[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 104 (Friday, July 26, 2002)]
[House]
[Pages H5845-H5888]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002

  The Committee resumed its sitting.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment 
No. 24 printed in House Report 107-615.

                              {time}  1700


               Amendment No. 24 Offered by Ms. Schakowsky

  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 24 offered by Ms. Schakowsky
       Strike subtitle C of title VII.
       Strike section 762 and insert the following:

     SEC. 762. REMEDIES FOR RETALIATION AGAINST WHISTLEBLOWERS.

       Section 7211 of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(a)'' before ``The right''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(b) Any employee aggrieved by a violation of subsection 
     (a) may bring a civil action in the appropriate United States 
     district court, within 3 years after the date on which such 
     violation occurs, against any agency, organization, or other 
     person responsible for the violation, for lost wages and 
     benefits, reinstatement, costs and attorney fees, 
     compensatory damages, and equitable, injunctive, or any other 
     relief that the court considers appropriate. Any such action 
     shall, upon request of the party bringing the action, be 
     tried by the court with a jury.
       ``(c) The same legal burdens of proof in proceedings under 
     subsection (b) shall apply as under sections 1214(b)(4)(B) 
     and 1221(e) in the case of an alleged prohibited personnel 
     practice described in section 2302(b)(8).
       ``(d) For purposes of this section, the term `employee' 
     means an employee (as defined by section 2105) and any 
     individual performing services under a personal services 
     contract with the Government (including as an employee of an 
     organization).''.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Sweeney). Pursuant to House Resolution 
502, the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky) and a Member 
opposed each will control 15 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Illinois.

[[Page H5846]]

  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the gentlewoman from Hawaii (Mrs. Mink) 
and the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) I rise to offer an amendment 
that will prevent the Department of Homeland Security from becoming the 
``department of homeland secrecy.'' I want to commend the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Waxman) and his staff, as well as the Select 
Committee, particularly its ranking member, the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi).
  First, this amendment strikes subtitle C of section VII of the 
underlying bill, language that excludes from the Freedom of Information 
Act information submitted voluntarily from corporations regarding 
critical infrastructure information. It strikes language that preempts 
all State and local open records laws.
  Second, this amendment strikes section 762, language that allows the 
Secretary to circumvent the Federal Advisory Committee Act, FACA, by 
putting all the deliberations of those advisory committees beyond 
public reach.
  Third, this amendment provides real teeth to protections against 
retaliation for whistleblowers, the kind of individuals who have been 
the lifeblood of exposing failures at the FBI to heed warnings of 
terrorists within the country, and exposing corporate misconduct.
  The Freedom of Information Act is a law carefully crafted to balance 
the ability of our citizens to access information and the interests of 
those who want to protect such information from public scrutiny. There 
are nine exemptions to FOIA, including national security information 
and business information. FOIA currently protects information that is a 
trade secret or information that is commercial and privileged or 
confidential. In addition, President Reagan issued Executive Order 
12600 that gives businesses even more opportunities to oppose 
disclosure of information.
  In fact, I and other Members of the Committee on Government Reform 
repeatedly have asked proponents of this exclusion, including the FBI 
and Department of Commerce, for even one single example of when a 
Federal agency has disclosed voluntarily submitted data against the 
express wishes of the industry that submitted that information. They 
could not name one case.
  Instead, we are told that FOIA rules just are not conducive to 
disclosure, that corporations are not comfortable releasing data needed 
to protect our country, even if we are at war.
  Is our new standard for deciding such fundamental questions of 
openness and accountability in our democracy how comfortable industry 
will be? Environmental groups, open government groups and press 
organizations support my amendment because the broad secrecy provisions 
of the new Department would hide information critical to protecting 
public safety, such as chemical spills, results of testing to determine 
levels of water and air pollution, compliance records, and maintenance 
and repair records. Corporations could dump information they want to 
hide into this department under the cover critical infrastructure 
information. Corporate lobbyists can meet with government officials in 
the name of critical infrastructure protection and hide their collusion 
behind this exclusion.
  If we create the Department without my amendment, corporations will 
no longer need to bury their secrets in the footnotes, or even shred 
their documents. They can hide them in the FOIA exclusion at the 
Department of Homeland Security. No longer will industry officials have 
to hide their meetings with government officials. The exemption from 
FACA will offer them a safe haven within which to have those secret 
meetings. State and local authorities would also be barred from and 
subject to jail sentences for disclosing information that they require 
to make public, even if it is because it is withheld at the Federal 
level.
  This amendment also protects the rights of whistleblowers. My 
colleagues will go into more detail. But most whistleblowers are not as 
high profile as Sharon Watkins of Enron or Coleen Rowley of the FBI, to 
whom we owe a great debt, and many of them suffer retaliation. They 
often lose their jobs or are demoted as punishment for speaking out.
  It is clear that the protections currently available simply are not 
working. Since the Whistleblower Protection Act was amended in 1994, 74 
of the 75 court decisions have gone against whistleblowers. So my 
amendment gives whistleblowers the right to go to court instead of 
going through the administrative process and requires the same burden 
of proof to be used in whistleblower cases as in all other cases 
involving personnel actions.
  Mr. Chairman, I believe that we are in great danger today of tipping 
the delicate balance between security and basic, precious freedoms, 
those rights that uniquely define our American democracy. We can have 
both, and I urge my colleagues to restore the balance and support my 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 
15 minutes.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment because I believe that this 
amendment will significantly damage the ability of the Department of 
Homeland Security to be effective.
  Now, let me make a couple of points clear from the beginning. 
Whistleblowers are protected in the legislation now. That is one of the 
specific protections we were talking about earlier in the various 
management flexibility amendments which were offered. Whistleblowers 
are protected now.
  Now, under current law, various companies and industries have to 
disclose certain information. Nothing changes under this bill. They 
still have to disclose that information, and we add no loopholes. There 
are no new requirements, and they cannot hide. They still have to meet 
the current requirements. But our hope is that under the new law, the 
Department of Homeland Security will receive additional information 
voluntarily from industries. They will tell us their vulnerabilities. 
They will tell us what they are worried about in their computer 
networks. They will tell us what they are worried about in their 
infrastructure.
  We want them to tell the Federal Government that information 
voluntarily, so that we can help protect that infrastructure. They will 
not disclose that information if you just turn right around and make it 
public. It could be trade secrets, it could be information that you are 
giving to the terrorists. You certainly do not want to help them.
  So, to go as far as the amendment does in requiring this additional 
information, which is voluntarily disclosed to the government, to turn 
around and make all that public means that companies simply will not 
disclose it, we will not know their vulnerabilities, and this 
Department will not be able to do its job to protect infrastructure.
  Mr. Chairman, I would suggest the better course would be to reject 
this amendment. There are essential protections already in the bill. We 
do not need more.
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman 
from Hawaii (Mrs. Mink), a cosponsor of the amendment.
  Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for 
yielding me time.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to directly respond to the prior speaker, 
who made a case for further extension of the exemptions for the Freedom 
of Information Act by arguing that it was necessary in order to protect 
private sources of information that might be necessary for this new 
Department.
  I want to call the attention of the House to the current Freedom of 
Information Act, which already includes nine exemptions for all Federal 
agencies, including the Defense Department and all the other security-
type organizations that now exist that fall under the Freedom of 
Information Act and have done so for the last 30 years, because they 
are protected under the exemptions that exist under current law.
  The exemptions are all classified documents. The government has the 
power

[[Page H5847]]

to classify documents. So if there is something in their possession 
that is essential to the national security or homeland security, they 
could classify those documents. They have that power inherent in the 
FOIA legislation.
  As far as private confidential trade secrets, there is an exemption 
specifically for business information. So there exists already the 
power of the government to classify as nonapproachable by a Freedom of 
Information request information which is private, trade secrets, or 
something which is essential to the protection of business.
  All of these rules exist. The exemptions exist. They were part of 
legislation which I helped to work out in the early 1970s, and they 
have stood the test of time.
  It has created a broad range of protections for the people of the 
United States. The most important liberty, freedom, that we have is 
that we as individual citizens of this country have the right to 
information that the government possesses, and we do so by making a 
FOIA request.
  I cannot conceive of enlarging the nine exemptions that already 
exist. What kind of a Department of Homeland Security are we creating? 
Why does it have to have all of the super protections of private 
information, when we already have nine exemptions that exist that can 
protect every single suggested item that has been discussed here on the 
floor?
  So I hope that people will realize that under this climate, being 
concerned about terrorism and the protection of property and the 
protection of life and so forth, we cannot jeopardize those things that 
we have fought for so hard, so diligently, and which have, to a large 
measure, enabled the public of the United States to know what is going 
on. The nuclear tests out in the Midwest and the terrible things that 
happened from them would have continued to be the secrets of the 
government if we did not have FOIA. But because we had the Freedom of 
Information Act, we enabled the public to be better informed and we 
enabled the Congress to do a better job in legislating.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge adoption of this amendment.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis), the author of the original FOIA language, who 
has done such an excellent job.
  (Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, let me first of all say I 
think the problem with this amendment is it goes in the wrong 
direction. We are all strong supporters of FOIA legislation. I served 
in local government for 15 years, and the Freedom of Information Act 
applies to local government. Strangely enough, Congress is exempt from 
any of these exemptions.
  This is a very narrowly tailored FOIA exemption that will allow 
companies out there that have innovative ideas in terms of how to 
protect our critical infrastructure, it will allow them to disclose it 
to the government without fear of it being discovered by competitors or 
terrorists.
  We have to remind ourselves that we discovered when we went into the 
caves in Afghanistan that al Qaeda groups had copies of GAO reports and 
other government information obtained through the Freedom of 
Information Act. While we work to protect our Nation's assets in this 
war against terrorism, we also need to make sure we are not arming 
terrorists.
  The previous speaker spoke about how they worked on this in the early 
1970s. I would submit the world has changed. There was a challenge from 
the other side saying there were no instances where information was not 
shared. Just last year it was discovered that the widely used 
implementations of the simple network management protocol, a 
fundamental element of the Internet, contained vulnerabilities that 
could expose the Internet's infrastructure to attack. Many companies 
were reluctant to give the government information about these 
vulnerabilities, which were not yet mentioned in the general press, for 
fear that the vulnerability information would be forced to be disclosed 
once it was in the government's hands and this could create substantial 
risk to their customers and to the Internet and the U.S. economy.
  I might also add the Department of Energy for years has asked that 
electric utility industries provide it with a list of critical 
facilities. They have consistently refused because they do not want to 
create a target list that could be released under the Freedom of 
Information Act. I suspect there are many, many others.
  We need to remember that the critical infrastructure of the United 
States is largely owned and operated by the private sector, 90 percent 
operated by the private sector. Understanding the vulnerabilities, 
experiencing the vulnerabilities, finding, if you will, antidotes to 
these vulnerabilities, is something that the private sector has much 
more experience in than the public sector. We need that information at 
the Federal level if we are to protect our critical infrastructure.
  This very narrowly tailored amendment, I might add, went through the 
Senate committee on a bipartisan unanimous vote. There were no concerns 
over there, because it is narrowly tailored. This is essential if we 
are going to get companies to be able to volunteer to the government 
solutions that can help us protect our critical infrastructure.
  There is precedent for this. I heard arguments that this is 
unprecedented. If you take a look at the successful Y2K Act, 
Information Readiness Disclosure Act, it provided a limited FOIA 
exemption and civil litigation protection for shared information.
  We narrowly tailor these so we do not take away what FOIA offers the 
general public, very important protections. But if we do not allow it 
in these narrow instances, I am afraid we are not going to have the 
tools to fight terrorism. This legislation, I think, helps the private 
sector, including the ISOs, to move forward without fear from the 
government. It is essential.
  Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment.
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman), the ranking Democrat on the 
Committee on Government Reform and a leader in this House on both 
homeland security and good government.
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, it is remarkable, the position of the Republican Party 
today. It really shows the bankruptcy of that party. The Republican 
party used to stand for the idea that there should be some distrust of 
government. The theory was it can get too big, too bureaucratic; the 
federal government could interfere in the lives of individuals and 
start dictating policies from Washington. So what does this bill do? It 
grows the bureaucracy. It wastes money. With these Freedom of 
Information and FACA changes, it allows the government to keep things 
secret.
  You know who wrote the Freedom of Information Act? Barry Goldwater 
wrote it. Barry Goldwater wrote FOIA, because he said a government that 
has so much power can intrude in the lives of individuals, and he 
wanted the public to know what was going on.
  This bill and the way it is drafted without the Schakowsky amendment 
would allow this administration to meet in secret with business 
executives and lobbyists, just like it did in the Energy Task Force 
Vice President Cheney chaired. The administration could keep it all 
quiet. It could, in the name of national security, reward all these big 
industry groups that it is now so beholden to, by meeting with 
executives from the airline industry when they come in for special 
favors. But the public will never know, because the Freedom of 
Information Act, which protected all of us, will now be wiped out.
  Remember the days when the Republicans said Washington is not the 
place where all the wisdom is located? Well, what do they do? They 
preempt the States from having Freedom of Information laws that are 
more open to the public than what we are going to get in the bill 
passed today.
  It is a very sad day to see this in the Republican Party. I did not 
used to agree with them, but I used to respect them, when they worried 
about a big intrusive government that wasted money, that grew 
bureaucracy and became inefficient. Now it is responsive just to 
special interest big money.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton), the

[[Page H5848]]

distinguished chairman of the Committee on Government Reform, the 
committee of jurisdiction.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me time.
  Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say to my good friends, the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman) and the gentlewoman from 
Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky), I have high regard for both of them. We have 
tried to work on this in a bipartisan manner, and I really hope this 
whole issue does not degenerate into a political name-calling session, 
because we all want the same thing. We want to make sure Americans are 
secure and free from the threat of terrorism.
  Now, the President wants to encourage the private sector to give 
information to the Department of Homeland Security to enhance the 
safety of the American people. He is concerned that the people we are 
talking about will not volunteer information if they think whatever 
they turn over will be released to the public under the Freedom of 
Information Act. I think he is right. You would not want some terrorist 
getting some of this information that would be voluntarily given to 
Homeland Security.
  Let me give you an example. If a business owner recognizes that some 
part of his business infrastructure might be vulnerable to a terrorist 
attack, we want him to be able to come to the government and tell us 
about what he thinks might be done and how to deal with it. We want him 
to go to the Department of Homeland Security and be very candid. We 
wanted to be proactive, not reactive.
  This is the sort of information we must have to prevent tragedy to 
the American people. But if the businessman is worried and if his 
lawyers are worried that whatever he voluntarily discloses will go 
straight into the public domain and hence maybe to the terrorists, as 
we said earlier today, then he probably will not do it.
  We are in a war. I hope my colleagues all remember that. We are in a 
war. We need to take steps to guarantee that those people will come to 
us with that information to protect the safety of the American people, 
and that is why I oppose this amendment.
  I think the concerns raised by the sponsors of the bill, and I have 
high regard for all of them, are misplaced. The Freedom of Information 
Act will not be harmed. The legislation we will vote on today will not 
allow people to dodge the Freedom of Information Act. This bill does 
not change FOIA or the rules of FOIA for any other forms that 
businesses have to produce to any agency of the Federal Government. The 
only thing that will not be subject to FOIA information are the 
vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks.
  The government needs the kind of information we are talking about, 
and we will not get it unless there is a voluntary decision by the 
business people and the private sector to disclose it to government. 
They are not going to do it if they feel like they are going to be 
threatened or they will expose something that might lead to a terrorist 
attack.
  This is a commonsense, real world proposal, and we should not tie our 
hands behind our backs when it comes to fighting terrorism and 
protecting the American people.
  I hate to say this, but I have high regard for the gentlewoman from 
Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky) and the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Waxman), but this amendment would do more harm than good.

                              {time}  1715

  We need to make sure we take every step possible to get the private 
sector working with the government to make sure we are free from 
terrorist attacks.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Sweeney). The Chair wishes to inform 
Members that the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Armey) has 7 minutes 
remaining and the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky) has 5\1/2\ 
minutes remaining.
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) whose whistleblower amendment passed in the 
Committee on Government Reform, the language included in this bill.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, it would be unfortunate, in our efforts 
to improve homeland security, if suddenly our government became less 
open, less transparent. It would appear if we do that, then the 
terrorists win, because their attack is on our basic premise of 
democracy, of a free and open society.
  The current language in the bill fails to protect transferred 
homeland security, civil servants from whistleblower reprisals. Under 
the current Whistleblower Protection Act, the standard bureaucratic 
response has been to silence messengers blowing the whistle on national 
security breakdowns.
  Now, the Schakowsky-Kucinich-Mink amendment is designed, and it is 
needed, to protect national security whistleblowers by allowing them to 
petition Congress directly and providing an effective remedy for any 
reprisal taken by the new agency.
  Whistleblower rights are workers' rights and no worker should lose 
his or her job for exposing waste, cover-up, and lies of his or her 
superiors. It is ironic that in a bill which is designed to fight 
terrorism we have a provision designed to terrorize workers.
  The passage of this amendment is vital to protect the security of the 
American people. The September 11 terrorist attacks highlight a long-
standing necessity to strengthen free speech protections for national 
security whistleblowers, a number of whom have already made significant 
contributions to reducing U.S. terrorist vulnerability.
  Now, Mr. Chairman, I just want to offer one example of a case that 
this House ought to be aware of, the case of Mark Graf.
  Mark Graf was an alarm station supervisor and Authorized Derivative 
Classifier. He worked 17 years at the Department of Energy's Rocky 
Flats Environmental Technology Site. After the Wackenhut Services, a 
private security agency, took over this site with more than 21 tons of 
uranium and plutonium, Mark Graf witnessed the elimination of their 
bomb detecting unit, sloppy emergency drills, and negligence at taking 
inventory of the plutonium for months at a time. He and several other 
high-level officials raised serious concerns about a terrorist risk to 
the security of plutonium, as more than a ton of the material is 
unaccounted for at Rocky Flats. He took his concerns to management, 
which took no action.
  In 1995, after blowing the whistle to a Member of Congress, Mr. Graf 
was immediately reassigned from the areas that raised concerns in the 
first place. In a classified memo to the site supervisors and later to 
the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, he outlined specific 
vulnerabilities which, if exploited, could result in catastrophic 
consequences.
  With no corrective action being taken, he did an interview with CBS 
News. After the interview, he was subjected to a psychological 
evaluation and placed on administrative leave. As a condition of 
returning to work, he was gagged from speaking to Congress, the media, 
the agency, and also under the threat of job termination.
  In 1998, he filed and later won a whistleblower reprisal complaint 
currently being appealed by his employers. His disclosures contributed 
to legislation in the 1998 Defense Authorization Bill requiring an 
annual review of the safety and security program.
  We have a nuclear industry in this country with over 100 nuclear 
reactors, many of which have been relicensed and have reactor vessels 
that have been embrittled. We have a hole in a reactor that is trying 
to be repaired in Toledo, Ohio. Nuclear reactors are part of the 
critical infrastructure. This bill would let a cover-up be, in effect, 
okay in the name of national security so that the public would never 
know about a hole in a nuclear reactor or anything that was done that 
compromises the security of people who lived in the area.
  This amendment is necessary. This amendment is in the interests of 
our national security and our public health.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Portman).
  Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think the FOIA concerns over parts of 
this amendment have already been made by others, but I will say just to 
my friend from Ohio, that is clearly not the intent of the underlying 
bill nor is it the impact of the underlying bill. All of the FOIA 
requirements that

[[Page H5849]]

we would have, including right to know, would continue to be operative. 
This is a very narrow stipulation that, with regard to infrastructure 
information provided by the private sector, that we would get limited 
FOIA protection, which is absolutely necessary for national security, 
and that has been discussed.
  This amendment would also create a plaintiff lawyers' dream as I see 
it, and that is the civil actions open to punitive damages for 
whistleblowers claiming to have suffered from reprisal. The mere threat 
of these punitive damages can cause defendants, including the 
government, to settle cases; and it does, to settle cases that have 
questionable merit just to reduce that risk of an extreme verdict.
  The opportunity of punitive damages for a plaintiff, can make an 
otherwise meritless case look awfully tempting to pursue, just in case 
the jury does come in with a big verdict. It is excessive. Let us be 
clear. The committee bill does have traditional whistleblower 
protections in it. I am kind of tired of hearing it does not. Please 
turn to page 185 of the bill, because it is right there. These are the 
whistleblower protections that we have currently and they should be 
continued. They are important.
  We should be promoting team spirit at this new Department, 
collaboration. The bill gives the Department the chance to give merit 
pay, performance bonuses in order to make this department work better 
as a team. That is the right incentive.
  Let us not give incentives to start disputes in the off chance that a 
clever plaintiffs' lawyer might find something to win in a settlement. 
Let us stick with the strong whistleblower protections we have in the 
underlying legislation. Let us stick with the FOIA provisions which are 
appropriate to provide this narrow limitation with regard to 
infrastructure information that is important to protecting the national 
security of this country. Let us vote down this amendment and support 
the underlying bill.
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire as to how much time we 
have remaining.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. 
Schakowsky) has 2 minutes remaining.
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of the time to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Doggett).
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, how many times will this Congress need to 
relearn the very basic lesson that an unaccountable government is an 
irresponsible government? When we confront difficult problems, we can 
either work to try to solve them, or we can seek to hide them. Without 
the amendment that is being advanced at the moment, it is the latter 
choice that is being made.
  Exempting so much of this new bureaucracy from the Freedom of 
Information Act and denying basic protections to whistleblowers is a 
true ticket to trouble for America. It is a ``kill-the-messenger'' and 
``hide-the-body'' approach that tries to sweep all problems, including 
ones that endanger basic public health and safety, under the carpet by 
increasing the power of self-appointed censors and denying 
whistleblowers protection from retaliation.
  The only lesson that some people have learned from Enron is the value 
of secrecy. After all, who exposed Enron's misconduct? A whistleblower 
named Sheeron Watkins. Certainly no one in this Congress exposed it. 
Indeed, some are still trying to ignore the causes of what happened at 
Enron.
  Meanwhile, with this Administration, this is not the only place where 
secrecy is beloved. Just ask Vice President Cheney about his ``Energy 
Policy Development Group''. We can ask, but he will not tell until a 
court makes him do it.
  Congress should not shield unscrupulous employers who wield the 
powerful weapon of the pink slip to intimidate their workers into 
silence in order to conceal and perpetuate activities that endanger 
America.

                              {time}  1730

  These are citizen crime-fighters, who deserve the protection that we 
provide crime-fighters, not our scorn.
  I have confidence in the power of courageous individuals to make 
lasting contributions to our Nation--to improve our private and public 
institutions. Congress should advance that interest by building in 
government accountability and by ensuring that our government is as 
open as possible, where employees are encouraged to fix security 
problems, not to hide them.
  Vote in favor of the Schakowsky amendment.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to yield 1 minute to the 
distinguished gentleman from Utah (Mr. Cannon).
  (Mr. CANNON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, I was intrigued by the comments of the 
gentlewoman from Hawaii (Mrs. Mink) and also the gentleman from 
California. My first job as a lawyer was to work with Stuart Udall in 
the late 1970s when he was suing the Federal Government on the facts 
that came out about the fallout, which came out, in fact, in the 
context of FOIA requests.
  Let me say that the information that came out was remarkable. I read 
every page of that information of the discussions that were held at 
very high levels in the military about how they should control the 
information about fallout and subject citizens of the United States 
knowingly to the unknown effects, known to be bad; but the scope of 
those effects were unknown at the time.
  I agree that it was appropriate to have that information come out and 
be the subject of a lawsuit. The fact, though, is that that was 
government activity that was made available through the Freedom of 
Information Act.
  The gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman) talked about the 
Republican Party. These are governmental activities. What we are 
dealing with in this exception is information that comes from private 
parties who own 90 percent of the infrastructure.
  This amendment is ill advised, inappropriate; and I suggest that my 
colleagues vote against it.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran).
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I really like and respect its 
author, but I have to urge my colleagues to vote against the Schakowsky 
amendment on the Freedom of Information Act.
  This is a very narrow restriction on public disclosure of information 
about the private industry's critical infrastructure. We all rely on 
that privately owned infrastructure of this Nation: computer networks, 
phone and power lines, airplanes, et cetera. As the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis) said, 90 percent of our critical 
infrastructure is owned by the private sector.
  In President Clinton's Directive 63, an effort was put into play to 
enable the owners of this infrastructure to communicate with each other 
and formulate effective response plans to terrorism, extortion, and 
hacking. However, PD-63, that Presidential directive, found that 
companies would not share information about threats to their 
infrastructure because of their lawyers' concerns about FOIA and 
antitrust. Sharing such information would put them in an even more 
vulnerable position with respect to their customers, their 
shareholders, and their competitors.
  I have to say, some of the objections that this amendment addresses 
are misleading. It is not unprecedented. Congress passed Y2K 
legislation to exempt information-sharing about critical infrastructure 
vulnerabilities from use in lawsuits and disclosure to third parties. 
It is narrower than that Y2K legislation. It contains numerous 
definitions. It provides no immunity from liability, no limit on 
discovery or lawsuits, no free pass on criminal activity. All required 
disclosures under the Clean Air and Clean Water Act must continue.
  If we do not include this limited FOIA restriction, we will not be 
able to say we did everything we could to prepare and defend our 
homeland. It is a narrowly crafted restriction on FOIA, and it can help 
win the war on terrorism; so I urge my colleagues to join me in voting 
against the Schakowsky amendment and for the Davis-Moran amendment, 
which comes up next.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

[[Page H5850]]

  Mr. Chairman, the amendment of the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. 
Schakowsky) would do two things. It would set aside some very carefully 
crafted language that modifies FOIA out of consideration for private 
sector firms who are asked to share crucial information with the 
government. That would be a mistake to set that aside. We need these 
firms that own so much of our infrastructure to cooperate.
  Let me just say, FOIA was designed for the American people to 
understand what is going on in this government; not designed, nor would 
I think many Americans would think it appropriate, to use FOIA to force 
private citizens or corporations to give their information up to people 
like trial lawyers, newspaper editors, or college professors, the three 
practical categories of people who access FOIA information.
  The second part of the gentlewoman's amendment is predicated on the 
misrepresentation that we do not protect whistleblowers in this 
legislation. This myth has been running amok in public discourse since 
the President proposed this. It was always the President's intention, 
and I believe discerning people would have recognized the President's 
intention in everything he said and submitted. It certainly is our 
intention on page 185 of this bill to protect whistleblowers.
  So, one, Mr. Chairman, the argument that this bill contains no 
protection for whistleblowers is just plain flat wrong. The 
perceptiveness of any eighth-grader who can read would reveal that to 
anyone.
  Now, what the gentlewoman does, building on the myth that there is no 
protection, is to provide extra special protections in the form of 
compensatory damages. Also, and I like this one, lawyers across America 
must be licking their chops over this one: ``any other relief that the 
court considers appropriate not currently available to 
whistleblowers.''
  Mr. Chairman, if Members want to win the lottery, they should buy a 
ticket. In the meantime, vote down this amendment and defend the rights 
of the American people that are legitimate and just.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Sweeney). All time has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from 
Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Illinois 
(Ms. Schakowsky) will be postponed.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 25 printed in House 
Report 107-615.


         Amendment No. 25 Offered by Mr. Tom Davis of Virginia

  Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 25 offered by Mr. Tom Davis of Virginia:

       Strike paragraph (2) of section 722, and insert the 
     following:
       (2) Covered federal agency.--The term ``covered Federal 
     agency'' means the Department of Homeland Security and any 
     agency designated by the Department or with which the 
     Department shares critical infrastructure information.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 502, the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis) and a Member opposed each will 
control 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis).
  Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that 
my time be equally divided between myself and the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Moran).
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Virginia?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Utah (Mr. Cannon).
  (Mr. CANNON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, I want to express my support for the 
amendment offered by my good friend, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
Tom Davis), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Technology and 
Procurement Policy. He has worked thoughtfully on this issue for many 
years now.
  Although the underlying bill contains some of the necessary 
protections for private organizations to coordinate with each other and 
share information with the government, it does not go far enough. This 
amendment is a critical element to facilitate the type of public-
private cooperation we want to see developed in protecting vital 
elements of our infrastructure.
  That cooperation should not be artificially limited to the Department 
of Homeland Security exclusively when the President may want other 
existing Departments to be recipients of infrastructure vulnerability 
information.
  A fact of life is that 90 percent of our critical infrastructure in 
this country, whether it is telecommunications facilities, pipelines, 
or electricity, the electricity grid, is held not by the government but 
by private companies and individuals. In order to induce these private 
entities to voluntarily share information about their vulnerabilities 
and security protections with each other and with the government, they 
need to be granted clear advance assurances that such collaboration and 
information-sharing will not hurt them.
  Even more importantly, we need to ensure that such information is not 
used to our collective detriment. Openness is a great asset of our 
society, but there needs to be a balance. Already there is a great deal 
of publicly available information that can be used by those who wish us 
harm. But we should not release sensitive information not normally 
available in the public domain because a private entity has voluntarily 
cooperated with the Federal Government, the Federal or local 
government.
  We have a successful model for this type of limited exemption from 
FOIA in the public and private efforts that were undertaken to prepare 
for the Y2K computer programming glitch, and that effort was an 
astounding success. I urge Members to support the Davis amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Does any Member rise in opposition?
  Ms. DeLAURO. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do. I seek the time to control in 
opposition to this amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Connecticut is 
recognized for 10 minutes in opposition.
  Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to this amendment which 
would take a bad idea and make it worse. We all understand the need to 
safeguard sensitive information relating to national security. The FOIA 
statute already contains exemptions for critical infrastructure 
information, confidential business information, for national security 
information. In effect, the tools are in place to protect this kind of 
information without curtailing the public's right to know.
  This provision defines infrastructure information so broadly that it 
covers all kinds of lobbying requests, even lobbyists asking for 
liability protection. In essence and in effect, this provision is a 
lobbyists' protection act. An energy company could shield itself from 
liability from radioactive materials that leaked from its nuclear power 
plant, and lobbyists and industry officials would be allowed to 
communicate with Department staff charged with critical decisions 
without any public disclosure. We saw that already with the protracted 
fight with the administration, with the Energy Department, where they 
were forced to turn over documents that showed much of the White House 
energy plan was written by the energy lobbyists.
  We have another example of the kind of information that could be kept 
from the public if this amendment passes. After a fatal Amtrak 
derailment in southern Iowa, investigation showed that a stretch of 
privately owned railroad track which suffered from over 1,500 defects 
was partly to blame. The FOIA exemptions in this bill would have kept 
this information, which is essential to prevent another disaster, from 
the public; and expanding those exemptions to other agencies would only 
keep more health and safety information from the public.
  We should not be using this bill to curtail the public's right to 
know about critical health information, safety information. We should 
not use it, if

[[Page H5851]]

you will, as a way to give corporations a way to avoid accountability 
for their actions.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis). In fact, this amendment is 
actually an abbreviated version of a bill that he and I sponsored, H.R. 
2435, the Cyber Security Information Act.
  Some people thought our bill was too broad, so we worked together in 
a bipartisan manner with the administration and all the committees of 
jurisdiction, the interest groups, and the public to craft a very 
narrow restriction on public disclosure of information about the 
private industry's critical infrastructure.
  The FOIA exemption at issue here is deliberately narrow, but it has 
addressed concerns that are legitimate. We all rely on the critical 
infrastructure of this Nation, and over 90 percent of that critical 
infrastructure is private. This is where our principal vulnerability 
lies. In Presidential Directive 63, which was issued by President 
Clinton, it enabled the owners of this private infrastructure to 
communicate with each other and formulate effective response plans to 
any acts of terrorism, extortion, or hacking; but that Presidential 
Directive 63 found that companies would not share information about 
threats to their infrastructure because of their concerns about FOIA 
antitrust and liability.
  So today, as we continue to fight our war on terrorism, many 
companies want to help us by sharing what they have discovered; but 
they will not because they are legitimately concerned that in revealing 
actual or potential network risks and vulnerabilities, they may 
inadvertently heighten their own risks if all the information they 
provide the government has to be published under the Freedom of 
Information Act.
  Without exemption from FOIA, businesses are likely to spend a lot of 
valuable time and resources scrubbing virtually all information 
supplied to the new Department of Homeland Security so that they do not 
inadvertently disclose market-sensitive information to their commercial 
rivals.
  This narrowly crafted freedom of information exemption in this bill 
will alleviate this widespread industry concern and accomplish a 
fundamental goal of this legislation: collaborative and constructive 
business-government cooperation in the cause of homeland security.
  We faced and solved a potential crisis like this before with our Y2K 
act. Everybody remembers when we woke up the morning of January 1, 
2000, we wondered if the Y2K preparations were enough, or if we would 
face shutdowns of our critical infrastructure, banks, and other 
computer systems. But everything worked, and there were no Y2K 
disasters because of that legislation, which did very much the same 
thing that this legislation does.
  The success of our approach to Y2K should be followed now. As with 
Y2K, we have to create an environment where private industry can 
discuss and share with the government information about threats, best 
practices, and defenses against terrorism.

                              {time}  1745

  And I have to say, I do not think the objections raised are based on 
an accurate description of the language in this bill. Contrary to what 
it's opponents are saying, our FOIA provisions are not a mechanism to 
hide corporate wrongdoing or environmental disasters. The FOIA 
provisions in this bill provide no immunity from liability. There is no 
limit on discovery of lawsuits, and no free pass on criminal activity. 
Moreover, all required disclosures under the environmental statutes 
such as the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act must continue.
  Without this legislation, we will not be able to say that we did 
everything we could to prepare our people and prevent disasters and 
defend our homeland. This very limited restriction on FOIA can 
contribute to winning the war on terrorism. That is why we need to 
support it.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Waxman).
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman very much for 
yielding me time.
  The Freedom of Information Act provisions in this bill are a 
continuation of the current administration's onslaught on the public's 
right to know and they should be struck from the bill. Now we have the 
Davis amendment which dramatically expand them.
  We know what this administration has done so far. It would not 
disclose what lobbyists and energy companies met with the Chaney energy 
task force. It issued an executive order limiting the release of 
presidential records. It repeatedly refused to release information 
requested by Congress, including even basic census information. Now it 
wants a huge statutory loophole inserted in the Freedom of Information 
Act. The majority says this is to protect information that may be 
necessary to protect homeland security.
  Let me submit to the Members that what they really want to do is to 
protect lobbying groups, special interest groups, from having the fact 
that they have gone in and asked for special favors to be disclosed.
  Under this amendment, a chemical company can go to the EPA and ask to 
relax the requirement that it report chemicals stored at its facility; 
it would make this request on the grounds that this information could 
be useful to terrorists. It could also be useful for the public to 
know. Under this amendment, they would say that has to be exempt from 
disclosure. A drug company could lobby the Department of Health and 
Human Services to relax human testing requirements for drugs that might 
have homeland security uses. And under this amendment, this information 
would be exempt from disclosure. A manufacturer can lobby the 
Department of Labor to relax worker safety regulations on the grounds 
that the regulations add unnecessary costs that limit its ability to 
implement securities measures, and under this amendment, this 
information would be exempt from disclosure.
  Now in our committee I raised this point and the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Davis) said absolutely not true. He said, this is not to 
protect lobbying and to assure the Members who were raising this point, 
he agreed, and everybody supported, an amendment I offered to the bill 
that said nothing in this subtitle shall apply to any information 
submitted in the course of lobbying any covered Federal agency.
  So what happened? The bill went to the Select Committee on Homeland 
Security and it struck it out. What does that tell you? Why would the 
members of the Select Committee strike that out? Because they want to 
protect the lobbyists that come ask for special favors. This is just 
like they want to protect the groups that might be negligent in giving 
services or devices that they are going to sell to the government.
  It is a giveaway. It is a giveaway to special interest groups that I 
am sure are major contributors to the Republican campaign committee. I 
believe it and I see evidence of it over and over again. There is no 
attempt to make this a bipartisan bill. They want it to be partisan and 
they want it for their special contributors.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Sweeney). The Chair wishes to advise 
Members that the gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro) has 5 
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran) has 1\1/2\ 
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis) has 3 
minutes remaining.
  Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky).
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, we are told over and over again as we 
create this Department of Homeland Security that we are at war, that 
these are very special times. And clearly we need to know about 
infrastructure vulnerabilities. There is no question about it. Such 
information is essential.
  Well, I wonder if it occurred to the majority that one way to get 
that information might be to require it. For an issue as critical as 
national security, it is striking that the administration is apparently 
unwilling to require

[[Page H5852]]

companies to submit information on vulnerabilities, but instead willing 
only to rely on coaxing it from them voluntarily by relaxing the 
disclosure law that is a cornerstone of open government.
  Now, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Davis) purported to give an 
example how information regarded as confidential by a company was 
released as an example of why we have to have this. But, instead, 
actually what he told us was how a company refused to give the 
information because they did not trust the government.
  Again, over and over what we are told here is not that the Freedom of 
Information Act as currently written really does not have enough 
exemptions but that the lawyers for private corporations do not trust 
it. Do we not trust the new Secretary, whoever that may be, of the 
Department to say we will exempt those things that are a threat to 
national security, that are a threat to the confidential proprietary 
information of a company? We have put all kind of power in his hands. 
Certainly we can trust him to do that.
  I think it was the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Davis) also said that 
the Senate passed this language or the earlier language, the FOIA 
language, in their version of the bill, but that is not true. One 
important exception is the Senate bill does not preempt State and local 
Freedom of Information and other kinds of public information disclosure 
laws. It is important we should vote down this amendment. It is 
dangerous to our democracy.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair wishes to further inform Members 
that the order of closure will be the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
Moran), who has 1\1/2\ minutes remaining, then the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis), who has 3 minutes remaining, and then the 
gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro), who has 3 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as 
I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, let me put a couple of things to rest.
  First of all, we are simply taking the base text of the bill as it is 
currently drafted as this House has approved, and we are extending the 
information that could be obtained by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security and are allowing in his discretion to share information that 
would not otherwise be attainable by the government, to share this 
information with other Federal agencies if it will help protect our 
critical infrastructure so that we can obtain the information that will 
keep our security systems, our cybersystems in the Department of 
Defense or in the FBI or the CIA, and the information that we receive 
through Homeland Security will protect those systems. We can share that 
information.
  This is a very narrowly tailored amendment. This amendment, in fact, 
is more narrowly tailored than an exemption that was passed by this 
House and signed by the President on the Y2K Readiness Act. So we have 
done our best to make sure the Freedom of Information Act is protected.
  This does not apply to lobbyists. I do not know why the language was 
taken out by the other committee. I certainly accepted antilobbying 
language at the committee level where we were before, but perhaps they 
took it out because such language is redundant.
  The language here is very clear that only information that would 
otherwise not be attainable by government would now be able to be 
shared to protect our critical infrastructure and that it has to 
pertain to critical infrastructure information. If it pertains to 
anything else, it does not fit the exemption and it would be as it 
currently is, available under the current statute.
  Now, this legislation has nothing to do with campaign contributions, 
and I think those kinds of statements belong in the political waste 
basket. I think we are people of good will here who are doing our best 
to make sure that in developing a Department of Homeland Security we 
are getting the best information available to combat terrorism.
  We have to remember that in the caves of al Qaeda we found government 
documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act that lay in 
terrorists' hands that they were using to destroy us. And just as the 
Romans built a system and a network that took them to all corners of 
the Earth, it was the same barbarians that used those roads to come in 
to destroy Rome.
  What we want to do is as we build this infrastructure, we want to 
protect it from those barbarians, in this case, the terrorists.
  Since the infrastructure is 90 percent owned by the private sector, 
we are soliciting comments, we are soliciting the experience from the 
private sector to share with the government in a way that will not be 
used to the private sector's detriment, so that the private sector's 
competitors, so that terrorists, so that lawyers cannot come in and get 
this information that would otherwise be attainable and use it against 
them. And without that protection, what we are finding out is 
companies, innovators, small innovators are reluctant to share that 
information with the government because it could bankrupt those 
companies.
  This is narrowly crafted. The Senate agrees, at least, on the Federal 
portion of this. I concur with the previous speaker, it does not apply 
to State and local on the Senate side. We do because critical 
infrastructure also applies to State and local. I urge adoption of the 
amendment.
  Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Doggett).
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is the logical extension of 
a very bad idea of spreading secrecy throughout our government. It 
would enlarge a giant black hole. You pour taxpayer money in one side 
and out the other side, the only thing that comes out are the 
government-approved leaks.
  For over 2 decades while the Soviet Union existed and the Berlin Wall 
divided Europe, the Freedom of Information Act maintained a careful 
balance between the public's right to know and our national security. 
Why today then have some leaders lost confidence in this landmark law?
  Well, apparently, the answer is found in the language deleted from 
the bill that we are now told amazingly is ``redundant''. Language that 
clearly assumed that lobbying contacts would be revealed has been 
removed. And so the clear legislative history of this bill is that when 
lobbyists are seeking special treatment from this new bureaucracy, no 
one but them and their benefactors will know it occurred. Where our 
public safety is at stake, when we begin by burying secrets, we will 
end with burying bodies. This amendment ought to be rejected.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Does the gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. 
DeLauro) wish to close?
  Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Chairman, yes, I do. How much time do I have 
remaining?
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. 
DeLauro) has 2 minutes remaining.
  Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Hawaii (Mrs. Mink).
  Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for 
yielding me time.
  We all want to make sure the government has tools with which to 
operate efficiently, effectively, to safeguard the people and property 
of this country. The government is out there collecting information 
with its own resources, with tax dollars. All of that information is 
now available, accessible to the public under FOIA. Why is it we have 
to generate an exemption to the private sector for voluntary 
information?
  If this information is necessary for homeland security, the 
government ought to be required to get that information; and then, if 
necessary, that information coming from a private source can be 
classified. It can be deemed to be business-related information that 
should be exempt.
  I submit that all of the powers of the government that now allow 
these exemptions already exist in the nine categories that are in 
current law, that have been effective for the last 30 years to protect 
private interests, private business, trade secrets, everything else in 
the private sector; but we have not touched in any way the right of the 
public to know what it is that the government is doing, and there 
should be no secrets. Let the public have the absolute right to know.
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume to close.

[[Page H5853]]

  Mr. Chairman, the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. 
Waxman) threw me for a loop a bit there when he said the language 
restricting lobbying had been taken out. But in looking through this, 
it is moot because this has nothing to do with lobbying.
  The Congress just passed legislation to address corporate 
accountability. The President is going to sign it. There are a total of 
11 sections in title 18 of the Civil Service Code. These are criminal 
law provisions. They govern the behavior of Federal employees and they 
restrict and prohibit acting as a lobbyist, being lobbied, revolving-
door activities, financial conflicts of interest, making political 
contributions, lobbying with appropriated monies.

                              {time}  1800

  The information that we are talking about here has nothing to do with 
lobbying. It is critical infrastructure vulnerabilities to terrorism. 
Electric dam supervisors are not going to be having anything to do with 
lobbying. It has to be in good faith and no evasion of law is allowed. 
These are telecommunications managers, they are financial service 
people, they are people that have identified vulnerabilities, 
vulnerabilities that we need to be protected by. We have been told by 
the FBI, by the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection.
  They desperately need this kind of language. The Department of 
Homeland Security needs it. Otherwise we cannot act effectively. We are 
not going to be able to protect the people of this country if our 
private sector that runs 90 percent of critical infrastructure is not 
able to disclose all of the information that might be relevant to 
protecting the American people. That is the reason for this amendment. 
It has nothing to do with lobbying. And it has everything to do with 
protecting the security of the American people.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Sweeney). The gentlewoman from 
Connecticut is recognized for 1 minute.
  Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Chairman, this is really rather incredulous. We have 
through the Freedom of Information Act been protecting national 
security, trade secrets, other provisions of business information for 
the last 36 years. What have we been doing since we initiated this 
piece of legislation? Why if already the exemptions are built in here 
that they have worked for our Defense Department, they work for the 
FBI, they work for the CIA, do all of a sudden we put together a new 
Department here and those safeguards of the public's right to know are 
inoperable, they are abrogated? What is the reason?
  And the very reason is what my colleagues, some on this side of the 
aisle and my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, say is that 
this provision is about protecting lobbyists. That is what it is all 
about, and we ought to vote it down. We ought to do what is the right 
thing to do, protect the public's right to know. The exemptions are 
built unto the law. They have been working. Let us continue to let them 
work.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia 
(Mr. Tom Davis) will be postponed.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that after debate 
concludes on all amendments made in order under the rule, it be in 
order to recognize both the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) 
and myself for the purpose of offering a pro forma amendment to 
conclude debate.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request from the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to strike the last 
word.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request from the 
gentlewoman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I sought that time in order to engage the 
majority leader in colloquy about section 770 of H.R. 5005.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentlewoman will yield, I would be 
happy to engage in colloquy with the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Armey).
  This section would prohibit the Government from putting in place the 
Bush administration's TIPS program, the Terrorist Information and 
Prevention System. Is it the majority leader's intent that section 770 
ban both the program called ``TIPS'' and any other successor program 
that might be considered that would have the same or similar 
characteristics as TIPS? In other words, would section 770 bar the 
Government both from putting in place the same program under a 
different name or a program under a different name with similar 
characteristics to the proposed TIPS program?
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. PELOSI. I yield to the leader.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  Yes. Section 770 is intended not only to prohibit the TIPS program, 
but also any and all activities to implement the proposed plan. This 
means that section 770 prohibits the TIPS program no matter what name 
it is given and any program with the same or similar characteristics. 
This is not to say that the Government would be barred from receiving 
information about potential terrorism from any member of the public. Of 
course, it could and it does under current law.
  Rather, what is prohibited is the creation of a Government program 
that would have the effect or purpose of encouraging workers and others 
who have access to our homes and our neighborhoods to report to the 
Government information that they think is suspicious. This work is best 
left to State and local law enforcement officials. There are much 
better ways to involve our communities in securing our homeland. After 
all, we are here today to defend our freedoms.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the majority leader.
  Further, I would like to engage the majority leader in a colloquy 
about Section 815 of H.R. 5005. This section makes it crystal clear 
that nothing in this legislation authorizes the development a national 
identification system or card. Since September 11 there have been 
several proposals to institute a national identification system or 
national I.D., and all have been met with a great deal of controversy. 
Direct passage of a national I.D. card, however, is only one possible 
path to such a system. There have also been proposals to establish a 
national I.D. through the back door of the State driver's license.
  For example, in a recent report, the nonpartisan National Research 
Council called the American Association of Motor Vehicle 
Administrators' standardization proposal a ``nationwide identity 
system.'' Does the majority leader agree that recent proposals to 
standardize State driver's licenses would be a back door route to a 
national I.D. and therefore prohibited under this provision?
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. PELOSI. I yield to the leader.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, the answer is yes on both counts. The 
Federal government does not have the authority to nationalize driver's 
licenses and other identification cards. And this legislation would not 
give them that authority. The authority to design and issue these cards 
shall remain with the States.
  The use of uniform unique identifiers or Social Security numbers with 
driver's license or proposed ``smart cards'' is not consistent with a 
free society. This legislation rejects a national identification card 
in any form.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to strike the last 
word.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from New 
Jersey is recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I wish to engage in a colloquy with the 
gentleman from Texas, who is the majority leader, the gentleman from 
New

[[Page H5854]]

York and the gentleman from Delaware.
  Mr. Chairman, I am troubled by reports indicating that due to 
financial pressures, Amtrak has been forced to make drastic reductions 
in the security personnel that patrol the Trenton Train Station, Penn 
Station in New York City, 30th Street Station in Philadelphia and 
others.
  According to recent media accounts in Trenton, New Jersey, the staff 
reductions are so severe that they are now time when no officers are on 
patrol. This lack of security personnel not only compromises security 
but the safety of passengers. A strong railroad security is an 
essential part of a strong homeland security, and I hope that the 
gentleman from Texas will make certain that the commitment to rail 
security, particularly Amtrak police officers, is not reduced.
  I am currently working with the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley) 
on a letter to the Committee on Appropriations to ask that they address 
this important issue in their transportation appropriations bill, and I 
hope that we can address it in this legislation as well.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Delaware.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for 
yielding to me, and Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself with the 
gentleman from New Jersey's comments because what he is talking about 
is indicative of a larger problem.
  Unfortunately, last year Congress and the administration provided 
Amtrak only $5 million for rail security in comparison to $3.8 billion 
for the Transportation Security Agency to improve aviation security. In 
my opinion, this imbalance must be addressed.
  I do not know how many Members are aware of this, but I would like to 
point out that Amtrak's tunnels run underneath the House and Senate 
office buildings and the Supreme Court. We literally cannot afford to 
ignore rail security any longer.
  I would say to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Armey) that I 
respectfully request that when the House and Senate meet to negotiate 
the final details of this bill, that adequate security funding will be 
provided for Amtrak.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his comments.
  Mr. QUINN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. QUINN. Mr. Chairman, I share the sentiments expressed here by my 
two colleagues, and I thank the distinguished majority leader for 
engaging in this discussion this afternoon.
  As the chairman of the Subcommittee on Railroads in our full 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, I think it is important 
for us to remember that regardless of any Member's position on the 
future of Amtrak and passenger rail service here in our country, I 
think all of us can agree that security on that rail system is 
essential. Reducing rail security personnel while we continue to wage a 
war on terrorism is misguided and unacceptable.
  I join my colleagues in asking the gentleman from Texas for his 
assurance, even during a period of uncertainty surrounding Amtrak, to 
reaffirm our commitment to the security of our national rail 
infrastructure, including police personnel.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his remarks.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and let 
me say to all three of my colleagues, I thank them for their interest 
in the issue, and let me assure my colleagues that I share their 
concern about the security of our Nation's rail system.
  I would also like to assure them that we will work in conference 
committee to make certain that the commitment to rail security, 
particularly Amtrak and Amtrak police officers, is not reduced so that 
rail stations such as the Trenton Train Station may remain secure.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas for his 
comments and my colleagues.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider Amendment 
No. 26 printed in House Report 107-615.


               Amendment No. 26 Offered by Mr. Chambliss

  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 26 offered by Mr. Chambliss:
       At the end of title VII add the following new subtitle:

                    Subtitle H--Information Sharing

     SEC. 780. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Homeland Security 
     Information Sharing Act''.

     SEC. 781. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) The Federal Government is required by the Constitution 
     to provide for the common defense, which includes terrorist 
     attack.
       (2) The Federal Government relies on State and local 
     personnel to protect against terrorist attack.
       (3) The Federal Government collects, creates, manages, and 
     protects classified and sensitive but unclassified 
     information to enhance homeland security.
       (4) Some homeland security information is needed by the 
     State and local personnel to prevent and prepare for 
     terrorist attack.
       (5) The needs of State and local personnel to have access 
     to relevant homeland security information to combat terrorism 
     must be reconciled with the need to preserve the protected 
     status of such information and to protect the sources and 
     methods used to acquire such information.
       (6) Granting security clearances to certain State and local 
     personnel is one way to facilitate the sharing of information 
     regarding specific terrorist threats among Federal, State, 
     and local levels of government.
       (7) Methods exist to declassify, redact, or otherwise adapt 
     classified information so it may be shared with State and 
     local personnel without the need for granting additional 
     security clearances.
       (8) State and local personnel have capabilities and 
     opportunities to gather information on suspicious activities 
     and terrorist threats not possessed by Federal agencies.
       (9) The Federal Government and State and local governments 
     and agencies in other jurisdictions may benefit from such 
     information.
       (10) Federal, State, and local governments and 
     intelligence, law enforcement, and other emergency 
     preparation and response agencies must act in partnership to 
     maximize the benefits of information gathering and analysis 
     to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks.
       (11) Information systems, including the National Law 
     Enforcement Telecommunications System and the Terrorist 
     Threat Warning System, have been established for rapid 
     sharing of classified and sensitive but unclassified 
     information among Federal, State, and local entities.
       (12) Increased efforts to share homeland security 
     information should avoid duplicating existing information 
     systems.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     Federal, State, and local entities should share homeland 
     security information to the maximum extent practicable, with 
     special emphasis on hard-to-reach urban and rural 
     communities.

     SEC. 782. FACILITATING HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING 
                   PROCEDURES.

       (a) Procedures for Determining Extent of Sharing of 
     Homeland Security Information.--
       (1) The President shall prescribe and implement procedures 
     under which relevant Federal agencies--
       (A) share relevant and appropriate homeland security 
     information with other Federal agencies, including the 
     Department, and appropriate State and local personnel;
       (B) identify and safeguard homeland security information 
     that is sensitive but unclassified; and
       (C) to the extent such information is in classified form, 
     determine whether, how, and to what extent to remove 
     classified information, as appropriate, and with which such 
     personnel it may be shared after such information is removed.
       (2) The President shall ensure that such procedures apply 
     to all agencies of the Federal Government.
       (3) Such procedures shall not change the substantive 
     requirements for the classification and safeguarding of 
     classified information.
       (4) Such procedures shall not change the requirements and 
     authorities to protect sources and methods.
       (b) Procedures for Sharing of Homeland Security 
     Information.--
       (1) Under procedures prescribed by the President, all 
     appropriate agencies, including the intelligence community, 
     shall, through information sharing systems, share homeland 
     security information with Federal agencies and appropriate 
     State and local personnel to the extent such information may 
     be shared, as determined in accordance with subsection (a), 
     together with assessments of the credibility of such 
     information.

[[Page H5855]]

       (2) Each information sharing system through which 
     information is shared under paragraph (1) shall--
       (A) have the capability to transmit unclassified or 
     classified information, though the procedures and recipients 
     for each capability may differ;
       (B) have the capability to restrict delivery of information 
     to specified subgroups by geographic location, type of 
     organization, position of a recipient within an organization, 
     or a recipient's need to know such information;
       (C) be configured to allow the efficient and effective 
     sharing of information; and
       (D) be accessible to appropriate State and local personnel.
       (3) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall 
     establish conditions on the use of information shared under 
     paragraph (1)--
       (A) to limit the redissemination of such information to 
     ensure that such information is not used for an unauthorized 
     purpose;
       (B) to ensure the security and confidentiality of such 
     information;
       (C) to protect the constitutional and statutory rights of 
     any individuals who are subjects of such information; and
       (D) to provide data integrity through the timely removal 
     and destruction of obsolete or erroneous names and 
     information.
       (4) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall 
     ensure, to the greatest extent practicable, that the 
     information sharing system through which information is 
     shared under such paragraph include existing information 
     sharing systems, including, but not limited to, the National 
     Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, the Regional 
     Information Sharing System, and the Terrorist Threat Warning 
     System of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (5) Each appropriate Federal agency, as determined by the 
     President, shall have access to each information sharing 
     system through which information is shared under paragraph 
     (1), and shall therefore have access to all information, as 
     appropriate, shared under such paragraph.
       (6) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall 
     ensure that appropriate State and local personnel are 
     authorized to use such information sharing systems--
       (A) to access information shared with such personnel; and
       (B) to share, with others who have access to such 
     information sharing systems, the homeland security 
     information of their own jurisdictions, which shall be marked 
     appropriately as pertaining to potential terrorist activity.
       (7) Under procedures prescribed jointly by the Director of 
     Central Intelligence and the Attorney General, each 
     appropriate Federal agency, as determined by the President, 
     shall review and assess the information shared under 
     paragraph (6) and integrate such information with existing 
     intelligence.
       (c) Sharing of Classified Information and Sensitive but 
     Unclassified Information With State and Local Personnel.--
       (1) The President shall prescribe procedures under which 
     Federal agencies may, to the extent the President considers 
     necessary, share with appropriate State and local personnel 
     homeland security information that remains classified or 
     otherwise protected after the determinations prescribed under 
     the procedures set forth in subsection (a).
       (2) It is the sense of Congress that such procedures may 
     include one or more of the following means:
       (A) Carrying out security clearance investigations with 
     respect to appropriate State and local personnel.
       (B) With respect to information that is sensitive but 
     unclassified, entering into nondisclosure agreements with 
     appropriate State and local personnel.
       (C) Increased use of information-sharing partnerships that 
     include appropriate State and local personnel, such as the 
     Joint Terrorism Task Forces of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, the Anti-Terrorism Task Forces of the 
     Department of Justice, and regional Terrorism Early Warning 
     Groups.
       (d) Responsible Officials.--For each affected Federal 
     agency, the head of such agency shall designate an official 
     to administer this Act with respect to such agency.
       (e) Federal Control of Information.--Under procedures 
     prescribed under this section, information obtained by a 
     State or local government from a Federal agency under this 
     section shall remain under the control of the Federal agency, 
     and a State or local law authorizing or requiring such a 
     government to disclose information shall not apply to such 
     information.
       (f) Definitions.--As used in this section:
       (1) The term ``homeland security information'' means any 
     information possessed by a Federal, State, or local agency 
     that--
       (A) relates to the threat of terrorist activity;
       (B) relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or 
     disrupt terrorist activity;
       (C) would improve the identification or investigation of a 
     suspected terrorist or terrorist organization; or
       (D) would improve the response to a terrorist act.
       (2) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning 
     given such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
       (3) The term ``State and local personnel'' means any of the 
     following persons involved in prevention, preparation, or 
     response for terrorist attack:
       (A) State Governors, mayors, and other locally elected 
     officials.
       (B) State and local law enforcement personnel and 
     firefighters.
       (C) Public health and medical professionals.
       (D) Regional, State, and local emergency management agency 
     personnel, including State adjutant generals.
       (E) Other appropriate emergency response agency personnel.
       (F) Employees of private-sector entities that affect 
     critical infrastructure, cyber, economic, or public health 
     security, as designated by the Federal government in 
     procedures developed pursuant to this section.
       (4) The term ``State'' includes the District of Columbia 
     and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United 
     States.
       (g) Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed 
     as authorizing any department, bureau, agency, officer, or 
     employee of the Federal Government to request, receive, or 
     transmit to any other Government entity or personnel, or 
     transmit to any State or local entity or personnel otherwise 
     authorized by this Act to receive homeland security 
     information, any information collected by the Federal 
     Government solely for statistical purposes in violation of 
     any other provision of law relating to the confidentiality of 
     such information.

     SEC. 783. REPORT.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than 12 months after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit 
     to the congressional committees specified in subsection (b) a 
     report on the implementation of section 782. The report shall 
     include any recommendations for additional measures or 
     appropriation requests, beyond the requirements of section 
     782, to increase the effectiveness of sharing of information 
     between and among Federal, State, and local entities.
       (b) Specified Congressional Committees.--The congressional 
     committees referred to in subsection (a) are the following 
     committees:
       (1) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
       (2) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the Senate.

     SEC. 784. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
     necessary to carry out section 782.

     SEC. 785. AUTHORITY TO SHARE GRAND JURY INFORMATION.

       Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``, or of guidelines 
     jointly issued by the Attorney General and Director of 
     Central Intelligence pursuant to Rule 6,'' after ``Rule 6''; 
     and
       (2) in paragraph (3)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting ``or of a foreign 
     government'' after ``(including personnel of a state or 
     subdivision of a state'';
       (B) in subparagraph (C)(i)--
       (i) in subclause (I), by inserting before the semicolon the 
     following: ``or, upon a request by an attorney for the 
     government, when sought by a foreign court or prosecutor for 
     use in an official criminal investigation'';
       (ii) in subclause (IV)--

       (I) by inserting ``or foreign'' after ``may disclose a 
     violation of State'';
       (II) by inserting ``or of a foreign government'' after ``to 
     an appropriate official of a State or subdivision of a 
     State''; and
       (III) by striking ``or'' at the end;

       (iii) by striking the period at the end of subclause (V) 
     and inserting ``; or''; and
       (iv) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(VI) when matters involve a threat of actual or potential 
     attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an 
     agent of a foreign power, domestic or international sabotage, 
     domestic or international terrorism, or clandestine 
     intelligence gathering activities by an intelligence service 
     or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign 
     power, within the United States or elsewhere, to any 
     appropriate federal, state, local, or foreign government 
     official for the purpose of preventing or responding to such 
     a threat.''; and
       (C) in subparagraph (C)(iii)--
       (i) by striking ``Federal'';
       (ii) by inserting ``or clause (i)(VI)'' after ``clause 
     (i)(V)''; and
       (iii) by adding at the end the following: ``Any state, 
     local, or foreign official who receives information pursuant 
     to clause (i)(VI) shall use that information only consistent 
     with such guidelines as the Attorney General and Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall jointly issue.''.

     SEC. 786. AUTHORITY TO SHARE ELECTRONIC, WIRE, AND ORAL 
                   INTERCEPTION INFORMATION.

       Section 2517 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(7) Any investigative or law enforcement officer, or 
     other Federal official in carrying out official duties as 
     such Federal official, who by any means authorized by this 
     chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, 
     oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived 
     therefrom, may disclose such contents or derivative evidence 
     to a foreign investigative or law enforcement officer to the 
     extent that such disclosure is appropriate to the proper 
     performance of the official duties of the officer making or 
     receiving the disclosure, and foreign investigative or law 
     enforcement officers may use or

[[Page H5856]]

     disclose such contents or derivative evidence to the extent 
     such use or disclosure is appropriate to the proper 
     performance of their official duties.
       ``(8) Any investigative or law enforcement officer, or 
     other Federal official in carrying out official duties as 
     such Federal official, who by any means authorized by this 
     chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, 
     oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived 
     therefrom, may disclose such contents or derivative evidence 
     to any appropriate Federal, State, local, or foreign 
     government official to the extent that such contents or 
     derivative evidence reveals a threat of actual or potential 
     attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an 
     agent of a foreign power, domestic or international sabotage, 
     domestic or international terrorism, or clandestine 
     intelligence gathering activities by an intelligence service 
     or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign 
     power, within the United States or elsewhere, for the purpose 
     of preventing or responding to such a threat. Any official 
     who receives information pursuant to this provision may use 
     that information only as necessary in the conduct of that 
     person's official duties subject to any limitations on the 
     unauthorized disclosure of such information, and any State, 
     local, or foreign official who receives information pursuant 
     to this provision may use that information only consistent 
     with such guidelines as the At-
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 502, the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss) and a Member opposed each will 
control 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss).


       Modification to Amendment No. 26 Offered by Mr. Chambliss

  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to modify the 
amendment with the modification that I have placed at the desk.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will report the modification.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Modification to Amendment No. 26 offered by Mr. Chambliss:
       In lieu of amendment #26 printed in House Report 107-615,
       At the end of title VII add the following new subtitle:

                    Subtitle H--Information Sharing

     SEC. 780. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Homeland Security 
     Information Sharing Act''.

     SEC. 781. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) The Federal Government is required by the Constitution 
     to provide for the common defense, which includes terrorist 
     attack.
       (2) The Federal Government relies on State and local 
     personnel to protect against terrorist attack.
       (3) The Federal Government collects, creates, manages, and 
     protects classified and sensitive but unclassified 
     information to enhance homeland security.
       (4) Some homeland security information is needed by the 
     State and local personnel to prevent and prepare for 
     terrorist attack.
       (5) The needs of State and local personnel to have access 
     to relevant homeland security information to combat terrorism 
     must be reconciled with the need to preserve the protected 
     status of such information and to protect the sources and 
     methods used to acquire such information.
       (6) Granting security clearances to certain State and local 
     personnel is one way to facilitate the sharing of information 
     regarding specific terrorist threats among Federal, State, 
     and local levels of government.
       (7) Methods exist to declassify, redact, or otherwise adapt 
     classified information so it may be shared with State and 
     local personnel without the need for granting additional 
     security clearances.
       (8) State and local personnel have capabilities and 
     opportunities to gather information on suspicious activities 
     and terrorist threats not possessed by Federal agencies.
       (9) The Federal Government and State and local governments 
     and agencies in other jurisdictions may benefit from such 
     information.
       (10) Federal, State, and local governments and 
     intelligence, law enforcement, and other emergency 
     preparation and response agencies must act in partnership to 
     maximize the benefits of information gathering and analysis 
     to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks.
       (11) Information systems, including the National Law 
     Enforcement Telecommunications System and the Terrorist 
     Threat Warning System, have been established for rapid 
     sharing of classified and sensitive but unclassified 
     information among Federal, State, and local entities.
       (12) Increased efforts to share homeland security 
     information should avoid duplicating existing information 
     systems.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     Federal, State, and local entities should share homeland 
     security information to the maximum extent practicable, with 
     special emphasis on hard-to-reach urban and rural 
     communities.

     SEC. 782. FACILITATING HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING 
                   PROCEDURES.

       (a) Procedures for Determining Extent of Sharing of 
     Homeland Security Information.--
       (1) The President shall prescribe and implement procedures 
     under which relevant Federal agencies--
       (A) share relevant and appropriate homeland security 
     information with other Federal agencies, including the 
     Department, and appropriate State and local personnel;
       (B) identify and safeguard homeland security information 
     that is sensitive but unclassified; and
       (C) to the extent such information is in classified form, 
     determine whether, how, and to what extent to remove 
     classified information, as appropriate, and with which such 
     personnel it may be shared after such information is removed.
       (2) The President shall ensure that such procedures apply 
     to all agencies of the Federal Government.
       (3) Such procedures shall not change the substantive 
     requirements for the classification and safeguarding of 
     classified information.
       (4) Such procedures shall not change the requirements and 
     authorities to protect sources and methods.
       (b) Procedures for Sharing of Homeland Security 
     Information.--
       (1) Under procedures prescribed by the President, all 
     appropriate agencies, including the intelligence community, 
     shall, through information sharing systems, share homeland 
     security information with Federal agencies and appropriate 
     State and local personnel to the extent such information may 
     be shared, as determined in accordance with subsection (a), 
     together with assessments of the credibility of such 
     information.
       (2) Each information sharing system through which 
     information is shared under paragraph (1) shall--
       (A) have the capability to transmit unclassified or 
     classified information, though the procedures and recipients 
     for each capability may differ;
       (B) have the capability to restrict delivery of information 
     to specified subgroups by geographic location, type of 
     organization, position of a recipient within an organization, 
     or a recipient's need to know such information;
       (C) be configured to allow the efficient and effective 
     sharing of information; and
       (D) be accessible to appropriate State and local personnel.
       (3) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall 
     establish conditions on the use of information shared under 
     paragraph (1)--
       (A) to limit the redissemination of such information to 
     ensure that such information is not used for an unauthorized 
     purpose;
       (B) to ensure the security and confidentiality of such 
     information;
       (C) to protect the constitutional and statutory rights of 
     any individuals who are subjects of such information; and
       (D) to provide data integrity through the timely removal 
     and destruction of obsolete or erroneous names and 
     information.
       (4) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall 
     ensure, to the greatest extent practicable, that the 
     information sharing system through which information is 
     shared under such paragraph include existing information 
     sharing systems, including, but not limited to, the National 
     Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, the Regional 
     Information Sharing System, and the Terrorist Threat Warning 
     System of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (5) Each appropriate Federal agency, as determined by the 
     President, shall have access to each information sharing 
     system through which information is shared under paragraph 
     (1), and shall therefore have access to all information, as 
     appropriate, shared under such paragraph.
       (6) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall 
     ensure that appropriate State and local personnel are 
     authorized to use such information sharing systems--
       (A) to access information shared with such personnel; and
       (B) to share, with others who have access to such 
     information sharing systems, the homeland security 
     information of their own jurisdictions, which shall be marked 
     appropriately as pertaining to potential terrorist activity.
       (7) Under procedures prescribed jointly by the Director of 
     Central Intelligence and the Attorney General, each 
     appropriate Federal agency, as determined by the President, 
     shall review and assess the information shared under 
     paragraph (6) and integrate such information with existing 
     intelligence.
       (c) Sharing of Classified Information and Sensitive but 
     Unclassified Information With State and Local Personnel.--
       (1) The President shall prescribe procedures under which 
     Federal agencies may, to the extent the President considers 
     necessary, share with appropriate State and local personnel 
     homeland security information that remains classified or 
     otherwise protected after the determinations prescribed under 
     the procedures set forth in subsection (a).
       (2) It is the sense of Congress that such procedures may 
     include one or more of the following means:
       (A) Carrying out security clearance investigations with 
     respect to appropriate State and local personnel.
       (B) With respect to information that is sensitive but 
     unclassified, entering into nondisclosure agreements with 
     appropriate State and local personnel.
       (C) Increased use of information-sharing partnerships that 
     include appropriate State

[[Page H5857]]

     and local personnel, such as the Joint Terrorism Task Forces 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Anti-Terrorism 
     Task Forces of the Department of Justice, and regional 
     Terrorism Early Warning Groups.
       (d) Responsible Officials.--For each affected Federal 
     agency, the head of such agency shall designate an official 
     to administer this Act with respect to such agency.
       (e) Federal Control of Information.--Under procedures 
     prescribed under this section, information obtained by a 
     State or local government from a Federal agency under this 
     section shall remain under the control of the Federal agency, 
     and a State or local law authorizing or requiring such a 
     government to disclose information shall not apply to such 
     information.
       (f) Definitions.--As used in this section:
       (1) The term ``homeland security information'' means any 
     information possessed by a Federal, State, or local agency 
     that--
       (A) relates to the threat of terrorist activity;
       (B) relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or 
     disrupt terrorist activity;
       (C) would improve the identification or investigation of a 
     suspected terrorist or terrorist organization; or
       (D) would improve the response to a terrorist act.
       (2) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning 
     given such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
       (3) The term ``State and local personnel'' means any of the 
     following persons involved in prevention, preparation, or 
     response for terrorist attack:
       (A) State Governors, mayors, and other locally elected 
     officials.
       (B) State and local law enforcement personnel and 
     firefighters.
       (C) Public health and medical professionals.
       (D) Regional, State, and local emergency management agency 
     personnel, including State adjutant generals.
       (E) Other appropriate emergency response agency personnel.
       (F) Employees of private-sector entities that affect 
     critical infrastructure, cyber, economic, or public health 
     security, as designated by the Federal government in 
     procedures developed pursuant to this section.
       (4) The term ``State'' includes the District of Columbia 
     and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United 
     States.
       (g) Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed 
     as authorizing any department, bureau, agency, officer, or 
     employee of the Federal Government to request, receive, or 
     transmit to any other Government entity or personnel, or 
     transmit to any State or local entity or personnel otherwise 
     authorized by this Act to receive homeland security 
     information, any information collected by the Federal 
     Government solely for statistical purposes in violation of 
     any other provision of law relating to the confidentiality of 
     such information.

     SEC. 783. REPORT.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than 12 months after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit 
     to the congressional committees specified in subsection (b) a 
     report on the implementation of section 782. The report shall 
     include any recommendations for additional measures or 
     appropriation requests, beyond the requirements of section 
     782, to increase the effectiveness of sharing of information 
     between and among Federal, State, and local entities.
       (b) Specified Congressional Committees.--The congressional 
     committees referred to in subsection (a) are the following 
     committees:
       (1) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
       (2) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the Senate.

     SEC. 784. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
     necessary to carry out section 782.

     SEC. 785. AUTHORITY TO SHARE GRAND JURY INFORMATION.

       Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``, or of guidelines 
     jointly issued by the Attorney General and Director of 
     Central Intelligence pursuant to Rule 6,'' after ``Rule 6''; 
     and
       (2) in paragraph (3)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting ``or of a foreign 
     government'' after ``(including personnel of a state or 
     subdivision of a state'';
       (B) in subparagraph (C)(i)--
       (i) in subclause (I), by inserting before the semicolon the 
     following: ``or, upon a request by an attorney for the 
     government, when sought by a foreign court or prosecutor for 
     use in an official criminal investigation'';
       (ii) in subclause (IV)--

       (I) by inserting ``or foreign'' after ``may disclose a 
     violation of State'';
       (II) by inserting ``or of a foreign government'' after ``to 
     an appropriate official of a State or subdivision of a 
     State''; and
       (III) by striking ``or'' at the end;

       (iii) by striking the period at the end of subclause (V) 
     and inserting ``; or''; and
       (iv) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(VI) when matters involve a threat of actual or potential 
     attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an 
     agent of a foreign power, domestic or international sabotage, 
     domestic or international terrorism, or clandestine 
     intelligence gathering activities by an intelligence service 
     or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign 
     power, within the United States or elsewhere, to any 
     appropriate federal, state, local, or foreign government 
     official for the purpose of preventing or responding to such 
     a threat.''; and
       (C) in subparagraph (C)(iii)--
       (i) by striking ``Federal'';
       (ii) by inserting ``or clause (i)(VI)'' after ``clause 
     (i)(V)''; and
       (iii) by adding at the end the following: ``Any state, 
     local, or foreign official who receives information pursuant 
     to clause (i)(VI) shall use that information only consistent 
     with such guidelines as the Attorney General and Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall jointly issue.''.

     SEC. 786. AUTHORITY TO SHARE ELECTRONIC, WIRE, AND ORAL 
                   INTERCEPTION INFORMATION.

       Section 2517 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(7) Any investigative or law enforcement officer, or 
     other Federal official in carrying out official duties as 
     such Federal official, who by any means authorized by this 
     chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, 
     oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived 
     therefrom, may disclose such contents or derivative evidence 
     to a foreign investigative or law enforcement officer to the 
     extent that such disclosure is appropriate to the proper 
     performance of the official duties of the officer making or 
     receiving the disclosure, and foreign investigative or law 
     enforcement officers may use or disclose such contents or 
     derivative evidence to the extent such use or disclosure is 
     appropriate to the proper performance of their official 
     duties.
       ``(8) Any investigative or law enforcement officer, or 
     other Federal official in carrying out official duties as 
     such Federal official, who by any means authorized by this 
     chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, 
     oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived 
     therefrom, may disclose such contents or derivative evidence 
     to any appropriate Federal, State, local, or foreign 
     government official to the extent that such contents or 
     derivative evidence reveals a threat of actual or potential 
     attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an 
     agent of a foreign power, domestic or international sabotage, 
     domestic or international terrorism, or clandestine 
     intelligence gathering activities by an intelligence service 
     or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign 
     power, within the United States or elsewhere, for the purpose 
     of preventing or responding to such a threat. Any official 
     who receives information pursuant to this provision may use 
     that information only as necessary in the conduct of that 
     person's official duties subject to any limitations on the 
     unauthorized disclosure of such information, and any State, 
     local, or foreign official who receives information pursuant 
     to this provision may use that information only consistent 
     with such guidelines as the Attorney General and Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall jointly issue.''.

     SEC. 787. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

       (a) Dissemination Authorized.--Section 203(d)(1) of the 
     Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
     Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA 
     PATRIOT ACT) of 2001 (Public Law 107-56; 50 U.S.C. 403-5d) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following: ``Consistent with 
     the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to 
     protect intelligence sources and methods, and the 
     responsibility of the Attorney General to protect sensitive 
     law enforcement information, it shall be lawful for 
     information revealing a threat of actual or potential attack 
     or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of 
     a foreign power, domestic or international sabotage, domestic 
     or international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence 
     gathering activities by an intelligence service or network of 
     a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power, within the 
     United States or elsewhere, obtained as part of a criminal 
     investigation to be disclosed to any appropriate Federal, 
     State, local, or foreign government official for the purpose 
     of preventing or responding to such a threat. Any official 
     who receives information pursuant to this provision may use 
     that information only as necessary in the conduct of that 
     person's official duties subject to any limitations on the 
     unauthorized disclosure of such information, and any State, 
     local, or foreign official who receives information pursuant 
     to this provision may use that information only consistent 
     with such guidelines as the Attorney General and Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall jointly issue.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 203(c) of that Act is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``section 2517(6)'' and inserting 
     ``paragraphs (6) and (8) of section 2517 of title 18, United 
     States Code,''; and
       (2) by inserting ``and (VI)'' after ``Rule 
     6(e)(3)(C)(i)(V)''.

     SEC. 788. INFORMATION ACQUIRED FROM AN ELECTRONIC 
                   SURVEILLANCE.

       Section 106(k)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1806) is amended by inserting after 
     ``law enforcement officers'' the following: ``or law 
     enforcement personnel of a State or political subdivision of 
     a State (including the chief executive officer of that State 
     or political

[[Page H5858]]

     subdivision who has the authority to appoint or direct the 
     chief law enforcement officer of that State or political 
     subdivision)''.

     SEC. 789. INFORMATION ACQUIRED FROM A PHYSICAL SEARCH.

       Section 305(k)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1825) is amended by inserting after 
     ``law enforcement officers'' the following: ``or law 
     enforcement personnel of a State or political subdivision of 
     a State (including the chief executive officer of that State 
     or political subdivision who has the authority to appoint or 
     direct the chief law enforcement officer of that State or 
     political subdivision)''.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the modification be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Georgia?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the modification 
offered by the gentleman from Georgia?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent, that unless we 
have someone rising in opposition, that the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Harman) be entitled to the 10 minutes that normally would be 
claimed by the opposition.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Georgia?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I might 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, information sharing is the key to cooperation and 
coordination in homeland security, and better information sharing among 
government agencies and with State and local agencies needs to be a 
higher priority.
  The idea for this amendment was developed during a series of public 
hearings which my Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security held 
last fall. Witnesses ranging from former New York City Mayor Rudy 
Guiliani to Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating stressed the importance of 
increasing the level of information sharing between Federal 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies and local and State law 
enforcement personnel.

                              {time}  1815

  We must make certain that relevant intelligence and sensitive 
information relating to our national security be in the hands of the 
right person at the right time to prevent future terrorist attacks.
  The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and I introduced the 
Homeland Security Information Sharing Act, which overwhelmingly passed 
this House in June. Our bill has strong support from groups such as the 
National Association of Police Organizations as well as the American 
Ambulance Association and the National Sheriffs Association.
  Our amendment is virtually the same as H.R. 4598. We believe that it 
is critical that we increase the level of cooperation between State, 
local, and Federal law enforcement officials. Only by communicating on 
a more regular basis and sharing more information can we effectively 
prepare for and defend against future attacks.
  In talking to community leaders and emergency responders all across 
Georgia, I am convinced that we must get this legislation signed into 
law. We know that gaps in information-sharing opened the door to the 
tragic events of September 11. Our amendment will go a long way toward 
filling those gaps and helping our law enforcement officials protect us 
by giving them the tools they need to do their jobs better.
  I appreciate the improvements to the amendment that were made by the 
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays), the gentleman from New Jersey 
(Mr. Menendez), and others. I urge my colleagues to join me in 
supporting this very important amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I submit for the Record letters of support from the 
groups I previously mentioned:


                               American Ambulance Association,

                                        McLean, VA, June 26, 2002.
     Hon. Saxby Chambliss,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Saxby: It is with great honor that I send this letter 
     of support to you for your introduction of the Homeland 
     Security Information Sharing Act (H.R. 4598).
       As you and I have discussed, the American Ambulance 
     Association (AAA) represents ambulance services across the 
     United States that participate in serving more than 95% of 
     the urban U.S. population with emergency and non-emergency 
     care and medical transportation services. The AAA is composed 
     of individual ambulance operations which serve patients in 
     every state. Our membership is comprised of all types of 
     ambulance service providers including for and not for profit, 
     municipal and fire department and hospital based.
       Our members greatly appreciate the commonsense approach 
     that you and the Subcommittee you chair used in drafting this 
     legislation. Visiting with local ambulance providers about 
     their real needs, and then formulating federal law that is 
     consistent with these needs, is indeed refreshing to us out 
     there on the frontline of providing health care to our 
     communities. As you have identified in your bill, first 
     responders at the state and local level need access to 
     specific, credible threats in order to help prevent and 
     better respond to a terrorist incident. H.R. 4598 would 
     greatly improve the flow of this information and enhance the 
     emergency response system. The focus on local providers and 
     their needs will give first responders and medics the tools 
     and capabilities to better ensure the safety of the American 
     public.
       Again, thank you for your tireless efforts and tremendous 
     work in drafting this piece of legislation. You are truly a 
     representative of the people of this great nation. The AAA 
     stands ready to help assist you in anyway to ensure passage 
     of H.R. 4598.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Ben Hinson,
     President.
                                  ____

                                           National Association of


                                   Police Organizations, Inc.,

                                     Washington, DC, July 3, 2002.
     Hon. Saxby Chambliss,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Representative Chambliss: On behalf of the National 
     Association of Police Organizations (NAPO) representing 
     220,000 rank-and-file police officers from across the United 
     States, I would like to bring to your attention our 
     wholehearted support for H.R. 4598, the ``Homeland Security 
     Information Sharing Act of 2002.''
       If enacted, this bill will significantly improve the 
     ability of state and local law enforcement to access 
     important information regarding federal investigations and 
     possible terrorist threats. As the 2001 Anti-Terror 
     legislation expanded information sharing between government 
     agencies, H.R. 4598 will improve on this by setting up 
     positive guidelines and facilitating successful information 
     dissemination.
       In the past, legal hurdles, coupled with an overarching 
     federal culture that limited federal external communication, 
     have blocked potentially useful information from being fully 
     utilized. As our nation combats the threat of terrorism, 
     state and local law enforcement will be on the front lines 
     protecting the public and keeping the peace. In this role, 
     necessary information about terrorist threats or 
     investigation leads should not be kept out of reach due to 
     procedural concerns.
       As H.R. 4598 now moves to the Senate for consideration, 
     NAPO looks forward to working with you and your staff to 
     insure the bill's passage.
           Sincerely,
                                               William J. Johnson,
                                               Executive Director.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Sadly, Mr. Chairman, today we have had a few votes that were more 
partisan than I believe they needed to be. This amendment is not one of 
those, and I would hope that the managers of this bill might accept it. 
I certainly would hope that the House, if we vote on it, would vote on 
it by the margin it received last time, the small margin of 422 to 2.
  As I stand here today, I know that the gentleman from Connecticut 
(Mr. Shays), the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Menendez), and others, 
on a bipartisan basis, also plan to speak for this amendment. We have 
all worked together on this amendment. It is improved because of some 
language that they suggested, and I would like to thank the gentleman 
from Connecticut (Mr. Shays) for his action in his committee to include 
it in the draft of this bill as it was reported by his committee.
  As my partner, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss), has said, 
this amendment is nearly identical to H.R. 4598, which, as I said, 
passed overwhelmingly. The reason for offering this amendment today as 
part of this bill is to get in place as soon as possible procedures to 
share terrorist threat information across the Federal Government, which 
certainly includes the CIA, the FBI, and other intelligence agencies, 
and on down to first responders.

[[Page H5859]]

  As our Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security Report found 
last week, information-sharing is the most critical need in our 
intelligence community and the best way to arm our first responders and 
average Americans to stop terrorist attacks. What we hear in the field, 
and all of us go home each weekend, from police, fire, emergency 
responders, and average people is they are receiving all this general 
information, but they do not know what to do about it.
  The sooner we can get more specific threat warning information, 
stripped of sources and methods so that those without security 
clearances can get it, the sooner we can reduce panic, empower 
Americans, and make certain that, to the maximum extent, we prevent 
attacks, shore up our infrastructure, and respond effectively should 
they come our way.
  So this amendment, I think, is our first tool in the homeland 
security arsenal we are considering today. It received the overwhelming 
support of this body, and it is supported by the White House and by the 
office of Governor Ridge. It is vital for our hometowns. And as 
Governor Ridge often says, we cannot have homeland security without 
hometown security. I urge support of this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays), the chairman of the 
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs and International 
Relations of the Committee on Government Reform, a gentleman who has 
been very actively involved in the issue of terrorism for a number of 
months, even before September 11.
  Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to join the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Chambliss), the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), 
and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Menendez) in offering this 
amendment.
  Protecting the safety and security of the Nation against terrorist 
attacks requires absolute unprecedented cooperation between Federal, 
State, and local agencies. Timely information-sharing is an 
indispensable element of the Nation's ability to detect, preempt, 
disrupt or respond to any terrorist threat.
  The Committee on Government Reform's Subcommittee on National 
Security, Veterans' Affairs and International Relations has heard 
repeatedly from State and local officials about the stubborn procedural 
and cultural barriers blocking access to sensitive information. In 
particular, elected officials and law enforcement officers have said 
they need the ability to obtain security clearances in order to get 
meaningful access to data on terrorist threats.
  Whether it is intelligence about terrorist activity at the 
international level, or criminal history information shared between 
local jurisdictions, the electronic exchange of information is one of 
the most powerful tools available to protect our communities. This 
amendment calls for new procedures to maximize the potential of modern 
technologies, reduce bureaucratic barriers to information-sharing, and 
make sure essential homeland security data flows where it is needed 
most.
  Mr. Chairman, the day is late; we started last evening, and so I 
would like to just use this time to thank my colleagues, the gentleman 
from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Harman) for the incredible job they have done. I also wish to thank the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) and the majority leader for 
the work they have done. I also would like to thank the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Harman) and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Thornberry) for the work they did with the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Gibbons) and the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Tauscher) on 
homeland security legislation before it was in vogue.
  I am in awe to have had the opportunity to work with these 
colleagues. I believe that they have answered the call of the Nation in 
responding to the terrorist threat. I know we have a lot of work ahead 
of us. I am a little troubled by some of the partisan debate that has 
happened in the past few hours. I was hoping there might be an 
amendment or two our side of the aisle could have accepted during the 
debates today. But that notwithstanding, this is excellent legislation 
drafted by people of good will on both sides of the aisle.
  I think the President can be proud of what the House will do today. I 
am certainly proud to have worked with such wonderful men and women on 
both sides of the aisle.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for his lovely and 
generous comments, and would inquire of the Chair as to how much time 
remains.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Sweeney). The gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman) has 7\1/2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman 
from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss) has 4\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Reyes), a member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this amendment, because 
since September 11 we have been in the process of learning several 
important lessons. One of the most crucial was the lack of effective 
intelligence dissemination and analysis.
  For a while the buzzword was that we did not have the ability to 
connect all the dots. Machiavelli once said, ``There is nothing more 
difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain 
in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new 
order of things.'' This amendment directs the administration to develop 
procedures for Federal agencies to share homeland security information 
with appropriate State and local authorities, both classified and 
declassified information.
  After spending some 26\1/2\ years in Federal law enforcement, I know 
how important it is for the first responder to have access to tactical 
intelligence. Between 600,000 and 800,000 police officers protect our 
homeland every day, and have been on the job since the inception and 
the birth of this country. This amendment will build those bridges, 
those interagency bridges, that will get the information to the folks 
that need it. Those brave law enforcement men and women, who are 
literally our boots on the ground with respect to fighting domestic 
terrorism, need and deserve this capability.
  So, Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this amendment, and, in 
closing, I want to note the great job that both my colleagues, the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss) and the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman) have done, both on this amendment and also on 
the great work in working with the antiterrorism task force.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his kind 
comments.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. 
Gibbons), the vice chairman of my Subcommittee on Terrorism and 
Homeland Security, and also the chairman of the Subcommittee on Human 
Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence within the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  (Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Georgia for 
yielding me this time, and I do support this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, over the last several years, many of our government 
organizations, both State and Federal, have handled information-sharing 
and analysis in vastly different ways, much like various people would 
do in trying to put a puzzle together. For many of these organizations, 
when they get information, it is like reaching into a bag or box full 
of mixed-up puzzle parts, grabbing a handful of it, and running into 
their office to try to put the puzzle together without ever sharing the 
information about what they have with anyone else in another room. Just 
trying to put it all together all alone. And this has led to 
information gaps and analytical failures. The so-called Phoenix memo is 
a perfect example of this type of information hoarding.
  I am pleased to support this bipartisan legislation which I believe 
helps

[[Page H5860]]

our government organizations connect the dots much more effectively 
than it had before September 11. Over the past 10 months, it has become 
frighteningly clear that the terrorists targeting our Nation are far 
more advanced than previously thought. The new Department of Homeland 
Security must have complete and unobstructed access to every piece of 
information, whether Federal or State, and this information regarding 
cyberterrorism, weapons proliferation, terrorist financial activities 
and narcotics trafficking, to name a few, are critical for every 
organization to have at hand.
  H.R. 5005 establishes a key counterintelligence division within the 
Department of Homeland Security that will keep vital information out of 
the hands of our enemy, tighten the noose around the neck of terrorist 
organizations, such as al Qaeda, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and others, 
while being able to share that information with our first responders 
down at the local level.
  The Information Analysis Center is another integral part of this 
overall legislation, and this Center will have several key missions, 
including correlating and evaluating information and intelligence; 
producing all-source collaborative intelligence analysis, warnings, and 
assessments of the terrorist threat and disseminating these 
assessments.
  Improving the lines of communication between the States and the 
Federal Government, local public safety agencies, and the private 
sector through the timely dissemination of information pertaining to 
threats of terrorism is critical and a key part of this amendment.
  Coordinating elements of the intelligence community with Federal, 
State and local law enforcement agencies is also a critical part of 
this. If the new Department is to make credible threat warnings, it 
must be able to obtain and analyze information from all possible 
sources. It is not enough to rely on whatever the CIA and FBI 
themselves choose to tell them.
  To put it simply, Mr. Chairman, knowledge is good, all-source 
analysis is even better, an all-source, collaborative analytical center 
within the Department that shares information is best. This legislation 
gives the Department of Homeland Security the information and resources 
necessary to make its own conclusions.
  Mr. Chairman, I have had the privilege to work closely with both my 
colleagues, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss) and the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) on this legislation, and they 
are great leaders. I applaud their work, and this is a strongly 
supported amendment to this overall legislation. It is important for 
our country today, and I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on it.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi), the ranking member on the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, on which I serve, and the Democratic 
whip.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me 
this time, for her kind words, but most of all for her leadership.

                              {time}  1830

  Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that this amendment is being 
considered on the floor today. I commend the gentleman from Georgia 
(Mr. Chambliss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) for 
their work on this over the long term.
  This bill passed the floor 412-2. It had been our hope to include it 
in the base bill that would come to the floor, but it was rejected by a 
5-4 vote in the Select Committee. I am pleased that we have another 
chance for Congress to work its will on this important issue on the 
floor this evening.
  As I have quoted previously real estate, the three most important 
words are location, location, location. When it comes to homeland 
security, the three most important words are localities, localities, 
localities. Our work on homeland security should begin and end in the 
localities. That is largely where the threat is. That is where the 
ideas are, and that is where the needs are. The gentleman from Georgia 
(Mr. Chambliss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) have 
traveled the country having hearings on this subject.
  We hear from our experts that information sharing is absolutely 
essential. They have pled with us to make this part of any homeland 
security. I want to praise them for the response they have received 
thus far from Congress, and hope that result will even be better today.
  In any event, the need for information is essential for us to reduce 
risk to protect the American people better, and that is why this is so 
essential. I hope that we can do it in a department of homeland defense 
that is technologically maximizing the capabilities of the new 
technologies, and it will further enable information to be shared to 
protect the American people.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  This is the kind of bipartisan debate that this bill, H.R. 5005, 
deserves. I am pleased that on a bipartisan basis, every single speaker 
has been for this good idea. I hope our first responders are listening 
because they are about to get some very important new tools, the 
critical one of which is the ability to get accurate, credible threat 
information in time to know what to do.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from 
New Jersey (Mr. Menendez), who has shown extraordinary leadership on 
this issue and the related issues in this bill we are considering today 
as head of the House Democratic Caucus on Homeland Security.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Harman) and the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss) and the 
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays) for the work that they have been 
producing for quite some time, for the vote that was taken 
overwhelmingly in the House, and I am glad to have not only offered it 
in the Select Committee to lay the foundation, but to offer some 
additional language that was accepted.
  This amendment is about the key problem with the Federal Government's 
performance leading up to September 11. Most important, it is about 
Congress acting to correct in part what went wrong. The crux of the 
issue of September 11, it seems to me, is the need for information 
sharing, both within the Federal Government and between the Federal 
Government and State and local authorities.
  The crux of this amendment is to guarantee that critical threat 
information will be shared. We have to get this right from the start, 
and I believe this certainly is. Simply moving agencies as proposed 
into a new Department without requiring agencies to share information 
is simply insufficient. We would be remiss not to guarantee, as this 
amendment would, that critical homeland security information sharing 
will occur.
  We learned that from Coleen Rowley, the courageous FBI whistleblower, 
among others, about the unacceptable failure to share information 
critical to the events surrounding September 11 within the Federal 
Government. This amendment would make sure that those failures are not 
repeated.
  Lastly, the amendment directs the President to prescribe and 
implement new procedures to share information on terrorist threats. 
Adding implement to the equation is necessary to ensure that these 
procedures do not end up collecting dust on the shelves of Washington's 
bureaucracies.
  This amendment requires that through those procedures, the 
information will be shared, and the information must be shared both 
across the Federal Government and down to the State and local 
governments and first responders. Local responders have told all of us 
in meetings throughout the country that they need threat information on 
terrorist activities along with clear guidance on what to do with it.
  Only with the guarantees in this amendment can we be secure in 
knowing that a process is in place to make sure that the secretary, 
police, firefighters, all first responders, get all of the critical 
information that they need and that they know what to do with it.
  Governor Ridge often says if the hometown is secure, the homeland is 
secure. Shared information will empower the local communities to 
protect themselves. And shared information will also supplement the 
administration's homeland security advisory system by giving those 
responders useful and actionable information.
  Lastly, this amendment recognizes that the sharing of information is 
more

[[Page H5861]]

effective when it is unclassified, but it protects all of the sources 
and methods and the work that my colleagues have done in this regard, 
which is I think exceptionable and is to be commended to the House in 
that regard.
  I think that by having this amendment adopted, we can guarantee that 
information sharing takes place across the Federal Government and then 
across the landscape of our country from States, counties, and 
municipalities. With that when we know that information is being 
shared, we are secure. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  We are coming to a close of two long days of debate on what is the 
most major restructuring of the Federal Government that we have seen in 
60 years. This is probably the most important piece of legislation that 
in, my 8 years, that I have served in this great institution that we 
will take up and pass. I am very pleased that this particular amendment 
is going to be included in the bill that is going to be finally passed 
in this House, because I am totally confident that because of this 
particular amendment, because we are going to be able to now get 
information in the hands of local and State officials, law enforcement 
officials, the folks who are on the front line, the folks like Sheriff 
Richie Chaifin, Sheriff Bunch Conway, those folks on the front lines 
are going to have information now to be able to disrupt and stop 
terrorist activities.
  I want to conclude by just commending our President under his 
leadership, his particular step to take this bold action of 
restructuring our Federal Government to ensure that our children and 
our grandchildren are able to live in the same safe and secure society 
that all of us have enjoyed is a major, major step in the right 
direction.
  This Department of Homeland Security is going to allow us to give our 
children and grandchildren that safe and secure America. I again thank 
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) for the gentlewoman's hard 
work on this. We have traveled a long trail with this, and it is good 
that we are coming to a conclusion with it.
  Mr. BALDACCI. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment, 
which will improve the sharing of relevant terrorist threat information 
between federal agencies and local governments and our first 
responders.
  To me, this is the very foundation of our efforts, and the 
fundamental basis of a sound homeland security and an effective 
Department of Homeland Security. Since September 11th, I have worked 
closely with my colleagues to secure funding to equip our first 
responders, as they are our first line of defense in the fight against 
terrorism. However, to successfully win this fight against terrorism, 
we must provide our first responders with more than equipment and 
money. In order to safely and effectively perform their jobs and 
prevent or respond to a terrorist attack we must share critical 
homeland security threat information with our first responders and 
local officials.
  I am sure that we have all heard from first responders and local 
officials in our districts about the need to strengthen lines of 
communication between federal and local governments regarding Homeland 
Security information. This amendment directly addresses the concerns 
that I have heard from Maine officials. The more information provided 
to them, the better they are able to perform their duties and protect 
our citizens.
  Finally, I would like to thank my colleagues for their work on this 
important amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Sweeney). The question is on the 
amendment, as modified, offered by the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. 
Chambliss).
  The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment 
No. 27 printed in House Report 107-615.


           Amendment No. 27 Offered by Mr. Weldon of Florida

  Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 27 offered by Mr. Weldon of Florida:
       At the end of section 402 (relating to functions 
     transferred) insert the following:
       (9) The Visa Office of the Bureau of Consular Affairs of 
     the Department of State, including the functions of the 
     Secretary of State, relating thereto.
       In section 403 (relating to visa issuance) strike 
     subsections (a) through (f) and insert the following (and 
     redesignate subsection (g) as subsection (i)):
       (a) Authority.--Notwithstanding the provisions of section 
     104 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1104) or 
     any other law, the Secretary shall have exclusive authority 
     to issue regulations with respect to, administer, and enforce 
     the provisions of that Act and all other immigration and 
     nationality laws relating to the granting or refusal of 
     visas.
       (b) Transition.--
       (1) In general; details.--During the 2-year period 
     beginning on the effective date of this Act, there shall be a 
     transition period. During this period consular officers (as 
     defined in section 101(a)(9) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(9))) of the Department of 
     State and other foreign service officers in the Visa Office, 
     to the extent they are involved in the granting or refusal of 
     visas or any other documents required for entry into the 
     United States, shall be detailed to the Department of 
     Homeland Security. A detail under this subsection may be 
     terminated at any time by the Secretary.
       (2) Maintenance of rotation program.--During the transition 
     period described in paragraph (1), the Secretary of State 
     shall maintain and administer the current rotation program 
     (at least at the employment level in existence on the date of 
     enactment of this Act) under which foreign service officers 
     are assigned functions involved in the adjudication, review, 
     or processing of visa applications.
       (3) Termination of transition period.--The transition 
     period may be terminated within the 2-year period described 
     in paragraph (1) by the Secretary after consultation with the 
     Secretary of State.
       (4) Existing employees of visa office.--Employees of the 
     Visa Office who are not foreign service officers shall become 
     employees of the Department of Homeland Security immediately 
     upon the effective date of the transfer of the Visa Office to 
     the Department under this title.
       (c) Training.--
       (1) Training program.--The Secretary shall provide for the 
     training of Department personnel involved in the 
     adjudication, review, or processing of visa applications, 
     specifically addressing the language skills, interview 
     techniques, fraud detection techniques, and other skills to 
     be used by such personnel.
       (2) Study regarding use of foreign nationals.--During the 
     transition period, the Secretary shall study the role of 
     foreign nationals in the review and processing of visa 
     applications, specifically addressing the following:
       (A) The proper role, if any, of foreign nationals in such 
     processing.
       (B) Any security concerns involving the employment of 
     foreign nationals.
       (C) Whether there are cost-effective alternatives to the 
     employment of foreign nationals.
       (3) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report on 
     the findings of the study under paragraph (2) to the 
     Committee on Government Reform, Committee on the Judiciary, 
     and Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 
     Committee on the Judiciary, and Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate.
       (d) Legal Effect.--
       (1) In general.--The transfer of authority to the Secretary 
     in section 403(a) shall not be construed to modify--
       (A) any ground for such refusal authorized by law 
     (including grounds under sections 212 and 221(g) of such Act 
     (8 U.S.C. 1182 and 1201(g)));
       (B) the presumption of immigrant status established under 
     section 214(b) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1184(b)) or the effect 
     of failure to establish eligibility for nonimmigrant status 
     described in such section; or
       (C) the burden of proof placed upon persons making 
     application for a visa or any other document required for 
     entry under section 291 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1361) or the 
     effect of failure to establish eligibility for such visa or 
     other document described in such section.
       (2) Nonreviewability.--No court shall have jurisdiction to 
     review the granting or refusal of a visa by the Secretary or 
     a designee of the Secretary.
       (e) Refusal of Visas at Request of Secretary of State.--
     Upon request by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall refuse to issue a visa to an alien if 
     the Secretary of State determines that such refusal is 
     necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.
       (f) Review of Passports Issued to Americans Overseas.--The 
     Secretary shall have the authority to review requests for 
     passports by citizens of the United States living or 
     traveling overseas.
       (g) Conforming Amendments.--Section 104 of the Immigration 
     and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1104) is amended as follows:
       (1) In subsection (a), by striking ``conferred upon 
     consular officers'' and inserting ``conferred upon the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security''.
       (2) In subsection (c)--
       (A) in the first sentence, by striking ``, a Visa 
     Office,''; and
       (B) in the second sentence, by striking ``Directors of the 
     Passport Office and the Visa

[[Page H5862]]

     Office'' and inserting ``Director of the Passport Office, and 
     the head of the office of the Department of Homeland Security 
     that administers the provisions of this Act and other 
     immigration and nationality laws relating to the granting or 
     refusal of visas,''.
       (3) By striking subsection (e).
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 502, the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon) and the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Lantos) each will control 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon).
  Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, why are we passing this bill? Why are we creating this 
Department of Homeland Security? As I see it, we are doing it because 
if we are ever attacked again, we want to be able to respond better; 
but more importantly, we never want to be attacked again. We also 
believe that this is going to be a very long fight. Why else would we 
be rearranging all of these agencies like this. We certainly would not 
be doing this if we thought that this was just going to last for a few 
short years.
  It is important to note that this is not primarily an issue of 
protecting real estate, although the damage to the Pentagon and the 
loss of the Twin Towers hurt us, and hurt us badly. What hurt us much, 
much more is the loss of lives. I knew someone who was killed September 
11. Many Members knew people as well. Thousands of innocents are dead. 
We all agree, never again do we want to see Americans killed like we 
did on 9/11. I ask Members, what is the single most effective thing 
that we can do to prevent another terrorist attack on American soil. I 
think the answer is obvious, never let another terrorist into our 
Nation, a difficult task, granted, but nothing less than that should be 
our goal. It should be our mandate.
  I ask Members, what are we doing in this bill to respond to this 
mandate? Well, we are moving border patrol and INS into homeland 
security. We are moving the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, even 
APHIS. Why are we leaving the State Department's visa office, the very 
agency responsible for issuing all 19 of the September 11 terrorist 
visas, why are we leaving them out of the new department?
  Members will hear some of the reasons from some of the opponents to 
my amendment. I want to make two important points. We may hear that 
Colin Powell will be able to reform State's troubled visa office and 
give homeland security the priority it needs. Colin Powell is not going 
to be there forever. Deciding who we let into this country is arguably 
the most important homeland security function of all. Why leave this in 
the hands of diplomats? We may be fighting this battle for decades.
  The structural changes made in our government by Harry Truman 
provided the tools that were used throughout the Cold War by all 
Presidents who followed, Democrat and Republican alike. Should we leave 
the visa office out of the Department of Homeland Security simply 
because today we have a very capable person who understands security at 
the Department of State?
  I say that is not a valid reason. I will tell Members another reason 
why many people are fighting to move the Office of Visa Issuance into 
the Department of Homeland Security. The office next year will generate 
$630 million for the State Department. They do not spend that much 
money on visa services.
  Concerns about jurisdiction and money must not prevent us from doing 
what is best for our Nation. This amendment transfers the visa function 
to the Department of Homeland Security where it belongs, and provides 
singular management of the visa process. It allows for a 2-year 
transition period during which those foreign service officers currently 
on the visa line will remain there, and the State Department's current 
rotation system remains in place. It preserves the Secretary of State's 
authority to deny a visa for reasons of national interest, and it 
preserves the nonreviewability of visa refusals in the courts. It also 
provides for comprehensive training for visa officers.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde).
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)

                              {time}  1845

  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, this is a simple issue. There are 12 million, 
give or take, applications for visas every year submitted around the 
world. There are about 200 stations around the world where American 
foreign service officers process those applications for visas. What the 
gentleman from Florida wishes to do is to take the issuing of the 
visas, the administrative function, 12 million of them every year, and 
put them in the Homeland Security Agency. I am suggesting that that is 
impractical, that it is not going to work.
  You are not doing the Homeland Security Agency any favor by dumping 
an administrative task in their lap. The present foreign service 
officers have done, for the most part, a very good job, although I will 
agree with the gentleman from Florida, we do need some changes. This is 
not status quo. The gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) and the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) are cosponsors of this 
bipartisan bill which has been approved by the Committee on the 
Judiciary, the Committee on International Relations, the Committee on 
Government Reform, and the Select Committee on Homeland Security.
  What we do is we do turn over the administration of the office to the 
Homeland Security. The training, the review, the regulatory power, the 
authority, the running of the whole operation is turned over to 
Homeland Security. But the ministerial work out in the field, in the 
200 offices around the globe, is left with the Foreign Service 
Department of State because they have the experience, they know what 
they are doing, and they are in place. It would take 2 years to replace 
them all. I do not know where you would get the people to replace them 
all.
  This is not going to work. You are not helping Homeland Security by 
giving them this monumental task which has little to do with homeland 
security.
  I do not ask that the gentleman reconsider, I know that is not going 
to happen; but I hope that his amendment is defeated and this 
compromise that has been worked out with the administration and with 
four standing committees is not upset.
  Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. Keller).
  Mr. KELLER. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise tonight in support of the Weldon amendment to 
move the visa office from the State Department to the new Department of 
Homeland Security. I have the happy privilege of representing Orlando, 
Florida, which is the world's number one tourist destination. Orlando 
was devastated by the events of September 11. Nothing would be more 
harmful to Orlando's tourism-based economy than another terrorist 
attack. So I care deeply about this issue.
  Some of you may initially be reluctant to support the Weldon 
amendment because you have heard that Colin Powell and Henry Hyde 
oppose any attempt to strip the State Department of its power to issue 
visas to foreigners. I certainly do not blame you for deferring to 
these individuals, and I do not pretend to have the same level of 
expertise in foreign relations as these two esteemed gentlemen. But I 
am reminded of the words of President Ronald Reagan: facts are stubborn 
things. So let me give you the facts with respect to one country, Saudi 
Arabia:
  Fifteen of the 19 airplane hijackers on September 11 were from Saudi 
Arabia and were issued visas by the State Department. Ten of those 
visas were issued by a single foreign service officer, yet we know from 
a recent GAO investigation that the State Department did not interview 
that officer after 9-11 to learn what might have gone wrong. Three of 
the other Saudi terrorists obtained their visas through the State 
Department's ``visa express'' travel agency program and were never even 
interviewed by the State Department prior to obtaining their visas. In 
fact, in the 3 months prior to 9-11, the State Department failed to do 
a personal interview on 97 percent of the 22,360 Saudis they issued 
visas to.
  Shockingly, despite September 11, the State Department continued the

[[Page H5863]]

visa express program until just this week. Let me ask my colleagues a 
simple question: As a Member of Congress, how will you feel if there is 
another airplane hijacked in the United States because a poorly 
trained, entry-level State Department diplomat-wannabe issued a visa to 
yet another terrorist from Saudi Arabia?
  Vote ``yes'' on the Weldon amendment.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. LANTOS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I find myself in the unusual position of 
representing the position of the President of the United States, George 
W. Bush; the Secretary of State, Colin Powell; the President's adviser 
on homeland security, Governor Ridge; and, of course, the unanimous 
voice of the House Committee on International Relations which voted 
without a single dissenting vote for the Hyde-Lantos-Berman proposal.
  Our distinguished chairman, Chairman Hyde, outlined the main reasons 
for our position. Four House committees approved our position. It is a 
position which is a rational, sensible compromise. It leaves the 
issuance of over 11 million visas to competent foreign service officers 
all over the country, but it gives the Homeland Security Department the 
authority to place as many of their people into every single one of 
these offices that issues visas and they will have the sole and 
exclusive jurisdiction of final decision.
  It is inconceivable to me why the gentleman from Florida does not 
find this arrangement a perfectly safe, rational, and foolproof 
arrangement. Not a single visa will be issued under our plan if 
Homeland Security objects. Every single approval must come from 
Homeland Security.
  I think it is important to realize that the thousands of foreign 
service officers who perform the ministerial function do not choose to 
join the foreign service because they want to spend a lifetime issuing 
visas. That is their initial step. Their hope is to be an ambassador to 
a country 25 or 30 years into their career. The notion that we will set 
up a duplicate foreign service which has no other function but to issue 
visas simply boggles the mind. What quality individuals will we be able 
to find who will be dedicating their entire lives to issuing visas? Not 
the kinds of people we now find for our foreign service.
  I would like to suggest, Mr. Chairman, that our compromise, which has 
the support of four of our committees with jurisdiction in this matter, 
the President of the United States, the Secretary of State and Governor 
Ridge is the only rational formula. I urge all of my colleagues to 
reject the Weldon amendment.
   Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition to the Weldon 
amendment.
   Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Weldon amendment 
and I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks.
   Mr. Chairman, Chairman Hyde and I worked together on a bipartisan 
basis on H.R. 5005 with other members of the International Relations 
Committee to craft a sensible proposal relating to visas. This 
provision is now in section 403 as reported by the Select Committee.
  Under our proposal, the Secretary of Homeland Security would have 
exclusive authority to set visa policy, while State Department consular 
officers will continue to process the visas. The Secretary of Homeland 
Security can overturn decisions of consular officers to grant a visa, 
alter visa procedures now in place, and can develop programs of 
training for consular officers. In addition, our proposal would allow 
Homeland Security employees to be assigned abroad to review cases that 
present homeland security issues and deal with homeland security issues 
that arise abroad.
  I am very pleased that the White House has announced its support for 
this proposal, and that in addition to the Select Committee, all three 
other House committees that considered it adopted virtually the same 
amendment. Moreover, I understand that Governor Ridge confirmed the 
Administration's support for the amendment in testimony before the 
Select Committee last week. I am simply asking that the House endorse 
what all four Committees considering this matter have done and what the 
Administration has supported.
   Mr. Chairman, I want to take a brief moment to tell you why I feel 
so strongly about maintaining the provision as it exists in the Select 
Committee.
  The talented young people who join the Foreign Service, at the 
average age of 32 for the last entering class, have the ambition to 
become an ambassador to an important country or some other high level 
position in the Department of State. It is on this basis that they are 
willing to dedicate years of their lives to focus their talents on 
questions related to visas. It is inconceivable that we can attract 
quality people to jobs that have no such promise of advancement, with 
employees facing an entire career of visa interviews.
  Even more important, any proposal transferring the entire visa 
function to Homeland Security would risk overwhelming Homeland Security 
personnel with non-homeland security functions and thereby make it 
difficult or impossible for them to perform their central mission. The 
last thing this Department should be focused on is creating a whole new 
system for adjudicating over 11 million visas per year, at a huge and 
unknown cost.
   Mr. Chairman, I know people are concerned about the visas that were 
issued to the terrorists who attacked New York, and the amount of 
training that consular officers have on conducting interviews of visa 
applicants.
  Under our amendment, the Secretary of Homeland Security will be able 
to order exactly what kind of training consular officers should 
receive, specifically direct that certain persons will not be issued 
visas (irrespective of the Department of State's views), and will 
ensure that security concerns are properly considered both in 
Washington and abroad. If he believes that ``Visa Express'' or other 
similar programs should be closed, he can close it.
  Moreover, Mr. Chairman, the Weldon Amendment undercuts the very 
structure of this legislation. The Select Committee mark keeps the visa 
processing element of INS in the Department of Justice. The Gentleman's 
amendment would have the bizarre effect of keeping domestic visa issues 
out of Homeland Security, but overseas visa processing in Homeland 
Security. This is an absurd outcome.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, the version in the Select Committee also 
includes a provision that Mr. Weldon already added in the Government 
Reform Committee, requiring assignment of Homeland Security personnel 
to Saudi Arabia and review of all Saudi visa applications by such 
personnel. But this does not seem to be enough for Gentleman--he wants 
another bite at the apple.
  In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I think that the Hyde-Lantos-Ros-
Lehtinen-Berman Amendment adopted by four committees on a bipartisan 
basis, addresses all the Gentleman's concerns. I urge my colleagues to 
support section 403, which has been endorsed by the President, Governor 
Ridge, the President's adviser on Homeland Security, and Secretary of 
State.
  By retaining a role for consular officers in adjudicating the 
millions of applications presenting no security-related issues, the 
President's plan will allow Homeland Security officers to perform their 
homeland security mission. By authorizing the presence of Homeland 
Security officers in our overseas posts to identify and deal with 
homeland security issues, Section 403 as written offers the best 
protection for our homeland security.
  Do not upset this balance. Oppose the Weldon Amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Tancredo).
  Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Chairman, many of our colleagues have come to the 
floor today to express their deep commitment to doing everything that 
can be done to ensure the protection of the American people. It is a 
laudable sentiment, but one that rings hollow when juxtaposed against 
the fact that today our borders are just as porous and just as 
undefended as they were on September 11, 2001.
  We may indeed wish to go home to our constituents and tell them that 
we have done everything we can do, but that would be far from the 
truth. Just last week a television program documented the ease with 
which human smugglers illegally bring people into the United States, 
including potential terrorists. This is 10 months after September 11. 
This situation will improve only marginally by the creation of this new 
agency, and that is because of only one thing. It is the consolidation 
of the various border enforcement activities that now reside in a 
myriad of Federal agencies, each one operating within a vacuum, with 
little if any communication between and among them. But even this 
effort is being crippled because perhaps the most moribund of all of 
these agencies, namely, the Department of State does not want to give 
up a responsibility that they have so dismally failed to uphold.

[[Page H5864]]

  We have heard the horror stories, but it is not all due to just 
incompetence. Much of the slipshod process is a result of a culture 
within the Department of State. Consular officials are told that their 
primary responsibility is to treat every applicant for a visa as if 
they were a ``customer'' and to expedite the process as quickly as 
possible with as little inconvenience to the ``customer'' as possible. 
Hence, most interviews are completed literally in seconds. Of course, 
some of those ``customers'' showed their appreciation for this 
consideration by crashing airplanes into our buildings.
  Even today, attempts to enforce security standards are resisted by 
the State Department. In Mexico, consular officials today have been 
told to ignore FBI requests to fingerprint and record all applicants on 
particular watch lists. They are told that it would take, quote, ``too 
much time.''
  I ask you, if you were leaving home at night, would the State 
Department be the type of neighbor with whom you would leave the keys 
to your house? Vote for the Weldon amendment.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Berman).
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Three points: first, the logic of the amendment from the gentleman 
from Florida is simple. Consular employees, State Department consular 
employees have granted visas to bad people. They have made mistakes. 
Therefore, eliminate them. Eliminate the State Department role. Under 
that logic, the CIA should be taken out of intelligence-gathering 
because they did not know that Iraq was developing nuclear weapons 
during the 1980s. The central office of the FBI should be collapsed 
because they did not act on messages from the Phoenix and Minneapolis 
offices regarding suspicious activities by people in the United States. 
And the National Security Agency should be folded up because it did not 
translate intercepted communications fast enough to warn us about 
September 11.
  I would suggest that for 2 days we have been debating amendments with 
arguments tossed back and forth. ``Listen to the committees of 
jurisdiction, they have expertise.''
  ``Defer to the administration, they know what is best.''
  ``Take the approach of the Special Committee on Homeland Security 
because they have the right synthesis.''
  Well, in this case the administration, the three committees of 
jurisdiction, and the Special Committee on Homeland Security have 
considered the gentleman's amendment and have rejected it. Moreover, 
had the other gentleman from Florida (Mr. Keller) talked to the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon), I am sure he would have learned 
that in the case of Saudi Arabia, the Weldon amendment, the other 
Weldon amendment, exists in this bill that says as to Saudi Arabia 
visas, someone from Homeland Security has to make every single 
interview in this context.
  In this bill, policies, training and ultimate final decisions are 
made by the Department of Homeland Security but do not try to re-
create, because you will not be able to, an incredible bureaucracy of 
language-trained people in many countries to do this process. It will 
not work. It will fall on its face. This compromise is the sensible 
compromise. I urge the amendment be rejected.
  Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire who has the right 
to close?
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Sweeney). The gentleman from Florida, 
the proponent of the amendment, has the right to close.
  Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 1 minute to the 
distinguished gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  (Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend her remarks.)
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. President, I want a Homeland Security 
Department, but I want a deliberative and thoughtful process. I thank 
the ranking member, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman), 
and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) for a thoughtful process. 
This is the way to have this work effectively.
  How does it work? First, it gives the Homeland Security officers 
authority to oversee the visa process. Those officers can actually 
refuse visas and develop programs for training the consular offices. 
But at the same time, we do not throw away the expertise of the State 
Department and all the expertise of our outstanding foreign service 
staff persons who deal with diplomacy every day, who understand the 
language and the culture. We keep the employees in the State 
Department, but the hard-line rules and the instructions and the way to 
protect us and the security direction is with the Department of 
Homeland Security. I believe the Weldon amendment will undermine this 
expertise and will take us further away from being secure; and it 
should be defeated and we should keep the language and the format as it 
is in the bill.
  Mr. President, I want a bill, but I want it to be deliberative and 
effective on behalf of the security of the American people.
  As the ranking member of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, 
Border Security and Claims, I, like many others in this body, have sat 
through many a hearing and markup about the creation of the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS). At every hearing and every markup that I 
have attended regarding the DHS, visa processing has been a contentious 
and difficult issue. There are the State Department for its role in the 
events of September 11.
  Yes, we all know that the nineteen terrorist who attacked the U.S. on 
this infamous date, traveled to the United States on legally issued 
visas. What they fail to realize, however, is that the consular agents 
who man the front lines of the war on terror and interview and carry 
out the rules which govern visa processing, have no way of knowing that 
a visa applicant is a terrorist, but for the information they are 
provided about the applicant through the FBI, CIA or other 
organizations and institutions that make up the Intelligence Community 
in the United States. I distinctly recall the testimony of the Under 
Secretary for Management at the State Department before my 
Subcommittee. He unflinchingly stated that ``There is no way, without 
prior identification of these [applicants] as terrorists through either 
law enforcement or intelligence channels and the conveyance of that 
knowledge to consular officers abroad, that we could have known [the 
terrorists] intention.'' I would underscore this point by adding that 
the largest of these intelligence organizations, we all know who they 
are, are not even a part of the newly created DHS.
  I, for one, find the prospect of placing the entire visa issuance 
function, currently the responsibility of the State Department, within 
the exclusive authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security 
troubling. Everyday, in consular posts around the world, issues arise 
as to how a policy or regulation should apply in a specific case. Cases 
often turn on questions that have a significant impact on U.S. foreign 
policy interests, U.S. business interests, or the American values of 
family unity and humanitarian protection. These issues all properly 
reside within the expertise of the State Department and should be 
resolved in consultation with it.
  During, the Judiciary Committee's markup of its recommendations for 
the Department of Homeland Security, my colleagues Mr. Hyde and Mr. 
Berman, offered an amendment that addresses these important issues. I 
spoke in favor of the provisions of the Hyde-Berman amendment and I do 
the same today as it is currently the prevailing language of H.R. 5005. 
This bill provides that the administration of visa issuance function be 
carried out by State Department employees under the policy and 
regulatory guidance of the DHS. I had planned to offer an amendment 
creating a fifth division of the DHS. My amendment includes the Hyde-
Berman Amendment language.
  The Weldon amendment is opposed by the White House and Secretary of 
State Powell and is contrary to the bipartisan decision of the four 
House Committees that considered this issue, including the Select 
Committee. If adopted, the amendment will distract the Secretary of 
Homeland Security from the task of securing the United States by 
forcing the new Department not only to absorb all the agencies 
described in H.R. 5005, but also to create a whole new bureaucracy and 
career track for processing between 10 and 12 million visa applications 
a year--of which the overwhelming majority are from bona fide tourists, 
business people, and relatives of U.S. citizens who pose no danger to 
homeland security.
  The House International Relations, Judiciary and Government Reform 
Committees considered this issue and determined that the visa function 
should remain with the State Department, which will act under the 
guidance of the policies and regulations developed by the new

[[Page H5865]]

Department of Homeland Security. Transferring exclusive policy and 
regulatory authority over visa issuance to the Secretary of Homelands 
Security will put security concerns at the forefront of visa decisions 
without losing the talent, training and experience of consular 
officials currently serving at the State Department.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to oppose the Weldon amendment.

                              {time}  1900

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself my remaining time.
  Mr. Chairman, my colleagues have made all the arguments but one: 
Buying into the Weldon amendment would incur a vast and indeterminable 
cost in building a gigantic overseas bureaucracy to perform 
administerial functions. Homeland Security has full authority to reject 
any visa application they choose. The State Department officers must 
continue to issue visas. I ask all of my colleagues to reject this ill-
advised amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this body passed a bill creating a large bureaucracy to 
protect our airline security, so the argument that was just made, as 
far as I am concerned, is not really valid, particularly when you look 
at the fact that I do not create a new bureaucracy. I transfer the visa 
office to the Department of Homeland Security.
  What will happen if we do that? Well, some of the Department of State 
personnel will stay on in the new Department of Homeland Security, 
because they have been doing visa issues for years, and then the 
Department of Homeland Security will have to hire new people.
  The important thing they will do is they will hire people who are 
trained more like police officers, that have more security in mind. The 
people who are currently occupying these positions essentially are 
people who are interested in becoming diplomats. Is that the right 
thing? Do we want the people who screen who comes in to be people who 
really want to do diplomatic and economic policy?
  Finally, I want to say one important thing about the current supposed 
compromise. Under current law, the Justice Department under the 
Attorney General defines policy for visa issuance and the State 
Department carries it out. Under this supposed compromise, the 
Department of Homeland Security will define those policies and the 
State Department will carry it out.
  I do not really see the current language as going obviously far 
enough. In committee I managed to get an amendment through that at 
least gave the Department of Homeland Security Secretary the authority 
to deny a visa, which I would have to say is somewhat of an 
improvement. But it simply does not go far enough.
  The most effective thing we can do is transfer the visa office. I ask 
my colleagues again, why are we moving all of these other functions 
into the Department of Homeland Security and leaving this vital 
function out?
  I was in the Army. When you deploy to the field, protecting your 
perimeter was the most important thing. If you could not do that, you 
were not going to be able to be a fighting force.
  Protecting our borders is the most important thing. Vote yes on the 
Weldon amendment.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, as the ranking member of the 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims, I, 
like many others in this body, have sat through many a hearing and 
markup about the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
At every hearing and every markup that I have attended regarding the 
DHS, visa processing has been a contentious and difficult issue. There 
are the State Department for its role in the events of September 11.
  Yes, we all know that the nineteen terrorist who attacked the U.S. on 
this infamous date, traveled to the United States on legally issued 
visas. What they fail to realize, however, is that the consular agents 
who man the front lines of the war on terror and interview and carry 
out the rules which govern visa processing, have no way of knowing that 
a visa applicant is a terrorist, but for the information they are 
provided about the applicant through the FBI, CIA or other 
organizations and institutions that make up the Intelligence Community 
in the United States. I distinctly recall the testimony of the Under 
Secretary for Management at the State Department before my 
Subcommittee. He unflinchingly stated that ``There is no way, without 
prior identification of these [applicants] as terrorists through either 
law enforcement or intelligence channels and the conveyance of that 
knowledge to consular officers abroad, that we could have known [the 
terrorists] intention.'' I would underscore this point by adding that 
the largest of these intelligence organizations, we all know who they 
are, are not even a part of the newly created DHS.
  I, for one, find the prospect of placing the entire visa issuance 
function, currently the responsibility of the State Department, within 
the exclusive authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security 
troubling. Everyday, in consular posts around the world, issues arise 
as to how a policy or regulation should apply in a specific case. Cases 
often turn on questions that have a significant impact on U.S. foreign 
policy interests, U.S. business interests, or the American values of 
family unity and humanitarian protection. These issues all properly 
reside within the expertise of the State Department and should be 
resolved in consultation with it.
  During, the Judiciary Committee's markup of its recommendations for 
the Department of Homeland Security, my colleagues Mr. Hyde and Mr. 
Berman, offered an amendment that addresses these important issues. I 
spoke in favor of the provisions of the Hyde-Berman amendment and I do 
the same today as it is currently the prevailing language of H.R. 5005. 
This bill provides that the administration of visa issuance function be 
carried out by State Department employees under the policy and 
regulatory guidance of the DHS. I had planned to offer an amendment 
creating a fifth division of the DHS. My amendment includes the Hyde-
Berman Amendment language.
  The Weldon amendment is opposed by the White House and Secretary of 
State Powell and is contrary to the bipartisan decision of the four 
House Committees that considered this issue, including the Select 
Committee. If adopted, the amendment will distract the Secretary of 
Homeland Security from the task of securing the United States by 
forcing the new Department not only to absorb all the agencies 
described in H.R. 5005, but also to create a whole new bureaucracy and 
career track for processing between 10 and 12 million visas 
applications a year--of which the overwhelming majority are from bona 
fide tourists, business people, and relatives of U.S. citizens who pose 
no danger to homeland security.
  The House International Relations, Judiciary and Government Reform 
Committees considered this issue and determined that the visa function 
should remain with the State Department, which will act under the 
guidance of the policies and regulations developed by the new 
Department of Homeland Security. Transferring exclusive policy and 
regulatory authority over visa issuance to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security will put security concerns at the forefront of visa decisions 
without losing the talent, training and experience of consular 
officials currently serving at the State Department.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to oppose the Weldon Amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Sweeney). All time for debate on this 
amendment has been exhausted.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Weldon).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon) 
will be postponed.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 1 
minute.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak to inquire of the 
distinguished majority leader how he would like to proceed.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. PELOSI. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, we have come to the conclusion now of the 
consideration of all our amendments. We will soon move on to votes. The 
gentlewoman from California may note that under a previous unanimous 
consent request, both she and I will be recognized for 5 minutes to 
speak out of order for the purpose of appreciating the process and our 
colleagues.
  Mr. Chairman, it would be my suggestion the gentlewoman take her 5

[[Page H5866]]

minutes and then, as has been my custom, I will cling to the last word.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, if I may further 
inquire of the distinguished majority leader, would it then be the 
intention that we would move to the votes and any other business before 
we move to final passage?
  Mr. ARMEY. The gentlewoman is right.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman like to shed any light 
on the schedule for the remainder of the evening?
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentlewoman will continue to yield, 
we will soon be completing this bill. I would guess we would probably 
go to the bankruptcy conference report that so many of us have waited 
upon with such great expectations. Then, should other business make 
itself available after that, we would be prepared.
  I would advise Members to be prepared to work until sometime later in 
the evening, but that we should conclude our work before we adjourn 
tonight's session and be available, I think, for first flights in the 
morning.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman for the 
information, and look forward to making further inquiries into the 
night as may be required.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the prior unanimous consent 
request, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) is recognized for 
5 minutes.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank you and all of those who have 
presided over this debate in the last 2 days on an issue of very, very 
immediate importance to the American people, the safety of our country 
and their personal safety. I wish to commend all of the Members of 
Congress, of this House, on both sides of the aisle for their 
enthusiastic embrace of the issues involved in this legislation.
  I particularly want to commend the staff, the bipartisan staff of the 
standing committee, as well as of the committees of jurisdiction, who 
worked very, very hard over the past few weeks. Personally I want to 
commend on my own staff Carolyn Bartholomew, George Crawford and Nathan 
Barr for their good work; Kristi Walseth of the staff of the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Frost); Pedro Pablo Permuy of the staff of the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Menendez); and Becky Salay of the staff 
of the gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro), and as I say, all of 
the staff of the standing committee.
  Mr. Chairman, we are gathered here today to honor a compact that our 
government has with the American people, and that compact is to provide 
for the common defense. It is embodied in our preamble to the 
Constitution, wherein our civil liberties are enshrined. Our Founding 
Fathers knew that we could do both, protect and defend our country and 
protect and defend our Constitution and our civil liberties, and that 
is what we set upon to do in this legislation.
  On September 11, our country was attacked in a way that was 
unimaginable up until that time, and is unforgettable from then on. 
Anyone who has visited Ground Zero in New York, the Pentagon or the 
crash site in Pennsylvania knows that they have walked on hallowed 
ground. Indeed, in our work here today and in the past few weeks, we, 
too, are on hallowed ground. We have a solemn obligation to those 
heroes who died as martyrs to freedom and to their families to respond 
in a way that reflects the greatness of our country. That greatness, 
again, calls for protecting our country and our civil liberties in the 
best possible way, to reduce risk, to protect the American people in 
the best possible way.
  Mr. Chairman, I am sad to report that I do not think that the 
legislation before us meets that standard. We have tried to find our 
common ground, and where we found agreement, we resolved differences. 
But on some issues that are fundamental to us on both sides, we could 
not find agreement.
  We are in a stage of the legislative process, and it is my hope that, 
as we go forward, we will be able to resolve some of these differences 
further, so that at the end of the day we will have bipartisan 
agreement on the Department of Homeland Security, which we all agree we 
need, but have some disagreement over what form it should take.
  I myself had hoped that we could present to the American people a 
Department of Homeland Security that was lean and of the future, not a 
monstrous bureaucracy of the '50s that would have been obsolete even 
then. I had hoped that this new lean department would, instead of bulk, 
capitalize on the technological revolution in order to increase 
communication and coordination.
  I had hoped that the Secretary of Homeland Security would be able to 
coordinate functions, rather than have to manage and administer staff. 
Indeed, the very size of this Department is alarming. It will have, by 
low estimate, 170,000 employees, and the Government Accounting Office 
says it may even have 200,000 employees.
  Mr. Chairman, there are 85,000 jurisdictions in the United States, 
cities, towns, municipalities, governments, and only 120 of them, of 
the cities in our country, have a larger population than the Department 
of Homeland Security. Salt Lake City, Utah, Providence, Rhode Island, 
Portsmouth, Maine, Reno, Nevada, to name a few, are all smaller in 
their population than the Department of Homeland Security will be.
  I am sad that in the bloated bureaucratic approach we are taking that 
we are looking backward rather than forward in protecting the American 
people. But hopefully we can resolve some of that as we go forward. 
That speaks to the need for a strong Office of Homeland Security in the 
White House.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman from California 
has expired.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I would ask the distinguished chairman, the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Armey), if he would agree to an additional 5 
minutes on both sides. I will ask unanimous consent to have an 
additional 5 minutes on each side. I understand that the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. DeLay) wishes to speak. I will use our time.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentlewoman makes that request, I can 
say to the gentlewoman that I certainly would not object, and I would 
encourage my colleagues to not do so, if the gentlewoman would direct 
the request to the Chair.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent for an additional 5 
minutes on both sides.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid that we do not see the respect 
for the civil service that I think that this Homeland Security 
Department legislation should contain. There is a serious reason why we 
have a civil service. It came into existence to eliminate corruption 
and favoritism, and, here, we have here a diminishing of the rights of 
our workforce, rather than enhancement of our civil service.
  We sing the praises of our first responders, of our public employees 
who stand as the first line of defense, physically and intellectually, 
in protecting America, and yet in this new Department we want to 
diminish their rights.
  I am also concerned about the safety issues. It took my breath away 
in committee when the chairman's mark had in it the elimination of a 
deadline for putting detection devices in place to detect explosives in 
baggage. We end up in this bill with an extension. But I hope that that 
will not be an endless extension, but I fear that it may be. I do not 
think that is the way to protect the American people best.
  I am very concerned about the liability provisions, the total 
immunity given to businesses, even those guilty of fraud and 
wrongdoing. Unlimited immunity. We had a nice alternative, a good 
alternative that the business community agreed to offered by the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) which lost by one vote on the floor. 
I hope that we can revisit that issue.

                              {time}  1915

  So I put it to my colleagues. Is it your judgment that a bloated 
bureaucracy that undermines the civil service, that gives unlimited 
immunity even to wrongdoers is the best way to protect the American 
people?
  As my colleagues know, our tragedy started at the airports, Mr. 
Chairman, and in this legislation, there is protection for the very 
kinds of security companies that were a part of the problem

[[Page H5867]]

to begin with. Not only are we not trying to improve the situation, we 
are protecting the wrongdoers very specifically.
  So as my colleagues can see, I have some concerns about the bill. It 
does not mean I have some concerns about the idea; we all know that we 
want a Department of Homeland Security. We all hope that in working 
together through the rest of the legislative process, we can come 
closer to a department that will do the job. What we have now is the 
department that the Government Accounting Office says will take 5 to 10 
years to be up and running, and that will cost $4.5 billion to set up. 
We will spend any amount of money to protect the American people, but 
is that $4.5 billion spent in the best way to protect the American 
people?
  After all is said and done, Mr. Chairman, it comes back to the 
families. I have had them say to me that a plane flying overhead is a 
source of terror to them. We owe it to them to reduce risk, to bring 
life as close to normal as possible for them.
  The goal of terrorists is to instill fear. We cannot let them have 
that victory. We must work together to again, protect the American 
people best, and to do so in a way that is not only a comfort to the 
families, but removes sources of terror for them.
  Again, though, I want to commend all of my colleagues on both sides 
of the aisle for the respect and dignity for those families they have 
brought to this debate. I know we all have a common goal; we have 
different ways of reaching it. But those of us who have certain beliefs 
about how government should look in the future, and have experience 
that speaks to the possibilities of technology being the source of 
coordination and communication, rather than having cohabitation in a 
building for 170,000 people, believe that we can reach that goal.
  In closing, I want to compliment the majority leader. He is never 
listening, so my colleagues will have to tell him what I say, and that 
is that he, throughout the process, has been a champion for protecting 
our civil liberties every step of the way.
  Not only has he been vigilant, he has taken leadership, and for that 
I want to commend him. We did not have many other areas of agreement, 
but I hope the American people know that we are all of good intent when 
it comes to their welfare.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, at this time I yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
DeLay), the distinguished whip, and a member of the Select Committee on 
Homeland Security.
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the majority leader for yielding me 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, we need to move forward, and we need to move forward to 
provide the President with the tools that he needs to secure our 
homeland. Our current structure simply cannot meet the demands of an 
age in which the primary threats to the United States have shifted. New 
threats have surfaced. We face asymmetrical warfare from rogue regimes. 
We face grave danger from terrorist organizations plotting to use 
weapons of mass destruction.
  America needs an overhauled, comprehensive agency that is engineered 
to combat the dangers that are unique to our time. We need to move 
beyond our current dysfunctional organization of domestic security 
responsibility. We need to apply ingenuity and experience to craft a 
combined agency whose employees will arrive at work each morning with a 
single defining mission: protecting the people, resources, and 
institutions of the United States.
  To be organized effectively and function efficiently, the Homeland 
Security Department must be consolidated. It has to be flexible, and 
its employees must be readily accountable to its Secretary.
  The President's focus is a department that is lean, focused, and 
operating under the highest standards of accountability. Unfortunately, 
many of the amendments that we saw through this process had little or 
nothing to do with protecting our homeland.
  We saw attempts to freeze out private enterprise. We saw efforts to 
water down the Homeland Security Secretary's power to hold the 
Department's employees to the highest standards of performance and 
conduct. We saw initiatives to deny flexibility. We saw proposals that 
would have opened a whole banquet for trial lawyers and dissuaded 
companies offering high-tech, terror-fighting tools; amendments that 
would serve a divergent agenda; amendments that would weaken the 
Department to placate entrenched interests; amendments designed by the 
bureaucracy to preserve bureaucratic unaccountability.
  We should be pursuing a common goal. We should only consider change 
that would increase the effectiveness of the new Department to catch 
and preempt terrorists. Changes that do not should be rejected out of 
hand. We do not have the luxury of weakening our last line of defense.
  Let me just close with a word about the extraordinary job that the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Armey) performed in stewarding the 
President's plan through the Select Committee on Homeland Security 
process.
  Mr. Chairman, the majority leader was fair, he was open to 
constructive ideas, even-tempered, and generous to the minority. He was 
a true leader in the best sense of the term. Unfortunately, his 
generosity was not met in kind. He was rewarded with a raw dividend of 
stale partisanship.
  I take my hat off to the majority leader. I take my hat off to the 
majority leader for accomplishing his mission and producing a plan that 
upheld the President's vision and brought us closer to a safer, 
stronger America. Members were right to keep a sharp eye against any 
measure that would cripple our effort. We simply could not afford to 
invest this new Department with the ponderous inefficiency that hobbles 
much of the Federal bureaucracy. This is a reorganization that we can 
be proud of, a reorganization that will ensure our security at home.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, as we said earlier, on June 18, the 
President of the United States sent up here a request for legislation 
to create a Department of Homeland Security which we all recognize to 
be a daunting task. On the very next day, on June 19, this body enacted 
resolution 449, which established the Select Committee on Homeland 
Security and the procedure by which we would act upon the President's 
request. In just these few short weeks, all 12 of our standing 
committees have acted and have acted judiciously and comprehensively, 
with a sense of focus on this Nation's security that demands and 
commanded our respect.
  The Select Committee on Homeland Security was privileged to have the 
work of these 12 different committees and to work with that work, and I 
hope with all of my heart that that which we brought before this body 
tonight justifies the quality of commitment that we saw in our 
colleagues on those 12 committees. We will vote on that in a minute, 
but one thing is for certain. By the time we take a final vote tonight, 
every Member of this body will know: I had my say, I had my influence, 
I had my input, and I have a part of what we produced here.
  Let me, if I may, talk about a few people in addition to, of course, 
our standing committees, those members of the President's 
administration and cabinet, Governor Ridge, I suppose, in particular, 
but virtually every member of the cabinet came before us and shared 
their insight, their advice, their understanding. We had what I like to 
call our congressional entrepreneurs who worked with us so much of the 
time, shared their insight, their understanding. We had so many people, 
but we also had some remarkable staff work, and I would like to talk 
about those people we call staff that make it possible for us to take 
bows.
  Let me mention a few. Brian Gunderson, my chief of staff. Brian and I 
had the extraordinary opportunity in the years 1987, 1988 as a couple 
of green horns to earn some spurs around here over this thing called 
base closing. We have been working together on so many products since, 
and now we come to a parting for us. Brian is moving on, I am sure to 
better things. I will miss him, my friend, my advisor, my partner.
  Brian served as the Select Committee on Homeland Security staff 
director, and Paul Morrell as the deputy staff director. Paul covered 
everything,

[[Page H5868]]

and I think you all will agree, with consideration and charm.
  Margaret Peterlin served as the Select Committee on Homeland 
Security's general counsel, and she has been my right-hand man. 
Margaret worked day and night, and we may have, I say to my colleagues, 
we may have owned the days around here, but Margaret Peterlin owned the 
nights and she kept everything on hand, and everybody enjoyed working 
through her good cheer and her kindness.
  Stephen Rademaker, you even worked through your birthday, Stephen, 
bless your heart, as the Select Committee on Homeland Security's chief 
counsel. He came to us from the House Committee on International 
Relations and his expertise was outstanding, and we now know your 
secret, Mr. Chairman, why your committee produces such quality work.
  Hugh Halpern served as the Select Committee on Homeland Security's 
Parliamentarian. Hugh took a temporary leave of duty from the House 
Committee on Financial Services to serve with the Select Committee on 
Homeland Security, and he sat at my side through some of the difficult 
things. I always wondered why the gentleman from Ohio (Chairman Oxley) 
looks so good in committee. I hope I look nearly as good. But for the 
extent to which I may or may not have, it was Hugh that made it 
possible for me to not look as bad as I could have.
  Kim Kotlar served as the senior professional staff member. Kim came 
to the Select Committee on Homeland Security from the office of one of 
our brightest stars in this Chamber, my good friend, the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Thornberry), long before September 11. The gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Thornberry) was on the job on this deal, and Kim obviously 
is the brains of that, and she has been so sharing with us.
  Richard Diamond served as the Select Committee on Homeland Security's 
Press Secretary. Richard first started in my Texas office, he has done 
so many things, but he is, I say to my colleagues, the conscience of 
the conservative when it comes to basic foundation human rights. In my 
office, Richard is my guy. He is the one that spots the transgressions 
and calls them to my attention.
  Joanna Yu overcame an educational handicap as a Princeton graduate. 
Joanna has worked so hard as the select staff member providing support 
to all of our general efforts.
  Michael Twinchek from the House Committee on Resources served as 
clerk for the Select Committee on Homeland Security. Mike kept our 
hearings and markup running smoothly, and proved that it was not just 
the chairman that knew how to mispronounce a name.
  Will Moschella, as counsel from the Committee on the Judiciary to the 
Select Committee on Homeland Security, was a vast resource for us.
  I would also like to thank members of the majority leader staff who 
pitched in to help. Liz Tobias and Tiffany Carper who helped to plan, 
organize, and implement our grueling days of hearings and markup. Terry 
Holt, who served double duty on the press front, and I do believe 
helped the Nation to see and appreciate what it is we were trying to 
accomplish. Those are just a few of the people I might mention.
  Let me say what it is I think we tried to do, all of us working 
together. The need for a Select Committee on Homeland Security to work 
with the President's proposal and the 12 committees of jurisdiction and 
the Members of this body to create a Department of homeland defense was 
born out of one of the most horrible moments of terror in the history 
of this Nation.

                              {time}  1930

  It was certainly the most in any of our lifetimes. But we believed 
that we could rise beyond that. America is a great Nation that refuses 
to have its future and its expectations about its future defined by its 
fears.
  We believe that we have helped to craft a department of this 
government that will focus the resources of this government on our 
safety and on our security, on the defeat of villainy, so thoroughly 
well that this great Nation can get back to its business of living by 
its greatest expectations, its hopes, and dreams.
  Should we have done that right, Mr. Chairman, we will look back some 
day and we will say, we had a hand in that, and are we not proud?


          Sequential Votes Postponed in Committee of the Whole

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Sweeney). Pursuant to clause 6 of rule 
XVIII, proceedings will now resume on those amendments on which further 
proceedings were postponed in the following order: Amendment 23 offered 
by the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar); amendment No. 24 
offered by the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky); amendment 
No. 25 offered by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis); 
amendment No. 27 offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon).
  The Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the time for any electronic vote 
after the first vote in this series.


                Amendment No. 23 Offered by Mr. Oberstar

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The pending business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota 
(Mr. Oberstar) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which 
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 211, 
noes 217, not voting 5, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 362]

                               AYES--211

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett
     Becerra
     Berman
     Berry
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson (IN)
     Carson (OK)
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frank
     Frelinghuysen
     Ganske
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Grucci
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Harman
     Hill
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kelly
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Lynch
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Mink
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Phelps
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shays
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Simmons
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Snyder
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Towns
     Turner
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Waters
     Watson (CA)
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Wilson (NM)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                               NOES--217

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boozman
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Coble
     Collins
     Cooksey
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis (FL)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal
     DeGette
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers

[[Page H5869]]


     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Flake
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (TX)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hart
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Issa
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Keller
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kerns
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kleczka
     Knollenberg
     LaHood
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     Matheson
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Meek (FL)
     Mica
     Miller, Dan
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, Jeff
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pastor
     Paul
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Saxton
     Schaffer
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Sherwood
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sullivan
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Udall (CO)
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins (OK)
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Blunt
     Combest
     Cox
     Meehan
     Roukema

                              {time}  1958

  Messrs. HEFLEY, HUNTER, HOBSON, REGULA, KENNEDY of Minnesota, and 
SCHAFFER changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Messrs. ROEMER, HILL, and WYNN, and Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD changed 
their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


               Amendment No. 24 Offered by Ms. Schakowsky

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Sweeney). The pending business is the 
demand for a recorded vote on the amendment No. 24 offered by the 
gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky) on which further proceedings 
were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 188, 
noes 240, not voting 5, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 363]

                               AYES--188

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson (IN)
     Carson (OK)
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Frank
     Frost
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Lynch
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Mink
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Morella
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Solis
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watson (CA)
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                               NOES--240

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bereuter
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boyd
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Coble
     Collins
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Grucci
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Issa
     Istook
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kerns
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     Menendez
     Mica
     Miller, Dan
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, Jeff
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Roemer
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Saxton
     Schaffer
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sullivan
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Turner
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins (OK)
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Blunt
     Combest
     Meehan
     Roukema
     Terry

                              {time}  2007

  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


         Amendment No. 25 Offered by Mr. Tom Davis of Virginia

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The pending business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia 
(Mr. Tom Davis) on which further proceedings were postponed and on 
which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 195, 
noes 233, not voting 5, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 364]

                               AYES--195

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Armey
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass

[[Page H5870]]


     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boucher
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Castle
     Chambliss
     Coble
     Collins
     Condit
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Foley
     Forbes
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goss
     Graham
     Graves
     Greenwood
     Grucci
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hart
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hobson
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Issa
     Istook
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller, Dan
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (VA)
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Portman
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce
     Saxton
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sullivan
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins (OK)
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--233

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson (IN)
     Carson (OK)
     Chabot
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Flake
     Fletcher
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frank
     Frost
     Ganske
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Granger
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Harman
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kerns
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kirk
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Lynch
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Miller, Jeff
     Mink
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Petri
     Phelps
     Platts
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Rahall
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schaffer
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Shows
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Toomey
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watson (CA)
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (PA)
     Wexler
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Blunt
     Combest
     Meehan
     Rangel
     Roukema

                              {time}  2015

  Mr. TURNER, Mr. FOSSELLA, and Mr. ADERHOLT changed their vote from 
``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                 Amendment 27 by Mr. Weldon of Florida

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Sweeney). The pending business is the 
demand for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Weldon) on which further proceedings were postponed 
and on which the noes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 118, 
noes 309, not voting 6, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 365]

                               AYES--118

     Aderholt
     Baker
     Barr
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bilirakis
     Bonilla
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Bryant
     Burton
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Castle
     Coble
     Cooksey
     Crane
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Doolittle
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Everett
     Fletcher
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Gallegly
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Grucci
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Isakson
     Israel
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kerns
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Lewis (KY)
     Lofgren
     Lucas (OK)
     Maloney (CT)
     Manzullo
     McInnis
     Miller, Jeff
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Northup
     Norwood
     Ose
     Paul
     Pence
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Putnam
     Ramstad
     Riley
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ryun (KS)
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Smith (TX)
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Upton
     Vitter
     Wamp
     Watkins (OK)
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wicker
     Wilson (SC)

                               NOES--309

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Akin
     Allen
     Andrews
     Armey
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barrett
     Bass
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonior
     Bono
     Boozman
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Burr
     Callahan
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson (IN)
     Carson (OK)
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Collins
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Cox
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Flake
     Foley
     Ford
     Frank
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Green (TX)
     Greenwood
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hart
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kirk
     Kleczka
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Luther
     Lynch
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, Dan
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Mink
     Mollohan
     Moore

[[Page H5871]]


     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Otter
     Owens
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pomeroy
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Rush
     Ryan (WI)
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schrock
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sununu
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Thurman
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Toomey
     Towns
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walden
     Walsh
     Watson (CA)
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wilson (NM)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--6

     Blunt
     Combest
     Lipinski
     Meehan
     Roukema
     Waters

                              {time}  2023

  Mrs. KELLY changed her vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


               Preferential Motion Offered by Mr. Murtha

  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, I offer a preferential motion.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. MURTHA moves that the Committee do now rise and report 
     the bill back to the House with the recommendation that the 
     enacting clause be stricken.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
Murtha) is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion.
  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, let me explain the problem. Last night, as 
my colleagues are aware, in my district we had a mine incident where we 
have nine miners trapped. The gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rogers) 
offered an amendment which I was interested in and was concerned about 
and was not able to talk about because of the work we were doing with 
the mine rescue effort.
  Just to report to the Members, the drill bit broke, as many saw on 
TV, and we are trying to drill another hole. The shafts are big and it 
is very, very difficult. We have not heard anything for over a day and 
a half. We have gone as far as 5 days, but the water, we are pumping 
the water out and hot air in and doing everything we can.
  There has been marvelous cooperation with the Federal Government, the 
State government, the local commissioners, and my guy has been out 
there for 2 straight days. So we are hopeful.
  But the reason I rise is that the gentleman from Kentucky offered an 
amendment last night which I am concerned about. I am concerned that it 
involves posse comitatus. We are allowing the military to get involved 
in civilian affairs. I worry that even the Germans had the Gestapo 
picking people up; I worry that the Russians had their special agency 
picking people up; and I am worried that this amendment would delegate 
to an unelected official the ability to have police authority.
  Now, after talking to the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rogers), he 
and I talked about it, and I want him to put on the Record, so that we 
understand, the concerns that he has, but I first have a couple of 
people who want to speak.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. MURTHA. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, the concerns that some of us have had is 
that the amendment that was passed by the House would open up the 
possibility for the military to be empowered to act as a domestic 
police force and would be a clear invitation to put the Posse Comitatus 
Act at risk.
  The American constitutional experience has required the separation of 
the military from domestic police authority. Countries where the 
military has the power to act as a domestic police force include 
dictatorships and totalitarian regimes. I think many of us believe the 
Federal military is no substitute for civilian police authority.
  Now, notwithstanding that the underlying bill contains language 
reaffirming the posse comitatus, I think many of us in this Chamber are 
familiar with statements by some high-ranking administration officials 
indicating a strong interest in employing the military in a domestic 
police force setting. So that is what causes our concern to arise here 
and why we bring this matter to the House.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania for 
allowing this opportunity for this discussion.
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. MURTHA. I yield to the gentleman from Hawaii.
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, no one doubts for a moment the 
motivation of the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rogers). No one doubts 
the desire of the body to move forward in this area, not just with 
dispatch but with a focus that will accomplish the task.
  The problem I think that we have is that some of this has been 
debated, including this amendment, in a late hour, without much 
opportunity for exchange between the Members. The plain fact is that 
those of us on the Committee on Armed Services know there are some 
folks, perhaps in the Pentagon and elsewhere, who have a separate 
political agenda on this which may be in contrast to what the 
intentions are here, and that is why I think the question is being 
raised at this point.

                              {time}  2030

  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  I am willing to withdraw or not ask for a revote after we hear the 
explanation from the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rogers).
  Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Sweeney). The gentleman from Kentucky 
(Mr. Rogers) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment simply tries to use the template, the 
model, of the Nation's drug interdiction program which is coordinated 
in two different places, in Key West, Florida, for the east side, South 
America, and the Caribbean, and Alameda, California, for the West 
Coast, Mexico and South America.
  These centers are under no one's command. These are voluntary, 
governmental agencies that cooperate together in those centers under a 
memorandum of understanding. It is not controlled by anyone. Yet in 
those centers, and I recommend that Members visit them, we see the 
Nation's military, our civilian agencies, our intelligence agencies, in 
a boiler-room operation, all working 24 hours a day, 7 seven days a 
week, receiving intelligence from all sorts of places, and then acting 
on it with whatever resource may be available from whatever agency of 
the government that may be on the scene.
  Now, they recognize posse comitatus; military is only used offshore. 
If there is a domestic or civilian aspect of what they do, they turn to 
the proper domestic civilian authorities, the sheriffs, the police 
departments, and so on. So there is a high recognition of posse 
comitatus there. This amendment requires if the secretary sets up such 
an operation, that he must model it after those models that I 
mentioned, which recognize posse comitatus.
  Number two, the underlying bill in the manager's amendment reaffirmed 
that we are operating under posse comitatus. That we cannot violate in 
the bill posse comitatus. All civil liberties are completely protected 
under this amendment. The amendment grants no new authorities or powers 
to the components of the proposed task force, recognizing the existing 
Posse Comitatus Act.
  Number two, we wrote this amendment so it is even permissive. We do 
not direct the Secretary to do this. He may if he chooses; but if he 
does, he must recognize posse comitatus. If Members believe that the 
war against foreign terrorism must be coordinated, then Members should 
be for this. There is no better model that we have than

[[Page H5872]]

what exists in Key West and Alameda, which can easily be transferred if 
the secretary deems necessary to the fight against foreign terrorism.
  Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the concerns of the gentlemen who have 
expressed interest. It is too bad we had to debate this last night at 
12:30 or 1 in the morning. We had 5 minutes, and it was too bad that 
the gentleman was busy in his home district in Pennsylvania. If the 
gentleman has questions about it, I will be happy to answer by whatever 
means the gentleman deems necessary.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by 
the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha).
  The motion was rejected.
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 5005 
and the hard work of the Select Committee on Homeland Security. By 
creating the Department of Homeland Security we will send a clear 
message to the world that the United States will not sit idly by while 
our enemies plot against us. It is critical that we quickly approve 
this measure in order to ensure that the President has the tools 
necessary to protect our citizens from evil acts perpetrated by those 
who hate our free and open society.
  The creation of a Department of Homeland Security is a logical and 
necessary step. There are over 100 different federal agencies which are 
charged with protection of our borders. By consolidating this 
collection of bureaucracies into one agency, we will eliminate 
duplication of effort and conserve resources.
  As Chairman of the Financial Services Committee, I have reviewed the 
Committee's jurisdiction over three programs within the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency that would become the responsibility of the 
new department. These programs are: the National Flood Insurance 
Programs, the Defense Production Act, and the Emergency Food and 
Shelter Program. FEMA's mission is to prevent, prepare for, respond to 
and recover from disasters of all types. The Financial Services 
Committee believes that FEMA's expertise in consequence management is 
critical to the function of the proposed Office of Homeland Security 
and that all of these programs should remain within FEMA at this time.
  I commend the Committee's proposal to move the United States Secret 
Service to the new Department and maintain it as a ``distinct entity'' 
outside the four major jurisdictional cylinders established under the 
new Secretary. The long dual-role history of the Service--investigation 
and protective--combined with its more recently developed expertise in 
preventing and investigating cyber crimes, and its core mission of 
protecting the financial system of the United States make the Secret 
Service uniquely suited to draw from and augment the work of the other 
component agencies of the new Department.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the Majority Leader and the other 
Members of the Select Committee for all their efforts in crafting this 
bill. The creation of this new department will be reflected in the 
history of our Nation as occurring at a time when Americans joined 
together in a unified fight against terrorism and against those who 
seek to suppress freedom. I strongly urge my colleagues to cast aside 
partisan differences and vote in favor of this legislation.
  Mr. KOLBE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Homeland 
Security Act.
  The Select Committee on Homeland Security and the other Committees, 
recognizing the gravity of this matter, have moved swiftly to bring 
this legislation to the Floor. But they have given adequate 
consideration for the many different points of view about the 
legislation. One of the guiding principles of the Select Committee is 
that there should be no greater priority than defending the promise of 
America and that individual liberty and personal safety come before 
bureaucratic regulations, rules and red tape. I could not agree more.
  I represent the people of southeastern Arizona, an area of the 
country that borders Mexico and has considerable experience with border 
security needs. We have been struggling for years to reform and improve 
the coordination and effectiveness of federal law enforcement efforts 
along the southwest border.
  During the debate on reorganizing the INS earlier this year, I hoped 
to offer my legislation implementing the Jordan Commission's 
recommendation to separate the two divergent functions within the INS--
immigration services and benefits, but I was not provided the 
opportunity to offer this substitute. The bill before us today does 
include this fundamental restructuring the INS by placing enforcement 
functions within the new Department of Homeland Security and leaving 
the immigration services functions in a different Cabinet-level 
department--the Department of Justice. Although I would go further by 
consolidating all the immigration services that are shared by the 
Department of Justice and the Department of State, this bill does most 
of what I proposed and is needed to make our immigration system work.
  Some have argued in the past that the two functions--enforcement and 
services--are complementary and must be coordinated by a single 
government official. But this concept was tried for decades through a 
failed experiment known as the INS, and has caused great harm to 
America. We cannot make the same mistake again. The price is too high 
as we wage our war on terrorism.
  As we create this new Cabinet department, we must give the highest 
priority to ensuring that the responsibilities given to the 
Undersecretary for Border and Transportation are not assigned based 
simply on the current structure of the affected bureaucracies. The 
various agents and inspectors at a port-of-entry today, such as Customs 
officials, INS officials, Transportation officials, and Agriculture 
officials, should all be ``Homeland Security officials'' with the same 
management, same uniform, same communication and information networks, 
and the same policies and guidelines. We should not maintain the 
current bureaucracies separately within the new Bureau for Border and 
Transportation Security. It is essential that all these border 
functions be fully consolidated under the same, seamless management 
structure. Of course, the consolidation of the many agencies along the 
border will take time, but the bill before us today moves us 
significantly towards this vision.
  Finally, I am pleased that the Select Committee on Homeland 
Security's recommendation would keep the statutory authority for 
revenue collecting with the Department of Treasury, while transferring 
law enforcement and trade responsibilities exercised by the existing 
Customs Service to the Department of Homeland Security. However, we 
must not diminish the capability of the Customs Service to carry out 
its diverse missions. Trade responsibilities of Customs should be 
separated from the enforcement activities. Activities that should 
remain at the Department of Treasury or be shifted to the U.S. Trade 
Representative's office include: rulings; legal determinations and 
guidelines relating to classification and value of merchandise; and the 
responsibility for identifying and planning for major trade issues.
  Trade is a critical component of the U.S. economy. The flow of 
imports and exports contribute enormously to our economic growth as 
well as that of the global economy. We should not assign purely 
commercial decision making responsibilities to the new Homeland 
Security Department. It will have neither the mission nor the core 
competency to perform that role adequately. Nonetheless, it should be 
obvious that the Department of Homeland Security will perform a host of 
front line enforcement responsibilities that in fact will intersect 
with commercial or trade related spheres. This is a delicate balancing 
act, and we're not quite there with this bill.
  This legislation to create a new Homeland Security Department comes 
as close to solving our illegal immigration border woes as could be 
done without a comprehensive overhaul of our immigration policies. I 
enthusiastically support this bill. I believe it will have a positive 
impact on southern Arizona and the entire nation in the years to come.
  I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, in creating a new Department of Homeland 
Security, the House of Representatives is considering legislation which 
realigns the federal government in order to properly address a new 
threat. This bill promotes security, integrates new solutions to 
address new threats, recognizes the value and service of first 
responders, and defines clear lines of government authority.
  The primary mission of this new department will be the prevention of 
terrorist attacks within the United States, to reduce America's 
vulnerability to terrorism, and to minimize the damage and recover from 
attacks that may occur. In carrying out this mission, the Department of 
Homeland Security must be equipped with the proper expertise available 
in the various government agencies which currently perform the 
functions of border security, emergency preparedness and response, 
information analysis, and infrastructure protection.
  In all of this, the focus must remain the basic protection of our 
neighborhoods and communities from the threat of terrorism. On the 
front lines of that effort are first responders--local law enforcement, 
firefighters, rescue workers, and emergency response teams. This bill 
establishes a National Council of First Responders charged with the 
responsibility to provide first responder best practices, latest 
technological advances, identify emerging threats to first responders, 
and identify needed improvements for first response techniques, 
training, communication, and coordination.
  With this emphasis on improving first responder capabilities, we must 
not ignore the integral role of our local governments in the ability of 
first responders to succeed in their mission. Local governments have 
already

[[Page H5873]]

dedicated millions of dollars on increased security, preparedness, and 
emergency response costs since September 11. Cities and counties have 
upgraded security at key public facilities, enhanced information 
technology and communications systems, and improved local bioterrorism 
response capabilities.
  Congress approved the Fiscal Year 2002 Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations bill this week, which includes $151 million in grants to 
first responders. In providing this federal assistance, I requested 
consideration of local input regarding the application of federal first 
responder grants. In response, the bill requires state strategic plans 
for terrorism response to fully consult local governments. While this 
provides a good first step in integrating our local governments, we 
must keep the application of resources for first responders a top 
legislative priority.
  In order to successfully secure our communities and provide effective 
emergency response, it is critical that local governments are 
integrally involved in the National Council of First Responders, and in 
any regional strategic planning for terrorism response. Most 
importantly, local governments must be given the opportunity to 
directly access available resources. The task at hand is too critical 
to allow funding and other assistance to be swallowed up by 
bureaucracy, or hijacked to mask deficits. Local governments are in the 
best position to understand what the first responders in their 
community need and must remain integrally involved in determining the 
allocation of resources.
  I strongly support H.R. 5005 and commend the various committees of 
jurisdiction that deliberatively and expediously contributed to the 
creation of the new Department of Homeland Security. I also applaud the 
leadership of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, without which 
we may not have had the opportunity to enact this historic legislation.
  Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise as a staunch supporter of 
homeland defense, but in strong opposition to H.R. 5005, the Homeland 
Defense Bill.
  This bill is seriously flawed in many areas, and several of its 
measures would undermine civil liberties and deny work protections, 
while protecting contractors who could supply flawed, even deadly 
products.
  Overall, the bill as currently constructed, would in my opinion put 
us more at risk than we are now, or was in September 10, 2001.
  While the leadership sought input from the relevant committees in 
writing the bill, in the end that process turned out to be no more than 
a sham. As they have done time and time again, the regular order, 
processes that have served this body and our country well for over 200 
years have been cast aside. That sets a dangerous precedent, and does 
nothing to ensure expert input into a very complex bill and agency.
  I am particularly concerned about the rush to create headlines by 
having the bill ready on September 11th of this year. There can be no 
other reason.
  This is a massive undertaking, and reorganization. It needs to be 
well thought out, and planned. Personally, I do not feel that the 
merging of the different agencies is at all necessary, and jeopardizes 
the other important functions of many of them.
  We should look at the difficulties encountered with a much smaller 
project--the creation of the Transporting Security Agency, and take 
counsel on what happens when we rush headlong into something, without 
proper forethought and expert input.
  Our homeland Defense is too important to give it such short shrift in 
our deliberations. As we have done time and time again since September 
11th, we are throwing everything at the problem, hoping that something 
will stick and be effective. That is no way to lead.
  Because caution, due diligence, and respect for process has already 
been called for by many on my side of the aisle, I know that this plea 
will also fall on deaf ears, but nevertheless, I am asking the 
leadership of this body, to stop this rush to meet an unnecessary and 
unwise deadline. The people of this country don't want a sound bite or 
photo-op, they want real leadership from us, and they want real 
homeland security.
  Mr. BORSKI. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity 
during debate on H.R. 5005 to apprise my colleagues of a Coast Guard 
issue that, if not properly addressed, will have serious consequences 
on our ability to defend our homeland. As the Coast Guard is to be 
transferred to the Department of Homeland Defense under this Act, the 
subject is most relevant to today's debate.
  The Coast Guard recently launched a new mission known as HITRON. A 
combination of ships, boats and helicopters pursue drug runners in fast 
boats. Following a competition in 2000, the Coast Guard leased 8 MH-68A 
helicopters as a part of a new mission to dramatically improve the 
nation's ability to interdict drug traffickers. The helicopters fleet 
became fully operational this winter and has had a 100 percent 
interdiction success rate with 13 chases, 13 busts and a seizure of 
cocaine and marijuana valued at nearly $2.4 billion. Thus the mission 
is proven, the effectiveness of the helicopter is proven and HITRON has 
been made permanent by the Commandant.
  On April 26, Congressman Howard Coble and I led 39 Members of 
Congress in a request to the Appropriations Committee to provide the 
Coast Guard with plus-up funding of $60 million the purpose of 
purchasing 8 MH-68A helicopters currently under short-term lease to the 
Coast Guard, plus 4 additional helicopters. We believe buying the 
helicopters would be a better investment than a continuation of leasing 
arrangements. Leasing is an expensive alternative to purchase.
  Mr. Coble and I kept the Coast Guard Commandant and staff informed of 
our every step while we worked with the appropriations and 
authorization processes. On May 7, I met with representatives of the 
Commandant led by Admiral Harvey Johnson. Admiral Johnson informed me 
that while the helicopter was performing well; the Coast Guard did not 
want to make a purchase at this time. The reason is the Coast Guard was 
evaluating the option of deploying a ``multi-mission'' aircraft which 
would have drug interdiction capability as a part of the Deep Water 
modernization program. The USCG was awaiting a recommendation from the 
newly selected Integrated Coast Guard Systems group (ICGS), which is 
led by Lockheed and Northrop Grumman.
  Congressman Coble and I responded to the Coast Guard that we 
understood the interest in a multi capability aircraft, and did not 
want to foreclose the Coast Guard option through a congressional 
mandate to purchase the existing MH-68A fleet. However, a very serious 
problem remains. The lease on the existing HITRON fleet expires this 
January 2003. It will be five years before new multipurpose helicopters 
are introduced. I am extremely worried that there could be an 
interruption in this program. Mr. Coble and I called on the Coast Guard 
to extend the lease of eight or more MH-68A helicopters for five years 
or until a permanent Deepwater multipurpose helicopter is fully 
operational and in the Coast Guard DeepWater inventory. An independent, 
but identical request for a five year lease extension was made by 
Congressman Bob Filner on June 28.
  Last week, on July 17, the ICGS group presented its findings to the 
Coast Guard. It recommended a USCG-Industry team evaluate the trade 
offs between a single mission and multi-mission helicopter for drug 
interdiction. ICGS selected the Bell/Agusta Aerospace Company's AB-139 
as the multi-mission aircraft. Consistent with the request made by Mr. 
Coble, Mr. Filner and myself, ICGS recommended an extension of the MH-
68A lease for up to five years.
  Mr. Chairman, Mr. Speaker, I urge the Coast Guard to adopt the 
recommendation of the ICGS to extend the MH-68A lease up to 5-years to 
get us from here to there. I also support specific funding to provide 
more protection for the crews of these helicopters. I hope my 
colleagues will join my efforts to ensure that there is no interruption 
in this vital homeland security program, and to secure the resources 
necessary to add further protection for our brave pilots and crew who 
have already done so much.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, the move to create a federal Department of 
Homeland Security was initiated in response to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11 and subsequent revelations regarding bureaucratic bungling 
and ineptness related to those attacks. Leaving aside other policy 
initiatives that may be more successful in reducing the threat of 
future terror attacks, I believe the President was well-intentioned in 
suggesting that a streamlining of functions might be helpful.
  Mr. Speaker, as many commentators have pointed out, the creation of 
this new department represents the largest reorganization of federal 
agencies since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947. 
Unfortunately, the process by which we are creating this new department 
bears little resemblance to the process by which the Defense Department 
was created. Congress began hearings on the proposed department of 
defense in 1945--two years before President Truman signed legislation 
creating the new Department into law! Despite the lengthy deliberative 
process through which Congress created the new department, turf battles 
and logistical problems continued to bedeviled the military 
establishment, requiring several corrective pieces of legislation. In 
fact, Mr. Speaker, the Goldwater-Nicholas Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433) was passed to deal with problems 
stemming from the 1947 law! The experience with the Department of 
Defense certainly suggests the importance of a more deliberative 
process in the creation of this new agency.
  This current proposed legislation suggest that merging 22 government 
agencies and departments--compromising nearly 200,000 federal 
employees--into one department will address our current 
vulnerabilities. I do not see

[[Page H5874]]

how this can be the case. If we are presently under terrorist threat, 
it seems to me that turning 22 agencies upside down, sparking scores of 
turf wars and creating massive logistical and technological headaches--
does anyone really believe that even simple things like computer and 
telephone networks will be up and running in the short term?--is hardly 
the way to maintain the readiness and focus necessary to defend the 
United States. What about vulnerabilities while Americans wait for this 
massive new bureaucracy to begin functioning as a whole even to the 
levels at which its component parts were functioning before this 
legislation was taken up? Is this a risk we can afford to take? Also, 
isn't it a bit ironic that in the name of ``homeland security'' we seem 
to be consolidating everything except the government agencies most 
critical to the defense of the United States: the multitude of 
intelligence agencies that make up the Intelligence Community?
  Mr. Speaker, I come from a Coastal District in Texas. The Coast Guard 
and its mission are important to us. The chairman of the committee of 
jurisdiction over the Coast Guard has expressed strong reservations 
about the plan to move the Coast Guard into the new department. 
Recently my district was hit by the flooding in Texas, and we relied 
upon the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to again provide 
certain services. Additionally, as a district close to our border, much 
of the casework performed in my district offices relates to requests 
made to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
  There has beem a difference of opinion between committees of 
jurisdiction and the administration in regard to all these functions. 
In fact, the President's proposal was amended in no fewer than a half 
dozen of the dozen committees to which it was originally referred.
  My coastal district also relies heavily on shipping. Our ports are 
essential for international trade and commerce. Last year, over one 
million tons of goods was moved through just one of the Ports in my 
district! However, questions remain about how the mission of the 
Customs Service will be changed by this new department. These are 
significant issues to my constituents, and may well affect their very 
livelihoods. For me to vote for this bill would amount to giving my 
personal assurance that the creation of this new department will not 
adversely impact the fashion in which the Coast Guard and Customs 
Service provide the services which my constituents have come to rely 
upon. Based on the expedited process we have followed with this 
legislation, I do not believe I can give such as assurance.
  We have also received a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) cost 
estimate suggesting that it will cost no less than $3 billion just to 
implement this new department. That is $3 billion dollars that could be 
spent to capture those responsible for the attacks of September 11 or 
to provide tax-relief to the families of the victims of that attack. It 
is three billion dollars that could perhaps be better spent protecting 
against future attacks, or even simply to meet the fiscal needs of our 
government. Since those attacks this Congress has gone on a massive 
spending spree. Spending three billion additional dollars now, simply 
to rearrange offices and command structures, is not a wise move. In 
fact, Congress is actually jeopardizing the security of millions of 
Americans by raiding the social security trust fund to rearrange deck 
chairs and give big spenders yet another department on which to lavish 
pork-barrel spending. The way the costs of this department have 
skyrocketed before the Department is even open for business leads me to 
fear that this will become yet another justification for Congress to 
raid the social security trust fund in order to finance pork-barrel 
spending. This is especially true in light of the fact that so many 
questions remain regarding the ultimate effect of these structural 
changes. Moreover, this legislation will give the Executive Branch the 
authority to spend money appropriated by Congress in ways Congress has 
not authorized. This clearly erodes Constitutionally-mandated 
Congressional prerogatives relative to control of federal spending.
  Recently the House passed a bill allowing for the arming of pilots. 
This was necessary because the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) simply ignored legislation we had passed previously. TSA is, of 
course, a key component of this new department. Do we really want to 
grant authority over appropriations to a Department containing an 
agency that has so brazenly ignored the will of Congress as recently as 
has the TSA?
  In fact, there has been a constant refusal of the bureaucracy to 
recognize that one of the best ways to enhance security is to legalize 
the second amendment and allow private property owners to defend their 
property. Instead, the security services are federalized.
  The airlines are bailed out and given guaranteed insurance against 
all threats. We have made the airline industry a public utility that 
get to keep its profits and pass on its losses to the taxpayers, like 
Amtrak and the post office. Instead of more ownership responsibility, 
we get more government controls. I am reluctant, to say the least, to 
give any new powers to bureaucrats who refuse to recognize the vital 
role free citizens exercising their second amendment rights play in 
homeland security.
  Mr. Speaker, government reorganizations, though generally seen as 
benign, can have a deleterious affect not just on the functioning of 
government but on our safety and liberty as well. The concentration and 
centralization of authority that may result from today's efforts should 
give us all reason for pause. But the current process does not allow 
for pause. Indeed, it militates toward rushing decisions without regard 
to consequence. Furthermore, this particular reorganization, in an 
attempt to provide broad leeway for the new department, undermines our 
Congressional oversight function. Abrogating our Constitutionally-
mandated responsibilities so hastily now also means that future 
administrations will find it much easier to abuse the powers of this 
new department to violate constitutional liberties.
  Perhaps a streamlined, reconfigured federal government with a more 
clearly defined and limited mission focused on protecting citizens and 
their freedoms could result from this reorganization, but right now it 
seems far more likely that the opposite will occur. That is why I must 
oppose creation of this new department.
  Until we deal with the substance of the problem--serious issues of 
American foreign policy about which I have spoken out for years, and 
important concerns with our immigration policy in light of the current 
environment--attempts such as we undertake today at improved homeland 
security will amount to, more or less, rearranging deck chairs--or 
perhaps more accurately office chairs in various bureaucracies. Until 
we are prepared to have serious and frank discussions of policy this 
body will not improve the security of American citizens and their 
property. I stand ready to have that debate, but unfortunately this 
bill does nothing to begin the debate and nothing substantive to 
protect us. At best it will provide an illusion of security, and at 
worst these unanswered questions will be resolved by the realization 
that entities such as the Customs Service, Coast Guard and INS will be 
less effective, less efficient, more intrusive and mired in more 
bureaucratic red tape. Therefore, we should not pass this bill today.
  Mr. EVANS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of legislation creating 
the Department of Homeland Security.
  We will never forget the tragic events of September 11th. That day 
truly ushered in a new era when we, as a nation, can never take for 
granted the security of our borders or terrorist threats.
  If anything, the tragedies that unfolded on that day demonstrated 
that we have much work to do to guarantee the safety of average 
Americans. There were too many warning signs that should have been 
acted on by our government. It is clear that there are many gaping 
holes between numerous agencies in responding to terrorist threats and 
that those same agencies have not cooperated properly in analyzing and 
working to eliminate these threats.
  The legislation before us today addressed areas such as border 
security, immigration enforcement, and infrastructure preparedness, 
that must be immediately reorganized to better deal with these threats. 
This reorganization will better facilitate communication and 
intelligence sharing between many of these agencies that are on the 
front line of fighting and preventing terrorist acts. The 
reorganization will also prepare our communities to address weaknesses 
in physical cyber-security.
  Despite the strengths of the legislation, I do have serious 
reservations about some provisions that needlessly restrict the rights 
of Americans and would not contribute to the goals of a more secure 
homeland. For example, provisions in this legislation unnecessarily 
abridge civil service protections for the 170,000 federal employees 
being transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. We should not 
view civil service protections as a hindrance to fighting terrorism, 
nor should the cover of anti-terrorism be used to roll back these 
protections.
  This legislation would allow employees transferred to the new 
department to have their salaries arbitrarily reduced, as well as deny 
thousands of federal servants due process in merit board proceedings. 
Many Americans are making sacrifices to fight terrorism, but to ask 
federal employees to forfeit these basic job protections is callous and 
unnecessary. There are some in this body that would like to eliminate 
all civil service protections, but using the cover of terrorism is 
offensive.
  The bill also has a blanket waiver for contractors who produce anti-
terrorist devices and products from civil product liability. 
Contractors who even exhibit fraud or willful misconduct in 
manufacturing could not be brought to justice under the act. This would 
even apply to the very servicemen and women who would use this 
equipment. I believe this is unconscionable and should not be allowed 
to stand.

[[Page H5875]]

  I am also very disappointed that the committee did not include an 
amendment by Representative DeLauro to deny government contracts to 
American firms that skirt their tax liability by using offshore havens. 
The DeLauro amendment would have restored a similar bipartisan 
provision that passed unanimously in the Ways and Means but was deleted 
by the Republican leadership when they drew up their version of the 
legislation to be offered on the floor of the House. I believe that 
Companies that avoid their tax liability should not be eligible for 
contracting and procurement for a department with a budget the size of 
Puerto Rico's entire economy.
  I encourage my colleagues to support this legislation and support the 
Morella and DeLauro amendments when they come up for a vote. Their 
addition would help improve what is largely a worthwhile and effective 
piece of legislation that will greatly aid our nation in its war on 
terrorism.
  Ms. DeGETTE. Mr. Chairman, although I believe it is imperative to 
install explosion detection devices at our airports as soon as 
possible, we must also understand what is reasonable and not lull the 
public into false hopes by setting arbitrary and unattainable 
deadlines. We need to listen to the experts and agree to an extended 
deadline for implementing explosion detection systems to improve 
baggage screening at our nation's airports. That is why I am voting 
against the amendment to strike the language form the homeland security 
bill to extend the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) deadline. 
I remain deeply concerned about passenger safety and I believe we ought 
to continue to take aggressive steps to ensure it. Nevertheless, 
December 31, 2002 is an arbitrary deadline. Worse than that, it is an 
arbitrary deadline that our nation's largest airports cannot meet.
  For example, in my district, Denver International Airport (DIA) has 
already implemented many safeguards that exceed TSA standards. However, 
TSA has failed to fund the equipment that needs to be installed. As a 
result, if we push forward with a band-aid solution, the large machines 
that are currently TSA-certified would force passengers to stand 
outside waiting for their bags to be checked. We are talking about 
Denver, Colorado. We have cold winters. And having crowds of people 
waiting outside where cards drive up to let out passengers would create 
a new safety hazard. An interim solution that provides a less-than-
optimal level of security and that will result in unacceptable delays 
to the traveling public is unacceptable.
  Increasing passenger safety is our mutual goal and there is 
technology that will better achieve that awaiting certification this 
November. It has been shown to have a greater rate of positive 
detection, a decreased rate of false positives, and it is a more 
reasonable size. Denver is planning on implementing this technology and 
DIA will serve as a test site for the rest of the nation. TSA needs to 
certify this superior technology and make the financial commitment to 
allow airports like DIA to begin working on these vital projects. Thus 
far, the TSA's funding delays have hindered DIA's ability to commence 
building the necessary infrastructure. DIA and other airports should 
not be punished for the lack of coordination and support from the TSA.
  Let's get it right the first time and implement the technology that 
will best achieve greater safety and reassure the flying public. We 
need to recognize the very real, very serious and very costly obstacles 
the TSA and airports face and allow the airports to continue to utilize 
one or more of the current screening methods required by the TSA beyond 
the December 31, 2002, deadline.
  Let's not insist on an arbitrary deadline that will not and cannot be 
met. This should not be construed as a weakening of Congress' resolve. 
Our nation's airports and airlines have a responsibility to ensure the 
safety of the flying public. However they determine to achieve this, it 
needs to happen with all due speed.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Chairman, today I rise in support of House Resolution 
5005 creating a new Department of Homeland Security.
  Like the rest of Congress, I applaud the President for his bold 
decision to reorganize the government and make homeland security the 
highest priority. Like others, however, I also have had questions about 
the details of this transition and how it would affect the many 
responsibilities of those agencies transferred to the new department. 
The bill before us has answered my questions and provides real 
protection for our Nation.
  Let me focus on one of the important sections dealing with the 
security of collecting revenue and the economically critical mission of 
trade facilitation.
   Mr. Chairman, the requirement to generate revenue for this country 
through Customs duties, which was the very first Act of Congress, was 
the primary reason Customs was established in the fifth Act of Congress 
as the first Federal agency of the new Republic. This function is still 
important today as demonstrated by the fact that Customs collects over 
$20 billion of revenue.
  Today, under the authority of the Department of the Treasury, Customs 
enforces well over 400 provisions of law for at least 40 agencies. In 
addition to collecting revenue, Customs safeguards American 
agriculture, business, public health, and consumer safety and ensures 
that all imports and exports comply with U.S. laws and regulations.
  Through the work of this Congress, the new Department now has the 
tools it needs to protect our borders while at the same time ensuring 
that revenue continues to be collected and that goods keep moving 
across the border with little delay.
  For these reasons I urge a YES vote on H.R. 5005.
  Mr. CAMP. Mr. Chairman, today I rise in support of H.R. 5005, the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002. I would like to thank the distinguished 
Majority Leader for his hard work and leadership on the Select 
Committee to bring this legislation to the Floor.
  The U.S. government has no higher purpose than to ensure security of 
American citizens and to preserve our democratic way of life. The 
proposal before us creates the Department of Homeland Security, a 
Cabinet-level agency that will unite essential agencies for better 
coordination, greater preparedness and quicker response time. 
Currently, there is no one department that has homeland security as its 
primary mission. In fact, responsibilities for homeland security are 
dispersed among more than 100 different government organizations. We 
need to strengthen our efforts to protect America, and the current 
governmental structure limits our ability to do so.
  As a northern border state, Michigan is on the frontline in border 
security. We enjoy the longest unmilitarized border in the world with 
our friend and ally, Canada. With over $1.9 billion in goods and over 
300,000 people crossing the border every single day, the connection 
between our societies is critical to maintain the economic stability of 
both nations. However, this openness can become a vulnerability when 
exploited by the mobility and destructive potential of terrorists.
  Currently, border security involves multiple agencies--including INS, 
which is under the Department of Justice; Customs, which is part of the 
Department of Treasury; and plant and livestock inspectors from the 
Department of Agriculture. All of these entities have different bosses, 
different equipment, and even different regulations that govern them. 
This legislation moves these principal border and transportation 
security agencies into the Department of Homeland Security. This will 
provide a direct line of authority and clear chain of command 
administered by the Secretary of Homeland Security, who is answerable 
to Congress and the President.
  Homeland security should not be a partisan issue. We must rise above 
politics and jurisdictional disputes to send to the President a strong 
bipartisan bill that will be effective in improving America's security. 
I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of H.R. 5005 because it is the 
right thing to do.
  Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, H.R. 5005, a bill to establish the 
Department of Homeland Security to safeguard our homeland, to secure 
our nation for the protection of citizens and property, to defend and 
preserve our democracy for posterity, to reorganize our government to 
strengthen emergency preparedness throughout the country, and to reduce 
the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, is a bold 
undertaking that deserves our most serious consideration and attention. 
As we take up the task of establishing this new department, I want to 
reiterate and emphasize several important points that concern my 
constituency, the people of Guam.
  In this debate, it is important to recognize that the American 
homeland extends far beyond the 50 states, and includes the U.S. 
territories, including my home island of Guam, some 9,500 miles away 
from Washington, D.C. I have long maintained that in concept, the 
American homeland should consist of all U.S. jurisdictions which 
Americans reside and call home. I was pleased to learn that the 
President's ``National Strategy for Homeland Security,'' unveiled last 
week, takes into account the U.S. territories. I feel it is equally 
important for the House to ensure that the bill before us today 
properly takes into account the U.S. territories. The domestic defense 
and emergency response capability needs of Americans residing in the 
U.S. territories are just as critical as the needs of Americans 
residing in the 50 states.
  The territories present unique challenges in planning for homeland 
security and defense. These unique needs and challenges should be 
addressed and assessed by the new Department of Homeland Security. 
Critical resources need to be harnessed and clear lines of 
communication must be established for the local law enforcement 
officials in the territories, just as they should be for the 50 states, 
to combat terrorism at the front lines. In this regard, I am pleased 
that this bill defines the U.S. territories as part of the geographic 
homeland. I am

[[Page H5876]]

equally pleased that this bill ensures coordination on the part of the 
Department of Homeland Security with the territorial and local 
governments of Guam, American Samoa, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, 
and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
  I want to thank the Select Committee on Homeland Security, in 
particular the Majority Leader, Mr. Armey, and the Democratic Whip, Ms. 
Pelosi, for their acceptance of my request to add a specific definition 
of ``State'' to the bill that includes Guam and the U.S. territories. 
This specific definition is needed in order to ensure that the other 
provisions of the bill adequately take into account how guidelines will 
be carried out and implemented in and for the U.S. territories. The 
Select Committee's inclusion of my proposal as well as the House Armed 
Services Committee's recognition of this matter is important to 
guarantee that information, intelligence, and analysis produced and 
gathered by the Department is shared with the territories. This action 
also makes certain that public advisory notices issued and 
infrastructure vulnerability assessments conducted by the Department 
include the territories. Furthermore, border control measures 
implemented, regulations promulgated, policy formulated, communication 
facilitated, and comprehensive planning will be for the benefit of the 
territories as well as the states.
  The people of Guam proudly continue to stand united with our country 
in the war against terrorism, but we want to ensure that we stand 
together when it comes to the planning and preparation to safeguard our 
homeland, even in distant shores. Let us pass a bill that will help 
protect all Americans, both in the states and the territories.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, the events of September 11 changed the 
way Americans view the safety of air travel by exposing loopholes in 
security procedures at our nation's airports. Aviation security is now 
more than ever a top priority for all Americans, and it is the 
responsibility of the federal government to provide for the security 
and safety of every passenger on a commercial flight originating in 
this country. In my home state of Georgia is Hartsfield Atlanta 
International Airport the world's busiest airport.
  Hartsfield's Aviation General Manager, Ben DeCosta, has implored 
Secretary Norman Mineta to assist in moving the arbitrary December 31, 
2002 deadline to screen 100% of checked baggage. I agree with Mr. 
DeCosta, if this artificial deadline is maintained and we do not allow 
for a more measured approach, we will compromise the very security that 
we are trying to restore. Waiting until later in the year to extend the 
deadline is a tragic public policy failure. I have submitted for the 
record Mr. DeCosta's letter urging support for legislative relief from 
this deadline for my colleagues to view.

                     Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport,

                                       Atlanta, GA, June 12, 2002.
     Rep. Saxby Chambliss,
     U.S. House of Representatives, Longworth House Office 
         Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Representative Chambliss: I thought you would be 
     interested in hearing from me directly regarding a letter 
     that I, along with 38 other airport directors, wrote to 
     Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta to stress our concerns 
     about the December 31, 2002 congressional deadline to screen 
     100% of checked baggage. I also have enclosed a copy of the 
     letter for your review.
       We fully support the Transportation Security 
     Administration's efforts to fulfill the nation's goal of 
     strengthening the security of aviation in this nation. Tight 
     deadlines have focused the attention of everyone to get 
     things done expeditiously. But, in the case of the 100% 
     baggage screening deadline, it will drive the TSA to 
     implement a program at Hartsfield that will not give us the 
     best security or an acceptable level of customer service.
       We believe that an integrated and automated Explosive 
     Detection System is a must for many airports. But, the TSA 
     will not implement such a system because it cannot be 
     completed by December 31, 2002. We fear that harried efforts 
     to meet an artificial deadline will compromise efforts to 
     enhance security, frustrate our aims to increase capacity and 
     slow the return of the industry to financial health. We 
     should do the bag screening right the first time. We may not 
     be able to afford to do it over again.
       We urge you to support our request for legislative relief 
     from the December 31, 2002 deadline. A more measured approach 
     can lead to successful results in both enhanced security and 
     good customer service. I will provide you with additional 
     information and analysis when TSA finalizes its approach for 
     Hartsfield.
           Sincerely,
                                              Benjamin R. DeCosta,
                                         Aviation General Manager.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, strengthening the capacity of our 
government agencies to defend our nation from terrorist attacks is 
necessary and vital to our security. Our Nation will benefit from 
better communication among federal agencies and from improved safety of 
air travel, our borders, our ports, and our water supplies. However, we 
must develop a focused strategy to protect our Nation rather than 
taking cosmetic actions. The proposed Homeland Security Department, as 
proposed in this bill, does not achieve this end.
  We need to address the intelligence failures that led up to the 
events of September 11th. We need to work with local governments to 
coordinate responses to future attacks. The proposed Department does 
not address either. Instead we will create a new bureaucracy that, I 
fear, gives more the illusion of safety. By concentrating on a massive 
restructuring of the federal government, we will not be able to focus 
on actually improving the security of our Nation. Under this proposal, 
those working at all levels will have to divert their attention from 
national security to bureaucratic reorganization.
  As has been documented time and again in jarring detail by the news 
media, the FBI and CIA were not properly coordinated before September 
11. This massive reorganization, rather than dealing with fundamental 
problems between these two agencies, adds a third governmental 
department to the uncoordinated mix.
  There are real questions about whether we are spending the necessary 
amount of time to ensure the success of this new Department or are 
setting it up for failure. We need only look to the Department of 
Energy reorganization, which occurred over 25 years ago, and today 
still has failed to become a streamlined, effective department with an 
efficient process. Past successful reorganizations required more time 
and enjoyed fuller cooperation and interaction between the 
administration and Congress.
  The proposed Homeland Security Department would include agencies like 
the Coast Guard and FEMA, whose primary responsibilities are not 
related to the terrorist threat. Focusing the resources of these 
agencies instead on homeland security could well detract from the 
majority of their other vital services that affect the health and 
safety of millions of Americans every day.
  The cost of this new department is another factor that needs more 
attention. The President has suggested that the most massive 
reorganization in 50 years will not require any new spending. History 
and my own experience in governmental reform and reorganization suggest 
the contrary.
  This proposal was developed in private by the Administration with 
very little Congressional deliberation and input. For such a 
significant reorganization we should include all segments of our 
community: local government officials, first responders, and private 
entities. Homeland security should not be a Washington-driven agenda 
and we must ensure that local consultation is part of the process.
  Finally, the timing is problematic. There appears to be an imperative 
to rush this into law before the anniversary of September 11th. A more 
fitting tribute than marking the anniversary with questionable 
legislation would be to honor those who lost their lives with our best 
efforts, even if it takes a few more weeks. It would be a shame if this 
critical legislation left America in greater jeopardy after its passage 
than it is today.
  Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of HR 5005, the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002. This important legislation will bring 
more than 100 different security and safety units from around the 
nation together into a newly created Cabinet department. This new 
department will work to control movement at the borders, emphasize 
coordination with state and local emergency responders, merge 
intelligence units to identify, map threats, and address 
vulnerabilities, and develop technologies to protect the homeland.
  The attacks on September 11th changed the everyday lives of 
Americans. As a result of these attacks, our country is now at war with 
an invisible enemy that lurks in the shadows. We face the real 
possibility of additional attacks of a similar or even greater 
magnitude. Terrorists around the world are conspiring to obtain 
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons with the express intent of 
killing large numbers of Americans. We saw on September 11th that 
terrorist will use unconventional means to deliver their terror.
  These new times require new thinking. Creating a Department of 
Homeland Security will give the Government the flexibility necessary to 
make the right decision that are needed to protect the American people. 
Consolidating these agencies into one Cabinet-level Department will 
support the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security, it 
will facilitate the ability of the private sector to more effectively 
communicate and coordinate threat and vulnerability management, and it 
will centralize response and recovery management with the federal 
government. The Department of Homeland Security will have three mission 
function. They are (1) to prevent terrorist attacks within the United 
States, (2) to reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism and, (3) to 
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.
  H.R. 5005 transforms many government functions into a 21st century 
Department. In order to protect the freedom of our citizens,

[[Page H5877]]

we must protect America's borders from those who seek to cause us harm. 
Under this legislation, protection of our borders is a primary 
function. This legislation will encompass INS enforcement functions, 
the Customs service, the border functions of the Animal Plant Health 
Inspections Service and the Coast Guard all together in the new 
Department of Homeland Security. H.R. 5005 will also ensure that our 
neighborhoods and communities are prepared to address any threat or 
attack we may face. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will 
also be included in the Department of Homeland Security.
  Thus, if an attack should occur, it will be clear who is responsible 
for consequence management and whom our first responders can quickly 
communicate with. Additionally, HR 5005 places a high priority on 
transportation safety. The Transportation Security Agency is 
transferred entirely to the Department of Homeland Security. TSA has 
the statutory responsibility for security of all modes of 
transportation and it directly employs transportation security 
personnel.
  These are just a few of the agencies that will encompass the 
Department of Homeland Security. Only those agencies whose principal 
missions align with the Department's mission of protecting the homeland 
are included in this proposal. The current unfocused confederation of 
government agencies is not the best way to organize if we are to 
effectively protect our homeland, as responsibility is too scattered 
across the federal government. This has led to confusion, redundancy 
and ineffective communication.
  Even though this legislation addresses issues concerning personal 
privacy, government disclosure, and individual rights, lawmakers and 
citizens alike must be vigilant against government encroachment of 
traditional liberties. Specifically, this bill prohibits the 
implementation of the Terrorism Information and Prevention System 
(TIPS), a national ID card system, guarantees whistle-blower 
protections, details Freedom of Information provisions, and establishes 
a Privacy Officer responsible for ensuring privacy rights of citizens. 
I believe an unaccountable government is an irresponsible government 
and in addition to a vigilant watch against abuses of individual 
rights, we must be accountable to taxpayers and not allow the 
Department to expand beyond its fiscal and bureaucratic parameters.
  Mr. Chairman, the new Department of Homeland Security will be the one 
department whose primary mission is to protect the American Homeland. 
It will be the one department to secure our borders, transportation 
sector, ports, and critical infrastructure. One department to 
synthesize and analyze homeland security intelligence. One department 
to coordinate communications with state and local governments, private 
industry and first responders, and one department to manage our federal 
emergency response activities.
  We owe the American people nothing less than the absolute best to 
protect its citizens. Reorganization of America's homeland security 
functions is critical to defeating the threat of terrorism and is vital 
to the nation's long-term security.
  Mr. NETHERCUTT. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 5005, a 
bill to create a much-needed Department of Homeland Security in the 
Presidential Cabinet.
  For the first time, America will have all its border protection 
services under one authority. The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) enforcement, the Customs Services, the border activities 
of Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the Coast 
Guard will be able to work more closely than ever to ensure that our 
borders--especially our northern border, the longest undisputed border 
in the world--are protected from threats. Whether those threats are 
from terrorists, illegal immigrants, drug smugglers or smugglers of 
other contraband, the Department of Homeland Security will be in a 
position to protect against those threats, while utilizing technology 
to aid the free flow of legal commerce.
  The legislation before us today varies from the President's initial 
proposal in a very meaningful and positive way. It incorporates 
language I supported with the Science Committee to include an 
Undersecretary for Science and Technology who will be given the task of 
coordinating homeland security-related scientific research government-
wide. One aspect I fought to keep in this bill is the flexibility for 
federal partnerships with small businesses that have innovative 
technologies to offer. Other Transaction Authority, as it is called, 
has been used successfully by the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA), and I believe it has equal merit to advance time-
critical and life-saving technologies in this new Department. I am 
pleased that the President has embraced these changes.
   Mr. Chairman, I am also pleased that this Department will be 
organized almost entirely out of existing government agencies. Congress 
could have easily taken this opportunity to create more government 
bureaucracy. The terrorist threat that faces our great Nation could 
have easily been used as an excuse to broaden the size and scope of the 
federal government. The bill before us today does not take that 
approach, but rather reorganizes, consolidates, streamlines and focuses 
those federal agencies responsible for homeland security. With those 
agencies under one Secretary of Homeland Security, I am confident that 
our nation is in a better position to prepare for and responds to any 
threat to our domestic security.
  This legislation will provide the flexibility the President needs in 
order to make staffing changes and provide for the national security, 
and to reorganize activities within the Department so that agencies 
work with one another to make our country safe. At the same time, this 
bill provides the Constitutionally mandated Congressional oversight 
necessary to maintain separation of powers and prevent excessive and 
abusive government. For example, this bill preserves the authority of 
Congress and the Appropriations Committee to prescribe levels of 
funding for Executive Branch functions. Furthermore, H.R. 5005 will 
prohibit the unwise Terrorism Information and Prevention System (TIPS) 
program, which would have encouraged neighbors to spy on neighbors. I 
am pleased with the privacy protections built into this act, which will 
prevent an intrusive `Big Brother' government which violates our 
Constitution.
  I thank the members of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, and 
the distinguished Majority Leader and Chairman of the Committee, Mr. 
Armey, for their hard work crafting this bill.
  Mr. ETHERIDGE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5005, a bill 
that establishes the new U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
  Since September 11th, the United States has made protecting the 
American homeland from terrorism and fighting terrorism abroad our top 
priority. I support the reform and reorganization of the departments 
and agencies with responsibilities for homeland defense, as well as a 
thorough review of events and factors that led to the tragic events of 
September 11.
  Such reform and reorganization, coupled with a comprehensive threat 
assessment and strategy to address threats to the American homeland, 
are the best way to improve the safety and security of the American 
people. I call on the Secretary to operate the new Department in an 
open and fiscally responsible manner. Through this legislation we have 
given the Department Secretary the requisite statutory and budget 
authority to effectively and efficiently protect America from 
terrorism.
  Make no mistake: this bill is far from perfect. The House Republican 
leadership in too many instances misused H.R. 5005 to score political 
points instead of legislating responsibly. I am hopeful the conference 
with the Senate will overcome these deficiencies and Congress can pass 
a final Homeland Security bill that produces real security for the 
American homeland.
  As we protect and defend our country, we must also protect and defend 
the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, our civil liberties, and the 
protection of civil service employees. Futhermore, the development and 
operation of the Department of Homeland Security must involve a bottom-
up process, with the input and recommendations of local first 
responders and local officials from America's cities, small towns and 
rural communities. They are our first line of defense against 
terrorism, and also the first to answer a call in case of attack.
  The security of our country, our people and our freedoms are 
paramount. The new Department of Homeland Security will allow us to 
devote time, people and resources in a coordinated and effective manner 
to deter any more tragedies like September 11.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the bill H.R. 
5005, the ``Homeland Security Act of 2002.''
  At the very outset, I want to express my thanks to the Members of the 
Select Committee on Homeland Security, from both sides of the isle, all 
of whom were very gracious in considering and ultimately accepting the 
recommendations from the House Agriculture Committee. I am convinced 
that through this cooperation we were able to make significant 
improvements to the sections involving the transfer of the Plum Island 
Animal Disease Laboratory and the border inspection functions of the 
USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). In addition, I 
want to acknowledge the support and cooperation of the Administration 
in our efforts to improve these specific provisions as well.
  Despite my support for moving the process forward today, however, I 
would not be fully honest if I didn't express serious concern about the 
accelerated pace at which we have developed this legislative package 
and about some of the uncertainties associated with it. Many in 
Congress are concerned that, in our haste, we may not have given 
adequate consideration to unintended consequences that could result 
from the current effort.

[[Page H5878]]

  Little that I have heard during this abbreviated process has 
reassured me that the American people will be significantly safer from 
terrorist threats as a result of the passage of this bill and its 
enactment into law. Of course, the vast majority of this bill is really 
not about creating new protections for the American Homeland. Rather, 
much of this bill relates to a gigantic reshuffling and potential 
expansion of the federal bureaucracy--the largest new federal 
bureaucracy created since World War II. This too is a source of serious 
concern to me.
  While I realize that efforts have been made to ensure that no 
important functions are lost or degraded by this reorganization, I 
would feel much more comfortable if we had been able to question the 
Administration about these matters during the hearings held by the 
House Agriculture Committee. Unfortunately, representatives for the 
Administration did not choose to accept our invitation to appear, and 
we consequently had to do our work with less information and assistance 
from them than I would have liked.
  Nonetheless, I do remain hopeful, that through our actions today, 
some improvements in inter-governmental communication and coordination 
may take place. I am also pleased that we were able to address the 
issues related to the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
in a way that will preserve important agricultural functions, while 
assisting the effort to consolidate homeland security protections.
  Given these positive steps, I will be voting for the legislation 
before us today. I am hopeful that, as a result of this legislation, at 
least one American family will be spared additional loss and suffering 
at the hands of those who hate us and our way of life.
  Mr. SERRANO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in reluctant but strong opposition 
to the Homeland Security Act before us today.
  It has been clear since September 11th--indeed it was clear well 
before that date--that the Federal government needs to change to better 
face the threats posed by terrorists, to better coordinate and focus 
prevention, preparation, and response efforts. The bill before us 
attempts to do that. But I have several serious concerns with the 
approach the President and the majority are taking.
  First, let me praise the Select Committee for including in the new 
department an Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. This 
represents an acknowledgement that our fundamental values must be 
preserved as we fight against forces that seek to destroy those values.
  However, on a number of other issues, equally important values, such 
as fairness and openness, are undercut.
  I am deeply concerned that what is proposed in this bill goes too far 
too fast and actually risks disrupting our efforts to detect and 
prevent future terrorist acts against America and Americans. Changed 
priorities and restructuring are very disruptive to any organization, 
and it will be extremely difficult to maintain a new department's focus 
on its primary missions when so many different entities with so many 
different cultures are being merged. The Comptroller General has 
testified that, based on review of organizations undertaking similar 
``transformational change efforts'', it could take between five and ten 
years for the department to become fully effective.
  I am also deeply concerned that the non-homeland security activities 
of many of the agencies proposed to move to the new department will 
suffer within an organization focused on homeland security. While the 
new department's primary mission is critical to the well-being of our 
people, so are the Coast Guard's search and rescue function and FEMA's 
response to natural disasters. They must not lose attention or 
resources because the main focus of the department and its top managers 
is on homeland security.
  Another problem I see with the bill is that it rewrites or even 
abandons an array of good government protections in the name of 
``flexibility''. As several of my colleagues have noted, we got through 
World War II, the Cold War, Korea, and Vietnam without needing to 
exempt the federal workforce from civil service protections, ranging 
from collective bargaining to whistleblower protection. It is simply 
wrong to turn hardworking, loyal civil servants into second-class 
employees because their box is moved to a new place on an 
organizational chart.
  It is also wrong and unnecessary to fiddle with the Freedom of 
Information Act and the Federal Advisory Commission Act. Both have 
sufficient protections against disclosure of sensitive information and 
should be retained.
  Mr. Chairman, others have identified other serious problems with this 
bill, but I believe the fundamental problem is that it tries to do too 
much all at the same time. The real problems were not the structure of 
the government; they involved priorities that did not include counter-
terrorism, as well as failures of coordination and information-sharing 
among existing agencies.
  As an example of a more focused, less disruptive approach, a team 
from the Brookings Institution suggested concentrating initially on 
agencies involved in border and transportation security and 
infrastructure protection and creating a new intelligence analysis 
unit, and stressed strong management in the department and central 
White House coordination of government-wide strategy and budgets as 
crucial to the success of the reorganization. Other activities and 
agencies could be considered for inclusion later, as the department 
finds its footing. This is not the only approach, but shows it is 
possible to address the real need for restructuring on a smaller, less 
disruptive scale.
  Mr. Chairman, I continue to believe that we must reorganize our 
government--and Congress--to meet the terrorist threats against us. But 
this is not the right way to do it and I urge my colleagues to vote 
against it and start over.
  Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, I reluctantly must rise in opposition to 
the Oberstar-Menendez amendment.
  As a Member of the Transportation Committee, I have a great deal of 
respect for my Ranking Member and Mr. Menendez, but I must oppose their 
amendment.
  As a Member of the Aviation Subcommittee, making air travel safer is 
my highest priority.
  But I do not believe that forcing arbitrary deadlines on our local 
airports will actually make air travel any safer.
  On the contrary, if airports are forced to set up temporary solutions 
to meet these deadlines, the result will be wasted tax dollars and huge 
crowds of passengers standing in lines inside and outside airport 
lobbies, which will create an entirely new security risk.
  Congress has taken many bold, new steps to respond to the terrorist 
attacks since September 11th.
  One of these is the sweeping aviation security reforms we passed last 
year.
  As a member of the committee that drafted last year's bill, I can 
tell you that the deadlines established in the legislation were 
arbitrary and are unenforceable.
  The United States had never experienced such an attack.
  And because Congress' response was swift, the details on how to 
achieve such sweeping reforms were untested.
  Our airports, which are responsible for implementing these mandates 
on the ground, have told us for months that these deadlines are 
unworkable.
  I have been contacted by all of the Bay Area airports: SFO, Oakland, 
San Jose and Sacramento International airports urging me to allow the 
TSA to have the flexibility it needs to deploy the most reliable 
explosive detection equipment as soon as possible.
  Secretary Mineta testified before our subcommittee three days ago 
that due to the funding cuts and new mandates in the supplemental 
appropriations bill, the TSA could not meet these deadlines.
  I think the Secretary knew before two days ago that these deadlines 
were unachievable.
  And I find it too convenient that the administration is now trying to 
blame Congress for this.
  But the underlying fact still remains: These deadlines are not 
realistic.
  We should not be playing political chicken with common-sense aviation 
security.
  Instead, we should be working together to find real solutions at each 
of our airports.
  The Granger language included in the underlying bill requires the TSA 
to work with every airport to customize its unique security needs and 
establish a plan to achieve 100 percent baggage screening.
  The Frost language sets an outer limit of one year to achieve this 
goal at every airport.
  My understanding is that most airports will be able to comply with 
this well before the year deadline.
  I, like all of you, want to keep the pressure on to ensure that all 
baggage is screened as soon as possible.
  I believe the underlying bill will do that while still addressing the 
reality of implementing this at all our nation's airports in a cost 
effective and responsible way.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment and support the common-
sense language in the underlying bill.
  Mr. SCHROCK. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to thank the members of 
the Select Committee for all of their hard work to craft this 
legislation. I also want to thank the President for moving forward to 
establish a Department of Homeland Security. The Government Reform 
Committee and many other House Committees gave the Select Committee 
many amendments to work with, and they skillfully sifted through these 
amendments to come up with what I think is a bill that sets up the best 
framework to protect our nation.
  The creation of this department is of particular interest to the 
people I represent as they live every day with the threat of terrorism. 
The greatest security threat that we in the Second Congressional 
District of Virginia face is an attack on our seaport.
  The characteristics that make Hampton Roads an ideal seaport--a great 
location and an efficient intermodal transportation system--also makes 
it a prime target.

[[Page H5879]]

  A ship sailing through Hampton Roads steams within a few hundred 
yards of the Norfolk Naval Base, home to the Atlantic Fleet, and Fort 
Monroe, home of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command. The 
detonation of a ship-based weapon of mass destruction would have 
disastrous effects on our military and our economy.
  Under the current framework, the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service all have some jurisdiction over ships coming 
into the Port of Hampton Roads.
  These agencies have different, often limited, powers to search and 
inspect ships and cargo and lack a formal process for sharing 
information with each other. In some cases, federal laws even prevent 
the sharing of information between these federal agencies.
  These problems became clear at a workshop I recently held on port 
security. Putting these agencies under one umbrella will enable them to 
communicate more effectively and work together, filling the security 
gaps that exist today.
  Also, this homeland security plan will help goods get to market more 
efficiently. Under the current system, a ship and its containers are 
stopped and searched several times by different agencies. This system 
unnecessarily impedes the flow of commerce.
  I am confident the President's proposal will ensure security remains 
our top priority during the inspection of ships, while also providing 
for a more efficient flow of goods to their ultimate destination 
through the reduction of duplication.
  Many government agencies want to work together to ensure homeland 
security, but in the past, either the framework did not exist or legal 
barriers prohibited their cooperation. This legislation will create the 
necessary framework for the collaboration needed to keep our ports, our 
airports and our entire homeland safe from terror.
  This legislation will establish the structure necessary to address 
today's new problems. But as we develop this legislation it is 
imperative that we not amend the legislation such that this new 
department is a static one, difficult to change and unable to address 
the unforeseen problems of tomorrow. We must not unnecessarily tie the 
hands of this and future Presidents, robbing them of their ability to 
best address the threats of the future.
  I am proud to support this legislation, and I urge my colleagues to 
do the same.
  Ms. HOOLEY of Oregon. Mr. Chairman, the Rules Committee Wednesday was 
presented with a tremendous number of amendments to the Homeland 
Security Legislation. Their task was certainly a monumental one. 
However, the Committee did not allow my amendment to be considered on 
the floor or be included in the Manager's amendment, which I believe to 
be an erroneous decision.
  As such, I have converted that amendment into a bill, the ``Secure 
Identity Protection Act of 2002.'' This bill would effectively prevent 
the theft of Social Security numbers of the deceased by requiring the 
White House to issue a report on the advisability of requiring State 
DMVs to subscribe to the Social Security Administration's Death Master 
File. The report, in turn, must be submitted to Congress.
  This bill is not a mandate. It is not a proposal to create a national 
ID card, nor is it an effort to ban Social Security Numbers from 
general usage. Rather, it is a common sense proposal that would greatly 
benefit our national security, as well as prevent billions of dollars 
in fraudulent charges by identity thieves.
  Identity theft is not just a financial crime, it is a threat to our 
national security. An individual suspected of training four of the 
September 11 terrorists used the Social Security number of a New Jersey 
woman who died in 1991 to establish his identity in the U.S. Untold 
numbers of other terrorists may have done the same.
  The financial services industry, the medical community, the insurance 
industry, educational institutions and state and local governments rely 
upon our Social Security Numbers as a means to uniquely identify us. 
Each of these entities reproduces our Social Security number within 
their own files and generates documents that make this information 
available to others in some form. That's why the vast majority of us 
have our Social Security numbers emblazoned upon our medical insurance 
cards in our policy numbers or on our driver's licenses as our license 
numbers.
  Even more alarming is that by using the Internet, the ability to gain 
access to personal identifying information such as Social Security 
numbers is growing at a tremendous and frightening pace. The ability to 
exploit that information has empowered a new generation of identify 
thieves who have in turn made identity theft the fastest growing crime 
in the world.
  Unfortunately, only 18 state DMVs currently subscribe to the Death 
Master File. So, if a terrorist provides a Social Security number of a 
deceased individual to a state DMV, it is highly likely that terrorist 
will be successful in his or her endeavor to obtain a driver's license 
or identification card. We should all shudder to think of the 
consequences.
  Compounding the problem, Congress has already recognized the need to 
improve the current system in ensuring states certify the identities of 
commercial truck drivers, and included $5.1 million in federal funds 
for states to access the Death Master File in the FY '02 Supplemental 
appropriations bill. Unfortunately, not every terrorist is going to 
apply for a CDL.
  We have failed for too long to address the problem of identity theft. 
We have failed to help protect the citizens of the United States from 
additional terrorists illegally gaining identification and access to 
numerous resources to plot their attacks.
  My bill is a step in the right direction, and I urge all my 
colleagues to assist me in ensuring our government takes common sense 
steps to safeguard our national security.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I support the creation of a new Federal 
Cabinet Department of Homeland Security. Therefore, I shall vote for 
H.R. 5005, but I have major reservations about many of its provisions 
that I hope will be corrected in conference. It is important to let the 
process move forward.
  I agree that we need to consolidate our existing agencies that have 
homeland security and counter-terrorism functions by creating a new 
Department with the primary mission to prevent, disrupt, and respond to 
terrorist attacks. I believe that Congress will enhance the national 
security interest of the United states by creating this new Department 
of Homeland Security. The security and safety of the homeland and its 
citizens is perhaps our greatest responsibility.
  I am very disappointed that the House rejected several amendments 
that could have strengthened this legislation--amendments that would 
have subjected this new agency to the Freedom of information Act 
(FOIA), civil service rules, whistleblower protections. The House also 
rejected amendments that would have stricken the delay in implementing 
explosives screening for baggage at our airports, as well as an 
amendment that would have clarified the liability immunity for homeland 
security contracts.
  In each of these areas, I am hopeful that the conference committee 
will modify these provisions.
  We also have to ensure that many of the agencies that would be 
included in this new department not lose sight of their original 
missions. An example of that is the U.S. Coast Guard, which boaters 
rely on in emergency situations. I support strengthening the Coast 
Guard to deal with border security issues, but I do not want the result 
to be that Maryland boaters in the Chesapeake Bay are at greater risk 
because the Coast Guard focus has changed. The new Department of 
Homeland Security should not jeopardize those functions of different 
departments and agencies that are not specifically related to security.
  In order for me to support this legislation on final passage, it is 
important that we not only establish the consolidated agency for 
homeland security, but that it is constituted in a manner that protects 
the civil liberties of its workforce and the people of this country. I 
am hopeful that when the legislation returns from conference the 
legislation will accomplish these goals.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my serious reservations 
about H.R. 5005, creating the new Department of Homeland Security. On 
the occasion of this historic vote, I wish to expres my concerns about 
the Administration's proposal and implementing legislation considered 
by the House of Representatives today.
  The September 11 tragedy confirmed a problem that exists in our 
domestic security and exposed on vulnerability to outside attacks. The 
existing bureaucracy and the intelligence community made some mistakes 
and errors. In addition, there are existing problems with management, 
organization, ``stove piped'' agencies, outdated technology, and not 
enough effective communication between key people and departments. I 
fear that some of these problems and organizations are replicated here 
in H.R. 5005.
  The President proposed to create a new Department constituting the 
largest federal reorganization in half a century. I hope and pray it 
works, but I don't think it will. Understanding the urgency of possible 
future terrorist threats, Congress pledged to enact a bill quickly so 
that the President can sign it as the Nation approaches the one-year 
anniversary of September 11th. We should take more time and get this 
bill right. This organization will last for decades to come.
  Homeland security has now become one of the most important challenges 
facing the Nation, and the vote we cast today to address terrorist 
threats will have profound and lasting consequences for national 
security, the economy, the future of our children, and our way of life 
for the next several generations. It is

[[Page H5880]]

therefore critically important that we make our decisions based on 
careful and thoughtful analysis before voting to institute far-reaching 
changes altering the face of government and the way we prepare for and 
respond to terrorist threats. It is vitally important to combine the 
newest and most effective organizational ideas and theories.
  There is considerable agreement in America, including Congress, that 
some kind of organizational reform is necessary. I applaud President 
Bush for proposing a plan. The question now is not whether to 
reorganize but how and to what extent. In Congress, twelve committees 
considered the President's proposal and offered some thoughtful 
improvements, although most of them were rejected by the Select 
Committee.
  While I have strongly supported the President's creation of the White 
House Office of Homeland Security, I maintain serious reservations 
about this approach to establishing a new Department. My objections are 
not solely based on the Department's personnel policies or even the 
absence of Posse Comitatus protections to safeguard individual 
liberties. Rather, my reservations are based on this ``1960's'' type of 
approach to reorganizing existing agencies and my belief that this form 
of restructuring will not be able to respond to terrorist threats 
with improved agility, flexibility and dispatch. As the management 
theory of the day promotes synergy and symmetry, this proposal reflects 
big bureaucracy, big budgets, and big problems.

  The legislation considered today is the only solution we are being 
offered. The bill will shuffle tens of thousands of government 
employees and billions of dollars in new federal spending without 
achieving what should be the core mission: to provide sufficiently 
flexible and responsive intelligence resources and information 
gathering; reliable analysis and effective sharing to executive 
agencies; and field agents, intelligence personnel and first responders 
who are thoroughly trained and prepared. Indeed, the last thing our 
nation needs now is a hastily conceived Department of Homeland 
Security. This monumental undertaking, if not carefully and cautiously 
thought through, could produce an unwieldy and overblown bureaucracy 
that would exacerbate the current situation and render the country more 
vulnerable to certain weaknesses.
  I have been proud to serve on the Select Committee on Intelligence 
and on the Congressional Joint Inquiry, which has for the last two 
months been intensely focused on the role of the core components of the 
intelligence community, particularly the CIA, FBI and NSA. This inquiry 
has also heavily scrutinized information management particularly with 
regard to intelligence collection, analysis and information sharing. 
Following dozens of special briefings and lengthy hearings, I have 
concluded that increasing resources and technology for intelligence and 
improving information management are some of the keys to reform. We 
must improve the ability of our services to turn lots of information 
into knowledge and therefore actionable intelligence.
  Rather than folding dozens of executive agencies under one tent and 
moving desks from one department to another, the bill should increase 
efficiencies for computers, equipment, and technology in order to 
assure that we communicate more quickly between federal offices with e-
mail and databases to the field where terrorists might be located. The 
intelligence community is challenged by the use of increasingly 
sophisticated technology, such as encryption systems, that require a 
far different effort than we have employed over the last few decades to 
combat technology used by terrorists.
  One of the amendments I proposed, which was not accepted by the 
Committee on Rules, would have bolstered the intelligence functions of 
the Department by creating stronger directorates for intelligence and 
critical infrastructure protection. These directorate's missions would 
have fused and analyzed intelligence from all sources in a more 
integrated approach than that proposed by the Administration's 
proposal.
  Another amendment I proposed would have prohibited the transfer of 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency into the new Department. FEMA's 
mission is reactive, responsive, and rehabilitative. Folding them into 
the Department would threaten to disrupt one of our most respected and 
effective independent federal agencies from delivering premier first-
responder relief that has added tens of thousands of Americans 
devastated by natural disasters, such as fires, floods, earthquakes and 
hurricanes. Focus for FEMA would then be split between a proactive and 
preventive priority and secondly, the traditional rehabilitative 
mission. My amendment would have retained FEMA's independent status and 
ensured that our nation's increased focus on terrorism preparedness 
will be in addition to, and not at the expense of, FEMA's natural 
disaster response capabilities.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 5005 focuses on reorganization and insists on the 
misguided notion that if law enforcement and related agencies are swept 
under one roof, they will be able to communicate and respond to threats 
more quickly and efficiently. Our agents should be able to communicate 
via email and hand-held technology with tremendous speed and 
efficiency. It is not always necessary for them to be located under the 
same roof to achieve their mission. Information management is another 
key to securing homeland security, preventing future attacks, and 
protecting valuable assets. Effectively using intelligence is one of 
the most useful and powerful instruments we have to prevent, or at 
least mitigate, the likelihood and consequences of a possible future 
attack. However, the bill's approach toward information management and 
accountability seems limited and flawed. If the new Department is to 
function effectively, its access to information relating to terrorist 
threats must not be restricted as it is under this bill.
  For example, the Secretary of Homeland Security is granted only 
limited access to ``raw data'' on information collected by the 
intelligence community and law enforcement agencies. The bill 
specifically provides that the Secretary can obtain unanalyzed 
information ``only if the President has provided that the Secretary 
shall have access to such information.'' This approach seems designed 
to keep the new department dependent on the good will of the 
intelligence community and law enforcement agencies and hostage to 
their partial clues on insufficient information. This would be a grave 
mistake.
  I believe we should modestly increase the size and scope of the 
current White House Office of Homeland Security, headed now by Director 
Ridge. That position should have Cabinet level status, a larger budget, 
and analytical intelligence function, and jurisdiction over the Coast 
Guard, among some other agencies and responsibilities. But it should 
not be combined with 22 federal departments and 180,000 workers costing 
taxpayers $38 billion.
  Mr. Speaker, for many of these reasons, I have serious reservations 
about the bill. I do not cast this vote lightly. I believe that we 
should provide accountability and maximum efficiency in our effort to 
provide homeland security. Congress should rework this bill and try 
again. We should break the mold, think ``outside the box,'' and create 
the agency of the new century, not the bureaucracy of the 1960's. After 
all, we are not targeting the former USSR and missile silos in Siberia, 
but targeting against terrorists that can swiftly move from Hamburg, 
Germany to New York and kill thousands of Americans.
  Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this bill. 
I do have some concerns about it, but I think it deserves to be passed.
  I am united with my colleagues and with the President in a shared 
determination to win the war against terrorism. We must do everything 
we can to reduce the risks of further attacks. I believe we must 
reorganize our government to meet that goal.
  What we have chosen to take on in the aftermath of September 11th is 
an enormous task, the largest reorganization of the government in half 
a century, a total rethinking of how we approach security. We need to 
plan for the protection of all domestic people, places, and things. We 
need to fundamentally restructure our government to be more responsive 
to terrorism.
  This is a tall order. Homeland security has always been an important 
responsibility of federal, state and local governments. But in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the scope of this responsibility 
has broadened.
  The bill before us has much in common with a report that we received 
just last year from a commission headed by former Senators Gary Hart of 
Colorado and Warren Rudman of New Hampshire. The report recommended 
sweeping changes, including the establishment of a Department of 
Homeland Security.
  I have reviewed the commission's report carefully and discussed it 
with Senator Hart, and I have been impressed with the soundness of the 
report's recommendations. I have also cosponsored two bills dealing 
with this subject.
  So I am glad that the President has come to agree that a new 
Department of Homeland Security is necessary.
  The question we face today is whether the bill before us is up to the 
challenge. Will this bill actually make the American people safer? I'm 
not entirely certain. I believe this bill generally heads in the right 
direction, but it still contains a number of troubling provisions.
  One concern I have is that in our rush to create this new department, 
we may be assembling an unwieldy bureaucracy instead of a nimble 
department that can be quick to respond to the challenges at hand. The 
proposed department's size, cost and speed may well hamper its ability 
to fight terrorism. We need to recognize that no department can do 
everything. Homeland security will be the primary responsibility of the 
new department, but it will also continue to be the responsibility of 
other departments, of states and local governments, and of all 
Americans.

[[Page H5881]]

  It's also true that many of the agencies that will be subsumed by 
this new department have multiple functions, some of them having 
nothing to do with security. That's why I think it's right that the 
bill abolishes the INS and includes its enforcement bureau in the new 
DHS, while leaving a bureau of immigration services in the Department 
of Justice. I also think it's right that the bill moves only the 
agricultural import and entry inspection functions of the Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service into the new department, while leaving 
the rest of the service--including the unit that investigates chronic 
wasting disease and other possibly contagious diseases--intact. I 
believe this same model should apply to the Federal Emergency 
Management Administration, or FEMA, which this bill would move as a 
whole into the new department. While it may seem that FEMA--as the 
central agency in charge of disaster response and emergency 
management--should constitute the heart of the new DHS, FEMA is 
primarily engaged in and especially effective at responding to natural 
hazards. This bill should leave FEMA outside the new department, or at 
a minimum transfer its Office of National Preparedness to the new 
department, while leaving FEMA's Disaster Response and Recovery and 
Mitigation Directorates intact. I voted today to leave FEMA outside the 
new department because I fear FEMA's current mission and focus will be 
lost in the new bureaucracy we are creating.
  I am hopeful that the President will continue to work with the 
Congress to make sure the agencies moved to the new Department will be 
supported in their many other important duties even as they focus anew 
on their security roles.
  I have other concerns aside from the organization of the agency.
  The bill includes language that denies basic civil service 
protections for the federal workers who would be transferred to the new 
department. While I am encouraged by the passage of two amendments that 
slightly improve the bill's language in these areas, I remain fearful 
for the 170,000-plus employees of the new DHS whose jobs this bill 
would put at risk in an attempt to give the President ``flexibility'' 
to manage in a ``war-time'' situation. That's why I voted for 
amendments to preserve collective bargaining rights, whistleblower 
protections, and civil service rules that have protected career 
employees for over 75 years. I don't believe we should use the creation 
of a new department as an excuse to take away these protections--
protections that Congress enacted so that we could attract the very 
best to government service. Taking away these protections now signals 
that we don't value our federal workers, their hard-won rights, or the 
integral role these workers will continue to play as part of the new 
department in the fight against terrorism.

  I also supported an amendment striking the overly broad exemptions in 
the bill to the Freedom of Information Act, or FOIA, which was designed 
to preserve openness and accountability in government. The bill 
includes a provision excluding information voluntarily submitted to the 
new department from the requests for disclosure, it would also preempt 
state disclosure laws. FOIA does not require the disclosures of 
national security information, sensitive law enforcement information, 
or confidential business information, which makes the exemptions to 
FOIA in this bill unnecessary in my view.
  I think that these parts of the bill will need to be revised, and I 
will do all I can to improve them.
  There is one provision we debated today that I do think should remain 
in the bill. Last year, I strongly supported the airport security bill 
because I believed then--as I do now--that we must protect the public 
from a repetition of terrorist hijackings. One key part of that is to 
have baggage screened to safeguard against explosives being smuggled 
aboard airplanes in checked luggage.
  But today I voted to extend the baggage screening deadline 
established in the airport security bill because it doesn't make sense 
to me to mandate a deadline that clearly is impossible for a quarter of 
airports in this country to meet. It has been clear for some time that 
although 75% of airports would be able to meet the December 31st 
deadline, 25% of this country's largest airports would not. Denver 
International Airport (DIA) is among those airports still waiting for 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to approve its 
security plan.
  DIA has developed its own plan that would employ a baggage-screening 
system that costs approximately $85 million to implement, versus $130 
million for the system currently approved for use in the U.S. The bill 
before us today allows TSA to incrementally address individual airport 
requirements like DIA and accommodate new technology improvements.
  I am a cosponsor of legislation that would extend the deadline 
because I believe DIA will be able to provide a better, more cost-
effective baggage screening system than the current TSA-approved model 
given a bit more time. So I am pleased that this bill includes an 
extension on the baggage screening system.
  In summary, I am pleased that this bill echoes the overall approach 
of the Hart-Rudman report recommendations. I am also pleased that the 
bill includes important Science Committee contributions, such as the 
one establishing an Under Secretary for Science and Technology in the 
new department, as well as provisions I offered in the Science 
Committee markup requiring the new department and NIST to engage in a 
systematic review and upgrading of voluntary consensus standards. I 
believe it is important that the bill includes a provision reaffirming 
the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the use of the armed forces 
for civil law enforcement. And it is important that the bill prohibits 
the government from implementing the proposed ``Operation TIPS,'' an 
Orwellian program under which designated citizens would be trained to 
look for and report suspicious behavior on the part of their fellow 
citizens.
  Despite the problems in the bill, I am voting for it today because I 
remain committed to a strong, effective Department of Homeland 
Security. I am hopeful that the problematic issues I highlighted and 
other concerns will be successfully addressed in the conference 
committee.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, this Member rises to express his 
reluctant support for H.R. 5005, legislation to establish a Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS). There are several improvements to the bill 
included as a result of the work of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).
  When the Intelligence Committee, of which this Member is Vice-
Chairman, reviewed President Bush's initial proposal, it considered a 
number of issues:
  What will be the relationship between the Department of Homeland 
Security and the intelligence community?
  Will the Department have the access it needs to intelligence 
information?
  Will the Department have the trained personnel to analyze threat 
information and other critical intelligence data?
  Will the new Department be tasked to defense the homeland against 
threats in addition to terrorism--for example, threats from the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?
  As offered by the Administration, the Homeland Security Department 
proposal would not provide for the capability to analyze the range of 
threat information that is gathered by the U.S. intelligence community. 
Without such an analytical capability, the Homeland Security Department 
will have to rely on whatever finished intelligence the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) chooses to supply. The Intelligence 
Committee overwhelmingly agreed that the new Homeland Security 
Department could not simply rely on final reports and analysis 
generated by the myriad of intelligence agencies--its mission is just 
too important. We agreed that the Department must have timely access to 
raw data from all intelligence sources, information systems to 
integrate these diverse data, and the trained people to analyze the 
information.
  Mr. Chairman, this Member generally appreciates the improvements the 
Select Homeland Security Committee made to the bill regarding the 
tasking for the collection of intelligence gathering by the 
Intelligence Community under existing law and this Member is 
particularly appreciative of the Select Committee on Homeland 
Security's willingness to accept these recommendations and incorporate 
them into H.R. 5005 by establishing the meaningful analytical 
organization we recommended. However, during the Select Homeland 
Security Committee's markup, an unfortunate decision was made to delete 
the new Department's seat at the table when it comes to intelligence-
gathering instructions. The members of the Select Committee expressed 
the concern that the new Homeland Security Department should not ask 
intelligence services to gather information on American citizens.
  Mr. Chairman, the protection in individual liberties of American 
citizens is an understandable and appropriate priority. This Member 
fully concurs that the Homeland Security Department should not be 
allowed to issue instructions that the CIA gather information on 
Americans.
  However, to ensure that the Department's analytic capability is 
robust, it must have a role in tasking our intelligence services to 
gather information on foreign individuals, entities, and threats. 
Without a seat at the mission formulation table, the policy decisions 
of the Homeland Security Department will rely on whatever foreign 
threat information our Intelligence Community happens to collect under 
the tasking decisions they have made according to their respective 
agency and collective priorities.
  This Member must express deep regret that the amendment to H.R. 5005 
he had hoped to offer was not made in order by the Rules Committee. 
This is an unfortunate error in judgment, apparently reflecting the 
advice of various persons in the Executive Branch. The amendment was a 
simple and straightforward

[[Page H5882]]

one that would have offered a slightly modified version of language 
that received bipartisan support in the Intelligence Committee. It 
should be emphasized that this Member's amendment was narrowly 
constructed and would have specifically authorized such tasking only on 
foreign adversaries, not U.S. citizens or other persons legally 
resident within the United States.
  The tasking for information on foreign adversaries is not a trivial 
concern, Mr. Chairman. Without the proper information, the Homeland 
Security analysts will not be able to devise appropriate defenses. The 
other departments of government have different missions (for example, 
the State Department is to advance diplomacy, the Department of Defense 
is to win wars, and the FBI is to prosecute criminals) and their 
analytic needs are quite different.
  It is unfortunate that this Member's amendment was not made in order 
as it would have made a critical improvement to the final bill. Without 
this authority for the Department of participate in the tasking for the 
collection of foreign intelligence, we will have a major and continuing 
gap in information which the DHS will need to do its job well in 
protecting our citizens and homeland. It is this Member's hope that the 
other body may include this authority.
  Mr. Chairman, this Member has grave concerns about the overall 
approach to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security as 
proposed by the Administration. Its drafting may well have been a 
defensive reaction to a proposal by the junior Senator from Connecticut 
(Mr. Lieberman) and by other Members of Congress from both houses. The 
proposal presented to the Congress has all the indicators of a proposal 
too hastily prepared and of one that was drafted in too much isolation. 
It was understandable in that its preparation was a process so heavily 
guarded--restricted to relatively very few people--in order to avoid 
the otherwise inevitable massive internal campaign of bureaucratic 
turf-protection, pre-emptive opposition campaigns from a wide variety 
of interests, and the immediate opposition of competing congressional 
authorizing and appropriations committees while the consideration and 
drafting was underway.
  The proposal had whole agencies, bureaus, or divisions shifted to the 
DHS when very major parts of such units clearly don't belong in the 
DHS. Fortunately, the House has corrected a few of the most egregious 
misplacements.
  A lean, well-organized DHS would have been the way to proceed. This 
is an absolutely huge bureaucracy being created with very disparate 
parts. Merging the employees and their agencies' cultures into an 
efficient and effective DHS will be an incredibly difficult feat. It 
will result in an unnecessarily long number of years to put in place 
when the security of our country demands an expeditious reorganization 
of our government. Undoubtedly too, the prospects for increased costs 
to attain these undesirable results are certain and highly under-
estimated.
  This Member's only hope is that the Senate version and results of a 
House-Senate conference will give us a much smaller, refined and 
properly focuses DHS, but from all accounts of expected action in the 
other body, that appears to be unlikely. Practically no Member of 
Congress wants to oppose the creation of a DHS, especially during the 
war on terror when our President is requesting congressional action. 
Ultimately this Member will have to make the judgment whether the 
legislative product from the House-Senate conference is better than the 
status quo and if the costs of further delay in starting over to create 
a much different and much smaller DHS is achievable and worth the delay 
at a time when the United States and its facilities and personnel 
abroad remain very vulnerable. Will the enactment of the legislation 
creating a DHS that now seems in prospect be worth the delay and 
dissension caused by starting over and doing it right? That is the 
question and the answer is not clear, Mr. Chairman, count this Member's 
vote as a vote to move the legislative process forward.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, twenty-six hours ago, when the House began 
this historic debate to create a new Homeland Security Department, it 
was my hope and expectation that I would be able to support this 
legislation on final passage. In light of the terrorist strikes of 
September 11, and the continued threat, I strongly believe we need to 
reorganize the federal government to better address the dangers facing 
our nation.
  The bill as reported to the House by the Select Committee on Homeland 
Security fell short in a number of key areas. During the long amendment 
process of the last two days, I regret that the House voted down 
amendments that would have improved this bill. As a result, I cannot 
support this legislation at this time.
  I am particularly disappointed that the amendment offered by 
Representative Oberstar was rejected. This is not the time to extend 
the deadline for airports to install the explosive detection equipment 
that is critically needed to check airline passenger luggage for bombs. 
Last fall, this House voted overwhelmingly to have this equipment in 
place by the end of this year. There is no good reason to extend that 
deadline for another twelve months as this bill does.
  I hope that this and other flaws in the House bill be addressed in 
conference with the Senate. This is the largest reorganization of the 
Federal Government ever attempted. It concerns the security of our 
nation and the safety of every American. With so much at stake, we 
should get it right. I believe we can and must do better. I will 
continue my efforts to strengthen and improve this bill as we go to 
conference with the Senate.
  Mr. PASTOR. Mr. Chairman, it is with great reluctance that I must 
oppose H.R. 5005, the Homeland Security Act.
  The tragic events of September 11 thrust this nation across the 
threshold into an entirely new world where terrorism is a real and 
viable threat to the well-being of all Americans. For that reason, I 
supported the President when he recommended that we create a new 
department to address the prevention and impacts of terrorists. 
However, our experience with forming new cabinet posts in the past has 
taught us that this is an undertaking that should be done in a careful 
and deliberate manner, not one that is rushed to meet an arbitrary 
deadline.
  The reorganization as proposed by the President would create the 
third-largest Cabinet department, in terms of personnel, by combining 
22 federal agencies with 170,000 to 225,000 employees and a total 
budget of $37.5 billion. However, that budget estimate was simply the 
compilation of those agencies' current budgets with no regard to the 
costs associated with creating an entirely new infrastructure and 
giving those agencies expanded areas of responsibility. Clearly, this 
rearranging of agencies is going to cost many billions of dollars above 
that budget estimate.
  It has been exactly 48 days since the President made his proposal, 
but in that time, Congress has had less than 29 working days to hold 
hearings, consult with experts, receive input from interested parties, 
and evaluate all this information. That is simply not enough time to 
form a sound structure that addresses Congressional oversight, 
elimination of redundancy, budget and labor issues, in addition to the 
critical delineation of areas of responsibility. Furthermore, 
consideration must be given to the impact that such a change will have 
on agency core activities which do not have a direct interface with the 
war on terrorism, such as Customs collecting duties and the Coast Guard 
rescuing people at sea. Many are concerned that these non-security 
missions may be diluted under the new department's mission to fight 
terrorism.
  In the few days available, an attempt was made by ten authorizing 
committees to hold hearings and formulate recommendations on how they 
thought the plan should be implemented. But after all was said and 
done, the 9-member Select Committee on Homeland Security dismissed many 
of those recommendations and gave the Administration most of its wants, 
irrespective of the wishes of many lawmakers.
  In particular, I am concerned over the White House's desire to 
deviate from established federal labor practices and protections such 
as collective bargaining rights, the potential for the Administration 
to assume too much fiscal power by shifting funds among agencies 
without Congressional oversight or approval, and the diminishment of 
non-security roles. With such a short time to stimulate national debate 
and to review the above issues, I can not support this measure.
  Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, it is impossible for me to 
support this legislation. It is not constitutional, it is not just, and 
it is not fair.
  This bill would strip hundreds and thousands of Federal employees of 
their labor protections. It would deprive hundreds of millions of 
American citizens of their civil liberties and fundamental rights.
  This bill is nothing less than a power grab by our President and this 
administration. It would be the largest consolidation of power in 
recent American history.
  By denying our citizens their basic rights, but giving this 
administration overwhelming power, this bill would effectively declare 
Marshall law. It would violate the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
  Even the name--``Homeland Security'' conjures images of Banana 
Republics where individuals rights are a mere afterthought. This is 
America. Our government does not deny our citizens fundamental rights 
in the name of homeland security. We are greater than that. We are 
better than that.
  As Thomas Jefferson said, ``the price of freedom is eternal 
vigilance.'' My Colleagues, let us heed the warning of the author of 
our Bill of Rights. It is time to be vigilant. Now is the time to stand 
up for all of our citizens. Now is the time to do what is right.

[[Page H5883]]

  Do not deny our people their fundamental rights. Vote ``no'' on this 
ill-conceived bill.
  Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, I regrettably rise in opposition to H.R. 
5005, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which establishes a Department 
of Homeland Security, as an executive department of the United States, 
headed by a Secretary of Homeland Security.
  Mr. Speaker, while I support the core concept of H.R. 5005, as I 
believe that our government is sorely in need of reorganization to 
anticipate, prevent and react to potential future terrorist attacks on 
our soil, I have strong concerns with several aspects of this measure, 
especially those that should never have become political issues. 
Certainly, when it comes to defending our nation and prosecuting our 
war on terrorism, we must spare no expense. Those entities who attacked 
us on that unfortunate day on September 11, 2001 cruelly exploited our 
weaknesses, and it is our responsibility to make sure that we close all 
the gaps in our national safety infrastructure.
  Neither should we spare the principles of democracy we seek to defend 
in this very bill. And our desire to move quickly to arrest the threat 
should not be done with such haste as to not fully comprehend the 
model, structure and mission we wish of this new mega-Department. But 
in fact, Mr. Speaker, after two days of debate, I am afraid that is 
exactly what we are doing, and thus I am voting tonight not against the 
concept of a Department which better coordinates our efforts, but 
against the plan as it has been laid before us in the hope that 
deliberation in the other body and in conference will yield a better, 
more efficient product.
  H.R. 5005, as it stands, is not the ideal solution to this problem. 
The defeat of Representative Morella's amendment will subject employees 
to less protection from political interference than is now the 
standard. The bill goes too far in exempting this new, powerful 
department from contractor liability and the Freedom of Information 
Act, exceeding that which is already afforded to other national 
security entities such as the Department of Defense. The bill would gut 
``whistle blower'' protections, further subjecting employees to the 
potential of political interference and intimidation. Surely we have 
learned from our recent experiences with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation that rank-and-file employees need to be allowed to speak 
up. And, Mr. Speaker, the adoption of Representative Roger's amendment 
seeks to undermine the longstanding concept of ``posse comitatus'' by 
opening the door for domestic police action by our armed forces, 
something which goes against the very essence of our system of 
government.
  Indeed, should H.R. 5005 become law, we will see the largest 
reorganization and outward growth of the federal government in decades, 
all done without sufficient, thoughtful consideration on how this will 
affect the responsibilities and organization of numerous Cabinet 
Departments and agencies. All of us want to do what we can to protect 
the nation, but we should do it right.
  As this measure takes further steps in the Congress toward final 
passage, I am hopeful that these key issues are resolved in a manner 
that is in the best interests of all parties affected, and that we will 
one day have a Department of Homeland Security that offers unrivaled 
protection. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, as the measure stands, I oppose 
H.R. 5005. I implore my colleagues to consider that this measure is in 
need of refinement, and that if we do not resolve these outstanding 
issues, all this debate and consideration will be counterproductive and 
harmful to our nation.
  Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise to express my 
deep skepticism the Homeland Security Act of 2002. We are rushing to 
undertake the most dramatic reorganization of the federal government in 
decades, and I am uncertain whether the particulars of this plan are 
well thought out.
  As a member of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee I have 
heard my friend Mr. Oberstar speak about the deliberative process that 
went into the creation of the Department of Transportation in 1966. 
That effort took over 9 months, and the final product has produced 
lasting benefits for Americans.
  In comparison, we are rushing this bill in less than 9 weeks. We are 
pulling together disparate elements from all over the federal 
government. I am uncertain whether these pieces really do fit together, 
and even if they do, it will take years for them to come together as a 
coherent department that protects the homeland.
  I strongly object to partisan manner in which the bill's authors are, 
under the guise of homeland security, assaulting the civil service 
protections of our nation's federal workers.
  There is no justification for this proposal. If we are to maintain 
the morale and professionalism of employees of the new department, they 
will need the basic protections that we afford all other federal 
workers.
  Finally, I wish to reiterate that the provisions to push back by one 
year the deadline for deployment of EDS equipment at the nation's 
airports do not belong in this bill. As I indicated earlier, the 
prudent course of action is to wait for the DOT IG's recommendation 
forthcoming in late August. We will have plenty of time to address this 
issue when we come back from the recess.
  Because of the aforementioned reasons, I intend to vote against final 
passage today. I do so with great misgiving because it would be ideal 
for members to stand together in a united front in our war against 
terrorism.
  It is my sincere hope that the Senate will fix the defects in the 
bill we pass today and that conferees will produce a final product I 
can support.
  Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, in October, I co-sponsored H.R. 3026, the 
Office of Homeland Security Act of 2001, to establish an Office of 
Homeland Security within the Executive Office of the President. Eight 
months later, President George W. Bush gave impetus to the creation of 
a Department of Homeland Security, and Congress has been given a week 
to give it our stamp of approval. The primary issue for Congress and 
the President is what the program composition and administrative 
organization of the new department should be, unfortunately with only a 
few weeks, we had to craft the best legislation possible.
  As proposed, the administration bill would permit the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to choose how or whether their employees would be 
covered by current legal protections against reprisal when they call 
attention to instances of agency misfeasance. The bill also would 
exempt from the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) any information about 
infrastructure vulnerabilities given to the Homeland Security 
Department by any private or nonfederal entity.
  In congressional hearings, members of both parties have made it clear 
that the administration is overreaching, especially with regard to 
whistle-blowers and exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act. The 
need for whistle-blowers and for their protection was evidenced by the 
recent cases of Special Agent Coleen Rowley and of two Immigration and 
Naturalization Service agents disciplined for revealing how thin 
security is along the U.S.-Canadian border. These examples argue for 
extending whistle-blower protection to the FBI, not withdrawing it from 
the INS, which could be part of the Homeland Security Department.
  In June, I sponsored H. Res. 436, commending Special Agent Coleen 
Rowley for outstanding performance of her duties. As a former district 
attorney, I know any law enforcement organization is only as good as 
its people and their ability to gather and analyze information. FBI 
agent Rowley courageously came forward to reveal critical breakdowns in 
the FBI's information gathering processes before September 11. She did 
this without any regard for her own career or prospects for 
advancement. Agent Rowley personifies the American tradition of 
demonstrating integrity and selflessness in the service of our nation.
  Experts have been saying for years that the U.S. needed a Department 
of Homeland Security. A Department of Homeland Security is essential to 
coordinating the U.S. war on terrorism. Arguably our tactical and 
strategic missions and goals have been forever changed since the events 
of September 11th. H.R. 5005 is a bipartisan piece of legislation with 
input from all House standing committees with jurisdiction. H.R. 5005 
also shows what Congress can actually achieve when given a deadline and 
an issue above the fray of partisan politics.
  Mr. COSTELLO, Mr. Chairman, I rise today to oppose H.R. 5005, 
legislation to create a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security, 
and I urge my colleagues to do the same. This experience reminds me of 
the efforts of President Clinton to overhaul our nation's healthcare 
system. As with that plan, President Bush's homeland security proposal, 
while well intended, goes too far, too fast in creating a massive new 
Federal agency that may well add to the current problems in the 
system--not solve them.
  Creating a new federal agency and 170,000 employees with a budget of 
$38 billion is not something that the Congress should rush into without 
proper planning or without understanding the ramifications of this 
action. In announcing his plans to create a Department of Homeland 
Security just a few weeks ago, the President said that the new agency 
could be created at no cost to the taxpayers. The Congressional Budget 
Office now estimates that it will cost about $3 billion to create and 
implement this new department.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge the President to withdraw his plan and attempt 
to address the issue of homeland security in a thoughtful and 
deliberative manner, and I urge my colleagues to vote against it.
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the measure we 
are considering today, the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Since 
September 11, it has become abundantly clear that we must change the 
way we conduct national security in this country and we must address 
our security shortfalls with aggressive, decisive actions. We all agree 
we

[[Page H5884]]

must do more to protect our country from threats posed by those who 
wish us harm and those who wish to alter the way we live our lives. 
There is no question that all members want to protect the American 
public. Unfortunately, the bill we are considering today does not take 
the right approach to accomplishing that goal.
  At the outset of this process, I said that any new proposal to 
address our national security shortfalls must pass three basic tests. 
First, the plan must actually make us safer. Second, the plan must not 
compromise our precious civil liberties or rights. Finally, the 
critical non-security functions of government entities must not be 
compromised. This legislation fails to adequately address those 
critical tests.
  The bill before us today creates a new Department of Homeland 
Security. As we debated the bill originally proposed by the 
Administration, we were able to make several significant improvements 
to it. I am pleased that the legislation includes a provision 
establishing an Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties within the 
new department. I offered an amendment to accomplish that goal during 
the Government Reform Committee's consideration of this bill and was 
glad to see that provision maintained.
  I would also like to draw my colleagues' attention to the issue of 
immigration and the organization of immigration services. I come from 
an immigrant-rich district. Their contributions to our community 
demonstrate how important it is to ensure that newcomers to this 
country are received in a fair and considerate manner. It is critical 
that, however immigration and naturalization services are structured, 
the quality and efficiency of the services offered to immigrants are 
not compromised, and are in fact improved.
  For that reason, I have worked hard to help secure various provisions 
in this bill that will provide immigrants with a place to turn if they 
have complaints and will hold immigration officials accountable for 
doing their job with diligence and fairness. First, this bill 
establishes an Ombudsman's office to assist individuals and employers 
in resolving problems with citizenship and immigration services.

  Second, this bill would require the new Bureau of Citizenship and 
Immigration Services to report on how it is handling its immigration 
caseload. This provision includes reporting requirements on how many 
applications the Bureau receives and how many it is able to process; 
how it is addressing the enormous backlog that exists; and whether 
people requiring immigration and naturalization services have adequate 
access to the Bureau and the services it offers. These are critical 
data that will allow us to hold this new Bureau accountable for 
addressing the concerns that have been raised over the years about how 
the INS has performed its duties.
  While the improvements made to the bill are important, there are a 
number of serious problems with this legislation that force me to vote 
against it.
  This bill gives broad new authority to the President to reorganize 
the massive federal workforce created by this legislation. The bill 
gives the President an excuse to disregard and to take away hard-won 
civil service protections and collective bargaining rights for 
employees of the new Department.
  At a time when agencies throughout the federal government--in 
Washington, D.C. and in cities across the country--are having 
difficulty attracting and retaining qualified employees, this bill 
could turn employees of the new department into second class workers. 
What kind of a signal will we send to those federal workers if we ask 
them to move and tell them that they will lose many of the guaranteed 
rights that they now enjoy? How many of those workers will decide to 
leave federal service and move to the private sector? For those workers 
who do stay, how can we expect them to demonstrate high morale and 
commitment when they know that they lack the same rights as their 
federal colleagues in other agencies?
  Congress enacted civil service protections and collective bargaining 
rights so that we could attract the very best to government service. We 
should not give this or any other Administration the right to take them 
away. As we stand together to fight terrorism, we should also stand 
together for the rights and well being of federal workers.
  The House also missed an opportunity today to provide real 
protections for whistle-blowers. I offered an amendment that would 
guarantee American patriots who come forward to expose improprieties 
and threats to our security a guarantee that, if they are retaliated 
against for their actions, they will have a right to legal recourse. 
Sadly, under the current inadequate whistle-blower provisions in the 
bill, those who risk their future to shed light on issues of concern to 
the public will have no guarantees and no real protection. By 
withholding very basic rights and protections for whistle-blowers, we 
are actually subjecting the American public to greater risk because 
those with information that should be shared with Congress or the 
public will be reluctant to do so--leaving us in the dark about threats 
we might otherwise be able to eliminate.

  This bill creates an exclusion from the Freedom of Information Act to 
all information dealing with infrastructure vulnerabilities and is 
voluntarily submitted to the new department. This is an unnecessary 
provision because, under current law, the government already has the 
authority to exempt from FOIA information that meets one of several 
standards, including that which is related to national security and 
trade secrets. While the current law simply requires the Administration 
to review information voluntarily submitted for possible exemptions 
from FOIA, this bill provides a blanket exclusion, thereby removing the 
discretion of the Administration completely. Even worse, the same 
section of the bill preempts state and local good government and 
openness laws.
  This bill also exempts committees created by the Secretary of 
Homeland security from the Federal Advisory Committee Act. This would 
allow the Secretary to create secret forums where lobbyists for all 
sorts of special interests could push their agendas with the 
Administration without concern that the public would find out and 
regardless of whether their discussions are about security or business 
goals.
  The legislation before us today negates the Congressionally-mandated 
requirement that all airports have the ability to screen checked 
baggage for explosives. One of our most frightful and realistic 
vulnerabilities is the status of our air travel system in this country. 
It is a sad message to send to our constituents and the flying public 
that we are not willing to do what it takes to ensure the skies are 
truly safe. Many on the Republican side have argued that the task of 
providing equipment to secure our planes and prevent terrorist devices 
from making their way on board is too costly. I would submit that we 
cannot afford to do otherwise.
  Finally, this bill is flawed because it provides an exemption from 
liability for manufacturers of equipment used for national security 
purposes. This broad protection for industry would apply even if 
company officials willfully neglect the welfare of the public in order 
to make profits. If a new bomb-detection machine company knows that its 
product is not reliable but does not inform the government, we will not 
be able to seek legal recourse if that company's product, as 
anticipated by company officials, fails to work and leads to loss of 
life.
  September 11 made us all painfully aware of the limitations of our 
current national security and anti-terrorism apparatus. We have become 
painfully aware of the shortcomings of the FBI and CIA. And we have 
become painfully aware of the need to act decisively to correct our 
flawed system.

  If we want to be able to prepare our nation and to guarantee 
America's security, we must improve communications, invest in language 
translation capabilities, invest in our public health infrastructure, 
provide necessary training and resources to emergency first responders 
and focus on improving the capabilities and the capacity of state and 
local authorities, and more. Moving the boxes from one agency to 
another will not accomplish these important tasks.
  Unfortunately, this bill fails to address even the most obvious and 
immediate concerns. Instead, what the President and the Republicans in 
the House put forth is a massive reorganization of the federal 
government, nothing more than a reshuffling of the deck, with a few 
added tools for the Administration. Simply shifting people and agencies 
will not make America safer and that is all we will accomplish if we 
pass this bill. I urge all members to reject this flawed legislation 
and to focus on efforts that will actually enhance our security and 
maintain our American way of life.
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 5005, the 
Homeland Security Act, and am pleased to be an original cosponsor of 
the legislation.
  With this legislation, we will organize and focus on the resources of 
the executive branch of the federal government on the task of ensuring 
the security and safety of our citizens inside our borders. While many 
of the functions of the new Department have been performed by dedicated 
federal employees for many years, such as insuring the quality of 
imported food and public health needs, a new dimension will be added to 
the tasks of the new Department: that of preventing terrorist attacks 
within the United States and reducing the vulnerability of the United 
States to further terrorist attacks. This is a high calling.
  I am pleased that the Select Committee maintained the transfer of the 
Coast Guard and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to the new 
Department of Homeland Security. The Coast Guard will play a 
significant role in maintaining the security of our borders, the 
longest of which is our coastlines. It is also crucial that FEMA's 
expertise be tapped by the Department when plans are developed to 
respond quickly to the damage and recover of local communities.

[[Page H5885]]

  Let me also express my support for provisions in the legislation that 
give the new Department the authority to assist with the cybersecurity 
of information systems of federal agencies. The Secretary will have the 
duty to evaluate the security of federal systems; assist federal 
agencies with the identification of risks; and conduct research and 
development on security techniques.
  I commend the Majority Leader for working through the difficult 
issues in the creation of the new Department and I believe he has 
brought to the floor a product worthy of our consideration and passage.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the committee amendment 
in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, 
was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Hastings of Washington) having assumed the chair, Mr. Sweeney, Chairman 
pro tempore of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the 
Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the 
bill (H.R. 5005) to establish the Department of Homeland Security, and 
for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 502, he reported the 
bill back to the House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of 
the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee 
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the 
Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


               Motion to Recommit Offered by Ms. De Lauro

  Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentlewoman opposed to the bill?
  Ms. DeLAURO. I am, Mr. Speaker, in its present form.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Ms. DeLauro moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 5005, to the 
     Select Committee on Homeland Security with instructions to 
     report the same back forthwith with the following amendment:
       Page 173, after line 12, insert the following:

     SEC. 735. PROHIBITION ON CONTRACTING WITH CORPORATE 
                   EXPATRIATES.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary may not enter into any 
     contract with a subsidiary of a publicly traded corporation 
     if the corporation is incorporated in a tax haven country but 
     the United States is the principal market for the public 
     trading of the corporation's stock.
       (b) Tax Haven Country Defined.--For purposes of subsection 
     (a), the term ``tax haven country'' means each of the 
     following: Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
     Islands, Commonwealth of the Bahamas, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Isle 
     of Man, the Principality of Monaco, and the Republic of the 
     Seychelles.
       (c) Waiver.--The President may waive subsection (a) with 
     respect to any specific contract if the President certifies 
     to the Congress that the waiver is required in the interest 
     of national security.

  Ms. DeLAURO (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
consent that the motion to recommit be considered as read and printed 
in the Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Connecticut?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. 
DeLauro) is recognized for 5 minutes in support of her motion to 
recommit.
  Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Every Member of the House should support this motion to recommit 
which bans the Department of Homeland Security from contracting with 
corporations which operate in America but incorporate overseas to avoid 
paying U.S. taxes. Corporate expatriates should not continue to benefit 
from government largess, but they do, billing $2 billion a year in 
government contracts.
  Not only have these companies abandoned their responsibilities to our 
country, they put responsible corporate citizens at a disadvantage. We 
benefit from private sector expertise, and we want to reward their 
creativity and their entrepreneurial spirit, but we should not reward 
them for refusing to pay their taxes and their responsibility as U.S. 
citizens.
  The truth is the war on terrorism costs money. $500 million of the 
revenue lost by those corporations could buy 500 explosive detection 
systems, which are badly needed at airports across this country. These 
companies have abandoned our country at a critical time in our history. 
They leave seniors, our soldiers fighting overseas, and our good 
corporate citizens with the cost of war on terrorism. They should not 
be rewarded with contracts from the very department charged with 
securing our safety. They should pay American taxes on American 
profits.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Turner).
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Speaker, the overwhelming majority of the American 
people play by the rules every day, and they pay their taxes. I cannot 
explain to those folks why in the world an American corporation can 
relocate in a tax haven overseas with just a Post Office box and a 
corporate certificate, and avoid paying any taxes. I cannot explain to 
hard-working Americans how their tax dollars can go to buy goods and 
services from those companies that do not even contribute to the cost 
of our government. I cannot explain to the American people how we allow 
companies to do business with our government and bid on our government 
contracts when they have an advantage over their competitors because 
these companies are not paying any taxes.
  We have got to change the tax law. We have got to make sure that 
companies do not profit by doing business with the government and are 
not willing to support this government. We are in time of war, and I 
think it is essential that tonight we send a strong message of 
corporate responsibility to America's corporations and say it is time 
to stop this practice. Vote for this motion to recommit.
  Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Maloney).
  Mr. MALONEY of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for 
yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, corporate expatriates benefit from over $2 billion in 
lucrative government contracts from large consulting deals with the 
United States Government agencies, to equipping airport screeners, to 
providing tools and equipment to the Department of Defense.
  Stanley Works of Connecticut, which is attempting to expatriate, 
received $5.6 million in government contracts in fiscal year 2001, and 
92 percent of those government contracts were for defense and homeland 
security-related items. Our national security should not depend on 
companies that are overseas or that are American companies that have 
moved overseas.
  Stanley Works and other expatriate corporations do not want to pay 
for our defense and national security, but they want to reap the fruits 
of it. They turn their backs on America at the same time they reach out 
their hands for the money of American taxpayers. This is wrong and this 
must stop, and this motion will help to stop this abusive practice of 
some of the leading corporations that have expatriated or plan to do 
so.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge Members to support this very important motion.
  Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Doggett), a member of the Committee on Ways 
and Means where a similar amendment was passed.
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, motions like this are routinely condemned 
with the throw-away claim that they are ``partisan.'' Well, tonight, 
let us be American partisans. Let us be partisan to the loyal 
businesses that stay and pay their fair share to keep America strong at 
her time of need.
  Corporations that have renounced America have been lobbying overtime 
all over this Capitol complex this week to stop this motion. They will 
not pay their fair share, but they are sure ready to take their fair 
take of government business. American companies that stay and 
contribute to building this country, to keeping her secure at

[[Page H5886]]

home and abroad, they deserve a level playing field on which to 
compete.
  If a Bermuda-bound company does not have to pay taxes on some of its 
income, of course it can underbid those who stay loyal to America, pay 
their taxes, and work here at home. We should send those who come here 
packing when they seek Federal contract dollars, and yet will not 
contribute to the security of our country.
  I recall a communication from a company in Houston that had this very 
type of situation where a competitor exited, while it remained based in 
Texas loyal to all of us here at home.
  Tonight, let us together send a bipartisan message that if companies 
want a slice of the American pie, they had better help bake it.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, I claim the time in opposition to the motion 
to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Armey) is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, let me appreciate the concern that the gentlewoman 
expresses over the burden of our taxes that make American corporations 
undertake regrettable action.
  Mr. Speaker, that is just one of the burdens of our current Tax Code 
that would be corrected by the flat tax. But, Mr. Speaker, I think 
everybody in the body would agree that tonight on this subject on this 
bill, is not the time to be talking about tax reform.

                              {time}  2045

  We ought to be talking, ladies and gentlemen, about the security of 
our Nation, homeland security. And that, Mr. Speaker, is my point.
  This issue has nothing to do with homeland security. Mr. Speaker, I 
am disappointed that after 2 days of constructive discussion on how 
best to protect our homeland, we are dealing with a motion to recommit 
that relates to politics.
  Mr. Speaker, the gentlewoman has a right to offer this motion, and I 
would like to address its shortcomings:
  First, the issue is being dealt with, and being dealt with in a much 
more serious and substantive way, in the Committee on Ways and Means, 
the committee of jurisdiction. Hearings have been held and legislation 
has been introduced that actually addresses the underlying problems 
that lead to the most regrettable and deplorable process of corporate 
inversions.
  Second, Mr. Speaker, even if this were the right place to deal with 
this issue, this motion to recommit creates more questions than 
answers. Clearly, this was not written by one of our standing 
committees. For example, Mr. Speaker, what does it mean when it says 
that a corporation has the United States as, and I quote, ``the 
principal market for public trading of the corporation's stock''? Does 
that mean 10 percent of trading, if trading in all other foreign 
countries is less than 10 percent? Do we want to, in fact, encourage 
further with this kind of legislation American firms to trade in 
European or Japanese exchanges? Why stock? How about debt? Or 
employees? Or other corporate connections? Why are some tax havens 
defined and not others? Does the gentlewoman like some countries with 
lower tax rates better than she likes other countries with lower tax 
rates?
  Mr. Speaker, one of the concerns that is often times expressed about 
corporate inversions is the suggestion that jobs are lost by American 
employees. If indeed you deny to American firms producing product in 
this country the ability to sell to the Federal Government, will that 
not result in real job losses before their employees? Under this motion 
to recommit, you could have a longstanding United States or Swiss 
company that incorporated long ago in Monaco and that happens to have 
the best new technology for fighting terrorists, but this entity would 
be prohibited from helping us fight the scourge of terrorism. Is this 
what we want?
  Unbelievably, the result of this motion to recommit could be that we 
would be hampered in our mission to secure the homeland for reasons 
that have nothing to do with so-called corporate inversions. Perhaps an 
inadvertent result, but a result nonetheless.
  Mr. Speaker, in summary, this poorly drafted motion to recommit is 
not about homeland security but about homeland politics. After a 
serious, thoughtful and bipartisan 7-week process by this Congress to 
respond to the President's challenge, I am disappointed that this would 
be the final issue before we vote on this historic legislation to 
protect our families from the very real threat of terrorism.
  I would urge the Members of this body to vote ``no'' on this motion 
to recommit, and I strongly urge a resounding ``yes'' vote on final 
passage of this historic bill.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). The Chair would 
advise Members that it is in violation of the House rules to have 
cellular phones on the floor and the Chair would ask Members to turn 
off their phones.
  Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to 
recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair 
will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for any electronic vote on 
the question of passage.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 318, 
noes 110, not voting 5, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 366]

                               AYES--318

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barrett
     Bartlett
     Bass
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Boehlert
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Bono
     Boozman
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown (SC)
     Bryant
     Burton
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson (IN)
     Carson (OK)
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Farr
     Fattah
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Fletcher
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frank
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gilchrest
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Graham
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Grucci
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hayes
     Hefley
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Israel
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kerns
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Luther
     Lynch
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Miller, Jeff
     Mink
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Platts
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Riley
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Rush
     Ryan (WI)
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott
     Serrano

[[Page H5887]]


     Shays
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Tierney
     Toomey
     Towns
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Waters
     Watson (CA)
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--110

     Akin
     Armey
     Baker
     Barr
     Barton
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Blumenauer
     Boehner
     Brady (TX)
     Burr
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Coble
     Collins
     Cox
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Davis, Tom
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     English
     Flake
     Foley
     Frelinghuysen
     Gibbons
     Gillmor
     Goss
     Hansen
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Istook
     Johnson, Sam
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lucas (OK)
     McCrery
     McKeon
     Miller, Dan
     Miller, Gary
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Osborne
     Otter
     Oxley
     Paul
     Peterson (PA)
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reynolds
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ryun (KS)
     Schaffer
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Sherwood
     Simpson
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stump
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Vitter
     Walden
     Watkins (OK)
     Watts (OK)
     Weller
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Blunt
     Combest
     Lipinski
     Meehan
     Roukema

                              {time}  2124

  Mr. BLUMENAUER changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Messrs. THUNE, SWEENEY, CASTLE, KERNS, PENCE, SIMMONS, KELLER, RYAN 
of Wisconsin, GREEN of Wisconsin, UPTON, ROGERS of Michigan, LoBIONDO, 
QUINN, McHUGH, FERGUSON, BILIRAKIS, GRAHAM, GEKAS, EHRLICH, SHAYS, 
BRYANT, OSE, HAYES, GREENWOOD, BARTLETT of Maryland, MANZULLO, 
BOEHLERT, FOSSELLA, KINGSTON, CHAMBLISS, GOODE, WALSH, RILEY, BACHUS, 
FORBES, GRAVES, MORAN of Kansas, GOODLATTE, JEFF MILLER of Florida, 
HALL of Texas, COOKSEY, PLATTS, SHIMKUS, YOUNG of Florida, ADERHOLT, 
TOOMEY, JOHNSON of Illinois, WELDON of Pennsylvania, SHUSTER, KING, 
BASS, BALLENGER, GRUCCI, SAXTON, SULLIVAN, GILMAN, DEAL, ISAKSON, 
JENKINS, RAMSTAD, KENNEDY of Minnesota, WICKER, SMITH of New Jersey, 
FLETCHER, BOOZMAN, KIRK, MICA, GILCHREST, McINNIS, GALLEGLY, PETRI, 
ISSA, EVERETT, ROYCE, CUNNINGHAM, SKEEN, WELDON of Florida, CANTOR, 
ROGERS of Kentucky, BONILLA, BROWN of South Carolina, CHABOT and 
NORWOOD and Mrs. EMERSON, Mrs. CUBIN, Mrs. CAPITO, Mrs. WILSON of New 
Mexico, Mrs. JoANN DAVIS of Virginia, Mrs. KELLY, Mrs. BONO, Mrs. 
MYRICK, Ms. GRANGER and Messrs. BURTON of Indiana, DUNCAN, HEFLEY, 
HILLEARY, LEACH, McHUGH, PICKERING, STEARNS, STENHOLM, WAMP and 
WHITFIELD changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the motion to recommit was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

                              {time}  2126

  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, with compliments to the gentlewoman from 
Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro), pursuant to the instructions of the House on 
the motion to recommit, I report the bill, H.R. 5005, back to the House 
with an amendment.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). The Clerk will 
report the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment:
       Page 173, after line 12, insert the following:

     SEC. 735. PROHIBITION ON CONTRACTING WITH CORPORATE 
                   EXPATRIATES.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary may not enter into any 
     contract with a subsidiary of a publicly traded corporation 
     if the corporation is incorporated in a tax haven country but 
     the United States is the principal market for the public 
     trading of the corporation's stock.
       (b) Tax Haven Country Defined.--For purposes of subsection 
     (a), the term ``tax haven country'' means each of the 
     following: Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
     Islands, Commonwealth of the Bahamas, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Isle 
     of Man, the Principality of Monaco, and the Republic of the 
     Seychelles.
       (c) Waiver.--The President may waive subsection (a) with 
     respect to any specific contract if the President certifies 
     to the Congress that the waiver is required in the interest 
     of national security.
  Mr. ARMEY (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent 
that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, I object.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard. The Clerk will continue 
to read.
  The Clerk concluded the reading of the amendment.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the amendment.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 295, 
noes 132, not voting 6, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 367]

                               AYES--295

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Allen
     Andrews
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Cardin
     Carson (OK)
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Clay
     Clement
     Coble
     Collins
     Condit
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal
     Delahunt
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Ferguson
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Grucci
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Hooley
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kerns
     Kildee
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Langevin
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manzullo
     Mascara
     Matheson
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, Dan
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, Jeff
     Moore
     Morella
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pascrell
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Royce
     Rush
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sanchez
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Schaffer
     Schiff
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)

[[Page H5888]]


     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Sullivan
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins (OK)
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Wu
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--132

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Baca
     Baldwin
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Cannon
     Capuano
     Carson (IN)
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cummings
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Flake
     Frank
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Holt
     Honda
     Hostettler
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kilpatrick
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Markey
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Miller, George
     Mink
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Petri
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Roybal-Allard
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Slaughter
     Snyder
     Solis
     Stark
     Stupak
     Tancredo
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watson (CA)
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Woolsey
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--6

     Blunt
     Combest
     Ehrlich
     Lipinski
     Meehan
     Roukema

                              {time}  2141

  Messrs. MOLLOHAN, CUMMINGS, LAMPSON, LEVIN, and LARSEN of Washington 
changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. SAXTON changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated for:
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall 367, although I would love to 
blame a machine error, apparently it was a human error. The gentleman 
from California recorded a ``no'' when he intended to record an 
``aye''.
  Mr. EHRLICH. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 367, I was inadvertently 
detained. I would have voted ``aye'' on this important legislation.

                          ____________________