[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 112 (Monday, September 9, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8337-S8339]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CHINA
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, this week, which will be one Americans
remember for a long time as the anniversary of the September 11 attacks
of last year, a lot of second-guessing has been going on about what we
might have done differently. Part of that is based on the fact that
there was a lot of evidence that the United States should have been
prepared to deal with the kind of attack that occurred, even if not at
that precise time and place.
I think history will show, notwithstanding all of the evidence, it
would have been very difficult for us to actually defend against those
attacks, but it should not dissuade us from acting on similar evidence
in the future.
I fear there is another situation developing which, both because we
are focused on the war on terror and because it presents us with some
unpleasant choices about what to do, is creating a similar situation
where there is evidence that we should be paying attention to a
problem, but either because we do not want to deal with it or because
there is a lack of consensus about how to deal with it, the United
States is not taking adequate precautions or taking adequate steps to
deal with the situation.
What I have in mind is a concern that has been now discussed in two
very recently released Government reports on the threat that is posed
by the nation of China against the United States.
The first, produced by the congressionally-mandated United States-
China Security Review Commission, offers a sobering analysis of the
national security implications of the economic relationship between our
two countries. It flatly states that trade alone has failed to bring
about serious political change in China.
The second, the Defense Department's annual report on the military
power of the People's Republic of China, paints an unsettling picture
of China's military buildup, the main objective of which is to prepare
that country for a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and to
counter potential U.S. intervention in the conflict.
Proponents of unconditional engagement with China opine that the
Chinese people's access to the Internet, modern telecommunications, and
free trade will make that country a more free and open society. They
suggest that entrenched vestiges of the Communist system will
eventually fade away as new leaders, who are committed to capitalism,
take the reins of
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power. In other words, economic freedom will invariably translate into
political freedom, and democracy will be the clear result.
But, particularly with the release of these two reports, it seems
more and more clear that China's willingness to engage in the world
economy has not translated into evolution toward democracy. Indeed, the
United States-China Security Review Commission concluded that:
. . . Trade and economic liberalization have not led to the
extent of political liberalization much hoped for by U.S.
policymakers. The Chinese government has simultaneously
increased trade and aggressively resisted openness in
politically sensitive areas such as the exercise of
religious, human, and worker rights.
Consider, for example, Chinese Government control over the Internet.
While many expected that access to the Internet would facilitate the
influx of Western ideas and values, the Commission stated that those
hopes ``have yet to be realized.'' Indeed, Beijing has passed sweeping
regulations in the past two years that prohibit news and commentary on
Internet sites in China that is not state-sanctioned. The Commission
noted that China has even convinced American companies like Yahoo! to
assist in its censorship efforts, and others, like America Online, to
leave open the possibility of turning over names, e-mail addresses, or
records of political dissidents if the Chinese government demands them.
It is impossible to predict China's future. That country has embarked
on an uncertain path, opening its economy while simultaneously
attempting to strengthen the Communist Party's political and social
control. The consequences, given that Chinese policies run directly
counter to U.S. national security interests, are potentially grave.
Thus, the Commission established benchmarks against which Beijing's
future progress can be measured, including China's proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction; its cozy relationships with terrorists
states like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea; its bellicose posture toward
Taiwan; and its pursuit of asymmetric warfare capabilities to counter
U.S. military capabilities.
China's proliferation of technology and components for ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction to terrorist-sponsoring
states--including North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and Sudan--is
of serious concern. The Commission found that, despite numerous
bilateral and multilateral pledges to halt that proliferation,
``Chinese proliferation and cooperation with [such] states has
continued unabated.''
Just in the past year, the administration has sanctioned Chinese
entities three times for their proliferation to Iran of equipment and
materials used to make chemical and biological weapons. Yet these
sanctions are unlikely to curb China's proliferation activities. As the
Commission concludes, ``Current U.S. sanctions policies to deter and
reform Chinese proliferation practices have failed and need immediate
review and overhaul.''
The Commission recommended that the United States expand the use of
economic sanctions to apply against entire countries, rather than just
individual entities. Suggested sanctions include import and export
limitations, restrictions on the access of foreign entities to American
capital markets, restrictions on direct foreign investments in an
offending country, and restrictions on science and technology
cooperation.
I should note that these measures are very similar to those proposed
by my distinguished colleague from Tennessee, Senator Thompson, in 2000
during the debate on granting China permanent normal trade status. His
amendment, which I strongly supported, was rejected by this body.
As to Taiwan, Beijing is deadly serious about pursuing unification--
through force, if necessary--with our long-standing, democratic ally.
The Chinese military is actively pursuing capabilities and strategies
that it would need to accomplish that task, and according to the
Commission, it is believed that the military has been directed to have
viable options to do so by 2005 to 2007.
Mr. President, let me repeat that: It is believed that the Chinese
military has been directed by the Communist leadership to be prepared
to move against Taiwan by 2005 to 2007. If there is one sentence in
this report that ought to serve as a wake-up call, this is it.
What is so significant about that time-frame is that, during those
two years, a number of factors fall in line. First of all, the Defense
Department has projected that the balance of power across the Taiwan
Strait will shift toward China by 2005. Second, it is estimated that
our theater missile defense system, which China fears we will share
with Taiwan, will be up and running by 2007. Finally, it is estimated
that China's myriad conventional weapons recently purchased from
Russia--including submarines, fighter jets, and air-to-air missiles--
will become fully operational within that 2-year period.
Indeed, the Defense Department, in its report, concluded that China's
``ambitious military modernization casts a cloud over its declared
preference for resolving differences with Taiwan through peaceful
means.'' The Pentagon observes that, over the past year, Beijing's
military exercises have taken on an increasingly real-world focus aimed
not only at Taiwan, but also at increasing the risk to U.S. forces and
to the United States itself in any future Taiwan contingency.
The Defense Department warns that China's ``military training
exercises increasingly focus on the United States as an adversary.''
Its military modernization concentrates on weapons that could cripple
our military strength, including anti-ship missiles to counter our
naval fleet and cyber-warfare to disrupt our infrastructure. Beijing is
also modernizing its ballistic missile program, improving its missile
force across the board both quantitatively and qualitatively. Beijing
currently has about 20 inter-continental ballistic missiles, ICBMs,
capable of targeting the United States, is projected to add up to 40
longer-range, road-mobile missiles by 2010.
In light of the Pentagon's conclusions, it is more important than
ever that the United States provide Taiwan in a timely manner with the
equipment and training it needs to defend itself against a potential
Chinese attack. That training should include joint operational
training, which would facilitate an allied U.S.-Taiwan response to an
attack on Taiwan by China. Taiwan is currently outnumbered 10 to 1 in
combat aircraft, 2 to 1 in ships, 60 to 4 in submarines, and its air
force is beginning to lose its qualitative edge over China.
The United States should also expand and multilateralize its security
relationships with Taiwan and other allies in East Asia to deter
potential Chinese aggression. No doubt China is a very different
country than the former Soviet Union, but there is something to be said
for the deterrent factor that comes with a NATO-like coalition. As
President Bush stated during his campaign, ``We should work toward a
day when the fellowship of free Pacific nations is as strong and united
as our Atlantic partnership . . .''
Additionally, the United States needs to develop and deploy missile
defenses at the earliest possible date. I am pleased that President
Bush recognizes the importance of having such a defensive system, and
has made it a top priority among our military objectives.
What is frustrating is that the United States continues to play a
facilitating role in China's military buildup and its proliferation of
dual-use technologies--technologies that have civilian and military
uses--to rogue states. China's buildup and its proliferation both harm
U.S. national security. The United States China Security Review
commission agreed with the conclusion of the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission
that:
The U.S. has been and is today a major, albeit
unintentional, contributor to the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction [through] foreign student training in the
U.S., by wide dissemination of technical information, by the
illegal acquisition of U.S. designs and equipment, and by the
relaxation of U.S. export control policies.
Our progressive relaxation of controls on the export of high
performance computers is just one example. These computers can assist
China in its efforts to rapidly design modern nuclear weapons and their
delivery systems.
Our lax controls over the export of these computers allow China to
legally obtain U.S. technology that helps to improve its military
capabilities. Indeed, the Commission concluded that,
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despite the existence of nominal controls, most high performance
computers are no longer licensed and monitored.
Not only is China using U.S. technology to build its own military
capabilities, it is transferring this technology to countries that
support international terror networks. The China Commission found that:
Chinese firms have provided dual-use missile-related items,
raw materials, and/or assistance to Iran, North Korea, and
Libya.
Chinese companies have also exported substantial dual-use
telecommunications equipment and technology to countries like Iraq.
Media reports indicate that the Chinese firm Huawei Technologies--an
important player for many U.S. firms who want to reach the Chinese
telecom and data communications market--assisted Iraq with fiber-optics
to improve its air-defense system. This was not only a violation of
U.N. sactions, it also greatly increased the danger to U.S. and British
pilots patrolling the no-fly zones.
Despite the serious concerns of some policymakers, Members of this
body, and others about the national security implications of transfers
of such technology to China, the Senate, in September 2001, passed S.
149, the Export Administration Act. If enacted, this legislation would
significantly relax our export control regulations and make it far
easier for China to obtain sensitive U.S. technology. it would
decontrol a number of items--including electronic devices used to
trigger nuclear weapons and materials used to build missiles and
produce nuclear weapons fuel--by giving these items ``mass market
status.''
Mr. President, it is my hope that, as the anniversary of September 11
approaches, the administration and Congress recognize the potential
danger of allowing business interests to continue to trump our national
security needs. I am a strong proponent of free trade and open markets.
But our national security should not be sacrificed for potential
commercial gain. The federal government's first responsibility is the
protection of the American people.
How the United States chooses to manage its relationship with China
will have a far-reaching impact on our long-term national security. As
that country continues to play a more prominent role on the world
stage--no doubt a product of its economic liberalization--it is
imperative that U.S. policy appropriately address not only our trade
relationship, but also the threat posed by China to U.S. national
security. Our actions should be based not on wishes, but on facts--even
if they are unpleasant.
I thank the Chair.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Wyoming.
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