inaction in the future. Saddam probably is the 
     ``grave and gathering danger'' described by President Bush in 
     his speech to the United Nations last week. It may also be 
     true that ``whoever replaces Saddam is not going to be 
     worse,'' as a senior administration official put it to 
     Newsweek. But the story of how America helped create a 
     Frankenstein monster it now wishes to strangle is sobering. 
     It illustrates the power of wishful thinking, as well as the 
     iron law of unintended consequences.
       America did not put Saddam in power. He emerged after two 
     decades of turmoil in the '60s and '70s, as various strongmen 
     tried to gain control of a nation that had been concocted by 
     British imperialists in the 1920s out of three distinct and 
     rival factions, the Sunnis, Shiites and the Kurds. But during 
     the cold war, America competed with the Soviets for Saddam's 
     attention and welcomed his war with the religious fanatics of 
     Iran. Having cozied up to Saddam, Washington found it hard to 
     break away--even after going to war with him in 1991. Through 
     years of both tacit and overt support, the West helped create 
     the Saddam of today, giving him time to build deadly arsenals 
     and dominate his people. Successive administrations always 
     worried that if Saddam fell, chaos would follow, rippling 
     through the region and possibly igniting another Middle East 
     war. At times it seemed that Washington was transfixed by 
     Saddam.
       The Bush administration wants to finally break the spell. 
     If the administration's true believers are right, Baghdad, 
     after Saddam falls will look something like Paris after the 
     Germans fled in August 1944. American troops will be cheered 
     as liberators, and democracy will spread forth and push 
     Middle Eastern despotism back into the shadows. Yet if the 
     gloomy predictions of the administration's many critics come 
     true, the Arab street, inflamed by Yankee imperialism, will 
     rise up and replace the shaky but friendly autocrats in the 
     region with Islamic fanatics.
       While the Middle East is unlikely to become a democratic 
     nirvana, the worst-case scenarios, always a staple of the 
     press, are probably also wrong or exaggerated. Assuming that 
     a cornered and doomed Saddam does not kill thousands of 
     Americans in some kind of horrific Gotterdammerung--a scary 
     possibility, one that deeply worries administration 
     officials--the greatest risk of his fall is that one 
     strongman may simply be replaced by another. Saddam's 
     successor may not be a paranoid sadist. But there is no 
     assurance that he will be America's friend or forswear the 
     development of weapons of mass destruction.
       American officials have known that Saddam was a 
     psychopath--

  Get that.

       American officials have known that Saddam was a psychopath 
     ever since he became the country's de facto ruler in the 
     early 1970s. One of Saddam's early acts after he took the 
     title of president in 1979 was to videotape a session of his 
     party's congress, during which he personally ordered several 
     members executed on the spot.

  Let me repeat that:

       American officials have known that Saddam was a psychopath 
     ever since he became the country's de facto ruler in the 
     early 1970s. One of Saddam's early acts after he took the 
     title of president in 1979 was to videotape--

  Videotape--

     a session of his party's congress, during which he personally 
     ordered several members executed on the spot.
       The message, carefully conveyed to the Arab press, was not 
     that these men were executed for plotting against Saddam, but 
     rather for thinking about plotting against him. From the 
     beginning, U.S. officials worried about Saddam's taste for 
     nasty weaponry; indeed, at their meeting in 1983, Rumsfeld 
     warned that Saddam's use of chemical weapons might 
     ``inhibit'' American assistance. But top officials in the 
     Reagan administration saw Saddam as a useful surrogate. By 
     going to war with Iran, he could bleed the radical mullahs 
     who had seized control of Iran from the pro-American shah. 
     Some Reagan officials even saw Saddam as another Anwar Sadat, 
     capable of making Iraq into a modern secular state, just as 
     Sadat had tried to lift up Egypt before his assassination in 
     1981.
       But Saddam had to be rescued first. The war against Iran 
     was going badly by 1982. Iran's ``human wave attacks'' 
     threatened to overrun Saddam's armies. Washington decided to 
     give Iraq a helping hand.
       After Rumsfeld's visit to Baghdad in 1983, U.S. 
     intelligence began supplying the Iraqi dictator with 
     satellite photos showing Iranian deployments. Official 
     documents suggest that America may also have secretly 
     arranged for tanks and other military hardware to be shipped 
     to Iraq in a swap deal--American tanks to Egypt, Egyptian 
     tanks to Iraq. Over the protest of some Pentagon skeptics, 
     the Reagan administration began allowing the Iraqis to buy a 
     wide variety of ``dual use'' equipment and materials from 
     American suppliers. According to confidential Commerce 
     Department export-control documents obtained by NEWSWEEK, the 
     shopping list included a computerized database for Saddam's 
     Interior Ministry (presumably to help keep track of political 
     opponents); helicopters to transport Iraqi officials; 
     television cameras for ``video surveillance applications''; 
     chemical-analysis equipment for the Iraq Atomic Energy 
     Commission (IAEC), and, most unsettling, numerous shipments 
     of ``bacteria/fungi/protozoa'' to the IAEC. According to 
     former officials, the bacterial cultures could be used to 
     make biological weapons, including anthrax. The State 
     Department also approved the shipment of 1.5 million atropine 
     injectors, for use against the effects of chemical weapons, 
     but the Pentagon blocked the sale. The helicopters, some 
     American officials later surmised, were used to spray poison 
     gas on the Kurds.
       The United States almost certainly knew from its own 
     satellite imagery that Saddam was using chemical weapons 
     against Iranian troops. When Saddam bombed Kurdish rebels and 
     civilians with a lethal cocktail of mustard gas, sarin, tabun 
     and VX in 1988, the

[[Page S8988]]

     Reagan administration first blamed Iran, before 
     acknowledging, under pressure from congressional Democrats, 
     that the culprits were Saddam's own forces. There was only 
     token official protest at the time. Saddam's men were 
     unfazed. An Iraqi audiotape, later captured by the Kurds, 
     records Saddam's cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid (known as Ali 
     Chemical) talking to his fellow officers about gassing the 
     Kurds. ``Who is going to say anything?'' he asks. ``The 
     international community? F----k them!''
       The United States was much more concerned with protecting 
     Iraqi oil from attacks by Iran as it was shipped through the 
     Persian Gulf. In 1987, an Iraqi Exocet missile hit an 
     American destroyer, the USS Stark, in the Persian Gulf, 
     killing 37 crewmen. Incredibly, the United States excused 
     Iraq for making an unintentional mistake and instead used the 
     incident to accuse Iran of escalating the war in the gulf. 
     The American tilt to Iraq became more pronounced. U.S. 
     commandos began blowing up Iranian oil platforms and 
     attacking Iranian patrol boats. In 1988, an American warship 
     in the gulf accidentally shot down an Iranian Airbus, killing 
     290 civilians. Within a few weeks, Iran, exhausted and 
     fearing American intervention, gave up its war with Iraq.
       Saddam was feeling cocky. With the support of the West, he 
     had defeated the Islamic revolutionaries in Iran. America 
     favored him as a regional pillar; European and American 
     corporations were vying for contracts with Iraq. He was 
     visited by congressional delegations led by Sens. Bob Dole of 
     Kansas and Alan Simpson of Wyoming, who were eager to promote 
     American farm and business interests. But Saddam's 
     megalomania was on the rise, and he overplayed his hand. In 
     1990, a U.S. Customs sting operation snared several Iraqi 
     agents who were trying to buy electronic equipment used to 
     make triggers for nuclear bombs. Not long after, Saddam 
     gained the world's attention by threatening ``to burn Israel 
     to the ground.'' At the Pentagon, analysts began to warn that 
     Saddam was a growing menace, especially after he tried to buy 
     some American-made high-tech furnaces useful for making 
     nuclear-bomb parts. Yet other officials in Congress and in 
     the Bush administration continued to see him as a useful, if 
     distasteful, regional strongman. The State Department was 
     equivocating with Saddam right up to the moment he invaded 
     Kuwait in August 1990.

  Mr. President, I referred to this Newsweek article yesterday at a 
hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Specifically, during 
the hearing, I asked Secretary Rumsfeld:

       Mr. Secretary, to your knowledge, did the United States 
     help Iraq to acquire the building blocks of biological 
     weapons during the Iran-Iraq war? Are we in fact now facing 
     the possibility of reaping what we have sewn?

  The Secretary quickly and flatly denied any knowledge but said he 
would review Pentagon records.
  I suggest that the administration speed up that review. My concerns 
and the concerns of others have grown.
  A letter from the Centers For Disease Control and Prevention, which I 
shall submit for the Record, shows very clearly that the United States 
is, in fact, preparing to reap what it has sewn. A letter written in 
1995 by former CDC Director David Satcher to former Senator Donald W. 
Riegle, Jr., points out that the U.S. Government provided nearly two 
dozen viral and bacterial samples to Iraqi scientists in 1985--samples 
that included the plague, botulism, and anthrax, among other deadly 
diseases.
  According to the letter from Dr. Satcher to former Senator Donald 
Riegle, many of the materials were hand carried by an Iraqi scientist 
to Iraq after he had spent 3 months training in the CDC laboratory.
  The Armed Services Committee is requesting information from the 
Departments of Commerce, State, and Defense on the history of the 
United States, providing the building blocks for weapons of mass 
destruction to Iraq. I recommend that the Department of Health and 
Human Services also be included in that request.
  The American people do not need obfuscation and denial. The American 
people need the truth. The American people need to know whether the 
United States is in large part responsible for the very Iraqi weapons 
of mass destruction which the administration now seeks to destroy.
  We may very well have created the monster that we seek to eliminate. 
The Senate deserves to know the whole story. The American people 
deserve answers to the whole story.
  Also yesterday, in the same 6 minutes that I was given in which to 
ask questions--which was extended by virtue of the kindness of the 
distinguished Senator from Georgia, Mr. Max Cleland, and other members 
of the committee, so it was perhaps 9 or 10 minutes--there was another 
interesting question that I asked. Let me read a portion of that 
transcript from the Armed Services Committee:

       Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these hearings. Mr. 
     Secretary, to your knowledge, did the United States help Iraq 
     to acquire the building blocks of biological weapons during 
     the Iran-Iraq War? Are we, in fact, now facing the 
     possibility of reaping what we have sown?
       Rumsfeld: Certainly not to my knowledge. I have no 
     knowledge of United States companies or government being 
     involved in assisting Iraq develop chemical, biological or 
     nuclear weapons.

  There is another excerpt from that question and answer period in 
which Secretary Rumsfeld and I engaged:

       Byrd: Now, the Washington Post reported this morning 
     [yesterday] that the United States is stepping away from 
     efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. Are 
     we not sending exactly the wrong signal to the world, at 
     exactly the wrong time?
       Doesn't this damage our credibility in the international 
     community at the very time that we are seeking their support 
     to neutralize the threat of Iraq's biological weapons 
     program? If we supplied, as the Newsweek article said, if we 
     supplied the building blocks for germ and chemical warfare to 
     this madman in the first place, this psychopath, how do we 
     look to the world to be backing away from this effort to 
     control it at this point?

  That question speaks for itself. I ask unanimous consent that the 
following material be printed in the Record at the close of my remarks: 
The partial transcript from the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing 
on September 19; the article from the Washington Post of yesterday, 
titled ``U.S. Drops Bid to Strengthen Germ Warfare Accord''; the 
Newsweek article, which I have alluded to already; a letter dated 
January 6, 1994, requesting information from the Centers for Disease 
Control and a response to the Honorable Donald W. Riegle, Jr., U.S. 
Senator, dated June 21, 1995, from David Satcher, M.D., Ph.D., 
Director; a U.S. Senate Hearing Report 103-900, dealing with U.S. 
exports of biological materials to Iraq to the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs which has oversight responsibility 
for the Export Administration Act, and keeping in mind that the U.S. 
Department of Commerce approves licenses by that Department for 
exports; including also the U.S. Senate hearing report in that matter. 
Included in the approved sales are such items as Bacillus Anthracis, 
anthrax, Clostridium Botulinum, Histoplasma Capsulatum, which causes a 
disease superficially resembling tuberculosis that may cause pneumonia; 
Brucella Melitensis, a bacteria which can cause chronic fatigue, and so 
on; Clostridium Perfringens, which causes gas gangrene. I believe that 
completes the list.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Byrd-Rumsfeld Transcript--Partial Transcript From Senate Armed Services 
                     Committee, September 19, 2002

       Levin. Senator Byrd?
       Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these hearings.
       Mr. Secretary, to your knowledge, did the United States 
     help Iraq to acquire the building blocks of biological 
     weapons during the Iran-Iraq War? Are we, in fact, now facing 
     the possibility of reaping what we have sown?
       Rumsfeld. Certainly not to my knowledge. I have no 
     knowledge of United States companies or government being 
     involved in assisting Iraq develop chemical, biological or 
     nuclear weapons.
       Byrd. Mr. Secretary, let me read to you from the September 
     23, 2002, Newsweek story. I read this, I read excerpts, 
     because my time is limited.
       ``Some Reagan officials even saw Saddam as another Anwar 
     Sadat, capable of making Iraq into a modern secular state, 
     just as Sadat had tried to lift up Egypt before his 
     assassination in 1981. But Saddam had to be rescued first. 
     The war against Iran was going badly by 1982.''
       Byrd. ``Iran's human-wave attacks threatened to overrun 
     Saddam's armies. Washington decided to give Iraq a helping 
     hand. After Rumsfeld's visit to Baghdad in 1982, U.S. 
     intelligence began supplying the Iraqi dictator with 
     satellite photos showing Iranian deployments.
       ``Official documents suggest that America may also have 
     secretly arranged for tanks and other military hardware to be 
     shipped to Iraq in a swap deal: American tanks to Egypt, 
     Egyptian tanks to Iraq.
       ``Over the protest of some Pentagon skeptics, the Reagan 
     administration began allowing the Iraqis to buy a wide 
     variety of, quote, `dual-use,' close quote, equipment and 
     materials from American suppliers.
       ``According to confidential Commerce Department export 
     control documents obtained

[[Page S8989]]

     by Newsweek, the shopping list included a computerized 
     database for Saddam's Interior Ministry, presumably to help 
     keep track of political opponents, helicopters to help 
     transport Iraqi officials, television cameras for video 
     surveillance applications, chemical analysis equipment for 
     the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission, IAEC, and, most 
     unsettling, numerous shipments of the bacteria, fungi, 
     protozoa to the IAEC.
       ``According to former officials the bacterial cultures 
     could be used to make biological weapons, including anthrax. 
     The State Department also approved the shipment of 1.5 
     million atropine injectors for use against the effects of 
     chemical weapons but the Pentagon blocked the sale.
       ``The helicopters, some American officials later surmised, 
     were used to spray poison gas on the Kurds. The United States 
     almost certainly knew from its own satellite imagery that 
     Saddam was using chemical weapons against Iranian troops.
       ``When Saddam bombed Kurdish rebels and civilians with a 
     lethal cocktail of mustard gas, sarin, tabun and VX in 1988, 
     the Reagan administration first blamed Iran before 
     acknowledging, under pressure from congressional Democrats, 
     that the culprit were Saddam's own forces. There was only 
     token official protest at the time. Saddam's men were 
     unfazed.
       ``An Iraqi audiotape later captured by the Kurds records 
     Saddam's cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, known as Ali Chemical, 
     talking to his fellow officers about gassing the Kurds. 
     Quote, `Who is going to say anything?' close quote, he asks, 
     `the international community? F-blank them!' exclamation 
     point, close quote.''
       Now can this possibly be true? We already knew that Saddam 
     was dangerous man at the time. I realize that you were not in 
     public office at the time, but you were dispatched to Iraq by 
     President Reagan to talk about the need to improve relations 
     between Iraq and the U.S.
       Let me ask you again: To your knowledge did the United 
     States help Iraq to acquire the building blocks of biological 
     weapons during the Iran-Iraq war? Are we, in fact, now facing 
     the possibility of reaping what we have sown?
       The Washington Post reported this morning that the United 
     States is stepping away from efforts to strengthen the 
     Biological Weapons Convention. I'll have a question on that 
     later.
       Let me ask you again: Did the United States help Iraq to 
     acquire the building blocks of biological weapons during the 
     Iran-Iraq War? Are we, in fact, now facing the possibility of 
     reaping what we have sown?
       Rumsfeld. I have not read the article. As you suggest, I 
     was, for a period in late '83 and early '84, asked by 
     President Reagan to serve as Middle East envoy after the 
     Marines--241 Marines were killed in Beirut.
       As part of my responsibilities I did visit Baghdad. I did 
     meet with Mr. Tariq Aziz. And I did meet with Saddam Hussein 
     and spent some time visiting with them about the war they 
     were engaged in with Iran.
       At the time our concern, of course, was Syria and Syria's 
     role in Lebanon and Lebanon's role in the Middle East and the 
     terrorist acts that were taking place.
       As a private citizen I was assisting only for a period 
     of months. I have never heard anything like what you've 
     read, I have no knowledge of it whatsoever, and I doubt 
     it.
       Byrd. You doubt what?
       Rumsfeld. The questions you posed as to whether the United 
     States of America assisted Iraq with the elements that you 
     listed in your reading of Newsweek and that we could 
     conceivably now be reaping what we've sown.
       I think--I doubt both.
       Byrd. Are you surprised that this is what I've said? Are 
     you surprised at this story in Newsweek?
       Rumsfeld. I guess I'm at an age and circumstance in life 
     where I'm no longer surprised about what I hear in the 
     newspapers.
       Byrd. That's not the question, I'm of that age, too. 
     Somewhat older than you, but how about that story I've read?
       Rumsfeld. I see stories all the time that are flat wrong. I 
     just don't know. All I can say . . .
       Byrd. How about this story? This story? How about this 
     story, specifically?
       Rumsfeld. As I say, I have not read it, I listened 
     carefully to what you said and I doubt it.
       Byrd. All right.
       Now the Washington Post reported this morning that the 
     United States is stepping away from efforts to strengthen the 
     Biological Weapons Convention. Are we not sending exactly the 
     wrong signal to the world, at exactly the wrong time?
       Byrd. Doesn't this damage our credibility in the 
     international community at the very time that we are seeking 
     their support to neutralize the threat of Iraq's biological 
     weapons program? If we supplied, as the Newsweek article 
     said, if we supplied the building blocks for germ and 
     chemical warfare to this madman in the first place, this 
     psychopath, how do we look to the world to be backing away 
     from this effort to control it at this point?
       Rumsfeld. Senator, I think it would be a shame to leave 
     this committee and the people listening with the impression 
     that the United States assisted Iraq with chemical or 
     biological weapons in the 1980s. I just do not believe that's 
     the case.
       Byrd. Well, are you saying that the Newsweek article is 
     inaccurate?
       Rumsfeld. I'm saying precisely what I said, that I didn't 
     read the Newsweek article, but that I doubt it's accurate.
       Byrd. I'll be glad to send you up a copy.
       Rumsfeld. But that I was not in government at that time, 
     except as a special envoy for a period of months. So one 
     ought not to rely on me as the best source as to what 
     happened in that mid-'80s period that you were describing.
       I will say one other thing. On two occasions I believe when 
     you read that article, you mentioned the IAEC, which as I 
     recall is the International Atomic Energy Commission, and 
     mentioned that if some of the things that you were talking 
     about were provided to them, which I found quite confusing to 
     be honest.
       With respect to the Biological Weapons Convention, I was 
     not aware that the United States government had taken a 
     position with respect to it. It's not surprising because it's 
     a matter for the Department of State, not the Department of 
     Defense.
       If in fact they have indicated, as The Washington Post 
     reports, that they are not going to move forward with a--I 
     believe it's an enforcement regime, it's not my place to 
     discuss the administration's position when I don't know what 
     it is.
       But I can tell you, from a personal standpoint, my 
     recollection is that the biological convention never, never 
     was anticipated that there would even be thought of to have 
     an enforcement regime. And that an enforcement regime on 
     something like that, where there are a lot of countries 
     involved who are on the terrorist list who were participants 
     in that convention, that the United States has, over a period 
     of administrations, believed that it would not be a good 
     idea, because the United States would be a net loser from an 
     enforcement regime.
       But that is not the administration's position. I just don't 
     know what the administration's position is.
       Levin. We're going to have to leave it there, because 
     you're way over.
       Byrd. This is a very important question.
       Levin. It is indeed, and you're over time, I agree with you 
     on the importance, but you're way over time, sir.
       Byrd. I know I'm over time, but are we going to leave this 
     in question out there dangling?
       Levin. One last question.
       Byrd. I ask unanimous consent that I may have an additional 
     five minutes.
       Levin. No, I'm afraid you can't do that. If you could just 
     do one last--well, wait a minute, ask unanimous consent, I 
     can't stop you from doing that.
       (Unknown). I object.
       (Laughter)
       Byrd. Mr. Chairman?
       Levin. Just one last question. Would that be all right so 
     you could wind that up?
       Senator Byrd, if you could just take one additional 
     question.
       Byrd. I've never--I've been in this Congress 50 years. I've 
     never objected to another senator having a few additional 
     minutes.
       Now Mr. Chairman, I think that the secretary should have a 
     copy of this report, this story that--from Newsweek that I've 
     been querying him about. I think he has a right to look at 
     that.
       Levin. Could somebody take that out to the secretary?
       Byrd. Now, while that's being given to the secretary, Mr. 
     Secretary, I think we're put into an extremely bad position 
     before the world today if we're going to walk away from an 
     international effort to strengthen the Biological Weapons 
     Convention against germ warfare, advising its allies that the 
     U.S. wants to delay further discussions until 2006. 
     Especially in the light of the Newsweek story; I think we 
     bear some responsibility.
       Inhofe. Mr. Chairman I ask for a point of order.
       Levin. Can we just have this be the last question, if you 
     would just go along with us please, Senator Inhofe?
       Inhofe. I'll only say though, in all respect to the Senator 
     from West Virginia, we have a number of senators here. We 
     have a limited time of six minutes each, and we're entitled 
     to have our six minutes. That should be a short questions if 
     it's the last question.
       Levin. If we could just make that the last question and 
     answer, I would appreciate it. The chair would appreciate the 
     cooperation of all senators.
       Secretary Rumsfeld, could you answer that question please?
       Rumsfeld. I'll do my best.
       Senator, I just in glancing at this, and I hesitate to do 
     this because I have not read it carefully.
       But it says here that, ``According to confidential Commerce 
     Department export control documents obtained by Newsweek, the 
     shopping list included.'' It did not say that there were 
     deliveries of these things. It said that Iran--Iraq asked for 
     these things. It talks about a shopping list.
       Second, in listing these things, it says that they wanted 
     television cameras for video surveillance applications, 
     chemical analysis equipment for the Iraq Atomic Energy 
     Commission, the IAEC--and that may very well be the Iraqi 
     Atomic Energy Commission, which would be--mean that my 
     earlier comment would not be correct, because I thought it 
     was the International Atomic Energy Commission. But this 
     seems to indicate it's the Iraq Commerce Commission.
       Byrd. Mr. Chairman, may I say to my friend from Oklahoma, 
     I'm amazed that he himself wouldn't yield me time for this 
     important question. I would do the same for him.
       Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask . . .

[[Page S8990]]

       (Cleland). I yield my five minutes, Senator.
       Byrd. I thank the distinguished Senator.
       Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the secretary--and I 
     don't just like to ask him--I asked him to review Pentagon 
     records to see if the Newsweek article is true or not. Will 
     the secretary do that?
       Rumsfeld. It appears that they're Department of Commerce 
     records, as opposed to Pentagon. But I can certainly ask that 
     the Department of Commerce and, to the extent that it's 
     relevant, the Department of State, look into it and see if we 
     can't determine the accuracy or inaccuracy of some aspects of 
     this. Yes, sir.
       Levin. And we go one step further than that. I think the 
     request is that the Defense Department search its records. 
     Will you do that?
       Rumsfeld. We'll be happy to search ours, but this refers to 
     the Commerce Department.
       Levin. We will ask the State Department and the Commerce 
     Department to do the same thing.
       Rumsfeld. We'd be happy to.
       Levin. And we will also ask the Intelligence Committee to 
     stage a briefing for all of us on that issue, so that Senator 
     Byrd's question. . .
       Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman.
       Levin. Thank you very much, Senator.
       Byrd. I thank the secretary.
       Rumsfeld. Thank you.
       Levin. Senator Byrd, we will ask Senator Graham and Senator 
     Shelby to hold a briefing on that subject, because it is a 
     very important subject.
       Byrd. I thank the chairman.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Post, Sept. 19, 2002]

            U.S. Drops Bid To Strengthen Germ Warfare Accord

                           (By Peter Slevin)

       The Bush administration has abandoned an international 
     effort to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention 
     against germ warfare, advising its allies that the United 
     States wants to delay further discussions until 2006. A 
     review conference on new verification measures for the treaty 
     has been scheduled for November.
       Less than a year after a State Department envoy abruptly 
     pulled out of biowarfare negotiations in Geneva, promising 
     that the United States would return with new proposals, the 
     administration has concluded that treaty revisions favored by 
     the European Union and scores of other countries will not 
     work and should not be salvaged, administration officials 
     said yesterday.
       The decision, which has been conveyed to allies in recent 
     weeks, has been greeted with warnings that the move will 
     weaken attempts to curb germ warfare programs at a time when 
     biological weapons are a focus of concern because of the war 
     on terrorism and the administration's threats to launch a 
     military campaign against Iraq. It also comes as the 
     administration, which has angered allies by rejecting a 
     series of multilateral agreements, is appealing to the 
     international community to work with it in forging a new U.N. 
     Security Council resolution on Iraq's programs to develop 
     weapons of mass destruction.
       The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which has been 
     ratified by the United States and 143 other countries, bans 
     the development, stockpiling and production of germ warfare 
     agents, but has no enforcement mechanism. Negotiations on 
     legally binding measures to enforce compliance have been 
     underway in Geneva for seven years.
       The administration stunned its allies last December by 
     proposing to end the negotiators' mandate, saying that while 
     the treaty needed strengthening, the enforcement protocol 
     under discussion would not deter enemy nations from acquiring 
     or developing biological weapons if they were determined to 
     do so. Negotiators suspended the discussions, saying they 
     would meet again in November when U.S. officials said they 
     would return with creative solutions to address the impasse.
       Instead, U.S. envoys are now telling allies that the 
     administration's position is so different from the views of 
     the leading supporters of the enforcement protocol that a 
     meeting would dissolve into public squabbling and should be 
     avoided, administration officials said. Better, they said, to 
     halt discussions altogether.
       ``It's based on an incorrect approach. Our concern is that 
     it would be fundamentally ineffective,'' a State Department 
     official said. Another administration official said the 
     ``best and least contentious'' approach would be to hold a 
     very brief meeting in November--or even no meeting at all--
     and talk again when the next review is scheduled four years 
     from now.
       Amy Smithson, a biological and chemical weapons specialist, 
     said the administration is making a mistake by halting 
     collaborative work to strengthen the convention. ``It sounds 
     to me as though they've thrown the baby out with the bath 
     water,'' said Smithson, an analyst at the Henry L. Stimson 
     Center. ``The contradiction between the rhetoric and what the 
     administration is actually doing--the gulf is huge. Not a day 
     goes by when they don't mention the Iraq threat.''
       The Stimson Center is releasing a report today that 
     criticizes the U.S. approach to the convention. Drawn from a 
     review by 10 pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology 
     experts, the document argues that bioweapons inspections can 
     be effective with the right amount of time and the right 
     science and urges the administration to develop stronger 
     measures.
       ``To argue that this wouldn't be a useful remedy would just 
     be a mistake. I think it's because they're looking through 
     the wrong end of the telescope,'' said Matthew Meselson, a 
     Harvard biologist who helped draft a treaty to criminalize 
     biological weapons violations. ``We're denying ourselves 
     useful tools.''
       The administration has focused publicly on a half-dozen 
     countries identified by the State Department as pursuing germ 
     warfare programs. Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton said 
     the existence of Iraq's bioweapons project is ``beyond 
     dispute.'' The U.S. government also believes Iran, North 
     Korea, Sudan, Libya and Syria are developing such weapons, he 
     said.
       Meselson concurred with the administration's position that 
     a limited enforcement provision for the bioweapons treaty 
     could not provide confidence that countries are staying 
     clean. But he said that a pact establishing standards and 
     verification measures would deter some countries while also 
     helping to build norms of international behavior.
       Bolton, on the other hand, told delegates to last year's 
     review conference that ``the time for `better-than-nothing' 
     protocols is over. We will continue to reject flawed texts 
     like the BWC draft protocol, recommended to us simply because 
     they are the product of lengthy negotiations or arbitrary 
     deadlines, if such texts are not in the best interests of the 
     United States.''
       With only hours to go at the meeting, Bolton stopped U.S. 
     participation in the final negotiations. He said of the 
     resulting one-year delay, ``This gives us time to think 
     creatively on alternatives.''
       In Bolton's view, each country should develop criminal laws 
     against germ warfare activities, develop export controls for 
     dangerous pathogens, establish codes of conduct for 
     scientists and install strict biosafety procedures. The 
     administration has proposed that governments resolve disputes 
     over biowarfare violations among themselves, perhaps through 
     voluntary inspections or by referral to the United Nations 
     secretary general.
       Such an approach is ``at best ineffectual,'' said the 
     specialists gathered by the Stimson Center. At worst, they 
     concluded, the approach could damage U.S. interests because 
     it would not be structured to deliver ``meaningful 
     monitoring.''
       ``If a challenge inspection system is not geared to pursue 
     violators aggressively, then it does not serve U.S. security 
     interests,'' the 65-page report states. The participants 
     strongly favored establishing mandatory standards backed by 
     penalties and ``robust'' inspections, which goes 
     significantly further than the proposed protocol backed by 
     the EU and other nations.
       The State Department Web site has not yet been changed to 
     reflect the change in policy. It says, ``The United States is 
     committed to strengthening the BWC as part of a comprehensive 
     and multidisciplinary strategy for combating the 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
     international terrorism. . . . We would like to share these 
     ideas with our international partners.''
                                  ____


Partial Transcript From Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19, 
                                  2002

       Levin. Senator Byrd?
       Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these hearings.
       Mr. Secretary, to your knowledge, did the United States 
     help Iraq to acquire the building blocks of biological 
     weapons during the Iran-Iraq War? Are we, in fact, now facing 
     the possibility of reaping what we have sown?
       Rumsfeld. Certainly not to my knowledge. I have no 
     knowledge of United States companies or government being 
     involved in assisting Iraq develop chemical, biological or 
     nuclear weapons.
       Byrd. Mr. Secretary, let me read to you from the September 
     23, 2002, Newsweek story. I read this, I read excerpts, 
     because my time is limited.
       ``Some Reagan officials even saw Saddam as another Anwar 
     Sadat, capable of making Iraq into a modern secular state, 
     just as Sadat had tried to lift up Egypt before his 
     assassination in 1981. But Saddam had to be rescued first. 
     The war against Iran was going badly by 1982.''
       ``Iran's human-wave attacks threatened to overrun Saddam's 
     armies. Washington decided to give Iraq a helping hand. After 
     Rumsfeld's visit to Baghdad in 1983, U.S. intelligence began 
     supplying the Iraqi dictator with satellite photos showing 
     Iranian deployments.
       ``Official documents suggest that America may also have 
     secretly arranged for tanks and other military hardware to be 
     shipped to Iraq in a swap deal: American tanks to Egypt, 
     Egyptian tanks to Iraq.
       ``Over the protest of some Pentagon skeptics, the Reagan 
     administration began allowing the Iraqis to buy a wide 
     variety of, quote, `dual-use,' close quote, equipment and 
     materials from American suppliers.
       ``According to confidential Commerce Department export 
     control documents obtained by Newsweek, the shopping list 
     include a computerized database for Saddam's Interior 
     Ministry, presumably to help keep track of political 
     opponents, helicopters to help transport Iraqi officials, 
     television cameras for video surveillance applications, 
     chemical analysis equipment for the Iraq Atomic Energy 
     Commission, IAEC, and, most unsettling, numerous shipments of 
     the bacteria, fungi, protozoa to the IAEC.

[[Page S8991]]

       ``According to former officials the bacterial cultures 
     could be used to make biological weapons, including anthrax. 
     The State Department also approved the shipment of 1.5 
     million atropine injectors for use against the effects of 
     chemical weapons but the Pentagon blocked the sale.
       ``The helicopters, some American officials later surmised, 
     were used to spray poison gas on the Kurds. The United States 
     almost certainly knew from its own satellite imagery that 
     Saddam was using chemical weapons against Iranian troops.
       ``When Saddam bombed Kurdish rebels and civilians with a 
     lethal cocktail of mustard gas, sarin, tabun and VX in 1988, 
     the Reagan administration first blamed Iran before 
     acknowledging, under pressure from congressional Democrats, 
     that the culprit were Saddam's own forces. There was only 
     token official protest at the time. Saddam's men were 
     unfazed.
       ``An Iraqi audiotape later captured by the Kurds records 
     Saddam's cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, known as Ali Chemical, 
     talking to his fellow officers about gassing the Kurds. 
     Quote, `Who is going to say anything?' close quote, he asks, 
     `the international community? F-blank them!' exclamation 
     point, close quote.''
       Now can this possibly be true? We already knew that Saddam 
     was dangerous man at the time. I realize that you were not in 
     public office at the time, but you were dispatched to Iraq by 
     President Reagan to talk about the need to improve relations 
     between Iraq and the U.S.
       Let me ask you again: To your knowledge did the United 
     States help Iraq to acquire the building blocks of biological 
     weapons during the Iran-Iraq war? Are we, in fact, now facing 
     the possibility of reaping what we have sown?
       The Washington Post reported this morning that the United 
     is stepping away from efforts to strengthen the Biological 
     Weapons Convention. I'll have a question on that later.
       Let me ask you again: Did the United States help Iraq to 
     acquire the building blocks of biological weapons during the 
     Iran-Iraq War? Are we, in fact, now facing the possibility of 
     reaping what we have sown?
       Rumsfeld. I have not read the article. As you suggest, I 
     was, for a period in late `83 and early `84, asked by 
     President Reagan to serve as Middle East envoy after the 
     Marines--241 Marines were killed in Beirut.
       As part of my responsibilities I did visit Baghdad. I did 
     meet with Mr. Tariq Aziz. And I did meet with Saddam Hussein 
     and spent some time visiting with them about the war they 
     were engaged in with Iran.
       At the time our concern, of course, was Syria and Syria's 
     role in Lebanon and Lebanon's role in the Middle East and the 
     terrorist acts that were taking place.
       As a private citizen I was assisting only for a period 
     of months. I have never heard anything like what you've 
     read, I have no knowledge of it whatsoever, and I doubt 
     it.
       Byrd. You doubt what?
       Rumsfeld. The questions you posed as to whether the United 
     States of America assisted Iraq with the elements that you 
     listed in your reading of Newsweek and that we could 
     conceivably now be reaping what we've sown.
       I think--I doubt both.
       Byrd. Are you surprised that this is what I've said? Are 
     you surprised at this story in Newsweek?
       Rumsfeld. I guess I'm at an age and circumstance in life 
     where I'm no longer surprised about what I hear in the 
     newspapers.
       Byrd. That's not the question. I'm of that age, too. 
     Somewhat older than you, but how about that story I've read?
       Rumsfeld. I see stories all the time that are flat wrong. I 
     just don't know. All I can say . . .
       Byrd. How about this story? This story? How about this 
     story, specifically?
       Rumsfeld. As I say, I have not read it, I listened 
     carefully to what you said and I doubt it.
       Byrd. All right.
       Now the Washington Post reported this morning that the 
     United States is stepping away from efforts to strengthen the 
     Biological Weapons Convention. Are we not sending exactly the 
     wrong signal to the world, at exactly the wrong time?
       Byrd. Doesn't this damage our credibility in the 
     international community at the very time that we are seeking 
     their support to neutralize the threat of Iraq's biological 
     weapons program? If we supplied, as the Newsweek article 
     said, if we supplied the building blocks for germ and 
     chemical warfare to this madman in the first place, this 
     psychopath, how do we look to the world to be backing away 
     from this effort to control it at this point?
       Rumsfeld. Senator, I think it would be a shame to leave 
     this committee and the people listening with the impression 
     that the United States assisted Iraq with chemical or 
     biological weapons in the 1980s. I just do not believe that's 
     the case.
       Byrd. Well, are you saying that the Newsweek article is 
     inaccurate?
       Rumsfeld. I'm saying precisely what I said, that I didn't 
     read the Newsweek article, but that I doubt its accurate.
       Byrd. I'll be glad to send you up a copy.
       Rumsfeld. But that I was not in government at that time, 
     except as a special envoy for a period of months. So one 
     ought not to rely on me as the best source as to what 
     happened in that mid-'80s period that you were describing.
       I will say one other thing. On two occasions I believe when 
     you read that article, you mentioned the IAEC, which as I 
     recall is the International Atomic Energy Commission, and 
     mentioned that if some of the things that you were talking 
     about were provided to them, which I found quite confusing to 
     be honest.
       With respect to the Biological Weapons Convention, I was 
     not aware that the United States government had taken a 
     position with respect to it. It's not surprising because it's 
     a matter for the Department of State, not the Department of 
     Defense.
       If in fact they have indicated, as The Washington Post 
     reports, that they are not going to move forward with a--I 
     believe it's an enforcement regime, it's not my place to 
     discuss the administration's position when I don't know what 
     it is.
       But I can tell you, from a personal standpoint, my 
     recollection is that the biological convention never, never 
     was anticipated that there would even be thought of to have 
     an enforcement regime. And that an enforcement regime on 
     something like that, where there are a lot of countries 
     involved who are on the terrorist list who were participants 
     in that convention, that the United States has, over a period 
     of administrations, believed that it would not be a good 
     idea, because the United States would be a net loser from an 
     enforcement regime.
       But that is not the administration's position. I just don't 
     know what the administration's position is.
       Levin. We're going to have to leave it there, because 
     you're way over.
       Byrd. This is a very important question.
       Levin. It is indeed, and you're over time. I agree with you 
     on the importance, but you're way over time, sir.
       Byrd. I know I'm over time, but are we going to leave this 
     in question out there dangling?
       Levin. One last question.
       Byrd. I ask unanimous consent that I may have an additional 
     five minutes.
       Levin. No, I'm afraid you can't do that. If you could just 
     do one last--well, wait a minute, ask unanimous consent, I 
     can't stop you from doing that.
       (Unknown). I object.
       (Laughter)
       Byrd. Mr. Chairman?
       Levin. Just one last question. Would that be all right so 
     you could wind it up?
       Senator Byrd, if you could just take one additional 
     question.
       Byrd. I've never--I've been in this Congress 50 years. I've 
     never objected to another senator having a few additional 
     minutes.
       Now Mr. Chairman, I think that the secretary should have a 
     copy of this report, this story that--from Newsweek that I've 
     been querying him about. I think he has a right to look at 
     that.
       Levin. Could somebody take that out to the secretary?
       Byrd. Now, while that's being given to the secretary, Mr. 
     Secretary, I think we're put into an extremely bad position 
     before the world today if we're going to walk away from an 
     international effort to strengthen the Biological Weapons 
     Convention against germ warfare, advising its allies that the 
     U.S. wants to delay further discussions until 2006., 
     Especially in the light of the Newsweek story; I think we 
     bear some responsibility.
       Inhofe. Mr. Chairman I ask for a point of order.
       Levin. Can we just have this be the last question, if you 
     would just go along with us please, Senator Inhofe?
       Inhofe. I'll only say though, in all respect to the senator 
     from West Virginia, we have a number of senators here. We 
     have a limited time of six minutes each, and we're entitled 
     to have our six minutes. That should be a short question if 
     it's the last question.
       Levin. If we could just make that the last question and 
     answer, I would appreciate it. The chair would appreciate the 
     cooperation of all senators.
       Rumsfeld. I'll do my best.
       Senator, I just in glancing at this, and I hesitate to do 
     this because I have not read it carefully.
       But it says here that, ``According to confidential Commerce 
     Department export control documents obtained by Newsweek, the 
     shopping list included.'' It did not say that there were 
     deliveries of these things. It said that Iran--Iraq asked for 
     these things. It talks about a shopping list.
       Second, in listing these things, it says that they wanted 
     television cameras for video surveillance applications, 
     chemical analysis equipment for the Iraq Atomic Energy 
     Commission, the IAEC--and that may very well be the Iraqi 
     Atomic Energy Commission, which would be--mean that my 
     earlier comment would not be correct, because I thought it 
     was the International Atomic Energy Commission. But this 
     seems to indicate it's the Iraq Commerce Commission.
       Byrd. Mr. Chairman, may I say to my friend from Oklahoma, 
     I'm amazed that he himself wouldn't yield me time for this 
     important question. I would do the same for him.
       Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask . . .
       (Cleland). I yield my five minutes, Senator.
       Byrd. I thank the distinguished senator.
       Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the secretary--and I 
     don't just like to ask him--I ask him to review Pentagon 
     records to see if the Newsweek article is true or not. Will 
     the secretary do that?
       Rumsfeld. It appears that they're Department of Commerce 
     records, as opposed to Pentagon. But I can certainly ask that 
     the

[[Page S8992]]

     Department of Commerce and, to the extent that it's relevant, 
     the Department of State, look into it and see if we can't 
     determine the accuracy or inaccuracy of some aspects of this. 
     Yes, sir.
       Levin. And we go one step future than that. I think the 
     request is that the Defense Department search its records. 
     Will you do that?
       Rumsfeld. We'll be happy to search ours, but this refers to 
     the Commerce Department.
       Levin. We will ask the State Department and the Commerce 
     Department to do the same thing.
       Rumsfeld. We'd be happy to.
       Levin. And we will also ask the Intelligence Committee to 
     stage a briefing for all of us on that issue, so that Senator 
     Byrd's question . . .
       Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman.
       Levin. Thank you very much, Senator.
       Byrd. I thank the secretary.
       Rumsfeld. Thank you.
       Levin. Senator Byrd, we will ask Senator Graham and Senator 
     Shelby to hold a briefing on that subject, because it is a 
     very important subject.
       Byrd. I thank the chairman.
                                  ____


                    [From Newsweek, Sept. 23, 2002]

                          How Saddam Happened

                (By Christopher Dickey and Evan Thomas)

       The last time Donald Rumsfeld saw Saddam Hussein, he gave 
     him a cordial handshake. The date was almost 20 years ago, 
     Dec. 20, 1983; an official Iraqi television crew recorded the 
     historic moment.
       The once and future Defense secretary, at the time a 
     private citizen, had been sent by President Ronald Reagan to 
     Baghdad as a special envoy. Saddam Hussein, armed with a 
     pistol on his hip, seemed ``vigorous and confident,'' 
     according to a new declassified State Department cable 
     obtained by Newsweek. Rumsfeld ``conveyed the President's 
     greetings and expressed his pleasure at being in Baghdad,'' 
     wrote the notetaker. Then the two men got down to business, 
     talking about the need to improve relations between their two 
     countries.
       Like most foreign-policy insiders, Rumsfeld was aware that 
     Saddam was a murderous thug who supported terrorists and was 
     trying to build a nuclear weapon. (The Israelis had already 
     bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osirak.) But at the time, 
     America's big worry was Iran, not Iraq. The Reagan 
     administration feared that the Iranian revolutionaries who 
     had overthrown the shah (and taken hostage American diplomats 
     for 444 days in 1979-81) would overrun the Middle East and 
     its vital oilfields. On the theory that the enemy of my enemy 
     is my friend, the Reaganites were seeking to support Iraq in 
     a long and bloody war against Iran. The meeting between 
     Rumsfeld and Saddam was consequential: for the next five 
     years, until Iran finally capitulated, the United States 
     backed Saddam's armies with military intelligence, economic 
     aid and covert supplies of munitions.


                             former allies

       Rumsfeld is not the first American diplomat to wish for the 
     demise of a former ally. After all, before the cold war, the 
     Soviet Union was America's partner against Hitler in World 
     War II. In the real world, as the saying goes, nations have 
     no permanent friends, just permanent interests. Nonetheless, 
     Rumsfeld's long-ago interlude with Saddam is a reminder that 
     today's friend can be tomorrow's mortal threat. As President 
     George W. Bush and his war cabinet ponder Saddam's 
     successor's regime, they would do well to contemplate how and 
     why the last three presidents allowed the Butcher of Baghdad 
     to stay in power so long.
       The history of America's relations with Saddam is one of 
     the sorrier tales in American foreign policy. Time and again, 
     America turned a blind eye to Saddam's predations, saw him as 
     the lesser evil or flinched at the chance to unseat him. No 
     single policymaker or administration deserves blame for 
     creating, or at least tolerating, a monster; many of their 
     decisions seemed reasonable at the time. Even so, there are 
     moments in this clumsy dance with the Devil that make one 
     cringe. It is hard to believe that, during most of the 1980s, 
     America knowingly permitted the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission 
     to import bacterial cultures that might be used to build 
     biological weapons. But it happened.
       America's past stumbles, while embarrassing, are not an 
     argument for inaction in the future. Saddam probably is the 
     ``grave and gathering danger'' described by President Bush in 
     his speech to the United Nations last week. It may also be 
     true that ``whoever replaces Saddam is not going to be 
     worse,'' as a senior administration official put it to 
     Newsweek. But the story of how America helped create a 
     Frankenstein monster it now wishes to strangle is sobering. 
     It illustrates the power of wishful thinking, as well as the 
     iron law of unintended consequences.


                          transfixed by saddam

       America did not put Saddam in power. He emerged after two 
     decades of turmoil in the '60s and '70s, as various strongmen 
     tried to gain control of a nation that had been concocted by 
     British imperialists in the 1920s out of three distinct and 
     rival factions, the Sunnis, Shiites and the Kurds. But during 
     the cold war, America competed with the Soviets for Saddam's 
     attention and welcomed his war with the religious fanatics of 
     Iran. Having cozied up to Saddam, Washington. . . .
       While the Middle East is unlikely to become a democratic 
     nirvana, the worst-case scenarios, always a staple of the 
     press, are probably also wrong or exaggerated. Assuming that 
     a cornered and doomed Saddam does not kill thousands of 
     Americans in some kind of horrific Gotterdammerung--a scary 
     possibility, one that deeply worries administration 
     officials--the greatest risk of his fall is that one 
     strongman may simply be replaced by another. Saddam's 
     successor may not be a paranoid sadist. But there is no 
     assurance that he will be America's friend or forswear the 
     development of weapons of mass destruction.


                       a taste for nasty weapons

       American officials have known that Saddam was a psychopath 
     ever since he became the country's de facto ruler in the 
     early 1970s. One of Saddam's early acts after he took the 
     title of president in 1979 was to videotape a session of his 
     party's congress, during which he personally ordered several 
     members executed on the spot. The message, carefully conveyed 
     to the Arab press, was not that these men were executed for 
     plotting against Saddam, but rather for thinking about 
     plotting against him. From the beginning, U.S. officials 
     worried about Saddam's taste for nasty weaponry; indeed, at 
     their meeting in 1983, Rumsfeld warned that Saddam's use of 
     chemical weapons might ``inhibit'' American assistance. But 
     top officials in the Reagan administration saw Saddam as a 
     useful surrogate. By going to war with Iran, he could bleed 
     the radical mullahs who had seized control of Iran from the 
     pro-American shah. Some Reagan officials even saw Saddam as 
     another Anwar Sadat, capable of making Iran into a modern 
     secular state, just as Sadat had tried to lift up Egypt 
     before his assassination in 1981.
       But Saddam had to be rescued first. The war against Iran 
     was going badly by 1982. Iran's ``human wave attacks'' 
     threatened to overrun Saddam's armies. Washington decided to 
     give Iraq a helping hand. After Rumsfeld's visit to Baghdad 
     in 1983, U.S. intelligence began supplying the Iraqi dictator 
     with satellite photos showing Iranian deployments. Official 
     documents suggest that America may also have secretly 
     arranged for tanks and other military hardware to be shipped 
     to Iraq in a swap deal--American tanks to Egypt, Egyptian 
     tanks to Iraq. Over the protest of some Pentagon skeptics, 
     the Reagan administration began allowing the Iraqis to buy a 
     wide variety of ``dual use'' equipment and materials from 
     American suppliers. According to confidential Commerce 
     Department export-control documents obtained by Newsweek, the 
     shopping list included a computerized database for Saddam's 
     Interior Ministry (presumably to help keep track of political 
     opponents); helicopters to transport Iraqi officials; 
     television cameras for ``video surveillance applications''; 
     chemical-analysis equipment for the Iraq Atomic Energy 
     Commission (IAEC), and, most unsettling, numerous shipments 
     of ``bacteria/fungi/protozoa'' to the IAEC. According to 
     former officials, the bacteria cultures could be used to make 
     biological weapons, including anthrax. The State Department 
     also approved the shipment of 1.5 million atropine injectors, 
     for use against the effects of chemical weapons, but the 
     Pentagon blocked the sale. The helicopters, some American 
     officials later surmised, were used to spray poison gas on 
     the Kurds.


                   ``who is going to say anything?''

       The United States almost certainly knew from its own 
     satellite imagery that Saddam was using chemical weapons 
     against Iranian troops. When Saddam bombed Kurdish rebels and 
     civilians with a lethal cocktail of mustard gas, sarin, tabun 
     and VX in 1988, the Reagan administration first blamed Iran, 
     before acknowledging, under pressure from congressional 
     Democrats, that the culprits were Saddam's own forces. There 
     was only token official protest at the time. Saddam's men 
     were unfazed. An Iraqi audiotape, later captured by the 
     Kurds, records Saddam's cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid (known as 
     Ali Chemical) talking to his fellow officers about gassing 
     the Kurds. ``Who is going to say anything?'' he asks. ``The 
     international community? F--k them!''
       The United States was much more concerned with protecting 
     Iraqi oil from attacks by Iran as it was shipped through the 
     Persian Gulf. In 1987, an Iraqi Exocet missile hit an 
     American destroyer, the USS Stark, in the Persian Gulf, 
     killing 37 crewmen. Incredibly, the United States excused 
     Iraq for making an unintentional mistake and instead used the 
     incident to accuse Iran of escalating the war in the gulf. 
     The American tilt to Iraq became more pronounced. U.S. 
     commandos began blowing up Iranian oil platforms and 
     attacking Iranian patrol boats. In 1988, an American warship 
     in the gulf accidentally shot down an Iranian Airbus, killing 
     290 civilians. Within a few weeks, Iran, exhausted and 
     fearing American intervention, gave up its war with Iraq.
       Saddam was feeling cocky. With the support of the West, he 
     had defeated the Islamic revolutionaries in Iran. America 
     favored him as a regional pillar; European and American 
     corporations were vying for contracts with Iraq. He was 
     visited by congressional delegations led by Sens. Bob Dole of 
     Kansas and Alan Simpson of Wyoming, who were eager to promote 
     American farm and business interests. But Saddam's 
     megalomania was on the rise, and he overplayed his hand. In 
     1990, a U.S. Customs sting operation snared several Iraqi 
     agents who were trying to buy

[[Page S8993]]

     electronic equipment used to make triggers for nuclear bombs. 
     Not long after, Saddam gained the world's attention by 
     threatening ``to burn Israel to the ground.'' At the 
     Pentagon, analysts began to warn that Saddam was a growing 
     menace, especially after he tried to buy some American-made 
     high-tech furnaces useful for making nuclear-bomb parts. Yet 
     other officials in Congress and in the Bush administration 
     continued to see him as a useful, if distasteful, regional 
     strongman. The State Department was equivocating with Saddam 
     right up to the moment he invaded Kuwait in August 1990.


                     ambivalent about saddam's fate

       Some American diplomats suggest that Saddam might have 
     gotten away with invading Kuwait if he had not been quite so 
     greedy. ``If he had pulled back to the Mutla Ridge 
     [overlooking Kuwait City], he'd still be there today,'' one 
     ex-ambassador told Newsweek. And even though President George 
     H.W. Bush compared Saddam to Hitler and sent a half-million-
     man Army to drive him from Kuwait, Washington remained 
     ambivalent about Saddam's fate. It was widely assumed by 
     policymakers that Saddam would collapse after his defeat in 
     Desert Storm, done in by him humiliated officer corps or 
     overthrown by the revolt of a restive minority population. 
     But Washington did not want to push very hard to topple 
     Saddam. The gulf war, Bush I administration officials pointed 
     out, had been fought to liberate Kuwait, not oust Saddam. ``I 
     am certain that had we taken all of Iraq, we would have been 
     like the dinosaur in the tar pit--we would still be there,'' 
     wrote the American commander in Desert Storm, Gen. Norman 
     Schwarzkopf, in his memoirs. America's allies in the region, 
     most prominently Saudi Arabia, feared that a post-Saddam Iraq 
     would splinter and destabilize the region. The Shiites in the 
     south might bond with their fellow religionists in Iran, 
     strengthening the Shiite mullahs, and threatening the Saudi 
     border. In the north, the Kurds were agitating to break off 
     parts of Iraq and Turkey to create a Kurdistan. So Saddam was 
     allowed to keep his tanks and helicopters--which he used to 
     crush both Shiite and Kurdish rebellions.
       The Bush administration played down Saddam's darkness after 
     the gulf war. Pentagon bureaucrats compiled dossiers to 
     support a war-crimes prosecution of Saddam, especially for 
     his sordid treatment of POWs. They documented police stations 
     and ``sports facilities'' where Saddam's henchmen used acid 
     baths and electric drills on their victims. One document 
     suggested that torture should be ``artistic.'' But top 
     Defense Department officials stamped the report secret. One 
     Bush administration official subsequently told The Washington 
     Post, ``Some people were concerned that if we released it 
     during the [1992 presidential] campaign, people would say, 
     `Why don't you bring this guy to justice?' '' (Defense 
     Department aides say politics played no part in the report.)
       The Clinton administration was no more aggressive toward 
     Saddam. In 1993, Saddam apparently hired some Kuwaiti liquor 
     smugglers to try to assassinate former president Bush as he 
     took a victory lap through the region. According to one 
     former U.S. ambassador, the new administration was less than 
     eager to see an open-and-shut case against Saddam, for fear 
     that it would demand aggressive retaliation. When American 
     intelligence continued to point to Saddam's role, the 
     Clintonites lobbed a few cruise missiles into Baghdad. The 
     attack reportedly killed one of Saddam's mistresses, but left 
     the dictator defiant.


                       clinton-era covert actions

       The American intelligence community, under orders from 
     President Bill Clinton, did mount covert actions aimed at 
     toppling Saddam in the 1990s, but by most accounts they were 
     badly organized and halfhearted. In the north, CIA operatives 
     supported a Kurdish rebellion against Saddam in 1995. 
     According to the CIA's man on the scene, former case officer 
     Robert Baer, Clinton administration officials back in 
     Washington ``pulled the plug'' on the operation just as it 
     was gathering momentum. The reasons have long remained murky, 
     but according to Baer, Washington was never sure that 
     Saddam's successor would be an improvement, or that Iraq 
     wouldn't simply collapse into chaos. ``The question we could 
     never answer,'' Baer told Newsweek, ``was, `After Saddam 
     goes, then what?' '' A coup attempt by Iraqi Army officers 
     fizzled the next year. Saddam brutally rolled up the 
     plotters. The CIA operatives pulled out, rescuing everyone 
     they could, and sending them to Guam.
       Meanwhile, Saddam was playing cat-and-mouse with weapons of 
     mass destruction. As part of the settlement imposed by 
     America and its allies at the end of the gulf war, Saddam was 
     supposed to get rid of his existing stockpiles of chem-bio 
     weapons, and to allow in inspectors to make sure none were 
     being hidden or secretly manufactured. The U.N. inspectors 
     did shut down his efforts to build a nuclear weapon. But 
     Saddam continued to secretly work on his germ- and chemical-
     warfare program. When the inspectors first suspected what 
     Saddam was trying to hide in 1995, Saddam's son-in-law, 
     Hussein Kamel, suddenly fled Iraq to Jordan. Kamel had 
     overseen Saddam's chem-bio program, and his defection forced 
     the revelation of some of the secret locations of Saddam's 
     deadly labs. That evidence is the heart of the ``white 
     paper'' used last week by President Bush to support his 
     argument that Iraq has been defying U.N. resolutions for the 
     past decade. (Kamel had the bad judgment to return to Iraq, 
     where he was promptly executed, along with various family 
     members.)
       By now aware of the scale of Saddam's efforts to deceive, 
     the U.N. arms inspectors were unable to certify that Saddam 
     was no longer making weapons of mass destruction. Without 
     this guarantee, the United Nations was unwilling to lift the 
     economic sanctions imposed after the gulf war. Saddam 
     continued to play ``cheat and retreat'' with--the inspectors, 
     forcing a showdown in December 1998. The United Nations 
     pulled out its inspectors, and the United States and Britain 
     launched Operation Desert Fox, four days of bombing that was 
     supposed to teach Saddam a lesson and force his compliance.
       Saddam thumbed his nose. The United States and its allies, 
     in effect, shrugged and walked away. While the U.N. sanctions 
     regime gradually eroded, allowing Saddam to trade easily 
     on the black market, he was free to brew all the chem-bio 
     weapons he wanted. Making a nuclear weapon is harder, and 
     intelligence officials still believe he is a few years 
     away from even regaining the capacity to manufacture 
     enriched uranium to build his own bomb. If he can steal or 
     buy ready-made fissile material, say from the Russian 
     mafia, he could probably make a nuclear weapon in a matter 
     of months, though it would be so large that delivery would 
     pose a challenge.


                              lashing out?

       As the Bush administration prepares to oust Saddam, one way 
     or another, senior administration officials are very worried 
     that Saddam will try to use his WMD arsenal Intelligence 
     experts have warned that Saddam may be ``flushing'' his 
     small, easy-to-conceal biological agents, trying to get them 
     out of the country before an American invasion. A vial of 
     bugs or toxins that could kill thousands could fit in a 
     suitcase--or a diplomatic pouch. There are any number of grim 
     end-game scenarios. Saddam could try blackmail, threatening 
     to unleash smallpox or some other grotesque virus in an 
     American city if U.S. forces invaded. Or, like a cornered 
     dog, he could lash out in a final spasm of violence, raining 
     chemical weapons down on U.S. troops, handing out his 
     bioweapons to terrorists. ``That's the single biggest worry 
     in all this,'' says a senior administration official. ``We 
     are spending a lot of time on this,'' said another top 
     official.
       Some administration critics have said, in effect, let 
     sleeping dogs lie. Don't provoke Saddam by threatening his 
     life; there is no evidence that he has the capability to 
     deliver weapons of mass destruction. Countered White House 
     national-security adviser Condoleezza Rice, ``Do we wait 
     until he's better at it?'' Several administration officials 
     indicated that an intense effort is underway, covert as well 
     as overt, to warn Saddam's lieutenants to save themselves by 
     breaking from the dictator before it's too late. ``Don't be 
     the fool who follows the last order'' is the way one senior 
     administration official puts it.
       The risk is that some will choose to go down with Saddam, 
     knowing that they stand to be hanged by an angry mob after 
     the dictator falls. It is unclear what kind of justice would 
     follow his fall, aside from summary hangings from the nearest 
     lamppost.


                            post-saddam iraq

       The Bush administration is determined not to ``overthrow 
     one strongman only to install another,'' a senior 
     administration official told Newsweek. This official said 
     that the president has made clear that he wants to press for 
     democratic institutions, government accountability and the 
     rule of law in post-Saddam Iraq. But no one really knows how 
     that can be achieved. Bush's advisers are counting on the 
     Iraqis themselves to resist a return to despotism. ``People 
     subject to horrible tryanny have strong antibodies to anyone 
     who wants to put them back under tyranny,'' says a senior 
     administration official. But as another official 
     acknowledged, ``a substantial American commitment'' to Iraq 
     is inevitable.
       At what cost? And who pays? Will other nations chip in 
     money and men? It is not clear how many occupation troops 
     will be required to maintain order, or for how long. Much 
     depends on the manner of Saddam's exit: whether the Iraqis 
     drive him out themselves, or rely heavily on U.S. power. 
     Administration officials shy away from timeables and 
     specifies but say they have to be prepared for all 
     contingencies. ``As General Eisenhower said, `Every plan gets 
     thrown out on the first day of battle. Plans are useless. 
     Planning is everything','' said Vice President Cheney's chief 
     of staff, I, Lewis (Scooter) Libby.
       It is far from clear that America will be able to control 
     the next leader of Iraq, even if he is not as diabolical as 
     Saddam. Any leader of Iraq will look around him and see that 
     Israel and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and that Iran may 
     soon. Just as England and France opted to build their own 
     bombs in the cold war, and not depend on the U.S. nuclear 
     umbrella, the next president of Iraq may want to have his own 
     bomb. ``He may want to, but he can't be allowed to,'' says a 
     Bush official. But what is to guarantee that a newly rich 
     Iraqi strongman won't buy one with his nation's vast oil 
     wealth? In some ways, Iraq is to the Middle East as Germany 
     was to Europe in the 20th century, too large, too 
     militaristic and too competent to coexit peacebly with 
     neighbors. It took two world wars and millions of lives to 
     solve ``the German problem.'' Getting rid of Saddam may be 
     essential to creating a stable, democratic

[[Page S8994]]

     Iraq. But it may be only a first step on a long and dangerous 
     march.
                                  ____

       Per our previous conversation, after reviewing the 
     available licensing records of the Bureau of Export 
     Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, related to 
     biological materials exported to the government of Iraq, 
     additional information identifying the genus species, and 
     strain or origin (if known) of the following viruses, 
     bacteria, fungi, and protozoa for which export licenses were 
     granted is requested.
     Date License Approved, Consignee, and Material information:
     02/08/85, Iraq Atomic Energy Commission, Ustilago
     02/22/85 (2 each), Ministry of Higher Education, Fungi 
         Histoplasma
     07/11/85 (2 each), Middle and Near East Regional A, Fungi 
         Histoplasma
     10/02/85 (46 each), Ministry of Higher Education, Bacteria
     10/08/85 (10 each), Ministry of Higher Education, Bacteria, 
         Clostridium, Francisella
     03/21/86 (18 each), Agriculture and Water Resources, Fungi, 
         Alysidium, Aspergillus, Hypopichia
     03/21/86 (21 each), Agriculture and Water Resources, Fungi, 
         Actinormucor, Aspergillus, Rhizopus, Rhizomucor, 
         Talaromyces, Fusarium, Penicillium, Tricyoderma
     02/04/87 (11 each), State Company for Drug Indust, Bacteria 
         Bacillus, Bacillus, Escherichia, Staphylococcus, 
         Klebsiella, Salmonella, Pseudomonas
     08/17/87 (2 each), Iraq Atomic Energy Commission, Bacteria, 
         Escherichia
     03/24/88 (3 each), Iraq Atomic Energy Commission, Bacteria, 
         Escherichia
     04/22/88, Sera and Vaccine Institute, Bacteria, Salmonella 
         (Class I), Clostridium (Class II), Brucella (Class III), 
         Corynebacterium (II), Vibrio (Class III)
     05/05/88 (1 each), Iraq Atomic Energy Commission, Bacteria, 
         Escherichia
     08/16/88, Ministry of Trade, Bacteria, (12 each) Bacillus 
         (Class III), (6 each) Bacillus (Class II), (6 each) 
         Bacillus (Class III), (9 each) Clostridium (Class 10)
     11/07/88 (2 each), Iraq Atomic Energy Commission, Bacteria, 
         Escherichia (Class I)
     12/19/88 (3 each), Iraq Atomic Energy Commission, Bacteria 
         Escherichia (Class I)

       The above listing includes only those material for which 
     export licenses were granted from January 1, 1985, until the 
     present. A number of requests were returned without action. 
     If any information is available as to the specific materials 
     requested by the consignee in these cases, it may also prove 
     useful. A listing of materials for which export licenses were 
     approved between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 1984 
     follows. I understand that record may no longer be available 
     for these items, however, if any specific information is 
     available which identifies these materials please forward it 
     as well.
     Data License Approved, Consignee, and Material Information
     08/14/80 (20 each), Ministry of Health for College, Bacteria/
         Fungi, not further identified
     09/11/80 (45 each), University of Baghdad, Bacteria/Fungi/
         Protozoa, Virus/Viroids (15 each), not further identified
     03/17/82 (1 each), University of Mosul, Bacteria/Fungi/
         Protozoa
     04/09/82 (6 each), General Establishment/Drugs, Pseudomonas, 
         Salmonella, Aspergillus
     04/09/82 (6 each), General Establishment/Drugs, Pseudomonas, 
         Salmonella, Aspergillus
     07/30/82 (3 each), State Co for Drug Industries, Bacillus
     08/08/84 (2 each), Ministry of Health for College, Bacteria 
         Corynebacterium
     11/30/84 (59 each), College of Medicine, Aspergillus, 
         Epidermophyton, Microsporum, Penicillium, Trichophyton, 
         Alternaria, Neisseria, Clostridium, Bacteroides, 
         Escherichia

       I understand that information for those items exported 
     prior to January 1, 1985 may be unavailable. Please feel free 
     to contact me if you have any questions regarding this 
     request at 202-224-4822.
       HEADLINE: Ustilago nuda (Jensen) Rostrup, ATCC 34718. TEXT: 
     CBS 118.19. H. Kniep. USDA permit PPQ-526 required. Growth 
     Conditions: Medium 336 24C. Shipped: Test tube. Price Code: 
     W.

       HEADLINE: Histoplasma capsulatum var. farciminosum, ATCC 
     32136. TEXT: A.A. Padhye CDC Disagnostic 76-066816 
     (Histoplasma farciminosum). CBS 176.57. Class III pathogen, 
     requests must carry signed statement assuming all risks and 
     responsibilities for lab handling. Growth Conditions: Medium 
     337 25C. Shipped: Test tube. Price Code: W.

    AMERICAN TYPE CULTURE COLLECTION, CUSTOMER ACTIVITY DETAIL REPORT, FROM: 01/01/85 TO: 12/31/93; FOR: ALL
                                          CUSTOMERS, FOR COUNTRY: IRAQ
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Inv. #          Date           ATCC #              Description          Batch #      Quantity      Price
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Cust #: 015408 Customer Name: UNIV OF BAGHDAD
 
010072.........     05/02/86       000000000010  BACILLUS ANTHRACIS......      8-20-82            2       108.80
010072.........     05/02/86       000000000082  BACILLUS SUBTILIS.......      6-20-84            2       108.80
010072.........     05/02/86       000000003502  CLOSTRIDIUM BOTULINUM          7-7-81            3       163.20
                                                  TYPE A.
010072.........     05/02/86       000000003624  CLOSTRIDIUM PERFRINGENS.      10-85SV            2        20.40
010072.........     05/02/86       000000006051  BACILLUS SUBTILIS.......      12-6-84            2        20.40
010072.........     05/02/86       000000006223  FRANCISELLA TULARENSIS        5-14-79            2       108.80
                                                  VAR. TULARENSIS.
010072.........     05/02/86       000000009441  CLOSTRIDIUM TETANI......         3-84            3       163.20
010072.........     05/02/86       000000009564  CLOSTRIDIUM BOTULINUM         3-29-79            2       108.80
                                                  TYPE E.
010072.........     05/02/86       000000010779  CLOSTRIDIUM TETANI......     4-24-84S            3        30.60
010072.........     05/02/86       000000012916  CLOSTRIDIUM PERFRINGENS.      8-14-80            2       108.80
010072.........     05/02/86       000000013124  CLOSTRIDIUM PERFRINGENS.       7-84SV            3        30.60
010072.........     05/02/86       000000014185  BACILLUS ANTHRACIS......      1-14-80            3       163.20
010072.........     05/02/86       000000014578  BACILLUS ANTHRACIS......       1-6-78            2       108.80
010072.........     05/02/86       000000014581  BACILLUS MEGATERIUM.....      4-18-85            2        20.40
010072.........     05/02/86       000000014945  BACILLUS MEGATERIUM.....      6-21-81            2       108.80
010072.........     05/02/86       000000017855  CLOSTRIDIUM BOTULINUM         6-21-71            2       108.80
                                                  TYPE E.
010072.........     05/02/86       000000019213  BACILLUS MEGATERIUM.....         3-84            2       108.80
010072.........     05/02/86       000000019397  CLOSTRIDIUM BOTULINUM         8-18-81            3       163.20
                                                  TYPE A.
010072.........     05/02/86       000000023450  BRUCELLA ABORTUS BIOTYPE       8-2-84            3       163.20
                                                  3.
010072.........     05/02/86       000000023455  BRUCELLA ABORTUS BIOTYPE       2-5-68            3       163.20
                                                  9.
010072.........     05/02/86       000000023456  BRUCELLA MELITENSIS            3-8-78            2       108.80
                                                  BIOTYPE 1.
010072.........     05/02/86       000000023458  BRUCELLA MELITENSIS           1-29-68            2       108.80
                                                  BIOTYPE 3.
010072.........     05/02/86       000000025763  CLOSTRIDIUM BOTULINUM            8-83            2       108.80
                                                  TYPE A.
010072.........     05/02/86       000000035415  CLOSTRIDIUM BOTULINUM         2-24-84            2       108.80
                                                  TYPE F.
                                                                                                          297.12
010072.........     05/02/86            FREIGHT                                         ...........         0.00
010072.........     05/02/86                TAX                                         ...........  ...........
010072.........     05/02/86                         Total Invoice.......                        58     2,813.12
                                                                                       -------------------------
                                                     Total for: UNIV OF    ...........           58     2,813.12
                                                  BAGHDAD.
 
                             Cust #: 016124 Customer Name: STATE CO FOR DRUG INDUST.
 
AC377..........     08/31/87       000000002601  SACCHAROMYCES CEREVISIAE      8-28-80            1        12.00
AC377..........     08/31/87       000000006539  SALMONELLA CHOLERAESUIS         6-86S            1        12.00
                                                  SUBSP. CHOLERAESUIS.
AC377..........     08/31/87       000000006633  BACILLUS SUBTILIS.......        10-85            2       128.00
AC377..........     08/31/87       000000010031  KLEBSIELLA PNEUMONIAE         8-13-80            1        64.00
                                                  SUBSP. PNEUMONIAE.
AC377..........     08/31/87       000000010536  ESCHERICHIA COLI........       4-9-80            1        64.00
AC377..........     08/31/87       000000011778  BACILLUS CEREUS.........       5-85SV            2        24.00
AC377..........     08/31/87       000000012228  STAPHYLOCOCCUS                 11-86S            1        12.00
                                                  EPIDERMIDIS.
AC377..........     08/31/87       000000014884  BACILLUS PUMILUS........       9-8-80            2       128.00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

     AC1507, 04/26/88, Total Invoice
       AC1616, 07/11/88, 0000000035-X, COMMUNICATION FEES, 35-X.
       AC1616, 07/11/88, 000000011303, ESCHERICHIA COLI, 4-87S.
       AC1616, 07/11/88, 000000037349, PTIBO542 PLASMID IN 
     AGROBACTERIUM TUMEFACIENS, 6-14-85.
       AC1616, 07/11/88, 000000045031, CAULIFLOWER MOSAIC 
     CAULIMOVIRUS CLONE, 5-28-85.
       AC1616, 07/11/88, FREIGHT.
       AC1616, 07/11/88, TAX.
     062876, 10/12/87, Total Invoice
       AC1507, 04/26/88, 0000000035-X, COMMUNICATION FEES.
       AC1507, 04/26/88, 000000057236, HU LAMBDA 4X-8 PHAGE 
     LYSATE.
       AC1507, 04/26/88, 000000057240, HU LAMBDA 14 PHAGE LYSATE.
       AC1507, 04/26/88, 000000057242, HU LAMBDA 15 PHAGE LYSATE.
       AC1507, 04/26/88, FREIGHT.
       AC1507, 04/26/88, TAX.

       AC489, 08/31/87, 000000023846, ESCHERICHIA COLI, 7-29-83.
       AC489, 08/31/87, 000000033694, ESCHERICHIA COLI, 7-29-83.

[[Page S8995]]

       AC489, 08/31/87, FREIGHT.
       AC489, 08/31/87, MINIMUM.
     CUST #: 022913, Customer Name: TECHNICAL & SCIENTIFIC
       AC2658, 09/29/88, 000000000240, BACILLUS ANTHRACIS, 5-14-
     63.
       AC2658, 09/29/88, 000000000938, BACILLUS ANTHRACIS, 1963.
       AC2658, 09/29/88, 000000003629, CLOSTRIDIUM PERFRINGENS, 
     10-23-85.
       AC2658, 09/29/88, 000000008009, CLOSTRIDIUM PERFRINGENS, 3-
     30-84.
       AC2658, 09/29/88, 000000008705, BACILLUS ANTHRACIS, 6-27-
     62.
       AC2658, 09/29/88, 000000009014, BRUCELLA ABORTUS, 5-11-66.
       AC2658, 09/29/88, 000000010388, CLOSTRIDIUM PERFRINGENS, 6-
     1-73.
       AC2658, 09/29/88, 000000011966, BACILLUS ANTHRACIS, 5-5-70.
       AC2658, 09/29/88, 000000025763, CLOSTRIDIUM BOTULINUM TYPE 
     A, 7-86.
       AC2658, 09/29/88, 000000033018, BACILLUS CEREUS, 4-83.
       AC2658, 09/29/88, 000000033019, BACILLUS CEREUS, 3-88.
       AC2658, 09/29/88, DISCOUNT.
       AC2658, 09/29/88, FREIGHT.
       AC2658, 09/29/88, TAX.
     AC3352, 01/17/89, Total Invoice
       AC1639, 01/31/89, 0000000035-X, COMMUNICATION FEES, 35-X.
       AC1639, 01/31/89, 000000057056, PHPT31 PLASMID IN 
     ESCHERICHIA COLI JM83, 3-88.
       AC1639, 01/31/89, 000000057212, P LAMBDA 500 PLASMID IN 
     ESCHERICHIA COLI, 88-09.
       AC1639, 01/31/89, FREIGHT.
       AC1639, 01/31/89, TAX.
                                  ____

       Department of Health & Human Services, Centers for Disease 
                                           Control and Prevention,
                                       Atlanta, GA, June 21, 1995.
     Hon. Donald W. Riegle, Jr.,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Riegle: In 1993, at your request, the Centers 
     for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) forwarded to your 
     office a listing of all biological materials, including 
     viruses, retroviruses, bacteria, and fungi, which CDC 
     provided to the government of Iraq from October 1, 1984, 
     through October 13, 1993. Recently, in the course of 
     reviewing our shipping records for a Freedom of Information 
     Act (FOIA) request from a private citizen, we identified an 
     additional shipment, on May 21, 1985, that was not included 
     on the list that was provided to your office. Following this 
     discovery, we conducted a thorough review of all of our 
     shipping records and are confident that we have now included 
     a listing of all shipments. A corrected list is enclosed 
     (Note: the new information is italicized).
       These additional materials were hand-carried by Dr. 
     Mohammad Mahoud to Iraq after he had spent three months 
     training in a CDC laboratory. Most of the materials were non-
     infectious diagnostic reagents for detecting evidence of 
     infections to mosquito-borne viruses. Only two of the 
     materials are on the Commodity Control List, i.e., Yersinin 
     Pestis (the agent of plague) and dengue virus. (the strain of 
     plague bacillus was non-virulent, and CDC is currently 
     petitioning the Department of Commerce to remove this 
     particular variant from the list of controlled materials).
       We regret that our earlier list was incomplete and 
     appreciate your understanding.
           Sincerely,
                                                    David Satcher,
                                                         Director.
       Enclosure. (Copy unclear)

         CDC Shipments to Iraq October 1, 1984 through Present


     4/26/85--Minister of Health, Ministry of Health, Baghdad, Iraq

       8 Vials antigen and antisera, (R. rickettsii and R. typhi) 
     to diagnose rickettsial infections (non-infectious).


 5/21/85--Dr. Mahammad Imad, Al-Dean M. Mahmud, Dept. of Microbiology, 
        College of Medicine, University of Basrah, Basrah, Iraq

       Etiologic Agents:--lyophilized arbovirus seed;
       West Nile Fever Virus, Lyophilized cultures of avirulant 
     yersinia pestis and Y. pseudotuberculosis ((strain r);
       0.5 m1 Bhania Virus (Iq 690);
       0.5 m1 Dongua Virus type 2 (New Guinea C);
       0.5 m1 Dongua Virus type 3 (H-97);
       0.5 m1 Hazara Virus (Pak IC 280);
       0.5 m1 Kemeroud Virus (rio);
       0.5 m1 Langat Virus (TP 21);
       0.5 m1 Sandfly Fever/Naples Virus (original);
       0.5 m1 Sandfly Fever/Sicilian Virus (original);
       0.5 m1 Sindbis Virus (Egar 339);
       0.5 m1 Tahyna Virus (Bardos 92);
       0.5 m1 Thgoto Virus (II A).
       Diagnostic Reagents and Associated Materials:
       2. vials each Y. pestis FA (+ & -) conjugates;
       2 vials Y. pestis Fraction 1 antigen;
       10 vials Y. pestis bacteriophage impregnated paper strips;
       5 plague-infected mouse tissue smears (fixed);
       Various protocols for diagnostic bacteriology tests;
       23 X 0.5 m1 Bhanja (Ig 690) antigen;
       22 X 0.5 m1 Dengue Type 2 (New Guinea C) antigen;
       22 X 0.5 ml Dengue type 3 (H-69) antigen;
       22 X 0.5 ml Hazara (Pak IC 290) antigen;
       22 X 0.5 ml Kemarovo (Rio) antigen;
       22 X 0.5 ml Langat (IF 21) antigen,
       24 X 0.5 ml Sandfly Fever/Naples (original) antigen;
       24 X 0.5 ml Sandfly Fever/Sicilian (original) antigen;
       Diagnostic Reagents and Associated Materials:
       2 vials each Y. pestis PA (+6-) conjugates;
       2 vials Y. pestis Fraction 2 antigen;
       10 vials Y. pestis bacteriophage impregnated paper stripe;
       5 plague-infected mouse tissue smears (fixed);
       Various protocols for diagnostic bacteriology tests;
       23 X 0.5 ml Bhanja (Ig 690) antigen;
       22 X 0.5 ml Dengue Type 2 (New Guinea C) antigen;
       22 X 0.5 ml Dengue Type 3 (H-67) antigen;
       22 X 0.5 ml Hazara (Pak IC 280) antigen;
       23 X 0.5 ml Kemorovo (Rio) antigen;
       21 X 0.5 ml Langat (TP 21) antigen;
       24 X 0.5 ml Sandfly Fever/Maples (original) antigen;
       24 X 0.5 ml Sandfly Fever/Sicilian (original) antigen;
       23 X 0.5 ml Sindbis (EgAr 339) antigen;
       23 X 0.5 ml Tahyna (Bardos 92) antigen;
       20 X 0.5 ml Thogoto (II A) antigen;
       23 X 0.5 ml Bhanja (Ig 690) antigen;
       21 X 0.5 ml West Nile (Eg 101) antigen;
       20 X 0.5 ml Normal SMB antigen;
       10 X 0.5 ml Normal SML antigen;
       5 X 1.0 ml Bhanja (Ig 690) antibody;
       5 X 1.0 ml Dengue Type 2 (New Guinea C) antibody;
       5 X 1.0 ml Dengue Type 3 (H-87) antibody;
       5 X 1.0 ml Hazara (Pak IC 280) antibody;
       5 X 1.0 ml Xemerovo (Rio) antibody;
       5 X 2.0 ml Langat (TP 21) antibody;
       5 X 1.0 ml Sandfly Fever/Naples (original) antibody;
       5 X 2.0 ml Sandfly Fever/Sicilian (original) antibody;
       5 X 1.0 ml Sindbis (EgAr 339) antibody;
       5 X 1.0 ml Tahyna (Bardos 92) antibody;
       5 X 1.0 ml Thogoto (II A) antibody;
       5 X 1.0 ml West Nile (Eg 101) antibody;
       3 X 1.0 ml Normal MHIAF (SMB) antibody;
       3 X 1.0 ml Normal MHIAF (SML) antibody;
       1.0 ml A polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml AIYA, etc. polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml B polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml BUN polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml BWA polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml C-1 polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml C-2 polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml CAL polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml CAP polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml CON polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml GMA polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml KEM polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml PAL polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml PAT polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml PHL polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml ORF polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml Rabies, etc. polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml STM polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml TCR polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml VSV polyvalent grouping fluid;
       1.0 ml polyvalent 1;
       1.0 ml polyvalent 2;
       1.0 ml polyvalent 3;
       1.0 ml polyvalent 4;
       1.0 ml polyvalent 5;
       1.0 ml polyvalent 6;
       1.0 ml polyvalent 7;
       1.0 ml polyvalent 8;
       1.0 ml polyvalent 9;
       1.0 ml polyvalent 10;
       1.0 ml polyvalent 12;
       1.0 ml Group B1 reagent;
       1.0 ml Bluetongue reagent;
       4 X 0.5 ml Dengue 1-4 set monoclonal antibodies;
       1.0 ml St. Louis Enc. (MSI-7) monoclonal antibody;
       1.0 ml Western Eq. Enc. (McMillian) monoclonal antibody.


                               6/26/85--

       Dr. Mohammed S. Khidar, University of Baghdad, College of 
     Medicine, Department of Microbiology, Baghdad, Iraq 3 yeast 
     cultures Candida sp. (etiologic).


                                3/10/86

       Dr. Rowil Shawil Georgis, M.B.CH.B.D.F.H., Officers City 
     Al-Muthanna, Quartret 710, Street 13, Close 69, House 28/I, 
     Baghdad, Iraq. 1 vial Botulinum Toxiod # A-2 (non-
     infectious).


 4/21/56--Dr. Rowil Shawil Georgis, N.B. Cir. D.D.F.H., Officers City 
  Al-Muthana, Quartret 710, Street 13, Close 69, House 23/r, Baghdad, 
                                  Iraq

       1 vial Botulinum toxin (non-infections).


   7/21/88--Dr. Faqid Alfarhood, Mahela 887, Zikak 54, House 97, Hay 
                      Aljihad, Kerk, Baghdad, Iraq

       teaching supplies (non-infectious); CDC procedures manuals.


   7/27/88--Dr. Fagid Alfarhood, Mahela 887, Zikak 54, House 97, Hay 
                      Aljihad, Kerk, Baghdad, Iraq

       teaching supplies (non-infectious); CDC procedure manuals.


 11/28/89--Dr. Nadeal T. Al Hadithi, University of Basrah, College of 
              Science, Department of Biology, Basrah, Iraq

       5.0 mls Enterococcus faecalis;
       5.0 mls Enterococcus faccium;
       5.0 mls Enterococcus avium;
       5.0 mls Enterococcus raffinosus;
       5.0 mls Enterococcus gallinarum;

[[Page S8996]]

       5.0 mls Enterococcus durans;
       5.0 mls Enterococcus hirac;
       5.0 mls Streptococcus bovis (cciologic).

                From U.S. Senate Hearing Report 103-900


              u.s. exports of biological materials to iraq

  The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs has 
oversight responsibility for the Export Administration Act. Pursuant to 
the Act, Committee staff contacted the U.S. Department of Commerce and 
requested information on the export of biological materials during the 
years prior to the Gulf War. After receiving this information, we 
contacted a principal supplier of these materials to determine what, if 
any, materials were exported to Iraq which might have contributed to an 
offensive or defensive biological warfare program. Records available 
from the supplier for the period from 1985 until the present show that 
during this time, pathogenic (meaning ``disease producing''), toxigenic 
(meaning ``poisonous''), and other biological research materials were 
exported to Iraq pursuant to application and licensing by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce. Records prior to 1985 were not available, 
according to the supplier. These exported biological materials were not 
attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction. According to 
the Department of Defense's own Report to Congress on the Conduct of 
the Persian Gulf War, released in April 1992:
  ``By the time of the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had developed 
biological weapons. It's advanced and aggressive biological warfare 
program was the most advanced in the Arab world. The program probably 
began late in the 1970's and concentrated on the development of two 
agents, botulinum toxin and anthrax bacteria. . . . Large scale 
production of these agents began in 1989 at four facilities near 
Baghdad. Delivery means for biological agents ranged from simple aerial 
bombs and artillery rockets to surface-to-surface missiles.''
  Included in the approved sales are the following biological materials 
(which have been considered by various nations for use in war), with 
their associated disease symptoms:
  Bacillus Anthracis: anthrax is a disease-producing bacteria 
identified by the Department of Defense in the The Conduct of the 
Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, as being a major component 
in the Iraqi biological warfare program.
  Anthrax is an often-fatal infectious disease due to ingestion of 
spores. It begins abruptly with high fever, difficulty in breathing, 
and chest pain. The disease eventually results in septicemia (blood 
poisoning), and the mortality is high. Once septicemia is advanced, 
antibiotic therapy may prove useless, probably because the exotoxins 
remain, despite the death of the bacteria.
  Clostridium Botulinum: a baterial source of botulinum toxin, which 
causes vomiting, constipation, thirst, general weakness, headache, 
fever, dizziness, double vision, dilation of the pupils and paralysis 
of the muscles involving swallowing. It is often fatal.
  Histoplasma Capsulatum: causes a disease superficially resembling 
tuberculosis that may cause pneumonia, enlargement of the liver and 
spleen, anemia, an influenza-like illness and an acute inflammatory 
skin disease marked by tender red modules, usually on the shins. 
Reactivated infection usually involves the lungs, the brain, spinal 
membranes, heart, peritoneum, and the adrenals.
  Brucella Melitensis: a bacterial which can cause chronic fatigue, 
loss of appetite, profuse sweating when at rest, pain in joints and 
muscles, insomnia, nausea, and damage to major organs.
  Clostridium Perfringens: a highly toxic bacteria which causes gas 
gangrene. The bacteria produce toxins that move along muscle bundles in 
the body killing cells and producing necrotic tissue that is then 
favorable for further growth of the bacteria itself. Eventually, these 
toxins and bacteria enter the bloodstream and cause systemic illness.
  In addition, several shipments of Escherichia Coli (E.Coli) and 
genetic materials, as well as human and bacterial DNA, were shipped 
directly to the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
  The following is a detailed listing of biological materials, provided 
by the American Type Culture Collection, which were exported to 
agencies of the government of Iraq pursuant to the issuance of an 
export licensed by the U.S. Commerce Department:
  Date: February 8, 1985
  Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Agency
  Materials Shipped: Ustilago nuda (Jensen) Rostrup.
  Date: February 22, 1985
  Sent to: Ministry of Higher Education
  Materials Shipped: Histoplasma capsulanum var. farciminosum (ATCC 
32136). Class III pathogen.
       Date: July 11, 1985.
       Sent to: Middle And Near East Regional A.
       Materials Shipped: Histoplasma capsulatum var. farciminosum 
     (ATCC 32136). Class III pathogen.
       Date: May 2, 1986.
       Sent to: Ministry of Higher Education.
       Materials Shipped: 1. Bacillus Anthracis Cohn (ATCC 10). 
     Batch #08-20-82 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
       2. Bacillus Subtitlis (Ehrenberg) Cohn (ATCC 82). Batch 
     #06-20-84 (2 each).
       3. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 3502). Batch #07-07-
     81 (3 each). Class III Pathogen.
       4. Clostridium perfringens (Weillon and Zuber) Hauduroy, et 
     al (ATCC 3624). Batch #10-85SV (2 each).
       5. Bacillus subtilis (ATCC 6051). Batch #12-06-84 (2 each).
       6. Francisella tularensis, var. tularensis Olsufiev (ATCC 
     6223) Batch #05-14-79 (2 each). Avirulent, suitable for 
     preparations of diagnostic antigens.
       7. Clostridium tetani (ATCC 9441). Batch #03-84 (3 each). 
     Highly toxigenic.
       8. Clostridium botulinum Type E (ATCC 9564). Batch #03-02-
     79 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
       9. Clostridium tetani (ATCC 10779). Batch #04-24-84S (3 
     each).
       10. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 12916). Batch #08-14-80 
     (2 each). Agglutinating type 2.
       11. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 13124). Batch #07-84SV (3 
     each). Type A, alpha-toxigenic, produces lechitinase C.J. 
     Appl.
       12. Bacillus Anthracis (ATCC 14185). Batch #01-14-80 (3 
     each). G.G. Wright (Fort Dertick) V770-NP1-R. Bovine anthrax, 
     Class III pathogen.
       13. Bacillus Anthracis (ATCC 14578). Batch #01-06-78 (2 
     each). Class III pathogen.
       14. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 14581). Batch #04-18-85 (2 
     each).
       15. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 14945). Batch #06-21-81 (2 
     each).
       16. Clostridium botulinum Type E (ATCC 17855. Batch #06-21-
     71. Class III pathogen.
  17. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 19213). Batch #3-84 (2 each).
       18. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 19397). Batch #08-
     18-81 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
       19. Brucella abortus Biotype 3 (ATCC 23450). Batch #08-02-
     84 (3 each). Class III pathogen.
       20. Brucella abortus Biotype 9 (ATCC 23455). Batch #02-05-
     68 (3 each). Class III pathogen.
       21. Brucella melitensis Biotype 1 (ATCC 23456). Batch #03-
     08-78 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
       22. Brucella melitensis Biotype 3 (ATCC 23458. Batch #01-
     29-68 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
       23. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 25763. Batch #8-83 
     (2 each). Class III pathogen.
       24. Clostridium botulinum Type F (ATCC 35415). Batch #02-
     02-84 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
       Date: August 31, 1987.
       Sent to: State Company for Drug Industries.
       Materials Shipped:
       1. Saccharomyces cerevesia (ATCC 2601). Batch #08-28-08 (1 
     each).
       2. Salmonella choleraesuis subsp. choleraesuis Serotype 
     typhia (ATCC 6539). Batch #06-86S (1 each).
       3. Bacillus subtillus (ATCC 6633). Batch# 10-85 (2 each).
       4. Klebsiella pneumoniae subsp. pneumoniae (ATCC 10031). 
     Batch# 08-13-80 (1 each).
       5. Escherichia coli (ATCC 10536). Batch# 04-09-80 (1 each).
       6. Bacillus cereus (11778). Batch# 05-85SV (2 each).
       7. Staphylococcus epidermidis (ATCC 12228). Batch# 11-86s 
     (1 each).
       8. Bacillus pumilus (ATCC 14884). Batch# 09-08-90 (2 each).
       Date: July 11, 1988.
       Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
       Materials Shipped:
       1. Escherichia coli (ATCC 11303). Batch# 04-87S. Phage 
     host.
       2. Cauliflower Mosaic Caulimovirus (ATCC 45031). Batch# 06-
     14-85. Plant virus.
       3. Plasmid in Agrobacterium Tumefaciens (ATCC 37349). (Ti 
     plasmid for co-cultivation with plant integration vectors in 
     E Coli). Batch# 05-28-85.
       Date: April 26, 1988.
       Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
       Materials Shipped:
       Hulambda4x-8, clone: human hypoxanthine 
     phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1 
     (ATCC 57236) Phage vector; Suggested host: E.coli.
       2. Hulambdal 14-8, clone: human hypoxanthine 
     phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1 
     (ATCC 57240) Phage vector; Suggest host: E.coli.

[[Page S8997]]

       3. Hulambda 15, clone: human hypoxanthine 
     phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1 
     (ATCC 57242) Phage vector; Suggested host: E.coli.
       Date: August 31, 1987.
       Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
       Materials Shipped:
       1. Escherichia coli (ATCC 23846). Batch# 07-29-83 (1 each).
       2. Escherichia coli (ATCC 33694). Batch# 05-87 (1 each).
       Date: September 29, 1988.
       Sent to: Ministry of Trade.
       Materials Shipped:
       1. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 240). Batch# 05-14-63 (3 each). 
     Class III pathogen.
       2. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 938). Batch# 1963 (3 each). 
     Class III pathogen.
       3. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 3629). Batch# 10-23-85 (3 
     each).
       4. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 8009). Batch# 03-30-84 (3 
     each).
       5. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 8705). Batch# 06-27-62 (3 
     each). Class III pathogen.
       6. Brucella abortus (ATCC 9014). Batch# 05-11-66 (3 each). 
     Class III pathogen.
       7. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 10388). Batch# 06-01-73 (3 
     each).
       8. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 11966). Batch# 05-05-70 (3 
     each). Class III pathogen.
       9. Clostridium botulinum Type A. Batch# 07-86 (3 each). 
     Class III pathogen.
       10. Bacillus cereus (ATCC 33018). Batch# 04-83 (3 each).
       11. Bacillus ceres (ATCC 33019). Batch# 03-88 (3 each).
       Date: January 31, 1989.
       Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
       Materials Shipped:
       1. PHPT31, clone: human hypoxanthine 
     phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1 
     (ATCC 57057)
       2. plambda500, clone: human hypoxanthine 
     phosphoribosyltransferase pseudogene (HPRT). Chromosome(s): 5 
     p14-p13 (ATCC 57212).
       Date: January 17, 1989
       Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
       Materials Shipped:
       1. Hulambda4x-8, clone: human hypoxanthine 
     phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1 
     (ATCC 57237) Phage vector; Suggested host: E. coli.
       2. Hulambda14, clone: human hypoxanthine 
     phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1 
     (ATCC 57240) Cloned from human lymphoblast. Phage vector; 
     Suggested host: E. coli.
       3. Hulambda15, clone: human hypoxanthine 
     phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1 
     (ATCC 57241) Phage vector; Suggested host: E. coli.
       Additionally, the Centers for Disease Control has compiled 
     a listing of biological materials shipped to Iraq prior to 
     the Gulf War. The listing covers the period from October 1, 
     1984 (when the CDC began keeping records) through October 13, 
     1993. The following materials with biological warfare 
     significance were shipped to Iraq during this period:
       Date: November 28, 1989.
       Sent to: University of Basrah, College of Science, 
     Department of Biology.
       Materials Shipped:
       1. Enterococcus faecalis.
       2. Enterococcus faecium.
       3. Enterococcus avium.
       4. Enterococcus raffinosus.
       5. Enterococcus gallinarium.
       6. Enterococcus durans.
       7. Enterococcus hirae.
       8. Streptococcus bovis (etiologic).
       Date: April 21, 1986.
       Sent to: Officers City Al-Muthanna, Quartret 710, Street 
     13, Close 69 House 28/I, Baghdad, Iraq.
       Materials Shipped:
       1. 1 vial botulinum toxoid (non-infectious).
       Date: March 10, 1986.
       Sent to: Officers City Al-Muthanna, Quartret 710, Street 
     13, Close 69 House 28/I, Baghdad, Iraq.
       Materials Shipped:
       1. 1 vial botulinum toxoid #A2 (non-infectious).
       Date: June 25, 1985.
       Sent to: University of Baghdad, College of Medicine, 
     Department of Microbiology.
       Materials Shipped:
       1. 3 yeast cultures (etiologic) Candida sp.
       Date: May 21, 1985.
       Sent to: Basrah, Iraq.
       Materials Shipped:
       1. Lyophilized arbovirus seed (etiologic).
       2. West Nile Fever Virus.
       Date: April 26, 1985.
       Sent to: Minister of Health, Ministry of Health, Baghdad, 
     Iraq.
       Materials Shipped:
       1.8 vials antigen and antisera (r. rickettsii and r. typhi) 
     to diagnose rickettsial infections (non-infectious).


                 UNSCOM Biological Warfare Inspections

       UNSCOM inspections uncovered evidence that the government 
     of Iraq was conducting research on pathogen enhancement on 
     the following biological warfare-related materials: bacillus 
     anthracis; clostridium botulinum; clostridium perfirgens; 
     brucella abortis; brucella melentensis; francisella 
     tularensis; and clostridium tetani.
       In addition, the UNSCOM inspections revealed that 
     biological warfare-related stimulant research was being 
     conducted on the following materials: bacillus subtillus; 
     bacillus ceres; and bacillus megatillus.
       UNSCOM reported to Committee staff that a biological 
     warfare inspection (BW3) was conducted at the Iraq Atomic 
     Energy Commission in 1993. This suggests that the Iraqi 
     government may have been experimenting with the materials 
     cited above (E. coli and rDNA) in an effort to create 
     genetically altered microorganisms (novel biological warfare 
     agents). Committee staff plans to interview the BW3 team 
     leader, Col. David Franz of the United States Army Medical 
     Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in the 
     near future. This phase of the investigation continues.


                       Biological Warfare Defense

       The following section, describing the types, dissemination, 
     and defensive measures against biological agents, is quoted 
     verbatim from a United States Marine Corps Institute 
     document, Nuclear and Chemical Operations, MCI 7711B, used in 
     the Command and Staff College's nonresident program. It is 
     clear from this document that the Department of Defense 
     recognizes both the threat and U.S. vulnerability to 
     biological weapons. This document also outlines the 
     Department's understanding of what actions should be taken in 
     the event that a biological weapon has been or is suspected 
     to have been employed.
       ``Biological agents cannot be detected by the human senses. 
     A person could become a casualty before he is aware he has 
     been exposed to a biological agent. An aerosol or mist of 
     biological agent is borne in the air. These agents can 
     silently and effectively attack man, animals, plants, and in 
     some cases, materiel. Agents can be tailored for a specific 
     type of target.
       Methods of using antipersonnel agents undoubtedly vary so 
     that no uniform pattern of employment or operation is 
     evident. It is likely that agents will be used in 
     combinations so that the disease symptoms will confuse 
     diagnosis and interfere with proper treatment. It is also 
     probable that biological agents would be used in heavy 
     concentrations to insure a high percentage of infection in 
     the target area. The use of such concentrations could result 
     in the breakdown of individual immunity because the large 
     number of micro-organisms entering the body could 
     overwhelm the natural body defenses.
     Types of biological agents
       Different antipersonnel agents require varying periods of 
     time before they take effect, and the periods of time for 
     which they will incapacitate a person also vary. Most of the 
     diseases having antipersonnel employment potential are found 
     among group of diseases that are naturally transmitted 
     between animals and man. Mankind is highly vulnerable to them 
     since he has little contact with animals in today's urban 
     society. The micro-organisms of possible use in warfare are 
     found in four naturally occurring groups--the fungi, 
     bacteria, ricketisiae, and viruses.
       a. Fungi. Fungi occur in many forms and are found almost 
     everywhere. They range in size from a single cell, such as 
     yeast, to multicellular forms, such as mushrooms and 
     puffballs. Their greatest employment potential is against 
     plants, although some forms cause disease in man. A fungus 
     causes the disease coccidioidomycosis in man. Other common 
     infections caused by Fungi include ringworm and ``athletes 
     foot.''
       b. Bacteria. Bacteria comprise a large and varied group of 
     organisms. They occur in varying shapes, such as rods, 
     spheres, and spirals, but they are all one-celled plants. 
     Some bacteria can assume a resistant structure called a 
     spore, which enables them to resist adverse environmental 
     conditions. Others may produce poisonous substances called 
     toxins. Examples of human disease caused by bacteria are 
     anthrax, brucellosis, tularemia, staphylococcus, and 
     streptococcus.
       c. Rickettsiae. Rickettsiae organisms have the physical 
     appearances of bacteria and the growth characteristics of 
     viruses. Members of this group must have living tissue for 
     growth and reproduction, whereas most fungi and bacteria can 
     be grown on artificial material. Another characteristic of 
     rickettsiae is that most diseases caused by this group are 
     transmitted by the bite of an insect, such as the mosquito, 
     mite, or tick. Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, Q fever, and 
     typhus are diseases of mankind caused by rickettsiae.
       d. Virus. The smallest living things known to mankind are 
     virsuses. Viruses are so small that an electron microscope is 
     required to see them. Viruses cannot be grown in the absence 
     of living tissue. Diseases which are caused by viruses cannot 
     normally be treated with antibiotics. Viruses cause yellow 
     fever, rabies, and poliomyelitis.
     Dissemination of biological agents
       a. Aerosol. Biological agents may be disseminated on, or 
     over, the target by many means, such as aircraft, missiles, 
     and explosive munitions. These devices produce a biological 
     aerosol, and, if antipersonnel biological agents are ever 
     used, they will probably be disseminated in the form of 
     biological mists or aerosols. This method of dissemination 
     would be extremely effective because the micro-organisms 
     would be drawn into the lungs as a person breathes, and there 
     they would be rapidly absorbed into the blood stream. The 
     hours from dusk until dawn appear to be the best time for 
     dissemination of biological agents. The weather conditions 
     are most favorable for these agents at night, since sunlight 
     will destroy many of them. In field trials, using harmless 
     biological aerosols, area coverages of thousands of square 
     miles have been accomplished. The aerosol particles were 
     carried for long distances by air currents. (emphasis added)
       b. Living Hosts. Personnel may be infected by disease 
     carrying vectors, such as insects, rats, or other animals. 
     Mosquitos may

[[Page S8998]]

     spread malaria, yellow fever, or encephalitis; rats spread 
     plague (any mammal may carry rabies). Militarily, specific 
     vectors may be selected, infected as required, and then 
     released in the target area to seek out their human victims 
     and pass on the disease. Since infection is transmitted 
     through a bite in the skin, protective masks offer no 
     protection. A vectorborne agent may remain in the target area 
     for as long as there are live hosts; thus, a major 
     disadvantage results. The vectorborne agent can become a 
     permanent hazard in the area as the host infects others of 
     his species.
       c. Food and Water Contamination. Biological agents could 
     also be delivered to target personnel by placing the agent in 
     food and water supplies (sabotage). This type of attack would 
     probably be directed against small targets, such as 
     industrial complexes, headquarters, or specific individuals. 
     The methods of delivering the attack are many and varied.
     Defensive Measures
       The United States carries out research aimed at improved 
     means of detection of biological agents and treatment and 
     immunization of personnel. Both of these are essential to 
     biological defense.
       a. Before an Attack. The inability of the individual to 
     detect a biological attack is perhaps the greatest problem. 
     Contributing factors are the delay experienced before the 
     onset of symptoms and the time required to identify specific 
     agents. Without an adequate means of detection, complete 
     defensive measures may not be taken since an attack must 
     first be detected before you can defend against it. Diseases 
     caused by biological agents do not appear until a few days to 
     weeks after contact with the agent. Personnel are protected 
     against biological agents in aerosol form by the protective 
     mask. Ordinary clothing protects the skin from contamination 
     by biological agents. Other means of protection include 
     immunizations; quarantining contaminated areas; cleanliness 
     of the body, clothing, and living quarters; stringent rodent 
     and pest control; proper care of cuts and wounds; and 
     education of troops to eat and drink only from approved 
     sources.
       b. After an Attack: After a biological agent attack has 
     occurred, it will be necessary to identify the agent used in 
     the attack so that proper medical treatment may be given to 
     exposed personnel. To perform this identification, it is 
     necessary to collect samples or objects from the contaminated 
     area and send them to a laboratory or suitable facility for 
     processing. Samples may be taken from the air, from 
     contaminated surfaces, or from contaminated water. After the 
     sample is taken, laboratory time will be required to identify 
     the suspected biological agent. The length of time for 
     identification is being significantly shortened through the 
     use of new medical and laboratory techniques. Proper 
     defensive actions taken during a biological attack depend 
     upon the rapid detection of the attack. Biological defense is 
     continuous. You must always be prepared for the employment of 
     these weapons. (emphasis added)

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank all Members.

                          ____________________