[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 88 (Thursday, June 27, 2002)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1162-E1163]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                EVERY CONFLICT DEMANDS DIFFICULT CHOICES

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. MAC COLLINS

                               of georgia

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, June 26, 2002

  Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Speaker, the following article appeared in the May 
22, 2002 Griffin Daily News, Griffin, Georgia. It was so moving that I 
felt the entire article should be read by every Member of Congress and 
I would like to submit it for the Record.,

                Every Conflict Demands Difficult Choices

                           (By Philip Smith)

       I will address a subject that has had a special meaning to 
     me. It is called by some as ``limited war.'' It gets started 
     by a stronger country answering the call of a weaker country 
     (or should I say government) to protect and shield it by 
     limited involvement from outside intruders while it has time 
     to organize a means to govern and protect itself. This start 
     had a heavy meaning to this country in the early 1960s, 
     especially on Aug. 5, 1964, when the first U.S. pilot was 
     shot down and taken POW. The U.S. Veterans Administration 
     declares this date as the beginning of the American Vietnam 
     era.
       War is born of failure--the failure of nations to resolve 
     their differences diplomatically and peacefully. Furthermore, 
     it is waged with tools of death and destruction so that man 
     may live in peace.
       We found out just what was defined and not defined by 
     ``limited war'' over the next 8.5 years of the Vietnam War. 
     That war, which we lost, ended Jan. 27, 1973. After this 
     decade (now 25 years) to ponder lessons of Vietnam, we can 
     realistically think about the use of force again. It is my 
     purpose to try to show some areas which must not be forgotten 
     and must be completely understood before we can think more 
     clearly about potential future conflicts. It took 10 years 
     after my return from Vietnam before I wanted to read and 
     understand the history of the country and the lessons we 
     learned from the whole war. I have read many books and 
     articles, but I am by no means an expert. I am smart enough 
     to know that experience is the best teacher. We can't let 
     this experience go by without learning her lessons. They were 
     too costly. These are my views, but they are shared by more 
     than 95 percent of all the combat Vietnam vets I have talked 
     with. There is Total War, Limited War and Unilateral in 
     Action. With all the massive destructive power in all the 
     countries of the world, total war is an absurdity, just plain 
     suicide. Unilateral in action is just turning your back as 
     your hear screams of your friends dying because you don't 
     want to get involved. Limited war is between the Fierce Hawk 
     and the coward dove. In any future conflict, or better yet 
     before any future conflict, we need to make some hard choices 
     about (1) what the particular situation requires; (2) what 
     our final objectives are and (3) how valuable are these 
     objectives to the U.S., i.e., is it strategically a necessity 
     to the U.S.? Is it worth the blood of our young men? Is it 
     necessary in the survival of this country? Then, we need to 
     develop appropriate forces.
       There are four major mistake areas of concern surrounding 
     Vietnam. (1) Gradualism was a policy that did not work in 
     South Vietnam. We thought that if we kept turning the screws 
     tighter on the North, inflicting enough pain, they would stop 
     their aggression on the South. The politicians felt 
     constrained to this gradually, because of political pressure. 
     We were afraid if we went too fast, the Chinese or Soviets 
     would get directly involved, plus our own critics of the war 
     back home denounced any escalations. Well, every time we 
     tightened the screws, the North adapted to the pressure and 
     was able to endure and build up. Our only deviation from 
     gradualism was Operation Linebacker II, which was around-the-
     clock surgically precise bombing campaign of Hanoi, Haiphong 
     and other North Vietnamese cities. In mid-December 1972, when 
     the peace talks broke down, due again to the NVA not 
     negotiating in good faith, President Nixon put the baseball 
     bat to their heads and for the first time brought the North 
     Vietnamese to their knees in Operation Linebacker II.
       They signed readily in January to end the war. Linebacker 
     II was a lesson on the use of force. In Vietnam, we pussy-
     footed around the military power and paid a high price for 
     it. We fought much longer and escalated far higher than we 
     had ever intended, and we lost. Think what might have 
     happened if Linebacker II had been unleashed in 1965 and not 
     1972.
       (2) Attrition and gradualism often are lumped together. Our 
     ability to wear down an enemy whose history since B.C. had 
     been to endure pain, ended ultimately in failure. Small 
     powers can fight big powers in attrition wars and win. The 
     pattern is the same: Initial public support, prolonged 
     struggles without apparent result, decreasing public support, 
     one battle that goes badly, a vote of no-confidence, then 
     withdrawal. But, it is possible to fight a war of attrition 
     if there is total war. mobilization and commitment in the 
     initial public support phase, such as World War I or World 
     War 11.
       (3) Rules of engagement. We fought within specific rules of 
     engagement while the enemy pursued a total war. As a 
     helicopter pilot, we could not fire on the enemy unless we 
     were not only being fired on first, but only if we had the 
     specific person or persons identified. ``Charlie'' could fire 
     at us while standing among a group of working peasants or 
     villagers, and we could not return fire. But, he would give a 
     child from this village a live grenade to pull the pin out as 
     he walked up to some G.I. or rode in a helicopter. There were 
     geographical restrictions for us, but none for the enemy. 
     Don't think these rules won't demoralize a soldier fast.
       (4) The people. To win any war, the will of the people must 
     identify with the will of the conflict. For a young man to 
     leave home while watching his country protest his leaving to 
     fight an unpopular war and to arrive into that country seeing 
     people protest his being there and fighting in a war where he 
     has ``rules of engagement'' but the enemy does not, it 
     doesn't take him long to see the futility in that war.
       The will of the (Vietnamese) people was not the will of the 
     government, no matter how much military hardware they had. 
     So, without this ``will,'' the enemy could hide in the open 
     all over the country because they were the people. Without 
     this ``will of a people'' to fight for a change, a change 
     could never survive, an it didn't.
       Some of the veterans of World War II and the Korean War 
     have asked what is so special about the Vietnam combat vet. 
     They, too, went through war. War is the same through time; 
     only the weapons change. The horrors and pains and ever-
     present nightmares of war are the same after all wars. So, 
     why are we, the Vietnam combat veterans, having so much more 
     of a problem after this war?
       Two issues keep coming up in talking with Vietnam vets: We 
     Lost; we were defeated. We knew we could have won if only 
     allowed to fight a war that had final objectives and not been 
     a political palm.
       (1) To my friends that were lost and all the men who died 
     or were wounded or maimed for life, what is there to show for 
     this sacrifice? These men were some of the finest people to 
     ever live, and they answered their country's call, for what? 
     Not only did we who came home have to live with a losing 
     cause, but we came home to some hostile people who called us 
     child-killers and dope heads, the thanks from a grateful 
     nation.
       (2) The second issue was guilt, guilt of taking people and 
     ruining their customs and

[[Page E1163]]

     form of life so they could wait on the U.S. dollar. Families 
     were broken up, beautiful cities and shrines destroyed, a 
     country which had one of the prettiest coastlines and 
     mountains made to look like the moon with so many craters and 
     sprayed so much that nothing would grow, Yes, this, then 
     seeing a ``no win situation,'' packed up and left only to see 
     the South Vietnamese retreat in 1975. All the good and bad we 
     had done for more than 10 years was gone in less than 10 
     days.
       I have attempted this collection of views many times, but 
     never have been able to get my thoughts or research completed 
     or knew what to do with it after I had completed it until I 
     talked to a grand lady, who is a retired teacher in North 
     Carolina. She is a beautiful, well-educated person, who loves 
     her country. This lady is special to me. Our eyes get watery 
     when we speak to each other. One of the times I was shot down 
     was in Laos along with three other helicopters, a gunship 
     pilot friend of mine helped give us air cover until we could 
     be extracted. He was shot down and killed. This friend of 
     mine was her son. This tore her family apart. She asked the 
     same question after the war: why? What was Fred's life for? 
     What were all Freds' lives for? We can't let a Vietnam ever 
     happen again. We must learn from our experience. We can't 
     turn our heads on another future conflict without these 
     questions answered before. We must demand answers from 
     Washington. If the answers are yes to America's survival and 
     the decision is to go, then the whole country must go for it 
     immediately and completely or not at all.
       This next one may be close, and it may have your sons or 
     grandsons in it. If they have to die, we can't let them die 
     in vain or live with guilt and humiliation the rest of their 
     lives.

     

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