[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 98 (Thursday, July 18, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7035-S7048]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. CRAPO (for himself and Mr. Conrad):
S. 2750. A bill to improve the provision of telehealth services under
the Medicare program, to provide grants for the development of
telehealth networks, and for other purposes; to the Committee on
Finance.
Mr. CRAPO. Mr. President, I am pleased to rise today to introduce,
along with Senator Conrad of North Dakota, legislation that would
greatly enhance the use of telehealth technology to bring badly-needed
health care services to rural and underserved areas throughout the
country.
This bill would allow for greater reimbursement for telehealth
services under Medicare and calls for a valuable investment in the
development of new and more advanced telehealth networks in underserved
areas. Telehealth is the future of rural health care. Access to quality
health care in rural areas is at a critical stage. Today, many ill and
disabled people must drive hundreds of miles, often in bad weather on
dangerous roads, just to receive the most basic of health care. Access
to specialists is even more prohibitive. However, by using much of the
same technologies that we use to communicate with our constituents from
here in Washington, we can bring quality health care, and specialty
care, to their local health care provider.
I would like to thank Senator Conrad, who has been a longtime
supporter of telehealth services, for joining me in introducing this
important legislation. Our bill would allow a wide variety of health
care practitioners to provide telehealth services under Medicare. One
of the biggest challenges for rural practitioners is obtaining the
resources and infrastructure to provide technologically advanced
telehealth services. Our bill would also provide valuable resources for
the development of new telehealth networks in rural and underserved
areas.
Technology in America is booming. We must embrace this technology as
a cost-effective way to improve health care in rural and underserved
areas. This legislation takes a large step in providing a modest
investment toward the improvement of rural health care.
______
By Mr. JEFFORDS (for himself, Mr. Frist, Mr. Gregg, Mr. Breaux,
and Mr. Feingold):
S. 2752. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to
provide for the establishment of medicare demonstration programs to
improve health care quality; to the Committee on Finance.
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to speak
today on an issue that has been and will continue to be important and
vital to the health of all Medicare beneficiaries. Medicare's origins
date back to 1965; since that time little has changed in the
relationship between incentives to provide care and quality of care
received. The current system does not reward or provide incentives for
providing quality health care. Instead, what has evolved over the last
years is a perplexing data base of well documented facts concerning
quality and utilization. This information is very difficult to explain
but hard to ignore. Why is it that the utilization of some surgical
procedures varies tremendously from one part of the country to the
next? Why is it that the cost of care per beneficiary varies from
location to location without clear differences in outcomes, survival,
or quality? Today, after much work with numerous health systems,
patient advocacy organizations, and medical quality researchers, my
colleagues Senators Frist, Gregg, Breaux and Feingold and I are pleased
to announce the introduction of legislation to create Medicare
demonstration projects to address these issues.
The incentives, both financial and non-financial, to provide best
healthcare to Medicare beneficiaries are complex and poorly understood.
These incentives have historically been rooted in the longstanding
Medicare fee-for-service payment model. In an effort to better align
the incentives to provide care with best practice guidelines,
appropriate utilization, adherence to best medical information, and
best outcomes we have written legislation to address these issues
through a Medicare demonstration project. This project will implement
continuous quality improvement mechanisms that are aimed at integrating
primary care, referral care, support care, and outpatient services. The
bill will encourage patient participation in care decisions; strive to
achieve the proper allocation of health care resources; identify the
appropriate use of culturally and ethnically sensitive services in
health care delivery; and document the financial effects of these
decisions on the medical marketplace.
As we enter an era of rapidly increasing numbers of Medicare
beneficiaries, it will be increasingly important that we re-evaluate
the Medicare program to insure that the quality of care received is
uniformly exceptional in its delivery and quality. It is appropriate
that we continue to find better ways to insure that the norms of
quality health care are established and followed. It is my sincere hope
that my colleges will join me in this endeavor.
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Medicare
Quality Improvement Act--a bill to help revitalize the Medicare Program
by providing for the alignment of payment and other incentives. I want
to thank Senators Jeffords, Gregg, and Breaux for their work in helping
craft this crucial legislation.
To meet the needs of the 21st century health care system, it is
critical that payment policies be aligned to encourage and support
quality improvement efforts. Even among health professionals motivated
to provide the best care possible, the structure of payment and other
incentives may not facilitate the actions needed to systematically
improve the quality of care, and may even prevent such actions. For
example, redesigning care processes to improve follow-up for
chronically ill patients through electronic communication may reduce
office visits and decrease revenues for a medical group under some
payment schemes.
Current payment practices are complex and contradictory; and although
incremental improvements are possible, more fundamental reform will be
needed. In this report, ``Crossing the Quality Chasm,'' the Institute
of Medicine encouraged the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality to develop a
research agenda to identify, test, and evaluate options for better
aligning payment methods with quality improvement goals. The
demonstration project authorized by this legislation is part of that
larger research agenda--to help us understand the appropriate alight of
payment and other incentives and improve the quality of health care in
a way that will not increase the overall costs of Medicare.
[[Page S7036]]
We already have identified appropriate ways to align provider
incentives. Research supported by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
has noted at least 11 different incentive models--models that can be
implemented by a wide variety of organizations and applied to a range
of medical groups, providers, and health plans. In many circumstances,
key components of these models have been implemented in several health
care markets, and the research has shown that both financial and
nonfinancial incentives, such as technical assistance, are important in
motiving appropriate care. However, we do not know how these incentives
might apply to Medicare, and that is why this demonstration is so
vital.
It has been an honor and a pleasure to work closely with my
distinguished colleagues on this bill, and I look forward to continuing
to work with them and others as we move forward on the debate about how
to more appropriately reform Medicare.
______
By Mr. KERRY (for himself, Mr. Bond, Mr. Cleland, Ms. Cantwell,
Mr. Bingaman, and Mrs. Carnahan:
S. 2753. A bill to provide for a Small and Disadvantaged Business
Ombudsman for Procurement in the Small Business Administration, and for
other purposes; to the Committee on Small Business and
Entrepreneurship.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I am pleased today to introduce a critical
piece of legislation intended to help small businesses receive their
fair share of the Federal procurement pie and to ensure that they are
being treated fairly within the Federal procurement system. I would
like to thank my cosponsors, Senators Bond, Cleland, Cantwell, Bingaman
and Carnahan for working with me and small business groups to craft
this legislation, as well as Congressman Albert Wynn, for his
partnership on this legislation. Congressman Wynn will soon be
introducing companion legislation in the House.
In my time as Chairman of the Committee on Small Business and
Entrepreneurship and previously as Ranking Member, two facts regarding
small business procurement have made themselves very clear, small
businesses are not getting their fair share of Federal procurement and
there is no one in the entire Federal Government with the sole
responsibility of advocating for small businesses, governmentwide, in
the procurement process and ensuring that Federal agencies and large
business prime contractors treat small businesses fairly. Some
individuals are responsible for portions of this job, but no one
performs this role as their primary job function or has the authority
to do so solely.
I felt this was a glaring oversight and looked to the current make-up
of the SBA to see if it could be rectified. My solution is a new
position modeled along the Small Business Administration's, SBA,
regulatory ombudsman, which could focus solely on procurement matters.
A new ombudsman for small business procurement, or the Small and
Disadvantaged Business Ombudsman, is needed to fill this role for
procurement matters, just as the SBA's National Ombudsman does for
regulatory issues. By creating a parallel position, each ombudsman can
focus on his or her key mission, without detracting from either
regulatory or procurement issues important to the small business
community.
While no legislation alone can ever solve the complex problems faced
by small businesses in today's Federal procurement environment, I
believe the creation of a Small and Disadvantaged Business Ombudsman at
the SBA will put us firmly on the right track and address several
procurement issues raised through program oversight and communication
with small business owners.
For example, small businesses frequently contact my office to report
problems they are having with a prime contractor or a contracting
agency. Too often, these businesses are afraid to come forward and make
an official complaint for fear of being blackballed and denied future
contracting opportunities. The SDB Ombudsman will provide one solution
for these small businesses who fear being blacklisted by allowing them
to submit confidential complaints. The SDB Ombudsman will have the
responsibility of tracking these complaints and trying to rectify them.
The SDB Ombudsman will also work to change the culture at Federal
procuring agencies by tracking and reporting on the training of
procurement personnel and working to ensure that this training not only
includes the ``How to's'' of small business participation, but also
includes training on why small business participation is crucial to
agency success and the national economy.
Until the Federal Government, at all levels, realizes the importance
of doing business with small business, small business participation in
Federal procurement will continue to decline, our Nation will lose its
access to a wide range of small business suppliers, and small
businesses across the country will continue to lose billions of dollars
in procurement opportunities year after year. Of critical importance in
the legislation is the first statutory consequence of an agency failing
to meet its small business goals. Under the legislation, if an agency
fails to meet any small business goal, the agency would be required to
submit a report and an action plan to the SDB Ombudsman detailing why
the agency failed to meet its small business goal or goals, and what
the agency intends to do to remedy the situation.
The SDB Ombudsman will also be responsible for tracking compliance
with Section (k) of the Small Business Act, which stipulates, in part,
that the Director of the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business
Utilization at each Federal agency shall report to the head or deputy
head of the agency. Late last year, with the support of Ranking Member
Bond, I sent a letter to 21 Federal agencies to gauge compliance with
this provision. Using a very lenient standard of compliance, I have
concluded that at least nine of the Federal agencies surveyed are in
violation of Section (k) of the Small Business Act. This is
unacceptable.
On June 19, 2002, the Committee on Small Business and
Entrepreneurship help a roundtable to discuss Federal procurement
policies. The roundtable, title ``Are Government Purchasing Policies
Hurting Small Business?'' was attended by a wide range of small
business advocates, small business owners and government officials. One
of the topics discussed during the roundtable was my draft proposal,
the SDB Ombudsman Act, to create a new position at the SBA to monitor
Federal agency compliance with certain provisions of the Small Business
Act and serve as a focal point to assist small businesses that were
treated unfairly in the Federal procurement process.
During the Roundtable, I asked the participants for their
recommendations on how to improve the legislation to ensure that the
SDB Ombudsman serves as the most effective advocate possible for small
business. The Committee record was also kept open for two weeks so that
participants could submit further comments.
I have now reviewed the Committee record and further submissions and
am pleased to say that the responses were very positive. Several
important suggestions were made to strengthen the Office of Small and
Disadvantaged Business Utilization at each Federal agency as an
important corollary to the creation of the SDB Ombudsman, since the SDB
Ombudsman would be relying on each OSDBU to fulfill his or her
statutory responsibilities.
Many other small businesses have come to the Committee on Small
Business and Entrepreneurship and requested that we strengthen the
OSDBUs at each agency as well. This legislation fulfills that request
by including six new provisions.
First, the legislation clarifies that OSDBU Directors shall report to
the highest level at each agency. In the study I mentioned previously,
too often, an agency cited a bifurcated reporting system whereby the
OSDBU Director reports to the head or deputy head on small business
matters, but to other, lower-ranking personnel for budgetary or
personnel matters. The Small Business Act does not envision such a
system. Therefore, I felt it necessary to clarify, in no uncertain
terms, that the OSDBU Director must report to the head or deputy head
of his or her agency only, for all matters.
Second, the legislation requires that all OSDBU Directors now be
career personnel. The Director's position is one
[[Page S7037]]
of advocacy, which often entails challenging co-workers and political
personnel, including superiors. Under current law, OSDBU Directors may
be political appointees. While this has worked in some instances, I
believe the small business community would be better served by career
personnel with job protections.
Third, the legislation requires the OSDBU Director to be well-
qualified in assisting small businesses with procurement matters. No
one disputes the expertise of Federal procurement officials; however,
procurement expertise does not always translate to small business
procurement expertise. This provision will help ensure that small
businesses are being served by those who understand their particular
procurement needs.
Fourth, the legislation requires that, at major Federal agencies, the
OSDBU Director have no job responsibilities outside the scope of the
authorizing legislation. This provision was included because far too
many agencies assign the OSDBU Director title to their procurement
chief or another official with similar responsibilities, while the
actual OSDBU program is run by someone else. This provision will stop
this abuse.
Fifth, the legislation requires that a procurement chief not serve as
the Director of the OSDBU program at a Federal agency. I firmly believe
that the OSDBU Director's goal is fundamentally different from, and at
times even opposed to, that of a chief procurement official who must be
fair to all Federal contractors. An OSDBU Director's role is one of
advocacy. He or she must take the side of small business, and no
procurement chief can do this and perform both jobs fairly and
effectively. While OSDBU Directors at major Federal agencies are barred
from having additional responsibilities under this legislation, non-
major Federal agency OSDBU Directors may. This provision will help
ensure that at our non-major Federal agencies, the OSDBU Director can
act fairly on behalf of small businesses.
Sixth, the legislation provides statutory authority for the OSDBU
Council. Under the legislation, each OSDBU Director will have
membership on the Council, which will meet at least once every two
months. The Council's role is to discuss issues of importance to the
OSDBUs and the small business community they serve. OSDBU Directors
serving at major Federal agencies have as a part of their
responsibilities an obligation, under this legislation, to attend
Council meetings. This provision was included to once again prevent
Federal agencies from circumventing the Small Business Act. Attendance
at Council meetings will help ensure that Federal agencies are
complying with the law and that OSDBU Directors are small business
advocates, not simply procurement personnel with two hats.
One final note on the legislation is that the inclusion of a
provision to increase the governmentwide small business prime
contracting procurement goal from 23 percent to 30 percent has been
retained, although it will now be phased in over three years: 26
percent in FY 2004, 28 percent in FY 2005 and 30 percent in FY 2006 and
thereafter.
When I first made the suggestion that the small business procurement
goal should be increased seven percentage points, my office received
numerous calls, both in support of the increase and in opposition. Some
even suggested raising the goal to a level of 40 percent. But, by and
large, those in opposition pointed to one fact: The Federal Government
has never achieved such a level of small business procurement
participation. And while that is true, no one said that it was
impossible. Given the disappointing achievement of the Federal
Government on the current small business goal of 23 percent, I believe
it is time to raise the bar.
When Congress enacted goals as part of the Small Business act, the
goals were intended to be a minimum standard of achievement. For too
long, the goals have been treated as a target for attainment, not a
minimum level of acceptable small business participation. This too must
change. Almost every year the Federal Government comes very close to
hitting the small business prime contracting goal of 23 percent right
on the head. Some years it does slightly better, and some years,
unfortunately, it does slightly worse. However, this trend demonstrates
one important principle, the government is firmly shooting for 23
percent, no more--no less.
By raising the statutory goal, it is my hope that the Federal
Government will shoot for the higher target and succeed. But I ask my
colleagues to look at this critically in that the goal for small
business isn't so much being raised as the 77 percent of Federal
procurement that now goes to large businesses, which represent only a
tiny portion of all Federal contractors, is being reduced to 70
percent. So if the small business goal should increase to 30 percent,
70 percent of all Federal procurement will still be awarded to a
relatively small number of all Federal contractors. Is this fair to
small business? No. But it is an improvement.
I am pleased to say that my legislation is supported by groups
representing primarily small businesses or small business contractors,
such as the National Small Business United, NSBU, Women Impacting
Public Policy, WIPP, and the Association of Small and Disadvantaged
Business, as well as advocacy groups such as the Latin American
Management Association, LAMA, the Minority Business Enterprise Legal
Defense and Education Fund, MBELDEF, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars,
VFW.
I thank them as well as the cosponsors of this legislation, Senators
Bond, Cleland, Cantwell, Bingaman and Carnahan for their assistance,
input and support, and I look forward to continuing to work with them
on this and other important issues.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Small and Disadvantaged
Business Ombudsman Act be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Small and Disadvantaged
Business Ombudsman Act''.
SEC. 2. SBA SMALL AND DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS OMBUDSMAN FOR
PROCUREMENT.
Section 30 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 657) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'';
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and adding a
semicolon; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(3) `SDB Ombudsman' means the Small and Disadvantaged
Business Ombudsman for Procurement, designated under
subsection (e); and
``(4) `Major Federal agency' means an agency of the United
States Government that, in the previous fiscal year, entered
into contracts with non-Federal entities to provide the
agency with a total of not less than $200,000,000 in goods or
services.''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(e) SBA Small and Disadvantaged Business Ombudsman for
Procurement.--
``(1) Appointment.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of enactment of the Small and Disadvantaged Business
Ombudsman Act, the Administrator shall designate a Small and
Disadvantaged Business Ombudsman for Procurement (referred to
in this section as the `SDB Ombudsman').
``(B) Qualifications.--The SDB Ombudsman shall be--
``(i) highly qualified, with experience assisting small
business concerns with Federal procurement; and
``(ii) designated from among employees of the Federal
Government, to the extent practicable.
``(C) Line of authority.--The SDB Ombudsman shall report
directly to the Administrator.
``(D) Senior executive service.--The SDB Ombudsman shall be
paid at an annual rate not less than the minimum rate, nor
more than the maximum rate, for the Senior Executive Service
under chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code.
``(2) Duties.--The SDB Ombudsman shall--
``(A) work with each Federal agency with procurement
authority to ensure that small business concerns are treated
fairly in the procurement process;
``(B) establish a procedure for receiving comments from
small business concerns and personnel of the Office of Small
and Disadvantaged Business Utilization of each Federal agency
regarding the activities of agencies and prime contractors
that are not small business concerns on Federal procurement
contracts; and
``(C) establish a procedure for addressing the concerns
received under subparagraph (B).
``(3) Annual report.--
``(A) In general.--No later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the
SDB Ombudsman shall provide a report to the Committee on
Small Business of the House
[[Page S7038]]
of Representatives and the Committee on Small Business and
Entrepreneurship of the Senate.
``(B) Contents.--The report required under subparagraph (A)
shall contain--
``(i) information from the Federal Procurement Data System
pertaining to contracting and subcontracting goals of the
Federal Government and each Federal agency with procurement
authority;
``(ii) a copy of the report submitted to the SDB Ombudsman
by each major Federal agency and an evaluation of the goal
attainment plans submitted to the SDB Ombudsman pursuant to
paragraph (5);
``(iii) an evaluation of the success or failure of each
major Federal agency in attaining its small business
procurement goals, including a ranking by agency on the
attainment of such goals;
``(iv) a summary of the efforts of each major Federal
agency to promote contracting opportunities for small
business concerns by--
``(I) educating and training procurement officers on the
importance of small business concerns to the economy and to
Federal contracting; and
``(II) conducting outreach initiatives to promote prime and
subcontracting opportunities for small business concerns;
``(v) an assessment of the knowledge of the procurement
staff of each major Federal agency concerning programs that
promote small business contracting;
``(vi) substantiated comments received from small business
concerns and personnel of the Office of Small and
Disadvantaged Business Utilization of each Federal agency
regarding the treatment of small business concerns by Federal
agencies on Federal procurement contracts;
``(vii) an analysis of the responsiveness of each Federal
agency to small business concerns with respect to Federal
contracting and subcontracting;
``(viii) an assessment of the compliance of each Federal
agency with section 15(k) of the Small Business Act (15
U.S.C. 644(k); and
``(ix) a description of any discrimination faced by small
business concerns based on their status as small business
concerns or the gender or the social or economic status of
their owners.
``(C) Notice and comment.--
``(i) In general.--The SDB Ombudsman shall provide notice
to each Federal agency identified in the report prepared
under subparagraph (A) that such agency has 60 days to submit
comments on the draft report to the SDB Ombudsman before the
final report is submitted to Congress under subparagraph (A).
``(ii) Inclusion of outside comments.--
``(I) In general.--The final report prepared under this
paragraph shall contain a section in which Federal agencies
are given an opportunity to respond to the report contents
with which they disagree.
``(II) No response.--If no response is received during the
60-day comment period from a particular agency identified in
the report, the final report under this paragraph shall
indicate that the agency was afforded an opportunity to
comment.
``(D) Confidentiality.--In preparing the report under this
paragraph, the SDB Ombudsman shall keep confidential all
information that may expose a small business concern or an
employee of an Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business
Utilization to possible retaliation from the agency or prime
contractor identified by the small business concern, unless
the small business concern or employee of the Office of Small
and Disadvantaged Business Utilization consents in writing to
the release of such information.
``(4) Interagency coordination.--Each Federal agency,
through its Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business
Utilization, shall assist the SDB Ombudsman to ensure
compliance with--
``(A) the Federal procurement goals established pursuant to
section 15(g);
``(B) the procurement policy outlined in section 8(d),
which states that small business concerns should be given the
maximum practicable opportunity to participate in Federal
contracts;
``(C) Federal prime contractors small business
subcontracting plans negotiated under section 8(d)(4)(B);
``(D) the responsibilities outlined under section 15(k);
and
``(E) any other provision of this Act.
``(5) Goal attainment plan.--If a major Federal agency
fails to meet any small business procurement goal under this
Act in any fiscal year, such agency shall submit a goal
attainment plan to the SDB Ombudsman not later than 90 days
after the end of the fiscal year in which the goal was not
met, containing--
``(A) a description of the circumstances that contributed
to the failure of the agency to reach its small business
procurement goals; and
``(B) a detailed plan for meeting the small business
procurement goals in the fiscal year immediately following
the fiscal year in which the goal was not met.
``(6) Effect on other offices.--Nothing in this section is
intended to replace or diminish the activities of the Office
of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization or any
similar office in any Federal agency.
``(7) Administrative resources.--To enable the SDB
Ombudsman to carry out the duties required by this
subsection, the Administrator shall provide the SDB Ombudsman
with sufficient--
``(A) personnel;
``(B) office space; and
``(C) dedicated financial resources, which are specifically
identified in the annual budget request of the
Administration.''.
SEC. 3. OFFICE OF SMALL AND DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS
UTILIZATION.
(a) Director.--Section 15(k) of the Small Business Act (15
U.S.C. 644(k)) is amended--
(1) in the first sentence, by inserting ``(except for the
Administration)'' after ``Federal agency'';
(2) by striking paragraph (2), and inserting the following:
``(2) be well qualified, with experience assisting small
business concerns with Federal procurement, and receive basic
pay at a rate not to exceed the rate of pay for grade 15 of
the General Schedule, under section 5332 of title 5, United
States Code;'';
(3) by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following:
``(3) be appointed by the head of such agency, be
responsible to, and report only to, the head or deputy head
of such agency for policy matters, personnel matters,
budgetary matters, and all other matters;'';
(4) in paragraph (9), by striking ``, and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(5) in paragraph (10)--
(A) by striking ``or section 8(a) of this Act or section
2323 of title 10, United States Code. Such recommendations''
and inserting ``section 8(a), or section 2323 of title 10,
United States Code, which recommendations''; and
(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting a
semicolon; and
(6) by striking the undesignated matter after paragraph
(10) and inserting the following:
``(11) not concurrently serve as the chief procurement
officer for such agency; and
``(12) if the officer is employed by a major Federal agency
(as defined in section 30)--
``(A) have no other job duties beyond those described under
this subsection;
``(B) receive basic pay at a rate equal to the rate of pay
for grade 15 of the General Schedule, under section 5332 of
title 5, United States Code; and
``(C) attend the meetings of the Office of Small and
Disadvantaged Business Utilization Council.''.
(b) Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization
Council.--
(1) Establishment.--There is established an interagency
council to be known as the ``Office of Small and
Disadvantaged Business Utilization Council'' (in this
subsection referred to as the ``Council'').
(2) Membership.--The Council shall be composed of--
(A) the Director of Small and Disadvantaged Business
Utilization from each Federal agency;
(B) the Small and Disadvantaged Business Ombudsman for
Procurement, as an ex officio member; and
(C) other individuals, as ex officio members, as the
Council considers necessary.
(3) Leadership.--
(A) Chairperson.--The members of the Council shall elect a
chairperson, who shall serve for a 1-year, renewable term.
(B) Other positions.--The members of the Council may elect
other leadership positions, as necessary, from among its
members.
(C) Voting.--Each member of the Council, except for ex
officio members, shall have voting rights on the Council.
(4) Meetings.--
(A) Frequency.--The Council shall meet not less frequently
than once every 2 months.
(B) Issues.--At the meetings under subparagraph (A), the
Council shall discuss issues faced by each Office of Small
and Disadvantaged Business Utilization, including--
(i) personnel matters;
(ii) barriers to small business participation in Federal
procurement;
(iii) agency compliance with section 15(k) of the Small
Business Act (15 U.S.C. 644(k)), as amended by this Act; and
(iv) any other matter that the Council considers necessary
to further the mission of each Office of Small and
Disadvantaged Business Utilization.
(5) Funding limitation.--The Small Business Administration
shall not provide the Council with financial assistance to
carry out the provisions of this section.
SEC. 4. GOVERNMENTWIDE SMALL BUSINESS GOAL.
Section 15(g)(1) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C.
644(g)(1)) is amended in the second sentence, by striking
``23 percent of the total value of all prime contract awards
for each fiscal year.'' and inserting ``26 percent of the
total value of all prime contract awards for fiscal year
2004, not less than 28 percent of the total value of all
prime contract awards for fiscal year 2005, and not less than
30 percent of the total value of all prime contract awards
for fiscal year 2006 and each fiscal year thereafter.''.
______
By Ms. COLLINS:
S. 2754. A bill to establish a Presidential Commission on the United
States Postal Service; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the ``United
States Postal Service Commission Act of 2002.'' This legislation will
establish a Commission to examine the challenges facing the Postal
Service and develop
[[Page S7039]]
solutions to ensure its long term viability and increased efficiency.
The Postal Service's problems have reached a near crisis level. In
2000, the Postal Service lost nearly $200 million, while in 2001, this
loss ballooned to $1.68 billion. Losses are projected to be $1.35
billion this year, despite the $675 million in appropriations from
Congress to cover the unanticipated costs associated with the September
11 attacks and the anthrax incidents. The Postal Service is mandated by
law to break even on its operating expenses and its capital needs, both
of which continue to grow.
The Postal Service is also fast approaching its $15 billion statutory
borrowing limit. Given its recent history of increasing rather than
paying down its debt, increasing the Postal Service's debt ceiling is
not the answer. In addition, the Postal Service's long term liabilities
are enormous, to the tune of nearly $6 billion for Workers Compensation
claims, a staggering $32 billion in retirement costs and perhaps as
much as $45 billion to cover retiree health care costs. Meanwhile, on
June 30, consumers experienced a third postal rate increase in just 18
months.
How could the Postal Service have landed in such dire straits? The
Postal Service's problems stem from many causes. For example, the
overall growth rate of mail has been declining since 1997, and first
class mail volumes actually have declined over the past four years.
This is particularly significant, as first class mail accounts for 48
percent of total mail volume. In addition, revenues from first class
mail cover more than two-thirds of institutional costs, such as post
offices. Shortfalls must be made up by decreasing costs, increasing
volumes in other categories of mail or by increasing postal rates.
Some of this declining volume can be attributed to the increasing
forms of electronic communication, particularly the Internet, which has
revolutionized the way we communicate and transact business. For
example, while financial statements, bills and bill payments constitute
about half of first class mail revenue, or about $17 billion annually,
electronic bill payment is quickly becoming a major means of doing
business. It is estimated that 75 percent of banks will provide online
banking services by 2003. This is in addition to other competing
methods of communication such as faxes and telephones. In addition,
filing tax returns, receiving Social Security payments, and many other
transactions are also available electronically.
The Postal Service also faces significant labor-related costs. Indeed
nearly 80 percent of its expenses are related to compensation and
benefits. By comparison, 56 percent of FedEx's expenses and 42 percent
of UPS's expenses are related to compensation and benefits.
The need to preserve a viable Postal Service is clear. Americans rely
on affordable, reliable and universal mail delivery as their primary
means of communication. The Postal Service delivers more than 200
billion pieces of mail each year to nearly 140 million addresses, which
accounts for more than 40 percent of the world's mail. Moreover, 1.7
million new delivery points are added each year--roughly the equivalent
of adding the number of addresses in Chicago. More than seven million
Americans visit post offices each day.
In States with large rural areas, such as Maine, it is vital that
postal services remain in place. If the Postal Service were no longer
obligated to provide universal service and deliver mail to every
customer, six days a week, the affordable communication link upon which
many Americans rely would be jeopardized. Most commercial enterprises
would find it uneconomical, if not impossible, to deliver mail and
packages to these areas at rates that the Postal Service has been
offering.
In addition to providing a critical service to consumers, the Postal
Service is the eleventh largest enterprise in the Nation with $66
billion in annual revenues. This is more than Microsoft, McDonald's and
Coca Cola combined. While the Postal Service itself employs more
than 700,000 career employees, it is also the linchpin of a $900
billion mailing industry that employs nine million Americans in fields
as diverse as direct mailing, printing and paper production.
Affordable postal rates are vital to the economic health of many
companies, especially magazines, catalog houses and the service
providers they use. The June 2002 rate hike alone represents a ten
percent increase for periodicals, and a nine percent increase for
catalogs. It is estimated that the combined effect of the past three
rate increases, totaling 22 percent over just 18 months, have cost the
magazine industry about $400 million.
In May I met with a group of about twenty Maine businessmen and women
involved in the mailing industry, who described for me the impact that
rising postal rates have on their businesses. One magazine publisher
told me that postage represents ten percent of her costs. I was amazed
to hear that one of the catalog busineses pays more for postage a year
than it pays to any one of the companies that supply the raw materials
for its products. It was also startling to hear from one printer that
his postage costs have doubled over the last ten years.
Most of the people I met with are small business owners, and there
are millions more across the country, all grappling with the same
effects of rapidly rising postage costs.
At the request of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and House
Committee on Government Reform, the Postal Service produced a
comprehensive Transformation Plan, which it presented to Congress in
April. The Plan addresses general measures that the Postal Service
believes it needs to take to ensure its survival, but it fails to lay
out specific steps the Postal Service will take and a timeline for
action. It is also unclear whether these measures will result in the
cost savings necessary to ensure the long-term survival of the Postal
Service.
Many attempts have been made to reform the Postal Service over the
years. My colleagues in the House of Representatives have tried for
nearly eight years to pass postal reform legislation, but to no avail.
Stakeholders have widely diverging views on what shape postal reform
should take, if any. This lack of consensus on how or whether to deal
with divisive issues has led only to stalemates in Congress.
To take a fresh look at these difficult issues, I rise today to
introduce legislation establishing a Presidential Postal Commission
charged with examining the problems that the Postal Service faces, and
developing specific recommendations and legislative proposals that
Congress and the Postal Service can implement. Precedent exists for
such a commission. In the late 1960s, the Kappel Commission was formed
to resolve the crisis situation that the former Postal Department then
found itself in, train cars of undelivered mail, strikes, and a host of
other problems. The Kappel Commission's efforts laid the groundwork for
the Postal Service we have today, which has functioned admirably for
many years but is now in serious trouble.
Mindful of the body of work that has been done in this area by my
colleagues in the House and Senate, by the General Accounting Office,
by the Postal Service itself and by others, I intend that this
commission have a short life of one year, during which it will carry
out its study and produce legislative proposals for consideration by
the Administration and the Congress.
Finally, I intend that the commission consider all relevant aspects
of the Postal Service. Everything should be put on the table and
evaluated. We need to ensure that the Postal Service will stand up to
the challenges it is facing today and will face tomorrow.
These and many more issues must be examined in depth, if we are to
preserve this vital service upon which so many Americans rely for
communication and for their livelihood. The Postal Service has
successfully overcome numerous difficulties over its 226-year history,
and has continued to deliver the mail faithfully. Yet it has reached a
critical juncture and once again, it is time for a thorough evaluation
of the Postal Service's operations and requirements.
______
By Mr. SANTORUM (for himself and Mr. SPECTER):
S. 2755. A bill to require the Secretary of the Treasury to mint
coins in commemoration of the opening of the National Constitution
Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania scheduled for
[[Page S7040]]
July 4, 2003; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President I am pleased to introduce legislation
along with my colleague Senator Specter to establish a one dollar
silver coin that will benefit the National Constitution Center in
Philadelphia, PA.
As the first national center of its kind in the country, the National
Constitution Center will promote understanding of the United States
Constitution and its values. The events of the past year in our nation
as well as recent judicial rulings have brought increased attention to
those principles and values that define and bind us as Americans. All
would agree that the United States Constitution is central to defining
our country, who we are, and how we live as Americans. Even as we often
debate in the halls of Congress and the Supreme Court those policies
and laws that best reflect the values and intent of the Constitution,
we all recognize the freedoms and opportunity that this remarkable
document secures for us.
The National Constitution Center has been an important project in
Philadelphia with which Senator Specter and I have been involved.
Construction began on September 17, 2000. When the Constitution Center
is completed as expected on July 4, 2003, it will be a key feature of a
revitalized Independence Mall where it will join Independence Hall and
the Liberty Bell. The issuance of this coin would coincide with the
opening of the Center.
I encourage all of my colleagues to support the National Constitution
Center by cosponsoring this bill.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the
record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``National Constitution Center
Commemorative Coin Act of 2002''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds that--
(1) a Constitutional Convention was convened in the summer
of 1787 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for the purposes of
replacing the failed Articles of Confederation as a framework
for governing the 13 American colonies newly independent from
Great Britain;
(2) the United States Constitution produced by the
Convention would set the United States of America on a unique
course of experiment in self-government that would profoundly
impact the United States and the world;
(3) in its deliberations and promotion through such
literary works as The Federalist Papers, the United States
Constitution drew upon the successes and failures of nations
and peoples dating as far back as the city-state republics of
ancient Greece in forming representative governments;
(4) the first 10 amendments to the Constitution, known as
the Bill of Rights, comprise the best written set of legal
protections of the rights and dignity of the individual in
the history of human civilization and continue to be the
benchmark for nations' adherence to human rights standards;
(5) the principles of the United States Constitution have
been enacted into the governing laws of numerous free
countries around the globe, and are reflected in the founding
documents of the United Nations;
(6) the United States Constitution created the framework
for what is now the oldest representative democracy in the
world;
(7) in its wisdom, the Constitutional Convention created a
mechanism through which the United States Constitution can be
perfected, as it has been 27 times to date, to better reflect
its founding ideals, as well as to accommodate changing
circumstances;
(8) the rights and freedoms secured to Americans by the
United States Constitution have and continue to draw millions
from around the globe to the shores of this Nation;
(9) all Americans should gain an understanding of and
appreciation for the United States Constitution and the role
this remarkable document plays in the freedoms and quality of
life they enjoy;
(10) the National Constitution Center was established by
the Constitution Heritage Act of 1988 (16 U.S.C. 407aa et
seq.), which was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan
on September 16, 1988, to provide for continuing
interpretation of the Constitution and to establish a
national center for the United States Constitution; and
(11) the National Constitution Center, located at the site
of the birth of the Constitution, only steps away from the
Liberty Bell and Independence Hall in the Independence
National Historic Park in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is the
only center in the world solely dedicated to promoting
understanding of the Constitution and its values and ideals.
SEC. 3. COIN SPECIFICATIONS.
(a) $1 Silver Coins.--The Secretary of the Treasury (in
this Act referred to as the ``Secretary'') shall mint and
issue not more than 500,000 $1 coins, which shall--
(A) weigh 26.73 grams;
(B) have a diameter of 1.500 inches; and
(C) contain 90 percent silver and 10 percent copper.
(b) Legal Tender.--The coins minted under this Act shall be
legal tender, as provided in section 5103 of title 31, United
States Code.
SEC. 4. SOURCES OF BULLION.
The Secretary may obtain silver for minting coins under
this Act from stockpiles established under the Strategic and
Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, to the extent available,
and from other available sources, if necessary.
SEC. 5. DESIGN OF COINS.
(a) Design Requirements.--
(1) In general.--The design of the coins minted under this
Act shall be emblematic of the National Constitution Center
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
(2) Designation and inscriptions.--On each coin minted
under this Act, there shall be--
(A) a designation of the value of the coin;
(B) an inscription of the year ``2003''; and
(C) inscriptions of the words ``Liberty'', ``In God We
Trust'', ``United States of America'', and ``E Pluribus
Unum''.
(b) Design Selection.--The design for the coins minted
under this Act shall be--
(1) selected by the Secretary, after consultation with the
Constitution Center Coin Advisory Committee; and
(2) reviewed by the Citizens Commemorative Coin Advisory
Committee.
SEC. 6. ISSUANCE OF COINS.
(a) Quality of Coins.--Coins minted under this Act shall be
issued in uncirculated and proof qualities.
(b) Mint Facility.--Only 1 facility of the United States
Mint may be used to mint coins under this Act.
(c) Period for Issuance.--The Secretary may issue coins
minted under this Act beginning on January 1, 2003, and
ending when the quantity of coins issued under this Act
reaches the limit under section 3(a).
SEC. 7. SALE OF COINS.
(a) Sale Price.--The coins minted under this Act shall be
sold by the Secretary at a price equal to the sum of--
(1) the face value of the coins;
(2) the surcharge provided in subsection (d) with respect
to such coins; and
(3) the cost of designing and issuing the coins (including
labor, materials, dies, use of machinery, overhead expenses,
marketing, and shipping).
(b) Bulk Sales.--The Secretary shall make bulk sales of the
coins issued under this Act at a reasonable discount.
(c) Prepaid Orders.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall accept prepaid orders
for the coins minted under this Act before the issuance of
such coins.
(2) Discount.--Sale prices with respect to prepaid orders
under paragraph (1) shall be at a reasonable discount.
(d) Surcharges.--All sales of coins issued under this Act
shall include a surcharge established by the Secretary, in an
amount equal to not more than $10 per coin.
SEC. 8. DISTRIBUTION OF SURCHARGES.
(a) In General.--Subject to section 5134(f) of title 31,
United States Code, the proceeds from the surcharges received
by the Secretary from the sale of coins minted under this Act
shall be paid promptly by the Secretary to the National
Constitution Center.
(b) Use of Proceeds.--The proceeds received by the National
Constitution Center under subsection (a) shall be used by the
Center to promote a greater understanding of the Constitution
and its values and ideals.
(c) Audits.--The Comptroller General of the United States
shall have the right to examine such books, records,
documents, and other data of the National Constitution Center
as may be related to the expenditures of amounts paid under
subsection (a).
SEC. 8. FINANCIAL ASSURANCES.
(a) No Net Cost to the Government.--The Secretary shall
take such actions as may be necessary to ensure that minting
and issuing coins under this Act will not result in any net
cost to the United States Government.
(b) Payment for Coins.--A coin shall not be issued under
this Act, unless the Secretary has received--
(1) full payment for the coin;
(2) security satisfactory to the Secretary to indemnify the
United States for full payment; or
(3) a guarantee of full payment satisfactory to the
Secretary from a depository institution, the deposits of
which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation or the National Credit Union Administration.
______
By Mr. JEFFORDS (for himself, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Schumer, and Mrs.
Clinton):
S. 2756. A bill to establish the Champlain Valley National Heritage
Partnership in the States of Vermont and New York, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I am very pleased to introduce the
Champlain Valley National Heritage Act of 2002. I am joined by Senator
Leahy and
[[Page S7041]]
Senators Schumer and Clinton of New York. This bill will establish a
National Heritage Partnership within the Champlain Valley. Passage of
this bill will culminate a process to enhance the incredible cultural
resources of the Champlain Valley.
The Champlain Valley of Vermont and New York has one of the richest
and most intact collections of historic resources in the United States.
Fort Ticonderoga still stands where it has for centuries, at the scene
of numerous battles critical to the birth of our Nation. Revolutionary
gunboats have recently been found fully intact on the bottom of Lake
Champlain. Our cemeteries are the permanent resting place for great
explorers, soldiers and sailors. The United States and Canada would not
exist today but for events that occurred in this region.
We in Vermont and New York take great pride in our history. We
preserve it, honor it and show it off to visitors from around the
world. These visitors are also very important to our economy. Tourism
is among the most important industries in this region and has much
potential for growth.
The Champlain Valley Heritage Partnership will bring together more
than one hundred local groups working to preserve and promote our
heritage. Up to $2 million a year will be made available from the
National Park Service though the Lake Champlain Basin Program to
support local efforts to preserve and interpret our heritage and
present it to the world. Most of the funding will be given to small
communities to help preserve their heritage and develop economic
opportunities.
This project has taken many years for me to bring to the point of
introducing legislation. This has been time well spent working at the
grass-roots level to develop a framework to direct federal resources to
where it will do the most good. I am confident that we have found the
best model. This will be a true partnership that supports each member
but does not impose any new Federal requirements.
The Champlain Valley National Heritage Partnership will preserve our
historic resources, interpret and teach about the events that shaped
our Nation and will be an engine for economic growth. I am hopeful that
this bill soon become law.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am very pleased to join with my Senate
colleagues from Vermont and New York as we introduce the Lake Champlain
Heritage Act of 2002. With this legislation, we will take an important
step in recognizing the importance of the Lake Champlain Valley in the
history of America.
I want to thank Senator Jeffords and his staff for all the work they
have put into this effort. I know that many hours have gone into the
research, discussion and editing to get where we are today. I also want
to thank Senators Clinton and Schumer who are our valuable New York
partners in all things related to Lake Champlain.
Over the July 4th recess, I was able to participate in the Lake
Champlain Maritime Museum's opening of a new exhibit featuring
artifacts recovered from the 1776 Revolutionary War Battle of Valcour.
It was just 1 year ago that Senator Clinton and I were at the site of
the Battle to take part in the recovery and beginning of the
conservation process of those artifacts.
The Valcour Bay Research Project followed the 1997 discovery of the
missing American gunboat from the Battle. I bring this up because our
purpose today as we introduce this legislation underscores to the rest
of our Nation a message we Vermonters and New Yorkers have long
proclaimed: the role of Lake Champlain in the cause of American
independence cannot be overlooked.
The evidence of the struggle for this strategic waterway from the
days of Native American excursions, through the colonial rivalry
between Britain and France, our War of Independence, until the end of
the War of 1812, constantly surrounds those of us who make our homes in
this Valley.
This act is intended to advance the cultural heritage goals of
``Opportunities for Action,'' the comprehensive plan developed under
the Lake Champlain Special Designation Act by the Lake Champlain Basin
Program with broad public input and support as well as with the
involvement of local, State and Federal Governments.
We envision activities such as locally planned and managed heritage
networks and programs, a management strategy for the Lake's underwater
cultural resources and strengthening the links between cultural
resources and economic development. This legislation will also help
provide assistance as the 400th anniversary of Samuel De Champlain's
arrival in the Valley is commemorated in 2009.
Today, we are taking a significant step in helping all Americans
better appreciate the full history of the Lake Champlain Valley which
holds such an extensive collection of historic sites and artifacts.
As Vermonters and New Yorkers the stewards of Lake Champlain, we have
a serious responsibility to conserve this evidence for future
generations. We believe that what we do here, how we manage the
cultural heritage of the Valley, can contribute to the growing debate
on how present generations can live and prosper on the same ground that
we conserve as our natural and cultural heritage.
Our Vermont and New York Champlain Valley communities share this
heritage and have helped us develop a vision to enhance the
conservation, interpretation and enjoyment of our shared history and to
make it more readily available to residents and visitors alike. We can
help revitalize local economies and promote heritage tourism as we
improve the stewardship of the Valley's cultural legacy by making
additional resources available to communities and organizations through
the Lake Champlain Basin Program.
I think it is most fitting that we have come here together to
introduce this long-awaited bill, reasserting our partnership for Lake
Champlain: Vermont and New York engaged in a cooperative effort to
conserve, interpret, and honor our common heritage.
______
By Mr. BIDEN:
S. 2757. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to
provide coverage of outpatient prescription drugs under the medicare
program; to the Committee on Finance.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing a bill to add
outpatient prescription drug coverage as a new and integral benefit
under Part B of Medicare. Under this bill, like the rest of the
services under Part B, Medicare will pick up 80 percent of the cost of
prescription drugs. This would be the case until a beneficiary hits a
$4000 annual out-of-pocket limit, at which point the government picks
up 100 percent of drug costs. Moreover, beneficiaries will not have to
pay increased monthly premiums or annual deductibles as a result of
this new drug benefit.
Now, we have been discussing prescription drug coverage for seniors
in this chamber for many years, and there have been numerous proposals
brought forward. Some might ask, why do you feel the need to propose
your own prescription drug plan; what is wrong with the many previous
proposals.
Well, to my way of thinking, we have lost our focus on this issue. In
developing a drug plan, we have concentrated too much on such things as
budget allotments, philosophy of government, desires of committee
chairs, election politics, and other related issues, while ignoring the
one thing that really counts: what do the citizens of this country, the
ones who are supposed to use this plan, really want? All of these
prescription drug plans will be voluntary, and yet unless a plan is
attractive enough to ensure the participation of close to 100 percent
of those eligible, it probably won't work from an economic point of
view. Those of us who were around in 1988 for the debates about
catastrophic health care remember with great clarity the consequences
of passing a health-related bill that the citizens don't want.
Frankly, I have some doubts about whether any of the prescription
drug proposals to date provide what the citizens in Delaware or
elsewhere really want. And I think I have a pretty good idea of what
people want in a prescription drug plan, at least people in my home
state of Delaware. I live in Delaware, and I commute back and forth on
AMTRAK every day between Delaware and Washington DC. I have been a
Senator for 30 years and people in Delaware know me well. They have no
reluctance about walking up to me at the local diner, on the train, or
at the drugstore, to give me a piece of their
[[Page S7042]]
minds. And here is what Delawareans want in a prescription drug bill.
They want something simple and easily understandable. They don't want
a plan with a lot of fine print, exclusions, complicated payment
formulas, gaps in coverage, lengthy paragraphs filled with whereases
and wherefores. They don't want to be in a state of constant anxiety
because they really don't know what they have signed up for and what
they are covered for. They don't want to have to spend hours on the
phone listening to music while waiting for an insurance company clerk
to answer the phone and try to explain what the benefits are. They
don't want to spend a whole day filling out paperwork to try to get
reimbursed for their expenses when they could just as well be playing
with their grandchildren. They don't want to be caught in the middle of
a fight between their drug insurance plan and their Medicare over who
is going to pay for what.
They want a plan that provides meaningful and substantial financial
help towards the cost of their medications. For most people I talk to,
a cut in prescription drug costs from $5000 per year down to $4700 per
year is not very helpful; they are still faced with choosing between
paying for medications and paying for rent. With the increasing costs
of prescription drugs these days, this is a criterion that is just as
important to the middle class as it is to those with low incomes.
They want a plan that is stable, reliable, and predictable. They
don't want to sign up with an insurance company and then have the
company pull out of the state the following year. They don't want the
specifics of their benefits to be changing every year. They want to
know what they are getting.
They want a guarantee that a plan will be available to them. They
don't want a guarantee that a plan will be available only if an
insurance company decides it will offer a plan or if an insurance
company decides they are a good risk.
They want a plan that is uniform, not one whose benefits change
drastically if they happen to move a few miles. Delaware is a small
state, and people who live or work in Delaware move back and forth
across state lines with great frequency.
My prescription drug bill is focused on what consumers want, and it
fulfills all of these requirements. People are already very familiar
with Medicare Part B, so the addition of a prescription drug benefit
will not add any confusion. People know that Medicare is stable,
reliable, predictable, and the same all over the country. People know
that Medicare Part B covers a substantial 80 percent of their medical
expense. We know that people like Medicare Part B, since 94 percent of
those eligible have voluntarily signed up for it. The addition of a new
prescription drug benefit to Part B, without any change in monthly
premiums or deductibles, is almost certain to increase the voluntary
participation rate close to 100 percent.
Can we afford such a bill? Absolutely. It's just a matter of
priorities and choices. And these choices simply reflect our values. My
values tell me that providing life-saving prescription drugs to the
seniors and disabled is a higher priority than, say, making permanent a
tax cut for the well-to-do that they probably don't need and have not
really requested.
Many of my colleagues in the Senate, and a large number of their
staff, have been working enormously hard to develop a Medicare
prescription drug bill that satisfies everybody's concerns. However, I
am reminded of the statement by the noted British engineer Sir Alec
Issigonis, who commented that ``A camel is a horse designed by
committee''. If the public is expecting a horse, we better not end up
with a camel.
Our current situation here in Congress brings to mind a story related
by a local TV weatherman here in Washington, DC. This weatherman works
in a very high tech underground office with fancy color radars,
computers, split-second communications devices, and state of the art
graphics. Yet before each broadcast, the weatherman goes upstairs and
looks out the window to make sure it is not raining. I would ask my
colleagues, as they work through their cost estimates, economic
projections, and so forth in developing a prescription drug plan, to
walk upstairs and look out the window. Policy makers must not work in
protective isolation, in a vacuum; they need a strong dose of reality
to inform their deliberations.
I believe that my bill provides the kind of prescription drug plan
that Medicare beneficiaries in Delaware, and around the country, really
want. I encourage my colleagues to keep the wants of their constituents
foremost as they move to craft a vitally-needed prescription drug bill
for Medicare beneficiaries.
______
By Mr. DODD (for himself, Ms. Snower, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Reed, Mr.
Bingaman, Mrs. Clinton, Mrs. Murray, and Mr. Edwards):
S. 2758. A bill entitled ``The Child Care and Development Block Grant
Amendments Act''; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I am pleased to join with my colleagues
Senator Snowe, Senator Jeffords, Senator Reed, Senator Bingaman,
Senator Clinton, Senator Murray, and Senator Edwards today in
introducing the new Access to High Quality Child Care Act.
On April 11, I introduced, S. 2117, which represented a bipartisan
partnership with the Senate Finance Committee and Senate Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions, HELP, Committee to both improve the
quality of child care and expand the availability of child care. The
bill that we are introducing today further strengthens and improves
that legislation.
Compared to S. 2117, the new legislation we are introducing today:
further strengthens the coordination among agencies and outreach about
the availability of child care assistance, so that the child care
agency and TANF agency coordinate in providing information to eligible
parents about the availability of child care assistance; includes a new
section to improve parent access to the process of obtaining child care
subsidies; strengthens accountability for the use of quality funds by
requiring States to set State child care quality goals, set
quantifiable measures for each goal; and requires States to describe
their progress in meeting each goal in an annual report; strengthens
provisions to improve the quality and availability of child care for
infants and toddlers, child care for disabled children, and child care
for children who need care during nontraditional hours; allows States
to operate an At Home Infant Care program to improve the quality of
care for infants, currently successful in Montana and Minnesota;
consolidates the general quality setaside and the child care workforce
development setaside under S. 2117 into one 10 percent quality setaside
to be used by States to improve the quality of care that children
receive, regardless of setting; consolidates data collection under
current law to make data collection and reporting requirements easier
for States while retaining useful information for policymakers; deletes
the section on school readiness incentive grants under S. 2117,
instead, replacing these grants with the text of S. 2566, the Early
Care and Education Act authorized separately under Title III of this
new legislation; shifts the text of the Child Care Centers in Federal
Facilities Act and the Technical and Financial Assistance Grants Act
under S. 2117 to Title II of the new bill as separate authorizations;
adds the text of the Book Stamps Act to Title II as a separate
authorization; and, authorizes $1 billion in FY2003 and such sums as
necessary in the out years 2004-2007.
In short, the Access to High Quality Child Care Act is about putting
``Development'' back into the Child Care and Development Block Grant.
The fact is that 78 percent of school-age parents are working today;
65 percent of parents with children under 6 are working today; and,
over half of mothers with infants are in the workforce today.
That means about 14 million children, including 6 million infants and
toddlers, under the age of 5 are in some type of child care
arrangement. Many of them are in child care every week for many hours.
While their parents work, children are being cared for in a variety
of settings. Some of them are very good, but sadly, some of them are
not. What we know is that 46 percent of kindergarten
[[Page S7043]]
teachers report that half or more of their students enter kindergarten
not ready to learn.
This new legislation that we are introducing today further
strengthens our efforts to improve the quality of care to promote
school readiness while expanding child care assistance to more working
poor families.
We filed this legislation yesterday in the HELP Committee and will
proceed to markup next Wednesday, July 24th. I urge my colleagues to
join us in supporting this legislation that so many working families
with children need.
I ask unanimous consent that summary of the legislation be printed in
the Record.
There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
The 2002 Access Act--The Access to High Quality Child Care Act Brief
Summary
Background: The Access to High Quality Child Care is about
putting ``Development'' back into the Child Care and
Development Block Grant. About 14 million children, including
6 million infants and toddlers, under the age of 5 are in
some type of child care arrangement. Many of them are in
child care every week for many hours. The fact is that 78% of
school-age parents are working today; 65% of parents with
children under 6 are working today; and, over half of mothers
with infants are in the workforce today. While these parents
work, their children are being cared for in a variety of
settings--some of which are very good, but sadly, some of
them are not. What we know is that 46% of kindergarten
teachers report that half or more of their students enter
kindergarten not ready to learn. This reauthorization bill is
geared toward improving the quality of care to promote school
readiness while expanding child care assistance to more
working poor families.
Key Provisions: The Child Care and Development Block Grant
is designed to give parents maximum choice among child care
providers. The bill retains parental choice, but provides
states with a number of ways to help child care providers
improve the quality of care that they provide. The 2002
Access Act will: Strengthen the coordination among agencies
and outreach about the availability of child care assistance;
Promote greater coordination among federal, state, and local
care and early childhood development programs, including the
transition from early care programs to elementary school; Set
aside 10% of CCDBG funds to improve the quality of child care
for any of the following activities--initiatives to improve
recruitment, education, and retention of child care staff;
initiatives to improve the quality and availability of care
for infants and toddlers, children with disabilities, or care
during nontraditional hours; resource and referral services;
training and technical assistance; grants or loans to improve
provider compliance with state or local law; support for
states to monitor compliance or other activities deemed by
the state to improve the quality of care, including the
provision of emergency child care.
Improve the accountability of the use of quality funds by
requiring states to set quality improvement goals that are
measurable to ensure that states are making progress in
improving the quality of child care. Set aside 5% of CCDBG
funds to help states increase the reimbursement rate for
child care providers to ensure that parents have real choices
among quality providers. Under current law, CCDBG payment
rates are supposed to be sufficient ``to ensure equal access
for eligible children to comparable child care services in
the state or substate area that are provided to children
whose parents are not eligible to receive assistance''. But,
current low state reimbursement rates do not offer parents
comparable care for their children.
Allow states to operate an at-home infant care program to
promote the quality of care for infants.
The children of working parents need quality child care if
they are to enter school ready to learn. Yet, 30 states
require no training in early childhood development before a
teacher walks into a child care classroom. 42 states require
no training in early childhood development before a family
day care provider opens its home to unrelated children. The
2002 Access Act will: Require states to set training
standards, just as they are required to do now for health and
safety under current law. Such training would go beyond CPR
and first aid to include training in the social, emotional,
physical, and cognitive development of children.
Exempt relatives from the training requirements, but
through the quality funding in CCDBG states could partner
with colleges and R&Rs to provide training to relatives and
informal caregivers on a voluntary basis. Initial evaluations
in Connecticut of such efforts show that relatives and
informal caregivers are voluntarily participating and are
feeling better about themselves and their interactions with
the children have improved.
Reduce administrative barriers and improve coordination
among agencies so that low income working parents can more
easily access the process for obtaining and retaining child
care assistance.
Separate Authorizations for Quality Child Care Initiatives
Separate authorizations include the following measures: the
Child Care Centers in Federal Facilities Act, the Technical
and Financial Assistance Grants Act, the Book Stamps Act, and
the Early Care & Education Act.
______
By Mr. HOLLINGS (for himself, Mr. Lott, and Mr. Breaux):
S. 2759. A bill to protect the health and safety of American
consumers under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act from seafood
contaminated by certain substances; to the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions.
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise today as Chairman of the
Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee to introduce the Seafood
Safety Enforcement Act of 2002. I am pleased to be joined by the
Republican minority leader, Senator Trent Lott, and by Senator John
Breaux, both distinguished members of the Commerce Committee. This Act
would ensure that imports of seafood into the United States are meeting
the same food safety standards imposed on seafood that originates from
the United States.
Shrimp and other seafood harvested and processed in the United States
is some of the best quality seafood in the world. I know how hard the
shrimpers in my State of South Carolina work to bring good, wholesome
products to our tables. To preserve the quality of seafood, the United
States has established rigorous food standards to protect the health
and well-being of American consumers. As part of that approach, we have
banned the use of certain harmful substances in food-producing animals
due to the extreme hazards they pose to human health. While these
standards also apply to imported foods that cross our borders, these
protections cannot be enforced without adequate inspection and testing.
Unfortunately, not all countries are applying the same rigorous
standards that the United States demands for our consumers. In the last
few months, one of the banned substances, namely the antibiotic
chloramphenicol, was detected in shrimp and other food product imported
from several countries to the United States, the European Union and
Canada. Shockingly these substances have not been detected by the
inspectors for the federal Food and Drug Administration, FDA, the
agency responsible for protecting U.S. consumers from adulterated food
imports. Rather, these substances were detected in the United States by
independent testing done by State authorities in Louisiana.
While these products are prohibited by law, FDA testing has never
detected such substances in food imports. We were alarmed to discover
that FDA currently tests only 1 to 2 percent of all food imports for
compliance with food safety standards. This failure to detect such
substances may be due not only to inadequate frequency of testing, but
also may be attributed to inadequate testing methods employed by the
FDA. While the testing protocol used in Europe and Canada can detect
such substances to 0.3 parts per billion ppb, FDA until very recently
used a technique that only measures up to 3 ppb, and now is using a
test that only detects to 1 ppb.
It is vital that we close this inspection gap at our borders and
ensure the safety of our food supply, while not placing unreasonable
burdens on the men and women who are tasked with this huge inspection
job. This bill would ensure that U.S. consumers are protected from
serious health risks associated with harmful substances, while allowing
the continued flow of imports that are shown to be free of these
harmful substances. It would require FDA to ensure that imports
suspected of containing such substances are demonstrated to meet food
safety standards. Such demonstration would be made by the importer or
exporter, and subject to FDA approval.
Due to the health threats posed by such substances in our food
supply, and the national interest of having a uniform inspection and
testing standard, federal action is appropriate. This bill provides the
safety and security we seek, while not placing unreasonable burdens on
our federal food safety inspection system.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the
Record.
[[Page S7044]]
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2759
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Seafood Safety Enforcement
Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
(1) Chloramphenicol, a potent antibiotic, can cause severe
toxic effects in humans, including hypo-aplastic anemia,
which is usually irreversible and fatal. The drug is
administered to humans only in life-threatening situations
when less toxic drugs are not effective.
(2) Because of these human health impacts, chloramphenicol
and similar drugs are not approved for use in food-producing
animals in the United States. However, other countries have
been found to use these drugs in the aquaculture of shrimp
and other seafood, including Thailand, Vietnam, and China.
(3) The majority of shrimp consumed by the United States is
imported. The nation imports 400,000 metric tons of shrimp
annually, and the percentage of shrimp imports rises each
year. Thailand and Vietnam are the top two exporters of
shrimp to the United States, and China is the fifth largest
exporter of shrimp to the United States.
(4) Upon detection of chloramphenicol in certain shipments
of seafood from China and other nations, in 2002 the European
Union and Canada severely restricted imports of shrimp and
other food from these nations.
(5) The United States Food and Drug Administration inspects
only 2 percent of all seafood imports into the United States
and utilizes a testing procedure that cannot detect the
presence of chloramphenicol below 1 part per billion. The
European Union and Canada use testing protocols that can
detect such substances to 0.3 parts per billion.
(6) While Food and Drug Administration import testing did
not detect chloramphenicol in shrimp imported from these
nations in 2002, independent testing performed by the state
of Louisiana detected chloramphenicol at a level of over 2
parts per billion in crawfish imported from China.
(7) Imports of seafood from nations that utilize substances
banned in the United States pose potential threats to United
States consumers. Denial of entry to contaminated shrimp and
other products to the European Union and Canada will likely
redirect imports to the United States of contaminated
products turned away from these countries.
(8) Immediate and focused actions must be taken by the
Federal government to improve enforcement of food import
restrictions of seafood imports in order to protect United
States consumers and ensure safety of the food supply.
SEC. 3. CONTAMINATED SEAFOOD.
Section 801 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21
U.S.C. 381) is amended by--
(1) striking all of the text in the third sentence of
subsection (a) after ``section 505,'' and inserting ``or (4)
such article is seafood that appears to bear or contain one
or more substances listed in section 530.41(a) of title 21,
Code of Federal Regulations, or (5) such article is seafood
originating from an exporter or country that the Secretary
has identified in guidance as a likely source of articles
subject to refusal of admission under clause (4) of this
sentence, then such article shall be refused admission,
except as provided in subsection (c) of this section and,
with respect to articles subject to clause (5) of this
sentence, except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section.'';
(2) redesignating subsections (b) through (n) as
subsections (c) through (o), respectively; and
(3) inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b)(1) Notwithstanding clause (5) of the third sentence
in subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary may permit
individual shipments of seafood originating in a country or
from an exporter listed in guidance to be admitted into the
United States if evidence acceptable to the Secretary is
presented that the seafood in that shipment does not bear or
contain a substance listed in section 530.41(a) of title 21,
Code of Federal Regulations.
``(2) The Secretary may remove a country or exporter listed
in guidance under clause (5) of the third sentence of
subsection (a) of this section only if the country or
exporter has shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary that
each substance at issue is no longer sold for use in, being
used in, or being used in a manner that could contaminate
food-producing animals in the country at issue.''.
SEC. 4. GUIDANCE FOR REFUSING ENTRY OF SEAFOOD FROM A COUNTRY
OR EXPORTER.
(a) Issuance of Guidance.--Upon a determination by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services that, based on
information acceptable to the Secretary, an exporter or
country appears to be a source of articles subject to refusal
under section 801(a)(4) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 381(a)(4)), the Secretary shall issue
guidance described in section 801(a)(5) of that Act.
(b) Determination Criteria.--In making the determination
described in subsection (a), or any determination under
section 801(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(21 U.S.C. 381(a)), the Secretary may consider--
(A) the detection of substances described in section
801(a)(4) of that Act by the Secretary;
(B) the detection of such substances by a person
commissioned to carry out examinations and investigations
under section 702(a) of that Act;
(C) findings from an inspection under section 704 of that
Act;
(D) the detection by other importing countries of such
substances in shipments of seafood that originate from such
country or exporter; and
(E) other evidence or information as determined by the
Secretary.
(c) Annual Report.--The Secretary shall provide a report
within 30 days after the end of each fiscal year to the
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
and the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and
Commerce setting forth the names of all countries and
exporters for which the guidance described in subsection (a)
was issued during that fiscal year.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act, and no
amendment made by this Act, shall be construed to limit the
existing authority of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services or the Secretary of the Treasury to consider any
information or to refuse admission of any article under
section 801(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(21 U.S.C. 381(a)).
SEC. 5. ISSUANCE OF TOLERANCES.
If, after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services intends to issue a tolerance
under section 512(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (21 U.S.C. 360b(b)) for any of the substances listed in
section 530.41(a) of title 21, Code of Federal Regulations,
then the Secretary shall notify the Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions and the House of
Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce before
issuing that tolerance. The Secretary shall include in the
notification a draft of any changes in Federal statute law
that may be necessary.
SEC. 6. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
Section 801 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21
U.S.C. 381), as amended by subsection (a), is amended by--
(1) striking ``subsection (b)'' in subsection (d), as
redesignated by section 2(2) of this Act, and inserting
``subsection (c)'';
(2) striking ``subsection (e)'' in paragraph (1) of
subsection (g), as redesignated by section 2(2) of this Act,
and inserting ``subsection (f)'';
(3) striking ``section 801(a)'' in paragraph (1)(A)(i) of
subsection (h), as redesignated by section 2(2) of this Act,
and inserting ``subsection (a) of this section'';
(4) striking ``section 801(a)'' in paragraph (1)(A)(ii) of
subsection (h), as redesignated by section 2(2) of this Act,
and inserting ``subsection (a) of this section'';
(5) striking ``section 801(d)(1);'' in paragraph
(1)(A)(iii) of subsection (h), as redesignated by section
2(2) of this Act, and inserting ``subsection (e)(1) of this
section;''.
(6) striking ``Subsection (b)'' in paragraph (2) of
subsection (k), as redesignated by section 2(2) of this Act,
and inserting ``Subsection (c)'';
(7) striking ``Subsection (b)'' in paragraph (1) of
subsection (l), as redesignated by section 2(2) of this Act,
and inserting ``Subsection (c)'';
(8) striking ``Subsection (b)'' in subsection (m), as
redesignated by section 2(2) of this Act, and inserting
``Subsection (c)''; and
(9) striking ``Subsection (b)'' in paragraph (2)(B)(i) of
subsection (n), as redesignated by section 2(2) of this Act,
and inserting ``Subsection (c)''.
______
By Mr. SPECTER (for himself and Mr. Harkin):
S.J. Res. 41. A joint resolution calling for Congress to consider and
vote on a resolution for the use of force by the United States Armed
Forces against Iraq before such force is deployed; to the Committee on
Foreign Relations.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I sought recognition to introduce a joint
resolution on behalf of Senator Harkin and myself calling upon the
Congress to consider, vote on, and enact a joint resolution authorizing
the use of force by the U.S. Armed Forces against Iraq before such
force is used.
This resolution takes no position as to whether the use of force
should be authorized or it should not be authorized, but goes to the
essential authority of the Congress under the Constitution to declare
war.
The President's powers as Commander in Chief are reserved for an
emergency where Congress does not have an opportunity to deliberate and
decide. It is obvious that concerning the current situation with Iraq,
there is ample time for a resolution of the issue by the Congress.
There have been repeated statements by the administration relating to
military action against Saddam Hussein. It is known that Saddam has
weapons of mass destruction, such as chemicals which he used against
the Kurds, and there exists evidence of biological
[[Page S7045]]
weapons that he possesses. The best thinking is Saddam does not now
have nuclear bombs but is trying to acquire them.
The President of the United States, in his State of the Union speech,
identified Iraq, along with Iran and North Korea, as the ``axis of
evil.'' Secretary of State Powell in congressional testimony then
testified that the United States was not going to go to war against
either Iran or North Korea, raising the inference that war against Iraq
by negative implication was a distinct possibility.
There have been repeated requests for regime change by the
administration. In lieu of the limited time, I will not enumerate them,
although they are set forth in some detail in my prepared statement.
On February 13, 2002, I spoke on the floor calling for hearings by
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and/or the Senate Armed Services
Committee, and by letters dated February 14, 2002, and March 12, 2002,
wrote to the respective chairmen of those committees. I am glad to note
that Senator Biden, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has
called for a September hearing on the Iraq issue.
The power of the Congress on the declaration of war has been eroded
very materially, with the President taking unilateral action in Korea,
Vietnam, Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Somalia, and Kosovo. But in a
situation where there is ample time for the Congress to deliberate and
decide, the Congress should assert its constitutional authority.
Among the many issues regarding the separation of powers, none is
more important than this basic power to declare war and the separate
power which the President has as Commander in Chief which sometimes
conflict, but not in the situation such as the one at hand where we
have time to deliberate and decide.
Earlier this month, I conducted some 19 town meetings across my State
of Pennsylvania and found a great deal of citizen concern. People are
unaware of the details and would like to know more.
In my February 13, 2002 floor speech, I enumerated a number of issues
which are worth repeating. First, hearings would identify with greater
precision what Saddam has by way of weapons of mass destruction.
Secondly, we would get into the details as to what Saddam and Iraq
have done by way of thwarting the United Nations from conducting
inspections. Earlier this year, I met with Secretary General Kofi Annan
to get a firsthand briefing and to press the U.N. to do everything it
could to get those inspections.
Another issue which I think needs to be subjected to analysis and
hearings and national debate is what the cost would be of toppling
Saddam, including the cost in casualties.
Fourth, what will happen after a regime change? What will happen if,
as and when Saddam goes?
There is also the critical issue as to what we may expect from Saddam
by way of reprisal or by way of anticipatory action. We know that
Saddam Hussein is ruthless. We have seen him use chemicals against his
own people, the Kurds. We have his statement just yesterday on the 24th
anniversary of the July revolution when Saddam came into power. It is a
belligerent, bellicose statement.
I had an opportunity to meet with Saddam Hussein in January of 1990
at a meeting with Senator Richard Shelby. There is no doubt in my mind,
from that contact--a meeting of about an hour and a quarter--that we
are dealing with someone who has a mindset and a determination, having
invaded Kuwait, having acted against the Kurds, that should give us
every reason to be concerned about what he may do in light of the
administration's repeated statements about a regime change; a concern
if there is action by the United States against Iraq that there may be
retaliation against Israel or others in the Mideast.
Consideration by the Congress also would be very helpful in
addressing the concerns which the international community has expressed
on the unilateralism of President Bush and President Bush's
administration. We have had instances of that: the International
Criminal Court, Kyoto, the U.N.-Bosnia peacekeeping force, and others
which I have enumerated in greater detail in the written statement
which I will include at the conclusion of these remarks.
If there are Members of the Senate and House who come forward and
support the President--people in this body with extensive experience in
the field over many years, respected international reputations--I think
that would give credence to a position that the President may wish to
take and would allay some of the concerns internationally on
unilateralism, and perhaps persuade some of our allies that this is the
right course of conduct.
In considering what to do about Saddam, we have the example fresh in
our mind of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. We have learned that 20/20
hindsight always being very good that we should have acted against bin
Laden before September 11. We had ample warning and ample cause to do
so. Bin Laden was under indictment for killing Americans in Mogadishu
in 1993. Bin Laden was under indictment for the East Africa Embassy
bombings in 1998. We knew he was involved in the U.S.S. Cole terrorism.
He had made pronouncements about a worldwide jihad. The United States
and the United Nations made demands on the Taliban to turn over bin
Laden, which were refused. So we had a right under international law to
proceed against bin Laden.
There is obviously great concern about Saddam Hussein or what the
future may hold if he goes unchecked. But these are all complicated
issues. There ought to be full hearings. The American people ought to
be informed. We have learned from the bitter experience of Vietnam what
happens when there is military action where the American people are not
supportive and the Congress is not supportive.
Obviously, in a representative democracy, the matter first comes to
the Congress. There is the precedent of President George H.W. Bush in
1991, when the Congress authorized a resolution for the use of force. I
know the Presiding Officer remembers it well, as do I. It was a
historic debate, and has been so characterized by the media and other
commentators. President Bush, in 1990, had originally said he did not
need congressional authorization. Then Senator Harkin took the floor on
January 3, 1991, during a swearing-in ceremony, and procedurally the
course that then followed, without going into great detail now, was
that we had the debate on January 10, 11, and 12 and voted 52 to 47 in
this body authorizing the use of force to repel Iraq from Kuwait. So
that precedent is with us.
There is no doubt that Congress is reluctant to step into the breach
and to take a position. I urged in 1998 that the Congress authorize the
use of force before President Clinton moved in with the missile attacks
against Iraq in December of 1998. My written statement goes into detail
as to what I have done on this issue going back to 1983, when I
conducted a debate with Senator Charles Percy on the question of Korea
and Vietnam being a war, and the questioning of Justice Souter in 1990
on whether Korea was a war. There has been a reluctance on the part of
Congress to step forward. If we do nothing and it all works out,
everything is fine, the Congress is happy. If the President acts
unilaterally and is wrong, he gets the blame and we do not get the
blame.
I believe we have a responsibility to step forward. We have a
responsibility institutionally under the Constitution to declare war,
and we have a responsibility to acquaint the American people as to what
is involved, and I think a responsibility to have this debate, to tell
our European allies what our reasons are for what we may do.
If there is to be military action against Saddam and Iraq, there is
no doubt it would be much stronger with a congressional resolution,
which implicitly carries the support of the American people. I think
the hearings which I have called for and the debate on the resolution
will do a great deal to inform the American people and the people of
the world as to what we are up to, and whatever justification it is we
have.
I understand that my distinguished colleague, Senator Harkin, will be
a cosponsor of this resolution.
Repeated statements from the administration carry the strong
suggestion that President Bush intends to take military action to
change the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. There
[[Page S7046]]
are good reasons to be concerned about Saddam Hussein's developing
weapons of mass destruction. Iraq's exclusion of UN inspectors raises
the inference he has something to hide.
On February 13, 2002, in a Senate floor statement, I urged that the
Senate Armed Services and/or Senate Foreign Relations Committee hold
hearings as much as possible in public with some necessarily in closed
sessions, to determine:
(1) The specifics on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction;
(2) Precisely what happened on the United Nations efforts to conduct
inspections in Iraq and Iraq's refusals;
(3) What type of a military action would be necessary to topple
Saddam, including estimates of U.S. casualties;
(4) What is anticipated in a change in regime in Iraq including
Saddam's prospective replacement.
Congressional Record, S730-731, February 13, 2002.
On April 4, 2002, I met with United Nations Secretary General Kofi
Annan urging the UN to press Iraq to submit to wide-open, including
surprise inspections, to determine the facts on Iraq's possession and
efforts to create weapons of mass destruction. Meetings between UN
officials and Iraqi representatives on May 1 and 3, 2002 produced no
results. Subsequent meetings between UN officials and Iraqi
representatives in early July produced no results.
A ranking U.S. intelligence official advised that wide-open and
surprise inspections in Iraq could provide reasonable assurances as to
what Iraq has by way of possessing and/or developing weapons of mass
destruction.
Presidents have acted unilaterally in the past half century in
initiating military actions in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Lebanon,
Panama, Somalia and Kosovo. In some of those situations where there was
not time for the Congress to deliberate and decide on a declaration of
war or an authorization for the use of force, it was appropriate for
the President to utilize his authority as Commander-in-Chief in an
emergency. There is now ample time for the Congress to hold hearings,
deliberate and take whatever action Congress deems appropriate
regarding Iraq.
There is a need for the American public to understand the issues
involved in the use of military force against Iraq. There has been some
public discussion, but relatively little. Congressional hearings would
stimulate a national dialogue on the nation's op-ed pages, radio and
television talk shows and in town halls across the country. I am glad
to see that Senator Joseph R. Biden, Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, has announced his committee will hold hearings on Iraq in
September.
In 19 town meetings, which I conducted across the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania this month, I heard considerable public concern and
confusion over the President's intentions as to Iraq. Public support,
reflected through the elected members of the House and Senate, is
indispensable to successfully carry out an extensive military action.
The United States learned a better lesson in Vietnam that a war cannot
be successfully fought without public and congressional support.
Consideration by the Congress on these key issues would provide a
basis for international understanding of our position and perhaps even
support in some quarters. There is a world view that President Bush too
often acts unilaterally on critical international issues such as the
International Criminal Court, the UN/Bosnia peacekeeping force, the
Kyoto Protocol, ABM Treaty withdrawal, and the Biological Weapons
Convention. If congressional consideration was followed by the
authorization for the use of force supported by thoughtful and
experienced members of the House and Senate, the international
community might well be reassured that the U.S. military action was not
the decision of just one man, even though he is the President of the
United States.
There is solid precedent for President George W. Bush to request
congressional authority for the use of force against Iraq, just as
President George H.W. Bush did in January, 1991. On December 21, 1990,
and as late as January 9, 1991, President Bush was quoted as saying a
congressional authorization was not necessary. See Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents, January 14, 1991. Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 24-25.
Many Senators, including Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island, Richard Lugar
of Indiana, Tom Harkin of Iowa, Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts,
Joseph R. Biden, Jr. of Delaware, Brock Adams of Washington and I
sought to force debate on a resolution that would require congressional
authorization for the use of force against Iraq. Congressional Record,
S 48, January 4, 1991; Congressional Record, S119-120, January 10,
1991; see also New York Times, October 18, 1990, page A1, ``Senators
Demand Role in Approving Any Move on Iraq;'' Washington Post, January
4, 1991, page A19, ``Canceling Recess, Lawmakers Prepare to Debate War
Powers.''
On January 3, 1991, the date that Senators who were elected and re-
elected the previous November took the oath of office, Senator Harkin
successfully sought Senate debate and a vote on a use-of-force
resolution. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell scheduled Senate
floor action for consideration of a resolution for the use of force on
January 10, 1991. Following a Senate debate which was characterized as
``historical'' by the Washington Post, the Senate authorized the use of
force against Iraq by a vote of 52 to 47. Congressional Record, S1018-
1019, January 12, 1991. Similarly, the House of Representatives passed
such a resolution by a vote of 250 to 183. Congressional Record, H1139-
1140, January 12, 1991.
With the repeated public commentary on the President's plans to use
force against Iraq, there has been public concern about what Saddam
Hussein might do in anticipation or retaliation. Saddam is well known
for his ruthlessness and his disdain for life by use of chemicals
against his own people, the Kurds. Saddam is widely reported to have
stockpiles of biological weapons. In a struggle for his own survival,
why should we expect Saddam Hussein to refrain from using every weapon
at his disposal against an announced attacker? A lengthy article in the
New York Times on July 6, 2002 concerning U.S. plans for widespread
inoculation for smallpox carried the implicit suggestion of a concern
for a bioterrorism attack.
Consideration by Congress on a resolution for the use of force
against Saddam would not impact on any potential element of surprise
because there is no element of surprise left. The news media has been
full of notice to Saddam of potential U.S. plans such as: The New York
Times February 16, 2002, edition which quoted Vice President Cheney as
saying, ``The President is determined to press on and stop Iraq . . .
from continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction'' and intends to
use ``the means at our disposal--including military, diplomatic and
intelligence to address these concerns'';
The Los Angeles Times on May 5, 2002, reported that the defense
Intelligence Agency has produced an operational support study on Iraq
including maps and data on geography, roads, refineries, communication
facilities, security organizations and military deployments;
The Washington Post reported on May 24, 2002, General Tommy R.
Franks, Commander of the U.S. Central Command, has briefed the
President concerning troop levels necessary to invade Iraq and oust
Saddam Hussein;
The New York Times on July 5, 2002, reported on an American military
document calling for air, land and sea based forces to attack Iraq and
topple Saddam Hussein;
The New York Times on July 9, 2002, quoted President Bush as saying
on Iraq: ``It's the stated policy of this government to have regime
change and it hasn't changed. And we'll use all tools at our disposal
to do so.''
In considering a pre-emptive strike against Iraq, we should
consider--not that it is determinative--the consequences of not acting
against al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden before September 11, 2001. We had
reason in that situation to anticipate a terrorist attack and we had
rights under international law to move against bin Laden and al-Qaeda
in a pre-emptive strike before September 11, 2001.
Prior to September 11, Osama bin Laden was under U.S. indictment for
killing Americans in Mogadishu in 1993. He was further under U.S.
indictment for the attacks against American embassies in 1998. He was
known to have been involved in the terrorist attack of the USS Cole.
Osama bin Laden
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had spoken repeatedly and publicly about his intention to carry out a
worldwide Jihad against the United States.
When the Taliban in control in Afghanistan refused to turn over bin
Laden to the United States after demands by the United States and the
United Nations, the United States had rights under international law to
use military force against al-Qaeda and bin Laden.
With congressional hearings as a start, the American people should be
informed about Iraq's threat and all our efforts to deal with this
threat short of use of military force. We should do our utmost to
organize an international coalition against Iraq, which President
George Bush did in 1991, specifying as much of the evidence as possible
in public congressional hearings in order to create American and
worldwide public support for appropriate action. Such public hearings
would be supplemented by classified information given to the leaders of
the prospective coalition.
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides that
``Congress has the authority to declare war.'' Article 2 Section 2 of
the United States Constitution provides that the President ``shall be
commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States. . . .''
In the past half century, there has been a consistent and
considerable erosion of Congress' constitutional authority to declare
war with a concomitant expansion of the President's powers as
Commander-in-Chief. My concerns about the erosion of congressional
authority to declare war first arose in 1951 when I was called to
active duty in the United States Air Force after having received in
R.O.T.C. commission as a second lieutenant upon graduation from the
University of Pennsylvania. I was glad to serve state-side from July
29, 1951 to July 31, 1953 as a special agent in the Office of Special
Investigations, noting that President Truman had acted on his authority
as Commander-in-Chief to order a ``police action'' without
congressional authorization.
Early in my Senate career, I participated extensively in floor debate
on the War Powers Resolution concerning U.S. military action in
Lebanon. On September 27, 1983, I questioned Senator Charles H. Percy,
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, as to whether Korea and
Vietnam were wars. Senator Percy stated that both Korea and Vietnam
were wars even though undeclared. Congressional Record, S. 12995,
September 27, 1983.
In 1983, I prepared a legal document for a declaratory judgment
action to take to the Supreme Court of the United States on the issue
of the constitutionality of the War Powers Act and seeking a judicial
determination of the respective authority of the President as
Commander-in-Chief and the Congress to declare war. It was my thought
that if the Congress and the President asked the Court to take
jurisdiction and decide this issue, the Court might do so although even
with such a joint request, the Supreme Court might be unwilling to be
involved in the so-called ``political thicket''. The Reagan
Administration was unwilling to join in such a request and
congressional leaders were reluctant to do so although no final
determination was made since the issue was rendered moot by the Reagan
Administration's declination. Understandably, the parties preferred to
leave the issue ambiguous with a resolution on a case-by-case basis in
the political process without a finite judicial determination.
I pursued my inquiries by questioning Supreme Court nominees as to
whether Korea was a war. In confirmation hearings for Justice David
Souter on September 14, 1990, I questioned him as to whether Korea was
a war, whether the Presidents exceeded their constitutional authority
in military action in Korea and Vietnam and whether the War Powers Act
was unconstitutional in violating presidential powers as Commander-in-
Chief. Justice Souter declined to express an opinion stating, in
effect, that there was no law to guide him in answering these
questions. See Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., on the Nomination of David H.
Souter to be Associate of the Supreme Court of the United States.
In the Fall of 1990 and in early January 1991, I joined other
senators in successfully taking the position that the President needed
congressional authorization for the use of military force against Iraq
and the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 678.
Congressional Record, S. 405-490, January 10, 1991.
I took up this question again on September 13, 1994, taking the
position that the President did not have the constitutional authority
to order an invasion of Haiti without prior congressional
authorization. Congressional Record, S. 12760, September 13, 1994.
On June 5, 1995, I introduced S. Res. 128, which stated it was the
sense of the Senate that no U.S. military personnel should be
introduced into combat or potential combat situations in Bosnia without
clearly defined objectives and sufficient resources to achieve those
objectives. Congressional Record, S. 7703, June 5, 1995. That
resolution noted that there was ample time for Congress to deliberate
and decide that matter, stating that such a decision was a matter for
the Congress and that there should be no further erosion of that
authority by the Executive Branch.
On November 1, 1995, noting the military action in Somalia without
congressional authority and the military action in Haiti without
congressional authority, I urge the President to follow the precedent
of the Gulf war and seek congressional approval for incursions into
Bosnia since there was ample opportunity for Congress to consider and
decide the issue. Congressional Record, S. 31102, November 1, 1995.
On September 17, 1996, I spoke on the Senate floor on the use of
force with missile strikes against Iraq on September 3, 1996, noting
that this was another example where the President did not seek
congressional authorization or even consultation in advance of that
military action. Congressional Record, S. 10624-10625, September 17,
1996.
When there was speculation about additional military action against
Iraq in early 1998, I spoke on the Senate floor on February 12, 1998,
noting that an air attack or a missile attack constituted acts of war
which required congressional authority. Congressional Record, S. 791-
792, February 12, 1998. The President then ordered missile strikes
against Iraq in December 1998 without seeking congressional authority.
On February 23, 1999, during Senate debate on the President's use of
force in Kosovo, I noted my concern that air strikes constituted acts
of war which required authorization by Congress. Congressional Record,
S. 1771-1773, February 23, 1999. I again noted the continuing erosion
of constitutional authority and the need for Congress to debate,
deliberate and decide these issues when there was ample time to do so.
I noted the tendency on the part of Congress to sit back and avoid such
tough decisions. If things go wrong, there is always the President to
blame. If things go right, we have not impeded Presidential action.
On March 23, 1999, the Senate voted 58 to 41 to authorize air strikes
in Kosovo after the President's request for such congressional action.
Congressional Record, S. 3118, March 23, 1999. I voted in favor of air
strikes even though I had concerns about the President's reliance on
the ``humanitarian catastrophe'' which was a departure from recognized
U.S. policy to use force where there was a vital U.S. national security
interest. The House deadlocked 213 to 213 on the same vote to authorize
force. Congressional Record, H. 2451-2452, April 28, 1999.
On May 24, 1999, I proposed an amendment to S. 1059--the Department
of Defense Authorization bill--calling on the President to ``seek
approval from Congress prior to the introduction of ground troops from
the United States Armed Forces in connection with the present
operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or funding for
that operation will not be authorized.'' Congressional Record, S. 5809-
5811, May 25, 1999.
While supporting air strikes proposed by the President against the
former Yugloslavia, I opposed any open-ended authorization, such as
S.J. Res. 20, which would have ``authorized [the President] to use all
necessary force and other means in concert with
[[Page S7048]]
United States allies to accomplish the United States and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Serbia and Montenegro''. I thought the broad wording of that resolution
constituted a blank check which was unwise. Instead, the President
should seek specific congressional authority after specifying the
objectives and the means for accomplishing those objectives.
There is an understandable reluctance on the part of Members of the
House and Senate to challenge a President, especially a popular
President, on his actions as Commander-in-Chief to protect U.S.
national interests. The constitutional issues on separation of powers
and the respective authority of the Congress vis-a-vis the President
are obviously important. Of even greater importance, however, is the
value of a united front with the President backed by congressional
authorization and American public opinion on an issue where most, if
not virtually all, of the international community is in opposition.
If the Congress sits back and does nothing and the President is
right, then there is public approval. If the President turns out to be
wrong, then it is his responsibility without blame being attached to
the Congress. There is an added element that the President may, and
probably does, know more than the Congress. Hearings, in closed
session, could address that discrepancy in knowledge.
The current issue of Iraq is another chapter, albeit a very important
chapter, in the ongoing effort to define congressional and Presidential
authority on the critical constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. In the present case, there is ample time for Congress to
deliberate and decide. With the stakes so high, Congress should assert
its constitutional authority to make this critical decision.
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