[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 108 (Thursday, August 1, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7864-S7865]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in 
the Record a statement on Iraq that I gave before the Foreign Relations 
Committee.
  There being no objection, the material was order to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

       Mr. HAGEL. I would like to congratulate the Chairman and 
     the Ranking Member for holding these timely hearings on Iraq. 
     I agree with my colleagues that we need a national dialogue 
     on what steps we should take to deal with the threat posed by 
     Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Americans need to be informed about 
     the complexities and consequences of our policies in Iraq.
       I look forward to listening to and learning from the 
     distinguished witnesses before us today about the nature and 
     urgency of the threat we face from Iraq, including their 
     evaluations of what the best policy options may be for 
     meeting this threat; the prospects for a democratic 
     transition after Saddam Hussein; and what the implications of 
     our policies in Iraq may be for the stability of the Middle 
     East and our security interests there.
       Much of the debate by those advocating regime change 
     through military means have so far focused on the easy 
     questions. Is Saddam Hussein a ruthless tyrant who brutally 
     oppresses his own people, and who possesses weapons of mass 
     destruction that have the potential to threaten us, his 
     neighbors and our allies, including and especially Israel? 
     Yes. Do most Iraqis yearn for democratic change in Iraq? Yes, 
     they do. Can Saddam be rehabilitated? No, he cannot.
       In my opinion, complicated and relevant questions remain to 
     be answered before making a case for war, and here is where 
     these hearings will play an important role. What is the 
     nature, and urgency, of the threat that Saddam Hussein poses 
     to the United States and Iraq's neighbors? What do we know 
     about Iraq's programs of weapons of mass destruction? There 
     have been no weapons inspectors in Iraq since December 1998. 
     Is Iraq involved in terrorist planning and activities against 
     the United States and US allies in the Middle East and 
     elsewhere?
       What can we expect after Saddam Hussein in Iraq? What do we 
     know about the capabilities of the opposition to Saddam 
     inside Iraq? While we support a unified and democratic 
     opposition to Saddam Hussein, the arbiters of power in a 
     post-Saddam Iraq will likely be those who reside inside, 
     not outside, the country. And these individuals and groups 
     we do not know. Who are they? And where are they? These 
     are the Iraqis we need to understand, engage, and 
     eventually do business with.
       What will be the future of Iraqi Kurdistan in a post-Saddam 
     Iraq?

[[Page S7865]]

       How do we accomplish regime change in Iraq given the 
     complexities and challenges of the current regional 
     environment? The deep Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues; 
     our relations with Syria are proper though strained; we have 
     no relationship with Iran; Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and 
     Jordan have warned us about dangerous unintended consequences 
     if we take unilateral military action against Iraq; and 
     Afghanistan remains a piece of very difficult unfinished 
     business, an unpredictable but critical investment for the 
     United States and our allies.
       I can think of no historical case where the United States 
     succeeded in an enterprise of such gravity and complexity as 
     regime change in Iraq without the support of a regional and 
     international coalition. We have a lot of work to do on the 
     diplomatic track. Not just for military operations against 
     Iraq, should that day come, but for the day after, when the 
     interests and intrigues of outside powers could undermine the 
     fragility of an Iraqi government in transition, whoever 
     governs in Iraq after Saddam Hussein.
       An American military operation in Iraq could require a 
     commitment in Iraq that could last for years and extend well 
     beyond the day of Saddam's departure. The American people 
     need to understand the political, economic, and military 
     magnitude and risks that would be inevitable if we invaded 
     Iraq.
       There was no such national dialogue or undertaking before 
     we went into Vietnam. There were many very smart, well 
     intentioned professionals, intellectuals, and strategists who 
     assured us of a US victory in Vietnam at an acceptable cost. 
     Well, eleven years, 58,000 dead, and the most humiliating 
     defeat in our nation's history later we abandoned South 
     Vietnam to the Communists.
       Let me conclude by saying that I support regime change and 
     a democratic transition in Iraq. That's easy. The Iraqi 
     people have suffered too long, and our security and interests 
     will never be assured with Saddam Hussein in power. The tough 
     questions are when, how, with whom, and at what cost. I look 
     forward to the testimony of our witnesses over the next two 
     days on these critical questions.

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