[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 83 (Thursday, June 20, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5799-S5821]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now
resume consideration of S. 2514, which the clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 2514) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2003 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.
Pending:
Feingold Amendment No. 3915, to extend for 2 years
procedures to maintain fiscal accountability and
responsibility.
Reid (for Conrad) Amendment No. 3916 (to Amendment No.
3915), of a perfecting nature.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for the
fiscal year 2003 Defense authorization bill. I believe this bill
provides the needed resources to compensate and to reward the men and
women in uniform who are doing an extraordinary job protecting this
country across the globe and here at home. I also think the bill will
provide the funding and the direction to continue the transformation of
our military forces so that we are able to meet the new emerging
threats of this new century.
This year, I again served as chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee.
This subcommittee focuses on strategic systems, space systems, missile
defense, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs, and
the national security functions of the Department of Energy. The
subcommittee and the full committee held seven hearings dealing with
matters in the subcommittee's jurisdiction.
The issues addressed by the subcommittee cover a wide range of
subjects. These issues include the Nuclear Posture Review, which the
Defense Department issued in December, which covers our strategic
nuclear plan; the creation of a new Missile Defense Agency, which
replaced the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization; increased concerns
about the security of nuclear weapons and materials; the need to
substantially restructure several space programs; and proposed
reductions to the number of deployed nuclear weapons in the context of
the new and very commendable agreement with Russia.
Let me turn, first, to the issues of strategic systems.
The strategic systems that fall within the jurisdiction of the
Strategic Subcommittee include long-range bombers, the land-based and
sea-based ballistic missile forces, and the broad range of matters
pertaining to nuclear weapons in the Department of Defense.
In the area of strategic systems, the bill, as reported, adds $23
million to keep the Minuteman III ICBM upgrade programs and the effort
to retire the Peacekeeper on track, as has been requested by the Air
Force in their list of unfunded requirements.
The Peacekeeper and the Minuteman III missiles are both land-based
missile systems. When the Peacekeeper is retired, Minuteman III will be
the only land-based system, so it is very important to ensure, for our
nuclear deterrence, that the process of retirement of Peacekeeper and
modernization of Minuteman III continues at the appropriate pace.
Under the terms of the Nuclear Posture Review, the Department of
Defense plans to eliminate all 50 of the Peacekeeper missiles and
download the 500 Minuteman III missiles from their current multi-
warhead configuration to a single warhead. This is a significant step
in reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons and one of the major
reasons that the United States and Russia were able to come to an
agreement.
Reducing the number of warheads on the Minuteman III to one warhead
per missile, and removing all of the warheads from retiring Peacekeeper
missiles, is a key to achieving the goals of a reduced number of
deployed missiles that are at the heart of the agreement with the
United States and Russia.
The commitment is to reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads
to the range of 1,700 to 2,200 from the present approximately 6,000
deployed warheads.
Also, this will provide more stability, as missiles with single
warheads, in the context of deterrence policy, are a more stable
element than multi-warhead missiles.
These are all encouraging developments, but it is necessary to keep
this process on track by the additional funds which we have added to
this legislation.
The subcommittee is also concerned about ensuring that the long-range
bomber fleet is modernized and maintained. These bombers, particularly
the B-2 and the B-52, have repeatedly showed their usefulness in
conflicts from Desert Storm to present operations. There are no plans
to replace these bombers in the near future. In fact, in 2000, when the
Air Force last reviewed the projected lifetime of these bombers, they
determined they could rely on these bombers for an additional 30 years.
The reality is, the pilots who will retire the B-52 and B-2 bombers
have not yet been born.
We have to maintain these systems, upgrade their electronics and
avionics, to make sure they are still a valuable and decisive part of
our forces.
This bill would include an additional $28 million to address
shortfalls in the B-2 and B-52 bomber programs, and also approves the
request by the Department of Defense to reduce and consolidate the B-1
fleet.
Adding these additional funds is absolutely necessary if the Air
Force projections are correct, and we will have these systems--the B-2
and the B-52--in our inventory for an additional 30 years.
Turning to the area of space, another jurisdiction of the Strategic
Subcommittee, we considered a variety of very important Defense
Department space programs. These programs include satellite programs
that provide communications, weather, global positioning systems, early
warning, and other satellites for defense and national security
purposes.
Space programs are critical to the effective use of our Nation's
military forces, and each day they grow in importance. This is a very
important aspect of our deliberations.
We also included in our consideration the ability of the United
States to continue to effectively launch space vehicles by looking at
the east coast ranges in Florida and the west coast ranges in
California.
The bill includes funding at the requested levels for most of the
Department of Defense space programs. There are some exceptions,
however. The committee has added $29 million to continue to improve the
readiness and operations safety at the east coast and west coast space
launch and range facilities. If we cannot launch vehicles into space,
we cannot ensure that we have the appropriate constellation of
satellites to communicate, to provide intelligence resources, to
provide global positioning signals--all the things that are critical to
the success of our military forces in the field. These ranges are
important, and these additional funds will upgrade their ability to
continue to play a vital role in our national security.
The bill also includes reductions in certain space programs. One of
these programs is the Space-Based Infrared Radar-High or SBIRS-High
satellite program. This is a satellite program which is critical to
replacing an older and aging system of satellites that provides early
warning of missile launches and other activities of concern to the
United States.
The worldwide reach of this satellite system is key to its ability to
warn of any launches and to provide other critical intelligence. But
this program has been plagued with serious problems. It is overbudget
and years behind schedule. It is in the process of being restructured
by the Department of Defense.
[[Page S5800]]
Reflecting this restructuring, the bill reduces the over $800 million
budget request for SBIRS-High by $100 million so that this
restructuring can literally catch up with the funding stream. I think
this is an appropriate way to continue to maintain the defense
capabilities of the United States while recognizing a program that is
in the midst of serious restructuring by the Department of Defense.
The bill also reduces the requested funding for another satellite
that has had a troubled history; and that is the Advanced Extremely
High Frequency, or Advanced EHF satellite. This satellite program is
designed to ensure that the Department of Defense and the military
services will retain the ability to have a reliable and survivable
communication. Advanced EHF, like SBIRS-High, is a replacement for a
current system. But, here again, the program is in serious trouble,
overbudget and behind schedule. It, too, is being structured. This
restructuring made $95 million available that the Air Force requested
be shifted to other high-priority programs. And we have followed their
advice and their suggestion.
Space programs are critical to the operations of the U.S. military.
As I indicated, with each day, they become more and more critical. But
several of these programs, not only the SBIRS-High program and the
Advanced EHF communications satellite program, are experiencing
significant problems with cost growth and schedule slippage.
Some of the problems with the space programs appear to be connected
with the oversight and management of the programs. To address this, the
bill includes a legislative provision to ensure the adequate oversight
of space programs. This provision would direct the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to maintain oversight of space programs and would
require the Secretary to submit to Congress a plan on how oversight by
OSD and the joint staff will be accomplished. This provision is
included largely as a result of testimony before the Strategic
Subcommittee in March of 2002 and will ensure that OSD remains and
retains an oversight role for space programs.
Under Secretary of the Air Force Peter Teets, when testifying before
the subcommittee, stated that the Air Force is facing significant
challenges in several of our most important space programs. This bill
attempts to address these concerns by ensuring that adequate oversight
by the Department of Defense is maintained.
Let me again stress the importance of these programs. We have all
been amazed by the extraordinary success of our military forces in
Afghanistan. If you listened to the reports of the special forces
troops conducting these operations on the ground, one of the key
weapons they had was not a cannon or an M-16, it was a global-
positioning, range-finding, targeting device which will operate
magnificently as long as we have GPS satellites and comparable
satellites in the air. So communications and satellites are critical to
the special forces soldier on the ground, the aviator in the air, every
member of our military forces. We are endeavoring to maintain, to
enhance, and to secure the future of our space operations within this
legislation.
Let me turn now to another aspect of our responsibilities. That is
the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance functions. This area
includes programs such as the Global Hawk and the Predator unmanned
aerial vehicles, or UAVs. We have long supported these very innovative
and sophisticated weapons. They have shown their worth, particularly
Predator in Afghanistan, and therefore the committee recommends fully
funding the administration's request to accelerate the development and
procurement of UAVs.
Another area we have supported--and in fact we provide additional
support in the legislation--is the acquisition of commercial satellite
imagery by the Department of Defense. The bill includes an additional
$30 million to authorize the Department to buy commercially available
imagery to supplement and complement the imagery which we collect
through our own assets. This will enhance our ability to conduct
operations. This is an initiative strongly supported by Senator Allard,
ranking member of the committee. We join in his support of this very
worthy enterprise and endeavor.
Let me turn to some of the aspects in the subcommittee that touch
upon the responsibilities of the Department of Energy when it comes to
nuclear weapons. We include several provisions addressing DOE programs.
The first would ensure that Congress continues to exercise its
oversight responsibility with respect to funding for future nuclear
weapons activities.
This is absolutely important. In December the administration released
a Nuclear Posture Review. This Nuclear Posture Review has been
criticized, challenged, identified as perhaps blurring the line between
nuclear and conventional responses. This is an area where there is much
concern. Again, it reinforces the need for Congress to be informed and
responsive to evolving policy with respect to development
and deployment and use, potentially--we hope never--of nuclear weapons.
If you look at the Nuclear Posture Review, you will see throughout a
new triad which includes offensive strike systems which are described
as including both nuclear and nonnuclear.
You will see that in the context and literal words of the Nuclear
Posture Review, they have talked about ``in setting requirements for
nuclear strike capabilities, distinctions can be made among the
contingencies for which the United States must be prepared.
Contingencies can generally be categorized as immediate, potential, or
unexpected.''
In the realm of immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies,
they list countries such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya.
These are countries which may be endeavoring to develop nuclear weapons
but at this time are not declared nuclear powers, raising the issue of
whether we would abandon a long-term policy that we would not use
nuclear weapons as a first strike on a nonnuclear power unless they
attack us in conjunction with a nuclear power. This uncertainty,
ambiguity, exists. Perhaps it has always existed, but it underscores
the need for Congress to be informed, to be part of this evolving
discussion and debate about nuclear policy.
Therefore, we would ask that the Department of Energy specifically
request funds for any new or modified nuclear weapons. There is no
money in this budget for such weapons, but I think at this juncture we
have to go on record to ask for that type of specific information and
not rely upon finding it buried in some larger account. It is an
important issue. It is a critical issue. After the tensions between
Pakistan and India, that have not yet subsided totally, no one needs to
be reminded about the horrendous impact of the potential use of a
nuclear weapon. Therefore, it is vitally important that this Congress
be informed of any potential developments of new weapons by the United
States.
The budget request did include $15.5 million for a feasibility study
of a robust nuclear earth penetrator weapon. The bill denies funding
for this purpose and directs the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to
submit a report to Congress setting forth the military requirements,
the characteristics and types of targets the nuclear earth penetrator
would hold at risk, the employment policies of such a nuclear earth
penetrator, and an assessment of the capabilities of conventional
weapons against these potential targets.
Once again, in the context of a statement by administration officials
about the, perhaps, rejection of long-term policy, the nonfirst use
against nonnuclear powers, and the ambiguity that has been created, it
is essential to stop and look at justification for creating this weapon
system.
We already have a nuclear earth penetrator. It is the B61-11; it has
been publicly reported. We have the system in place. It is incumbent
upon the Departments of Energy and Defense to say why we need to modify
another system to do a similar job.
I will also point out there has been some suggestion that what the
Department of Energy might be working on is a small mini-nuke that
would be less troublesome in terms of radiation, in terms of the
impact. Quite seriously, once we cross the nuclear threshold, the size
of the weapon may be less important than the fact that we have crossed
the threshold.
From the candidates that might be chosen to modify for this robust
nuclear earth penetrator, these are very large weapons, hundreds of
kilotons, at
[[Page S5801]]
least six or seven times the destructive force that was used upon
Hiroshima. We have to be very careful. The bill goes ahead and denies
the funds and asks the Department of Energy to justify with the report
several parameters which are necessary before they go forward, if they
do go forward.
The last DOE provision I would like to speak about is a provision
that would focus additional resources, $100 million, in cleanup efforts
to clean up DOE sites throughout the country that have been polluted by
the nuclear activities going back more than 50 years. It is essential
to make our commitment to communities throughout this country that have
hosted DOE facilities and now see the ground around them literally
contaminated, in many cases by nuclear operations. This is very
important.
Let me turn to one of the most contentious and challenging issues
before the subcommittee. That is the issue of ballistic missile
defense. I want to take some time and go into some detail because there
are misconceptions and misinformation about what the subcommittee did
and what the committee finally approved.
Let me start with the very broad picture. The administration
requested $7.6 billion for missile defense. The committee recommends
$6.8 billion, a reduction of $812 million, or 11 percent. I should
point out that the budget for missile defense has grown dramatically in
the last several years. We are still funding this program at a very
robust $6.8 billion. The $812 million reduction in ballistic missile
defense was transferred to more immediate and pressing needs in the
view of the committee.
The most significant, in terms of dollars, was $690 million for
additional shipbuilding, which will provide advanced procurement for a
new submarine, a new destroyer, and a new troop transport ship, all
immediate and vital needs for our military forces.
Some of the additional money would be used to increase the security
of the Department of Energy facilities. Again, after the last several
weeks, where we thought an al-Qaida operative was making his way to the
United States to steal radioactive material to construct a ``dirty''
bomb, the need for enhanced security at DOE sites, as well as many
other sites that have radiological material, cannot be underestimated.
Let me talk in general terms about the ballistic missile threat and
the programs that are evolving to meet that threat. First, historically
and generally, we have categorized this in two ways: short-range
threats and the longer range threat of the intercontinental ballistic
missile. The reality is that many countries have short-range missiles,
some of which are capable of mounting chemical and biological warheads.
They are an immediate present threat to U.S. forces deployed throughout
the world and to U.S. allies throughout the world.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles are those, obviously, that travel
long distances and are designed to strike the homeland of the United
States. Those two distinctions have formed most of our programmatic
response for many decades.
The administration has come in and, in some respects, blurred the
lines between these two distinctions. Rather than the traditional
distinction between theater missile and national missile defense,
between the short- and medium-range missiles and the longer range
intercontinental ballistic missiles, they have talked about creating a
missile defense consisting of the boost phase defense systems--those
systems designed to strike a missile when it leaves the launch pad, in
the 2 or 3 minutes before it gets into the upper atmosphere; in fact,
outside of the atmosphere in some cases--a midcourse phase, as the term
indicates, which would destroy the missile in the middle of its flight;
and the terminal phase, which is the final point where the missile is
heading toward its target, coming down rapidly towards its target.
Now, there is a certain logic to this. I have to be fair about that.
If one looks at defense in other contexts, such as the more terrestrial
contexts of a land battle, defense in depth is a watchword--long-range
fires, intermediate fires, and close fires. So there is a logic to
this, and it might be unwitting, but there is a blurring and distortion
that I think can be misinterpreted--and I think it has been in many
cases--with respect to the actual programs we are trying to develop and
the progress on those programs.
One case in point is a recent article in the Wall Street Journal, on
June 18, where it talks about discussions by General Kadish, about the
Navy theater-wide missile system, on which the Journal opined in this
article:
The move would represent the first deployment of a
defensive missile shield since a system was first proposed by
President Reagan in the 1980s.
What General Kadish was talking about was a theater missile, not a
national missile system. In point of fact, the PAC-3 system, a land
based theater system, is being operationally tested now and likely will
be deployed. Certainly it is further along in development than this
proposed sea based system.
This type of blurring of the lines in recalibration and renaming of
systems I think has created a lot of misunderstanding. Hopefully, we
can add some clarity today.
As I mentioned before, theater ballistic missiles have long
threatened forward deployed U.S. forces. For years we have confronted
the potential of a real-time missile attack in North Korea and in other
places. Long-range missiles were the source of our long and,
fortunately, stalemated cold war with the Soviet Union. They had the
capacity to fire missiles intercontinentally. We were able to wait them
out or, through deterrence, through our strategic policy, we were able
to bring the cold war to a conclusion, and also to have a situation in
which now we are making real progress with Russia in terms of strategic
arms control. So this distinction between theater missiles and ICBMs is
significant.
I think it is appropriate at this point to try to go through the list
of the systems which have been developed, which we have been
developing, and systems that are the underpinning of this new
constellation of missile defenses the administration talks about.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed an article by Philip Coyle,
former director of operational test and evaluation in the Department of
Defense, in the Arms Control Today of May 2002. It summarizes in
excellent detail the systems we are talking about today.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From Arms Control Today, May 2002]
Rhetoric or Reality? Missile Defense Under Bush
(By Philip Coyle)
Since it assumed office, the administration of President
George W. Bush has made missile defense one of its top
priorities, giving it prominence in policy, funding, and
organization.
First, the administration outlined an ambitious set of
goals that extend well beyond the Clinton administration's
missile defense aims. In early January 2002, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld described the administration's top
missile defense objectives his way: ``First, to defend the
U.S., deployed forces, allies, and friends. Second, to employ
a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) that layers
defenses to intercept missiles in all phases of their flight
(i.e., boost, midcourse, and terminal) against all ranges of
threats. Third, to enable the Services to field elements of
the overall BMDS as soon as practicable.''
Then, in its nuclear posture review, the administration
outlined the specific elements of a national missile defense
that it wants to have ready between 2003 and 2008: an air-
based laser to shoot down missiles of all ranges during boost
phase; a rudimentary ground-based midcourse system, a sea-
based system with rudimentary midcourse capability against
short- and medium-range threats; terminal defenses against
long-range ICBMs capable of reaching the United States; and a
system of satellites to track enemy missiles and distinguish
re-entry vehicles from decoys.
Finally, to speed implementation, the administration has
taken a number of tangible steps. It announced on December
13, 2001, that the United States would withdraw from the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, ostensibly because the
treaty was restricting testing of mobile missile defenses
against y026ICBMs. In its first defense budget, the
administration requested a 57 percent increase in funding for
missile defense--from $5.3 billion to $8.3 billion, of which
it received $7.8 billion. Then, Rumsfeld reorganized the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization into the new Missile
Defense Agency, cancelled the internal Pentagon documents
that had established the program's developmental goals, and
changed the program's goal from being able to field a
complete system against specific targets to simply being able
to field various missile defense capabilities as they become
available.
All in all, a lot has happened in missile defense in the
first year or so of the Bush administration. But have these
actions brought
[[Page S5802]]
the United States any closer to realizing its missile defense
goals, especially deployment of a national missile defense?
And what elements, if any, of a national missile defense
capability might it be possible for the United States to
deploy by 2008, as called for in the nuclear posture review?
Despite the Bush administration's push for missile defense,
the only system likely to be ready by 2008 is a ground-based
theater missile defense intended to counter short-range
targets--i.e., a system to defend troops in the field. Before
Bush leaves office, the only system that could conceivably be
ready to defend the United States itself is the ground-based
midcourse system pursued by the Clinton administration. None
of the other elements mentioned in the nuclear posture review
as possible defenses against strategic ballistic missiles is
likely to be available by 2008.
To understand why, let us examine each of the missile
defense programs--starting with the short-range, theater
missile defense systems and moving to the longer-range,
strategic systems--to see what has happened since the Bush
administration took office 16 months ago. The results suggest
that the Bush administration should not base its foreign
policy on the assumption that during its tenure it will be
able to deploy defenses to protect the United States from
strategic missiles.
Theater Missile Defenses
Each of the U.S. military services has been pursuing
tactical missile defense programs designed to defend U.S.
troops overseas. None of these programs was designed to
defend the United States against ICBM attacks, and none has
any current capability to do so. However, the administration
hopes to be able to apply some of the technology from these
service programs to a layered national defense capable of
defending the U.S. homeland. (For an explanation of the
various stages of development discussed below, see the box
below.)
PAC-3
The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) is a tactical
system designed to defend overseas U.S. and allied troops in
a relatively small area against short-range missile threats
(such as Scuds), enemy aircraft, and cruise missiles.
Developmentally, it is the most advanced U.S. missile defense
system, and a small number have been made available for
deployment although testing has not yet been completed.
PAC-3 flight testing began in 1997. From 1997 to 2002, 11
developmental flight tests were conducted, including four
flight intercept tests with two or three targets being
attempted at once. Most of these tests were successful, but
in two of the tests one of the targets was not intercepted.
In February, PAC-3 began initial operational testing, in
which soldiers, not contractors, operate the system. Three
operational tests have been conducted, all with multiple
targets. In each, one of the targets has been missed or one
of the interceptors has failed.
A year ago, PAC-3 was planned to begin full-rate production
at the end of 2001. However, problems with system reliability
and difficulties in flight intercept tests have delayed that
schedule. This means that full-rate production likely will be
delayed until more stressing ``follow-on'' operational tests
can be conducted against targets flying in a wide range of
altitudes and trajectories. In March, Lieutenant General
Ronald Kadish, who heads U.S. missile defense programs,
testified to Congress that the full-rate production decision
would be made toward the end of 2002 (before operational
testing has been completed), representing a delay of about a
year since last year. The full system will be deployed once
all operational testing has been completed, perhaps around
2005.
A future version of PAC-3 is being considered for terminal
defense of the United States. However, PAC-3 was not designed
to counter long-range threats, and no flight intercept tests
have been conducted to demonstrate how it might be
incorporated in a terminal defense layer. Further, the ground
area that can be defended by PAC-3 is so small that it would
take scores of systems to defend just the major U.S. cities.
A version of PAC-3 that could be effective in a national
missile defense is probably a decade away.
THAAD
The Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system is
designed to shoot down short- and medium-range missiles in
their terminal phase. THAAD would be used to protect forward-
deployed troops overseas as well as nearby civilian
populations and infrastructure. THAAD is to defend a larger
area against longer-range threats than PAC-3, but it is not
designed to protect the United States from ICBMs.
From 1995 to 1999, 11 developmental flight tests were
performed, including eight in which an intercept was
attempted. After the first six of those flight intercept
tests failed, the program was threatened with cancellation.
Finally, in 1999, THAAD had two successful flight intercept
tests. The THAAD program has not attempted an intercept test
since then, instead focusing on the difficult task or
developing a new, more reliable, higher-performance missile
than the one used in early flight tests.
A year ago, full-rate production was scheduled to begin in
2007 or 2008, but because there were no intercept tests in
2000 or 2001, that schedule has likely slipped two years or
more. In fact, no flight intercept test is scheduled until
2004, and it is therefore unlikely that the first THAAD
system will be deployed before 2010.
The Bush administration is considering THAAD for use in a
layered national missile defense system. Conceptually, THAAD
might be used in conjunction with PAC-3 as part of a terminal
defense, or it could be deployed overseas to intercept enemy
missiles in the boost phase. However, in its current
configuration THAAD is incapable of performing these
missions--even once it has met its Army requirements for
theater missile defense--and therefore a role for THAAD in
national missile defense is probably more than a decade away.
Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
The Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense was the
sea-based equivalent of PAC-3. The Navy Area system was being
designed to defend forward-deployed Navy ships against
relatively short-range threats. But in December 2001 the
program was cancelled because its cost and schedule overruns
exceeded the limits defined by law. (Ironically, the
cancellation came just one day after President Bush announced
that the United States would pull out of the ABM Treaty
because its missile defense testing was advanced enough to be
bumping up against the constraints of the treaty.)
The Navy still wants to be able to defend its ships against
missile attack, and the program will most likely to be
restructured and reinstated once the Navy decides on a new
approach. In the meantime, the Navy Area program is slipping
with each day that passes. As with PAC-3, the Bush
administration has considered extending the Navy Area system
to play a role in the terminal segment of a layered national
missile defense. However, at this point the program is too
poorly defined to allow speculation about when it could
accomplish such a demanding mission.
Navy Theater Wide
The Navy Theater Wide program was originally intended to
defend an area larger than that to be covered by the Navy
Area system--that is, aircraft carrier battle groups and
nearby territory and civilian populations--against medium
range missiles during their midcourse phase. In this sense,
Navy Theater Wide is the sea-based equivalent of THAAD.
In January, the Navy Theater Wide program conducted its
first successful flight intercept test, but a dozen or more
developmental flight tests will be required before it is
ready for realistic operational testing. About a year ago,
full-rate production was scheduled for spring 2007, meaning
that the system could be deployed before the end of the
decade.
But since then, the Pentagon has given new priority to a
sea-based role in defending the U.S. homeland. Navy Theater
Wide was not designed to shoot down ICBMs, but the Bush
administration has restructured the program so that it aims
to produce a sea-based midcourse segment and/or a sea-based
boost-phase segment of national missile defense.
Either mission will require a new missile that is twice as
fast as any existing version of the Standard Missile, which
the system now uses; a new, more powerful Aegis radar system
to track targets; a new launch structure to accommodate the
new, larger missiles; and probably new ships. As a result,
the Navy Theater Wide program requires a great deal of new
development. It is unlikely that Navy Theater Wide will be
ready for realistic operational testing until late in this
decade, and it will not be ready for realistic operational
demonstration in a layered national missile defense for
several years after that.
Airborne Laser
The Airborne Laser (ABL) is a program to develop a high-
power chemical laser that will fit inside a Boeing 747
aircraft. It is the most technically challenging of any of
the theater missile defense programs, involving toxic
materials, advanced optics, and the coordination of three
additional lasers on-board for tracking, targeting, and beam
correction. The first objective of the program is to be able
to shoot down short-range enemy missiles. Later, it is hoped
the ABL program will play a role in national missile defense
by destroying strategic missiles in their boost phase.
The ABL has yet to be flight-tested. About a year ago,
full-rate production of the ABL was scheduled for 2008. The
plan was to build seven aircraft, each estimated to cost
roughly $500 million. At that time, the first shoot-down of a
tactical missile was scheduled for 2003. Recently, the ABL
program office announced that the first shoot-down of a
tactical missile had been delayed to later 2004 because of
many problems with the basic technology of high-power
chemical lasers--about a one-year slip since last year and
about a three-year slip since 1998. Accordingly, full-rate
production probably cannot be started before 2010, and the
cost will likely exceed $1 billion per aircraft.
Assuming all this can be done, it is important to note that
the ABL presents significant operational challenges. The ABL
will need to fly relatively close to enemy territory in order
to have enough power to shoot down enemy missiles, and during
a time of crisis it will need to be near the target area
continuously. A 747 loaded with high-power laser equipment
will make a large and inviting target to the enemy and will
require protection in the air and on the ground. Finally,
relatively simple countermeasures such as reflective surfaces
on enemy missiles could negate the ABL's capabilities.
[[Page S5803]]
Deployment of an ABL that can shoot down short- and medium-
range tactical targets is not likely before the end of the
decade, and the Airborne Laser will not be able to play a
role in national missile defense for many years after that.
National Missile Defense
The Bush administration hopes to build a layered national
missile defense that consists of a ground-based midcourse
system, expanded versions of the theater systems discussed
above, and, potentially, space-based systems. The Bush
administration does not use the phrase ``national missile
defense'' because it was the name of the ground-based
midcourse system pursued by the Clinton administration and
because the Pentagon's plans to defend the country are now
more robust. But national missile defense is a useful
shorthand for any system that is intended to defend the
continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii against
strategic ballistic missiles, and it is in that sense that it
is used here.
For all practical purposes, the only part of the Bush
national missile defense that is ``real'' is the ground-based
midcourse system. It is real in the sense that six flight
intercept tests have been conducted so far, whereas versions
of the THAAD or Navy Theater Wide systems that might be used
to defend the United States have not been tested at all.
Space-based systems are an even more distant prospect. For
example, the Space-Based Laser, which would use a laser on a
satellite to destroy missiles in their boost phase, was to be
tested in 2012, but funding cuts have pushed the testing date
back indefinitely. Deployment is so far in the future that it
is beyond the horizon of the Pentagon's long-range planning
document, Joint Vision 2020.
As a result, despite the Bush administration's attempts to
distinguish its plans from its predecessor's, Bush's layered
national missile defense is, in effect, nothing more than the
Clinton system.
Since 1997, the ground-based midcourse program has
conducted eight major flight tests, known as IFTs. The first
two, named IFT-1A and IFT-2, were fly-by tests designed
simply to collect target information. The next six tests,
IFT-3 through IFT-8, were all flight intercept tests. IFT-4
and IFT-5, conducted in January 2000 and July 2000
respectively, both failed to achieve an intercept, which
became a principal reason why, on September 1, 2000,
President Bill Clinton decided not to begin deployment of
ground-based midcourse components, such as a new X-band radar
on Shemya Island in Alaska.
Another year passed before the next flight intercept test,
IFT-6, was conducted. The intercept was successful except
that the real-time hit assessment performed by the ground-
based X-band prototype radar on the Kwajalein Atoll in the
Marshall Islands incorrectly reported the hit as a miss. IFT-
7, conducted in early December 2001, was also successful.
Until then, all of the flight intercept tests had had
essentially the same target cluster: a re-entry vehicle, a
single large balloon, and debris associated with stage
separation and decoy deployment. Then, in IFT-8, conducted on
March 15, 2002, two small balloons were added to the target
cluster. This flight intercept test also was successful and
marked an important milestone for the ground-based midcourse
program.
However, despite these recent successes, there have been
significant delays in the testing program. Several of the
flight tests were simply repeats of earlier tests, and as a
result IFT-8 did not accomplish the tasks set for it in the
original schedule. In short, the testing program has slipped
roughly two years--i.e., what was originally scheduled to
take two years has taken four. That is not to say that the
program has made no progress but rather that key program
milestones have receded into the future.
The pace of successful testing will be one of the primary
determinants of how quickly the United States can field a
national missile defense. If the ground-based midcourse
system has three or four successful flight intercept tests
per year, as it has during the past year, it could be ready
for operational testing in four or five years. If those
operational tests also were successful, then whatever
capability had been demonstrated in all those tests--which
would probably not include the capability to deal with many
types of decoys and countermeasures or the capability to
cover much of the space through which an enemy missile could
travel--could be deployed by the end of the decade or even
by 2008.
However, the ground-based midcourse system has difficulties
beyond the testing pace of its interceptor. The system
requires a new, more powerful booster rocket than the
surrogate currently being used in tests--a task that was
thought to be relatively easy. That new booster was to be
incorporated into the continuing series of flight intercept
tests to make those tests more realistic and to be sure that
the new booster's higher acceleration did not adversely
affect other components or systems on board.
But development of the new booster is about two years
behind schedule. Indeed, on December 13, just hours after
President Bush announced U.S. plans to withdraw from the ABM
Treaty, a test of the new booster had to be aborted and the
missile destroyed in flight for safety reasons because it
flew off course. Flight intercept tests that were to have
used the new booster have come and gone without it. Indeed,
development of the booster is so far behind that the Pentagon
recently issued another contract for a competing design.
Equally problematic is uncertainty over how the system will
track enemy missiles in flight and distinguish targets from
decoys. One approach is to use high-power radars operating in
the X-band (that is, at a frequency of about 10 billion
cycles per second). A prototype X-band radar on the Kwajalein
Atoll has been part all of the ground-based midcourse flight
intercept tests so far, and technically, X-band radar
progress has been one of the most successful developments in
missile defense technology.
A year and a half ago, Lieutenant General Kadish testified
to Congress that establishing an X-band radar in Alaska was
the ``long pole in the tent'' for missile defense. This meant
that the X-band radar was critical to a ground-based
midcourse system and that if that radar was not built soon,
the program would start slipping day for day. Then, as now,
there were many other developments that would take as long or
longer than building an X-band radar at Shemya, but the
Pentagon's official position was that construction needed to
start in the spring of 2001 at the latest. Nevertheless,
Clinton deferred taking action on the radar.
Surprisingly, the Bush administration has not requested
funding for an X-band radar at Shemya in either of its first
two budgets. This may be because the administration views
such an installation as inconsistent with the ABM Treaty,
which the administration has said it will not violate while
the treaty is still in effect. Or the administration may not
have requested funding because the Missile Defense Agency has
been exploring ``portable'' X-band radars--that is, X-band
radars deployed on ships or barges.
Some defense analysts believe that the Space-Based Infrared
Satellite (SBIRS) program could be used in place of the X-
band radar to assist a national missile defense. SBIRS--which
would consist of two sets of orbiting sensor satellites,
SBIRS-high and SBIRS-low--is designed to detect the launch of
enemy ballistic missiles and could be used to track and
discriminate among them in flight. However, the program has
significant technical problems.
SBIRS-high, which will consist of four satellites in
geosynchronous orbit and two satellites in highly elliptical
orbits, is to replace the existing Defense Support Program
satellites, which provide early warning of missile launches.
A year ago, the SBIRS-high satellites were scheduled for
launch in 2004 and 2006, but recently those dates have
slipped roughly two years because of problems with software,
engineering, and system integration. A year ago, realistic
operational testing was scheduled for 2007; now, it may not
occur this decade, which means that full deployment may not
occur this decade. SBIRS-high is also well over cost and is
in danger of breaching the legal restrictions covering cost
growth.
SBIRS-low is to consist of approximately 30 cross-linked
satellites in low-Earth orbit. A year ago, the launch of the
first of these satellites was scheduled for 2006, but SBIRS-
low has slipped two years because of a variety of difficult
technical problems. The developmental testing program for
SBIRS-low is very challenging, and realistic operational
testing will probably not begin this decade. This could delay
deployment of the full constellation of SBIRS-low satellites
until the middle of the next decade. SBIRS-low is also
dramatically over budget and was threatened with cancellation
in the latest round of congressional appropriations.
For now, the administration has been saying that it will
upgrade an existing radar on Shemya called Cobra Dane. Under
this plan, the Cobra Dane radar would become an advanced
early-warning radar with some ability to distinguish among
targets. But the Cobra Dane radar operates in the L-band with
about eight-times poorer resolution than a new X-band radar
would have, raising questions about the effectiveness of any
national missile defense using it.
In sum, the only element of a ``layered'' national missile
defense that exists on anything but paper is the ground-based
midcourse system pursued by the Clinton administration.
Accordingly, it is nearly impossible to predict when, if
ever, an integrated, layered national missile defense with
boost, midcourse, and terminal phases might be developed. As
noted above, given the most recent pace of testing, some part
of the ground-based midcourse system could be deployed by the
end of the decade or possibly by 2008.
However, the capability such a system would have would be
marginal and probably would not be able to deal with many
types of decoys and countermeasures or to cover much of the
space through which an attacking ICBM might fly. The Bush
administration has said it will deploy test elements as an
emergency capability as early as possible, but such a
deployment would be rudimentary and its capabilities would be
limited to those already demonstrated in testing. It would
likely not be effective against unauthorized or accidental
launches from Russia or China, which might include missiles
with countermeasures. It also would not be effective against
launches from Iraq, Iran, or Libya since those countries are
to the east, out of view of a radar on Shemya.
Conclusion
During the first year of the Bush administration, all U.S.
missile defense programs--both theater and national--have
slipped. In general, the shorter-range tactical missile
[[Page S5804]]
defense systems are further along than the medium-range
systems, and those medium-range systems are further along
than the longer-range systems intended to defend the United
States against ICBMs.
PAC-3 is the most developmentally advanced of any U.S.
missile defense system, but full deployment will not likely
take place before 2005, and realistic operational testing
will continue for many years after the first Army units are
equipped in the field. The THAAD program has slipped two
years or more and will not be deployable until 2010. The Navy
Area Wide program has been cancelled, and the Navy Theater
Wide program has slipped two years or more and will not be
deployable in a tactical role until the end of the decade. If
the Pentagon restructures the program so that its priority is
boost-phase or midcourse defense against strategic missiles,
it will likely take longer. The Airborne Laser has slipped
one year and will probably not be deployed as a theater
missile defense before the end of the decade.
SBIRS-low has slipped two years and doubled in cost and
probably will not be deployed before 2008. For all practical
purposes, national missile defense is technically not much
closer than it was in the Clinton administration. There have
been no flight intercept tests of the boost-phase or
terminal-phase elements suggested by the Bush administration,
and developmental testing could take a decade or more,
depending on the pace of testing and the level of success in
each test. The only element that can be flight-intercept
tested against strategic ballistic missiles today is the
ground-based midcourse system. Part of that system could be
deployed by 2008, but elements fielded before then will have
only a limited capability.
Thus, while making foreign policy, the Bush administration
would do well to consider that probably only a limited-
capability version of PAC-3 will be fielded during its tenure
and that an effective, layered national missile defense will
not be realized while it is in office. It would make little
sense to predicate strategic decisions on a defense that does
not exist.
It is important for Congress and the American public not to
be frightened into believing that the United States is--as
some missile defense proponents like to assert--defenseless
against even a limited missile attack by a ``rouge state''
such as North Korea. Powerful and effective options exist,
both military and diplomatic.
In Afghanistan, U.S. attack operations with precision-
guided weapons have been highly effective. Those same
precision weapons would be effective against an enemy ICBM
installation. In fact, given current capabilities and the
ever-improving technologies for precision strike, it would be
fantasy to believe any national missile defense system
deployed by 2003 to 2008 would work better and provide
greater reliability at a lower cost than the precision-guided
munitions used in Afghanistan.
On the diplomatic front, in 1999 former Secretary of
Defense William Perry made a series of trips to convince
North Korea to stop developing and testing long-range
missiles. He was remarkably successful. Although Secretary
Perry would not say that North Korea was no longer a threat,
it was obvious that the North Korean threat had been
moderated. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was able to
build on his trip the next year to secure a pledge from
Pyongyang to half flight testing of missiles. Dollar for
dollar, Secretary Perry has been the most cost-effective
missile defense system the United States has yet to develop.
The most straightforward route to missile defense against
North Korea may be through diplomacy, not technology.
Many decision-makers in Washington--and, from what one
reads, the president himself--seem to be misinformed about
the prospects for near-term success with national missile
defense and the budgets being requested for it. It takes 20
years to develop a modern, high performance jet fighter, and
it probably will take even longer to develop an effective
missile defense network. Taking into account the challenges
of asymmetric warfare, the time it can take to develop modern
military equipment, the reliability required in real
operational situations, and the interoperability required for
hundreds of systems and subsystems to work together, it would
be highly unrealistic to think that the United States can
deploy an effective, layered national missile defense by 2004
or even by 2008.
In the meantime, policymakers should be careful that U.S.
foreign and security goals and policies are not dependent on
something that cannot work now and probably will not work
effectively for the foreseeable future. A case in point is
President Bush's decision to abandon the ABM Treaty with
Russia. That decision was certainly premature given the state
of missile defense technology and likely could have been
avoided or postponed for many years if not indefinitely.
This is not to say that missile defense technology ought
not to be pursued--only that it should be pursued with
realistic expectations. Policymakers must be able to weigh
the potential merits and costs of missile defense based on a
sound understanding of both the technology and the possible
alternatives. No one weapon system can substitute for the
sound conduct of foreign policy, and even a single diplomat
can be effective on a time scale that is short when compared
with the time that will be required to develop the technology
for national missile defense.
stages of development
Missile defense, especially national missile defense, is
the most difficult program ever attempted by the Department
of Defense--much more difficult than the development of a
modern jet fighter like the F-22 Raptor, the Navy's Land
Attack Destroyer (DD-21), or the Army's Abrams M1A2 tank
complete with battlefield digitization, endeavors that all
have taken 20 years or more. Each new major weapons system
must proceed through several stages of development, which are
listed below. Most U.S. missile defense systems are currently
in developmental testing and are therefore not close to
deployment.
Research and Development (R&D): The period during which the
concepts and basic technologies behind a proposed military
system are explored. Depending on the difficulty of the
technology and the complexity of the proposed system, R&D can
take anywhere from a year or two to more than 10 years.
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD): The period
during which a system design is engineered and the industrial
processes to manufacture and assemble a proposed military
system are developed. For a major defense acquisition such as
a high-performance jet fighter, EMD can take five years or
more. If substantial difficulties are encouraged, EMD can
take even longer.
Developmental Testing: Testing that is performed to learn
about the strengths and weaknesses of proposed military
technologies and the application of those technologies to a
new military system in a military environment. Generally,
developmental testing is oriented toward achieving certain
specifications, such as speed, maneuverability, or rate of
fire. Developmental testing is conducted throughout the R&D
and EMD phases of development and becomes more stressing as
prototype systems evolve and mature.
Operational Testing: Testing that aims to demonstrate
effective military performance against operational
requirements and mission needs established for a system.
Testing is performed with production-representative equipment
in realistic operational environments--at night, in bad
weather, against realistic threats and countermeasures.
Military service personnel, not contractors, operate the
system, which is stressed as it would be in battle.
Operational testing of a major defense acquisition system
typically takes the better part of a year and is usually
broken into several periods of a month or two to accommodate
different environments or scenarios. If substantial
difficulties are encountered, several years of operational
testing may be required.
Production: The phase of acquisition when a military system
is manufactured and produced. Early on, during ``low-rate
production,'' the quantities produced are typically small.
Later, after successfully completing operational testing, a
system may go into ``full-rate production,'' where the rate
of production is designed to complete the government's
planned purchase of the system in a relatively short period
of time, about five years.
Deployment: The fielding of a military system in either
limited or large quantities in military units. The first
military unit equipped may help develop tactics, techniques,
and procedures for use of the new system if that has not
already been done adequately in development.
All ballistic missiles have three stages of flight.
The boost phase begins at launch and lasts until the rocket
engines stop firing and pushing the missile away from Earth.
Depending on the missile, this stage lasts three to five
minutes. During much of this time, the missile is traveling
relatively slowly although toward the end of this stage an
ICBM can reach speeds of more than 24,000 kilometers per
hour. The missile stays in one piece during this stage.
The midcourse phase begins after the propulsion system
finishes firing and the missile is on a ballistic course
toward its target. This is the longest stage of a missile's
flight, lasting up to 20 minutes for ICBMs. During the early
part of the midcourse stage, the missile is still ascending
toward its apogee, while during the latter part it is
descending toward Earth. It is during this stage that the
missile's warhead, as well as any decoys, separate from the
delivery vehicle.
The terminal phase begins when the missile's warhead re-
enters the Earth's atmosphere, and it continues until impact
or detonation. This stage takes less than a minute for a
strategic warhead, which can be traveling at speeds greater
than 3,200 kilometers per hour.
Mr. REED. The system that is most developed is one I mentioned
previously, the PAC-3 system. It is a theater missile system. It is not
designed to counter long-range threats. It has been tested rigorously.
It is in operational testing now. Phil Coyle states that the
administration is considering an advanced version of PAC-3 for a
national missile defense. But if you were trying to use it in a
terminal phase it would take many systems to defend a rather small area
of the United States. We probably would never have the number of
systems needed to adequately defend the United States.
Another system we have been developing for years is the THAAD system.
[[Page S5805]]
Phil Coyle states that the Administration is also considering use of
THAAD along with PAC-3 for national missile defense. But in its current
configuration THAAD is not ready for this role. In fact, it is far away
from it--perhaps a decade before it could be reasonably used in that
way.
The other system being developed as we speak is a Navy theater-wide
system. It is a midcourse system as it is currently designed. They are
now talking about this system as a potential element of their midcourse
national missile defense. Again, there are still significant issues
with respect to the use of this system for national missile defense.
As Mr. Coyle points out, if the system were to be used for a
midcourse mission, or a boost phase mission, for national missile
defense, it would require a new missile that is twice as fast as any
existing version of the standard missile which the system now uses. He
writes it would require:
A new, more powerful Aegis radar system to track targets; a
new launch structure to accommodate the new, larger missiles;
and probably new ships. As a result, the Navy theater-wide
program requires a great deal of new development. It is
unlikely that Navy theater-wide will be ready for realistic
operational testing until late in this decade, and it will
not be ready for realistic operational demonstration in a
layered national missile defense for several years after
that.
It is interesting to note that this system is being considered today
by the Missile Defense Agency for possible deployment in 2004. It is
also interesting, and a bit surprising, because in last year's
authorization bill we asked the Missile Defense Agency to tell us what
they propose to do with the Navy theater-wide system. We asked for a
report on April 30. The response to our request was actually a letter
that came to us on May 30, and repeated the questions we asked. It
responded to some of the questions in a very cursory way. It didn't
give any life cycle cost for us, so it is hard for us to estimate how
much this new evolving system will cost. It simply said they redefined
the system. That was May 30.
Yet, about 2\1/2\ weeks later, they were telling the press that we
are deploying this system in 2004. In fact, one of the points they made
in the letter is:
The details of the sea-based program block 2006 and out
capability are being developed through work that is scheduled
to be completed by December 2003. We will be able to provide
specifics on the system definition, along with a preliminary
assessment of force structure and life cycle cost at that
time.
So this work is going to be completed in planning by 2003. Yet this
system is being talked about for deployment in 2004.
It just does not seem to make much sense, and it illustrates, I
think, the problem we have had in the subcommittee, first of getting
reliable information, and second of getting a sense of the direction of
all these programs.
We are not trying to micromanage the Missile Defense Agency, but when
we asked a year ago in our report for information specifically about a
type of missile system, when we get a cursory response saying, we have
renamed it and we will not be able to tell you anything until we
conclude in December of 2003 our deliberations, and then 2 weeks later
they are talking about the system being deployed in a theater role in
2004, it illustrates, I think, the problems and the issues we have
confronted with simply getting the information we need to do our job,
to inform our colleagues, to make decisions that are not only important
to our national security, but extremely expensive decisions so that we
can perform our mission, our role in the Senate.
That is the Navy theater wide system. There are other systems we have
developed, and I think it is appropriate to note that the next system
is the airborne laser system. This is a program to develop a high-power
chemical laser that will fit inside a Boeing 747 aircraft. This is a
system that would be designed to shoot down short-range enemy missiles
in the boost phase. It has some potential, but it is a major
technological effort which is going forward, but not going forward with
great speed at the moment.
The final major component is the national missile defense midcourse,
or the land-based system, in Alaska, and that system we have supported.
We have supported it, but having supported it, we also have serious
questions with it. The system was inaugurated, if you will; at least
ground was broken last week for a test bed for missiles. There are
concerns that the missiles cannot be effectively used in a flight test
capacity because of safety concerns and other factors with respect to
the local area in Alaska. That is one issue.
The other issue, though, is for several years now in the development
of this national missile defense midcourse land-based system in Alaska,
the administration and the Missile Defense Agency have talked about
using an x-band radar, claiming it as absolutely necessary because of
its ability to discriminate the warhead. This is important because the
major issue that faces the midcourse intercept is the possibility of
countermeasures and decoys. So we need a very fine discriminating radar
to determine what is the warhead and what are the decoys. However, That
x-band radar has not been funded by the administration. They have
declared instead they will use an existing radar, COBRA DANE.
One of the problems with COBRA DANE is it faces the wrong way to
provide any coverage of Iran or Iraq and provides only limited coverage
of North Korea, if you are concerned with the ``evil empire.''
Despite that, and in an effort to support sincerely and consistently
the mission of developing adequate national missile defense, we have
provided robust funding for the Alaska test bed, and that is included
in this bill. However, I do think it is important and appropriate to
state our reservations now because they are points we should consider
as we go forward.
Let me continue to discuss some of the important issues, particularly
some of the actions the committee has specifically taken.
One thing we should point out is we have looked at the theater
missile systems. We have particularly found that the Arrow Missile
Defense Program is making great progress. We have increased funding for
the Arrow missile system. That is a joint United States-Israeli effort
for a theater missile system.
We have also fully funded the PAC-3 system, which is the one closest
to deployment. It is one that is, again, a theater missile system.
In all of our deliberations, we have striven to ensure deployment of
these systems in a timely way, but also ensure these systems are
operationally tested and rigorously tested before they are put in the
field. That is incumbent upon us.
We also tried to ensure the independent oversight of the Defense
Department's Director of Operational Tests and Evaluation is part of
the process. One of the concerns I have, frankly, is that in an attempt
by the administration for secrecy and flexibility, we will find a
situation in which there is no outside objective voice within the
Department of Defense. One that is looking at these programs, advising
these programs, and making some judgments that are not influenced by
the need for a successful program at any cost, or even a program--
forget successful--at any cost, but are motivated by the need to deploy
effective systems that will defend this country.
The other factor we considered, and consider constantly, is the
discussion of contingency deployments, contingency capabilities. One of
the reasons we pause slightly is these contingency capabilities and
deployments often result in a rush to failure, often result in a
situation where the system is pushed beyond its absolute capabilities.
A few years ago, that is exactly what happened with the THAAD Program.
It failed its first six intercept tests in a rush to deploy the system
before it was ready.
The THAAD Program was subsequently totally redone and revamped. It
cost hundreds of millions of dollars that were unnecessary
expenditures. It is on track now but, frankly, the situation is such
that we do not want to repeat that experience in other missile defense
programs. We do not want a situation where the pressure for contingency
deployments undercuts the need for thorough, deliberate consideration
of the operational characters of these systems and the ability of these
systems to do the job they are designed to do.
We have looked very closely at what we think are attempts to rush the
systems. In one area, we have reduced
[[Page S5806]]
funding of THAAD because they have requested what we consider a
premature acquisition of missiles before they have actually had
missile's first flight test. We have made that judgment.
Let's turn to another aspect of missile defense, and that is the ICBM
threat to the United States. It is not as immediate today as the
theater missile threat, but it is still a threat.
Fortunately, with our new relationship with Russia, the ICBM threat
has decreased significantly. China has a small arsenal of ICBMs, but
they typically do not have their missiles on ready status, fueled, and
with a warhead on the missile. North Korea seems to be developing an
ICBM capability of reaching the United States, although it has
voluntarily suspended its long-range missile flight test program. There
are other potential adversaries.
This is an issue about which we are concerned, but one of the things
we have to recognize with an ICBM is that its launch leaves an
indelible signal of the point of departure and our deterrence doctrine
is very clear. We have the capacity to strike back, and strike back
with overwhelming force. That has been the hinge, really, of our
deterrence policy for 50 or more years, and it remains an important
part of our policy.
As I have mentioned, the issue of intercontinental ballistic missiles
has been with us for many years. We have relied upon deterrence as a
mainstay of our defense posture. Today we are developing one system in
Alaska that is clearly designed to be a national missile defense
system, and this authorization bill supports that effort in Alaska.
As I mentioned, we have taken away resources from some programs that
are unjustified or duplicative and simply not advancing what we believe
is the common concern of developing adequate missile defense systems,
both theater and national. We have taken away approximately $800
million and applied $690 million to shipbuilding. But in addition, we
have applied resources for security at our nuclear facilities.
One of the things I found startling in press reports was the fact
that the Department of Energy asked for considerably more money to
protect nuclear facilities, and they were turned down by OMB.
This is a letter to Bruce M. Carnes, who is the Director of the
Office of Management Budget and Evaluation, from the chief financial
office of the Department of Energy:
We are disconcerted that OMB refused our security
supplemental request. I would have much preferred to have
heard this from you personally, and been given an opportunity
to discuss, not to mention, appeal your decision. We were
told by Energy Branch staff that the Department's security
supplemental proposals were not supported because the revised
Design Basis Threat, the document that outlines the basis for
physical security measures, has not been completed. This
isn't a tenable position for you to take, in my view. We are
not operating, and cannot operate, under the pre-September 11
Design Basis Threat. Until that is revised, we must operate
under Interim Implementing Guidance, and you have not
provided resources to enable us to do so.
That is from the Department of Energy to the OMB. We would move
resources into the Department of Energy to provide for security of DOE
facilities.
But I think this underscores something else, too. It illustrates what
I would say are the misaligned priorities between missile defense and
other pressing, immediate concerns. Yes, missile defense is important.
Yes, we should develop it quickly, thoroughly, and deliberately, but
certainly defending and protecting our facilities that have nuclear
radiological material is of an immediate and significant concern.
Last week, we were not threatened by an intercontinental missile. We
were threatened by a terrorist, an American who became infatuated with
the al-Qaida and their rhetoric and came here, if you believe the press
reports, to obtain nuclear materials to construct a ``dirty'' bomb.
That is the immediate real threat today.
Yet when the question before the administration was, do we fund
security at DOE facilities or do we continue to put resources into
missile defense, they made their choice to put resources in missile
defense, way above, I believe, the appropriate amount. As a result, we
have made adjustments, and I think those adjustments are entirely
appropriate.
The other aspect of this, too, when it comes to the issue of
resources, is, first, a point that all of these deliberations on the
missile defense budget seems to be outside the purview of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. I thought it was shocking when the Chiefs came up and
testified that they were not consulted during the preparation of the
ballistic missile defense budget. These are the uniformed leaders of
our military forces. These individuals are charged with and have taken
an oath to the Constitution to protect the country, and yet they were
not consulted at all about this budget.
Another point that is critical, and let me quote from Secretary
Rumsfeld's testimony before the Appropriations Committee on May 21. He
said:
In February of this year, we began developing the Defense
Planning Guidance for fiscal year 2004. In the fiscal years
2004 to 2009 program, the senior civilian and military
leadership had to focus on the looming problem of a sizeable
procurement bow wave beyond fiscal year 2007.
This is shorthand for describing the course of procurement of systems
that will be ready for fielding later in this decade.
If all were funded, they would crowd out all other areas of
investment and thereby cause a repetition of the same
heartaches and headaches that we still suffer from today as a
result of the procurement holiday of the 1990s.
This in the context of his plea to cut the Crusader system.
But what is most alarming about this quote is that this bow wave does
not include any deployment costs of missile defense at a time when the
administration is developing multiple systems which they proposed to
deploy at the end of this decade, costing hundreds of billions of
dollars perhaps.
As a result, we cannot simply ignore the cost implications of these
systems. As I mentioned before, simply to obtain life cycle cost
information on any of these systems has proven to be virtually
impossible. We asked for that with respect to Navy theater wide and we
got a letter back saying, we will not know until December of 2003 and
then we will tell you.
We cannot operate without an idea, understanding that it will be
amended many times before the end of this decade, but an idea about the
cost of all of these systems over several years, procurement and
operational deployment. If this bow wave is a crisis today, it becomes
a tidal wave when you include missile defense costs. As a result, we
have asked again for more specific information about the projected
costs associated with the missile defense program.
One of the areas, and an area on which we have focused our
reductions, has been systems engineering funding. The Department of
Defense Missile Defense Agency has asked for significant amounts of
money for systems engineering, BMD systems engineering, in addition to
specific moneys they are asking in every one of these component parts,
boost phase, midcourse, and terminal, where there is sufficient systems
engineering money. So we have directed reductions in this BMD systems
engineering.
It seems to us, again, to be an ill-defined area. We have asked for
what products they are buying. Mostly, I suspect it is engineering
services, or consulting services. It is not hardware. We have asked for
this and we have gotten very little in terms of a response. As a
result, we have shifted these funds significantly into the
aforementioned shipbuilding programs and further security for our
Department of Energy laboratories.
These efforts represent an attempt to provide good government, good
management to a program. We hope it will accelerate the deployment of
an effective missile system that has been operationally tested.
I hasten to add that this does not represent a revisitation of the
ABM Treaty debate. The President used his prerogative as President to
withdraw. This is not about arms control as much as it is about
maintaining good management, informing the Congress, so we can make
difficult decisions, so that 5 years from now we are not surprised when
that bow wave hits us and suddenly the bow wave becomes a tidal wave
because of the inclusion of significant costs of missile defense and
for theater missile defense.
There is a consensus to support missile defense, clearly theater and,
in
[[Page S5807]]
fact, I think also at this juncture clearly national missile defense. I
do not think we support that without asking tough questions and making
tough choices about how we spend our money, particularly when it comes
to the other uses that are so necessary today, the immediate protection
of our homeland, the immediate protection of forces around the globe
that are confronting our enemies today. So we have to make these
judgments and we made these judgments.
In addition to that, we have asked that a whole system of, we think,
very sensible reports and information be given to us. I have a
disconcerting feeling that there is a deliberate attempt to limit
information that we get and it is justified under the guise that we
need flexibility, that we have not thought through the problem yet.
There may be something to that, but it is particularly distressing when
the Director of Test and Evaluation does not have unfettered access to
the program. It is particularly distressing when the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council, the JROC, chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, does not have a role in these deliberations. It is
particularly distressing when the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not
consulted in the preparation of this significant budget. The American
people, I think, assume that these officials of the Department of
Defense are intimately involved in all of these details and have a seat
at the table to make judgments and to give advice. Our legislation
would do that.
As we go forward, we will continue to ask the tough questions. The
specifics of our requests with respect to these issues of oversight
include a reiteration of some of the things that we incorporated in
last year's request.
Last year, the National Defense Authorization Act required the Agency
to submit lifecycle cost estimates for all missile defense programs
that it entered into the engineering and manufacturing and development,
or EMD, phase. These are the same types of reports that every major
weapons system provides to the Congress.
The THAAD missile defense program, I have mentioned before, entered
EMD phase 2 years ago. We fully expected those lifecycle costs would be
reported to us in a routine way. However, instead of providing the
required information for THAAD, the Department chose to reclassify
THAAD as no longer being in EMD thereby avoiding, in their view, the
congressional requirement to submit the cost estimate.
It seems to be gamesmanship, to avoid responding to an obvious
question, an obvious concern: Tell us how much this system will cost
over its lifetime. That, again, is the type of nonresponsiveness,
either inadvertent or deliberate, that we have encountered. Therefore,
it reinforces the need for additional language in this legislation to
require appropriate reports, the same types of reports that you get
from mature systems in other areas of defense procurement.
We are not asking for the speculative. We are looking at systems that
have had many years of development, which are entering the phases of
engineering work. So the issue is defined. We can't do that because it
is not defined--sometimes we hear that--that is not at the heart of our
request. We have applied the request to major missile defense systems
such as the ground and sea-based midcourse program, Airborne laser, and
the THAAD program.
It is particularly important to get information because, on the one
hand, the administration says these are all speculative, ill-defined,
and they are thinking about it. And then they say: We will deploy the
system in a very short time, in 2004, for example.
You cannot have it both ways. If we are ready for contingency
deployment, certainly the information should be available to the
Congress. And this legislation would ask for that information.
We also recommend a provision that requires the Pentagon's director
of testing and evaluation to assess the potential operational
effectiveness of the major missile defense systems on an annual basis.
This would help the administration and Congress determine whether a
contingency deployment of a missile defense system is appropriate.
There has to be a certain operational threshold before deploying the
system. Who better than the director of testing and evaluation to make
that assessment.
It also requires the Joint Requirement Oversight Council to annually
assess the costs and performance in relation to military requirements.
This is the statutory role of the JROC for all military programs.
Missile defense is too important to bypass such a review.
As I mentioned earlier, the Chiefs were not even asked to provide
their views with respect to these missile defense priorities. That
should be corrected also. That should be something the Secretary of
Defense would want to have and would insist be included.
Now, we are endeavoring to bring this legislation to the floor
representing a commitment to missile defense but also a commitment to
the overall defense and security of the United States, to be able to
assure our constituents that we have looked carefully and deliberately
at all these programs and are aware of these programs, that we support
these programs, but we don't do it blindly. We do it on an informed
basis and are able to tell them: We are doing what we can, indeed, all
we can, in a thoughtful, deliberate, careful, professional way, to
enhance the security of the United States in terms of missile defense
and in terms of overall defense. We are, in fact, doing our job.
I believe the legislation we have brought from the subcommittee to
the committee and to the floor does this. It is a product of careful
deliberation. It is a product of many hours of work by staff and
Members. It is a product that is designed to enhance the security of
the United States. I believe it does. I hope my colleagues agree and
concur.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
Mr. REID. I hope all Members listened closely to the Senator from
Rhode Island. He certainly is qualified by virtue of his service in the
Congress, but mostly by virtue of his service in the U.S. Army. The
Senator from Rhode Island is the only Senator to graduate from the U.S.
Military Academy at West Point, to my knowledge. I always listen
closely to what he says. The country is very fortunate to have his
expertise.
Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator allow me to associate myself as an
extension about observations regarding my colleague. We have some
philosophical differences, but he does bring to our committee the
wealth of experience he gained in the U.S. military. That is so
important.
I also want to discuss scheduling on the floor.
Mr. REID. I am happy to yield without losing the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. I say to our leader, subject to the pending amendment, we
are hopeful to move on to other amendments in due course.
Mr. REID. I respond to my friend from Virginia, the comanager of this
bill, Majority Leader Daschle announced in his dugout this morning that
he wanted Members to offer amendments and that he was going to look
very closely early next week, if things are not moving well, at filing
cloture on this bill.
We cannot have this bill not completed by the time we leave for the
July recess. The committee has worked too hard. The President needs
this legislation. The United States military needs it. We have to
complete this bill.
I agree with the Senator from Virginia. We have a very important
amendment now pending, and we have to figure out some way to get this
off the floor. There are many people working on that as we speak.
The Senator from Virginia is absolutely right. Members need to offer
amendments. The majority leader spoke earlier today; he very much
desires to move this legislation along quickly. If it does not move
quickly after a week or so of debate, he will try to invoke cloture.
Mr. WARNER. I thank our distinguished assistant majority leader.
I am assured that the Republican leader worked hand-in-glove with the
majority to bring up this bill, providing our committee with this very
important period of time prior to the Fourth of July, but we must
finish it.
Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
[[Page S5808]]
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the
quorum call be dispensed with for purposes of an introductory statement
of approximately 5 minutes. At the conclusion, it is my intention to
place the Senate back into quorum call.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Florida is recognized.
Mr. GRAHAM. I thank the Chair.
(The remarks of Mr. Graham pertaining to the introduction of S. 2652
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills
and Joint Resolutions.'')
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Clinton). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Order Of Business
Mr. REID. Madam President, for the information of Members, we have
had a message from the House. We are going to go back into a quorum
call. We are trying to move on that as quickly as possible. As I
mentioned to the distinguished Senator from Texas, we are going to
modify the second-degree amendment. Then Senator Gramm has some things
he wants to say and a motion he wants to make, of which we are aware.
But this should not take long. In a few minutes we should be able to
get to the legislation.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 3916, As Modified
Mr. REID. Madam President, I send a modification to the desk to the
Reid-Conrad amendment. This is on behalf of Senator Conrad.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment is
so modified.
The amendment, as modified, is as follows:
Strike all after the first word in the amendment, and
insert the following:
BUDGET ENFORCEMENT.
(a) Entension of Budget Enforcement Points of Order.--
Section 904 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C.
621 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)(2)--
(A) by inserting ``and'' before ``312(b)'' and by striking
``, and 312(c)''; and
(B) by striking ``258C(a)(5)''; and
(2) in subsection (d)(3)--
(A) by inserting ``and'' before ``312(b)'' and by striking
``, and 312(c)''; and
(B) by striking ``258C(a)(5)''; and
(3) in subsection (e), by striking ``2002'' and inserting
``2007''.
(b) Extension of Budget Enforcement Act Provisions.--
(1) In general.--Section 275(b) of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 900 note) is
amended to read as follows:
``(b) Expiration.--Sections 251 and 258B of this Act and
sections 1105(f) and 1106(c) of title 31, United States Code,
shall expire September 30, 2007. The remaining sections of
part C of this title shall expire on September 30, 2011.''.
(2) Striking expired provisions.--
(A) BBA.--The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 900 et seq.) is amended by striking
section 253.
(B) Congressional budget act.--The Congressional Budget Act
of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.) is amended--
(i) in section 312, by striking subsection (c); and
(ii) in section 314--
(I) in subsection (b), by striking paragraphs (2) through
(5) and redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (2); and
(II) by striking subsection (e).
(c) Extension of Discretionary Caps.--
(1) In general.--Section 251(b)(2) of the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C.
901(b)(2)) is amended--
(A) in the matter before subparagraph (A), by striking
``2002'' and inserting ``2007'';
(B) by striking subparagraphs (C), (D), (E), and (F); and
(C) by redesignating subparagraph (G) as subparagraph (C).
(2) Caps.--Section 251(c) of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 901(c)) is
amended by striking paragraph (7) and (8) and inserting the
following:
``(7) with respect to fiscal year 2003--
``(A) for the discretionary category: $766,167,000,000 in
new budget authority and $756,259,000,000 in outlays;
``(B) for the highway category: $28,931,000,000 in outlays;
``(C) for the mass transit category: $6,030,000,000 in
outlays; and
``(D) for the conservation spending category:
$1,922,000,000 in new budget authority and $1,872,000,000 in
outlays;
``(8)(A) with respect top fiscal year 2004 for the
discretionary category: $784,425,000,000 in new budget
authority and $814,447,000,000 in outlays; and
``(B) with respect to fiscal year 2004 for the conservation
spending category; $2,080,000,000, in new budget authority
and $2,032,000,000 in outlays;''.
(3) Reports.--Subsections (c)(2) and (f)(2) of section 254
of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985 (2 U.S.C. 904) are amended by striking ``2002'' and
inserting ``2007''.
(d) Extension of Pay-As-You-Go.--
(1) Enforcement.--Section 252 of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 902) is
amended--
(A) in subsection (a), by striking ``2002'' and inserting
``2007''; and
(B) in subsection (b), by striking ``2002'' and inserting
``2007''.
(2) Pay-as-you-go rule in the senate.--
(A) In general.--Section 207 of H. Con. Res. 68 (106th
Congress, 1st Session) is amended--
(i) in subsection (b)(6), by inserting after ``paragraph
(5)(A)'' the following: ``except that direct spending or
revenue effects resulting in net deficit reduction enacted
pursuant to reconciliation instructions since the beginning
of that same calendar year shall not be available.''; and
(ii) in subsection (g), by striking ``2002'' and inserting
``2007''.
(B) Senate pay-as-you-go adjustment.--For purposes of
Senate enforcement of section 207 of House Concurrent
Resolution 68 (106th Congress), upon the enactment of this
Act, the Chairman of the Committee on the Budget of the
Senate shall adjust balances of direct spending and receipts
for all fiscal years to zero.
(3) Pay-as-you-go enforcement during on-budget surplus.--
If, prior to September 30, 2007, the Final Monthly Treasury
Statement for any of fiscal years 2002 through 2006 reports
an on-budget surplus, section 252 of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 902) shall
expire at the end of the subsequent fiscal year, and the
President, in the next budget, shall submit to Congress a
recommendation for pay-as-you-go enforcement procedures that
the president believes are appropriate when there is an on-
budget surplus.
(e) Senate Appropriations Committee Allocations.--Upon the
enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the Committee on the
Budget of the Senate shall file allocations to the committee
on Appropriations of the Senate consistent with this Act
pursuant to section 302(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974.
(f) Advance Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--Section 204 of H. Con. Res. 290 (106th
Congress) is amended by striking subsections (a) through (f),
(h), and (i).
(2) Limitation.--Section 202 of H. Con. Res. 83 (107th
Congress) is amended--
(A) in subsection (b)(1)--
(i) by striking ``2003'' and inserting ``2004''; and
(ii) by striking ``$23,159,000,000'' and inserting
``$25,403,000,000''; and
(B) in subsection (d), by striking ``2002'' in both places
it appears and inserting ``2003''.
(g) Special Rule.--Section 250(c)(4)(D)(i) of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C.
900(c)(4)(D)(i)) is amended by adding at the end the
following: ``Any budget authority for the mass transit
category shall be considered nondefense category budget
authority or discretionary category budget authority.''.
(h) Treatment of Crime Victims' Fund.--For purposes of
congressional points of order, the Congressional Budget Act
of 1974, and the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, any reduction in spending in the Crime
Victims' Fund (15-5041-0-2-754) included in the President's
budget or enacted in appropriations legislation for fiscal
year 2004 or any subsequent fiscal year shall not be scored
as discretionary savings.
(i) Exercise of Rulemaking Powers.--Congress adopts the
provisions of subsections (d)(2), (e), (f), (g) and (h) of
this section--
(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such
they shall be considered as part of the rules of each house,
or of that house to which they specifically apply, and such
rules shall supersede other rules only to the extent that
they are inconsistent therewith; and
(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of
either house to change those rules (so far as they relate to
that house) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same
extent as in the case of any other rule of that house.
(j) Senate Firewall for Defense and Nondefense Spending.--
[[Page S5809]]
(1) In general.--It shall not be in order in the Senate to
consider any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or
conference report that exceeds $392,757,000,000 in new budget
authority or $380,228,000,000 in outlays for the defense
discretionary category or $373,410,000,000 in new budget
authority or $376,031,000,000 in outlays for the nondefense
discretionary category for fiscal year 2003, as adjusted
pursuant to section 314 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974.
(2) Exceptions.--This subsection shall not apply if a
declaration of war by Congress is in effect or if a joint
resolution pursuant to section 258 of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 has been enacted.
(3) Waiver and appeal.--This subsection may be waived or
suspended in the Senate only by an affirmative vote of three-
fifths of the Members, duly chosen and sworn. An affirmative
vote of three-fifths of the Members of the Senate, duly
chosen and sworn, shall be required in the Senate to sustain
an appeal of the ruling of the Chair on a point of order
raised under this subsection.
Mr. REID. Madam President, Senator Conrad, chairman of the Budget
Committee, wants to speak about this modification. The chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, Senator Leahy, has been here for a while. Senator
Conrad has graciously allowed him to speak first. Senator Leahy needs
up to 15 minutes as in morning business. Following that, the Senator
from North Dakota would be recognized.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Vermont.
(The remarks of Mr. Leahy are located in today's Record under
``Morning Business.'')
Mr. CONRAD. Madam President, this is perhaps one of the most
challenging years we have faced dealing with the budget of the United
States. That is why moments ago I sent a modified amendment to the
desk. Let me just outline what is included in that amendment and why I
think it is so critically important that we adopt it today.
The Conrad-Feingold amendment sets discretionary spending limits for
2003 and 2004.
It also extends the 60-vote points of order protecting Social
Security, enforcing discretionary spending caps, and requiring fiscal
responsibility, and it extends for 5 years the pay-go and other budget
enforcement provisions that otherwise expire on September 30.
Let me discuss the level of spending that is covered by this
amendment. For 2003, it would provide a discretionary spending limit of
$768.1 billion. That is precisely the same as the President's budget
for 2003. The President sent us a discretionary spending level of $768
billion.
I have talked with Mr. Daniels this morning, the head of the Office
of Management and Budget. He believes this number is too high by some
$9 billion. Even though that is the President's number, even though
that is the number the President sent us, we have not adopted the
President's policy because the President has proposed switching certain
accounts from mandatory spending to discretionary spending. Those are
the retirement requirements of people in the Federal Government. In
other words, he has proposed switching the retirement accounts that
come out of the budget of the various agencies from mandatory spending
to discretionary spending.
Obviously, that would make discretionary spending more by $9 billion.
That is included in the President's proposal. We have not adopted that
part of his proposal. Their argument is that would shift back to the
mandatory side of the equation and reduce the $768 billion by $9
billion. That is true. They are correct about that.
It is also true that their budget needs to be adjusted in a number of
ways, I believe, in order to secure passage in the Congress. The
President has cut transportation funding, highway construction, and
bridge construction by 27 percent, by $9 billion. We proposed adding
back about two-thirds of that, about $6 billion. That money has to come
from somewhere.
The President has proposed cutting law enforcement by over $1
billion. I do not think that is realistic at a time when we face
terrorist threats to the United States. The President has proposed a
smaller amount for education that is even provided for in his own No
Child Left Behind legislation. That is going to have to be acknowledged
and dealt with before we finish our work. We are not going to cut that
program of No Child Left Behind that the President talked about all
across the country.
There are other provisions as well that are going to have to be
addressed. We are going to need that $9 billion to meet the needs of
the country. Again, it still leaves us with an overall amount that is
precisely what the President sent us in his own budget.
In addition to that, there is a second year of budget caps, of
restrictions on what can be spent, and that amount is $786 billion.
That is about a 2-percent increase over this year. That is a very sharp
restriction on spending, especially given the fact we are under attack,
especially given the fact the President, no doubt, will be asking more
for defense, more for homeland security. But we have agreed to a cap
this year that is exactly the number the President sent us in his
budget, and we have agreed on a cap for spending for next year at $786
billion, about a 2-percent increase over where we are now.
In addition, the amendment I have sent to the desk limits advance
appropriations. This was raised as an issue by Members on the other
side of the aisle. They wanted a restriction on advance appropriations,
so we included that in this bill. And we have included another request
from the other side of the aisle to establish a 1-year defense
firewall. What that means is, the money that is allocated for defense
would go for defense and could not be used for other purposes.
This amendment establishes a supermajority point of order in the
Senate to enforce a defense/nondefense firewall in 2003. Again, this
was in response to requests from Members on the other side of the
aisle.
This is the circumstance we face that I think we need to keep in mind
as we consider this amendment. Last year, the Congressional Budget
Office told us we could expect some $5.6 trillion of budget surpluses
over the next decade. That is what we were told just a year ago--nearly
$6 trillion of surpluses. Some of us questioned that. Some of us said:
Do not rely on a 10-year forecast. There is too much risk associated
with that. But others said: No, there will even be more money. That is
what we were told repeatedly.
Now we get to June of this year and look at the difference a year
makes. Not only do we not see any surpluses for the next decade, we see
deficits of some $600 billion over the next 10 years.
Where did the money go? This chart shows our analysis of what
happened to those surpluses, and the biggest chunk went for the tax
cuts that were enacted last year and the additional tax cuts passed
this year.
Forty-three percent of the disappearance of the surplus went to tax
cuts; 21 percent went to increased spending as a result of the attack
on this country--increased defense spending, increased homeland
security spending. That is where all of the increase has gone. Twenty-
one percent is from economic changes, that is, the economic slowdown
that occurred. That is where 21 percent of the disappearance of the
surplus occurred. And the last 14 percent is technical changes.
Largely, those are underestimations of the cost of Medicare and
Medicaid. That is where the money went, primarily to tax cuts; the next
biggest is increased spending as a result of the attack on the country;
the next biggest reason was the economic slowdown, and actually those
two are equal; and the final and smallest reason is underestimations of
the cost of Medicare and Medicaid.
That is where we are. What it tells us, as we look over an extended
period of time, a 10-year period going back to 1992 when we were in
deep deficit, and when the husband of the occupant of the chair came in
as President of the United States and fashioned a 5-year plan in 1993
that was very controversial to raise revenue and cut spending, we can
see that plan worked.
Each and every year, we were pulling ourselves out of deficit under
that plan. In 1997, we had a bipartisan plan that finished the job. As
a result, we emerged from deficit. We stopped using Social Security
funds for other purposes, and we were running surpluses, non-trust-fund
surpluses for 3 years.
Then last year we had the triple whammy: the tax cut that was too
large, the attack on this country, and the economic slowdown. We can
see now that we are headed for deficits for the entire next decade.
That is Social Security money being taken to pay for
[[Page S5810]]
the tax cuts, being taken to pay for other items.
In fact, we now estimate some $2 trillion will be taken from Social
Security over the next decade to pay for the President's tax cuts and
other spending initiatives. All of that matters, and it matters a lot
because of where we are headed.
The leading edge of the baby boom generation starts to retire in 6
years. It is hard to believe, but that is the reality. What that tells
us is those surpluses in the trust funds that have helped us offset
these deep deficits are going to evaporate; in 2016 the Medicare trust
fund is going to turn cash negative; and in 2017 the Social Security
trust fund is going to turn cash negative. Then it is going to be like
falling off a cliff.
This is a demographic time bomb that we are facing as a society. It
is unlike anything we have ever faced before because always in our
history the succeeding generation has been much larger than the
generation retiring.
In very rapid fire order, the number of people who are eligible for
Social Security and Medicare are going to double. We are headed for a
circumstance in which there will only be two people working for every
retiree. If that does not sober us, if that does not inform our
actions, I do not know what it will take.
The first thing we need to do is get these budget spending caps in
place for next year and the year thereafter, and couple that with the
budget disciplines that give us the chance to fend off ideas for
greater spending and for more tax cuts that are not paid for. Yes, we
can have spending initiatives. They have to be paid for. We can have
additional tax cuts, but they have to be paid for; otherwise, we are
going to dig this hole deeper and deeper.
There are real consequences to digging that hole deeper. Mr. Crippen,
the head of the Congressional Budget Office, told us that when he
appeared before the Senate Budget Committee. He said, in response to a
question from me:
Put more starkly, Mr. Chairman, the extremes of what will
be required to address our retirement are these: We'll have
to increase borrowing by very large, likely unsustainable
amounts; raise taxes to 30 percent of GDP, obviously
unprecedented in our history; or eliminate most of the rest
of the Government as we know it. That is the dilemma that
faces us in the long run, Mr. Chairman, and these next 10
years will only be the beginning.
I do not know how to say this with more force or more persuasiveness,
but we are coming to another moment of truth on this journey in our
economic future. Some will rise and say this spending amount is too
much; that $768 billion is $9 billion more than the President proposed,
even though the $768 billion number is precisely the number the
President sent us. Some will say we ought to wait. Some will say there
is some other reason to be opposed.
Another moment of truth is coming very soon, and the question is, Are
we going to have the budget disciplines that otherwise are phased out
at the end of September? Are we going to have those to discipline the
process as we proceed this year? Are we going to have a budget number
that can inform the appropriations process as we proceed, a budget
number, I again say, that is identical to the budget number the
President sent us?
I am swift to acknowledge we have adopted his number but not his
policy. It is absolutely correct he wanted to switch $9 billion from
mandatory spending to discretionary spending, and when we do not do
that, it allows us to use that $9 billion in a way different from the
way he proposed.
I say to my colleagues, do they really want to adopt a 27-percent cut
in highway and bridge construction that puts 350,000 people out of work
in this country? I do not think that is the will of the Congress or the
will of the American people. We have proposed a reduction from what was
spent last year but not as big a reduction as the President has
proposed.
Are we really going to cut the COPS Program by over a billion dollars
when we have a terrorist threat to this country?
Are we really going to take police off the street? I do not think so.
Are we really going to cut the President's signature education program,
No Child Left Behind? I do not think so. Those are the fundamental
issues that are before us now.
I emphasize to my colleagues that not only is this a spending cap for
this year at the level the President proposed in his budget, but in
addition to that, it is a spending cap for next year of $786 billion.
That is an increase of over 2 percent. That is very tight fiscal
constraint. I am ready to take the medicine to get us back on a course
to fiscal responsibility, and I believe most of my colleagues are as
well.
This amendment is the product of weeks of negotiation between
Republicans and Democrats and is a good-faith effort to capture in an
amendment the positions of Democrats and Republicans on what should be
contained in the budget for this year and next; what the limits should
be on spending for this year and next; what should be the budget
disciplines that are continued so we have a way of enforcing fiscal
restraint, and it contains a 1-year defense firewall in the Senate,
something requested by Members on the other side.
For those of us who believe it is critically important to have a
budget process in the Senate, for those of us who believe it is
critically important to have budget disciplines in place, this is our
opportunity. This is our chance. It may not come again.
I urge my colleagues to very carefully consider their votes on this
measure. This should not be a Republican vote or a Democratic vote.
This should be a vote for the country. This should be a vote for the
Senate. This should be a vote that sends a signal we are serious about
reestablishing fiscal discipline. This is a vote that should send a
signal that fiscal discipline matters to the economy of this country.
This should be a signal to the markets that this Congress is serious
about fiscal responsibility, and this should be a signal that while the
President has asked for the second biggest increase in our debt in our
Nation's history, all of us are committed to getting back on track
towards a course of reducing the debt of the United States, especially
in light of the coming retirement of the baby boom generation.
I yield the floor.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, the pending amendment and the second
degree to it, as modified, are an effort to control spending and
protect the Social Security trust fund. That is what it is--pure and
simple--to control spending and, by doing so, also protect the Social
Security trust fund. That is obviously not a new idea.
What we are doing here is trying to extend a process that has worked,
and worked pretty well, for most of the years since 1990. We are trying
to give 2 more years of life to the process that helped us do something
that a lot of people didn't think could happen--balance the budget
without using Social Security in both 1999 and 2000.
What we are trying to do is make sure there is some constraint on the
size of the Government.
I remind my colleagues, if we do not pass this amendment, if we do
not extend the budget process, then the vast majority of budget process
constraints will simply expire on September 30. Our failure to act will
mean an almost complete absence of responsible budget limitations.
Again, what our amendment does is not something new. It just tries to
keep in place these limitations that made the good fiscal management of
this Government possible during the 1990s.
As we saw this deadline coming, this problem that will occur on
September 30 with the loss of the rules and constraints, what I have
tried to do, with others, is work very hard to come to where we are
today. Our amendment is not my idea alone, by any means. It is the
result of a collaborative effort extending over several months.
Starting in March, my staff has been working with the staff of Senators
from about a dozen Senate offices, half Republican and half Democratic.
I followed up in a
[[Page S5811]]
number of meetings with Senators from other sides of the aisle, trying
to build consensus. What we tried to do is get the strongest budget
process we could.
My colleagues will recall that we tried to extend the caps for 5
years in an amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill that
Senator Gregg and I offered on behalf of Senators Chafee, Kerry,
Voinovich, McCain, and Cantwell. Half the Senate, a bipartisan group of
Senators, actually voted for that amendment, but we were not able to
generate the support necessary to get the 60 votes and have the
amendment actually adopted.
The amendment before us today is an effort to get the most done that
we can. For the first 2 years, it provides almost exactly the same cap
levels that were in the amendment of myself and Senator Gregg to the
supplemental appropriations bill. It is my judgment, and the judgment
of the bipartisan group of Senators with whom I worked to draft this
amendment, that this is as strong a budget process that the Senate will
actually be able to pass this year. So that is what I am asking of my
colleagues--to do at least this much. Let's at least get this done.
Let's at least preserve this much constraint and this kind of
responsibility, even though many of us would prefer more.
One of the reasons is because in the next decade the baby boom
generation will begin to retire in large numbers. Starting in 2016,
Social Security will start redeeming the bonds it holds and the non-
Social Security Government will have to start paying for those bonds
from non-Social Security surpluses. Starting in 2016, the Government
will have to show restraint in the non-Social Security budget so we can
pay the Social Security benefits that Americans have already earned or
will have already earned by that time. If we keep adding to the Federal
debt, we will simply add to the burden to be borne by the taxpayers of
the coming decade and decades thereafter. That is all we are really
doing. It has been said in many political speeches, but it is true--we
are just leaving them the bill. We are not doing our job. We are not
showing responsibility, if that is how we leave things.
Of course, September 11 changed our priorities in many ways,
including how our Government spends money. But September 11 does not
change the oncoming requirements of Social Security. As an economist
has said: ``Demographics is destiny.'' We can either prepare for that
destiny or we can fail to prepare for it.
To get the Government out of the business of using Social Security
surpluses to fund other Government spending, we have to strengthen our
budget process. That is what this amendment does. That is why we urge
our colleagues to support it.
We have sought to advance a goal that has a long and bipartisan
history, and I would like to just recite a little of that history. In
his January 1998 State of the Union Address, President Clinton called
on the Government to ``save Social Security first.'' That is also what
President George W. Bush said in a March 2001 radio address. In his
words, we need to ``keep the promise of Social Security and keep the
Government from raiding the Social Security surplus.'' That is what
President Bush said. It is what the Republican leader, Senator Lott,
said on the Senate floor in June 1999 when he said:
Social Security taxes should be used for Social Security
and only for Social Security--not for any other brilliant
idea we may have.
It is what Senator Domenici said in April of 2000 when he said:
I suggest that the most significant fiscal policy change
made to this point--to the benefit of Americans of the future
. . . is that all of the Social Security surplus stays in the
Social Security fund. . . .
Yes, we should stop using Social Security surpluses to fund the rest
of Government because it is the moral thing to do; for every dollar we
add to the Federal debt is another dollar our children must pay back in
higher taxes or fewer Government benefits.
I do not think our children's generation will forgive us if we fail
in our fiscal responsibility today. History will not forgive us if we
fail to act. We must balance the budget, we must stop accumulating
debts for future generations to pay, and we have to stop robbing our
children of their own choices.
We have got to make our own choices. We are doing that today. Let's
not take away from these kids their right to make their own choices in
their time because we have locked up all the money and we cannot pay
the Social Security benefits.
The amendment before us today, I am pretty sure, is the best, last
hope to do this this year. I urge my colleagues to support it.
Madam President, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has
issued a paper that concludes as follows:
These proposals, No. 1, are likely to be workable because
they extend enforcement tools that have worked in the past;
No. 2, are evenhanded because they treat spending increases
and tax cuts in the same fashion, without favoring one or the
other; and, No. 3, set targets that appear realistic and thus
are more likely not to be blown away by subsequent
congressional action.
This analysis by the Center on Budget and Policy is their view of
this amendment. It is a positive analysis.
I ask unanimous consent the full text of this analysis be printed in
the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, June 20, 2002]
The Feingold Amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill: A Workable
and Responsible Strengthening of Fiscal Discipline
Senator Feingold's amendment to the Defense authorization
bill would establish tight but realistic caps on
appropriations for 2003 and 2004, extend for five years the
requirement that tax and entitlement legislation be paid for,
and extend supermajority enforcement of congressional budget
plans for five years. These proposals: (1) are likely to be
workable because they extend enforcement tools that have
worked in the past; (2) are evenhanded because they treat
spending increases and tax cuts in the same fashion, without
favoring one or the other; and (3) set targets that appear
realistic and are thus more likely not to be blown away by
subsequent congressional action.
Key Budget Enforcement Tools are Due to Expire This
September 30. Four key tools to enforce budget discipline are
scheduled to expire September 30, 2002. If these provisions
expire, Congress will find it much easier to increase
appropriations and entitlements by unlimited amounts and cut
taxes by unlimited amounts. The clear risk is that the large
deficits we are currently experiencing would grow even larger
rather than decline, leaving the budget in a weak position at
just the wrong time--right before the baby boom generation
retires and places still greater pressure on the budget.
Allowing all these budget enforcement tools to expire could
set the stage for highly undisciplined budgeting in the
coming months and years.
Congressional Budget Targets. The budget targets in
Congressional budget plans are currently enforced by points
of order that can only be waived by 60 votes. This means that
appropriations and entitlement bills cannot spend more than
is provided for in the Congressional budget resolution and
tax cuts cannot exceed the level of tax cuts the
Congressional budget resolution allows, unless 60 Senators
agree. Starting October 1, however, excessive appropriation
bills, excessive entitlement increases, and excessive tax
cuts can all be agreed to by simple majority vote. The
Feingold Amendment keeps these vital 60-vote enforcement
mechanisms in place for another five years.
Discretionary Caps. Currently, a statute requires the
President to cut appropriations bills across-the-board if, at
the end of a session, those bills have breached dollar
``caps,'' or upper limits, set in statute. This law worked
well for eight years--from 1991 through 1998--but then was
evaded through gimmicks or set aside by statute for the last
four years because the caps established in 1997 proved
unrealistically tight. The entire mechanism of caps and
across-the-board cuts (called ``sequestration'') expires on
September 30 and so does not apply to FY 2003 appropriations
bills. The Feingold amendment renews the mechanism for
another five years and sets caps for 2003 and 2004 (no such
caps currently exist). The 2003-2004 caps in this amendment
are at the levels in the recent Gregg-Feingold amendment and
are tight but probably realistic.
The Senate Pay-As-You-Go Rule. Currently, a point of order
waivable by 60 votes lies against legislation that would
increase the cost of entitlements or reduce revenues unless
these costs are offset over 1, 5, and 10 years, except to the
extent that a budget surplus is projected outside Social
Security. This rule expires September 30; the Feingold
Amendment would renew it for another five years.
The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Rule. Under current law, a
statute requires the President to cut a selected list of
entitlement programs across the board if, at the end of a
session, OMB determines that tax and entitlement legislation
has not been fully offset for the coming fiscal year, i.e.,
if entitlement increases and tax cuts have not been ``paid
for.'' This mechanism worked well from 1991 through 1998 but
broke down when surpluses appeared; Congress wrote ad hoc
provisions
[[Page S5812]]
setting it aside. Starting October 1, the mechanism
effectively expires even though deficits have returned--new
entitlement increases and tax cuts will not have to be paid
for. The Feingold Amendment renews for five years the
requirement that such legislation must be paid for, while
turning off this requirement if the Treasury reports that a
year has been completed in which the budget outside Social
Security was in surplus.
The Feingold Amendment Sets Appropriations Targets For This
Year That Can Be Enforced By The Senate. In addition to the
extension of the four enforcement mechanisms discussed above,
the Feingold Amendment responds to the particular situation
faced by the Senate this year because a new congressional
budget plan has not been agreed to. While last year's
congressional budget plan continues to govern entitlement and
tax legislation, it does not govern appropriations. This
means that, as soon as the Appropriations Committee is ready,
the Senate can begin consideration of appropriations bills at
any funding level and pass them by majority vote. The
Feingold Amendment would address this problem by requiring 60
votes for any 2003 appropriations bill that exceeds its
allocation. The allocations for all the appropriations bills
combined must not exceed the statutory cap the Feingold
Amendment sets.
How Tight Are the Feingold Appropriations Caps?
If caps are too loose, they do not constitute fiscal
discipline. Experience also demonstrates that caps fail to
impose fiscal discipline if they are set unrealistically
tight. In that event, the caps are inevitably breached, which
can lead to a free-for-all on appropriations.
The Feingold caps are tight but realistic. They equal the
levels for 2003 and 2004 in the Gregg-Feingold amendment
offered three weeks ago. If Congress provides the defense and
homeland security increases the President has requested, as
appears very likely, these caps would require a reduction in
FY 2003 funding for all other discretionary programs of $5
billion below the CBO baseline level--i.e., below the FY 2002
level adjusted for inflation. (It may be said that the
proposed FY 2003 cap would be $36 billion above the 2000
level adjusted for inflation. This is true, but the
President's defense and homeland security levels are $41
billion above the 2002 levels adjusted for inflation.
Assuming the defense and homeland security requests are
funded, everything else would have to be cut $5 billion below
the CBO baseline.)
These figures constitute restraint. If figures much tighter
are agreed to, either the President will not receive his full
defense and homeland security increases, or, more likely, the
caps will be maneuvered around when appropriations battles
heat up because the cuts required in other programs will be
too large to be politically achieveable. If that occurs, the
attempt at restraint will fail and, as has been the case over
the last few years, no effective cap will be in operation.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I yield the floor and suggest the
absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Carnahan). The clerk will call the roll.
The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Conrad
second-degree amendment be agreed to; that the time until 3 p.m. today
be for debate with respect to the Feingold amendment, as amended, with
the time equally divided and controlled by the two leaders or their
designees; that during this time, whenever Senator Gramm of Texas
raises a Budget Act point of order against the amendment, and a motion
to waive the point of order is made, the Senate vote on the motion to
waive at 3 p.m., without further intervening action or debate; provided
that no other amendments or motions be in order prior to a vote on the
motion to waive the point of order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Under the previous order, the second-degree amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 3916), as modified, was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Amendment No. 3915
Mr. GRAMM. Madam President, I wish to explain why I am opposed to
this amendment, why I intend to raise a point of order against it, and
why I believe that point of order should be sustained.
Let me begin by saying we have not adopted a budget this year. A
budget has never been brought to the floor of the Senate during this
session of Congress. We have not been in a similar position since 1974.
We are now being asked on a Defense authorization bill to have the
Senate commit to a budget figure outside the budget process. In fact,
the point of order arises because we are basically going outside the
budget process and dealing with an amendment that was not reported by
the Budget Committee.
In doing so, we would be committing the Senate to a level of spending
that next year is $9 billion more than the President requested and $52
billion more than we spent last year. We would be going on record as
agreeing to setting a constraint under which we could spend $25 billion
this year that would not be counted until the following year.
In other words, we could actually spend $25 billion more than the $9
billion more that we are committing above the level the President
requested by what is called advanced appropriations. I do not believe
the Senate should lock itself into a budget that has not been approved
by the Budget Committee. We had a vote on that budget that was brought
up on another bill. Nobody voted for it--not one Democrat or one
Republican. We are now being asked to commit to a figure of $9 billion
above the President's, $52 million above last year, with the ability to
get around that constraint by spending $25 billion in advanced
appropriations. Last year was the largest level of advanced
appropriations in American history, and that was $23 billion. This
would set a new global record. And I do not believe this represents
good policy.
This is adamantly opposed by the President. OMB has notified Members
today that they are opposed to it. There is no possibility the House
will agree to this. I say to any of my colleagues who are tempted by
this and by the thought that any kind of budget numbering process is
better than none, the bottom line is the House will never agree to
this. What they would be doing in the process would be committing to a
level of spending $9 billion above the level the President requested,
with a $25 billion advanced appropriation escape hatch.
I do not believe this is a good deal. I wish we had more than an
opportunity to offer an amendment, but a consensus among Members that
when we didn't adopt a budget, we needed a permanent budget enforcement
process. This would give us the process but at numbers that are grossly
beyond the level the President requested and far beyond the numbers I
could ever support.
So I hope my colleagues will sustain this budget point of order. I
don't think it is good for the Senate to be trying to write a partial
budget on a Defense authorization bill instead of bringing a budget up
and debating it and amending it. The amendment will be subject to
amendment if we do not sustain the point of order. There will be
amendments offered. I will offer amendments if we do not sustain the
budget point of order.
Let me reiterate briefly that this is $9 billion more than the
President requested, $52 million more than we spent last year. This
would have advanced appropriations of $25 billion, which would be the
largest in American history, that would be sanctioned under this
agreement. The White House is adamantly opposed to this amendment. The
House will never accept this amendment. Therefore, it cannot and will
not become binding.
I urge colleagues to sustain the budget point of order. This is a
budget point of order with a purpose. Sometimes these budget points of
order represent sort of a ``gotcha'' kind of circumstance, where they
apply, but the logic of them is kind of convoluted. They are almost
accidental. The budget point of order I raise is not accidental. It
says that an amendment that alters the budget process has to come
through the orderly process of being reported by the Budget Committee
or else it is subject to a point of order.
I remind my colleagues that we are under a unanimous consent request.
So by making the point of order now, I am not cutting off anybody's
debate. That will continue until 3 o'clock. I say that so everybody
understands exactly where we are.
The pending amendment contains matter within the jurisdiction of the
Committee on the Budget, and it has been offered to a measure that was
not reported from the Budget Committee. I therefore raise a point of
order against amendment No. 3915 pursuant to section 306 of the
Congressional Budget Act.
[[Page S5813]]
Let me ask the Parliamentarian a question. Is 3915 the right number,
given they have merged the amendments?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is 3915, as amended.
Mr. GRAMM. Madam President, I make that point of order against the
pending amendment under section 306.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, pursuant to section 904 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, I move to waive the applicable
sections of that act for purposes of the pending amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion is pending. Who yields time?
The Senator from New Mexico is recognized.
Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, parliamentary inquiry. Is there a time
limit on the situation with which we are confronted?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. The time is evenly divided up until 3
o'clock.
Mr. DOMENICI. Then we must proceed to a vote?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Chair.
Who is in charge of the time in favor of the amendment?
Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, how much time do we have on our side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Forty-one minutes remain for the sponsors.
Mr. FEINGOLD. How much time does the Senator want?
Mr. DOMENICI. May I have 20?
Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield to the Senator from New Mexico 20 minutes.
Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, it is not often I would come to the
floor on a Thursday afternoon when a Defense authorization bill is
before us and join in an amendment offered by the chairman of the
Budget Committee on the other side, who has failed to produce a budget
resolution heretofore. I believe his side of the aisle had a
responsibility to do that. They did not do it. That is not the end of
the world.
We are today confronted with that situation. The truth of the matter
is that there will be an awful lot of Senators pondering the
appropriations process and wondering whether Senator Phil Gramm from
Texas, who knows an awful lot about this, is right when he speaks of
the dangers to America of authorizing a budget produced by the
Congress, not the President, which would exceed the President's annual
appropriation by $9 billion.
My friend from Texas makes that appear to be a very big issue. Let me
suggest that I would not join in producing an alternative to a
congressional budget that would permit us to spend between $9 billion
and $10 billion more than the President in appropriations if I did not
see down the road something a lot more onerous than a congressional
attempt not only to limit spending for each of the next 2 years, but
also to insert the points of order that are going to keep this Congress
from going absolutely wild on entitlement spending during the ensuing
months.
I think I could say this is going to be a year without any
restraints, if it were the $9 billion we were arguing about. But I tell
you, that is not it. For all the Senators who have been praying for the
day when there is no longer a Budget Act, they thought they would be
confronting appropriations bills run wild. But the truth of the matter
is, it is the entitlement programs that are coming to us during the
next 4 months, until October 1, that will have no constraints on them
and no 60-vote points of order, which have saved the American people
and this Congress from hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars of
outyear, next year expenditures.
For formal purposes, the Senator ought to put my name on the
amendment as a cosponsor. This amendment sets caps that is expenditure
limitations--for 2003 and 2004 with a Defense firewall in the Senate
but only for 2003, and that is good enough. That means in the Senate we
will not spend Defense money for domestic programs, but neither will we
spend the opposite. We will not spend domestic money for Defense
programs. That is what a wall means.
White House, before you get on the telephone and do what Senator Phil
Gramm said you have done, Mr. President--our President, down on
Pennsylvania Avenue--before you say to all the Republicans, ``Vote
against this,'' let me make a couple points for you.
One, this is not your budget, Mr. President--I am speaking of our
President down at the White House. It is not your budget. You have a
budget. The law of America says you produce a budget. I do not know
what would happen if you did not, Mr. President, but you did.
Then it says in another place in the law that Congress passes a
budget, and that congressional budget is for the use by the Congress in
their attempting to get their priorities adopted by the Congress. And,
Mr. President, if I were you, I would say: Congress, pass the best one
you can, but remember, that does not mean I am going to sign every bill
you produce.
The President still has the veto threat on every appropriations bill,
if that is what he wants.
I submit to you, Mr. President, my friend down on Pennsylvania
Avenue, just because the Senator from Texas has talked about the
ravages of his $9 billion that we might spend in excess of your
appropriations, just remember, you can vitiate every one of those with
negotiations in the appropriations bills and a veto just like you have
today. We cannot change your veto authority.
We have proceeded in a realistic manner with one of two alternatives,
and listen up, there are not 20, there are 1 or 2. Do we do this, which
is a half-baked budget resolution? It is half-baked because you did not
do your job, half-baked because you did not do your job because you
were supposed to produce a budget resolution, and you should not make
up your mind that it is too tough this year so we will not do it. I
heard somebody on that side say that. That is not the law.
For 27 years, when I was either chairman or ranking member, we
produced a budget every single year, no matter how tough it was, no
matter who had to vote on issues on which they did not want to vote.
Senator Baker sat right there on that table with the appearance of a
Buddha, and every Republican who came up, the Buddha would say--and 37
times the Buddha won.
We did precisely what the Republicans wanted to do to move our
country ahead. You did not have that. That is not my fault. That is
your fault. But it isn't America that ought to suffer from it, nor
should Congress be put in a position where they cannot do any work.
I have come to the conclusion it is a lot better to get caps, and
they are at pretty meaningful levels. Next year's are pretty low. The
one for the budget we are writing today is $9 billion to $10 billion
over the President's, and I submit when all this day is gone and the
rhetoric has simmered down, it is going to be very difficult, even with
our President with his pen in hand waiting to veto, it is going to be
very difficult to come out of this spending less than the amount that
we put in these caps. I hope we can. I will be there attempting to
enforce them, for what it is worth. The truth is, those caps are better
than none, and the President retains his veto authority.
For the defense of America, for which you asked us for so much money,
Mr. President, we put all that money in and we got a firewall, meaning
you cannot spend defense money for anything else. That is a very
important budget consideration.
We set limits on advance appropriations consistent with what we
wanted on this side when we met.
We extend the 60-vote budget points of order, including the pay-as-
you-go.
We eliminated a gimmick regarding the crime victims fund, and I think
you all have seen that and concurred with it. We showed it to you 10
days ago.
I do not know if 3 o'clock is enough time, or quarter of 3, but I
think it is. If somebody wants more time and we need to explain it
better, or I need to explain it to my side better, just come down and
ask for some time. I think we will get it.
I repeat, I want to talk to two situations for the next 2 minutes. I
say to my fellow Senators, through no fault of this side of the aisle,
we are in a real predicament today. If we let a whole batch of bills
get through and do not put some points of order and some budget-like
points of order and some caps on how much you can spend after which the
expenditure bills get hit--we have to do that. We cannot sit here and
watch this all go down the river, with the economy already in
sputtering shape.
[[Page S5814]]
Second, the President of the United States does not lose anything in
terms of his power, his strength. If anything, he gains a potential for
orderliness in the Senate and House as we finish our business that we
might not have but for the adoption of this amendment.
My last remarks: I do not know that this is the best bill on which to
put this, but I do not know which bill is next. It is sort of the
chicken and egg. The appropriators are waiting for the number. We are
saying: You know the number. Let's bring an appropriations bill up and
we will put this on it.
Others are saying that is too late if you do that. So here is a big
authorizing bill. If we approve this--and I urge that we do; Senator
Stevens, if he had time, would be here concurring in this, pledging to
stick to the numbers--if we approve this, we can put it on another bill
later if, as a matter of fact, this defense bill does not pass or gets
tied up in a conference that takes too long.
If anybody wants any further explanation, I will do it here on the
floor and seek time, or I will meet them wherever they like and show
them what we have done. I believe we might turn somebody. Thanks to
Senator Feingold for his courage, and Senator Gregg who is with the
Senator on this amendment. If he is not, we must ask him to be a
cosponsor because he had a lot to do with it.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the
Senator from New Mexico, Mr. Domenici, be added as a cosponsor of the
pending amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. FEINGOLD. How much time remains on our side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 29 and \1/2\ minutes.
Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from North Dakota.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. CONRAD. Madam President, I thank my colleague. We have heard some
arguments advanced by the Senator from Texas as to why Members should
not vote for this amendment. The Senator has said this has not gone
through the budget process. I reject that argument by the Senator from
Texas. The fact is the numbers that are before us are exactly the
numbers that passed the Senate Budget Committee on the budget
resolution that I took through the committee. That is a fact.
The fact is, I reported out of the Budget Committee, pursuant to the
budget I proposed, $768.1 billion in discretionary spending for this
year. That is precisely the same as what was in the President's budget.
It is true we did not adopt his policy. We did adopt his number.
The Senator says this is outside what the Budget Committee has
recommended. It is not outside what the Budget Committee has
recommended. It is precisely what the Budget Committee recommended in
the resolution I offered--$768 billion this year, $786 billion next
year. Where is the money going? I say to my colleagues who think that
is too much money, here is where the money is going: Last year we spent
$710 billion. The President has asked for, and we have agreed to, a $45
billion increase for national defense, every penny of it requested by
the President of the United States.
The President asked for an additional $5.4 billion for homeland
security. We have endorsed that, every penny of it requested by the
President of the United States. Now there is another $7 billion, $7
billion on a base last year of $710 billion. That is a 1-percent
increase available for all the other functions of Government, after the
increase asked for by the President for defense, after the increase
asked for by the President for homeland security.
If we look at the amount of money that is in this budget for this
year, the $768 billion, we have provided for the year thereafter an
increase of $18.4 billion. That is an increase of 2 percent, and that
is precisely what was in the budget resolution that passed the
committee. It is true, we have not yet considered a budget resolution
on the floor of the Senate. That is not unprecedented for June. There
have been many times we have not concluded work on a budget. In fact, 4
years ago, we never did complete work on a budget through the whole
process.
So we know the reality. We know what has occurred in the past. The
fact is, we have passed a budget resolution through the committee. The
budget numbers that are in that document are the numbers that are
before us today. They represent serious constraint on spending for both
this coming year and the year thereafter.
When the Senator from Texas says there is a $50 billion increase over
last year, it is actually a $58 billion increase. But where is it?
Again, I remind my colleagues, it is in defense; $45 billion of the
increase is in national defense, every penny of it requested by the
President of the United States.
Is the Senator from Texas saying he is against that increase in
defense? And $5.4 billion is an increase in homeland security, every
penny requested by the President of the United States. Is the Senator
from Texas against that increase in homeland security requested by the
President of the United States? The only other money is $7 billion for
everything else, a 1-percent increase.
Let's get serious about budgets and let's get serious about what is
being discussed. The Senator from Texas raises advanced appropriations.
Advanced appropriations have been done for many years. Why? Because the
school year does not fit the fiscal year of the Federal Government. The
Federal fiscal year ends at the end of September. Everybody knows the
school year does not end until May or June. So advanced appropriations
were adopted to fit the reality of the school year in America. There is
nothing wrong about that. There is nothing wrong with that at all.
The Senator from Texas says the House will never agree. That is not
our job, to write a budget that agrees with the House. Our
responsibility is to write a budget for this Chamber. We will then
negotiate with the House on an overall agreement. The first thing we
have to do is reach a conclusion in this Chamber.
What we are proposing, once again, for discretionary spending for
fiscal year 2003, is exactly the same number the President sent up in
his budget, $768 billion. That is what was in my mark that passed
through the Budget Committee and that is what we are proposing. It is
true it is not the same policy as the President proposed. He proposed a
different way of spending the money, but he proposed exactly that same
number.
I am proud of the way the Budget Committee has performed. The Budget
Committee had dozens of hearings and produced a responsible document,
one that restrains spending, one that did not contain a tax increase or
any delay in the scheduled tax cuts, but one that also called on the
Congress to put in place a circuitbreaker mechanism so that next year
it will be a responsibility of the Budget Committee to come before our
colleagues with a plan to stop the raid on Social Security.
The Budget Committee had more debt reduction than the President
proposed, less deficits than the President proposed and said that
additional tax cuts can be had, but they ought to be paid for, and to
put in place serious restraint on spending, not only for this year but
in the years following.
I am proud of that budget resolution. I am proud of the parts of it
that are before us now, that give our colleagues a real opportunity to
choose. Are we going to have a budget for this coming year and budget
caps for the next year? Are we going to have a continuation of the
budget disciplines that are critically important to keep this process
from spinning out of control or are we not? That is the choice that is
before the body.
I want to again thank my colleague from Wisconsin who has been a
valued member of the Budget Committee and who came to the floor with
something he negotiated on both sides of the aisle. I then became
involved with him in an effort and we have negotiated with many more
Members on both sides of the aisle. I think we have a responsible
package, and our colleagues are going to have a chance to vote in a few
moments. I hope they will carefully consider the implications of a
failure to pass this amendment.
I yield the floor, and I reserve the remainder of our time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
[[Page S5815]]
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, in this modern age, we are used to
revisionist history, but I have to say the debate we just heard is one
of the most extraordinary examples of revisionist history I have ever
heard. I am tempted to get into this debate about this wonderful budget
that when it was voted on not one Democrat voted for it and not one
Republican voted for it. That is a vote of confidence, or lack thereof,
which I have never witnessed before.
The budget that was rejected without a single vote in favor was a
budget that set taxes above the level requested by the President the
first year, the first 5 years, the first 10 years, and consistently
spent more money. In fact, it raided Social Security in the first year
more than the President's budget, even though it had taxes higher than
the level requested by the President because it increased spending by
over $13 billion. But that is an old debate. Why debate a budget that
was rejected unanimously?
Now we are on another debate, and it is a wonderful debate because we
have our colleagues who are saying we want to control spending, we are
worried about spending, and we need this budget to control spending.
There is only one problem. The budget increases spending. The budget
proposes spending $9 billion above what the President requested.
This amendment before us proposes spending $52 billion above last
year, and it does not stop with spending $9 billion more than the
President wants. That kind of budget constraint we have had a lot of.
It not only spends $9 billion more than the President wants, but it
allows $25.4 billion to be appropriated this year that won't count
until next year, what is called advanced appropriations. Last year, we
set a record in American history with $23 billion. This year, in this
amendment, we would condone in advance $25.4 billion, but that is not
the worst of it. We have had a budget provision that banned delayed
obligations.
Senator Domenici was a big proponent of this provision, as I
remember. This was to try to deal with this phony little game we play
by starting a program on the last day of the fiscal year and claiming
in the budget that it costs one-three hundred and sixty-fifth as much
as it really does, and then have it permanently in effect.
Interestingly enough, not only does this amendment spend $9 billion
more than the President requested, not only does it say you can spend
$25 billion more than that, it gets us back in the game of deferred
obligations by striking subsections (a) through (f), (h), and (i) of
House Concurrent Resolution 290. That is the section that deals with
deferred obligations.
This doesn't have to be belabored. This is not about controlling
spending. This is about spending. This is about force-feeding the
President and making the President take $9 billion more than he
requested, setting up a procedure where we will spend $25 billion more
than that, which will not count because it will be spent next year, and
then allowing us to get into the game of spending it, but deferring the
spending until a point where it doesn't count. This is an issue about
spending, and this point of order is about controlling spending.
The President has not been silent on this. Last night he spoke. I
will read what he said:
I know there's going to be some tough choices on these
appropriations bills, but I want to make sure that everybody
understands with clarity that the budget the House passed is
the limit of spending for the United States Congress.
If we adopt this amendment, we will be saying the President wants $9
billion less, but we are going to go on record saying we are going to
spend $9 billion more. I will be with the President on this issue.
Other Members will have to decide where they are.
We have a letter dated today from the OMB Director, and I will read
part of it:
It is my understanding that the Senate will continue
consideration today of two pending amendments regarding
budget enforcement--a Feingold amendment and a Reid/Conrad
amendment. I ask that you strongly oppose these amendments
and encourage your colleagues to oppose them as well.
Both amendments would lock in a spending cap that is much
too high--over $19 billion more than the President's budget
request.
Budget enforcement in Congress is vital and necessary but
enforcement at the wrong number could be even more
detrimental to our budget outlook.
Now, if we had not waived the budget last week, maybe I would take
this seriously. If 60 Members of this body had not last week voted to
waive the Budget Act to spend more money, maybe I would take this thing
seriously. But I don't take it seriously. We rejected making the death
tax permanent. This amendment would spend nine times as much money next
year as making the death tax penalty permanent would have cost.
Our colleagues do not have a nickel, they do not have a penny, to let
working people keep more of what they earn, but they have billions to
spend. They never, ever, have enough to let working people keep what
they earn, but they have always got plenty to spend.
This is an effort to bust the President's budget. This is an effort
to mandate that we set a budget $9 billion above the President's level.
This is a proposal that would let us back into the gimmick business on
deferred obligations. This is a budget that would let us advance
appropriate--which is spending money but not counting it until another
year--at a level unprecedented in American history. The President does
not want this. OMB has asked that we oppose it. I hope my colleagues
will oppose it. But I hope they will understand, whether they oppose it
or whether they support it, that this amendment is not about budget
control. This amendment is about spending, pure and simple. If you want
to spend more, you want this amendment.
Now, I am not saying it is going to be easy in the budget process not
having a budget. But we don't have a budget. We have not passed a
budget, and I don't believe we are going to see one brought to the
floor. People are proud of the budget resolution considered in the
Budget Committee, but not proud enough to bring it to the floor to
debate it, amend it, and vote on it.
The President has said he will veto appropriations that violate his
budget and the budget adopted by the House. What this amendment would
do would be to legitimize $9 billion in additional spending. That is
what it does.
Last week, we voted to waive the same points of order to spend money.
We have done it over and over again. What we are doing here is
legitimizing more spending. If you don't want to do it, you want to
vote and sustain this point of order. Those who want to waive the point
of order will have to have 60 votes. Maybe they have it. I pointed out
earlier, this is not going to become law. I don't think it ought to be
passed by the Senate. I don't think we ought to be slapping the
President of the United States in the face today.
When the President last night said he was going to hold the line on
his budget, to then turn around and do this is to say: You say you are
going to hold the line, but we are not going to let you do it.
Count me with the man. Count me with the President. That is what this
issue is about.
I hope when people cast this vote, they won't be confused. I hope
they will understand. This is not about budget points of order that we
just waived last week. This is not about process. This is about
spending $9 billion more spending next year, $25 billion more spending
above that in advanced appropriations, and an unlimited amount of
spending through a gimmick. I don't understand why people who support
the budget process, after all our effort to get rid of these delayed
obligations, can support this amendment. I am sure our colleagues
remember the games that were played where we started a program on
September 30 of a year so that it becomes law but you only count 1 day
of the spending. Why anybody could say this is about controlling
spending and could have an amendment that strikes the point of order on
deferred obligation, I don't understand. This is about spending, pure
and simple.
Don't be confused. If you are for spending, if you are against the
President, then vote to waive the budget point of order. But if you are
with the President, if you are against all this spending, if you think
it has to end somewhere, end it right here today. Let's stop this
process today. Do not add $9 billion more than the President asked
today. Do not spend $25 billion
[[Page S5816]]
beyond that in advanced appropriations today. And do not let Congress
back in the gimmick business today. Vote to sustain the point of order.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Carper). The Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as required.
The Senator from Texas knows very well that my goal in working on
this amendment has nothing to do with trying to upset the President's
budget. We have talked together, worked together on the Budget
Committee, and he knows exactly what I and other Members are trying to
do. We think there ought to be some rules, there ought to be some caps,
there ought to be some budget discipline. I don't think he could point
to one shred of information or comment I have made throughout the
months to suggest it has anything to do at all with trying to disrupt
the President.
I remember welcoming the comments of the OMB Director when he
suggested some aspects of what we were trying to do made sense. I will
work with anybody on this in order to get it done, because in the 10
years I have been in the Senate, we have had rules, we have had budgets
disciplines, and they have had good results. Sometimes when the
Democrats were in the majority, and sometimes when the Republicans were
in the majority, at least on this issue, I have seen this body
function, and function well, but only because there were caps, only
because there were rules and because there were enforcement mechanisms.
The Senator from Texas complains we are doing this outside of the
budget process. I agree with him. This is not the ideal way to do this.
But he knows why. He saw the efforts we made in the Budget Committee
and the difficulties we had. We could not get it done there. It is not
my idea to have to do it on the Defense bill.
The Senator says, even if the Senate were considering the budget
resolution, that the resolution could not have accomplished the
extension of the budget process that our amendment would do. But the
Senator from Texas knows that a budget resolution, unlike this one,
cannot constitutionally bind the President or his OMB. We have to pass
a law, not just a resolution to extend the Budget Act.
I would say nobody in the history of the Senate knows this better
than the Senator from Texas, who is very famous across this country for
passing statutes to control Government spending. A statute has much
more enforcement power than simply doing it on a budget resolution.
The Senator also suggests this is not going to go anywhere because
the House will not accept it. I certainly agree with my chairman,
Senator Conrad. The one thing that makes sure nothing happens is if we
do not do anything at all in the Senate. If we send a message to the
House that we do not need rules and disciplines, that is an invitation
to them to do nothing.
On the other hand, if we do something here, and even though the
Senator from Texas knows it is much less than I wanted to do at the
beginning, and less than he wanted to do, maybe it will put a little
pressure on the other body. Maybe they will hear from their
constituents, who will say: At least in the Senate they still believe
there ought to be some limits and some caps and some rules. Why don't
you folks in the House do the same thing?
If we do nothing, there is no pressure on them. As the chairman
indicated, if we at least put a marker down here, put something in this
bill that suggests some limits and some rules, we have a chance that
something will come through in a conference report that will achieve
bipartisan limitation on this.
We have now heard arguments about the levels in our amendment being
too high. We also heard arguments that they are too low. In this
respect the debate is taking on sort of the hallmarks of any debate to
set a level. There is always going to be disagreement about the amount.
But let's be clear about the amount in this 2-year period. The chairman
of the committee has indicated we have sought to use what I believe to
be the most neutral starting point. The number for 2003 is what the
Budget Committee reported. It is what we included in the Gregg-Feingold
amendment, for which 49 Senators voted, including the Senator from
Texas. On June 5, he voted for these exact 2-year limitations. I admit
there were 3 other years there on top of it, but he did vote for these
figures for those 2 years.
It is also the most neutral and most appropriate figure because it is
our best estimate, as the chairman has pointed out, of what the
President's budget request actually requires, what it really is when
you cut away the gimmicks and see what the real number is.
I think this is a consensus number that is reasonable. As the Senator
from Texas knows, he and I have worked together in various meetings to
try to have an even stronger budget process. We have tried to draft
amendments, and we reached agreement on a budget process amendment
that, had it been enacted, would have created powerful incentives to
reduce the deficit and further protect Social Security. I stood ready
and I stand ready to work with him to tighten fiscal discipline. In the
battle for fiscal responsibility, I want the Senator from Texas to know
I am and will be his ally.
But as the Senator from Texas also knows, we did not offer the
amendment we drafted. Now the question is, In the absence of that, in
the absence of a more perfect solution to the budget process, what will
we do?
We really only have a couple of choices. We can stand by and simply
do nothing or we can at least do this. That is the choice before the
Senate today. Nobody really believes there are going to be a lot of
real opportunities to do this in the future if we do not do it today.
I would prefer a stronger budget process. In fact, not only in
committee but on the floor I, with Senator Gregg, fought for a stronger
budget enforcement regime, and we offered our amendment to the
supplemental appropriations bill.
I voted with the Senators from Arizona and Texas when they sought to
limit spending on the supplemental appropriations bill. I stood ready,
and I continue to stand ready, to work with the Senator from Texas to
fight for the process changes that we worked on together. But the
amendment that Senator Gregg and I offered received only half of the
votes--it actually needed 60 to prevail.
The efforts to stop spending items on the supplemental appropriations
bill fell well short of a majority, and we have not offered the
amendment we worked on together.
So we face a very stark choice. We face the expiration of the budget
process. We have to face the question, Is the absence of a budget
process preferable to the 2-year extension of the existing process that
I and Chairman Conrad and Senator Cantwell and now Senator Domenici
offer today? Obviously, it most assuredly is not. Even though there are
imperfections in the existing budget process, it does provide some
budget discipline. It creates 60-vote hurdles for spending measures
that exceed the caps. It requires 60 votes to expand entitlements or
cut taxes without paying for the cuts.
These constraints have been a valuable force for consensus. They have
helped ensure the work we do in the Senate can garner the support of
three-fifths of the Senate, not just a bare majority. I think these are
useful bulwarks in the defense of the taxpayers' dollars.
Again, there could be better budget processes. After the adoption of
this amendment, if it is adopted, I will still join with others who
seek to advance further budget improvements. Even if this amendment is
adopted, nothing will stop the Senator from Texas from offering the
budget process on which he and I were working.
But at least let's draw the line. Let's at least prevent further
erosion of budget discipline. Let's seek further improvement where we
can, but let's at least ensure that things do not get worse.
The Senator from Texas may consider the amendment before the Senate
today to be half a loaf or maybe even less. I admit the amendment
before the Senate today is not perfect, but it is a far better result
than doing absolutely nothing, and that is where we are headed. Nothing
is what we will get if the Senate votes down this very modest attempt
at fiscal discipline.
I urge my colleagues to join at this barricade, if you will, this
last stand
[[Page S5817]]
this year for fiscal responsibility. I urge my colleagues, more than
anything else, to do this to defend the Social Security surplus. I urge
them to support this amendment.
How much time do we have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin has 12 minutes; the
Senator from Texas has just under 22 minutes.
Who yields time?
The Senator from Texas.
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, let me make clear I feel strongly about
this amendment, but I have profound respect for my colleague. I am a
longtime believer in the Jeffersonian thesis that good men, with the
same facts, are prone to disagree.
I point out the Gregg amendment that I voted for had 5 years of
budget numbers; not just the 2 years where the budget went up, but 3
years where it went down. So I thought, in terms of the whole package,
it was an improvement over nothing. But I do not think it is an
accident that this amendment has only the 2 years where spending goes
up.
Maybe I was not tending my business, but I do not think that the
Gregg amendment struck the provision on delayed obligations. If it did,
I was not aware of it, and I would stand to be corrected if anybody
corrected me.
I think the Gregg amendment left advanced appropriations untouched,
whereas this amendment increases them by $2.4 billion.
But ultimately, if we are talking about this being a consensus
product, there is one person who is not part of this consensus and that
is the President.
The President is taking a hard position, and, quite frankly, it is
about time. I love our President. I have known him for a long time. I
respect him. But I thought last year, in trying to work with both
parties and trying to bring a new environment of bipartisanship to
Washington, that he let Congress spend too much money. But it was a
price he was willing to pay to try to work with everybody and try to be
bipartisan. But our President is a Texan. And once you have slapped him
once or twice, then he begins to think maybe you mean to fight. The
bottom line is the President has said, I am going to limit spending to
the budget that I proposed, and to the aggregate number adopted in the
House. The amendment before us would add billions of dollars to that.
It would not only condone but basically justify $25.4 billion of
spending--in addition to the $9 billion I spoke of earlier--counted a
year later through a process called advanced appropriations. This would
be the highest level in American history.
Finally, to add insult to injury--and I asked somebody to explain to
me why it is in here--this amendment strikes the language on delayed
obligations. If people weren't meaning to cheat, why do they make it
legal? If people didn't expect to be in jail, why are they pulling the
bars out of the windows? If people aren't expecting to take advantage
of something we had stopped in the past, why are they taking the
prohibition against it out?
I do not know if my colleague from Oklahoma is aware of it, but the
amendment before us in part strikes our old language preventing delayed
obligation.
Our colleague will remember the bad old days when you wanted to fund
a great big old costly program but you didn't have the money in the
budget, so you started it on September 30--the last day of the fiscal
year. Then it cost only 1 day. It was just magic. You could spend 365
times as much money by just starting the program on the last day. We
finally wised up to that. We stopped it.
Now we have an amendment where our colleagues say they are trying to
stop spending. They are not for spending. They want to stop spending.
But yet they strike the language on delayed obligations, which is a
gimmick that has been used to spend billions of dollars.
I do not know how you could say they don't intend to do it when they
are legalizing it.
To sum up--because I know we have others who want to speak, including
my colleague from Oklahoma--this comes down to whether you are with the
President or you are with the spenders.
With all good intentions--I don't doubt good intentions on the other
side--the bottom line is that this amendment, if adopted, gives
credence to and gives cover to people who mean to bust the President's
budget in three ways: $9 billion on its face, $25.4 billion in advanced
appropriations, and then cheating with delayed obligation.
If you are with the President, if you are for fiscal restraint, if
you want to stop the spending spree in Washington, this is not the way
to do it.
I don't mind people making the best arguments they can. But I don't
think you can have it both ways. I don't think you can say this is
about fiscal restraint, and then say: Oh, by the way, we want to bust
the President's budget by adopting this.
I mean you have to be fish or fowl. You are either with the man or
you are against the man. I am with the man.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the Concord Coalition indicated today
that our amendment ``provides a strong and needed dose of fiscal
discipline.'' I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the complete
Concord Coalition statement appear in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
The Concord Coalition,
Washington, DC, June 20, 2002.
concord coalition supports budget enforcement amendment
Washington.--The Concord Coalition said today that the
Conrad-Feingold-Domenici bipartisan budget enforcement
amendment provides a strong and needed dose of fiscal
discipline. It sets new discretionary spending caps for two
years at tough but achievable levels, extends the pay-as-you-
go (paygo) requirement for entitlement expansions and tax
cuts, and renews important points of order that enforce
discipline.
The rapidly deteriorating budget outlook highlights the
importance of this amendment. With sudden speed, budget
deficits are back and the first time in several years there
is no clear agreed upon fiscal goal. As a result, open-ended
budgeting is back. Rather than setting priorities and making
hard choices, Congress and the President are falling back on
the old habit--cut taxes, increase spending, eat up the
Social Security surplus, and run up the debt. It's a
dangerous path to follow when looming just beyond the
artificial 10-year budget window are the huge unfunded
retirement and health care costs of the coming senior boom.
Restoring a sense of fiscal discipline--and eventually
returning to non-Social Security surpluses--is a very
difficult challenge. It is virtually impossible without the
type of enforcement mechanisms established in this amendment.
With the discretionary spending gaps, paygo, and vital
enforcement points of order scheduled to expire, the choice
for policymakers is whether to extend the current
mechanisms--and thus maintain a measure of fiscal
discipline--or to simply let the entire budget enforcement
framework expire and be left with renewed deficits and no
mechanism for enforcing fiscal discipline.
In Concord's view the choice is clear. Allowing caps,
paygo, and 60-vote points of order to expire is an open
invitation to fiscal chaos. The Concord Coalition strongly
commends and supports this bipartisan effort to restore
fiscal discipline to the budget process.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from
New Mexico.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, first of all, my good friend, Senator
Gramm, is doing exactly what good debaters do, except that I caught
him, so it won't work.
First of all, it is obvious on the point of the President's budget
and this budget that this isn't the President's budget, it is
Congress's budget. The President's budget is alive. The President's
veto powers are alive.
What we are trying to do is pass some constraints that Congress will
impose on itself in terms of entitlements, which have the opportunity
of going through the roof in hundreds of billions of dollars, between
now and October 1 and thereafter with no 60-vote point of order.
Down at the end of Pennsylvania Avenue, Mr. OMB Director, just get
the President ready when this Congress sends entitlement programs that
are going through the roof, because the 60 votes won't be available
here, and they will end up on your desk.
The Senator from Texas said it 10 times, but I will only say it once.
I am with the President. He is the best President we will have in
this century. When his first term is finished, that is what we will
begin saying about
[[Page S5818]]
him. But, Mr. President, do not be fooled by people who want you to get
involved in something in which you don't have to get involved. And you
lose no prerogatives; you keep all of them.
The second point is, when Senator Gramm loses his major argument, he
turns to another one. So he is up here about as loud as I speak talking
about this delayed obligation.
Let me tell Senator Gramm, just take another look at the late
obligations. First of all, it sunsets at the end of this year. So it
isn't around. It is literally not around.
Mr. GRAMM. Why didn't you extend it?
Mr. DOMENICI. I don't speak when you are speaking, Senator. Would you
mind?
Mr. GRAMM. All right.
Mr. DOMENICI. Would you mind acknowledging that you shouldn't be
speaking when I am speaking? I would appreciate it very much.
Mr. GRAMM. All right.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico has the floor.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, the second point is, for as long as we
have had this provision that he is now telling the President he is
going to lose, which provision I invented, we have never used it
because it can't be interpreted. We have never been able to interpret
what these words mean, which is now the real reason the President
should come down on us because we are getting rid of it. It never was
used. It will never be used. It is not interpretable. I knew that one
year after it was passed, and I considered getting rid of it because it
isn't necessary. It wouldn't be used.
My last point is a very simple one.
Fellow Senators, writing a budget resolution is essentially the work
of the Congress. The President is not bound by it. He loses no
authority. He can veto every bill that comes through here if it doesn't
meet what he wants. But I will tell you, fellow Senators, if you think
you can live within the President's budget with no problems, then I
suggest to you that you had better look at what is eliminated from the
budget: $1.2 billion for veterans' medical care, $1.2 billion for the
violent crime trust fund, and $1.7 billion for State and local
enforcement. They are not in his budget.
We will have to decide whether we are going to put them in and cut
something else. Nonetheless, this will not change the President's
prerogative to veto every single bill.
But, Mr. President--I am not speaking to you, Mr. President, but I am
speaking to the President down the street on Pennsylvania Avenue--if
something like this is not adopted, then remember this afternoon when
Senator Phil Gramm said there was an invitation to spend, and see what
you have when entitlement programs come down to your desk because they
passed up here 51 to 48, or 51 to 49 because there was no 60-vote point
of order to keep them from breaking the budget because we will not have
that protection unless this amendment is adopted.
I would say for an afternoon that it is a pretty good piece of change
for the American people and a pretty good way for the President to say,
I will veto, but I would rather not have all the entitlements coming up
here. Which entitlements? You know what they are. They have to do with
the various medical programs. They have to do with everything we are
going to be looking at for Medicaid reforms and Medicare reforms. Sixty
votes is not going to be applicable.
It seems to this Senator, Mr. President, that you ought to stick to
your work and to your veto authority, and you ought to let us do our
budget because we can help you a lot when we don't send you all the
entitlement bills.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, first of all, I am not telling the
President anything. The President was telling me. I read what the
President said last night. I am joining my voice with the President's,
but I am not speaking for the President.
Second, our problem is that the whole budget enforcement expired--not
just this one provision. We are extending the rest of it. We are not
extending this provision.
The bottom line is, this is about $9 billion. Senator Domenici says
we can't live within the President's budget. I believe we can live
within the President's budget. And the President has asked us to try.
Now, granted, the President can do whatever he wants to do. The
question is, Do Republican Senators want to vote to go on record for a
budget number that is $9 billion more than the President says he is
going to stand behind? I think that is why it comes down to the
question of whether you are with him or whether you are against him. I
am with him.
Mr. President, how much time do we have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas controls 14\1/2\
minutes.
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from
Oklahoma.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague from
Texas for his remarks. I will just make a comment. I see the chairman
of the Budget Committee is in the Chamber. Bring the budget to the
floor. I can tell you, my colleagues--who might have listened to my
very good friend, Senate Domenici, who says, let's vote for this
amendment--this amendment is going absolutely nowhere, even if it is
adopted--and it is not going to be adopted--because it is on the
Department of Defense bill, I tell my colleague.
It does not belong on the Department of Defense bill. I have urged
Senator Warner and Senator Levin that they should table this amendment.
It does not belong on this bill. Maybe we will make a budget point of
order it is a little higher--it does not belong on this bill.
I am on the Budget Committee. Let's bring the budget before the
Senate. Then we can have a good debate. Are we going to change points
of order? Are we going to change on whether or not you can have end-of-
year spending gimmicks that we have banned in the past, which evidently
this one-day budget is going to do? Are we going to reverse that? I
would like to know. I am on the Budget Committee.
I tell my good friend from Nevada, I believe the Senate procedures
should work. Now, for whatever reason, the majority has not decided to
call up the budget. So this is the second time that various Senators
have said: Well, let's do the budget on whatever authorization bill is
going through the Senate. That is not the way it should work. It is not
the way it has worked. I have been in the Senate for 22 years, and it
has never worked this way.
We have always passed the budget, and it has not been easy. I will
tell the majority, I know it is not easy. I will help them try to work
it. I want to see the Senate pass a budget. I do not happen to agree
with the majority's budget, but I will help to try to formulate the
process to go through the budget procedure to pass a budget. I believe
in it. But it does not belong on DOD authorization.
Let's just assume that it passed. I hope and I believe it will not,
but let's just assume that it passes. OK. So the Senate passes the
Senate budget--or part of the Senate budget, because I do not believe
this is the entire Senate budget. I do not think this is what passed
the Senate Budget Committee, which I serve on, and we spent a couple
days in markup. But we had lots and lots of hearings. It was a lot more
extensive.
I don't know the difference between this and what passed out of the
Senate Budget Committee, but I did not vote for it when it came out of
the Senate Budget Committee. But I know one thing: It doesn't belong on
the DOD authorization bill. I know my friends and colleagues from the
House, and they would say: Thank you very much. That is not going to be
accepted in conference. You have wasted your time--totally, completely.
Budgets have to pass both the House and the Senate if you want to
have a binding budget. It does not do any good just to pass it in the
Senate by one amendment on one day. That has no impact whatsoever. So
we are absolutely wasting our time.
I urge my colleagues--I urge the majority because this is not in the
minority's capability. The majority should bring this budget as passed
out of the Budget Committee and try to pass it
[[Page S5819]]
on the floor. That is what we should do. Instead, we have this game,
and it just happens to be the Democrats' budget. Obviously, the
President does not want it.
My Budget Committee staff tells me it is $21 billion higher than the
figure the President submitted. It is not a 1-year budget; it is a 2-
year budget. Wow. OK, it is $21 billion. We increased the amount you
can have on advanced appropriations, something that probably not three
people in the Senate really understand. But we are going to increase
that figure from $23 billion to $25 billion. Oh, we are going to do
that. Oh, now we are going to be changing the rules of the Senate
dealing with end of the year, beginning new programs, delayed
obligations. Oh, we are changing that.
Wait a minute. I say, if we are going to do all these things, let's
do it on a budget. Then, when we eventually pass it--it may not have my
vote--but when we eventually pass it, it goes to the conference with
the House, with budget conferees, not with DOD conferees. DOD conferees
in the House would laugh this off: We don't agree with that. It is
dropped.
The President is against it. He would say he would veto it if it is
in the DOT authorization bill. It has no business being in DOD
authorization.
We have to learn in the Senate at some point to have a little
discipline and say, when we are going to bring up the DOD authorization
bill, we are going to stay on DOD. That means the managers of the bill
have to table nongermane amendments. That means the majority has to
bring up a budget in a timely manner, which the law says we are
supposed to bring up and pass by April 15. And now we are past June 15,
and we have not had the budget brought up on the floor.
The majority needs to bring it up. It does not belong on this bill.
It is not going to be included in this bill, I hope. I believe a budget
point of order will be sustained. It takes 60 votes to pass it, as it
should, because the budget statute says it has to come out of the
Budget Committee, not to be done on DOD authorization. Oh, we are going
to have Senator Warner and Senator Levin be the conferees on the
budget? It is not going to happen. We are wasting our time.
I am embarrassed for the Senate and the way this Senate is being run,
the fact that we did not bring up a budget. And then some people say:
Well, we will take pieces of it and put it on DOD authorization. That
is absurd. And it just happens to be a couple of pieces that say: Oh,
we are going to spend billions of dollars more than the President
anticipated.
I will be happy to consider pay-go. I will be happy to consider a lot
of different things that are in the germane jurisdiction of the Budget
Committee on a budget resolution. But to do it on DOD authorization, I
think, is just a total, complete waste of time.
The point of order that it does not belong on this bill is exactly
right. I am sure--and I hope--that our colleagues will sustain that
point of order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the Senator from Oklahoma argues that we
should not have brought up this amendment on this bill.
This bill authorizes appropriations for the majority of appropriated
spending. It may well be the largest spending bill we consider this
year. So I think it is absolutely appropriate to consider the total
amount of appropriate spending on this bill.
Mr. NICKLES. Will my colleague yield for a question?
Mr. FEINGOLD. For a question.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. NICKLES. I respect my colleague from Wisconsin. I have agreed
with him on many issues dealing with fiscal matters.
Wouldn't you agree we should have a budget resolution that passed the
Senate Budget Committee for consideration by both Democrats and
Republicans so we would go through the budget procedure as we have
always done for the last 20-some years?
Mr. FEINGOLD. It would be great to have a budget resolution, but far
more important, far more useful is a statute to guarantee that these
caps and enforcement mechanisms exist to bind both Houses, a mechanism
that is actually the law of the land.
So this is far more important. This is an appropriate vehicle to do
it.
Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from
North Dakota.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota is recognized.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, how much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Five minutes remains for the Senator from
North Dakota.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I say to my colleague, the Senator from
Oklahoma, that the Senator from Oklahoma argues against himself. He
gives advances as a reason to oppose putting it on this measure, that
it will never pass both Houses, and that a budget has to pass both
Houses.
I say to my colleague, one of the key reasons we have not brought the
budget resolution to the floor is because the House passed a 5-year
budget when the requirement of the law is a 10-year budget. The
President submitted a 10-year budget. We passed a 10-year budget
through the Senate Budget Committee. The House passed a 5-year budget,
even though they cut taxes and committed to spending money outside the
5-year window.
In addition to that, they used rosy scenario forecasts.
Mr. NICKLES. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. CONRAD. I will not yield.
They used an estimate of Medicare expenses in the House that says
Medicare is going to rise at the lowest percentage in the history of
the program.
Now, how are we ever going to reconcile a 10-year budget in the
Senate, which is what the law requires, with a 5-year budget in the
House, when we used Congressional Budget Office estimates, which we are
supposed to do, and they used Office of Management Budget estimates
because it made it easier for them to cover up the raid on Social
Security in which they were engaged?
That is a fundamental reason that we have passed a budget resolution
through the committee and not brought it to the floor because we know
we would spend a week of the Senate's time and never be able to
reconcile with the House because they have adopted rosy scenario
forecasts, and they have adopted a 5-year budget when a 10-year budget
is required.
Mr. NICKLES. Will the Senator yield for a quick question?
Mr. CONRAD. No, I will not yield.
We hear, over and over, this is more money than the President's
budget. Well, the President's budget is exactly the same amount as in
this amendment. The President called for $768 billion in discretionary
spending. It is true, we did not adopt his policy. There is a $9
billion difference because he wanted to transfer money from mandatory
spending to discretionary.
Do you know what he wanted to transfer? He wanted to transfer the
cost of Federal employees' retirement and claim it was discretionary
rather than mandatory. I have not found anybody who thinks that is a
wise policy. Clearly, it is required that we pay the retirement costs
of Federal employees. That is not discretionary.
The fact is, the President's discretionary number is exactly the same
as the number we have. We didn't adopt his policy, but that is his
number.
Now, let's look, in comparison, to last year. Last year we spent $710
billion in discretionary. These are the increases: $45 billion for
defense, every penny of it requested by the President; $5.4 billion in
homeland security, every penny requested by the President. The only
difference is $7 billion, the difference between last year and this
year, that is going to other things. All of the rest of the increase is
for defense and homeland security, every dollar requested by the
President.
There is $7 billion more, 1 percent, for all the rest of Government.
That doesn't even keep pace with inflation. Between 2003 and 2004, we
are capping spending at $786 billion, an $18 billion increase, a 2-
percent increase, for total discretionary spending by the Federal
Government. That does not even keep pace with inflation, either. For
those who say this is spending, spending, that doesn't pass the laugh
test. This is a cap on spending, a cap on spending at the same number
the President proposed, a cap on spending for the second year that
allows a 2-percent increase
[[Page S5820]]
for all of domestic spending. That is defense, parks, law enforcement--
all the rest.
The fact is, without this amendment passing, there will be no budget.
There will be no budget disciplines. They expire on September 30. That
is the reality.
This is a choice that really matters. I reserve the remainder of my
time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 20 seconds remaining. Who
yields time?
Mr. GRAMM. How much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas has 8 minutes 25
seconds.
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, first, I want to respond. Our dear
colleague from North Dakota said that the President submitted a budget
that actually cut some programs. Can you imagine it? Can you imagine
it? In $2 trillion of spending, the President was able to find some low
priority items so that when a vicious set of terrorists attacked and
killed thousands of our people we could redirect some of that money.
Our colleagues are shocked. In fact, our colleagues can give you 100
taxes that they are willing to raise. They can give you dozens of tax
cuts they are willing to take back. But they can't give you one
Government program that they are willing to cut. And they are stunned
that in a $2 trillion Government, the President was able to come up
with about $10 billion of things that we might defer or do without so
we could instead grab a few terrorists by the throat and break their
necks.
I am not stunned. I am proud. We are the only people in the world who
never set a priority, who never had to make a hard choice. The
President is willing to make choices. That is one of the reasons I am
supporting the President.
It is true that this amendment before us does have some things from
the budget resolution considered in committee. But basically three of
the things are things that spend more money. The President said last
night and the OMB Director wrote us this morning, asking us to oppose
this amendment to help the President hold the line on spending. That is
what this issue is about.
It is not just about $9 billion that our colleagues want to spend and
the President doesn't want to spend. It is also about $25 billion more
spending now that won't count until next year. And then there is the
whole issue about this delayed obligation where you can play these
games when you start a program.
It is true that the amendment before us has some support, but when I
look at the President's position and when I look at the position before
us, if our colleagues had offered the President's number without this
delayed obligation and without the $25 billion of spending that doesn't
count until next year, I would have voted for it. I would have been a
cosponsor of it. But it spends $9 billion more than the President
wants. He is pretty adamant about it. It opens up a floodgate for
advanced appropriations where we spend it now so that when next year
comes we say, we can't possibly hold the line on spending because we
have already committed to spend part of it. Only Government could get
away with that. No person in the real world could possibly get away
with that.
The issue before us is, Are you with the man, or are you against the
man? The President asked us to hold the line on spending. He asked us
to enforce his budget. Now are we going to go on record and say: Thank
you, Mr. President, we appreciate your letting us know what you think,
but we are going to raise spending $9 billion above what you want
whether you like it or not? That is not part of any budget. It is part
of a 2-year deal where we increase spending, but it really boils down
to that.
I raised a point of order. So the question is, Are there 60 Members
of the Senate willing to say to the President: We are going to
basically commit ourselves and condone $9 billion of spending you
didn't ask for? Or are we going to stand with the President.
I urge my colleagues, this is a good day to start fiscal
responsibility. This is a good day to start saying no to business as
usual in Washington, DC.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
The Republican leader.
Mr. LOTT. Parliamentary inquiry: Do we have an agreement to get the
vote at 3 on this issue?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three is correct.
Mr. LOTT. How much time remains on each side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three and a half minutes controlled by the
Senator from Texas; 21 seconds controlled by the Senator from
Wisconsin.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I yield myself some time out of my leader
time to comment on this issue.
First, this situation has been caused by the fact that we don't have
a budget resolution. I think that is very unfortunate. Ordinarily, we
try to get a budget resolution by April 15 or as soon thereafter as
possible. Usually we get one done by May. Here we are in June. We have
not heard anything about when it might come up. Apparently it never
will. That presents us problems in terms of what is the aggregate cap,
what are the enforcement mechanisms that we are going to use to try to
control spending, keep it within some reasonable amount.
I also recognize without these caps, some orderly disposition to the
subcommittees, it is going be very difficult to hold the line when
these various appropriations bills come to the floor.
I don't know when that might be. We need to get going on the
appropriations bills. Usually in June we do anywhere between two and
five appropriations bills. Then in July we usually do anywhere between,
I guess, five and as many as nine. Right now I see none anywhere in
sight. We have done a supplemental after a very difficult time. It is
not clear when we will get going on appropriations.
I believe the House is going to pass the Defense appropriations bill
and then the military construction appropriations bill before the
Fourth of July recess. So that will begin the process. That is good.
I think to do this number and this procedure on this bill at this
time is a mistake. First, this is the Defense authorization bill. You
need some vehicle on which to put this. If not here, then where,
somebody might ask. But now that this door is open, we are being
advised that we are going to have all kinds of nongermane amendments on
the Defense authorization bill. I had been pleading with Senator
Daschle to call this issue up. And to his credit, he did. He could have
gone to other issues, but he did the right thing and moved to Defense
authorization.
Now we will be off on a discussion of taxes and Mexican trucks and
perhaps an abortion amendment. I am hearing all kinds of things. At
some point we will have to get back to Defense authorization
itself. That is point No. 1. I believe this is the wrong place to do
it.
Secondly, while the mechanisms have been improved--there is a
firewall in here now, and also some clarification with regard to
advanced appropriations--the number, 768, is still a problem. That is
about $9 billion above the President's request. Some people maintain--
and I am sure it has been maintained--we are going to have to have more
than what was asked for in the original budget as we try to move to a
conclusion this year. Somebody even said: ``You are fighting over
twosies and threesies here.'' It is $2 billion here, or $3 billion for
the supplemental, and $9 billion there. Pretty soon, all those billions
add up to real money.
So while I understand what we are trying to accomplish, I am
concerned about how we go forward from here. I think the number is
still too high. I think this is the wrong bill on which to be putting
this. It is similar to the debt ceiling. If we are going to do this,
probably we need to do it clean. That won't be easy. But a lot of
people were shocked that we were able to move the debt ceiling the way
we did in a bipartisan vote; 15 or so Democrats voted with most of the
Republicans. We didn't do a budget resolution, and I think that is a
travesty, but we are going to have to come to some agreement on how we
proceed and how we get to a conclusion at the end of this fiscal year.
My urgent plea is that we look for a number that is closer to what
the President and his advisers have indicated they could accept.
With that, I yield the floor.
[[Page S5821]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. CONRAD. How much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin controls 21
seconds.
Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield that remaining time to the Senator from North
Dakota.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, we cannot very well have it both ways. You
can't, on the one hand, decry not having budget discipline and a
budget, and, on the other hand, oppose those very provisions. That is
what this vote is about. It is a budget and it is budget discipline
provisions. They are critically needed. I hope colleagues will support
it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I believe my colleague is right on one
point. You can't have it both ways. You can't say I am for fiscal
restraint and then say we are going to make the President take $9
billion he doesn't want.
I think this boils down to a question, Are you with the President or
are you against him? The President asked us to hold the line on
spending. I am with the President, and therefore I am going to vote
against waiving the budget point of order. I urge my colleagues to do
the same.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion.
The Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr.
Helms) is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Nelson of Florida). Are there any other
Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?
The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 59, nays 40, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 159 Leg.]
YEAS--59
Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Byrd
Cantwell
Carnahan
Carper
Chafee
Cleland
Clinton
Collins
Conrad
Corzine
Daschle
Dayton
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feingold
Feinstein
Graham
Gregg
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
McCain
Mikulski
Miller
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Reed
Reid
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Shelby
Snowe
Stabenow
Stevens
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden
NAYS--40
Allard
Allen
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Cochran
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Ensign
Enzi
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gramm
Grassley
Hagel
Hatch
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Santorum
Sessions
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Specter
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner
NOT VOTING--1
Helms
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 59, the nays are
40. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn not having voted
in the affirmative, the motion is rejected. The point of order is
sustained. The amendment falls.
Mr. GRAMM. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. NICKLES. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DOMENICI. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum
call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DOMENICI. I ask to speak for 1 minute.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DOMENICI. I worked very hard this afternoon and today for what I
thought was the right approach. I am back on board, and I will do
everything I can to see that we keep some process and there is some
order for the remainder of the year in getting our work done.
I thank you very much.
Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, has the Pastore rule run its course?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, it has.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I speak out of order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
(The remarks of Senator Byrd are printed in today's Record under
``Morning Business.''
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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