[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 94 (Friday, July 12, 2002)]
[House]
[Pages H4555-H4564]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION SAFETY TEAM ACT

  Ms. PRYCE of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on 
Rules, I call up House Resolution 475 and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 475

       Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this 
     resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule 
     XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 
     Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of 
     the bill (H.R. 4687) to provide for the establishment of 
     investigative teams to assess building performance and 
     emergency response and evacuation procedures in the wake of 
     any building failure that has resulted in substantial loss of 
     life or that posed significant potential of substantial loss 
     of life. The first reading of the bill shall be dispensed 
     with. General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall 
     not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the 
     chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on 
     Science. After general debate the bill shall be considered 
     for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in 
     order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of 
     amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the 
     nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on 
     Science now printed in the bill. Each section of the 
     committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be 
     considered as read. All points of order against the committee 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived. During 
     consideration of the bill for amendment, the Chairman of the 
     Committee of the Whole may accord priority in recognition on 
     the basis of whether the Member offering an amendment has 
     caused it to be printed in the portion of the Congressional 
     Record designated for that purpose in clause 8 of rule XVIII. 
     Amendments so printed shall be considered as read. At the 
     conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the 
     Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with 
     such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may 
     demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted 
     in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous 
     question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and 
     amendments thereto to final passage without intervening 
     motion except one motion to recommit with or without 
     instructions.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Pryce) is 
recognized for 1 hour.
  Ms. PRYCE of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I 
yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. 
Slaughter), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. 
During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the 
purpose of debate only.
  Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 475 is an open rule which provides for 
1 hour of general debate, equally divided between the chairman and 
ranking member of the Committee on Science, on H.R. 4687, the National 
Construction Safety Team Act. The rule provides that it shall be in 
order to consider for the purpose of amendment the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute now printed in the bill.
  The rule waives all points of order against the committee amendment 
in the nature of a substitute and provides that it shall be open for 
amendment by section.

[[Page H4556]]

  Mr. Speaker, this is yet another open rule which affords any Member 
the opportunity to offer an amendment as long as it complies with the 
regular rules of the House. However, the rule allows the chairman of 
the Committee of the Whole to accord priority in recognition to those 
Members who have preprinted their amendments in the Congressional 
Record.
  Finally, the rule permits the minority to offer a motion to recommit, 
with or without instructions.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Boehlert), chairman of the Committee on Science, and the lead Democrat 
sponsor, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Weiner), along with the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hall), the ranking member, and all the 
members of the committee for their hard work and bipartisan efforts to 
further the use of science in our public policy decisions.
  Mr. Speaker, after every plane crash, whether a small, single-engine 
plane or a large, commercial airliner, a team of investigators arrives 
on the scene and begins to try and determine how did this happen. These 
teams of experts are brought together by the National Transportation 
Safety Board, simply known as the NTSB. These NTSB teams try and 
determine whether pilot error, mechanical failure, or forces of nature 
were to blame.
  In the end, the main goal of this group of experts is to try and 
prevent such an incident from happening again. After the horrible 
collapse of the World Trade Center on September 11, it was realized 
that the United States needs to develop similar teams of experts that 
could investigate the structural failure of buildings.
  H.R. 4687, the National Construction Safety Team Act, authorizes the 
development of teams of experts in building construction and 
engineering.
  This legislation establishes a clear procedure for the creation of 
construction safety teams to investigate building or structural 
collapses that result in large numbers of deaths. Under H.R. 4687, this 
task will be given to the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology.
  The national construction safety teams will have several important 
roles. First, these teams of experts will conduct investigations to 
determine the likely technical causes for the failure of the building. 
By finding out why it collapsed, specific recommendations can be made 
to improve building standards, codes, and construction practices to 
possibly prevent it from happening again.
  These safety teams also will be tasked with determining the technical 
aspects of evacuation and emergency response procedures. They will be 
looking at questions such as whether sprinkler systems are adequate or 
if there are enough stairways to handle a large exodus of people in a 
real emergency situation.
  Finally, upon completion of an investigation, these experts will then 
recommend research and other appropriate actions needed to improve the 
structural safety of buildings and improve evacuation and emergency 
response procedures based on these findings.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a good bill and it deserves our support. As many 
of my colleagues know, this legislation is the product of a number of 
high-profile hearings, discussions with the administration, the 
American Society of Civil Engineers, families of the victims of the 
World Trade Center collapse, as well as many other interested parties.
  I urge all of my colleagues to support this straightforward and 
noncontroversial rule, as well as this bipartisan legislation which 
will allow us to apply a clear scientific process to prevent the future 
catastrophic loss of life and property.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  (Ms. SLAUGHTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
her remarks.)
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Ohio for 
yielding me the customary 30 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this open rule. The underlying bill 
is noncontroversial and was passed by voice vote out of the House 
Committee on Science.
  Mr. Speaker, on September 11 we learned many hard lessons about our 
Nation's vulnerability to attack, and the underlying bill before us 
today sets out to improve our ability to respond to an attack, 
especially our ability to investigate building failures that cause a 
substantial loss of life.
  The aftermath of the collapse of the World Trade Center towers 
revealed serious flaws in how the Federal Government moves forward with 
these investigations. For instance, first FEMA responded to the Trade 
Center disaster by sending search and rescue teams to the site. FEMA 
also employed a team tasked with analyzing information about the 
sequence of events and failures that resulted in the progressive 
collapse of the World Trade Center towers. Its goal was to analyze how 
the structures performed and determine whether changing building codes 
and design practices might prevent future disasters.
  Eventually, FEMA recognized that it did not have the resources or the 
authority to conduct a comprehensive and thorough investigation; and in 
January, FEMA asked the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
to take over the investigation. Before all was said and done, the 
National Science Foundation was involved as well.
  Eventually, despite the extraordinary commitment of the agents and 
workers investigating the site, confusion became the order of the day. 
None of these agencies were prepared to conduct a comprehensive and 
thorough investigation immediately following the collapse of the 
buildings.
  In addition, the Federal efforts that were undertaken to study the 
building failures were hindered by many impediments: no Federal agency 
was clearly charged with investigating building failures; nothing 
ensured that an investigation would begin quickly enough to preserve 
evidence; no Federal agency had the investigative authority to ensure 
access to all the needed information; and nothing ensured that the 
public was kept informed of the progress of the investigation; and 
inadequate funding limited the efforts that were undertaken.
  The measure before us today is modeled on the legislation that 
created the National Transportation Safety Board and will go a long way 
toward addressing these problems. First, the act establishes NIST as 
the lead agency to investigate building failures that have caused a 
substantial loss of life or that posed significant potential for 
substantial loss of life. The legislation also requires NIST to deploy 
a team within 48 hours of a disaster so that the investigation is not 
hindered by delay.
  Additionally, the legislation gives NIST authority to enter the site 
of the building failure, inspect and move records and materials, issue 
subpoenas and impound evidence; and moreover, a provision of critical 
importance to the families of victims would require teams to hold 
regular public briefings on the status of the investigation in order to 
ensure that the public is informed.
  Finally, to prevent funding limitations from inhibiting future 
investigation, the legislation authorizes appropriations of $25 
million.
  Mr. Speaker, we owe it to the families of the victims to ensure 
timely and orderly investigation of this tragedy, and I urge favorable 
consideration of this bill; and, again, Mr. Speaker, I know of no 
controversy surrounding this measure.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. PRYCE of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Again, this is an open rule and noncontroversial, but a necessary 
piece of legislation. It sets up a clear process for building 
investigation and will allow use, upgrade of the safety of existing 
buildings and future structures. I urge all my colleagues to support 
this rule and this very, very important piece of legislation.
  I want once again to commend the committee and the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Boehlert), the chairman, and all who have participated in 
drafting this important piece of legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the 
previous question on the resolution.

[[Page H4557]]

  The previous question was ordered.
  The resolution was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                              {time}  0915

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. Pryce of Ohio). Pursuant to House 
Resolution 475 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the 
consideration of the bill, H.R. 4687.

                              {time}  0915


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 4687) to provide for the establishment of investigative teams to 
assess building performance and emergency response and evacuation 
procedures in the wake of any building failure that has resulted in 
substantial loss of life or that posed significant potential of 
substantial loss of life, with Mr. Simpson in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having 
been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) and the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hall) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert).
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I approach the task of bringing this bill to the floor 
with great solemnity. H.R. 4687 is, in many ways, a memorial to those 
who lost their lives on September 11 and a tribute to their families, 
who have joined together to advocate for this measure in the Campaign 
for Skyscraper Safety.
  It is fitting, therefore, that we are discussing this bill as 
Congress pulls together a Department of Homeland Security, another 
reaction to last fall's attack. Both H.R. 4687 and the Department are 
intelligent, targeted efforts to discern and apply the lessons of 
September 11.
  While the National Construction Safety Team Act will not do anything 
as dramatic as help us foil terrorist attacks, it will save lives in a 
more workaday manner than anti-terrorism legislation.
  The idea behind this bill is simple: we cannot make our buildings 
safer unless we understand what goes wrong when they fail. That has 
been a basic principle of engineering from its inception, and the 
Federal Government has been long involved in efforts to learn from 
building failures. But we learned from our Committee on Science 
hearings into the investigation that followed the World Trade Center 
collapse that our investigation system has its own failures. This bill 
is a carefully crafted attempt to address each and every failure that 
hampered the investigation into the World Trade Center collapse.
  The first problem was that no Federal agency was clearly charged with 
investigating building failures. The bill solves that problem by giving 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology clear responsibility 
to handle the investigations.
  Second, nothing ensured that investigations would begin quickly 
enough to preserve valuable evidence. The bill solves that problem by 
requiring NIST to act within 48 hours of a building failure.
  Third, no Federal agency had the investigative authority it needed to 
ensure access to all needed information. The bill solves that problem 
by giving NIST clear authority to enter sites, access documents, test 
materials, and move evidence, as well as clear authority to issue 
subpoenas.
  Fourth, nothing ensured that the public was kept informed of the 
progress of the investigation. The bill solves that problem by 
requiring NIST to provide regular public briefings and to make public 
its findings and the material that led to those findings.
  We have listened to expert witnesses, including the American Society 
of Civil Engineers, and the Nation owes a great debt of gratitude to 
the American Society of Civil Engineers, which conducted the Trade 
Center investigation under the aegis of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. We have responded with a measure targeted precisely 
to remedy the issues that came to our attention. And we base the bill 
on a highly successful model: the National Transportation Safety Board, 
the Federal agency that investigates airline crashes.
  I should emphasize this bill is not just about responding to 
terrorist attacks. It will come into play anytime a building failure 
has lessons to teach, whether the building failed from a natural 
disaster or human action, regardless of whether that action was 
intentional.
  So I urge my colleagues to support this measure. It is a simple 
lifesaving measure. It has the support of the groups who worked to put 
together our Nation's life safety codes, like the Civil Engineers and 
the National Fire Protection Association; and it is fully supported by 
the administration.
  There are a lot of thanks due to a lot of people for helping to 
assemble this important measure. I want to thank the professional staff 
on both sides of the aisle on this Committee on Science. I want to 
thank all of my colleagues who invested so much of their time and 
energy and talent into producing this document, particularly the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Weiner), who was a real leader, and my 
colleagues on the committee, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays) 
and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Grucci), who have been key right 
from the beginning in working with us every step of the way. And Sally 
Regenhard, a wonderful woman, who has been there every step of the way 
representing the families, guiding us and inspiring us. And Dr. Gene 
Corley of the American Society of Civil Engineers. What a magnificent 
job they did under some very difficult circumstances. There are a lot 
of people who deserve credit for where we are today.
  But the basic point is this: we are taking action that, hopefully, 
will prevent something like this from ever happening again.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I want to join the chairman, the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Boehlert), in strong support of H.R. 4687. Of course, he has well laid 
out the provisions of it, the need for it, and the action that was 
taken.
  We all look back to September 11, 2001, when our country was 
subjected to a cowardly attack on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon. These attacks, of course, will rank with any of the great 
tragedies of American history. As with any tragedy, we need to look for 
lessons that can help us against possible future tragedies.
  I know that we also need to carefully examine our emergency 
preparedness, our evacuation procedures and emergency responses as well 
as the structural integrity of our tall buildings. That is a tall 
order. And H.R. 4687 is the result of careful evaluation of how the 
various governmental agencies, State, local and Federal, investigated 
the collapse of the World Trade towers, and also emergency response and 
evacuation proceedings.
  During the course of the hearings and in consultations with 
professional societies and citizen groups, the Committee on Science 
discovered the Federal Government's inability to quickly deploy a 
building investigative team to the World Trade Center site. The 
committee found valuable data was lost because we had no one with the 
authority to sequester or to set aside for future observation. In 
haste, and amidst tragedy and disbelief, trails to analyze were lost.
  Citizen groups were angry and suspicious because the government in 
charge did not really provide public briefings on its building 
investigative team's activities. Our President reported to us as he 
could, as he visited the site and did everything he could to cooperate 
with the officials of the City of New York, as did the entire Nation.
  We also discovered, though, that there is not a good system in place 
to translate the findings of an investigation into a major building 
collapse and to improve building standards and codes. And, finally, 
Federal investigative efforts were woefully underfunded to do a 
thorough and comprehensive job.
  So, Mr. Chairman, H.R. 4687 is the Committee on Science's attempt to 
address these shortcomings. I will not go

[[Page H4558]]

through the specific provisions of the bill. Chairman Boehlert has done 
a good job of that. However, this bill provides solutions to each of 
the problems that we uncovered, and we have placed them in the bill.
  The National Construction Safety Team Act is going to enable, I 
think, the Federal Government to respond more quickly and 
comprehensively in the event of a major building failure. It is only by 
studying building disasters that we can improve building design and 
evacuation and emergency response procedures that ultimately make 
buildings safer.
  I am convinced that some of the actions that this country has taken 
are working, because we have not had another tragedy to date. And 
though we are warned repeatedly that one is on its way, I think a lot 
of what we have done at the local government level, the State 
government, and the Federal government, all acting in cooperation, may 
be working.
  I want to command Chairman Boehlert, well, I do not want to command 
Chairman Boehlert to do anything because he does such a good job of 
leading this committee, but I do want to commend him, and I want to 
certainly commend my colleagues, the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Weiner) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Israel), for their hard 
work on this legislation. As New Yorkers, they felt the hurt, they know 
the tragedy, and they were a lot of the life and breath of this bill as 
we labored through it and listened to the testimony. I also want to 
thank Chairman Boehlert for working with us in his usual bipartisan 
fashion.
  As I said at the beginning, this is a bill about lessons learned. If 
we are serious about making our buildings safer against future 
terrorist attacks, then we ought to pass this legislation.
  I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Weiner).
  Mr. WEINER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hall) 
for his leadership on our side of the aisle, and I want to join in the 
words he had to say about the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert). 
The chairman has led this committee with great dignity and pursued this 
issue with thoroughness and with a great compassion and respect for the 
families of the victims who came to this committee and came to this 
Congress with a very reasonable request, and that is that we try to do 
what we can to make buildings safer in the future.
  I also want to thank Mike Quear, and Geoff Hockert of my staff, who 
helped draft this bill.
  Mr. Chairman, no one would dispute that the attack on the World Trade 
Center could not have been anticipated. In many respects, one can only 
marvel at the skill of the designers of the Twin Towers and the 
workmanship of thousands of nameless steelworkers and laborers. 
Thousands of families will enjoy dinner together tonight because, even 
under the most unimaginable circumstances, these proud buildings stood 
tall for more than an hour.
  But for the families of those lost, this testament offers little 
consolation and leaves many questions about the causes of the collapse 
unanswered. And, sadly, because of the early missteps in the 
investigation, some of the most vexing questions may never be 
unraveled.
  Thousands of tons of steel were carted away from Ground Zero and were 
recycled before any expert could examine what could have been telltale 
clues. Support trusses, fireproofing fragments, and even burnt-out 
electrical switches that might have given scientists and engineers 
insight were lost forever, even before an investigation was underway.
  These failures mean that we are, even to this day, short on 
conclusions about design decisions that may have contributed to the 
deaths of so many firefighters and workers on the top floors.
  Should future building avoid the concentration of stairwells that was 
used in the Twin Towers? Was enough attention given to the 
communications infrastructure that failed in the 1993 bombing, and 
tragically left hundreds of emergency workers climbing stairs up while 
officials on the ground knew that the buildings were about to come 
down? Did the fireproofing separate from the steel beams because of the 
intense heat, or did the design of the post-asbestos treatment that is 
in place in thousands of buildings in this country fail for other 
reasons?
  We cannot bring back those that were lost on September 11, and today 
there are more than 25,000 mothers, fathers, aunts, uncles, husbands, 
wives, and loved ones that we thank God escaped that day. But if we 
want to ensure that the legacy of this tragedy is that future building 
collapses are avoided or mitigated, we need to do a better job 
investigating the causes.
  We pray that no other plane ever crashes into a tall building. And we 
hope that an earthquake never rattles our Nation's high-rises. We 
remain vigilant against threats of a bomb in our city centers.

                              {time}  0930

  But just as we are not satisfied to hope that another plane does not 
crash, we need to create an investigative team like the NTSB, like the 
National Transportation Safety Board, to jump into action to 
investigate building collapses, protect and preserve evidence, issue 
regular briefings and reach conclusions that formalize standards of 
building design, egress and emergency escape.
  The gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert), whose leadership on this 
issue has provided comfort to so many victims, and I have worked 
closely to craft legislation to create this authority. I call 
particular attention to two reforms contained in this bill.
  First, just as the NTSB immediately sequesters evidence involved in a 
plane crash, our bill creates immediate onsite authority for 
investigators of building collapses to have access and preservation of 
important materials. And if necessary, the new panel may subpoena 
materials. Never again will we see the destruction of material and the 
legal jousting that marked the scene of the September 11 attack, where 
even the blueprints of the building were kept from investigators and 
took weeks to secure.
  Secondly, the bill encourages the national construction safety teams 
to make recommendations to improve the design of buildings, evacuation 
and emergency plans, and I hope give localities guidance to avoid the 
tragic pitfalls in communication that befell so many in the World Trade 
Center.
  We cannot mitigate the tragedy that befell so many of my neighbors. 
Families of the victims, particularly Sally Regenhard and the others of 
the Skyscraper Safety Campaign, have asked that we do what we can to 
give meaning to their loss. Today, we pay tribute to those who perished 
at Ground Zero by taking another step to ensure that we learn the 
lessons of our past. One thing is certain, we will not stop reaching 
for the heavens in our lives or in our buildings.
  Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Israel).
  Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Hall) and the gentleman from New York (Chairman Boehlert) for their 
work on this important legislation. It was bipartisan from the 
beginning; and on such an important issue, that is the way it should 
be.
  Mr. Chairman, I lost over 100 constituents in the rubble of the World 
Trade Center. In the days after September 11, their families wanted to 
know why our national intelligence and our airport security were not 
strong enough to withstand the attack. Now their families are asking 
whether our building, fire and safety codes were strong enough to 
withstand the attack. They want to know if we learned anything from the 
collapse of the Federal building in Oklahoma, or did bureaucracy simply 
file a report on some shelf, only to be opened in the scrutiny of 
September 11. They want to make sure that the lessons lost on September 
11 will never be lost again.
  Since September 11, we have responded to the assault on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon in many ways. Militarily, we have 
eviscerated al Qaeda. We have replaced the Taliban theocracy with a 
secular interim government that will lead Afghanistan to democracy, we 
have started to revamp our airport security systems, we have passed the 
Comprehensive Bioterrorism Act and the PATRIOT Act.
  On Capitol Hill, we have erected steel barricades and shatterproof 
glass to

[[Page H4559]]

protect Members of Congress; but we are still asking our police, our 
fire, and our emergency workers around the country to risk their lives 
running into buildings without really knowing what they need to know 
about the technical conditions of those buildings.
  We need to know what can be done to make our buildings more 
structurally sound and control the intense fires caused by airplanes or 
bombs, and what precautions should be taken to minimize the weakening 
of steel, even under the most catastrophic conditions.
  Mr. Chairman, I went to the wreckage of the World Trade Center with 
President Bush a few days after the attack. We have an obligation to 
those lost in that rubble and to everyone who enters a skyscraper in 
this new age of terrorist warnings to shine some light, to get some 
answers, and to act on what we have learned. Protecting our skyscrapers 
and economic security is just as important an issue as flying F-16s 
over the Capitol Building in Washington.
  That is why the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert), the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Weiner), and I have asked the Office of Management 
and Budget to allocated the $40 million needed to complete a 
comprehensive study. When the Committee on Science held a hearing to 
study the progress of the investigation of the collapse, there was 
unanimity among the witnesses on the need for a comprehensive 
assessment and research agenda to address evacuation procedures, 
emergency response, and structural analysis of the World Trade Center.
  We need to give scientists the resources that they need to make and 
conclude this full, comprehensive study.
  Mr. Chairman as the gentleman from New York said, we were not ready 
for a building disaster like the one at the World Trade Center. This 
legislation will help us find the answers that our families are looking 
for and prepare us for a more secure future. We will always look at the 
site of the World Trade Center and ask why. Now it is our obligation to 
know how, and this bill gives us the tools.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I cannot emphasize enough the sensitivity with which 
the committee handled this very important assignment and the leadership 
provided by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Weiner), the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Israel), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hall), and 
the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays), whom I am about to yield 
time to. They were very sensitive and compassionate in dealing with the 
families and helped to craft a bill that we can all be proud of.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut 
(Mr. Shays).
  Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 4687, the National 
Construction Safety Team Act. The reason why I think this bill is so 
well drafted and so well thought out is because of the work of both the 
chairman and the ranking member, along with the extraordinary Science 
Committee staff.
  When we first began these hearings, I thought, ``Wait a second, we 
had two gigantic, wide-body planes filled with fuel imploding in these 
buildings? What would Members expect?''
  But as we began this investigation, we realized there were a lot of 
things we could learn from the collapse of these buildings. It is sad 
and unfortunate that no one was in charge of this investigation. 
Because no one was empowered to be in charge, we could not gain access 
to some of this material right away to understand how this building, 
for instance, imploded. It was fascinating for me to review the fire 
escape options. Had they not all been concentrated in one place, maybe 
more people could have gotten out.
  We learned that materials and building construction made a 
difference. Studying building No. 7, a building over 40 stories tall, 
while it burned indefinitely and then basically collapsed was an 
incredible opportunity for us to discover a number of things about 
building materials.
  The collapse of the World Trade Center forever changed the landscape 
in New York City. In Connecticut's fourth district alone, over 60 
constituents perished in the attacks, and the lives of their families, 
friends and colleagues will never be the same again.
  When both buildings imploded, I was unfortunately brought to remember 
what had happened in Bridgeport, Connecticut, shortly before I was 
elected in 1987. The L'Ambiance building in Bridgeport, a 16-story 
apartment building, collapsed when 16 concrete slabs crashed to the 
ground. We lost 28 construction workers.
  The collapse of L'Ambiance was due in large measure to poor 
construction practices. The tragedy made clear the need to improve the 
inspection and reporting requirements for building construction--which 
we did.
  I think what we are doing here does so much more to guarantee in the 
future we will build better buildings. In the future when there is a 
building collapse, we will have procedures to govern the investigation 
and understand what caused the collapse. And just like when an airplane 
crash takes place, we will understand why it happened and how we can 
prevent it from happening again.
  I have tremendous respect for what the Committee on Science has done. 
There has not been a lot of press on this issue, not a lot of attention 
to the extent I think it deserves, but from this horrible experience we 
have learned so much and will have the ability in the future to take 
command of a site and understand what needs to be done. I thank the 
chairman and the ranking member for their extraordinary work, and for 
the work of the staff, and I urge my colleagues to support this 
important legislation.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 4687, the National 
Construction Safety Team Act.
  The collapse of the World Trade Center forever changed the landscape 
in New York City. In Connecticut's Fourth district alone, over 60 
constituents perished in the attacks on the Twin Towers; and the lives 
of their families, friends and colleagues will never be the same again.
  As I watched in horror as the towers collapsed, I was reminded of the 
1987 collapse of L'Ambiance in Bridgeport, Connecticut. L'Ambiance was 
a 16-story apartment building which collapsed when 16 concrete slabs 
crashed to the ground, killing 28 construction workers.
  The collapse of L'Ambiance was due in large measure to poor 
construction practices. The tragedy made clear the need to improve the 
inspection and reporting requirements for building construction--when 
we did.
  As we continue to fight the war on terrorism and strive to prevent 
future conventional biological, chemical and nuclear attacks, we must 
also find more effective ways to respond to disasters.
  The study of the World Trade Center collapse made clear that we must 
improve procedures for investigating building collapses. H.R. 4687 will 
clarify who is in charge and their respective responsibilities in case 
of future disasters.
  This legislation grants the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) authorities similar to those of the National 
Transportation Safety Board, and establishes a procedure to govern all 
future building disasters. It grants NIST access and control of the 
disaster site, subpoena power and the ability to move and preserve key 
evidence.
  I commend Chairman Boehlert for his leadership on this issue, and I 
urge my colleagues to support this important legislation.
  Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, 
and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to 
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Grucci), someone who has been with us 
every step of the way, a very valuable member of the Committee on 
Science.
  Mr. GRUCCI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Boehlert) for his steadfast leadership on this important issue; and I 
thank the ranking member, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hall), for his 
leadership as well.
  Mr. Chairman, my congressional district lies just 45 miles from 
Ground Zero. My constituents were the first responders, opening up 
their emergency rooms, volunteering their rescue services to help 
mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters, friends, and even strangers, 
all that were trapped in the rubble of the World Trade Center on that 
morning of September 11.
  America sat with fear and awe, our eyes captivated by the sight of 
these once-great towers reduced to a pile of smoking debris. But as the 
hallowed ground of Lower Manhattan is cleared of the rubble and America 
attempts to

[[Page H4560]]

heal from the horror of September 11, we continue to work together to 
find what answers can be mustered from this tragedy and ask the 
critically important questions to find out how these towers failed.
  This key legislation, the National Construction Safety Team Act, will 
give the National Institute of Standards and Technology clear authority 
and responsibility, as well as the necessary legal tools, to 
investigate building failures. These tools allow for a complete 
understanding and study into why a building fails and how to ensure 
that it never happens again.
  Mr. Chairman, the crash of TWA Flight 800 was yet another tragic 
event that resulted in substantial loss of life. In order to learn what 
happened, the National Transportation Safety Board was sent to the 
scene to begin a full investigation. As a local leader at that time, I 
saw firsthand the vital importance of this effort. But in the collapse 
at Ground Zero, there was no clear mandate to what Federal agents would 
lead an investigation into the buildings' failure. This confusion 
cannot happen again.
  H.R. 4687 clarifies this process and makes certain that NIST has the 
authority to study building collapse. I am proud to be an original 
cosponsor of this legislation and place my full support behind the 
bill. I urge Members to join me in supporting this legislation. The 
tragedy that took place at the World Trade Center was one of 
unimaginable magnitude. Now 10 months after the tragedy of September 
11, we continue to work together to see that a tragedy like this never 
happens again.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) for 
his leadership, and thank him for his commitment to New York.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Crowley).
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 4687, the 
National Construction Safety Team Act, and I thank the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Weiner) as well as the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Israel) for their work on this important legislation.
  September 11 changed New York and changed our world. Since September 
11, volunteers and scientific experts have traveled to Ground Zero in 
the name of recovery and understanding. These workers, volunteers and 
experts have all pushed themselves and their skills to the ultimate 
limit to deal with an unusually grave situation.
  In particular, the National Institute of Standards and Technology had 
to deftly work with a myriad of concerns and concerned New Yorkers. 
People like Arthur Taub and Sally Regenhard of Co-op City, who had 
concerns about the NIST investigation. Mr. Taub and Ms. Regenhard were 
among thousands of family members, both grieving and seeking answers.
  NIST has worked with constituents who wanted answers and who had 
information. Even seasoned NIST employees admitted they were covering 
new ground as no one could ever have imagined such an event as 
September 11.
  In the immediate aftermath of 9-11, NIST had to try to do its job 
amidst emergency responders, police officers, and incomprehensible 
losses. In this extraordinarily challenging situation, critical 
evidence like beams, steel work and cables, were being carted off 
before the NIST team had a time to catalog or identify them. Given the 
fact that the scope of this tragedy had never been seen before, it is 
understandable that this investigation would be less than ideal. 
However, it is important that we learn from this tragedy.
  There are several lessons to be learned from September 11. One lesson 
is the importance of a swift and thorough investigation of a building 
failure. NIST must have access to building debris as soon as it is safe 
to enter a site, and they must be able to move and preserve critical 
evidence. This bill gives NIST that authority.
  Looking toward the future, it is important to do all we can to 
prevent a building failure of any kind from ever happening again. This 
bill will allow us to obtain information to help prevent building 
failures in the future.

                              {time}  0945

  It is important for us to swiftly and thoroughly respond to the 
community when buildings fail. God forbid if they fail like this again. 
This bill does that, and more. I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 
4687.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member as well as the chairman for 
this fine piece of work.
  Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of a 
measure that will end up saving many lives by allowing America's 
foremost experts in the area of structural collapses to conduct 
inquiries with adequate investigative authorities, and thereby allowing 
the American people to learn lessons that can be applied to future 
building construction and emergency procedures. I speak of the bill 
before us today, the National Construction Safety Team Act, H.R. 4687, 
of which I am a proud original sponsor and on which I have been working 
with my colleagues on the Science Committee for the past few months. 
This issue was first brought to my attention by Ms. Monica Gabrielle 
from my home State of Connecticut, who lost her husband, Richard, as a 
result of the collapse of 2 World Trade Center. As part of the 
Skycraper Safety Campaign, Ms. Gabrielle's efforts to bring this issue 
to the attention of me and to other Members of Congress were invaluable 
in getting the Science Committee and now the House to act on this 
important legislation. Her efforts, and those of the Skycraper Safety 
Campaign, to ensure that we know all we need to know about the 
structural collapse of the World Trade Center, the subsequent 
investigation, and to make sure that any recommendations are followed 
through and implemented so that we can avoid preventable deaths in the 
future are the principle reason we are voting today on this bill. And 
for that they should be mentioned here and praised. Thank you Ms. 
Gabrielle.
  I also want to specifically commend the efforts of two of my 
colleagues on the Science Committee, Chairman Boehlert and Mr. Weiner 
of New York. Their tireless efforts on behalf of the families of the 
victims who died on that terrible day last September is awe-inspiring.
  One of the unexpected and tragic lessons we learned from the attacks 
on the World Trade Center is that the Federal government is ill-
equipped to respond quickly to disasters and discover the lessons that 
building failures can teach--lessons that could save many lives in the 
future.
  In the case of the World Trade Center, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) was the Federal agency primarily responsible 
for responding to the disaster. A key component of that response was 
the deployment of a team of experts in engineering, design, 
construction, and building codes to investigate the causes of the 
collapse of the buildings and determine what lessons could be learned 
from the disaster.
  Unfortunately, FEMA's investigative team encountered roadblocks from 
the beginning. It was not deployed as rapidly as it should have been. 
It was unable to stop the recycling of many of the steel beams that had 
fallen from the towers and that could have provided valuable clues as 
the sequence of events that led to the collapse of the Trade Center 
towers. It was unable to obtain the blueprints for the buildings until 
almost 4 months after the collapse, and it was never given access to 
other important documents that could have been useful for the 
investigation.
  As a result, FEMA requested that the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) conduct a second, more extensive investigation. 
NIST has the only Federal laboratory dedicated to research on building 
design and fire and has existing statutory authority for conducting 
investigations into the structural failures.
  However, NIST does not currently have those authorities, and this 
bill provides that authority. It would require new authorities to 
conduct an effective investigation, so that lives can be saved in the 
future. Such authorities would be akin to those of the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) which is authorized by statute to 
enter the site of airplane crashes, preserve evidence, and issue 
subpoenas to witnesses or for documents to facilitate its 
investigation.
  I am very proud to have worked on this bill with my colleagues for 
the Science Committee and as we prepare to vote on it, I urge my 
colleagues to consider the impact this legislation will have in saving 
lives in the future, and therefore I urge them to support it. We owe 
this to the victims of the events of September 11, their families, and 
the American people.
  Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of HR 4687. As 
an original co-sponsor of this legislation, I want to thank the 
leadership Chairman Boehlert and Ranking Member Hall for bringing this 
issue forward and I strongly urge my colleagues to pass this important 
piece of legislation. On September 11th, there were no Republicans or 
Democrats in the rubble, only Americans and I am proud to stand here 
with my colleagues form both parties to honor their memory and support 
this bill.
  Over the past few months, the Science Committee has heard disturbing 
testimony

[[Page H4561]]

about the investigation into the reasons for the catastrophic building 
failure at the World Trade Center. We have learned that there was no 
federal agency clearly in charge of the investigation nor anything to 
assure it began in a timely fashion. Worse still, when FEMA was given 
authority to investigate, they lacked critical access to information, 
documents and materials and no legal authority to compel cooperation. 
Finally, the public was frequently kept out of the loop leading to 
confusion and resentment among victim's friends and families.
  We listened closely to these concerns and have responded with a 
precise and targeted remedy. Using the National Transportation Safety 
Board as a model, we have proposed the creation of a National 
Construction Safety Team to investigate catastrophic collapse complete 
with subpoena power, investigatory authority, and a clear chain-of-
command under the direction of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology. We are firmly establishing who's in charge of future 
investigations with clear mandates for action, without impeding search 
and rescue operations.
  In addition, we are supporting additional research by the NIST into 
the technical causes of the World Trade Center collapse and other fire 
safety issues in an attempt to provide the necessary research for 
future building safety codes. NIST is the premier federal laboratory 
for research in building design and safety and is uniquely positioned 
to conduct the extensive study required to fully understand the World 
Trade Center disaster and thereby prevent future collapses.
  Finally, while I applaud the efforts and support of my colleagues, I 
caution them that it may not be enough. As this work goes forward, we 
will likely come up with more questions than answers and as NIST 
uncovers deficiencies in our building designs, they may also discover 
gaps in our knowledge. New studies and new facilities may be needed to 
fill these voids and those investigations may require a new commitment. 
Today we take an important first step, and I hope I can count on my 
colleagues to be there when we take the next one.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 
4687, the National Construction Safety Act. I urge my colleagues to 
support this important measure.
  This legislation authorizes the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) within the Department of Commerce to establish 
national construction safety teams to investigate the structural causes 
of building failures that cause substantial loss of life. This measure 
authorizes the appropriation of $75 million over 3 years for this 
purpose. The NIST also will be allowed to accept and spend monetary 
gifts to support the teams.
  Mr. Chairman, this measure was drafted in response to the 
difficulties encountered by those who sought to investigate the 
collapse of the World Trade Center buildings last September 11th. It 
has been designed to address every problem encountered by those 
investigators, including bureaucratic confusion, a lack of 
investigative tools and excessive restrictions on the flow of 
information.
  We know why the World Trade Center Towers collapsed. This bill seeks 
to ensure that such an event is never repeated. By providing NIST with 
the authority it needs to swiftly carry out future investigations, H.R. 
4687 will help that organization develop an institutional knowledge 
base to improve its response to future tragedies, and hopefully to head 
off that alternative altogether. Moreover, the legislation will also 
help both NIST and the greater architectural and engineering 
communities improve their existing designs with the goal of developing 
better buildings in the future.
  Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to give this measure their strong 
support.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and 
I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute printed in the bill shall be considered by sections as an 
original bill for the purpose of amendment, and each section is 
considered read.
  During consideration of the bill for amendment, the Chair may accord 
priority in recognition to a Member offering an amendment that he has 
printed in the designated place in the Congressional Record. Those 
amendments will be considered read.
  The Clerk will designate section 1.
  The text of section 1 is as follows:

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``National Construction Safety 
     Team Act''.

  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 
remainder of the bill be printed in the Record and open to amendment at 
any point.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New York?
  There was no objection.
  The text of the remainder of the bill is as follows:

     SEC. 2. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION SAFETY TEAMS.

       (a) Establishment.--The Director of the National Institute 
     of Standards and Technology (in this Act referred to as the 
     ``Director'') is authorized to establish National 
     Construction Safety Teams for deployment after events causing 
     the failure of a building or buildings that has resulted in 
     substantial loss of life or that posed significant potential 
     for substantial loss of life. To the maximum extent 
     practicable, the Director shall establish and deploy a Team 
     within 48 hours after such an event. The Director shall 
     promptly publish in the Federal Register notice of the 
     establishment of each National Construction Safety Team.
       (b) Procedures.--
       (1) Development.--Not later than 3 months after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director, in consultation with 
     the United States Fire Administration and other appropriate 
     Federal agencies, shall develop procedures for the 
     establishment and deployment of National Construction Safety 
     Teams. The Director shall update such procedures as 
     appropriate. Such procedures shall include provisions--
       (A) regarding conflicts of interest related to service on 
     the Team;
       (B) defining the circumstances under which the Director 
     will establish and deploy a National Construction Safety 
     Team;
       (C) prescribing the appropriate size of National 
     Construction Safety Teams;
       (D) guiding the disclosure of information under section 8;
       (E) guiding the conduct of investigations under this Act;
       (F) identifying and prescribing appropriate conditions for 
     the provision by the Director of additional resources and 
     services National Construction Safety Teams may need;
       (G) to ensure that investigations under this Act do not 
     impede and are coordinated with any search and rescue efforts 
     being undertaken at the site of the building failure;
       (H) for regular briefings of the public on the status of 
     the investigative proceedings and findings;
       (I) guiding the National Construction Safety Teams in 
     moving and preserving evidence as described in section 
     5(a)(4), (b)(2), and (d)(4);
       (J) providing for coordination with Federal, State, and 
     local entities that may sponsor research or investigations of 
     building failures, including research conducted under the 
     Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977; and
       (K) regarding such other issues as the Director considers 
     appropriate.
       (2) Publication.--The Director shall publish promptly in 
     the Federal Register final procedures, and subsequent updates 
     thereof, developed under paragraph (1).

     SEC. 3. COMPOSITION OF TEAMS.

       National Construction Safety Teams shall be led by an 
     individual named by the Director. National Construction 
     Safety Team members shall include at least 1 employee of the 
     National Institute of Standards and Technology and shall 
     include other experts who are not employees of the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology, who may include 
     private sector experts, university experts, representatives 
     of professional organizations with appropriate expertise, and 
     appropriate Federal, State, or local officials.

     SEC. 4. FUNCTIONS OF TEAMS.

       National Construction Safety Teams shall--
       (1) conduct investigations to establish the likely 
     technical cause or causes of the building failure;
       (2) evaluate the technical aspects of evacuation and 
     emergency response procedures;
       (3) recommend specific improvements to building standards, 
     codes, and practices based on the findings made pursuant to 
     paragraphs (1) and (2); and
       (4) recommend research and other appropriate actions needed 
     to improve the structural safety of buildings, and improve 
     evacuation and emergency response procedures, based on the 
     findings of the investigation.

     SEC. 5. AUTHORITIES.

       (a) Entry and Inspection.--In investigating a building 
     failure under this Act, members of a National Construction 
     Safety Team, and any other person authorized by the Director 
     to support a National Construction Safety Team, on display of 
     appropriate credentials provided by the Director, may--
       (1) enter property where a building failure being 
     investigated has occurred, or where building components, 
     materials, and artifacts with respect to the building failure 
     are located, and do anything necessary to conduct the 
     investigation;
       (2) inspect any record (including any design, construction, 
     or maintenance record), process, or facility related to the 
     investigation;
       (3) inspect and test any building components, materials, 
     and artifacts related to the building failure; and
       (4) move such records, components, materials, and artifacts 
     as provided by the procedures developed under section 
     2(b)(1).
       (b) Avoiding Unnecessary Interference and Preserving 
     Evidence.--An inspection, test, or other action taken by a 
     National Construction Safety Team under this section shall be 
     conducted in a way that--
       (1) does not interfere unnecessarily with services provided 
     by the owner or operator of the building components, 
     materials, or artifacts, property, records, process, or 
     facility; and

[[Page H4562]]

       (2) to the maximum extent feasible, preserves evidence 
     related to the building failure, consistent with the ongoing 
     needs of the investigation.
       (c) Coordination.--
       (1) With search and rescue efforts.--A National 
     Construction Safety Team shall not impede, and shall 
     coordinate its investigation with, any search and rescue 
     efforts being undertaken at the site of the building failure.
       (2) With other research.--A National Construction Safety 
     Team shall coordinate its investigation, to the extent 
     practicable, with qualified researchers who are conducting 
     engineering or scientific (including social science) research 
     relating to the building failure.
       (3) Memoranda of understanding.--The National Institute of 
     Standards and Technology shall enter into a memorandum of 
     understanding with each Federal agency that may conduct or 
     sponsor a related investigation, providing for coordination 
     of investigations.
       (d) Interagency Priorities.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2) or 
     (3), a National Construction Safety Team investigation shall 
     have priority over any other investigation of any other 
     Federal agency.
       (2) National transportation safety board.--If the National 
     Transportation Safety Board is conducting an investigation 
     related to an investigation of a National Construction Safety 
     Team, the National Transportation Safety Board investigation 
     shall have priority over the National Construction Safety 
     Team investigation. Such priority shall not otherwise affect 
     the authority of the Team to continue its investigation under 
     this Act.
       (3) Criminal acts.--If the Attorney General, in 
     consultation with the Director, determines, and notifies the 
     Director, that circumstances reasonably indicate that the 
     building failure being investigated by a National 
     Construction Safety Team may have been caused by a criminal 
     act with intent to cause the building failure, the National 
     Construction Safety Team shall relinquish investigative 
     priority to the appropriate Federal law enforcement agency. 
     The relinquishment of investigative priority by the National 
     Construction Safety Team shall not otherwise affect the 
     authority of the Team to continue its investigation under 
     this Act.
       (4) Preservation of evidence.--If a Federal law enforcement 
     agency suspects and notifies the Director that a building 
     failure being investigated by a National Construction Safety 
     Team under this Act may have been caused by a criminal act 
     with intent to cause the building failure, the National 
     Construction Safety Team, in consultation with the Federal 
     law enforcement agency, shall take necessary actions to 
     ensure that evidence of the criminal act is preserved.

     SEC. 6. BRIEFINGS, HEARINGS, WITNESSES, AND SUBPOENAS.

       (a) General Authority.--The Director, on behalf of a 
     National Construction Safety Team, may conduct hearings, 
     administer oaths, and require, by subpoena and otherwise, 
     necessary witnesses and evidence as necessary to carry out 
     this Act.
       (b) Briefings.--National Construction Safety Teams shall 
     hold regular public briefings on the status of investigative 
     proceedings and findings.
       (c) Public Hearings.--During the course of an investigation 
     by a National Construction Safety Team, the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology may, if the Director 
     considers it to be in the public interest, hold a public 
     hearing for the purposes of--
       (1) gathering testimony from witnesses; and
       (2) informing the public on the progress of the 
     investigation.
       (d) Production of Witnesses.--A witness or evidence in an 
     investigation under this Act may be summoned or required to 
     be produced from any place in the United States. A witness 
     summoned under this subsection is entitled to the same fee 
     and mileage the witness would have been paid in a court of 
     the United States.
       (e) Issuance of Subpoenas.--A subpoena shall be issued 
     under the signature of the Director but may be served by any 
     person designated by the Director.
       (f) Failure To Obey Subpoena.--If a person disobeys a 
     subpoena issued by the Director or a National Construction 
     Safety Team under this Act, the Director may bring a civil 
     action in a district court of the United States to enforce 
     the subpoena. An action under this subsection may be brought 
     in the judicial district in which the person against whom the 
     action is brought resides, is found, or does business. The 
     court may punish a failure to obey an order of the court to 
     comply with the subpoena as a contempt of court.

     SEC. 7. ADDITIONAL POWERS.

       In order to support National Construction Safety Teams in 
     carrying out this Act, the Director may--
       (1) procure the temporary or intermittent services of 
     experts or consultants under section 3109 of title 5, United 
     States Code;
       (2) request the use, when appropriate, of available 
     services, equipment, personnel, and facilities of a 
     department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States 
     Government on a reimbursable or other basis;
       (3) confer with employees and request the use of services, 
     records, and facilities of State and local governmental 
     authorities;
       (4) accept voluntary and uncompensated services;
       (5) accept and use gifts of money and other property;
       (6) make contracts with nonprofit entities to carry out 
     studies related to purpose, functions, and authorities of the 
     National Construction Safety Teams; and
       (7) provide nongovernmental members of the National 
     Construction Safety Team reasonable compensation for time 
     spent carrying out activities under this Act.

     SEC. 8. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.

       (a) General Rule.--Except as otherwise provided in this 
     section, a copy of a record, information, or investigation 
     submitted or received by a National Construction Safety Team 
     shall be made available to the public on request and at 
     reasonable cost.
       (b) Exception.--Subsection (a) does not require the release 
     of information described by section 552(b) of title 5, United 
     States Code, or protected from disclosure by any other law of 
     the United States.
       (c) Protection of Voluntary Submission of Information.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a National 
     Construction Safety Team, the National Institute of Standards 
     and Technology, and any agency receiving information from a 
     National Construction Safety Team or the National Institute 
     of Standards and Technology, shall not disclose voluntarily 
     provided safety-related information if that information is 
     not directly related to the building failure being 
     investigated and the Director finds that the disclosure of 
     the information would inhibit the voluntary provision of that 
     type of information.
       (d) Public Safety Information.--A National Construction 
     Safety Team and the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology shall not publicly release any information it 
     receives in the course of an investigation under this Act if 
     the Director finds that the disclosure of that information 
     might jeopardize public safety.

     SEC. 9. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION SAFETY TEAM REPORT.

       Not later than 90 days after completing an investigation, a 
     National Construction Safety Team shall issue a public report 
     which includes--
       (1) an analysis of the likely technical cause or causes of 
     the building failure investigated;
       (2) technical recommendations for changes to or the 
     establishment of evacuation and emergency response 
     procedures;
       (3) recommended specific improvements to building 
     standards, codes, and practices; and
       (4) recommendations for research and other appropriate 
     actions needed to help prevent future building failures.

     SEC. 10. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 
                   ACTIONS.

       After the issuance of a public report under section 9, the 
     National Institute of Standards and Technology shall 
     comprehensively review the report and, working with the 
     United States Fire Administration and other appropriate 
     Federal and non-Federal agencies and organizations--
       (1) conduct, or enable or encourage the conducting of, 
     appropriate research recommended by the National Construction 
     Safety Team; and
       (2) promote the appropriate adoption by the Federal 
     Government, and encourage the appropriate adoption by other 
     agencies and organizations, of the recommendations of the 
     National Construction Safety Team with respect to--
       (A) technical aspects of evacuation and emergency response 
     procedures;
       (B) specific improvements to building standards, codes, and 
     practices; and
       (C) other actions needed to help prevent future building 
     failures.

     SEC. 11. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 
                   ANNUAL REPORT.

       Not later than February 15 of each year, the Director shall 
     transmit to the Committee on Science of the House of 
     Representatives and to the Committee on Commerce, Science, 
     and Transportation of the Senate a report that includes--
       (1) a summary of the investigations conducted by National 
     Construction Safety Teams during the prior fiscal year;
       (2) a summary of recommendations made by the National 
     Construction Safety Teams in reports issued under section 9 
     during the prior fiscal year; and
       (3) a description of the actions taken by the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology during the prior fiscal 
     year in response to reports issued under section 9.

     SEC. 12. ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

       (a) Establishment and Functions.--The Director, in 
     consultation with the United States Fire Administration and 
     other appropriate Federal agencies, shall establish an 
     advisory committee to advise the Director on carrying out 
     this Act and to review the procedures developed under section 
     2(b)(1) and the reports issued under section 9.
       (b) Annual Report.--On January 1 of each year, the advisory 
     committee shall transmit to the Committee on Science of the 
     House of Representatives and to the Committee on Commerce, 
     Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report that 
     includes--
       (1) an evaluation of National Construction Safety Team 
     activities, along with recommendations to improve the 
     operation and effectiveness of National Construction Safety 
     Teams; and
       (2) an assessment of the implementation of the 
     recommendations of National Construction Safety Teams and of 
     the advisory committee.
       (c) Duration of Advisory Committee.--Section 14 of the 
     Federal Advisory Committee Act shall not apply to the 
     advisory committee established under this section.

     SEC. 13. ADDITIONAL APPLICABILITY.

       The authorities and restrictions applicable under this Act 
     to the Director and to National Construction Safety Teams 
     shall apply to the activities of the National Institute of 
     Standards and Technology in response to the attacks of 
     September 11, 2001.

     SEC. 14. AMENDMENT.

       Section 7 of the National Bureau of Standards Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 1986 (15 U.S.C. 281a) is amended by 
     inserting ``, or from an investigation under the National 
     Construction Safety Team Act,'' after ``from such 
     investigation''.

[[Page H4563]]

     SEC. 15. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are authorized to be appropriated to the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology for carrying out this 
     Act $25,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2003 through 
     2005, to remain available until expended.


                   Amendment Offered by Mr. Boehlert

  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Boehlert:
       Page 4, line 24, insert: ``Team members who are not Federal 
     employees shall be considered Federal Government 
     contractors.'' after ``or local officials.''.
       Page 5, line 7, insert ``, as necessary,'' after 
     ``recommend''.
       Page 5, line 10, insert ``any'' after ``recommend''.
       Page 8, lines 9 and 10, strike ``with intent to cause the 
     building failure''.
       Page 8, lines 21 and 22, strike ``with intent to cause the 
     building failure''.
       Page 10, line 8, strike ``the Director'' and insert ``the 
     Attorney General, acting on behalf of the Director,''.
       Page 11, line 7, insert ``, to the extent provided in 
     advance in appropriations Acts'' after ``and other 
     property''.
       Page 13, line 19, insert ``(consistent with existing 
     procedures for the establishment of building standards, 
     codes, and practices)'' after ``promote''.
       Page 16, after line 6, insert the following new section:

     SEC. 15. CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this Act shall be construed to confer any 
     authority on the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology to require the adoption of building standards, 
     codes, or practices.
       Page 16, line 7, redesignate section 15 as section 16.
       Page 16, line 10, strike ``$25,000,000'' and insert ``such 
     sums as may be necessary''.

  Mr. BOEHLERT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, this is a manager's amendment that 
clarifies a number of issues in the bill. It reflects the discussions 
between the committee and the administration, especially the White 
House and the Department of Commerce. It also includes language worked 
out with the Committee on Appropriations. So I appreciate the 
willingness of both the White House and the gentleman from Florida 
(Chairman Young) of the Committee on Appropriations to work with us to 
bring this bill to the floor with their support.
  This is an en bloc amendment that clarifies or alters several 
different sections of the bill.
  First, the amendment clarifies that members of investigative teams 
should be treated as contract employees, thereby shielding them from 
liability.
  Second, it clarifies that team members not recommend code changes or 
further research in the unlikely event that they do not believe any 
code changes or further research is necessary.
  Third, it expands the types of criminal investigations that would 
require NIST to stop serving as the lead agency at the site of the 
building collapse.
  Fourth, the amendment clarifies how certain decisions of the Director 
of NIST can be enforced.
  Fifth, it clarifies that all expenditures in the bill are subject to 
appropriations.
  Sixth, it clarifies in two separate places that the bill gives NIST 
no regulatory authority over the adoption of building standards, codes 
and practices.
  Finally, it changes the authorization to ``such sums,'' which is 
fitting, given that it is impossible to predict how many investigations 
will be conducted in any given year. We hope there will not be any. 
There are no ongoing expenses associated with the bill.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a straightforward and carefully negotiated 
amendment, agreed to in a bipartisan fashion, and I urge its adoption.
  Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, Chairman Boehlert has succinctly laid out the amendment 
and has worked with us on it. We support it, and I urge its adoption.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the committee amendment in the 
nature of a substitute, as amended.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, 
was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Gibbons) having assumed the chair, Mr. Simpson, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 4687) to 
provide for the establishment of investigative teams to assess building 
performance and emergency response and evacuation procedures in the 
wake of any building failure that has resulted in substantial loss of 
life or that posed significant potential of substantial loss of life, 
pursuant to House Resolution 475, he reported the bill back to the 
House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on the amendment to the committee 
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the 
Whole? If not, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature 
of a substitute.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 338, 
nays 23, not voting 73, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 295]

                               YEAS--338

     Abercrombie
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Andrews
     Armey
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Bartlett
     Bass
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boswell
     Boyd
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown (SC)
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Camp
     Capito
     Capps
     Cardin
     Carson (IN)
     Carson (OK)
     Castle
     Chabot
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Farr
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Frank
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Grucci
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Harman
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Israel
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kerns
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kirk
     Kleczka
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Luther
     Lynch
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Mascara
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McGovern
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, Dan
     Miller, Jeff
     Mink
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Nussle
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Ose
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pitts
     Platts

[[Page H4564]]


     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Ryan (WI)
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schrock
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Sununu
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiberi
     Towns
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Waters
     Watkins (OK)
     Watson (CA)
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Young (FL)

                                NAYS--23

     Akin
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Chambliss
     Coble
     Culberson
     Duncan
     Flake
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Hostettler
     Isakson
     Jones (NC)
     Kingston
     Norwood
     Otter
     Paul
     Pence
     Royce
     Ryun (KS)
     Shadegg
     Taylor (NC)
     Toomey

                             NOT VOTING--73

     Ackerman
     Baker
     Barrett
     Barton
     Becerra
     Berman
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brady (PA)
     Bryant
     Calvert
     Capuano
     Clay
     Clement
     Conyers
     Crane
     Cubin
     Deal
     DeFazio
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     Fattah
     Fossella
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gillmor
     Gordon
     Gutierrez
     Hansen
     Hastings (FL)
     Hilleary
     Hunter
     Issa
     Jenkins
     John
     Jones (OH)
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Manzullo
     Markey
     McCarthy (MO)
     McDermott
     McHugh
     Meehan
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Oberstar
     Owens
     Pascrell
     Pickering
     Radanovich
     Riley
     Roukema
     Schaffer
     Smith (WA)
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tiahrt
     Tierney
     Traficant
     Velazquez
     Walden
     Wexler
     Young (AK)

                              {time}  1018

  Messrs. PENCE, AKIN, RYUN of Kansas, ISAKSON, and GOODLATTE changed 
their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Messrs. BLUNT, ARMEY, BARR, and WAMP, and Ms. KILPATRICK changed 
their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated for:
  Mr. CLAY. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 295, H.R. 4687, National 
Construction Safety Team Act, had I been present, I would have voted 
``yea.''
  Ms. McCARTHY of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 295, I was 
unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yea.''
  Mrs. CUBIN. Mr. Speaker, on roll call 295 I was detained by the 
construction on the Capitol Hill complex. Had I been present, I would 
have voted ``yea.''
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I was unable to be in Washington, DC 
today. As a result, I was unable to vote on the National Construction 
Safety Team Act (H.R. 4687). Had I been capable of voting, I would have 
voted ``yea.''

                          ____________________