[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 94 (Friday, July 12, 2002)]
[House]
[Pages H4555-H4564]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION SAFETY TEAM ACT
Ms. PRYCE of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on
Rules, I call up House Resolution 475 and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 475
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this
resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule
XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of
the bill (H.R. 4687) to provide for the establishment of
investigative teams to assess building performance and
emergency response and evacuation procedures in the wake of
any building failure that has resulted in substantial loss of
life or that posed significant potential of substantial loss
of life. The first reading of the bill shall be dispensed
with. General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall
not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the
chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on
Science. After general debate the bill shall be considered
for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in
order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of
amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the
nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on
Science now printed in the bill. Each section of the
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be
considered as read. All points of order against the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived. During
consideration of the bill for amendment, the Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole may accord priority in recognition on
the basis of whether the Member offering an amendment has
caused it to be printed in the portion of the Congressional
Record designated for that purpose in clause 8 of rule XVIII.
Amendments so printed shall be considered as read. At the
conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the
Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with
such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may
demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted
in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous
question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and
amendments thereto to final passage without intervening
motion except one motion to recommit with or without
instructions.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Pryce) is
recognized for 1 hour.
Ms. PRYCE of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I
yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Ms.
Slaughter), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.
During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the
purpose of debate only.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 475 is an open rule which provides for
1 hour of general debate, equally divided between the chairman and
ranking member of the Committee on Science, on H.R. 4687, the National
Construction Safety Team Act. The rule provides that it shall be in
order to consider for the purpose of amendment the amendment in the
nature of a substitute now printed in the bill.
The rule waives all points of order against the committee amendment
in the nature of a substitute and provides that it shall be open for
amendment by section.
[[Page H4556]]
Mr. Speaker, this is yet another open rule which affords any Member
the opportunity to offer an amendment as long as it complies with the
regular rules of the House. However, the rule allows the chairman of
the Committee of the Whole to accord priority in recognition to those
Members who have preprinted their amendments in the Congressional
Record.
Finally, the rule permits the minority to offer a motion to recommit,
with or without instructions.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Boehlert), chairman of the Committee on Science, and the lead Democrat
sponsor, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Weiner), along with the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hall), the ranking member, and all the
members of the committee for their hard work and bipartisan efforts to
further the use of science in our public policy decisions.
Mr. Speaker, after every plane crash, whether a small, single-engine
plane or a large, commercial airliner, a team of investigators arrives
on the scene and begins to try and determine how did this happen. These
teams of experts are brought together by the National Transportation
Safety Board, simply known as the NTSB. These NTSB teams try and
determine whether pilot error, mechanical failure, or forces of nature
were to blame.
In the end, the main goal of this group of experts is to try and
prevent such an incident from happening again. After the horrible
collapse of the World Trade Center on September 11, it was realized
that the United States needs to develop similar teams of experts that
could investigate the structural failure of buildings.
H.R. 4687, the National Construction Safety Team Act, authorizes the
development of teams of experts in building construction and
engineering.
This legislation establishes a clear procedure for the creation of
construction safety teams to investigate building or structural
collapses that result in large numbers of deaths. Under H.R. 4687, this
task will be given to the National Institute of Standards and
Technology.
The national construction safety teams will have several important
roles. First, these teams of experts will conduct investigations to
determine the likely technical causes for the failure of the building.
By finding out why it collapsed, specific recommendations can be made
to improve building standards, codes, and construction practices to
possibly prevent it from happening again.
These safety teams also will be tasked with determining the technical
aspects of evacuation and emergency response procedures. They will be
looking at questions such as whether sprinkler systems are adequate or
if there are enough stairways to handle a large exodus of people in a
real emergency situation.
Finally, upon completion of an investigation, these experts will then
recommend research and other appropriate actions needed to improve the
structural safety of buildings and improve evacuation and emergency
response procedures based on these findings.
Mr. Speaker, this is a good bill and it deserves our support. As many
of my colleagues know, this legislation is the product of a number of
high-profile hearings, discussions with the administration, the
American Society of Civil Engineers, families of the victims of the
World Trade Center collapse, as well as many other interested parties.
I urge all of my colleagues to support this straightforward and
noncontroversial rule, as well as this bipartisan legislation which
will allow us to apply a clear scientific process to prevent the future
catastrophic loss of life and property.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
(Ms. SLAUGHTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend
her remarks.)
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Ohio for
yielding me the customary 30 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this open rule. The underlying bill
is noncontroversial and was passed by voice vote out of the House
Committee on Science.
Mr. Speaker, on September 11 we learned many hard lessons about our
Nation's vulnerability to attack, and the underlying bill before us
today sets out to improve our ability to respond to an attack,
especially our ability to investigate building failures that cause a
substantial loss of life.
The aftermath of the collapse of the World Trade Center towers
revealed serious flaws in how the Federal Government moves forward with
these investigations. For instance, first FEMA responded to the Trade
Center disaster by sending search and rescue teams to the site. FEMA
also employed a team tasked with analyzing information about the
sequence of events and failures that resulted in the progressive
collapse of the World Trade Center towers. Its goal was to analyze how
the structures performed and determine whether changing building codes
and design practices might prevent future disasters.
Eventually, FEMA recognized that it did not have the resources or the
authority to conduct a comprehensive and thorough investigation; and in
January, FEMA asked the National Institute of Standards and Technology
to take over the investigation. Before all was said and done, the
National Science Foundation was involved as well.
Eventually, despite the extraordinary commitment of the agents and
workers investigating the site, confusion became the order of the day.
None of these agencies were prepared to conduct a comprehensive and
thorough investigation immediately following the collapse of the
buildings.
In addition, the Federal efforts that were undertaken to study the
building failures were hindered by many impediments: no Federal agency
was clearly charged with investigating building failures; nothing
ensured that an investigation would begin quickly enough to preserve
evidence; no Federal agency had the investigative authority to ensure
access to all the needed information; and nothing ensured that the
public was kept informed of the progress of the investigation; and
inadequate funding limited the efforts that were undertaken.
The measure before us today is modeled on the legislation that
created the National Transportation Safety Board and will go a long way
toward addressing these problems. First, the act establishes NIST as
the lead agency to investigate building failures that have caused a
substantial loss of life or that posed significant potential for
substantial loss of life. The legislation also requires NIST to deploy
a team within 48 hours of a disaster so that the investigation is not
hindered by delay.
Additionally, the legislation gives NIST authority to enter the site
of the building failure, inspect and move records and materials, issue
subpoenas and impound evidence; and moreover, a provision of critical
importance to the families of victims would require teams to hold
regular public briefings on the status of the investigation in order to
ensure that the public is informed.
Finally, to prevent funding limitations from inhibiting future
investigation, the legislation authorizes appropriations of $25
million.
Mr. Speaker, we owe it to the families of the victims to ensure
timely and orderly investigation of this tragedy, and I urge favorable
consideration of this bill; and, again, Mr. Speaker, I know of no
controversy surrounding this measure.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. PRYCE of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Again, this is an open rule and noncontroversial, but a necessary
piece of legislation. It sets up a clear process for building
investigation and will allow use, upgrade of the safety of existing
buildings and future structures. I urge all my colleagues to support
this rule and this very, very important piece of legislation.
I want once again to commend the committee and the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Boehlert), the chairman, and all who have participated in
drafting this important piece of legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the
previous question on the resolution.
[[Page H4557]]
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
{time} 0915
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. Pryce of Ohio). Pursuant to House
Resolution 475 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the
consideration of the bill, H.R. 4687.
{time} 0915
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 4687) to provide for the establishment of investigative teams to
assess building performance and emergency response and evacuation
procedures in the wake of any building failure that has resulted in
substantial loss of life or that posed significant potential of
substantial loss of life, with Mr. Simpson in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having
been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) and the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hall) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert).
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I approach the task of bringing this bill to the floor
with great solemnity. H.R. 4687 is, in many ways, a memorial to those
who lost their lives on September 11 and a tribute to their families,
who have joined together to advocate for this measure in the Campaign
for Skyscraper Safety.
It is fitting, therefore, that we are discussing this bill as
Congress pulls together a Department of Homeland Security, another
reaction to last fall's attack. Both H.R. 4687 and the Department are
intelligent, targeted efforts to discern and apply the lessons of
September 11.
While the National Construction Safety Team Act will not do anything
as dramatic as help us foil terrorist attacks, it will save lives in a
more workaday manner than anti-terrorism legislation.
The idea behind this bill is simple: we cannot make our buildings
safer unless we understand what goes wrong when they fail. That has
been a basic principle of engineering from its inception, and the
Federal Government has been long involved in efforts to learn from
building failures. But we learned from our Committee on Science
hearings into the investigation that followed the World Trade Center
collapse that our investigation system has its own failures. This bill
is a carefully crafted attempt to address each and every failure that
hampered the investigation into the World Trade Center collapse.
The first problem was that no Federal agency was clearly charged with
investigating building failures. The bill solves that problem by giving
the National Institute of Standards and Technology clear responsibility
to handle the investigations.
Second, nothing ensured that investigations would begin quickly
enough to preserve valuable evidence. The bill solves that problem by
requiring NIST to act within 48 hours of a building failure.
Third, no Federal agency had the investigative authority it needed to
ensure access to all needed information. The bill solves that problem
by giving NIST clear authority to enter sites, access documents, test
materials, and move evidence, as well as clear authority to issue
subpoenas.
Fourth, nothing ensured that the public was kept informed of the
progress of the investigation. The bill solves that problem by
requiring NIST to provide regular public briefings and to make public
its findings and the material that led to those findings.
We have listened to expert witnesses, including the American Society
of Civil Engineers, and the Nation owes a great debt of gratitude to
the American Society of Civil Engineers, which conducted the Trade
Center investigation under the aegis of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. We have responded with a measure targeted precisely
to remedy the issues that came to our attention. And we base the bill
on a highly successful model: the National Transportation Safety Board,
the Federal agency that investigates airline crashes.
I should emphasize this bill is not just about responding to
terrorist attacks. It will come into play anytime a building failure
has lessons to teach, whether the building failed from a natural
disaster or human action, regardless of whether that action was
intentional.
So I urge my colleagues to support this measure. It is a simple
lifesaving measure. It has the support of the groups who worked to put
together our Nation's life safety codes, like the Civil Engineers and
the National Fire Protection Association; and it is fully supported by
the administration.
There are a lot of thanks due to a lot of people for helping to
assemble this important measure. I want to thank the professional staff
on both sides of the aisle on this Committee on Science. I want to
thank all of my colleagues who invested so much of their time and
energy and talent into producing this document, particularly the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Weiner), who was a real leader, and my
colleagues on the committee, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays)
and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Grucci), who have been key right
from the beginning in working with us every step of the way. And Sally
Regenhard, a wonderful woman, who has been there every step of the way
representing the families, guiding us and inspiring us. And Dr. Gene
Corley of the American Society of Civil Engineers. What a magnificent
job they did under some very difficult circumstances. There are a lot
of people who deserve credit for where we are today.
But the basic point is this: we are taking action that, hopefully,
will prevent something like this from ever happening again.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I want to join the chairman, the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Boehlert), in strong support of H.R. 4687. Of course, he has well laid
out the provisions of it, the need for it, and the action that was
taken.
We all look back to September 11, 2001, when our country was
subjected to a cowardly attack on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. These attacks, of course, will rank with any of the great
tragedies of American history. As with any tragedy, we need to look for
lessons that can help us against possible future tragedies.
I know that we also need to carefully examine our emergency
preparedness, our evacuation procedures and emergency responses as well
as the structural integrity of our tall buildings. That is a tall
order. And H.R. 4687 is the result of careful evaluation of how the
various governmental agencies, State, local and Federal, investigated
the collapse of the World Trade towers, and also emergency response and
evacuation proceedings.
During the course of the hearings and in consultations with
professional societies and citizen groups, the Committee on Science
discovered the Federal Government's inability to quickly deploy a
building investigative team to the World Trade Center site. The
committee found valuable data was lost because we had no one with the
authority to sequester or to set aside for future observation. In
haste, and amidst tragedy and disbelief, trails to analyze were lost.
Citizen groups were angry and suspicious because the government in
charge did not really provide public briefings on its building
investigative team's activities. Our President reported to us as he
could, as he visited the site and did everything he could to cooperate
with the officials of the City of New York, as did the entire Nation.
We also discovered, though, that there is not a good system in place
to translate the findings of an investigation into a major building
collapse and to improve building standards and codes. And, finally,
Federal investigative efforts were woefully underfunded to do a
thorough and comprehensive job.
So, Mr. Chairman, H.R. 4687 is the Committee on Science's attempt to
address these shortcomings. I will not go
[[Page H4558]]
through the specific provisions of the bill. Chairman Boehlert has done
a good job of that. However, this bill provides solutions to each of
the problems that we uncovered, and we have placed them in the bill.
The National Construction Safety Team Act is going to enable, I
think, the Federal Government to respond more quickly and
comprehensively in the event of a major building failure. It is only by
studying building disasters that we can improve building design and
evacuation and emergency response procedures that ultimately make
buildings safer.
I am convinced that some of the actions that this country has taken
are working, because we have not had another tragedy to date. And
though we are warned repeatedly that one is on its way, I think a lot
of what we have done at the local government level, the State
government, and the Federal government, all acting in cooperation, may
be working.
I want to command Chairman Boehlert, well, I do not want to command
Chairman Boehlert to do anything because he does such a good job of
leading this committee, but I do want to commend him, and I want to
certainly commend my colleagues, the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Weiner) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Israel), for their hard
work on this legislation. As New Yorkers, they felt the hurt, they know
the tragedy, and they were a lot of the life and breath of this bill as
we labored through it and listened to the testimony. I also want to
thank Chairman Boehlert for working with us in his usual bipartisan
fashion.
As I said at the beginning, this is a bill about lessons learned. If
we are serious about making our buildings safer against future
terrorist attacks, then we ought to pass this legislation.
I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Weiner).
Mr. WEINER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hall)
for his leadership on our side of the aisle, and I want to join in the
words he had to say about the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert).
The chairman has led this committee with great dignity and pursued this
issue with thoroughness and with a great compassion and respect for the
families of the victims who came to this committee and came to this
Congress with a very reasonable request, and that is that we try to do
what we can to make buildings safer in the future.
I also want to thank Mike Quear, and Geoff Hockert of my staff, who
helped draft this bill.
Mr. Chairman, no one would dispute that the attack on the World Trade
Center could not have been anticipated. In many respects, one can only
marvel at the skill of the designers of the Twin Towers and the
workmanship of thousands of nameless steelworkers and laborers.
Thousands of families will enjoy dinner together tonight because, even
under the most unimaginable circumstances, these proud buildings stood
tall for more than an hour.
But for the families of those lost, this testament offers little
consolation and leaves many questions about the causes of the collapse
unanswered. And, sadly, because of the early missteps in the
investigation, some of the most vexing questions may never be
unraveled.
Thousands of tons of steel were carted away from Ground Zero and were
recycled before any expert could examine what could have been telltale
clues. Support trusses, fireproofing fragments, and even burnt-out
electrical switches that might have given scientists and engineers
insight were lost forever, even before an investigation was underway.
These failures mean that we are, even to this day, short on
conclusions about design decisions that may have contributed to the
deaths of so many firefighters and workers on the top floors.
Should future building avoid the concentration of stairwells that was
used in the Twin Towers? Was enough attention given to the
communications infrastructure that failed in the 1993 bombing, and
tragically left hundreds of emergency workers climbing stairs up while
officials on the ground knew that the buildings were about to come
down? Did the fireproofing separate from the steel beams because of the
intense heat, or did the design of the post-asbestos treatment that is
in place in thousands of buildings in this country fail for other
reasons?
We cannot bring back those that were lost on September 11, and today
there are more than 25,000 mothers, fathers, aunts, uncles, husbands,
wives, and loved ones that we thank God escaped that day. But if we
want to ensure that the legacy of this tragedy is that future building
collapses are avoided or mitigated, we need to do a better job
investigating the causes.
We pray that no other plane ever crashes into a tall building. And we
hope that an earthquake never rattles our Nation's high-rises. We
remain vigilant against threats of a bomb in our city centers.
{time} 0930
But just as we are not satisfied to hope that another plane does not
crash, we need to create an investigative team like the NTSB, like the
National Transportation Safety Board, to jump into action to
investigate building collapses, protect and preserve evidence, issue
regular briefings and reach conclusions that formalize standards of
building design, egress and emergency escape.
The gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert), whose leadership on this
issue has provided comfort to so many victims, and I have worked
closely to craft legislation to create this authority. I call
particular attention to two reforms contained in this bill.
First, just as the NTSB immediately sequesters evidence involved in a
plane crash, our bill creates immediate onsite authority for
investigators of building collapses to have access and preservation of
important materials. And if necessary, the new panel may subpoena
materials. Never again will we see the destruction of material and the
legal jousting that marked the scene of the September 11 attack, where
even the blueprints of the building were kept from investigators and
took weeks to secure.
Secondly, the bill encourages the national construction safety teams
to make recommendations to improve the design of buildings, evacuation
and emergency plans, and I hope give localities guidance to avoid the
tragic pitfalls in communication that befell so many in the World Trade
Center.
We cannot mitigate the tragedy that befell so many of my neighbors.
Families of the victims, particularly Sally Regenhard and the others of
the Skyscraper Safety Campaign, have asked that we do what we can to
give meaning to their loss. Today, we pay tribute to those who perished
at Ground Zero by taking another step to ensure that we learn the
lessons of our past. One thing is certain, we will not stop reaching
for the heavens in our lives or in our buildings.
Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Israel).
Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Hall) and the gentleman from New York (Chairman Boehlert) for their
work on this important legislation. It was bipartisan from the
beginning; and on such an important issue, that is the way it should
be.
Mr. Chairman, I lost over 100 constituents in the rubble of the World
Trade Center. In the days after September 11, their families wanted to
know why our national intelligence and our airport security were not
strong enough to withstand the attack. Now their families are asking
whether our building, fire and safety codes were strong enough to
withstand the attack. They want to know if we learned anything from the
collapse of the Federal building in Oklahoma, or did bureaucracy simply
file a report on some shelf, only to be opened in the scrutiny of
September 11. They want to make sure that the lessons lost on September
11 will never be lost again.
Since September 11, we have responded to the assault on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon in many ways. Militarily, we have
eviscerated al Qaeda. We have replaced the Taliban theocracy with a
secular interim government that will lead Afghanistan to democracy, we
have started to revamp our airport security systems, we have passed the
Comprehensive Bioterrorism Act and the PATRIOT Act.
On Capitol Hill, we have erected steel barricades and shatterproof
glass to
[[Page H4559]]
protect Members of Congress; but we are still asking our police, our
fire, and our emergency workers around the country to risk their lives
running into buildings without really knowing what they need to know
about the technical conditions of those buildings.
We need to know what can be done to make our buildings more
structurally sound and control the intense fires caused by airplanes or
bombs, and what precautions should be taken to minimize the weakening
of steel, even under the most catastrophic conditions.
Mr. Chairman, I went to the wreckage of the World Trade Center with
President Bush a few days after the attack. We have an obligation to
those lost in that rubble and to everyone who enters a skyscraper in
this new age of terrorist warnings to shine some light, to get some
answers, and to act on what we have learned. Protecting our skyscrapers
and economic security is just as important an issue as flying F-16s
over the Capitol Building in Washington.
That is why the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert), the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Weiner), and I have asked the Office of Management
and Budget to allocated the $40 million needed to complete a
comprehensive study. When the Committee on Science held a hearing to
study the progress of the investigation of the collapse, there was
unanimity among the witnesses on the need for a comprehensive
assessment and research agenda to address evacuation procedures,
emergency response, and structural analysis of the World Trade Center.
We need to give scientists the resources that they need to make and
conclude this full, comprehensive study.
Mr. Chairman as the gentleman from New York said, we were not ready
for a building disaster like the one at the World Trade Center. This
legislation will help us find the answers that our families are looking
for and prepare us for a more secure future. We will always look at the
site of the World Trade Center and ask why. Now it is our obligation to
know how, and this bill gives us the tools.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I cannot emphasize enough the sensitivity with which
the committee handled this very important assignment and the leadership
provided by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Weiner), the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Israel), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hall), and
the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays), whom I am about to yield
time to. They were very sensitive and compassionate in dealing with the
families and helped to craft a bill that we can all be proud of.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut
(Mr. Shays).
Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 4687, the National
Construction Safety Team Act. The reason why I think this bill is so
well drafted and so well thought out is because of the work of both the
chairman and the ranking member, along with the extraordinary Science
Committee staff.
When we first began these hearings, I thought, ``Wait a second, we
had two gigantic, wide-body planes filled with fuel imploding in these
buildings? What would Members expect?''
But as we began this investigation, we realized there were a lot of
things we could learn from the collapse of these buildings. It is sad
and unfortunate that no one was in charge of this investigation.
Because no one was empowered to be in charge, we could not gain access
to some of this material right away to understand how this building,
for instance, imploded. It was fascinating for me to review the fire
escape options. Had they not all been concentrated in one place, maybe
more people could have gotten out.
We learned that materials and building construction made a
difference. Studying building No. 7, a building over 40 stories tall,
while it burned indefinitely and then basically collapsed was an
incredible opportunity for us to discover a number of things about
building materials.
The collapse of the World Trade Center forever changed the landscape
in New York City. In Connecticut's fourth district alone, over 60
constituents perished in the attacks, and the lives of their families,
friends and colleagues will never be the same again.
When both buildings imploded, I was unfortunately brought to remember
what had happened in Bridgeport, Connecticut, shortly before I was
elected in 1987. The L'Ambiance building in Bridgeport, a 16-story
apartment building, collapsed when 16 concrete slabs crashed to the
ground. We lost 28 construction workers.
The collapse of L'Ambiance was due in large measure to poor
construction practices. The tragedy made clear the need to improve the
inspection and reporting requirements for building construction--which
we did.
I think what we are doing here does so much more to guarantee in the
future we will build better buildings. In the future when there is a
building collapse, we will have procedures to govern the investigation
and understand what caused the collapse. And just like when an airplane
crash takes place, we will understand why it happened and how we can
prevent it from happening again.
I have tremendous respect for what the Committee on Science has done.
There has not been a lot of press on this issue, not a lot of attention
to the extent I think it deserves, but from this horrible experience we
have learned so much and will have the ability in the future to take
command of a site and understand what needs to be done. I thank the
chairman and the ranking member for their extraordinary work, and for
the work of the staff, and I urge my colleagues to support this
important legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 4687, the National
Construction Safety Team Act.
The collapse of the World Trade Center forever changed the landscape
in New York City. In Connecticut's Fourth district alone, over 60
constituents perished in the attacks on the Twin Towers; and the lives
of their families, friends and colleagues will never be the same again.
As I watched in horror as the towers collapsed, I was reminded of the
1987 collapse of L'Ambiance in Bridgeport, Connecticut. L'Ambiance was
a 16-story apartment building which collapsed when 16 concrete slabs
crashed to the ground, killing 28 construction workers.
The collapse of L'Ambiance was due in large measure to poor
construction practices. The tragedy made clear the need to improve the
inspection and reporting requirements for building construction--when
we did.
As we continue to fight the war on terrorism and strive to prevent
future conventional biological, chemical and nuclear attacks, we must
also find more effective ways to respond to disasters.
The study of the World Trade Center collapse made clear that we must
improve procedures for investigating building collapses. H.R. 4687 will
clarify who is in charge and their respective responsibilities in case
of future disasters.
This legislation grants the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) authorities similar to those of the National
Transportation Safety Board, and establishes a procedure to govern all
future building disasters. It grants NIST access and control of the
disaster site, subpoena power and the ability to move and preserve key
evidence.
I commend Chairman Boehlert for his leadership on this issue, and I
urge my colleagues to support this important legislation.
Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Grucci), someone who has been with us
every step of the way, a very valuable member of the Committee on
Science.
Mr. GRUCCI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Boehlert) for his steadfast leadership on this important issue; and I
thank the ranking member, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hall), for his
leadership as well.
Mr. Chairman, my congressional district lies just 45 miles from
Ground Zero. My constituents were the first responders, opening up
their emergency rooms, volunteering their rescue services to help
mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters, friends, and even strangers,
all that were trapped in the rubble of the World Trade Center on that
morning of September 11.
America sat with fear and awe, our eyes captivated by the sight of
these once-great towers reduced to a pile of smoking debris. But as the
hallowed ground of Lower Manhattan is cleared of the rubble and America
attempts to
[[Page H4560]]
heal from the horror of September 11, we continue to work together to
find what answers can be mustered from this tragedy and ask the
critically important questions to find out how these towers failed.
This key legislation, the National Construction Safety Team Act, will
give the National Institute of Standards and Technology clear authority
and responsibility, as well as the necessary legal tools, to
investigate building failures. These tools allow for a complete
understanding and study into why a building fails and how to ensure
that it never happens again.
Mr. Chairman, the crash of TWA Flight 800 was yet another tragic
event that resulted in substantial loss of life. In order to learn what
happened, the National Transportation Safety Board was sent to the
scene to begin a full investigation. As a local leader at that time, I
saw firsthand the vital importance of this effort. But in the collapse
at Ground Zero, there was no clear mandate to what Federal agents would
lead an investigation into the buildings' failure. This confusion
cannot happen again.
H.R. 4687 clarifies this process and makes certain that NIST has the
authority to study building collapse. I am proud to be an original
cosponsor of this legislation and place my full support behind the
bill. I urge Members to join me in supporting this legislation. The
tragedy that took place at the World Trade Center was one of
unimaginable magnitude. Now 10 months after the tragedy of September
11, we continue to work together to see that a tragedy like this never
happens again.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) for
his leadership, and thank him for his commitment to New York.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Crowley).
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 4687, the
National Construction Safety Team Act, and I thank the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Weiner) as well as the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Israel) for their work on this important legislation.
September 11 changed New York and changed our world. Since September
11, volunteers and scientific experts have traveled to Ground Zero in
the name of recovery and understanding. These workers, volunteers and
experts have all pushed themselves and their skills to the ultimate
limit to deal with an unusually grave situation.
In particular, the National Institute of Standards and Technology had
to deftly work with a myriad of concerns and concerned New Yorkers.
People like Arthur Taub and Sally Regenhard of Co-op City, who had
concerns about the NIST investigation. Mr. Taub and Ms. Regenhard were
among thousands of family members, both grieving and seeking answers.
NIST has worked with constituents who wanted answers and who had
information. Even seasoned NIST employees admitted they were covering
new ground as no one could ever have imagined such an event as
September 11.
In the immediate aftermath of 9-11, NIST had to try to do its job
amidst emergency responders, police officers, and incomprehensible
losses. In this extraordinarily challenging situation, critical
evidence like beams, steel work and cables, were being carted off
before the NIST team had a time to catalog or identify them. Given the
fact that the scope of this tragedy had never been seen before, it is
understandable that this investigation would be less than ideal.
However, it is important that we learn from this tragedy.
There are several lessons to be learned from September 11. One lesson
is the importance of a swift and thorough investigation of a building
failure. NIST must have access to building debris as soon as it is safe
to enter a site, and they must be able to move and preserve critical
evidence. This bill gives NIST that authority.
Looking toward the future, it is important to do all we can to
prevent a building failure of any kind from ever happening again. This
bill will allow us to obtain information to help prevent building
failures in the future.
{time} 0945
It is important for us to swiftly and thoroughly respond to the
community when buildings fail. God forbid if they fail like this again.
This bill does that, and more. I urge my colleagues to support H.R.
4687.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member as well as the chairman for
this fine piece of work.
Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of a
measure that will end up saving many lives by allowing America's
foremost experts in the area of structural collapses to conduct
inquiries with adequate investigative authorities, and thereby allowing
the American people to learn lessons that can be applied to future
building construction and emergency procedures. I speak of the bill
before us today, the National Construction Safety Team Act, H.R. 4687,
of which I am a proud original sponsor and on which I have been working
with my colleagues on the Science Committee for the past few months.
This issue was first brought to my attention by Ms. Monica Gabrielle
from my home State of Connecticut, who lost her husband, Richard, as a
result of the collapse of 2 World Trade Center. As part of the
Skycraper Safety Campaign, Ms. Gabrielle's efforts to bring this issue
to the attention of me and to other Members of Congress were invaluable
in getting the Science Committee and now the House to act on this
important legislation. Her efforts, and those of the Skycraper Safety
Campaign, to ensure that we know all we need to know about the
structural collapse of the World Trade Center, the subsequent
investigation, and to make sure that any recommendations are followed
through and implemented so that we can avoid preventable deaths in the
future are the principle reason we are voting today on this bill. And
for that they should be mentioned here and praised. Thank you Ms.
Gabrielle.
I also want to specifically commend the efforts of two of my
colleagues on the Science Committee, Chairman Boehlert and Mr. Weiner
of New York. Their tireless efforts on behalf of the families of the
victims who died on that terrible day last September is awe-inspiring.
One of the unexpected and tragic lessons we learned from the attacks
on the World Trade Center is that the Federal government is ill-
equipped to respond quickly to disasters and discover the lessons that
building failures can teach--lessons that could save many lives in the
future.
In the case of the World Trade Center, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) was the Federal agency primarily responsible
for responding to the disaster. A key component of that response was
the deployment of a team of experts in engineering, design,
construction, and building codes to investigate the causes of the
collapse of the buildings and determine what lessons could be learned
from the disaster.
Unfortunately, FEMA's investigative team encountered roadblocks from
the beginning. It was not deployed as rapidly as it should have been.
It was unable to stop the recycling of many of the steel beams that had
fallen from the towers and that could have provided valuable clues as
the sequence of events that led to the collapse of the Trade Center
towers. It was unable to obtain the blueprints for the buildings until
almost 4 months after the collapse, and it was never given access to
other important documents that could have been useful for the
investigation.
As a result, FEMA requested that the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) conduct a second, more extensive investigation.
NIST has the only Federal laboratory dedicated to research on building
design and fire and has existing statutory authority for conducting
investigations into the structural failures.
However, NIST does not currently have those authorities, and this
bill provides that authority. It would require new authorities to
conduct an effective investigation, so that lives can be saved in the
future. Such authorities would be akin to those of the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) which is authorized by statute to
enter the site of airplane crashes, preserve evidence, and issue
subpoenas to witnesses or for documents to facilitate its
investigation.
I am very proud to have worked on this bill with my colleagues for
the Science Committee and as we prepare to vote on it, I urge my
colleagues to consider the impact this legislation will have in saving
lives in the future, and therefore I urge them to support it. We owe
this to the victims of the events of September 11, their families, and
the American people.
Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of HR 4687. As
an original co-sponsor of this legislation, I want to thank the
leadership Chairman Boehlert and Ranking Member Hall for bringing this
issue forward and I strongly urge my colleagues to pass this important
piece of legislation. On September 11th, there were no Republicans or
Democrats in the rubble, only Americans and I am proud to stand here
with my colleagues form both parties to honor their memory and support
this bill.
Over the past few months, the Science Committee has heard disturbing
testimony
[[Page H4561]]
about the investigation into the reasons for the catastrophic building
failure at the World Trade Center. We have learned that there was no
federal agency clearly in charge of the investigation nor anything to
assure it began in a timely fashion. Worse still, when FEMA was given
authority to investigate, they lacked critical access to information,
documents and materials and no legal authority to compel cooperation.
Finally, the public was frequently kept out of the loop leading to
confusion and resentment among victim's friends and families.
We listened closely to these concerns and have responded with a
precise and targeted remedy. Using the National Transportation Safety
Board as a model, we have proposed the creation of a National
Construction Safety Team to investigate catastrophic collapse complete
with subpoena power, investigatory authority, and a clear chain-of-
command under the direction of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology. We are firmly establishing who's in charge of future
investigations with clear mandates for action, without impeding search
and rescue operations.
In addition, we are supporting additional research by the NIST into
the technical causes of the World Trade Center collapse and other fire
safety issues in an attempt to provide the necessary research for
future building safety codes. NIST is the premier federal laboratory
for research in building design and safety and is uniquely positioned
to conduct the extensive study required to fully understand the World
Trade Center disaster and thereby prevent future collapses.
Finally, while I applaud the efforts and support of my colleagues, I
caution them that it may not be enough. As this work goes forward, we
will likely come up with more questions than answers and as NIST
uncovers deficiencies in our building designs, they may also discover
gaps in our knowledge. New studies and new facilities may be needed to
fill these voids and those investigations may require a new commitment.
Today we take an important first step, and I hope I can count on my
colleagues to be there when we take the next one.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of H.R.
4687, the National Construction Safety Act. I urge my colleagues to
support this important measure.
This legislation authorizes the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) within the Department of Commerce to establish
national construction safety teams to investigate the structural causes
of building failures that cause substantial loss of life. This measure
authorizes the appropriation of $75 million over 3 years for this
purpose. The NIST also will be allowed to accept and spend monetary
gifts to support the teams.
Mr. Chairman, this measure was drafted in response to the
difficulties encountered by those who sought to investigate the
collapse of the World Trade Center buildings last September 11th. It
has been designed to address every problem encountered by those
investigators, including bureaucratic confusion, a lack of
investigative tools and excessive restrictions on the flow of
information.
We know why the World Trade Center Towers collapsed. This bill seeks
to ensure that such an event is never repeated. By providing NIST with
the authority it needs to swiftly carry out future investigations, H.R.
4687 will help that organization develop an institutional knowledge
base to improve its response to future tragedies, and hopefully to head
off that alternative altogether. Moreover, the legislation will also
help both NIST and the greater architectural and engineering
communities improve their existing designs with the goal of developing
better buildings in the future.
Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to give this measure their strong
support.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and
I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute printed in the bill shall be considered by sections as an
original bill for the purpose of amendment, and each section is
considered read.
During consideration of the bill for amendment, the Chair may accord
priority in recognition to a Member offering an amendment that he has
printed in the designated place in the Congressional Record. Those
amendments will be considered read.
The Clerk will designate section 1.
The text of section 1 is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``National Construction Safety
Team Act''.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the
remainder of the bill be printed in the Record and open to amendment at
any point.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
New York?
There was no objection.
The text of the remainder of the bill is as follows:
SEC. 2. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION SAFETY TEAMS.
(a) Establishment.--The Director of the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (in this Act referred to as the
``Director'') is authorized to establish National
Construction Safety Teams for deployment after events causing
the failure of a building or buildings that has resulted in
substantial loss of life or that posed significant potential
for substantial loss of life. To the maximum extent
practicable, the Director shall establish and deploy a Team
within 48 hours after such an event. The Director shall
promptly publish in the Federal Register notice of the
establishment of each National Construction Safety Team.
(b) Procedures.--
(1) Development.--Not later than 3 months after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director, in consultation with
the United States Fire Administration and other appropriate
Federal agencies, shall develop procedures for the
establishment and deployment of National Construction Safety
Teams. The Director shall update such procedures as
appropriate. Such procedures shall include provisions--
(A) regarding conflicts of interest related to service on
the Team;
(B) defining the circumstances under which the Director
will establish and deploy a National Construction Safety
Team;
(C) prescribing the appropriate size of National
Construction Safety Teams;
(D) guiding the disclosure of information under section 8;
(E) guiding the conduct of investigations under this Act;
(F) identifying and prescribing appropriate conditions for
the provision by the Director of additional resources and
services National Construction Safety Teams may need;
(G) to ensure that investigations under this Act do not
impede and are coordinated with any search and rescue efforts
being undertaken at the site of the building failure;
(H) for regular briefings of the public on the status of
the investigative proceedings and findings;
(I) guiding the National Construction Safety Teams in
moving and preserving evidence as described in section
5(a)(4), (b)(2), and (d)(4);
(J) providing for coordination with Federal, State, and
local entities that may sponsor research or investigations of
building failures, including research conducted under the
Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977; and
(K) regarding such other issues as the Director considers
appropriate.
(2) Publication.--The Director shall publish promptly in
the Federal Register final procedures, and subsequent updates
thereof, developed under paragraph (1).
SEC. 3. COMPOSITION OF TEAMS.
National Construction Safety Teams shall be led by an
individual named by the Director. National Construction
Safety Team members shall include at least 1 employee of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology and shall
include other experts who are not employees of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, who may include
private sector experts, university experts, representatives
of professional organizations with appropriate expertise, and
appropriate Federal, State, or local officials.
SEC. 4. FUNCTIONS OF TEAMS.
National Construction Safety Teams shall--
(1) conduct investigations to establish the likely
technical cause or causes of the building failure;
(2) evaluate the technical aspects of evacuation and
emergency response procedures;
(3) recommend specific improvements to building standards,
codes, and practices based on the findings made pursuant to
paragraphs (1) and (2); and
(4) recommend research and other appropriate actions needed
to improve the structural safety of buildings, and improve
evacuation and emergency response procedures, based on the
findings of the investigation.
SEC. 5. AUTHORITIES.
(a) Entry and Inspection.--In investigating a building
failure under this Act, members of a National Construction
Safety Team, and any other person authorized by the Director
to support a National Construction Safety Team, on display of
appropriate credentials provided by the Director, may--
(1) enter property where a building failure being
investigated has occurred, or where building components,
materials, and artifacts with respect to the building failure
are located, and do anything necessary to conduct the
investigation;
(2) inspect any record (including any design, construction,
or maintenance record), process, or facility related to the
investigation;
(3) inspect and test any building components, materials,
and artifacts related to the building failure; and
(4) move such records, components, materials, and artifacts
as provided by the procedures developed under section
2(b)(1).
(b) Avoiding Unnecessary Interference and Preserving
Evidence.--An inspection, test, or other action taken by a
National Construction Safety Team under this section shall be
conducted in a way that--
(1) does not interfere unnecessarily with services provided
by the owner or operator of the building components,
materials, or artifacts, property, records, process, or
facility; and
[[Page H4562]]
(2) to the maximum extent feasible, preserves evidence
related to the building failure, consistent with the ongoing
needs of the investigation.
(c) Coordination.--
(1) With search and rescue efforts.--A National
Construction Safety Team shall not impede, and shall
coordinate its investigation with, any search and rescue
efforts being undertaken at the site of the building failure.
(2) With other research.--A National Construction Safety
Team shall coordinate its investigation, to the extent
practicable, with qualified researchers who are conducting
engineering or scientific (including social science) research
relating to the building failure.
(3) Memoranda of understanding.--The National Institute of
Standards and Technology shall enter into a memorandum of
understanding with each Federal agency that may conduct or
sponsor a related investigation, providing for coordination
of investigations.
(d) Interagency Priorities.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2) or
(3), a National Construction Safety Team investigation shall
have priority over any other investigation of any other
Federal agency.
(2) National transportation safety board.--If the National
Transportation Safety Board is conducting an investigation
related to an investigation of a National Construction Safety
Team, the National Transportation Safety Board investigation
shall have priority over the National Construction Safety
Team investigation. Such priority shall not otherwise affect
the authority of the Team to continue its investigation under
this Act.
(3) Criminal acts.--If the Attorney General, in
consultation with the Director, determines, and notifies the
Director, that circumstances reasonably indicate that the
building failure being investigated by a National
Construction Safety Team may have been caused by a criminal
act with intent to cause the building failure, the National
Construction Safety Team shall relinquish investigative
priority to the appropriate Federal law enforcement agency.
The relinquishment of investigative priority by the National
Construction Safety Team shall not otherwise affect the
authority of the Team to continue its investigation under
this Act.
(4) Preservation of evidence.--If a Federal law enforcement
agency suspects and notifies the Director that a building
failure being investigated by a National Construction Safety
Team under this Act may have been caused by a criminal act
with intent to cause the building failure, the National
Construction Safety Team, in consultation with the Federal
law enforcement agency, shall take necessary actions to
ensure that evidence of the criminal act is preserved.
SEC. 6. BRIEFINGS, HEARINGS, WITNESSES, AND SUBPOENAS.
(a) General Authority.--The Director, on behalf of a
National Construction Safety Team, may conduct hearings,
administer oaths, and require, by subpoena and otherwise,
necessary witnesses and evidence as necessary to carry out
this Act.
(b) Briefings.--National Construction Safety Teams shall
hold regular public briefings on the status of investigative
proceedings and findings.
(c) Public Hearings.--During the course of an investigation
by a National Construction Safety Team, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology may, if the Director
considers it to be in the public interest, hold a public
hearing for the purposes of--
(1) gathering testimony from witnesses; and
(2) informing the public on the progress of the
investigation.
(d) Production of Witnesses.--A witness or evidence in an
investigation under this Act may be summoned or required to
be produced from any place in the United States. A witness
summoned under this subsection is entitled to the same fee
and mileage the witness would have been paid in a court of
the United States.
(e) Issuance of Subpoenas.--A subpoena shall be issued
under the signature of the Director but may be served by any
person designated by the Director.
(f) Failure To Obey Subpoena.--If a person disobeys a
subpoena issued by the Director or a National Construction
Safety Team under this Act, the Director may bring a civil
action in a district court of the United States to enforce
the subpoena. An action under this subsection may be brought
in the judicial district in which the person against whom the
action is brought resides, is found, or does business. The
court may punish a failure to obey an order of the court to
comply with the subpoena as a contempt of court.
SEC. 7. ADDITIONAL POWERS.
In order to support National Construction Safety Teams in
carrying out this Act, the Director may--
(1) procure the temporary or intermittent services of
experts or consultants under section 3109 of title 5, United
States Code;
(2) request the use, when appropriate, of available
services, equipment, personnel, and facilities of a
department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States
Government on a reimbursable or other basis;
(3) confer with employees and request the use of services,
records, and facilities of State and local governmental
authorities;
(4) accept voluntary and uncompensated services;
(5) accept and use gifts of money and other property;
(6) make contracts with nonprofit entities to carry out
studies related to purpose, functions, and authorities of the
National Construction Safety Teams; and
(7) provide nongovernmental members of the National
Construction Safety Team reasonable compensation for time
spent carrying out activities under this Act.
SEC. 8. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.
(a) General Rule.--Except as otherwise provided in this
section, a copy of a record, information, or investigation
submitted or received by a National Construction Safety Team
shall be made available to the public on request and at
reasonable cost.
(b) Exception.--Subsection (a) does not require the release
of information described by section 552(b) of title 5, United
States Code, or protected from disclosure by any other law of
the United States.
(c) Protection of Voluntary Submission of Information.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a National
Construction Safety Team, the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, and any agency receiving information from a
National Construction Safety Team or the National Institute
of Standards and Technology, shall not disclose voluntarily
provided safety-related information if that information is
not directly related to the building failure being
investigated and the Director finds that the disclosure of
the information would inhibit the voluntary provision of that
type of information.
(d) Public Safety Information.--A National Construction
Safety Team and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology shall not publicly release any information it
receives in the course of an investigation under this Act if
the Director finds that the disclosure of that information
might jeopardize public safety.
SEC. 9. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION SAFETY TEAM REPORT.
Not later than 90 days after completing an investigation, a
National Construction Safety Team shall issue a public report
which includes--
(1) an analysis of the likely technical cause or causes of
the building failure investigated;
(2) technical recommendations for changes to or the
establishment of evacuation and emergency response
procedures;
(3) recommended specific improvements to building
standards, codes, and practices; and
(4) recommendations for research and other appropriate
actions needed to help prevent future building failures.
SEC. 10. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY
ACTIONS.
After the issuance of a public report under section 9, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology shall
comprehensively review the report and, working with the
United States Fire Administration and other appropriate
Federal and non-Federal agencies and organizations--
(1) conduct, or enable or encourage the conducting of,
appropriate research recommended by the National Construction
Safety Team; and
(2) promote the appropriate adoption by the Federal
Government, and encourage the appropriate adoption by other
agencies and organizations, of the recommendations of the
National Construction Safety Team with respect to--
(A) technical aspects of evacuation and emergency response
procedures;
(B) specific improvements to building standards, codes, and
practices; and
(C) other actions needed to help prevent future building
failures.
SEC. 11. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY
ANNUAL REPORT.
Not later than February 15 of each year, the Director shall
transmit to the Committee on Science of the House of
Representatives and to the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation of the Senate a report that includes--
(1) a summary of the investigations conducted by National
Construction Safety Teams during the prior fiscal year;
(2) a summary of recommendations made by the National
Construction Safety Teams in reports issued under section 9
during the prior fiscal year; and
(3) a description of the actions taken by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology during the prior fiscal
year in response to reports issued under section 9.
SEC. 12. ADVISORY COMMITTEE.
(a) Establishment and Functions.--The Director, in
consultation with the United States Fire Administration and
other appropriate Federal agencies, shall establish an
advisory committee to advise the Director on carrying out
this Act and to review the procedures developed under section
2(b)(1) and the reports issued under section 9.
(b) Annual Report.--On January 1 of each year, the advisory
committee shall transmit to the Committee on Science of the
House of Representatives and to the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report that
includes--
(1) an evaluation of National Construction Safety Team
activities, along with recommendations to improve the
operation and effectiveness of National Construction Safety
Teams; and
(2) an assessment of the implementation of the
recommendations of National Construction Safety Teams and of
the advisory committee.
(c) Duration of Advisory Committee.--Section 14 of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act shall not apply to the
advisory committee established under this section.
SEC. 13. ADDITIONAL APPLICABILITY.
The authorities and restrictions applicable under this Act
to the Director and to National Construction Safety Teams
shall apply to the activities of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology in response to the attacks of
September 11, 2001.
SEC. 14. AMENDMENT.
Section 7 of the National Bureau of Standards Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1986 (15 U.S.C. 281a) is amended by
inserting ``, or from an investigation under the National
Construction Safety Team Act,'' after ``from such
investigation''.
[[Page H4563]]
SEC. 15. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated to the National
Institute of Standards and Technology for carrying out this
Act $25,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2003 through
2005, to remain available until expended.
Amendment Offered by Mr. Boehlert
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Boehlert:
Page 4, line 24, insert: ``Team members who are not Federal
employees shall be considered Federal Government
contractors.'' after ``or local officials.''.
Page 5, line 7, insert ``, as necessary,'' after
``recommend''.
Page 5, line 10, insert ``any'' after ``recommend''.
Page 8, lines 9 and 10, strike ``with intent to cause the
building failure''.
Page 8, lines 21 and 22, strike ``with intent to cause the
building failure''.
Page 10, line 8, strike ``the Director'' and insert ``the
Attorney General, acting on behalf of the Director,''.
Page 11, line 7, insert ``, to the extent provided in
advance in appropriations Acts'' after ``and other
property''.
Page 13, line 19, insert ``(consistent with existing
procedures for the establishment of building standards,
codes, and practices)'' after ``promote''.
Page 16, after line 6, insert the following new section:
SEC. 15. CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to confer any
authority on the National Institute of Standards and
Technology to require the adoption of building standards,
codes, or practices.
Page 16, line 7, redesignate section 15 as section 16.
Page 16, line 10, strike ``$25,000,000'' and insert ``such
sums as may be necessary''.
Mr. BOEHLERT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, this is a manager's amendment that
clarifies a number of issues in the bill. It reflects the discussions
between the committee and the administration, especially the White
House and the Department of Commerce. It also includes language worked
out with the Committee on Appropriations. So I appreciate the
willingness of both the White House and the gentleman from Florida
(Chairman Young) of the Committee on Appropriations to work with us to
bring this bill to the floor with their support.
This is an en bloc amendment that clarifies or alters several
different sections of the bill.
First, the amendment clarifies that members of investigative teams
should be treated as contract employees, thereby shielding them from
liability.
Second, it clarifies that team members not recommend code changes or
further research in the unlikely event that they do not believe any
code changes or further research is necessary.
Third, it expands the types of criminal investigations that would
require NIST to stop serving as the lead agency at the site of the
building collapse.
Fourth, the amendment clarifies how certain decisions of the Director
of NIST can be enforced.
Fifth, it clarifies that all expenditures in the bill are subject to
appropriations.
Sixth, it clarifies in two separate places that the bill gives NIST
no regulatory authority over the adoption of building standards, codes
and practices.
Finally, it changes the authorization to ``such sums,'' which is
fitting, given that it is impossible to predict how many investigations
will be conducted in any given year. We hope there will not be any.
There are no ongoing expenses associated with the bill.
Mr. Chairman, this is a straightforward and carefully negotiated
amendment, agreed to in a bipartisan fashion, and I urge its adoption.
Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, Chairman Boehlert has succinctly laid out the amendment
and has worked with us on it. We support it, and I urge its adoption.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert).
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the committee amendment in the
nature of a substitute, as amended.
The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended,
was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Gibbons) having assumed the chair, Mr. Simpson, Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 4687) to
provide for the establishment of investigative teams to assess building
performance and emergency response and evacuation procedures in the
wake of any building failure that has resulted in substantial loss of
life or that posed significant potential of substantial loss of life,
pursuant to House Resolution 475, he reported the bill back to the
House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on the amendment to the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the
Whole? If not, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature
of a substitute.
The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 338,
nays 23, not voting 73, as follows:
[Roll No. 295]
YEAS--338
Abercrombie
Aderholt
Allen
Andrews
Armey
Baca
Bachus
Baird
Baldacci
Baldwin
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Bartlett
Bass
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berkley
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Boozman
Boswell
Boyd
Brady (TX)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Brown (SC)
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Camp
Capito
Capps
Cardin
Carson (IN)
Carson (OK)
Castle
Chabot
Clayton
Clyburn
Collins
Combest
Condit
Cooksey
Costello
Cox
Coyne
Cramer
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cummings
Cunningham
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
DeLay
DeMint
Deutsch
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
English
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Farr
Ferguson
Filner
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Frank
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gekas
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gilman
Gonzalez
Goss
Graham
Granger
Graves
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Grucci
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Harman
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Horn
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hyde
Inslee
Israel
Istook
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kerns
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kirk
Kleczka
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kucinich
LaFalce
LaHood
Lampson
Langevin
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Luther
Lynch
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Mascara
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCrery
McGovern
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinney
McNulty
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Mica
Millender-McDonald
Miller, Dan
Miller, Jeff
Mink
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Nethercutt
Ney
Northup
Nussle
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Osborne
Ose
Oxley
Pallone
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Phelps
Pitts
Platts
[[Page H4564]]
Pombo
Pomeroy
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Rehberg
Reyes
Reynolds
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Ryan (WI)
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schrock
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shows
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Snyder
Solis
Souder
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sullivan
Sununu
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Thune
Thurman
Tiberi
Towns
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Visclosky
Vitter
Walsh
Wamp
Waters
Watkins (OK)
Watson (CA)
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Young (FL)
NAYS--23
Akin
Cannon
Cantor
Chambliss
Coble
Culberson
Duncan
Flake
Goode
Goodlatte
Hostettler
Isakson
Jones (NC)
Kingston
Norwood
Otter
Paul
Pence
Royce
Ryun (KS)
Shadegg
Taylor (NC)
Toomey
NOT VOTING--73
Ackerman
Baker
Barrett
Barton
Becerra
Berman
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brady (PA)
Bryant
Calvert
Capuano
Clay
Clement
Conyers
Crane
Cubin
Deal
DeFazio
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
Fattah
Fossella
Gallegly
Ganske
Gillmor
Gordon
Gutierrez
Hansen
Hastings (FL)
Hilleary
Hunter
Issa
Jenkins
John
Jones (OH)
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lofgren
Manzullo
Markey
McCarthy (MO)
McDermott
McHugh
Meehan
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Oberstar
Owens
Pascrell
Pickering
Radanovich
Riley
Roukema
Schaffer
Smith (WA)
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tiahrt
Tierney
Traficant
Velazquez
Walden
Wexler
Young (AK)
{time} 1018
Messrs. PENCE, AKIN, RYUN of Kansas, ISAKSON, and GOODLATTE changed
their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Messrs. BLUNT, ARMEY, BARR, and WAMP, and Ms. KILPATRICK changed
their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated for:
Mr. CLAY. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 295, H.R. 4687, National
Construction Safety Team Act, had I been present, I would have voted
``yea.''
Ms. McCARTHY of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 295, I was
unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yea.''
Mrs. CUBIN. Mr. Speaker, on roll call 295 I was detained by the
construction on the Capitol Hill complex. Had I been present, I would
have voted ``yea.''
Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I was unable to be in Washington, DC
today. As a result, I was unable to vote on the National Construction
Safety Team Act (H.R. 4687). Had I been capable of voting, I would have
voted ``yea.''
____________________