[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 112 (Monday, September 9, 2002)]
[House]
[Pages H6088-H6089]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NEXTWAVE AUCTION BILL
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of
January 23, 2002, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Stearns) is
recognized during morning hour debates for 5 minutes.
Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague from
California (Mr. Rohrabacher) for his continuing support in recognizing
this anniversary. NPR had a great tribute to the general this morning
which I listened to. I think it is altogether appropriate that the
gentleman do this on the House floor, of course, and I want to thank
him.
Mr. Speaker, on another matter, I rise to deal with something that is
more close to home, and that is dealing with something I am involved
with in telecommunications. I am urging my colleagues to support a bill
that I introduced to eliminate impediments that restrict the ability of
certain wireless telecommunication providers to, I think, meet the
urgent need of the consumers. The bill has bipartisan support and the
support of the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet on
which I serve.
I am pleased, Mr. Speaker, that a recent editorial in the Wall Street
Journal supports my actions on this matter, and I will be providing the
Wall Street editorial to be made a part of the Record and part of my
speech.
The affected providers are the successful bidders for wireless
spectrum that the Federal Communications Commission auctioned off in
Auction No. 35. Some of the spectrum had previously been licensed to
companies, including NextWave Personal Communications, whose bankruptcy
filings, and subsequent failure to pay amounts due to the FCC for their
licenses, led to the cancellation of those licenses. The FCC
subsequently reclaimed the licenses and reauctioned them off in Auction
No. 35 for about $16 billion.
In June 2001, the D.C. Circuit held that ``the Commission violated
the provision of the Bankruptcy Code that prohibits governmental
entities from revoking debtors' licenses solely for failure to pay
debts dischargeable in bankruptcy.'' In August 2001, after the issuance
of that court's mandate, the FCC restored the NextWave licenses to
active status. More recently, the Supreme Court granted the FCC's
petition for a writ of certiorari to review the D.C. Circuit's
judgment. The Supreme Court will not hear argument in the case until
the fall of 2002 and is unlikely to announce a decision until the
spring of 2003. If the Court reverses the D.C. Circuit's decision,
there will be further litigation on remand in D.C. Circuit to resolve
issues that court did not reach in its first decision. As a result,
there is not likely to be a final resolution of the status of the
NextWave licenses any time soon, and the FCC therefore will not be in a
position to deliver licenses to the winners of Auction No. 35, until
three or more years from the time the auction was concluded.
Now, the status of NextWave's license has been the subject of
extended litigation in not only the bankruptcy court, but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and soon to be, the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Although the FCC recently returned most of the downpayment funds
previously deposited by all these successful bidders, it continues to
hold, without interest, Mr. Speaker, substantial sums, equal to 3
percent of the total amount of the winning bids. It apparently intends
to hold these sums indefinitely.
Despite the lengthy delay in delivering the licenses, moreover, the
FCC takes the position that the successful bidders remain obligated, on
a mere 10-day notice, to pay the full amount of their successful bids
if and when the FCC, at some unknown future date, establishes its right
to deliver those licenses.
Now, I think, as the Wall Street Journal points out, this is grossly
unfair to those who bid on these licenses and did so in good faith.
Companies calibrate their bids on the understanding of the auction,
implicit in any commercial arrangement, that the delivery of the
licenses will occur in a reasonable time following these auctions. That
expectation is especially crucial in the context of spectrum licenses.
Given the recent volatility we have seen in the market prices for
spectrum, we can understand that there would be some action by the FCC
after the auction.
Moreover, it is particularly burdensome to some companies to have the
FCC hold even a small portion of their enormous downpayment without any
interest on these amounts. It is not done in the private sector; it
should not be done in the government. They are paying no interest on
these deposits for extended periods of time.
In addition, winning bidders are obligated, as I mentioned, on very
short notice to pay the remaining $16 billion they bid for the license
at issue. Obviously, this adversely affects their capacity to serve the
needs of their customers, because they must have this capital always on
hand and they cannot use it for long-term benefits for business. This
need to keep itself in a position to fulfill that obligation at an
indefinite future date impedes its ability to take, as I mentioned,
interim steps for building their own businesses.
The FCC's failure to respond appropriately to alleviate these serious
burdens, I believe, deserves the public interest. That is why I have
dropped bill H.R. 4738. It addresses this problem in two ways, Mr.
Speaker.
First, it requires the FCC promptly to refund to the winning bidders
the full remaining amount of their deposits and their downpayments.
Second, it gives each winning bidder an opportunity to elect, within 15
days after enactment, to relinquish its rights and to be relieved of
all further obligations under Auction No. 35. Those who choose to
retain their rights and obligations under Auction No. 35 will
nonetheless be entitled to a return of their deposits and downpayments
in the interim period. If and when the FCC is in a position to deliver
the license at issue to those who remain obligated, they will be
required to pay the full amount of their bid in accordance with the
FCC's existing regulations. Those who elect to terminate their rights
and obligations under this auction will be free to pursue their
business interests without the burdens under which they must labor.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this timely and much-
needed legislation, and I appreciate the Wall Street Journal bringing
to the attention of the Nation this very important problem, and I also
hereby submit for
[[Page H6089]]
the Record the article I have referred to.
[From the Wall Street Journal, Aug. 21, 2002]
Another Telecom Fiasco
The telecom shakeout (or meltdown) continues, with Qwest
ditching assets to stay solvent, and VoiceStream pursuing a
merger in wireless with Cingular. The market will sort all of
this out, though it sure would help if the Federal
Communications Commission stopped making things worse.
Consider the FCC's ongoing NextWave spectrum fiasco. That
small wireless carrier won spectrum licenses in a 1997 FCC
auction, but later defaulted on its payments. The FCC revoked
the licenses and reauctioned them--even as NextWave was suing
to get them back. NextWave won its case, and a red-faced FCC
had to tell the other carriers that had just bid $16 billion
that it had nothing to give them.
In the real business world, the FCC would have cancelled
the reauction once it couldn't deliver the licenses. But
rules are different in FCC-land. The agency may not have
delivered any licenses, but it has nonetheless held on to the
hefty deposits the second batch of carriers gave it. And, by
the way, the FCC has informed those carriers that when it
does finally turn over the spectrum (in 2004, optimistically,
if ever), it expects them to cough up the entire $16 billion
within 10 business days.
All of this is playing havoc with an industry already in
chaos. Verizon Wireless, for instance, bid $8.7 billion for
its share of the spectrum. The FCC took a deposit from the
company of $1.7 billion, and then sat on it--interest free--
for 14 months. The FCC finally gave back some of the deposit
earlier this year, though it still holds the bureaucratic
pocket-change of $261 million.
Verizon is also stuck with a large liability--money it
can't effectively touch because of the 10-day future payment
obligation. Credit agencies say they may downgrade its debt
because of the $8.7 billion overhang. Meantime, the company
can't afford to run in place for years while the FCC fiddles,
so it has redrawn its business strategy around the lost
spectrum--which means it may not need it even if it comes
free.
The FCC usually hands over licenses within three months,
and for good reason: The industry changes faster than a
politician's mind. Since January 2001 when the reauction
ended, wireless and equipment companies have laid off tens of
thousands of workers and lost $850 billion, or 65%, in market
value. (Would that the FCC shrank 65% in size.) Wireless
officials estimate that if the reauction were held today, the
bids would be about 40% of the original $16 billion.
But that gets to the heart of the FCC matter: money, and
creative accounting. It turns out that when NextWave bid its
$4.8 billion in 1997, the FCC booked the entire amount in the
federal budget. Then, when the reauction happened in 2001, it
booked that $16 billion as well--adjusted for what it had
lost from NextWave.
Chairman Michael Powell keeps promising a telecom revival,
but this FCC money-grubbing doesn't help. The reauction is
tying up much-needed investment capital: According to a
recent study from AEI economist Gregory Sidak, the frozen $16
billion, if released, would increase GDP between $19 billion
and $52 billion. Consumers are also losing out, as new
services such as mobile videophones are delayed.
The FCC isn't even helping itself, if it cares. Reputation
counts, even in government, and the agency has important
auctions to come. Carriers may discount future bids because
of uncertainty of ever receiving licenses. Several big
players may not be able to bid at all, since the FCC is
already sitting on their capital.
We still believe FCC auctions are the most efficient way of
allocating spectrum. But their purpose is defeated when the
government keeps the cash but won't deliver the goods.
____________________