[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 81 (Tuesday, June 18, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5687-S5689]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        DEMISE OF THE ABM TREATY

  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, as we have recently passed June 13, I 
want to discuss the demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile ABM Treaty 
that ceased to exist after that date. I believe it is important to help 
a record of how this important treaty was brought to its end.
  The ABM Treaty was signed by President Nixon in 1972 with the Soviet 
Union as an important element of U.S.-Soviet arms control and strategic 
stability. It served to prevent an arms race in defensive weapons that 
would have led to larger offensive nuclear missile forces. It thus 
helped pave the way for negotiated limits and reductions in strategic 
arms. It was supported by every U.S. President until President George 
W. Bush, including Presidents Ford, Reagan and the first President 
Bush.
  The ABM Treaty affected only defenses against long-range, or 
strategic, ballistic missiles, those missiles with ranges of 5,500 
kilometers or more. It has no effect on defenses against missiles of 
shorter ranges, which are the only missiles that endanger our troops 
and allies today, and against which we have designed and built the 
Patriot theater missile defense system and helped develop Israel's 
Arrow missile defense system.
  Both the United States and the Soviet Union saw this treaty as a 
central component of their efforts to ensure mutual security. Russia, 
like the Soviet Union before it, saw the ABM Treaty as one of the 
foundations for the structure of arms control and security arrangements 
that had been carefully built over three decades to reduce the risk of 
nuclear war.
  As late as June 2000, at their Moscow summit, President Clinton and 
President Putin issued a joint statement emphasizing the importance of 
the ABM Treaty. That statement said the two Presidents ``agree on the 
essential contribution of the ABM Treaty to reductions in offensive 
forces, and reaffirm their commitment to that treaty as a cornerstone 
of strategic stability.'' It also stated that ``The Presidents reaffirm 
their commitment to continuing efforts to strengthen the ABM Treaty and 
to enhance its viability and effectiveness in the future, taking into 
account any changes in the international security environment.''
  Last December 13, President Bush announced that the United States 
would unilaterally withdrawn from the treaty. The treaty permits either 
side to withdraw from the treaty upon six months notice if either side 
decides that ``extraordinary events related to the subject matter of 
this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.''
  Although President Bush and members of his administration said they 
would try to modify the treaty to permit the development, testing and 
deployment of a limited National Missile Defense system, in the end 
they did not offer an amendment to the Russians.
  When he was campaigning for the presidency, then-Governor Bush gave a 
speech at The Citadel on September 23, 1999, in which he stated the 
following: ``we will offer Russia the necessary amendments to the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty--an artifact of the Cold War confrontation.'' 
He went on to say: ``If Russia refuses the changes we will give prompt 
notice, under the provisions of the Treaty, that we can no longer be a 
party to it.''
  That seems to be a clear and straightforward position. Candidate Bush 
said that the United States would offer amendments to the Russians to 
modify the treaty so as to permit the deployment of missile defense 
systems, and if Russia refused the amendments the President would 
withdraw the United States from the treaty.
  But the administration didn't propose any amendments to the treaty 
that would permit it to remain in effect in a modified form that, in 
turn, would have permitted the testing and deployment of limited 
missiles defenses.
  Instead, we tried to sell Russia on the idea of abandoning the 
treaty, not modifying it. That was something the Russians were never 
going to accept.
  Last year it was difficult to get a clear answer from the 
administration on its missile defense plans for fiscal year 2002, and 
whether they would be inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. First, 
Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, director of the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Organization told us in June that he knew of no planned missile 
defense testing activities that would conflict with the treaty.
  Later in June, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld told us he didn't know 
whether there would be a conflict because, even after the budget had 
been submitted to Congress, the missile defense program was undecided.
  Then in July, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz said that our 
planned missile defense activities would inevitably ``bump up'' against 
the treaty in a manner of months, not years. He also said that by the 
time a planned missile defense activity encounters ABM Treaty 
constraints, ``we fully hope and intend to have reached an 
understanding with Russia'' on a new security framework with Russia 
that would include missile defenses.
  Next came an announcement on October of last year by Secretary 
Rumsfeld that several planned missile defense tests were being 
postponed because they could have violated the treaty, even though one 
of the tests had already been postponed previously for entirely 
different technical reasons.
  Finally, the President announced on December 13th that the United 
States would unilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty to permit 
testing and development of missile defenses, something Deputy Secretary 
Wolfowitz had previously called a ``less than optimal'' choice.
  During all months of discussions and negotiations with the Russians 
we never heard details of any amendments proposed by the United States 
to modify the permit limited missile defenses. At the end we didn't 
offer an amendment to the treaty.
  Secretary of State Colin Powell acknowledged this fact in a letter 
dated May 2, 2002 after I wrote him in January to ask whether the 
United States had, in fact, ever presented Russia with any proposed 
amendments or modifications to the treaty. ``The direct answer to your 
question,'' wrote Secretary Powell, ``is that we did not table a 
proposed amendment to the ABM Treaty.''
  The administration has made much of the argument that the ABM Treaty 
was the reason we could not develop and test missile defense 
technologies adequately, and thus the treaty was keeping us defenseless 
against ballistic missiles.
  Madam President, now that the ABM Treaty has ceased to exist, I 
expect the administration to assert that they are finally free to make 
unconstrained progress toward defenses against long-range ballistic. As 
one example, they plan to begin construction of a missile

[[Page S5688]]

defense test facility in Alaska, even though that would have been 
permitted under the treaty. Congress authorized this construction last 
year, and they could have begun construction while the treaty was still 
in force. I expect they will also start to conduct a number of tests 
that would not have been permitted under the treaty, but which will not 
significantly advance the state of missile defense technology in the 
near term.
  All this may make good political theater, but it will not suddenly 
make possible rapid progress toward effective missile defenses because 
it wasn't the treaty that was preventing such progress; If these 
technologies prove workable, it will still take many years of rigorous 
development, integration, testing, and refinement, and probably 
hundreds of billions of dollars, to produce operationally effective 
missile defenses--even without the ABM Treaty.
  And or course, even if they prove to be technologically feasible and 
affordable, limited missile defenses still could be readily overwhelmed 
or spoofed by decoys and countermeasures that Russia or China might 
develop and possibly provide to others. In 1999, the intelligence 
community stated publicly that ``Russia and China each have developed 
numerous countermeasures and probably are willing to sell the requisite 
technologies.'' This would only make the task of developing missile 
defenses more difficult, more time consuming and more expensive.
  So although the ABM Treaty will come to an end after 30 years, its 
absence will not suddenly permit effective missile defenses. That task 
will remain inherently difficult, expensive, and time consuming.
  Furthermore, there may be long-term consequences of our withdrawal 
that we cannot yet foresee, but which may make us less secure. For 
example, two weeks ago it was reported that Japanese officials 
indicated the possibility that Japan may feel a need to pursue its own 
nuclear weapons. This was in response to Japanese concerns about 
China's increasing nuclear forces, which in turn seems to be, at least 
in part, a Chinese response to our pursuit of defenses against long-
range ballistic missiles. Our security will not be enhanced if China 
increases or accelerates its nuclear missile forces, or if Japan then 
decides to pursue its own nuclear weapons.
  Madam President, this is just one recent example of the kind of 
repercussions or consequences that may result from our unilateral 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Other nations will act in their own 
self interest, and if our actions make other nations feel less secure, 
they will act in a manner designed to preserve their security--even if 
it makes us less secure. In a world with nuclear weapons, the United 
States cannot be secure by making other nations feel insecure. If our 
ballistic missile defense efforts make other nations feel less secure, 
they could take actions that would reduce our security.
  We cannot yet foresee all the long-term reverberations from our 
decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. By taking a unilateral 
approach, it makes it more likely that others will act unilaterally as 
well. That is not the best way to increase mutual security and 
international stability.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the correspondence 
between Secretary of State Powell and myself on this matter be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                       The Secretary of State,

                                          Washington, May 2, 2002.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your recent letters 
     concerning our discussions with the Russians concerning an 
     amendment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
       The direct answer to your question is that we did not table 
     a proposed amendment to the ABM Treaty. Although we did have 
     ideas on what an amendment might look like and discussed them 
     at length with Russia, the discussions never reached the 
     point that such a proposal would have been appropriate. We 
     were prepared to entertain any proposal, to include an 
     amendment, that would allow us to do the missile defense 
     testing we needed to do. The Russians, in the end, made it 
     clear that, in their view, such testing would be inconsistent 
     with the Treaty and an amendment to permit such testing would 
     vitiate the Treaty.
       The way out of this impasse was for us to leave the Treaty 
     as provided for by the Treaty. The Russians regretted our 
     decision, but recognized our right to withdraw.
       The President was faithful to his 1999 campaign statement. 
     We spent ten months trying to find a way to conduct our 
     testing within the Treaty, with or without amendment. We 
     could not find a way to do so and we, therefore, are leaving 
     the Treaty.
       This issue is now behind us and we are working with the 
     Russians on a new strategic framework.
           Sincerely,
     Colin L. Powell.
                                  ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                  Committee on Armed Services,

                                Washington, DC, February 20, 2002.
     Hon. Colin Powell,
     Secretary of State,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Secretary: I received a letter dated February 4, 
     2002 (attached) from Paul Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State 
     for Legislative Affairs in response to my letter to you dated 
     January 10, 2002, regarding the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
     Treaty. Mr. Kelly's letter did not answer my questions.
       These are important questions and I feel it is essential to 
     receive clear written answers to them. To this end, I am 
     asking you to provide answers to these questions.
       1. Did the United States ever present to the Russian 
     government any written proposal or proposals to amend or 
     modify the ABM Treaty? If so, what specific proposal(s) did 
     the U.S. present, where and on what date(s)?
       2. If the United States did present any specific 
     proposal(s) to the Russian government, what was the response 
     of the Russian government to the U.S. proposal(s)?
       3. If the United States did not ever present to the Russian 
     government any proposals to modify or amend the ABM Treaty, 
     please explain why that is the case, especially given 
     President Bush's commitment to offer Russia ``the necessary 
     amendments'' to the ABM Treaty.
       I look forward to your answers to these questions.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Carl Levin,
      Chairman.
                                  ____



                                     U.S. Department of State,

                                 Washington, DC, February 4, 2002.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter of January 10, 
     regarding Russia concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
     Treaty.
       As you know, the Administration has been engaged in 
     intensive discussions with the Russians on a broad range of 
     strategic issues including the best way to meet the 
     President's objective of moving beyond the ABM Treaty. The 
     President made clear from his first meeting with President 
     Putin last July, his determination to devise a new U.S. 
     strategic posture better suited to meet today's threats. He 
     explained how the ABM Treaty was hindering our government's 
     ability to develop ways to protect people from future 
     terrorist or rogue state missile attacks. We discussed with 
     the Russians a number of ways in which we could devise a new 
     structure that included the Treaty in many meetings over 
     subsequent months but, in the end, we concluded that the best 
     way to proceed was for the United States to withdraw 
     unilaterally. We provided notification of our decision to 
     withdraw from the ABM Treaty on December 13. As President 
     Putin made clear, Russia disagreed with our decision, but was 
     not surprised by it, and judged that it was not a threat to 
     Russian security.
       Our discussions with Russia on strategic reductions were 
     given added impetus by President Bush's declarations of our 
     intention to reduce our operationally deployed weapons to 
     1700-2200 and by President Putin's positive response and 
     similar intention.
       We will be continuing our discussions with the Russians in 
     the months ahead, with the objective of reaching further 
     agreements codifying the strategic nuclear reductions we have 
     both decided to undertake and providing for transparency and 
     confidence-building measures relating to missile defenses.
       We would be happy to provide additional briefings or 
     information if you have further questions.
           Sincerely,

                                                Paul V. Kelly,

                                              Assistant Secretary,
     Legislative Affairs.
                                  ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                  Committee on Armed Services,

                                 Washington, DC, January 10, 2002.
     Hon. Colin Powell,
     Secretary of State,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Secretary: On September 23, 1999, at a speech at 
     The Citadel, then-Governor and presidential candidate George 
     W. Bush stated the following:

     ``At the earliest possible date, my Administration will 
     deploy anti-ballistic missile systems, both theater and 
     national to guard against attack and blackmail. To make this 
     possible, we will offer Russia the necessary amendments to 
     the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty--an artifact of the Cold 
     war confrontation. . . . If Russia refuses the changes

[[Page S5689]]

     we will give prompt notice, under the provisions of the 
     Treaty, that we can no longer be a party to it.'' (emphasis 
     added)

       On December 13, 2001, President Bush gave notice of his 
     intent to withdraw the United States from the ABM Treaty. 
     Please provide answers to the following questions:
       Did the United States ever present to the Russian 
     government any written proposal or proposals to amend or 
     modify the ABM Treaty? If so, what specific proposal(s) did 
     the U.S. present, where and on what date(s)?
       If the United States did present any specific proposal(s) 
     to the Russian government, what was the response of the 
     Russian government to the U.S. proposal(s)?
       If the United States did not ever present to the Russian 
     government any proposals to modify or amend the ABM Treaty, 
     please explain why that is the case, especially given 
     President Bush's commitment to offer Russia ``the necessary 
     amendments'' to the ABM Treaty.
       I would appreciate your prompt response to these questions.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Carl Levin,
     Chairman.

                          ____________________