[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 69 (Friday, May 24, 2002)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E927-E928]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   BOB STUMP NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                         HON. PETER A. DeFAZIO

                               of oregon

                    in the house of representatives

                         Thursday, May 9, 2002

       The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of 
     the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 4546) to 
     authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2003 for military 
     activities of the Department of Defense, and for military 
     construction, to prescribe military personnel strengths for 
     fiscal year 2003, and for other purposes;

  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to continue with my statement 
against H.R. 4546, the fiscal year 2003 Department of Defense 
authorization act. In my prior comments, I detailed how some quality-
of-life improvements for active duty and retired military personnel 
that I strongly supported were overshadowed by unnecessary spending on 
weapons systems like the Crusader artillery system and the Comanche 
helicopter.
  Unfortunately, as I mentioned in two previous statements about H.R. 
4546, the House Rules Committee blocked any amendments to reform or 
eliminate unnecessary weapons systems from being considered. Today, I 
want to talk about another weapons system of dubious value, the F-22 
Raptor fighter jet, that was fully funded in H.R. 4546. There is no 
threat that justifies the pursuit of this fighter jet program. 
Particularly when the Pentagon is simultaneously pursuing two other new 
fighter jet programs, the Joint Strike Fighter and the F-18E/F.
  I offered two amendments on the F-22 that came directly out of the 
recommendations in a March 2002 GAO report. My first amendment would 
have reduced the number of low rate initial production aircraft from 23 
to 13. My second amendment placed two conditions on the program: 
requiring a reassessment of the costs, and requiring the Air Force to 
monitor key manufacturing processes of the private contractors. Neither 
of these amendments was allowed to be debated by this House. In 
addition to the GAO, a variety of independent analysts have raised 
concerns about the F-22. Even the House of Representatives has gone on 
record expressing concerns. In the House report for the fiscal year 
2000 Department of Defense appropriations bill, the Armed Services 
Committee highlighted a number of concerns about the program including 
various technical problems, the inability to control rising costs, and 
the questionable need for the aircraft. The House report even mentioned 
suitable alternatives to the F-22.
  The problems highlighted in the House report have only gotten worse. 
Unfortunately, Congress seems content to bury its collective head in 
the sand and move forward with procuring F-22s that are too expensive, 
don't work, and are unnecessary. A March 2002 GAO report identified a 
number of ongoing problems with the F-22. In summary, GAO found ``The 
F-22 did not meet key schedule goals for 2001, the cost to complete 
planned development is likely to exceed the $21 billion reported to 
Congress, and the program is not far enough along in flight testing to 
confirm Air Force estimates of the aircraft's performance.''
  The problems identified by GAO include:
  Rising cost concerns: In the FY02 DOD authorization bill, Congress 
removed the development cost cap. Current estimates are the development 
costs will be $21 billion. However, that cost is likely to rise because 
flight testing delays may lead to an extension of the development 
program, and Lockheed Martin's costs, which are borne by taxpayers, 
have increased. Over the last two fiscal years, Lockheed's costs have 
exceeded budgets by $218 million. In addition, restructuring the test 
schedule increased costs by $557 million.
  Delays in testing: The Air Force realigned the testing schedule in 
June 2001 because development test aircraft are taking longer to 
assemble than anticipated, available test aircraft are not achieving 
the number of test objectives per flight hour that are specified in the 
plan, and completion of the test schedule is highly dependent on a 
single test aircraft rather than the three as originally planned. The 
Air Force has a goal of ten test points per hour, but the program is 
only accomplishing seven per hour, 30 percent less than planned. GAO 
notes, ``avionics testing with development test aircraft has been 
limited.'' Only around 22 percent of planned avionics test points have 
been completed. GAO computations show that development flight testing 
necessary for the planned start of operational testing might not be 
completed until March 2004, 11 months later than planned.
  However, the Air Force now plans to overlap development flight 
testing with operational flight testing. But, GAO wams ``there is an 
increased risk involved in the concurrency, and there is still a high 
risk of not completing an adequate amount of development flight testing 
before operational testing is scheduled to begin.''
  The Air Force has also decided to dumb down the testing. GAO notes, 
``the Air Force eliminated and consolidated some test points (specific 
test objectives conducted during flight testing) and deferred other 
test points . . . as a result, the combined total flight test points 
remaining have been reduced by approximately 4,708 points, or 31 
percent.''
  A recent review by the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation 
Center concluded there was insufficient testing completed to assess 
nine of the ten key performance parameters. GAO projects that airframe 
flight testing will have to continue until February 2008 to accomplish 
all the remaining 8,199 test points with one aircraft, which is almost 
four years beyond the current schedule. GAO concludes that the Air 
Force's cheerleading about the success of the test program is largely 
overblown. GAO wrote, ``the Air Force's estimates are based on limited 
flight test data, computer models, ground tests, and analyses. Flight 
test progress has been slower than expected, thus

[[Page E928]]

delaying the confirmation that the F-22 will deliver requirement 
performance.''
  I am also concerned about quality control problems in the F-22 
program. According to the GAO, ``The Air Force has estimated that the 
F-22 should at this point in development be able to complete 1.55 
flying hours between maintenance actions . . . However, development 
aircraft have been completing only .60 flying hours between 
maintenance.''
  GAO also identified problems with the compound that helps make the F-
22 stealthy. GAO noted that even the new formula has been prone to 
cracking and swelling. The Air Force is also investigating a problem 
with the aircraft's vertical tails that could impact performance. GAO 
wams: ``Buying production articles before they can be adequately tested 
can result in buying systems that require significant, and sometimes 
costly modifications to achieve satisfactory performance; accepting 
less capable systems than planned; and deploying substandard systems to 
combat forces.''
  Finally, I am concerned about inadequate oversight of private 
contractors. In November 2000, when the F-22 program office ceased 
collecting information on the percentage of key processes in control, 
the contractor had only 44 percent of its manufacturing processes in 
control. GAO expressed concem about this lack of oversight. ``During 
our current review, the F-22 program officials told us that neither 
they nor the prime contractors track the status of manufacturing 
processes in control because of the cost involved in tracking these 
processes. They rely on subcontractors to manage their own 
manufacturing processes. Hence, the program office may be committing to 
increased production quantities without knowing the percentage of key 
manufacturing processes that are in control. Continuing to increase the 
F-22 aircraft production quantities in low rate production before 100 
percent of the key manufacturing processes are under control increases 
the risk that manufacturing and assembly problems evident with the 
development test aircraft will carry over into the production 
program.''
  In a strongly worded conclusion, GAO wrote, ``The cost involved in 
correcting manufacturing and assembly problems would most likely exceed 
,he cost of tracking and manufacturing processes.'' My amendments would 
have addressed the concerns of the GAO and protected taxpayers. 
Unfortunately, as I mentioned before, the Rules Committee refused to 
allow a real debate and blocked my amendments from floor consideration.

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