[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 83 (Thursday, June 20, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5795-S5797]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        THE PIECES TO THE PUZZLE

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the Chair for that clarification. 
I have sought recognition this morning to express my concern that the 
legislation submitted by the President for homeland security submitted 
two days ago to the Congress does not meet the critical need for 
collection and analysis of intelligence information in one place.
  Each day there are new disclosures of key information, information 
which was known prior to September 11, 2001. If it had been activated 
and put together with other information, this might well have prevented 
the September 11 attack.
  This morning's Washington Post has as its major story, in the upper 
right-hand corner, ``NSA Intercepts On Eve of 9/11 Sent a Warning.'' 
The first sentence reads:

       The National Security Agency intercepted two messages on 
     the eve of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center 
     and the Pentagon warning that something was going to happen 
     the next day.

  If that information had been put together with other information 
which was in the files of Federal intelligence agencies but not focused 
on, there would have been, I think, an emerging picture providing a 
warning, not just connecting dots, but a picture which was pretty 
obvious when all of the pieces were put together.
  The FBI had the now-famous Phoenix report, which had been submitted 
in July 2001 by the Phoenix office, telling about aeronautical training 
to people with backgrounds which indicated potential terrorist 
leanings, aeronautical students with a large picture of Osama bin Laden 
in their room and a background which would have supported the inference 
that those students in training might well have been put up to 
something. If that had been put together with the confession that was 
obtained by a Pakistani terrorist known as Abdul Hakim Murad in 1996, 
who had connections with al-Qaida, when he told of plans to attack the 
CIA headquarters in Washington by plane and to fly into the White 
House, there might have been a pretty sharp focus, especially if linked 
to the information which had been developed by the FBI field office in 
Minneapolis, that there was a man named Zacarias Moussaoui, who had 
terrorist connections to al-Qaida, and that plans were being developed 
and that he was actually to be the twentieth hijacker.
  That information never came to full fruition because of a failure of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to move the matter forward for a 
warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
  The Judiciary Committee heard testimony from special agent Coleen 
Rowley about the difficulties of dealing with the FBI, which requires a 
standard not in accordance with the law, 51 percent, more probable than 
not where the standard of a warrant does not require that. Had 
Moussaoui's computer been examined, it would have provided a virtual 
blueprint for what was about to happen.
  These are very glaring and fundamental defects in our intelligence 
system. They have existed for a very long time. We have had a situation 
where the Director of Central Intelligence, who is supposed to be in 
charge of all intelligence, does not have key components of the 
intelligence apparatus under his wing. For example, he does not have 
access to the National Reconnaissance Office. He does not have 
unfettered access to the National Security Agency, the National Imagery 
and Mapping Agency, and certain special Navy units. This is a 
deficiency which has gone on for a long time.
  When I chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee during the 104th 
Congress, I introduced Senate bill 1718. That bill was designed to 
correct the deficiency that the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, who nominally and in the public view had access to all of the 
intelligence information, but, in fact, did not have it. My bill, S. 
1718, is only one of many efforts which are currently underway, efforts 
which are currently under consideration by the White House. However, 
there is strong opposition by the Department of Defense and opposition 
by others. I am not characterizing it necessarily as a turf battle. It 
is a battle which has its origin in the concerns of some in the 
Department of Defense that the Department of Defense has the 
responsibility to fight a war and needs access to all of these 
intelligence matters; that is unique control.
  The reality is that a structure can be worked out so the Department 
of Defense is not deprived of access to any of this information in time 
of war or at any time. However, the Director of Central Intelligence 
ought to have it in one coordinated place.
  Now, when you create a Department of Homeland Security, it is 
obviously very difficult to touch upon matters on the broader picture. 
That is something that must be done and which must be addressed. When 
this matter was considered, I raised some of these issues in a meeting 
which Senators had with the White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card and 
Homeland Security Advisor, Governor Ridge. Recently, there have been 
additional meetings at the staff level, working together with the White 
House staff extensively, one of which was last Friday afternoon. During 
that meeting, my staff made a specific proposal that on the Department 
of Homeland Security, there should be a repository in one place to 
gather all of this information. The suggestion which we submitted was 
that there should be a national terrorism assessment center, a concept 
developed by someone who is very experienced in intelligence affairs, 
Charles Battaglia, who spent years in the CIA, as well as the Navy, and 
who served as majority staff director for the Intelligence Committee 
during my tenure as chairman during the 104th Congress.
  The Battaglia proposal to establish a national terrorism assessment 
center, in my opinion, goes right to the mark. It would be staffed by 
analysts who would come from the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency, 
the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the National Reconnaissance 
Office, and a listing of other Federal agencies, including the State 
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which would have 
access to all of this information.

  The bill, which was submitted by the President two days ago to 
establish the Department of Homeland Security, I say respectfully, does 
not meet this core critical ingredient. For example, referring to 
intelligence staff, the President's proposal provides at section 201: 
The Secretary may obtain such material by request.
  Mr. President, that is hardly the authority that the Secretary of 
Homeland Defense needs to do his job. If he has to ask somebody in 
Washington, DC, for something, it is an enormous uncertainty as to 
whether he will get it. In fact, it is more probable than not that he 
will not get it. There is a long trail around here to get information 
from anyone. I have seen that in detail in my time trying to conduct 
oversight on the FBI or in conducting oversight when I chaired the 
Intelligence Committee. That information just is not forthcoming.
  The President's bill further provides that the Secretary may enter 
into ``cooperative arrangements with other executive agencies to share 
such material.'' Whether or not there will be such arrangements entered 
into, and whether the other executive agencies will be agreeable to 
that, is highly uncertain.
  The time has long since passed to leave it to the discretion of a 
large variety of the Federal bureaucrats as to what they will do on 
intelligence. The time has come for the Congress of the United States 
in legislation signed by the President to establish central authority 
in one place, under one roof, to collect all the information which is 
available. To do any less is dereliction of our duty. That has not been 
done. The intelligence community has been stumbling along. America 
stumbled into September 11 because this Congress had not undertaken the 
approach with the strength to resolve all of these jurisdictional 
disputes and see to

[[Page S5796]]

it that this information was under one roof.
  The Congress of the United States has a fundamental responsibility to 
provide for the security of the United States. When the Judiciary 
Committee conducts hearings and finds out that the FBI does not have 
the procedures in place to know what is in the Phoenix report on a 
potential terrorist with Osama bin Laden's picture on his wall, when 
the Judiciary Committee commits oversight and finds out that the FBI 
Minneapolis office cannot get headquarters to request a warrant under 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act because they are applying the 
wrong standard, when the Intelligence Committee conducts oversight on 
the Director of Central Intelligence and finds his authority lacking 
because he does not know what many other intelligence agencies are 
collecting, and when the National Security Agency has on the eve of 
September 11 specific warnings and these pieces are not put together, 
the time has come to act.
  On this legislation, we ought to move ahead with a national terrorism 
assessment center. This information, as I noted earlier, was 
communicated by my staff to the White House staff. We did not have it 
prepared in time, but we had it this week in draft form. However, the 
matter is now before the Congress.
  For the information of my colleagues, I ask unanimous consent that 
this draft proposal be printed in the Congressional Record. It is by no 
means a finished product, however it might be of some help as we move 
ahead with hearings on this very important subject in the Congress.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
     Amendment No.--

   (Purpose: To provide the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
    Security with timely and objective intelligence assessments on 
   terrorism and actionable intelligence essential to carry out the 
 Secretary's duties as assigned, and to refocus the efforts of Federal 
 law enforcement (including the FBI) on the collection, analysis, and 
          dissemination of intelligence related to terrorism)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. ____. NATIONAL TERRORISM ASSESSMENT CENTER.

       (a) Establishment.--There is established the National 
     Terrorism Assessment Center (in this section referred to as 
     the ``NTAC''), to provide--
       (1) the Department of Homeland Security with the authority 
     to direct the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other officers of 
     Federal agencies to provide the NTAC with all intelligence 
     and information relating to threats of terrorism; and
       (2) the means for intelligence from all sources to be 
     analyzed, synthesized, and disseminated to Federal, State, 
     and local agencies as considered appropriate by the 
     Secretary.
       (b) Duties of the NTAC.--The NTAC shall--
       (1) direct the Director of Central Intelligence, the 
     Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other 
     officers of Federal agencies to provide the NTAC with all 
     intelligence and information relating to threats of 
     terrorism;
       (2) synthesize and analyze information and intelligence 
     from Federal, State, and local agencies and sources;
       (3) disseminate intelligence to Federal, State, and local 
     agencies to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption, 
     and response to terrorism;
       (4) refer, through the Secretary of Homeland Security, to 
     the appropriate law enforcement or intelligence agency, 
     intelligence and analysis requiring further investigation or 
     action; and
       (5) perform other related and appropriate duties, as 
     assigned by the Secretary.
       (c) Management of the NTAC.--
       (1) In general.--The NTAC shall be under the operational 
     control of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
     Security, who shall evaluate the performance of personnel 
     assigned to the NTAC.
       (2) Director.--
       (A) Appointment.--The NTAC Director shall be a senior 
     officer of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and appointed 
     by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security from 
     candidates recommended by the Director of the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation.
       (B) Duties.--The Director of the NTAC shall--
       (i) ensure that the law enforcement, immigration, and 
     intelligence databases information systems containing 
     information relevant to homeland security are compatible; and
       (ii) with respect to the functions under this subparagraph, 
     ensure compliance with Federal laws relating to privacy and 
     intelligence information.
       (3) Deputy director.--The NTAC Deputy Director shall be a 
     senior officer of the Central Intelligence Agency and 
     appointed by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
     Security from candidates recommended by the Director of 
     Central Intelligence.
       (d) Staffing of the NTAC.--
       (1) In general.--The NTAC shall be staffed by analysts 
     assigned by--
       (A) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
       (B) the Central Intelligence Agency;
       (C) the National Security Agency;
       (D) the Defense Intelligence Agency;
       (E) the National Imagery and Mapping Agency;
       (F) the National Reconnaisance Office;
       (G) the Department of Energy;
       (H) the Department of Homeland Security;
       (I) the Department of the Treasury;
       (J) the Department of Justice;
       (K) the Department of State; and
       (L) any other Federal agency, as determined by the 
     Secretary in consultation with the President or the 
     President's designee.
       (2) Additional staffing.--The Secretary may also require 
     the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Customs Service, 
     Coast Guard, Secret Service, Border Patrol, and other 
     subordinate agencies to assign additional employees to the 
     NTAC.
       (3) Administrative support.--Administrative support to 
     employees assigned to the NTAC from other agencies shall be 
     provided by such agencies.
       (e) Authority To Employ Personnel and Consultants.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may, 
     without regard to the civil service laws, employ and fix the 
     compensation of such personnel and consultants, including 
     representatives from academia, as the Secretary considers 
     appropriate in order to permit the Secretary to discharge the 
     responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security.
       (2) Personnel security standards.--The employment of 
     personnel and consultants under paragraph (1) shall be in 
     accordance with such personnel security standards for access 
     to classified information and intelligence as the Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall establish for purposes of this 
     subsection.
       (f) Tour of Duty Requirement.--
       (1) Senior intelligence service.--Title III of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 409a) is amended by inserting 
     after section 303 the following:


               ``promotion to senior intelligence service

       ``Sec. 304. An employee of an element of the intelligence 
     community may not be promoted to a position in the Senior 
     Intelligence Service until the employee has served 1 or more 
     tours of duty, aggregating not less than 24 months, in a 
     nonacademic position in 1 or more other elements of the 
     intelligence community.''.
       (2) Senior executive service for employees of fbi.--Chapter 
     33 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
     after section 536 the following:

     ``Sec. 536A. Promotion to Senior Executive Service

       ``(a) An employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     may not be promoted to a position in the Senior Executive 
     Service until the employee has served 1 or more tours of 
     duty, aggregating not less than 24 months, in a non-academic 
     position in 1 or more other elements of the intelligence 
     community.
       ``(b) In this section, the term `element of the 
     intelligence community' means an element of the intelligence 
     community specified by or designated under section 3(4) of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''.
       (3) Technical and conforming amendments.--
       (A) Senior intelligence service.--The table of sections for 
     the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting 
     after the item relating to section 303 the following:

``304. Promotion to Senior Intelligence Service.''.
       (B) Senior executive service for employees of fbi.--The 
     table of sections at the beginning of chapter 33 of title 28, 
     United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 536 the following:

``536A. Promotion to Senior Executive Service.''.
       (4) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection 
     shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act, and 
     shall apply with respect to promotions that occur on or after 
     that date.
       (g) Access of Director of Central Intelligence to 
     Intelligence Collected by Intelligence Community.--Section 
     104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(h) Access to Intelligence.--(1) The Director shall have 
     full and complete access to any intelligence collected by an 
     element of the intelligence community that the Director 
     requires in order to discharge the responsibilities of the 
     Director under section 103.
       ``(2) The head of each element of the intelligence 
     community shall take appropriate actions to ensure that such 
     element complies fully with the requirement in paragraph 
     (1).''.
       (h) Electronic Networking of Intelligence Data.--As soon as 
     practicable after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
     Director of Central Intelligence shall implement a program to 
     provide for the full interconnection by electronic means of 
     the intelligence databases of the intelligence community in

[[Page S5797]]

     order to ensure the ready accessibility by all elements of 
     the intelligence community of intelligence and other 
     information stored in such databases.

  Mr. SPECTER. I yield the floor.

                          ____________________