[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 111 (Thursday, September 5, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8238-S8239]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, as we contemplate military action 
against Iraq, I wish to bring to the attention of my colleagues the 
rationalization, in the opinion of the junior Senator from Alaska, of 
the circumstances surrounding the risk to allow Saddam Hussein to 
continue to develop weapons of mass destruction. It is no secret that 
over an extended period of time, Saddam Hussein and Iraq have been 
developing this capability. It not only includes chemical weapons and 
biological weapons, but a delivery system. Clearly, we have seen as a 
consequence of the Persian Gulf war the capability of a delivery system 
reaching Israel. In addition to that, we have every reason to believe 
he is developing his nuclear capability.
  The question to which we have to relate is, of course, the obligation 
as to how to thwart this exposure from the standpoint of the United 
States' role as not only the peacekeeper of the world but the 
recognition that if the United States does not do it, it probably will 
not be done.
  I bring that reference up to simply highlight a comparison. Had we 
known in advance of 9/11 the contemplated exposure--not only to the 
United States, but the peace of the world, as we knew the world prior 
to that time and the recognition that a number of aircraft was going to 
be used as weapons and the consequences associated with the aircraft 
that went into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon, and, 
of course, the exposure in Washington and other areas of the United 
States associated with the activities at that time--we would have taken 
some action, Mr. President. There is no question about it because we 
knew the ramifications of not taking such action.

  What I am saying is we have a dilemma in the sense of a recognized 
concentration of weapons of mass destruction being controlled by an 
individual who is not only uncontrollable but one who has, over an 
extended period of time, initiated actions such as we have seen during 
the Persian Gulf war where he saw fit to invade Kuwait with the 
intention of going into Saudi Arabia with the objective of controlling 
the wealth of the oil provinces of that part of the world. That was his 
objective, make no mistake about it.
  If he could have prevailed in Kuwait and gone into Saudi Arabia, he 
would have controlled a good portion of Mideast oil and, hence, the 
wealth and cashflows of the area.
  The consequences of that, as we see Saddam Hussein again amassing 
this threat as a consequence of his development of weapons of mass 
destruction, brings us to the evaluation of what action we should take. 
Is it inevitable that sooner or later Saddam Hussein will use these 
weapons of mass destruction, and against whom?
  We have had an opportunity to observe a pattern of Saddam Hussein in 
the time since the Persian Gulf war. If one can perhaps simplify it, we 
have initiated a no-fly zone over Iraq since about 1992. In initiating 
that no-fly zone, we have taken out some of his targets. He has 
attempted to shoot some of our aircraft down that are patrolling the 
area.
  There is another inconsistency that stands out even more openly, and 
that

[[Page S8239]]

is the realization that during this time we have been buying oil from 
Saddam Hussein, hundreds of thousands of barrels a day. In September of 
2001, we set a record by importing nearly 1.2 million barrels of oil 
per day from Saddam.
  It is almost as if we would take his oil, put it in our airplanes, 
and go take out his targets. That is rather ironic. I think it is 
rather inconsistent, and it shows certainly an inconsistency in our 
foreign policy.
  What does he do with the money he receives from the United States? 
Why, he takes care of his Republican Guard, the group that keeps him 
alive, and develops more weapons of mass destruction and perhaps aims 
them at our ally Israel. Maybe that is an oversimplification of foreign 
policy. Nevertheless, that is what has been going on over a period of 
time. So we have become, to some extent, perhaps a partner because we 
are providing Saddam Hussein indirectly, through the purchase of his 
oil, with a cashflow that allows him to develop his weapons of mass 
destruction.
  Others might say that is inconsistent logic because someone else 
would buy his oil if the United States did not. I am not going to 
pursue that, other than to state a fact: We are buying hundreds of 
thousands of barrels of oil from Saddam Hussein. He is developing 
weapons of mass destruction. Where does he get the money? A portion of 
it comes from oil sales to the United States.
  So as we contemplate our decision on initiating an action against 
Saddam Hussein, we have to look back to the circumstances surrounding 
9/11 where, had we known that the threat was what it turned out to be, 
we would have initiated an action. We did not know. We did not initiate 
an action.
  We can criticize our security. We can criticize the CIA and the other 
intelligence agencies for inadequate information. Nevertheless, the 
fact remains, we did not know. Had we known, we would have taken 
action.
  In the case of Saddam Hussein, clearly we know he is developing 
weapons of mass destruction. So the point is, should we take action? If 
we do not, who will? What is the actual threat? We do not know, but it 
is clearly a choice. We are giving Saddam Hussein a choice of either 
surrender--in other words, open up your country to the U.N. 
inspectors--or be prepared for the ultimate alternative, and that is 
basically to be subjected to a conflict that could go on for some time.

  I see my good friend, the senior Senator from West Virginia, is 
seeking recognition. I will conclude with one reference: That we need 
to consider again the obligation that the energy conferees have. The 
conference is in order. The issues are being discussed. There is an 
issue, and it is the issue of opening up ANWR that is within the 
authority of the conference to bring back to the Senate for action. As 
the President well knows, the House has included ANWR in its bill and 
the issue is before the conference.
  At a time when we are contemplating an action against Saddam Hussein, 
which certainly would result in an upheaval in the Mideast, it is 
imperative each Member recognize his or her obligation to address this 
with some finality. It simply makes sense to authorize the opening of 
this area so we can reduce our dependence on Mideast oil, particularly 
the sources we currently get our oil from, including Iraq and Saddam 
Hussein.
  There is going to be an invitation by the conference to invite 
Members to ANWR, to Kaktovik, on September 13. Members should avail 
themselves of the opportunity to see for themselves that it could be 
opened up safely.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Alaska for his comments. There will come a time when the Senate should 
debate this question.
  I compliment the distinguished Senator from Alaska on his concerns 
with respect to Saddam Hussein. I believe he said we have every reason 
to believe Saddam Hussein has developed a nuclear capability. I hope I 
am not misquoting the Senator.
  In the days ahead, we will want to know what the evidence is. I do 
not intend to get into any long debate at this point about the matter 
because we have a bill before us with a pending amendment. We need to 
get on with that, but no Senator is seeking recognition at this point.
  Perhaps Saddam Hussein has developed such a nuclear capability. When 
the able Senator says we have every reason to believe he has, that is 
not quite the point. Where is the evidence?
  Of course, it is to be expected that some people in this country will 
assign unpatriotic reasons for the asking of questions by Senators. We 
have a right to ask questions, we have a duty to ask questions, because 
we are living in a very perilous time.
  The war drums are beating all around us. I want to listen to what is 
said. I want to listen to what the President has to say. I want to 
listen to what he is going to say at the United Nations. I hope the 
United Nations will respond. I am not saying we in the Congress have to 
have authorization by the United Nations. Authorization is contained 
right here in this little book I hold in my hand, the Constitution of 
the United States. This Congress has the power to declare war.
  I, for one, am not going to hang my vote on an authorization by the 
U.N. for us in this Congress to do thus and so. We should know what the 
United Nations has to say. I think the United Nations should take a 
position. If the straits are as dire as we hear, then the United 
Nations ought to be concerned. And the United Nations ought to give the 
world the benefit of its opinion. I am glad the President is going to 
the United Nations.
  I am breaking our own rules here. I ask unanimous consent, although 
the Pastore rule may not have run its course, I may speak on a 
different subject.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. The United Nations, I think, has a duty to let the world 
know where it stands and what its opinion is. If this country is going 
to eventually go into a difficult situation, as may confront us, if war 
is declared by this legislative branch, or if war is approved, 
authorized, by this legislative branch, then we in the United States 
should not have to go it alone.
  But when we say we have every right to believe that Saddam Hussein 
has developed nuclear capability, well, we have every right in our 
minds to think perhaps he has, and we can easily convince ourselves, 
but is that enough? Where is the evidence?
  I, for one, intend to ask questions as we go along. It is not 
unpatriotic to ask questions. I intend to ask questions. I have a right 
to ask questions. Where is the evidence? We might think about that as 
we go along.

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