Congressional Record, Volume 148 Issue 88 (Thursday, June 27, 2002)

[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 88 (Thursday, June 27, 2002)]
[House]
[Pages H4111-H4119]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[[Page H4111]]

House of Representatives

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2003

(Continued)

Amendment Offered by Mr. Spratt

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Spratt:
Page 34, line 2, after the dollar amount, insert ``(reduced
by $30,000,000)(increased by $30,000,000)''.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, this amendment would take $30 million out
of the space-based kinetic intercept program, leaving $14 or $15
million for concept definition, which is the status of it anyway, and
instead, shift that $30 million to another program, a vitally important
program as part of missile defense which has been debited by this bill,
the airborne laser bill.
So it would not decrease by any means the total amount appropriated
by this bill for ballistic missile defense. It would simply reallocate
within those accounts $30 million, shifting it, as I said, from the
space-based boost phase interceptor over to the airborne laser system
to make up for 50 percent of a cut which the committee has made in that
particular program.
Mr. Chairman, some 15 years ago when the SDI program, Strategic
Defense Initiative, was first begun, it was to be a layered defense.
There were to be ground-based layers and space-based layers.
One of the space-based layers was a space-based intercept system. It
would have been a satellite which would have housed many different
smaller satellites, each of which would have housed many different
interceptors, each of which could be fired at missiles as they were
launched, or even in the midcourse, as they came towards the United
States.
The problem with this system, in addition to the fact of being an
enormous system, was that in a fixed orbit in space a target this large
with that many interceptors on it was a very valuable target and a very
vulnerable target; and any country able to fire at us an ICBM that
really put us at risk would also be able to build what is called a
DANASAT, a direct ascent ASAT, to take out that defensive system.
So to avoid the inherent vulnerability of having predeployed
satellites in space, the idea of Brilliant Pebbles was conceived. This
system, the SBI system, was abandoned and Brilliant Pebbles was taken
up.
The idea of Brilliant Pebbles was to make this target not so valuable
and not so vulnerable by making each satellite a single interceptor.
Each would have been self-sufficient and able to sense what was coming
on and able to propel itself towards that oncoming missile and take it
out.
Members can imagine how daunting this technology is. Because the
technology was so daunting and the cost of lift and other things was so
enormously expensive, the Brilliant Pebbles program was abandoned, as
well.
We have spent substantial sums of money, therefore, on space-based
interceptors and boost phase interceptors in space. We have abandoned
both. We should learn from our mistakes. We should learn from our
mistakes and concentrate on what has worked and put our assets where
they are likely to pay off in the near term. That is exactly what we
are trying to do today.
I am not opposed to boost-phase intercept. In fact, what I am trying
to do is shift some money from a system not likely to work any time
soon into a system that shows the promise of being an effective space-
based or boost-phase interceptor, the ABL, the airborne laser.
Why do I do this? One reason for doing it is that if we look at what
the Missile Defense Agency, the BMD agency is doing today, we will see
they have a full plate, a fuller plate than they have had since SDI
began. They are developing a ground-based midcourse interceptor; they
are developing two or three variations on a ship-based mid course
interceptor and a ship-based boost-phase interceptor; they are
developing theater systems like the PAC-3, the THAAD, the MEADs. They
are developing laser systems, airborne laser systems, and space-based
laser systems.
They need to winnow down some of these systems and focus on what
works and try to bring those things that are most feasible to fruition,
as opposed to going off in pursuit of a million different ideas. So
that is what we would try to do here, refine the focus of the program
on a system that is likely to work, taking out of a system that has
been proven not to work in at least two iterations over the last 15
years.
Let me say that this system right now, this so-called space-based
boost-phase intercept system, is relatively, relative to the defense
budget, a small system. It is $23 million, or $23.8 million is the
funding level for this year. The President requested $54.4 million. We
would leave in the budget $14 million for this program; but as I said,
we would shift the program.
Now, it does not seem like it is really crowding anything out at that
level of funding. What we have to do is look at what the MDA, the
Missile Defense Agency, has provided us in a backup and justification
charts for the cost growth they expect in this particular program, the
boost-phase intercept program. They expect the cost to go up to $510
million.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr.
Spratt) has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Spratt was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, this program will go from today's modest

[[Page H4112]]

level to $510 million in just 10 years. When it gets to that level, it
is going to crowd out and preclude something else.
The ABL, on the other hand, the airborne laser, needs money to buy,
number one, a second airframe, a Boeing 747; and, number two, and even
more critically, it needs some money to buy long lead time items that
will make this airframe a suitable platform for a laser that will weigh
200,000 to 250,000 pounds and has to have absolute stability if it is
going to work and be functional at all.
What we would put back in this budget, we would take the money out of
one program and put it back in the ABL so we could buy those critical
long lead items. If we do not buy those critical items, if we let the
$30 million deletion stand in this budget, we are going to find that
this program is going to be stretched out and out and out, and it is
not going to be ready to be tested to determine whether or not the
power system, the laser system, will have the power necessary to be an
effective system by the year 2005 or 2007.
Mr. Chairman, this is a very constructive amendment, and it does not
take a dime out of the overall program. It will enhance the prospects
for boost-phase intercept. It will ensure that the money we are
spending on ballistic missile defense is being spent more effectively
and is being spent towards accomplishing the purposes that we have set
out for the program.
I urge support for this amendment.
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I was going to rise to try and strike this item on a
point of order, but the gentleman from South Carolina is such a quality
gentleman, he had done the homework on this amendment in a fashion so
that it is not subject to a point of order.
But in the meantime, let me say that the thrust of his amendment,
really an intent, has essentially the same purpose as the amendment
that I did object to, regard space-based missile defense. He does speak
to the question of putting funding back into airborne laser.
I might mention to the gentleman that this bill increases funding for
that program, increases it enough so that the Department will have a
decision to make whether they want to put the money into a more robust
program or to go to the second aircraft. So I think we have really met
that challenge within the work of the bill.
On the other hand, the question relative to space-based kinetic
energy I think is a matter that was fully discussed in the authorizing
committee and on that bill as it moved through the House.
The CHAIRMAN. Does any other Member wish to be heard on the
amendment?
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I believe the gentleman has made a very important case
here. The Airborne Laser program is one I have followed closely. I
think it is on the verge of being tested, and I just want to commend
the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), who I think is the most
knowledgeable person in the Congress on these issues, for the good work
that he has done over the years in following these issues.
We do not want to do anything to slow down this first test on the
airborne laser so we can find out that it will work. In fact, last year
I urged the committee to put money in so we would not let the test be
delayed. So I urge the committee to adopt the Spratt amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr.
Spratt) will be postponed.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, one of the areas that I am most deeply concerned about
in the course of our dealing with the Department of Defense deals with
the consequences of military activity over the course of the last 2
centuries. Unfortunately, we have left a legacy of unexploded ordnance,
toxic waste that is involved from border to border, from coast to
coast. It is in every State and virtually every congressional district.
Unexploded ordnance, UXO, as we talk about it, is left over from
military training exercises at some 2,000 formerly used defense sites
and closed bases in every State; and in fact, we really do not have an
inventory of actually how many millions of acres; it may be 10 million,
it may be 50 million.

{time} 1230

These sites include bombing ranges, testing facilities that were once
located in underpopulated areas. However, we find that, today, distance
is no longer a protective factor; and sites are now often bordered by
housing developments or schools or contained within parks and other
public lands.
Recently, there was a gentleman rototilling in his yard in a
subdivision in Arlington, Texas.
Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BLUMENAUER. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, we think this amendment is a very important
area. We will take a look at it and see if we cannot add money to this
field. There is no question in mind that the gentleman has hit an area
that a lot of Members are interested in. We will take care of the
problem.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Reclaiming my time, I appreciate the gentleman's
comments and interest; and I guess I do not need to get up and thump
the tub any further. But I would be interested if the chairman of the
committee has any observations about the work that we may be able to do
to deal with the research and development and the cleanup of unexploded
ordnance.
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BLUMENAUER. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman
bringing up this important subject. I could not respond any better than
my colleagues from Pennsylvania did, and we look forward to working
with the gentleman.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, I deeply appreciate the gentleman's
interest and activities; and, too, I look forward to working with the
gentleman.
I would note that there appears to be a growing awareness on the part
of Members across the country. I will save my stump speech, but I would
just mention that there is one site we had a hearing on yesterday that
is still, the campus of the American University, that 84 years after
World War II we are still cleaning up chemical weapons.
I think there is lot we can do. I appreciate the assurance and look
forward to working with the gentleman.
Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last
word.
Mr. Chairman, I just want to rise to commend the chairman, the
gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), and the ranking member, the
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha), for their excellent work on
this bill. I look forward to working with them on the training of our
National Guard. I know that the Guard is about to deploy in
Pennsylvania. General Centraccio in my home State of Rhode Island has
been very active in making sure our Guard is prepared and trained.
We are relying on the Guard more than ever, and they are part of our
total force, especially in this war on terrorism. I think they need to
get the needed training and equipment that they need to do their job
successfully.
I know this bill goes a long way to doing that. I look forward to
working with the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha) to ensure
that they continue to get the best training available.
I rise today to commend Chairman Lewis and Congressman Murtha for
their work on this legislation. Their task hasn't been an enviable one,
given the limited budget allocations that they were forced to work
with.
In the end, they made it work. Looking at the bill that they
produced, everyone can see that Chairman Lewis and Congressman Murtha
are dedicated to our military and the security of our Nation at home
and abroad. The safety and security of our Nation and the training and
readiness of our military came first--just as it should.

[[Page H4113]]

I'd also like to associate myself with the comments of Mr. Murtha
made when the Appropriations Committee was discussing this legislation.
He expressed his belief in the importance of ensuring that our
soldiers receive the best training in the world to fight in our war on
terrorism. He reminded us that the National Guard and the Reserves are
a vital component in winning this war. He mentioned that the
Pennsylvania Guard is about to deploy to Bosnia to initiate operations.
In Rhode Island, General Centraccio is leading the Rhode Island Guard
on a similar course. These Guard personnel are dedicated men and women,
average American citizens, who are putting their lives on the line for
their country.
As Mr. Murtha mentioned, we owe it to them to ensure that they have
the absolute best training and equipment available to do their job
right in areas like marksmanship which I know is important to both Mr.
Murtha and Mr. Lewis.
I deeply appreciate the opportunity to work with the Committee on
these and other issues. I look forward to continuing the good work we
have begun to ensure that our men and women in uniform have access to
the best training available.

Amendment Offered by Mr. Kucinich

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Kucinich:
At the end of the bill (before the short title), insert the
following new section:
Sec. . Of the total amount appropriated pursuant to this
Act for any component of the Department of Defense that the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget has
identified (as of the date of the enactment of this Act)
under subsection (c) of section 3515 of title 31, United
States Code, as being required to have audited financial
statements meeting the requirements of subsection (b) of that
section, not more than 99 percent may be obligated until the
Inspector General of the Department of Defense submits an
audit of that component pursuant to section 3521(e) of title
31, United Sates Code.

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I want the gentleman to know I
am inclined to accept his amendment if we do not have to spend a lot of
time discussing it, since we have discussed the matter already.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman and
certainly would yield to his higher wisdom.
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, with that, we will accept the
amendment if we can move forward.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment Offered by Mr. Tierney

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Tierney:
In the item relating to ``Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation, Defense-Wide'', after the dollar amount, insert
the following: ``(reduced by $121,800,000)''.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, this particular matter, an amendment, goes
to reducing the budget by $121.8 million that is now earmarked for the
construction of five silos at Fort Greely. This does not deal with
research but rather the construction.
You will remember that earlier in our remarks we talked about the
fact that the Department of Operational Testing and Evaluation had come
before committees in this Congress to indicate that the national
missile defense system, particularly this mid-range system, is nowhere
near a point where it had been tested adequately to sufficiently give
anybody confidence in its reliability; and, in fact, the experts and
director of that department had indicated we should not move forward
with construction until we adequately test it.
The fact of matter is that is why Congress passed the act setting up
the Office of Operational Testing and Evaluation, because we had in the
past allowed services to go forward and build weapons systems that were
not adequately tested, resulting in enormous losses of money and great
losses of time in trying to build the defense of this country. So the
fact of the matter here is we concentrate on the premature construction
and not the research of this.
You will remember that when Mr. Coyle, who was the former director of
that agency, came before Congress and testified that the testing regime
was inadequate, the answer we got from the Department of Defense was to
pull it in and say they will now do an entirely different system of
testing. This one would lump all the research and development and
construction together, and it would be more difficult to separate one
out from the other. They would also do what they call the capabilities-
based system, as opposed to a system where we set out goals and tried
to meet those goals as we went forward and we could measure and
identify the progress in developing a system and whether or not it was
working.
When asked about the real capabilities of these Fort Greely
interceptors, General Ronald Kadish, the head of the Missile Defense
Agency, seems to be of two minds. On one hand, he calls it a limited
capability, a residual protection, not perfect by any means, but then
he testified before the Committee on Armed Services in February and
said he had high confidence that this would be capable to be put in
place by 2004.
The fact of the matter is that that is not the case, and because it
is not the case we should not be spending money to construct something
that has not been adequately tested.
Now the problem that we have here is that usually we would have a
Test and Evaluation Master Plan, or what we call a TEMP, by which we
could judge where this is going, but the administration has not given
us one. We would devise specific tests and goals and time lines. That
was originally due in June. It has yet to be completed. It has now been
pushed off to the fall, maybe later.
Normally, as an alternative, Congress would have certain minimum
requirements established by military planners in so-called operational
requirements documents, but the administration has canceled those as of
January.
Pentagon officials have also failed to deliver many other technical
documents, including the program implementation plan. So, essentially,
they are leaving us all out there without any guide or direction as to
whether or not we can measure the progress on this. They are ignoring
the technology. They are rushing ahead on construction without any
thoughtful testing regimen and forcing us to get a situation where we
will have to retroactively correct mistakes and errors, costing
billions of dollars and a great deal of time.
So we had a hearing and a briefing. We called in Mr. Coyle, and we
called in people of the Union of Concerned Scientists, experts on this
matter, for specific questioning about whether or not these programs
and aspects of it, separate components of it, were really going to be
operational and capable by 2004. We learned that that will not be the
case.
We first asked about the X-Band Radar System. The Pentagon thought
this system is essential to any ground-based system. We were told that
it will not be in place by 2004.
Then we asked about the space-based infrared satellite system, the
so-called SBIRS. We were told that those would not be in place near
operational and capable by 2004. In fact, we are looking a decade or
more out on that.
We then talked about whether or not we would have a Cobra Dane Radar
as a substitute for the X-Band Radar, even though it would not come
anywhere remotely close to doing all of the things that the X-Band
Radar was called upon doing; and we were told at best that would be
extremely limited and would not serve the purposes of testing or having
it be operational at that point in time.
We talked about whether or not flight tests would be conducted with
significant information being provided by the interceptor before the
launch, because essentially that is what we have been doing. We have
been telling the interceptor ahead of time where the target is. You can
bet no enemy is going to do that.
By 2004, Mr. Coyle and the Union of Concerned Scientists told us that
we would not have had a single test conducted without advanced
information on trajectory for the incoming missile given to the
interceptor. Nor would we have an opportunity to have any tests done
without first telling the interceptor where the launch location was. So
it is noes all the way down the line to there.

[[Page H4114]]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
Tierney) has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Tierney was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, we then asked whether or not the flight
intercept tests by 2004 would be able to tell us whether or not
countermeasures would be effectively taken into account in the test;
and we were told that, no, that would not be done.
We then asked whether or not it was important to test the system for
different kinds of weather, and we were told it was, but those types of
tests would not be done by 2004.
We asked whether or not there would be a simple target sweep or a
complex target sweep and whether or not there would be tests done on
complex target sweeps, and we were told that that would not be done.
We talked about the fact that, so far, any target has had a beacon on
it so that the enemy setting it up would have to have a red light
telling it where it was to be hit, and they said there would be no test
without the beacon being on target ahead of time.
So right on down the line we have had a system of boosters that have
been plagued with problems, and we were told that any booster
productivity by 2004 would be extremely unlikely. More likely that is a
decade out. So we are using a booster system that will not even be the
final one when this becomes operational.
Mr. Chairman, the bottom line on all of there is there is no way we
should start building this, no way we should start building it until it
is fully tested. We cannot under any conditions, by the former
operations and technical person at the Pentagon, have this in place and
operational and capable by 2004.
Why are we spending taxpayers' hard-earned money when we have so many
other needs in defense? Primary among those are homeland security
issues, pay for our troops, housing for our troops, right on down the
line. Instead, just because someone treats this program like religion,
we are out here allowing them to get away with starting to build
something that we have not tested. We are throwing good money after
bad.
The worst part of it is, Mr. Chairman, that now the Pentagon tells
us, because they were found out about how bad their testing regime is,
now they will classify everything so nobody will get the information.
You can bet every time they have a test they will tell you it is a
success. What they will not tell you is that they are testing it
knowing where the launch point was, knowing what the trajectory was,
knowing there is a beacon on the target, knowing there are no
countermeasures, knowing everyone will know the answer before it
starts, and that does not serve the American taxpayer well in the
defense of this country.
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last
word.
Mr. Chairman, I will not take the 5 minutes, but the gentleman is a
member of the authorizing committee and he knows full well this has to
do with authorizing policy. The fact is, we have begun spending money
and we have already provided a considerable amount of money to build
those silos in Alaska, that are designed to do the testing he says we
are not interested in doing.
The reality is that this amendment takes the heart out of our ability
to even consider ground-based missile defense, which is pretty
fundamental when we consider possibilities for protecting our country
in the future.
Because of that, I very, very strongly object to this amendment. I
would do so even if I did not object to the fact that the gentleman did
not discuss it with us before we came to the floor.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
Tierney) for the work he has done on this and ask the gentleman if he
would answer a question.
In looking at this presentation here, am I to understand that what
the people in charge of this program have done is that they have
basically failed to prove in any way that this system can work?
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, that is absolutely accurate, and when they
failed to do that they then tried to change the nature in which they
proceed with the system to make it harder to measure, and now they are
trying to classify it.
If I could add one word and make note of what the chairman said, this
is strictly a matter of money in this case. It identifies only
construction issues and not research issues and in no other way impedes
the Department of Defense moving forward research on this. In fact, the
very point is, let us research and know what it is we are building
before we start throwing bad money after good.
Mr. KUCINICH. Reclaiming my time, I appreciate what the gentleman
says. Let us just conduct our own simulation here.
Here is an incoming missile. Is there going to be a beacon on an
incoming missile?

{time} 1245

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, the way they have structured it so far,
there will not be any tests before 2004 where the beacon will not be
present.
Mr. KUCINICH. So there is an incoming missile for this test that has
a beacon on it?
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, it or some of the target suite will have a
missile beacon on it.
Mr. KUCINICH. Have they had tests where they had a beacon on it and
they failed that test?
Mr. TIERNEY. It is possible, though some of the earlier tests had
that scenario.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, so they had earlier tests when even when
they put a sign on it that said hit me, they were still unsuccessful?
Mr. TIERNEY. That is right.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, so from my colleague's recitation here,
what my colleague is saying basically and what has been testified to is
that the tests have been basically tricked up to make it appear that
this system works?
Mr. TIERNEY. I am saying that the testimony was from the Pentagon's
own person, the person who was in charge of doing operational testing
and evaluation, Mr. Coyle. It was his job on behalf of the Pentagon, as
directed by this Congress, to evaluate whether or not the testing
regime was adequate, and it was not. It was basically found that all of
these things would not be ready by 2004 and that the whole testing
program fell short of giving us any reasonable amount of confidence
that the system would be reliable.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, let us just go over
this now. My colleague is saying that in these tests they are giving
advance information, this missile coming in, they have advance
information on what the trajectory is going to be and what the speed is
going to be and what time it is going to be launched and where it is
going to be launched from and what the countermeasures might be; and
even though they have advance information, they still cannot make this
work?
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, they have a history of having failures.
They have had some successes, but none of the successes without those
additional components.
Mr. KUCINICH. Reclaiming my time, where they have had success, they
have been given advance information. Now in a real life scenario are
they likely to have advance information on trajectory and speed and
launch time? Is that likely?
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, no, it is not likely; and Mr. Coyle made
that point, that they do not have the realistic testing scenarios in
place and planned for execution before 2004. That is what they should
be doing. They should be having realistic scenarios in place and done
and completed and be evaluated before we get to the point of building.
We have a very bad history in this country, prior to the legislation we
passed to set up Mr. Coyle's Department, of having built things before
they were adequately tested.

[[Page H4115]]

Mr. KUCINICH. So basically we have a system here where they are
testing technology, but they are not accepting the results?
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, we have a system here where they are
testing, and they have not tested adequately to get to the point to
where they should be constructing.
Mr. KUCINICH. If we were to adopt the gentleman's amendment, how
would this effect a beneficial purpose for the American taxpayers?
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield, it would at
least stop them from starting to build something that they have not
adequately tested. They could continue to research. They could continue
to move in the direction of trying to find a way to make a system like
this work; but we would not be spending money on building something
only to run the extreme risk of having to change it later on at a
higher cost and much delay in the program, and that money could then be
used more fruitfully on some of the higher priorities of our defense,
including homeland security.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman for his
work on this, and I am supporting his amendment.
Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, what I really appreciate about this country is that we
can have an open forum and allow two lawyers to talk about rocket
science. What the gentleman just brought up here is 12 parameters on a
rocket test. I would like to talk just a little bit about speaking on
only 12 parameters on a rocket test. The facts of the matter is that
there will probably be close to 12,000 parameters addressed in the
series of tests that we are going to be doing out of Fort Greely,
Alaska. I think before I go on, I want to talk a little bit about why
we are going to have these tests.
There is a need to have protection from incoming intercontinental
ballistic missiles. Today we know that Russia has those capabilities as
do some of the former Soviet countries that were part of the former
Soviet Union, USSR. We know China has that capability. India is working
on that capability. North Korea is working on that capability and has
launched a three-stage rocket. Fortunately, the third stage did not
fire, but it is just a matter of time.
Iran, Iraq is also pursuing this technology; but we are not doing it
for today. Listening to the previous discussion, it sounded like we
were expecting something to be ready either by this December or we
should not do it at all. This is a very complex system, but this is a
complex system that has had successful tests; and even the gentleman
admitted, yes, there have been some successes.
The success was that we fired a rocket off out of the Pacific, a
second intercepting rocket was launched from a land-based location, and
in essence, a bullet hit a bullet thousands of miles from the location
from where either of these rockets were launched, thousands of miles, a
bullet hitting a bullet, tremendous success, wonderful success.
I do not think we can get two lawyers, one on each end of the
Capitol, have them shoot at each other, ever get a hit on a bullet; but
these scientists were able to do this at thousands of miles, a
tremendous technical achievement.
We are expecting it to happen immediately, or we should do not it at
all? Well, it is going to take time to continue this technology so that
we can be successful in protecting, not ourselves necessarily, but our
posterity, our children. North Korea does not have an intercontinental
ballistic missile yet, but they will have. Countries that are rogue
nations, with rogue leaders will have that capability in the future. We
do have a constitutional requirement to provide for the common defense
of our citizens. We cannot do it without a system like this. It does
not happen overnight. We have to work on it overtime. We have to invest
time; we have to invest money. We have to expect some failures. But it
is an incredible technology.
For us to shut the water off on this is very shortsighted. It ignores
the future. It ignores the safety of our citizens, my children, our
children. We cannot turn our backs on this. It is a reality. It is an
achievable technology. It is a necessity, and for us to stop this is
very shortsighted and I think, hopefully, improbable. I think that is
the general feeling here in the House is that we should provide for the
common defense of our children, and that is a viable means of doing
that.
One of the other things I wanted to say about the location is that
Fort Greely, Alaska, is probably the best location to run this battery
of tests, to measure these parameters. The location has been studied.
Construction has already started. It is very important that we continue
with this program; and I think that the Pentagon, the administration,
the rocket scientists have a very good plan. It is a well-thought-out
plan. It measures every facet. It starts with a design concept. It
develops documents as to what test requirements are going to be
required, what the statement of work, the total environment of this
test activity, every little stress point on these rockets that is going
to be measured. It is going to be able to hit a bullet with a bullet,
thousands of miles over the Pacific or over areas remote from our
country; and that is something that we need to think about as a
priority for our children, because the reality is, it is going to
occur.
My colleagues cannot convince me that Mu'ammar Qadhafi or Saddam
Hussein or some future despot is not going to want to use that leverage
on America. How do we protect ourselves from that? We have to have a
system, an umbrella around our citizens, around our children. So, Mr.
Chairman, I ask that this amendment be opposed and that we continue on
with the business of the day.
Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
I, first of all, want to congratulate the chairman of the
subcommittee as well as the ranking member for constructing a very good
bill. There is no question that this is a very good piece of
legislative work. Nevertheless, I rise here this afternoon to support
this amendment because I think it makes a very constructive improvement
to the legislation that we are currently considering.
A week ago today, the Bush administration unilaterally withdrew the
United States of America from the antiballistic missile treaty which
had been in effect since 1972. This is a treaty which has stood the
American people and the people of the world in good stead for 30 years.
It has had the effect of reducing tensions, reducing the likelihood of
a nuclear attack by any country; and it is a treaty that I think ought
to continue to be in existence, but the administration withdrew us from
that treaty so that they could begin the construction of these
facilities in Alaska and elsewhere.
In doing so, the allegation is, and we have just heard an exposition
of that from the gentleman from Kansas just a moment ago, that all of
this is designed to improve our security; but in fact, I think what we
are seeing is the opposite is happening. As a result of our withdrawal
from the ABM treaty, the Russian military is already talking and
pressuring the leadership in Russia to put their missiles on higher
alert. They are already discussing multiple, independently targeted
reentry vehicles, in other words, MIRVing the system, putting more
warheads on their missiles. In other words, the effect of the
withdrawal from the treaty has already begun to increase tensions on
both sides and putting the Russian nuclear missile system on a higher
position of alert.
What this amendment does is prevent the expenditure of $181-plus
million for the construction of these silos. It is a very thoughtful
and very prudent initiative, and it is one that we ought to follow. We
ought to follow it because the expenditure of that money is premature;
and if we do expend it and this construction goes forward, it is going
to increase tensions additionally even further.
We have also heard it expressed very, very clearly that the physics
of this system has not been proved, not in any sense. The success that
we heard about just a moment ago is a false success. It is a success
that has demonstrated over and over again that in spite of the fact
that we know where the launch is coming from, what time the launch is
occurring, the trajectory of that launch,

[[Page H4116]]

where the missile will be at a precise moment in time, in spite of
that, the tests have failed over and other and over again. There has
been some minimal success, but the preponderance has been failure.
Such that, as we heard from the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
Tierney) a moment ago, Phillip Coyle, who is the former Pentagon chief
investigator, said earlier this year in February that some aspects of
this tall order are virtually impossible; and the overwhelming evidence
from the scientific community agrees with that. Scientists over and
over and over again studying the physics tell us that we have not
tested this system enough to demonstrate that it is going to work; the
physics of it are impossible.
So what we are offered here today is an opportunity to improve this
bill, reduce the expenditures by $181 million, and instead of
increasing tensions and reducing national security, to improve national
security by the adoption of this amendment.
I support the amendment, and I hope that the House will do so as
well.
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
I had not intended to speak on this amendment, but heard the
gentleman before me when I just came back from the energy conference to
my office. I believe there is a credible nuclear threat against the
United States of America. There is a possibility that a rogue nation or
terrorist group will deliver a nuclear device to the United States of
America, but it will not be on the tip of a missile.
This misbegotten technology, if it ever worked, would not defend
against a depressed launched trajectory missile from a submarine,
against stealth missiles, against bombers, against all those other
threats. But not even those are the real threats, and that is not the
real failing of this. It will not defend against the container, one of
the 500 million that come to the United States every year. That is the
most likely vehicle for a nuclear bomb in the United States of America.
A simple bomb attached to a GPS device gets to a certain point in the
United States and it blows up.

{time} 1300

And guess what? While we are spending $100 billion or more of our
hard-earned tax dollars to try and take this totally failed and
continually failing system, one that has to be notified in advance, has
to have a GPS device tracking the incoming missile, one that cannot
take on any sort of devices that would cloak or hide the missile or in
any way make it more difficult to hit, they are going to be attacking
us in another way.
It is a real shame. The one thing we have that really works are our
satellites and our detection capability. The second that one of those
rogue nations launches a missile against the United States, we will
know it, and in 20 minutes that nation would no longer exist.
They are not going to launch missiles against the United States. They
might buy a junk freighter, they might sneak it into a container, or
they might put it in a van and drive it across the border from Mexico
or Canada. There is a whole bunch of ways they might deliver a nuclear
weapon to the United States. And while we are wasting money on this
program to enrich the defense contractors with failing technology, they
will be making their plans.
It is just extraordinary to me after 9-11, when they commandeered our
civilian aircraft and used them as weapons of mass destruction, that we
are still obsessed with trying to build technology to fight a threat
that does not exist.
Yes, the North Koreans. The North Koreans once launched a missile
that, if it had worked, might have reached the United States; and
someday they might have two or three of them. Well, the leader of North
Korea might be nuts, but he is not nuts enough that he wants to turn
his country into nuclear glass.
Our assurance of deterrence, mutually assured destruction, in this
case, is not mutually assured. They might hit some tiny corner of the
United States, which would be very tragic, and I doubt very much they
will even try to do that, but we would totally devastate them. That is
not the way they will deliver these threats.
There are credible threats. Let us invest some of this money in a
technology to screen the 500 million containers coming into the United
States, to screen the Mexican semis that are about to start streaming
across the border to all points in the United States with no
inspection.
How do my colleagues think they are going to deliver it? They are not
going to try to build a missile and then shoot it at us and let us
detect it. They will put it in a truck, they will put it in a
container, maybe a suitcase or maybe a van. And while we are wasting
all this money for technology that probably will not work anyway, they
are going to be planning a credible attack.
Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, in the aftermath of September 11, there is even more
interest than usual in rushing legislation through the House. Certainly
all of us respect the time, effort, and expertise of this subcommittee
in trying to develop the best bill. There is not a Member of this House
that does not want to provide every dollar that is essential to
securing the future of America and of every American family. But I
believe it is appropriate, as is happening here on the floor of the
House today, that we at least devote as much time to this expenditure
of $354 billion of taxpayer money as we normally allot to a bill naming
a post office.
I commend the gentleman from Massachusetts for his courage in
advancing these amendments, because the most recent sequel of the
Administration's Star Wars plans is considerably similar to the most
recent sequel of the Star Wars movie. It depends in the main on
gimmicks and special effects.
One of our colleagues has told us today about the success of one of a
number of tests that was done with a bullet hitting a bullet. If my
colleagues believe that our adversaries will choose a clear night, will
announce the launch time to us, will ensure there is good weather along
the full route of the missile, and, in addition, they will place a
homing beacon in the missile they are firing at American cities, then,
perhaps, with those disclaimers, this is a system worth considering,
with one major exception. Because even under those circumstances, even
under the best-case scenario, I have yet to hear a single official or a
single advocate who has any knowledge about this system who is willing
to say that it will be 100 percent successful.
Indeed, most people who have explored this realize that the whole
Fort Greely plan is based on the premise: ``Build it and it will
work''. And when it works, it will not work 100 percent of the time.
Well, consider with me again the tremendous horror that we all feel
as we reflect on September 11, the damage, the destruction, that gouge
in the earth that one can see at Ground Zero in New York City; and
think for a moment how much worse it would have been if it had been a
nuclear device and how many more tens of thousands of families would
have suffered, as so many have already suffered from September 11.
Are we to accept as a security system for American families a system
that can permit just one New York City or one Chicago or one Austin,
Texas that was 85 or 95 percent effective in stopping most of the
missiles from coming in? I suggest that is like going out in the rain
with an umbrella full of holes. It is better to consider whether there
is not a better way to stay dry than to use that kind of leaky
umbrella.
It builds a sense of false security. It encourages adventurism. It
encourages a foreign policy that promises the American people 100
percent security when, in fact, experts agree we are going to expose
some Americans to a nuclear catastrophe to an extent that we have never
seen in the history of the world. It would make a Hiroshima or a
Nagasaki look like a small disaster in comparison.
I would suggest that, there is not an expert around that does not
think if we build at Fort Greely and begin this kind of effort that we
will not have more missiles designed to be targeted to the United
States by our potential adversaries.
If the Chinese build more missiles, and there has been a suggestion
that they would as a result of this kind of

[[Page H4117]]

construction at Fort Greely, what impact might that have on the Indians
who are a little closer than San Francisco to China? If the Indians
begin building more missiles because the Chinese are building more
missiles, what impact might that have on the Pakistanis right across
the border? And if the Pakistanis build more missiles, what impact
might that have on the Iranians, with whom they have had some
competition in Afghanistan? And if the Iranians build more missiles,
what impact might that have on Israel? And if Israel builds more, what
impact might that have on Egypt?
What we are looking at in Fort Greely is the beginning of a system
that will lead to destabilization and to an arms race, the ultimate
effect of which will be jeopardizing the security of American families.
It is because we share a commitment as deep as the advocates for this
bill in the desire to defend our country that we speak out today
against Star Wars and in favor of the amendment of the gentleman from
Massachusetts, because we believe the true security of our Nation rests
on stopping the false security of this phony Star Wars system.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
(Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the bill and to
oppose this amendment and particularly to thank the chairman, the
gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), and the ranking member, the
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha), for their work with me, as
well as the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Sabo), on finding a proper
replacement for the Crusader.
I want to thank the gentlemen and staff for all their work in
protecting those technologies and the brain trust that goes with those
jobs.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the Fiscal Year 2003
Defense Appropriations bill. I thank Chairman Lewis and Congressman
Murtha, the ranking member, as well as their staff, for their work.
We are still a nation at war, and our first and foremost priority at
this time must be to the men and women we have called upon to fight.
Rightfully, this is the first of the regular FY03 Appropriations bills
that this body will consider, and that it should be the first of the
FY03 appropriations bills to be sent to the President's desk for his
signature.
Since the tragic events of September 11, we have asked a great deal
of our military. And Congress has acted to provide them with additional
funds to purchase ammunition and equipment, to pay them better wages,
and to make sure their families have a decent place to live, access to
health care, while their loved ones are fighting for our freedom in
Afghanistan, the Balkans, South Korea, the Middle East and around the
globe.
But while it is important that we continue to meet the immediate
needs of our armed forces, we must begin to look ahead at their future
needs, and focus on what investments are truly worthy.
When it comes to war, we want overwhelming superiority in every way.
We want our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, along with their
guard and reserve components, to have the most advanced, most
revolutionary, most lethal systems possible.
I am pleased that this bill contains $57.7 billion for research and
development on the next generation of fighter jets, ammunition rounds,
communications equipment, unmanned aerial vehicles and other critical
weapons. This is $4 billion over the President's request and $8 billion
over last year's level.
However, this bill does not contain funding for one critical R&D
project--the Crusader Self-propelled Howitzer, which Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld proposed terminating. This system would have
brought revolutionary technologies to the battlefield and provided a
true ``leap ahead'' from the currently fielded Paladin.

While this bill on the floor today meets the administration's
objective of terminating the Crusador program, this committee has
recognized the need for ground-based indirect fire support
capabilities, and it supports a large leap ahead toward developing the
Army's next generation of these systems. I want to take this
opportunity to thank Chairman Lewis and Mr. Murtha and his staff for
working closely with me and Mr. Sabo to shape the direction of the
Army's replacement for the Crusader. They have put in long hours, and I
believe they have crafted a compromise which keeps the Crusader's
``brain trust'' intact while moving ahead with the development of a
lighter, more mobile, more lethal system.
Air superiority alone cannot win all our nation's future wars. We
must maintain robust ground warfare capabilities, including a range of
direct and indirect fire support systems. Our soldiers on the ground
need direct and indirect fire support systems that can hit their
targets, day or night, rain or shine.
One system that will fill that need to provide ground-based fire
support is the Lightweight 155mm Towed Howitzer, which the committee
has fully funded. This joint Marine Corps and Army program will provide
a means for our soldiers to fire the Excalibur precision munition
round. The importance of getting this system in the hands of our
soldiers and Marines, sooner rather than later, is more critical given
the cancellation of Crusader.
Further, to address future indirect fire support needs, the Committee
has provided $368.5 million to begin development of a future Army
objective force vehicle. These funds include $195.5 million for the
maturation and transfer of indirect fire support capabilities from the
Crusader, as was requested in the President's recent FY03 Budget
Amendment. Additionally, the Committee provided $173 million for the
integration of revolutionary cannon technologies onto a new, lighter
platform.
As a result of the language so carefully crafted by the chairman and
his staff this will allow us to harness the ``brain trust'' behind the
development of Crusader's revolutionary technologies--the liquid-cooled
cannon, automated loading mechanism, crew compartment and software--and
imbed them in a lighter, more mobile, more lethal replacement system.
Many of the scientists and engineers responsible for developing these
revolutionary Crusader technologies work for the Program Manager for
Crusader at Picatinny Arsenal in my district.
I am confident that Picatinny's ``brain trust'' is up to the
challenge of developing a system that possesses the capabilities and
advances that Crusader would bring to the battlefield in a package that
is half the weight, and can become part of the Army's arsenal within
the next six years.
Also contained in this bill is funding for a broad range of projects
at Picatinny in areas as diverse as homeland defense, smart munitions,
nanotechnology and environmental remediation, which I support because
they provide our soldiers in the field with the tools they need to win.
I urge my colleagues to stand in support of the men and women who are
fighting on behalf of our nation, and to vote for this bill.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Tierney).
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
Tierney) will be postponed.

Amendment Offered by Mr. Collins

Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Collins:
At the end of the bill (before the short title), insert the
following new section:
Sec. ____. None of the funds provided in this Act may be
used to relocate the headquarters of the United States Army,
South, from Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, to a location in the
continental United States.

Mr. COLLINS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Georgia?
There was no objection.
Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I rise to offer this amendment to the
defense appropriations bill as a technical correction to a situation
dealing with the Army South Headquarters. I have discussed this with
Chairman Lewis, Chairman Hobson, and Chairman Young; and I do believe
that the Chair also discussed it with the ranking member.
Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. COLLINS. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, we have no problem with the amendment.
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. COLLINS. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, we have no objection to the
amendment.
Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman and the ranking
member for their support of the amendment.

[[Page H4118]]

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Collins).
The amendment was agreed to.

Sequential Votes Postponed in Committee of the Whole

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings will
now resume on those amendments on which further proceedings were
postponed in the following order: The first amendment offered by the
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Tierney), the amendment offered by
the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), and the second
amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Tierney).
The Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the time for any electronic vote
after the first vote in this series.

Amendment Offered by Mr. Tierney

The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
Tierney) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the
noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The Clerk designated the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was refused.
The CHAIRMAN. The noes prevailed by voice vote, so the amendment is
rejected.

Amendment Offered by Mr. Spratt

The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr.
Spratt) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the
ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The Clerk designated the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was refused.
The CHAIRMAN. The ayes prevailed by voice vote, so the amendment is
agreed to.

Amendment Offered by Mr. Tierney

Recorded Vote

The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 112,
noes 314, not voting 8, as follows:

[Roll No. 269]

AYES--112

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Baird
Baldwin
Barrett
Becerra
Berkley
Blumenauer
Bonior
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Capps
Cardin
Carson (IN)
Clay
Clayton
Clyburn
Conyers
Coyne
Crowley
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
Doggett
Duncan
Ehlers
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Frank
Gephardt
Hastings (FL)
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoeffel
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Inslee
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jones (OH)
Kind (WI)
Kleczka
Kucinich
LaFalce
Larsen (WA)
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Lynch
Maloney (NY)
Markey
McCarthy (MO)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Miller, George
Morella
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Paul
Payne
Pelosi
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Rivers
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sanders
Sawyer
Schakowsky
Serrano
Sherman
Smith (WA)
Solis
Stark
Strickland
Stupak
Thompson (CA)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Velazquez
Waters
Watson (CA)
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weiner
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn

NOES--314

Aderholt
Akin
Andrews
Armey
Baca
Bachus
Baker
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop
Blagojevich
Blunt
Boehlert
Bonilla
Bono
Boozman
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Bryant
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capuano
Carson (OK)
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Clement
Coble
Collins
Combest
Condit
Cooksey
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Cummings
Cunningham
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal
DeLauro
DeLay
DeMint
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dingell
Dooley
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Dunn
Edwards
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Etheridge
Everett
Ferguson
Flake
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Granger
Graves
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Grucci
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Harman
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Isakson
Israel
Issa
Istook
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kerns
Kildee
Kilpatrick
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Maloney (CT)
Manzullo
Mascara
Matheson
Matsui
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
Menendez
Mica
Millender-McDonald
Miller, Dan
Miller, Gary
Miller, Jeff
Mink
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Myrick
Napolitano
Nethercutt
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Ortiz
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Oxley
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Phelps
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reyes
Reynolds
Riley
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sanchez
Sandlin
Saxton
Schaffer
Schiff
Schrock
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shows
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Snyder
Souder
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Sullivan
Sununu
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Thune
Thurman
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Toomey
Turner
Upton
Visclosky
Vitter
Walden
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins (OK)
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING--8

Allen
Boehner
Burr
McCarthy (NY)
Northup
Roukema
Sabo
Traficant

{time} 1336

Mrs. TAUSCHER and Messrs. OTTER, GEKAS, LANGEVIN, CANTOR, PICKERING,
KENNEDY of Rhode Island, HINOJOSA and TOM DAVIS of Virginia changed
their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Messrs. INSLEE, WYNN and SAWYER changed their vote from ``no'' to
``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read the last two lines of the bill.
The Clerk read as follows:
This Act may be cited as the ``Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2003''.

The CHAIRMAN. There being no further amendments to the bill, under
the rule the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Shimkus) having assumed the chair, Mr. Camp, Chairman of the Committee
of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that
Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 5010) making
appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2003, and for other purposes, pursuant to House
Resolution 461, he reported the bill back to the House with sundry
amendments adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

[[Page H4119]]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair will
put them en gros.
The amendments were agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
Under clause 10 of rule XX, the yeas and nays are ordered.
Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, this vote will be followed by two 5-
minute votes on motions to suspend the rules on the following measures:
House Concurrent Resolution 424;
H.R. 3034.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 413,
nays 18, not voting 3, as follows:

[Roll No. 270]

YEAS--413

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Allen
Andrews
Armey
Baca
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Becerra
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonior
Bono
Boozman
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (FL)
Brown (SC)
Bryant
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carson (IN)
Carson (OK)
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coble
Collins
Combest
Condit
Cooksey
Costello
Cox
Coyne
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Culberson
Cummings
Cunningham
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
DeLay
DeMint
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Farr
Fattah
Ferguson
Flake
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Granger
Graves
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Grucci
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Harman
Hart
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inslee
Isakson
Israel
Issa
Istook
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kerns
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kleczka
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaFalce
LaHood
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Luther
Lynch
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manzullo
Markey
Mascara
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCrery
McGovern
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Mica
Millender-McDonald
Miller, Dan
Miller, Gary
Miller, Jeff
Mink
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Nethercutt
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Owens
Oxley
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Pelosi
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Phelps
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Rehberg
Reyes
Reynolds
Riley
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Rush
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Sanchez
Sandlin
Sawyer
Saxton
Schaffer
Schiff
Schrock
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shows
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Souder
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sullivan
Sununu
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Thune
Thurman
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Tierney
Toomey
Towns
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Velazquez
Visclosky
Vitter
Walden
Walsh
Wamp
Waters
Watkins (OK)
Watson (CA)
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Wu
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NAYS--18

Baldwin
Brown (OH)
Conyers
DeFazio
Filner
Frank
Jackson (IL)
Kucinich
Lee
McDermott
McKinney
Miller, George
Paul
Payne
Sanders
Schakowsky
Stark
Woolsey

NOT VOTING--3

Northup
Roukema
Traficant

{time} 1359

Messrs. BROWN of Ohio, JACKSON of Illinois, and PAYNE and Ms. BALDWIN
changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

____________________