[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 86 (Tuesday, June 25, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6046-S6047]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




              VIOLENCE AGAINST MASS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

  Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent the Senate proceed to the 
consideration of Calendar No. 430, S. 2621.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 2621) to provide a definition of vehicle for 
     purposes of criminal penalties relating to terrorist attacks 
     and other acts of violence against mass transportation 
     systems.


[[Page S6047]]


  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President. I am pleased the Senate is considering 
today S. 2621, a bill I introduced earlier this month with Senator 
Biden that is also cosponsored by Senators Hatch and Schumer. This bill 
is intended to clarify that an airplane is a vehicle for purposes of 
terrorist and other violent acts against mass transportation systems. A 
significant question about this point has been raised in an important 
criminal case and deserves our prompt attention.
  On June 11, 2002, a U.S. district judge in Boston dismissed one of 
the nine charges against Richard Reid stemming from his alleged attempt 
to detonate an explosive device in his shoe while onboard an 
international flight from Paris to Miami on December 22, 2001. The 
dismissed count charged defendant Reid with violating section 1993 of 
title 18, United States Code, by attempting to ``wreck, set fire to, 
and disable a mass transportation vehicle,''
  Section 1993 is a new criminal law that was added, as section 801, to 
the USA PATRIOT Act to punish terrorist attacks and other acts of 
violence against, inter alia, a ``mass transportation'' vehicle or 
ferry, or against a passenger or employee of a mass transportation 
provider. I had urged that this provision be included in the final 
anti-terrorism law considered by the Congress. A similar provision was 
originally part of S. 2783, the ``21st Century Law Enforcement and 
Public Safety Act,'' that I introduced in the last Congress in June, 
2000 at the request of the Clinton administration.
  The district court rejected defendant Reid's arguments to dismiss the 
section 1993 charge on grounds that (1) the penalty provision does not 
apply to an `'attempt,'' and (2) an airplane is not engaged in ``mass 
transportation,'' ``Mass transportation'' is defined in section 1993 by 
reference to the ``the meaning given to that term in section 5302(a)(7) 
of title 49, U.S.C., except that the term shall include schoolbus, 
charter and sightseeing transportation.
  Section 5302(a)(7), in turn, provides the following definition: 
``mass transportation'' means ``transportation by conveyance that 
provides regular and continuing general or special transportation to 
the public, but does not include school bus, charter or sightseeing 
transportation.'' The court explained that ``commercial aircraft 
transport large numbers of people every day'' and that the definition 
of ``mass transportation'' ``when read in an ordinary or natural way, 
encompasses aircraft of the kind at issue here,'' U.S. v. Reid, CR No. 
02-10013, at p. 10, 12 (D. MA, June 11, 2002).
  Defendant Reid also argued that the section 1993 charge should be 
dismissed because an airplane is not a ``vehicle,'' The court agreed, 
citing the fact that the term ``vehicle'' is not defined in section 
1993 and that the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. Sec. 4, narrowly defines 
``vehicle'' to include ``every description of carriage or other 
artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of 
transportation on land.'' The emphasis in the original opinion.
  Notwithstanding common parlance, the district court relied on the 
narrow definition to conclude that an aircraft is not a ``vehicle'' 
within the meaning of section 1993.
  The new section 1993 was intended to provide broad Federal criminal 
jurisdiction over terrorist and violent acts against all mass 
transportation systems, not only bus services, but also commercial 
airplanes, cruise ships, railroads and other forms of transportation 
available for public carriage.
  The bill the committee reports today would add a definition of 
``vehicle'' to section 1993 and clarify that an airplane is a 
``vehicle'' both in common parlance and under this new criminal law to 
protect mass transportation systems. Specifically, the bill would 
define this term to mean ``any carriage or other contrivance used, or 
capable of being used, as a means of transportation on land, water or 
through the air.''
  On June 20, 2002, less than two weeks after the bill was introduced, 
the Judiciary Committee favorably reported this bill for consideration 
by the Senate. I urge the Senate to act promptly and pass this 
legislation.
  Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent the bill be read three times, 
passed, the motion to reconsider be laid on the table with no 
intervening action or debate, and any statements relating thereto be 
printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The bill (S. 2621) was read the third time and passed, as follows:

                                S. 2621

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. DEFINITION.

       Section 1993(c) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (7), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) in paragraph (8), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(9) the term `vehicle' means any carriage or other 
     contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of 
     transportation on land, water, or through the air.''.

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