[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 68 (Thursday, May 23, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4772-S4786]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 PUBLIC HEALTH SECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE ACT 
                       OF 2002--CONFERENCE REPORT

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the clerk will 
report the conference report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the 
     two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 
     3448), to improve the ability of the United States to 
     prevent, prepare for, and respond to bioterrorism and other 
     public health emergencies, having met, have agreed that the 
     House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the 
     Senate and agree to the same with an amendment, and the 
     Senate agree to the same, signed by all conferees on the part 
     of both Houses.

  The Senate proceeded to the consideration of the conference report.
  (The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the 
Record of May 21, 2002, on page H2691.)
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time for 
the quorum I suggest be charged evenly to both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will call the 
roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, as I understand, there is an hour and a 
half evenly divided; am I correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. KENNEDY. I yield myself such time as I might use.
  Mr. President, today, the Senate considers historic legislation to 
enhance the Nation's preparedness for bioterrorism. This legislation 
has benefitted from the leadership of many Members of Congress on both 
sides of the aisle and on both sides of the Capitol. I thank all of our 
colleagues who have made such important contributions to this 
legislation. In particular, I commend my fellow conferees for their 
dedicated and effective leadership on this issue in the conference 
committee on this legislation. Under the skillful and effective 
leadership of our conference chairman, Representative Billy Tauzin, the 
conferees and their staffs have worked tirelessly to ensure that this 
legislation was completed in a timely manner, and I thank them for 
their efforts.
  Our conference has reported legislation that will provide a historic 
$4.6 billion investment to prepare the Nation to respond effectively to 
bioterrorism. This is the single greatest investment our Nation has 
ever made in public health.
  Many members of the public had never heard of the word 
``bioterrorism'' before the anthrax attacks of last fall showed us all 
how chillingly vulnerable we are to this new form of terrorist attack. 
But bioterrorism was a challenge that our committee had addressed long 
before the terrible events of September 11 and the anthrax attacks of 
October.
  In 1998, my colleague, Senator Bill Frist, and I began to assess the 
Nation's preparedness for the new challenge of bioterrorism. We learned 
of the terrible loss of life that could result from a major attack 
using anthrax, Ebola, smallpox or some other deadly biological weapon. 
In the Armed Services Committee, my colleagues and I learned that 
biological weapons engineers in the former Soviet Union had conducted 
chilling experiments to make these already deadly pathogens yet more 
lethal through genetic engineering.
  Our committee learned that our Nation's preparedness for the threat 
of bioterrorism was dangerously inadequate. Supplies of vaccine against 
smallpox were decades old and insufficient to protect the entire US 
population. We also learned that more and more germs were becoming 
resistant to the antibiotics doctors rely on to treat dangerous 
infections. The Nation's public health agencies were underfunded and 
understaffed. Rapid communication of information about dangerous 
disease outbreaks is an essential part of a national bioterrorism 
response yet many public health agencies lacked equipment as basic as a 
fax machine or an e-mail account.
  To address these grave deficiencies in our Nation's response to 
bioterrorism and other public health emergencies, Senator Frist and I--
together with many of our colleagues in the Senate--introduced The 
Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act of 2000. Congress approved 
this legislation later that year.
  The act was the basis for the infusion of needed resources that were 
provided to help prepare for bioterrorism in the supplemental 
appropriation at the end of last year. I commend my colleagues on the 
Appropriations subcommittees, Senator Harkin, Senator Inouye and 
Senator Specter, and our distinguished chairman and ranking member of 
the Appropriations Committee, Senator Byrd and Senator Stevens, for 
their vision and leadership in recognizing the needs of the Nation for 
bioterrorism preparedness, and for providing the funds that will help 
our Nation prepare for this threat. I look forward to working with 
these distinguished colleagues on our supplemental appropriation and on 
funding for the initiatives authorized in the conference report for 
fiscal year 2003.
  I wish I could say that all the deficiencies that Senator Frist and I 
learned about in 1998 have been put right. Sadly, I cannot. But we have 
made a good start. Public health and laboratory personnel have received 
intensive training in identifying biological weapons. The laboratory 
technicians who identified the cause of the mysterious illnesses in 
Florida as anthrax had recently received such training. Without that 
preparation, it is impossible to know how long the anthrax attack would 
have gone undetected.
  Our legislation authorized rebuilding of CDC's dilapidated and 
obsolete facilities in Atlanta. In 1998, we found that the laboratories 
and facilities of the CDC were in a shocking state of disrepair. 
Ceilings leaked onto sensitive equipment. Offices were scattered across 
Atlanta, requiring scientists to spend time fighting traffic when they 
should be fighting disease. Our legislation authorizes the funds needed 
to complete the CDC's building plan.
  No Member of this body has been a more forceful and dedicated 
advocate for the CDC than my good friend, Senator Max Cleland. He has 
spared no effort in his determination to enhance the ability of CDC to 
improve the health of every American. He was one of the original 
sponsors of the legislation the Congress enacted 2 years ago to improve 
the CDC, and his leadership has been indispensable in including 
provisions to enhance CDC in the conference report. His vision and 
leadership has enabled CDC to become a magnet for new health care 
companies in

[[Page S4773]]

Atlanta, and he has been a guiding force in the development of a new 
business park. Through these tireless efforts, CDC has contributed not 
only to the Nation's health, but to the economy and prosperity of 
Atlanta and the entire State of Georgia. Senator Cleland's leadership 
has been instrumental in adding over $300 million for CDC facilities to 
the supplemental appropriation.
  Public health agencies have received new funds to invest in better 
training, improved laboratory equipment and modern communications 
technology. Medical researchers are using the tools of this new century 
of the life sciences to discover better ways to prevent or cure deadly 
infections.
  We have come a long way since 1998, but we still have far to go. Too 
many communities are still underprepared for bioterrorism. Too many 
hospitals--crippled by savage cutbacks in their funding under Medicare 
and Medicaid--cannot make the investments needed to prepare for 
bioterrorism. Too many Americans are still at risk.
  The conference report that the Senate is considering today expands 
and extends the legislation approved 2 years ago so that we can build 
on the progress we began in 1998.
  The keys to responding effectively to a bioterrorist attack lie in 
three concepts: detection, treatment, and containment.
  Detecting an attack is the key to containing it. Initiatives 
authorized in the conference report will improve the training of 
doctors to recognize the symptoms of a bioterrorist attack, so that 
precious hours will not be lost as doctors try to diagnose their 
patients. The report will accelerate development of new methods for 
disease surveillance, using modern information technology to provide 
real-time reporting of disease outbreaks. The report will also provide 
public health laboratories with the training, the equipment, and the 
personnel needed to identify biological weapons as quickly as possible.
  Once an attack has been identified, we must have adequate medical 
supplies to contain it and treat its victims. The conference report 
requires the production of enough doses of smallpox vaccine to meet the 
needs of every American, so that the Nation will be protected if our 
enemies ever unleash this ancient plague. The legislation also enhances 
Federal stockpiles of pharmaceuticals, vaccines and other medical 
supplies that can be brought to the aid of communities affected by 
terrorism, as was done by Secretary Thompson so swiftly and effectively 
in the terrible aftermath of the attacks on New York and the Pentagon.
  Bioterrorism is a threat to the entire Nation and it demands a 
national response. Our legislation authorizes $1.6 billion in grants to 
states to enhance bioterrorism preparedness in every state in the 
nation. The conference report also sets aside $520 million to enhance 
hospital preparedness for bioterrorism. Since bioterrorism will affect 
entire communities, our legislation encourages hospital planning to be 
integrated with community-wide planning by funding partnerships between 
hospitals and state or local governments. Our legislation also includes 
a proposal made by my friend, Representative Ed Markey, to provide 
needed medications to communities living in the shadow of nuclear power 
plants.
  The report will enhance preparedness for bioterrorism at the 
national, state and local levels. Because of the initiatives we approve 
today, American families can go to sleep tonight knowing that their 
security will be enhanced.
  Title II of the conference report provides important, new protections 
against the misuse of dangerous pathogens like anthrax. These 
provisions are a decisive step forward for the security of our country. 
Once implemented, they will assure greater certainty over the 
possession and use of the substances which cause anthrax, plague and 
botulism.
  Ever since the attacks using anthrax in the fall, our country has 
been trying to figure out how this could have happened. And we have 
learned that we don't even know who possesses anthrax in the United 
States. In response, and through the leadership of Senators Feinstein, 
Harkin, and Durbin, we've added significant new authority for the CDC 
and the Department of Agriculture to oversee the possession of anthrax 
and other dangerous biological agents that could be used to harm our 
citizens or agriculture.
  Laboratories will now have to register to possess such materials, and 
they will have to meet guidelines to ensure the safety and security of 
these materials. Individuals who work with these materials in labs will 
now be screened to see whether they are terrorists or might otherwise 
put the agents to criminal use.

  Most importantly, we have enhanced the controls on these materials 
while preserving the ability to pursue legitimate research--research 
that will produce the treatments, vaccines, and tests that will protect 
us from these biological agents, should they ever be used against us.
  In light of the anthrax attacks, we have become increasingly 
concerned that terrorists could use food as a delivery vehicle for one 
of these agents, or that terrorists could attack with biological agents 
capable of crippling or destroying our food supply and our agricultural 
economy. And so, we have given the FDA more funding and substantial new 
authority to protect the food we eat, and the USDA more funding to 
enhance the security of the food supply and agribusiness.
  I am proud of these accomplishments. In the hands of the FDA, these 
provisions will be at work every day to better protect the health and 
safety of Americans. They will prevent deliberate attacks on our 
country, and they will help reduce our country's epidemic of foodborne 
illness. By some estimates, contaminated food in our country causes 76 
million illnesses, 325,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths each and 
every year.
  For many years, Senators Clinton, Durbin, Mikulski and Reed have 
understood this problem and have long championed strong, new food 
safety authority and resources for the FDA. Senator Durbin has made 
this a top priority throughout his congressional career in both the 
House and Senate. For years, Senator Mikulski and I have sought new 
authorities over imported foods.
  Thanks to the provisions in this legislation, the American public 
will greatly benefit from what has been rightly described by the New 
York Times as ``the most significant expansion of federal authority 
over the food industry in more than six decades.''
  FDA will have new authority to prevent unsafe food from entering the 
country, new authority to inspect food records and require additional 
records to assist in tracing the origins of foodborne illness, and new 
authority to register food manufacturers. And we've provided for grants 
to States for food inspections and for surveillance and detection of 
outbreaks of foodborne illness.
  FDA also has more authority to track imported drugs, and authority to 
monitor more closely bulk ingredients of drugs, medical devices, and 
foods that are imported for export to ensure that these products are 
not diverted into domestic commerce.
  Just as we have focused attention on securing our Nation's food 
supply, Senator Jeffords has led our efforts to secure our Nation's 
water supply. Thanks to Senator Jeffords' patient and deliberative 
efforts, this legislation will better protect the American public. As 
chairman of the Environment and Public Works Committee, our colleague 
worked closely with the ranking member, Senator Bob Smith, on 
provisions to anticipate and prevent vulnerabilities in our water 
supply. Their careful work will fund and enable community water systems 
across the country to assess their vulnerabilities, address immediate 
and urgent security needs, and carefully plan for potential terrorist 
attack.
  I am also happy to note that the conference report includes S. 1275, 
``The Community Access to Emergency Defibrillation Act'' authored by 
myself and Senator Frist. This important legislation has the 
demonstrated potential to save two of thousands of lives annually and 
is strongly endorsed by the American Heart Association.
  I am very pleased we have reauthorized the Prescription Drug User Fee 
Act, PDUFA, for the second time. When I authored the Prescription Drug 
User Fee Act of 1992 with Congressmen Dingell and Waxman and Senator 
Hatch, I hoped this law would provide urgently needed funds to the Food 
and Drug Administration to speed the review of new drugs. Before user 
fees

[[Page S4774]]

were enacted, FDA was short staffed and underfunded. Every beneficial 
drug delayed because FDA had insufficient staff to act promptly 
represented a therapeutic opportunity denied to patients and consumers.
  The past decade has more than fulfilled my hopes and expectations. 
The FDA has done a remarkable job of reviewing new drugs in a rapid but 
deliberative manner. Patients have benefitted from the agency's 
dramatic success in speeding drug reviews, and this legislation 
promises to continue this track record of success.
  At the same time that speedier approvals have benefitted patients, 
there have been growing concerns over whether faster speed to market 
for drugs has come with heightened risks to patients. The fact that 
more new drugs have reached American consumers first in the world means 
they are also the first to be exposed to new risks and new safety 
concerns. A recent Pulitzer Prize-winning investigation by David 
Willman of the Los Angeles Times documented the urgent need to balance 
rapid approval of drugs with an equal commitment to assuring safety.
  This concern is substantiated by a recent General Accounting Office 
study which I requested on the user fee program. According to GAO, the 
proportion of safety-related drug withdrawals has increased for drugs 
approved under PDUFA II compared to drugs approved under the first 
PDUFA. While only 1.6 percent of drugs approved from 1993 through 1996 
were withdrawn for safety reasons, over 5 percent of drugs approved 
from 1997 through 2000 were withdrawn due to safety. While the number 
of drugs involved is still small only seven in the latter period 
compared to two in the earlier period--this report is still an 
important caution and a substantial increase in our investment in drug 
safety is warranted.
  These are the issues I have shared and discussed for years with 
patient advocates, consumer groups and independent scientists. And for 
many years, I have made clear that we must restore public confidence in 
the FDA's stewardship of prescription drugs. Our dramatic investments 
in drug reviews had to be matched by a corresponding renewal of effort 
in post-marketing surveillance and drug safety. Anything less would 
only serve to cast doubts on the integrity of FDA's regulation of drug 
safety.
  In the past year, our committee, including Senators Reed, Clinton, 
Bingaman, Mikulski, Harkin, Dodd, and Edwards, worked closely with the 
Patient and Consumer Coalition and with independent drug safety experts 
to develop solutions. We found that our concerns were shared by our 
colleagues in the House, including Congressmen Dingell, Brown, Waxman 
and Stupak. Throughout congressional deliberations on the 
reauthorization of prescription drug user fees, we agreed upon the need 
for additional resources and stronger authorities for FDA. While it is 
important for us to bring drugs to market quickly, we agreed that this 
redoubles our obligation to assure the safety of those drugs.
  Today, I am happy to say that is precisely what we have accomplished 
in this legislation.
  First, the FDA's performance goals relating to the speed of approval 
have not changed. The many review staff hired by FDA with user fees can 
continue to scrutinize the safety of drugs seeking approval. The 
increased fees in the new agreement will be used not to further 
accelerate the approval of drugs, which is already the fastest in the 
world, but to assure that the studies underlying drug applications are 
given the most careful possible scrutiny to assure that the drugs are 
in fact safe and effective.

  The public and my colleagues in the Senate should also understand 
that the performance goals contained in all of the PDUFA agreements are 
not goals for the approval of new drugs; rather they are goals for the 
timely review of new drugs. FDA meets these goals whether or not the 
agency approves or denies approval of a drug.
  Best of all, I want my colleagues to know that this reauthorization 
is a tremendous accomplishment where drug safety is concerned. We will 
increase FDA's drug safety spending by over 80 percent over the life of 
this user fee agreement. With FDA's annual drug safety activities 
currently funded at $36 million, this legislation will ensure an 
increase of $29 million in the fifth year of this agreement, for a 
total of $65 million in annual drug safety funding at FDA.
  To achieve this goal, we have made a fundamental change to how user 
fees are used. The user fee agreement includes a dramatic funding 
increase of $76 million over five years for FDA to plan, execute and 
fund drug safety ``risk management'' activities for newly marketed 
drugs. While these activities would be limited in scope and duration, 
FDA will be able to greatly expand its focused scrutiny of these drugs.
  But in order to give FDA greater freedom of action, we have also 
mandated substantial funding increases for the agency's Office of Drug 
Safety. In fiscal year 2003, the Office will receive an additional $5 
million, and an additional $10 million in fiscal year 2004, with 
increases assured in subsequent years. Since these funds will be drawn 
from FDA's appropriations, Congressman Tauzin, my fellow conferees and 
I are committed to doing all that is necessary to ensure that these are 
new funds and will not be cannibalized from FDA's other essential 
programs and activities.
  We have made other important steps to advance public health and 
safety. In response to the explosion of direct-to-consumer drug 
advertising, we have authorized an additional $27 million over five 
years for FDA's scrutiny of drug advertising and promotions. In 
response to delays in generic drug approvals, some of which arise from 
anti-competitive practices by the brand-name drug industry, we have 
authorized an additional $45 million over five years for FDA's Office 
of Generic Drugs to ensure that generic drugs reach the public more 
quickly.
  We have also squarely addressed a persistent problem with the 
prescription drug industry. For years, drug companies would promise to 
complete post-market, or phase IV, clinical trials to answer important 
questions about their products. These commitments paved the way for 
reaching the market earlier. In the case of fast track drugs and drugs 
approved through the accelerated approval, these trials were mandatory. 
Yet many companies have failed to begin or complete these trials. And 
to respond, FDA's only--and usually unacceptable--recourse would be to 
withdraw a drug for market.
  The industry's track record has been disappointing. According to the 
FDA, since 1998, only four of 109 post-market commitments have been 
fulfilled for fast track drugs. Only a quarter of the industry's 
commitments for standard drugs since 1991 have been fulfilled. And only 
a third of its commitments for accelerated approval drugs since 1992 
have been fulfilled.
  Five years ago, I urged the adoption of new authorities for FDA to 
enable the agency to bring these companies into compliance with the law 
and to ensure these essential trials are conducted in a timely way. I 
am very pleased that this legislation includes new authority for the 
FDA to publicize the failure of companies to fulfill their legal 
obligations to complete post-market studies. FDA will publicize such 
failures through their website, through `dear prescriber' letters, and 
public statements on the late, uncompleted studies and the resulting, 
unanswered questions of clinical benefit and safety. I am hopeful that 
the FDA will be able to employ these new tools to bring about more 
responsible conduct by the industry, and consequently resolve 
unresolved questions of drug safety and efficacy.
  I am disappointed that some of my colleagues objected to addressing 
in this legislation a crucial priority for children's health. The FDA 
has a Pediatric Rule that requires a company, before approval of a 
drug, to study in children the use for which approval is sought in 
adults. It also gives FDA the authority to require, in certain 
circumstances, that drugs that are already marketed be studied for 
their approved use in children. The Pediatric Rule has always served as 
a complement to pediatric exclusivity, which we recently reauthorized 
in the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act.
  But today, the Rule is being challenged in court by parties who 
believe the drug industry should be free to decide when or whether to 
determine their drugs are safe and effective for

[[Page S4775]]

children. The Rule was recently threatened with withdrawal, but the 
Administration reconsidered this ill-advised step.
  That is why a clear signal must be sent. This research is of critical 
importance to children. Without the Rule, less of this research will be 
conducted. And some products, such as biologicals, will not be studied 
at all.
  With my colleagues, Senators Clinton, Dodd and DeWine, I intend to 
pursue this issue in the coming months. We cannot afford to compromise 
the health of our children with half measures.
  Finally, I am disappointed that we could not reach agreement on 
legislation enacting medical device user fees. In 1994, I introduced 
such legislation with Congressmen Dingell and Waxman. But dissension 
within the device industry prevented us from enacting this important 
reform. Since then, the FDA Center for Devices and Radiological Health 
and suffered severe losses in its budget and staffing. Its staff has 
shrunk by almost eight percent since 1995 and it has effectively lost 
more than $34 million in its base funding.
  With support of my colleague, Senator Gregg, we urged the FDA and the 
device industry to seek agreement on performance goals and fees. And to 
their great credit, the FDA and the industry reached agreement. But 
some in the device industry insisted on including extraneous proposals 
that could not be worked out in the limited time available.
  Medical device user fees are a win for patients, the industry and the 
FDA. That is why I am committed to achieving a consensus on this issue. 
I believe that we can enact such legislation, so long as we can 
dispense with extraneous controversies and focus on the common goals of 
restoring the resources of FDA's device center, establishing reasonable 
performance goals for device reviews, and assuring that safe and 
effective devices are approved in a more timely manner.

  The timely completion of the conference report would not have been 
possible without the hard work of the many staff members who worked on 
this important legislation. I particularly want to thank Bill Baird of 
Senate Legislative Counsel and Pete Goodloe of House Legislative 
Counsel. Both of these dedicated professionals worked many long, late 
hours and met many tight deadlines to allow this report to be 
completed.
  I want to also thank Patrick Morrissey, Tom DiLenge, Brent Delmonte, 
Amit Sachdev, Bob Meyers and Nandan Kenkeremath from Congressman 
Tauzin's staff; Katy French, Vince Ventimiglia, and Steve Irizarry from 
Senator Gregg's staff; Adam Gluck, Eric Juzenas, and Lowell Ungar with 
Senator Harkin; Rhonda Richards with Senator Mikulski; Alison Taylor, 
Jo-Ellen Darcy, and Sean Donohue with Senator Jeffords; Deb Barrett and 
Jim Fenton with Senator Dodd; Shana Christrup, Helen Rhee and Dean 
Rosen from Senator Frist's staff; John Ford, David Nelson, Edith 
Holleman, Bridgett Taylor and Dick Frandsen from Congressman Dingell's 
staff; Karen Nelson, Ann Witt and Greg Dotson with Congressman Waxman.
  On my own staff, I want to thank David Bowen for his outstanding work 
on all aspects of the bioterrorism issue. He has been tireless and 
insightful and I know everyone involved in this effort appreciates his 
work.
  I also want to thank Paul Kim and David Dorsey for their 
extraordinary efforts to assure protection of our food and water 
supply, as well as providing better security for potentially dangerous 
bio-materials in our nation's laboratories. They also worked very hard 
to assure that the Prescription Drug User Fee Agreement was a step 
forward for every patient in this country.
  David Nexon, my Health Staff Director, brought his usual energy and 
commitment to the effort. Michael Myers, the Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pension Committee Staff Director, kept his hand on the tiller 
throughout.
  The conference report is a landmark in our national response to 
terrorism and the security threats of this new century. Congress today 
sends the message in one unified and clear voice that this nation will 
not remain unprepared for the threat of bioterrorism. The front lines 
in the new war against bioterrorism will be our health care system. 
Today we take a historic step forward in preparing America's health 
care professionals to win the war against bioterrorism.


                    Amendment No. 3462, As Modified

  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Corzine 
amendment No. 3462 be modified with the language at the desk; further, 
that the amendment be agreed to, and the motion to reconsider be laid 
upon the table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Carper). Is there objection? Without 
objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 3462), as modified, is as follows:

       Beginning on page 208, beginning on line 4, strike all 
     through page 211, line 19, and insert the following:

     SEC. 1143. BORDER SEARCH AUTHORITY FOR CERTAIN CONTRABAND IN 
                   OUTBOUND MAIL.

       (a) In General.--The Tariff Act of 1930 is amended by 
     inserting after section 582 the following:

     ``SEC. 583. EXAMINATION OF OUTBOUND MAIL.

       ``(a) Examination.--
       ``(1) In general.--For purposes of ensuring compliance with 
     the Customs laws of the United States and other laws enforced 
     by the Customs Service, including the provisions of law 
     described in paragraph (2), a Customs officer may, subject to 
     the provisions of this section, stop and search at the 
     border, without a search warrant, mail of domestic origin 
     transmitted for export by the United States Postal Service 
     and foreign mail transiting the United States that is being 
     imported or exported by the United States Postal Service.
       ``(2) Provisions of law described.--The provisions of law 
     described in this paragraph are the following:
       ``(A) Section 5316 of title 31, United States Code 
     (relating to reports on exporting and importing monetary 
     instruments).
       ``(B) Sections 1461, 1463, 1465, and 1466, and chapter 110 
     of title 18, United States Code (relating to obscenity and 
     child pornography).
       ``(C) Section 1003 of the Controlled Substances Import and 
     Export Act (relating to exportation of controlled substances) 
     (21 U.S.C. 953).
       ``(D) The Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
     2401 et seq.).
       ``(E) Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2778).
       ``(F) The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
     U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
       ``(b) Search of Mail Not Sealed Against Inspection and 
     Other Mail.--Mail not sealed against inspection under the 
     postal laws and regulations of the United States, mail which 
     bears a Customs declaration, and mail with respect to which 
     the sender or addressee has consented in writing to search, 
     may be searched by a Customs officer.
       ``(c) Search of Mail Sealed Against Inspection Weighing in 
     Excess of 16 Ounces.--
       ``(1) In general.--Mail weighing in excess of 16 ounces 
     sealed against inspection under the postal laws and 
     regulations of the United States may be searched by a Customs 
     officer, subject to paragraph (2), if there is reasonable 
     cause to suspect that such mail contains one or more of the 
     following:
       ``(A) Monetary instruments, as defined in section 1956 of 
     title 18, United States Code.
       ``(B) A weapon of mass destruction, as defined in section 
     2332a(b) of title 18, United States Code.
       ``(C) A drug or other substance listed in schedule I, II, 
     III, or IV in section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act 
     (21 U.S.C. 812).
       ``(D) National defense and related information transmitted 
     in violation of any of sections 793 through 798 of title 18, 
     United States Code.
       ``(E) Merchandise mailed in violation of section 1715 or 
     1716 of title 18, United States Code.
       ``(F) Merchandise mailed in violation of any provision of 
     chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or chapter 110 (relating 
     to sexual exploitation and other abuse of children) of title 
     18, United States Code.
       ``(G) Merchandise mailed in violation of the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.).
       ``(H) Merchandise mailed in violation of section 38 of the 
     Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778).
       ``(I) Merchandise mailed in violation of the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
       ``(J) Merchandise mailed in violation of the Trading with 
     the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 1 et seq.).
       ``(K) Merchandise subject to any other law enforced by the 
     Customs Service.
       ``(2) Limitation.--No person acting under the authority of 
     paragraph (1) shall read, or authorize any other person to 
     read, any correspondence contained in mail sealed against 
     inspection unless prior to so reading--
       ``(A) a search warrant has been issued pursuant to rule 41 
     of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; or
       ``(B) the sender or addressee has given written 
     authorization for such reading.
       ``(d) Search of Mail Sealed Against Inspection Weighing 16 
     Ounces or Less.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
     section, subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to mail weighing 
     16 ounces or less sealed against inspection under the postal 
     laws and regulations of the United States.''.

[[Page S4776]]

       (b) Certification by Secretary.--Not later than 3 months 
     after the date of enactment of this section, the Secretary of 
     State shall determine whether the application of section 583 
     of the Tariff Act of 1930 to foreign mail transiting the 
     United States that is imported or exported by the United 
     States Postal Service is being handled in a manner consistent 
     with international law and any international obligation of 
     the United States. Section 583 of such Act shall not apply to 
     such foreign mail unless the Secretary certifies to Congress 
     that the application of such section 583 is consistent with 
     international law and any international obligation of the 
     United States.
       (c) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), this 
     section and the amendments made by this section shall take 
     effect on the date of enactment of this Act.
       (2) Certification with respect to foreign mail.--The 
     provisions of section 583 of the Tariff Act of 1930 relating 
     to foreign mail transiting the United States that is imported 
     or exported by the United States Postal Service shall not 
     take effect until the Secretary of State certifies to 
     Congress, pursuant to subsection (b), that the application of 
     such section 583 is consistent with international law and any 
     international obligation of the United States.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Massachusetts for 
his exceptional leadership on this piece of legislation, along with the 
many members of the committee I have worked with and about whom I will 
talk later on as I discuss the implications of this piece of 
legislation. Also, I thank our House colleagues who produced an 
excellent bill on their own. As a result, we were able to merge the 
best of the two which, I believe, produce a superb package, although 
lacking in a couple of items, as alluded to by the chairman of the 
committee.
  It is basically an extremely positive package, and it puts us well 
down the road to addressing what is clearly one of the most threatening 
situations we have as a society, and that is the capacity of those who 
wish us ill--and, regrettably, there are a number of people and 
organizations in this world who wish us ill and would use weapons of 
mass destruction against us, which would include biological warfare.
  We saw, of course, the devastating impact of a biological event with 
the anthrax incident, and the President has been speaking about this as 
he has been moving through Europe on his trip, that some nations in 
this world are continuing to develop biological weapons and may be 
making those weapons available to terrorists.
  We as a nation, whether we like it or not, have to get ready to 
confront this threat. This bill will do a great deal to put us in a 
position to accomplish that.
  The bill is structured around a variety of points, and I will go into 
them in specific detail, but the concept of the bill is basically to 
significantly improve our Federal capability to deal with a biological 
event and prepare ourselves with adequate vaccines and adequate 
research in the area of developing vaccines to confront bioterrorism 
and, at the same time, look to the local communities and the States and 
significantly improve the public health capability of the States and 
the local communities so that they, as the first responders, will be 
able to manage an event should the worst occur, and we will be able to 
deal with it in an effective and prompt way.
  The bill makes a significant commitment of resources well beyond what 
we had anticipated making when we started down this road but which are 
necessary. In this war on terrorism, we cannot look at pricetags, we 
must look at results. It is going to cost a great deal to accomplish 
the results we need.
  This bill, although long-awaited, will definitely better prepare this 
Nation to respond to attacks which use biological, chemical, or other 
weapons of mass destruction.
  The bill provides grants to States and local public health agencies 
to assist in preparing for a biological terrorist attack. With these 
resources, unlike prior law, even small States such as New Hampshire 
are assured the ability to prepare and respond to a bioterrorist attack 
or other public health emergency.

  Because of the importance of State preparedness and the amount of 
resources that have been provided, I intend to play an active role in 
making sure these funds are not just received by hospitals and State 
and local governments but that they are well spent for the benefit of 
the American citizenry.
  An important part of this bill is ensuring that the funds are spent 
consistent with a State's bioterrorism plans. In addition, we have 
already begun oversight of the program and look forward to working with 
the administration and grant recipients as work under the grants begins 
in earnest.
  Further, under section 102, we will help ensure effective 
communication and cooperation among the State, local, and Federal 
agencies by creating a new Assistant Secretary for Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness at HHS.
  Also, the volunteer spirit has always been alive and well, especially 
in New Hampshire, and I am pleased this conference report includes 
several provisions which are designed to facilitate voluntarism in 
preparing for public health emergencies and especially bioterrorism 
emergencies.
  Title I also includes a number of provisions intended to further 
speed lifesaving products to citizens before we are faced with another 
serious threat of bioterrorism.
  Section 121 ensures that stockpiles of products are improved 
immediately so that there is an adequate supply to protect our citizens 
from bioterrorism and other threats. This year we provided the funding 
necessary to fulfill this commitment, and the Secretary is directed to 
improve not just the stockpile contents but the supply chain management 
of and local access to products.
  The bill improves the Secretary's authority to, one, prioritize and 
do research on new vaccines and therapies; two, rely on all available 
forms of proof of safety and effectiveness, including animal trials; 
and three, accelerate approval of these products. This is absolutely 
critical if we are to be prepared with adequate vaccines to make sure 
our citizenry is protected.
  Title II includes the expanded Gregg-Feinstein provisions initially 
passed by the Senate late last year as part of the appropriations 
legislation.
  As the recent anthrax attack has suggested, current authorities have 
been inadequate to ensure the Government can track the use of 
biological agents and toxins such as anthrax and botulinum toxins, West 
Nile virus, and the like, and to protect against their misuse.
  The bill makes critical improvements in the Secretary's ability to 
identify who is handling and doing research with these agents and 
toxins, to ensure they are qualified to handle these agents, and to 
ensure they are not restricted due to inappropriate background or 
current intent.
  The bill also ensures that universities, laboratories, and agencies 
working with these agents are registered, appropriately qualified, and 
have adequate security in place.
  Many of these agents are used in important research or for important 
therapeutic purposes in animals and humans. These uses must remain 
protected and promoted even as we protect the public from their misuse. 
The bill ensures important exemptions, for example, for FDA-approved 
products using or investigating these agents or toxins.

  Title III of the bill provides the FDA with additional inspection, 
recordkeeping, and detainment authority to ensure the safety of 
America's food and drug supply and increases the number of FDA food 
inspectors. Senator Kennedy spoke about this at some length.
  The bill also improves our capacity to prevent, detect, and respond 
to an attack on American farmers, livestock, and poultry producers, and 
certainly Senator Roberts deserves great credit for that. I know he is 
going to be speaking in a few minutes.
  Finally, it provides funds to community drinking water systems to 
allow them to assess any possible vulnerabilities and to institute 
measures to prevent tampering. Many have been concerned about having 
these vulnerability studies go to the EPA which does not have a solid 
track record of maintaining control over sensitive information. We must 
ensure that the EPA allocates resources and institutes procedures 
designed to prevent this information from falling into the wrong hands. 
It would do no good for us to develop these studies and then find that 
terrorists had been able to use these studies against us.

[[Page S4777]]

  Conferees also succeeded in reauthorizing PDUFA, which has already 
been mentioned by the chairman, which has so successfully ensured 
patients timely access to safe, effective, and lifesaving drugs. By 
collecting fees from pharmaceutical companies, FDA can hire additional 
reviewers and support staff and speed the drug review process without 
compromising safety or review quality.
  Under the agreement, the amount of funding FDA receives under the 
program will increase by over 28 percent, and in today's deficit 
environment this will be of significant assistance. Voluntary user fees 
are substantial and essential sources of revenue that the agency cannot 
afford to lose.
  I am concerned, however, that this bill does not include some of the 
following items that are particularly critical to the ability of this 
country to rapidly prepare for, detect, or respond to biological 
threats, including anthrax, smallpox, and botulism.
  In the antitrust area, the Senate bill included a bipartisan 
consensus provision supported by the Judiciary Committee that would 
extend protection to manufacturers of vaccines and their therapies for 
bioterrorism agents when the companies were engaged in discussions with 
the Secretary over how best to meet the unmet needs of the United 
States.
  It is critical these companies be able to discuss frankly with the 
Secretary their capacities and their strengths so that they can have 
rapid research and develop new vaccines and drugs that protect us 
against bioterrorism acts. This provision was, regrettably, dropped in 
conference over my strong objection. I will continue to press for it in 
other arenas.
  In many critical respects, this Nation remains unprepared for 
bioterrorism threats simply because the threat of unreasonable and 
abusive lawsuits has kept good ideas and good products from being 
available to our citizens. Examples include decontamination services 
and cleanup services for contaminated worksites, unavailable because of 
a threat a lawyer might sue the company.
  Lifesaving vaccines also remain undeveloped for these same reasons. 
Respirator manufacturers risk the threat of suit when volunteers misuse 
a mask in the midst of the chaos during a crisis.
  I intend to work for a solution this year with many of my colleagues 
who have expressed support for reasonable liability protections so we 
can bring on to the market the necessary devices and vaccines in order 
to address these needs and make sure our marketplace is able to respond 
effectively to the threat.
  Finally, I note my disappointment that the final package did not 
include critical new user fee programs for the FDA's device on animal 
drug centers and accompanying reforms that would dramatically improve 
regulation of those products. These programs and reforms are essential 
to ensuring that our Nation continues to be the leader in developing 
lifesaving therapies and technologies.
  However, I am heartened by the extraordinary bipartisan, bicameral 
support demonstrated for those provisions during the conference. I look 
forward to working with my colleagues, particularly Senator Dodd, 
Senator Hutchinson, and Senator Kennedy, in the development of a strong 
user fee and reform package. I understand the House intends to move 
this separately, and certainly I hope we will be able to do the same in 
the Senate.
  There are a lot of people who worked very hard on this bill to make 
it a success. Certainly Senator Kennedy was a leader, and he is to be 
congratulated for his foresight in this matter. Senator Frist, whose 
knowledge in this area is unique and brings so much to the table in the 
Senate, was a major player in designing much of this bill; Senator Enzi 
and Senator Tim Hutchinson for their critical role in ensuring the 
capacity of all States, but especially rural States, to have capacity 
to prepare for attacks. Senator Susan Collins played a critical role in 
developing the Senate food supply safety provisions, a role reflected 
in a long history working to pass such legislation. Senator Hutchinson 
also played the single most critical role in the provision protecting 
America's agricultural livestock and poultry provisions. His animal 
enterprise provision, which will protect our folks working on the next 
generation of lifesaving vaccines and medicines, is absolutely 
essential.
  I am also pleased with the inclusion in this bill of so much of 
Senator Hutchinson's legislation concerning improvement in the ability 
to bring antibioterrorism products to the American citizen; Senator 
Sessions for his tremendous effort with regard to the minor use, minor 
species provisions, which would have provided safe and effective drugs 
for minor animal species for which therapies are currently unavailable.
  Unfortunately, this provision was not included in the final bill, but 
it is sound policy and I will continue to support his efforts and to 
pass this legislation; Senator Roberts whose attention to the issue of 
farm policy and the effect of bioterrorism issues relative to our farm 
community was absolutely critical to the design of this bill.
  At a staff level, I have an exceptional staff. They have worked 
thousands of hours, days and nights, and I thank them very much. Vince 
Ventimiglia, Steve Irizarry, and Katy French did a superb job. I also 
thank the majority staff led by David Nixon, and the many people he has 
working with him. Also, I thank Dean Rosen on Senator Frist's staff.
  I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Kansas, Mr. Roberts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas is recognized.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the Senator for yielding. The completion of the 
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act conference report, in my view, represents 
an absolutely vital and significant step forward for our Nation as we 
work to protect ourselves from any kind of a terrorist attack involving 
bioterrorism.
  I also had the privilege of being chairman and now ranking member of 
the Emerging Threats Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee. We 
had witness after witness and commission after commission. We asked 
them: What keeps you up at night? Each and every time when we tried to 
prioritize the threat that faced this country, bioterrorism was listed 
as No. 1.
  I thank Senator Kennedy for his leadership with regard to this bill. 
I echo the comments by Senator Gregg, who has been extremely helpful 
and led the effort on our side. I especially thank Senator Frist whose 
expertise and leadership with the Centers for Disease Control and the 
Department of Health and Human Services, plus his personal expertise, 
is second to none. If he is not the godfather of this bill, he is 
indeed the godprince. So I thank him for those efforts.
  This bill also represents a significant advancement in helping to 
protect agriculture and our Nation's food supply from a possible 
agroterrorist attack. The legislation contains language based on 
numerous provisions I introduced in the bill some time ago. It was 
called the Biosecurity for Agriculture Act. I think that was last fall.
  Specifically, the bill provides funding authorization for $190 
million for expanded agroterrorism research in 2002 and such sums as 
necessary in the future years.
  This language will allow us to significantly expand our research 
capabilities to deal with these threats. It will allow us to expand 
existing research partnerships between the Department of Agriculture 
and many of our land grant universities to develop first-responder 
capability in case we have an agroterrorist attack. It is going to 
create many additional partnerships. It will increase the coordination 
between the Department of Agriculture and the intelligence community, 
and undertake research to develop what we call rapid field test kits 
that will allow us to make a determination of the possible introduction 
of any pathogen or disease within minutes or hours instead of days or 
weeks, as often occurs, as of today.
  In addition, the bill also includes language similar to that I 
introduced to authorize funding for the upgrades of the Department of 
Agriculture research facilities at Plum Island, NY, Ames, IA, Laramie, 
WY, and Athens, GA. These facilities really represent the frontline in 
the Department of Agriculture's research efforts to prevent disease 
outbreaks in the United States.
  Why is the inclusion of this provision in this particular bill so 
important? I am not aware of any specific threat, but the possibility 
of agroterrorism or

[[Page S4778]]

food security attacks is very real, and it has increased since 
September 11.
  Second, we know the former Soviet Union had developed literally tons 
of biowarfare agents that were to be aimed at the North American food 
supply. Many of these agents are still housed in unsecured facilities. 
I have been there. Senator Lugar has been there. Many of the scientists 
are simply unemployed and are willing to work for the highest bidder, 
and that is a grave concern.
  Third, we know several of the September 11 hijackers had significant 
agricultural training. It would be very easy to introduce a disease 
such as foot and mouth disease or Karnal Bunt, and the effects would be 
devastating to our grain supply and our livestock production. Our 
exports would be lost and consumer confidence would simply plummet. 
Food shortages would occur in our Nation's cities.
  This is particularly frightening when we realize that agriculture is 
one of the few sectors of the economy with a trade surplus. Using 1999 
numbers, agriculture and agribusiness-related industries accounted for 
approximately 22 million jobs, almost 17 percent of the gross domestic 
product. The overall contribution to the Nation's GDP in 1999 was $1.5 
trillion. That is at risk. And the cheap U.S. food supply kept the 
total portion of the individual income spent on food to about a dime or 
10 percent--one dime out of the consumer's disposal income dollar for 
that so-called market basket of food. A terrorist attack would 
certainly endanger that.
  The importance of this sector to our economy, and our national 
security, cannot be underestimated. We must take the steps to protect 
our agricultural producers, our farmers, our ranchers, and our food 
supply. This bill represents a very important step.
  I thank my colleagues who have worked with me on this issue. I thank 
the staff of the HELP Committee in working with my staff and those on 
the Agriculture Committee. I thank them for their assistance, including 
these provisions in this legislation.
  I yield back the remainder of my allotted time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, we have learned a lot about terrorism since 
September of last year. We have learned that terrorists prey on 
vulnerability. Our vulnerability becomes their target. This bill 
reduces our vulnerability when it comes to this threat of bioterrorism 
and thus reduces the likelihood of an attack by reducing our 
vulnerability and reduces the potential damage an attack may cause by 
improving and strengthening our response.
  We have learned the goal of a bioterror attack is not only to hurt 
people directly but to paralyze them, to cause panic. This bill will 
calm the nerves and keep order in the event there is another bioterror 
attack.
  This bill addresses prevention and preparedness, as well as response. 
Indeed, this bill touches all areas of preparedness: Protecting our 
food and water, boosting medical stockpiles, and supporting our local 
communities and public health infrastructure.
  This bill emphasizes the local response and local preparedness. It 
recognizes that it is local people who will respond in the event of a 
bioterror attack. It is about whom you call when you suspect something, 
whom you call if you are worried about bioterrorism: The family 
doctors, the emergency workers, the health care professionals. Today, 
with this legislation we make the first people on the scene our first 
priority.
  Over 3 months after the tragedies of September 11 and slightly more 
than 60 days after the anthrax attacks, Congress provided a record $3 
billion in emergency bioterrorism funding. This was in December of last 
year. This was a historic investment. As we have learned since that 
time, it must be only a downpayment toward ensuring that America is 
fully prepared to respond to bioterrorism and other public health 
risks.
  Today, we take another important and very necessary step toward 
securing our Nation with the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act. It is a cohesive and comprehensive 
framework to improve our public health system and thereby reduce our 
vulnerability.
  I, too, thank Senator Kennedy and Senator Gregg for their leadership 
and their tremendous contributions to this conference report. I thank 
our colleagues in the House of Representatives, primarily Chairman 
Tauzin and Representative Dingell, for their huge and important 
efforts. Yesterday's overwhelming vote in the House in favor of passing 
this conference agreement demonstrates this legislation is truly broad 
and bipartisan.
  There is no question we live today in a more dangerous world, much 
more dangerous than we envisioned before September 11, much more 
dangerous than we had envisioned before the anthrax-laden letters were 
delivered across the east coast. We are not unprepared for a bioterror 
attack, but we are clearly underprepared. This bill goes a long way in 
boosting that preparedness and reducing the vulnerabilities.
  We know terrorists around the world, including al-Qaida, are intent 
on using biological weapons against us. We know more than a dozen 
nations--including Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria--have the capability 
to produce chemical and biological weapons, and many have stockpiled 
such biological weapons in the past. We know thousands of Soviet 
scientists who have the expertise to develop biological weapons are, 
today, unemployed, and potentially available to the highest bidder.
  Yes, the risk is real. We know the risk is increasing. The National 
Intelligence Council warns:

       The biological warfare capabilities of state and non-state 
     actors are growing worldwide. This trend leads us to believe 
     that the risk of an attack against the United States, its 
     interests and allies will increase in the coming years.

  This bill is the foundation and framework for our response.
  Iraq launched a robust biological program in 1985 and has admitted to 
producing large quantities of agents and weapons, including 19,000 
liters of botulinum--in fact, 10,000 liters loaded into munitions--and 
8,500 liters of anthrax--and 6,500 were loaded into munitions. During 
the gulf war, Iraq weaponized 100 bombs and 15 missile warheads with 
botulinum, and 50 bombs and 10 missile warheads with anthrax.

  Nonstate actors are also a threat. CIA Director George Tenet has been 
quoted recently in the New York Times as saying: Documents recovered 
from al-Qaida facilities in Afghanistan show that Osama bin Laden was 
pursuing a sophisticated biological weapons research program. U.S. 
forces discovered a facility in southern Afghanistan near Kandahar that 
was being built to produce biological agents.
  Our vulnerabilities remain high. This bill addresses reducing those 
vulnerabilities. Most public health departments in the United States do 
not have staff fully trained in bioterrorism. A recent report showed 
that one-third of public health departments serving 25,000 or fewer 
people had no Internet access, and one-quarter of public health staff 
had no electronic or e-mail. Today more than 99 percent of food 
imported into this country is never inspected.
  The American people, with passage of this legislation, should rest 
easier, knowing that our Government is taking the steps necessary to 
respond to this threat at the local level, at the State level, and at 
the national level. This legislation will ensure that we continue to 
act both rapidly and appropriately to secure the Nation against future 
attacks on our freedom.
  What does the bill do? The conference agreement provides the 
resources necessary to improve the training of those first responders, 
to those doctors, to nurses, to public health officials at the local 
level. They are the first line of defense. The bill authorizes $300 
million both in 2002 and 2003 to strengthen the capabilities of the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and modernize its 
facilities. The bill enhances our national research capabilities and 
helps speed the development of needed drugs, of needed vaccines, 
diagnostic tests, and other priority countermeasures. And the bill 
helps ensure that our national strategic pharmaceutical stockpile is 
adequate to meet the needs of America.
  The October anthrax-laden letters underscored the importance of 
coordination, the importance of communication. The conference agreement 
puts in place structures to ensure improved

[[Page S4779]]

government coordination, as well as improved collaboration between 
government and the private sector. The legislation helps us develop the 
state-of-the-art communication infrastructure so we can more readily 
and more rapidly identify and treat infectious disease outbreaks. It 
also helps ensure that our children and other vulnerable populations 
are better prepared.
  This conference agreement will significantly improve our ability to 
protect our water supply, our food supply, our Nation's agriculture, 
and it will help better track and regulate the use of dangerous 
pathogens within our borders.
  The bill focuses on what happens at the local level, at the community 
level. If you are suspicious, if an attack occurs, you pick up the 
telephone, you call somebody, or go to a local facility. This bill 
underscores the importance of support at the local level.
  The legislation will provide significant new resources, $1.6 billion 
in the year 2003 alone, to strengthen our State and local public health 
systems. We have underinvested in our public health infrastructure in 
the last 30 years in this country.
  As the title of the bill makes clear, this legislation will not only 
improve our ability to respond to bioterrorism but to other public 
health risks, and emergencies as well, whether they be from other 
intentional acts of terrorism, nuclear attacks, chemical accidents or 
attacks, or from naturally occurring infectious disease outbreaks, the 
so-called dual use of the investment that we put in public health 
today.
  I am proud to be part of this legislation. I believe that years from 
now America will look back upon this bill as landmark legislation, a 
landmark achievement, a turning point in our commitment to 
strengthening our defenses, focusing on biological threats.
  As has been mentioned by my colleagues, I am very pleased with the 
reauthorization of what is called the Prescription Drug User Fee Act. 
This important law helps make it possible for the Food and Drug 
Administration to hire additional manpower and expertise to speed the 
drug approval process so consumers can benefit more quickly in a safe 
way from life-saving drugs.
  I am also pleased this agreement includes the Frist-Kennedy Emergency 
Access to Defibrillator Act, an act which has passed the Senate earlier 
this year, a provision which will provide annual grants to deploy 
lifesaving cardiac heart defibrillators in more public buildings.
  My colleague, Senator Gregg, has already recognized so many people 
who have participated in such an admirable way to this bill. There are 
items that I, too, would like to have included in this particular bill 
that are not in the final package, items that I think we must continue 
to address in the Senate and in committee. I believe we need more 
certainty if private industry truly is to become a partner in combating 
bioterrorism. To harness the genius, to harness the resources of 
private companies in these efforts, we should continue to find ways to 
protect companies from frivolous lawsuits and provide pharmaceutical 
research companies and others the certainty that they will not face 
antitrust enforcement simply because they are collaborating with the 
Government and their business partners to more rapidly and more 
rationally develop vaccines and other countermeasures.

  This is a solid bill. It combines sound policy and enhanced resources 
to better prepare our Nation and to provide security to the American 
people. Once again, I commend Senator Kennedy for his dedication and 
leadership. In many ways, this legislation builds upon a foundation we 
began about 3 years ago as we began, in a bipartisan way, to develop 
this issue of bioterrorism. He and I agree that protecting the American 
people from bioterrorist attacks and other public health threats and 
emergencies does require a robust, a reinvigorated public health 
system.
  I also thank and commend the ranking member of the Senate HELP 
Committee, Senator Gregg, as well as the other Senate Republican 
conferees he has previously mentioned, Senator Enzi and Senator Tim 
Hutchinson, for the tremendous work he is doing in the agricultural and 
rural elements of the bill. Other Members, Senators Roberts, DeWine, 
Collins, and Hatch, also were instrumental in drafting this important 
legislation.
  Finally, it is difficult to pass legislation of this magnitude 
without the assistance and diligence of dedicated staff. Most of those 
staff members have been recognized already. I do want to thank members 
of my own staff, in particular Dean Rosen, Helen Rhee, Shana Christrup, 
and Doug Campos-Outcalt, a fellow in my office. I would also like to 
recognize the contributions of Vince Ventimiglia, Katy French, and 
Steve Irizzary of Senator Gregg's staff; David Nexon, Paul Kim, David 
Bowen, and David Dorsey of Senator Kennedy's staff; Raissa Geary of 
Senator Enzi's staff; Kate Hull of Senator Hutchinson's staff; and Mike 
Seyfert and Lisa Meyer of Senator Roberts' staff.
  Finally, with this bill we will take away one of the most formidable 
weapons in the terrorist arsenal, and that is our own vulnerability.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield 7 minutes to the Senator from New 
York.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized for 7 
minutes.
  Mrs. CLINTON. I thank the chairman for yielding me that time. I, too, 
wish to add my words of gratitude for the work that has been done on 
this bipartisan, comprehensive bioterrorism legislation. Under the 
leadership of Chairman Kennedy and Ranking Member Gregg, and Senator 
Frist, as well as a number of others of our colleagues, we are about to 
pass legislation that I think will make a significant difference in the 
health, safety, and preparedness of our Nation. Americans know we 
cannot wait for another bioterrorism incident such as the one we 
suffered last fall with respect to the anthrax attacks before we take 
action to protect ourselves.
  This bill contains a number of critical provisions that will improve 
national, State, and local preparedness. The authorization of a 
national stockpile of vaccines, antibiotics, and other drugs necessary 
in the case of an outbreak or other incident is absolutely essential.
  Furthermore, the emphasis on public health is long overdue, as 
Senator Frist so eloquently stated. This bill will invest over $1 
billion in grants to our States to assure the adequate planning that is 
necessary to improve State and local public health system preparedness.
  I know all of us were surprised when we learned that many public 
health offices were more in the early 20th century with respect to 
their equipment and communications capability than in the early 21st 
century. They didn't have fax machines or e-mail capabilities. One of 
the problems we encountered with respect to our efforts to get ahead of 
the anthrax outbreaks and attacks was, in fact, the inability to 
communicate at different levels of government.
  The underinvestment in our public health infrastructure has been 
unacceptable. Now we are about to reverse it. This is long overdue and 
to be applauded.
  I also appreciate the bill authorizing $520 million to equip 
hospitals to respond to bioterrorism.
  After 9-11, when we had our hospitals on alert to try to take care of 
what we at the time thought would be thousands of injured people--
unfortunately, it turned out to be thousands of deaths and relatively 
few people who were injured--we found we were not prepared because we 
could not perform many of the functions that were necessary, not only 
to respond to the attacks but the aftermath.
  For example, many of the first responders went, after their duties at 
the Ground Zero site, to be decontaminated. There was no 
decontamination system. Many ended up at our hospitals in New York and 
were in very cramped and totally insufficient situations to try to 
decontaminate them before they went back to Ground Zero.
  That is just one example of what we determined was absolutely 
unacceptable, given the threats we currently face. So we will be 
providing training and other provisions to promote the development and 
production of treatments and what is necessary for our hospitals to be 
prepared.
  I also applaud the inclusion of strong provisions to safeguard our 
food supply

[[Page S4780]]

and to provide for the protection of our children. We are finally 
coming into the recognition that we have not protected our food supply, 
now that we are in a global marketplace, the way we need to. These 
provisions that are included are ones that I and others have long 
believed were absolutely essential to establishing a registration 
system for food manufacturers, to give the FDA records 
inspection authority to trace back investigations, to provide for prior 
notice of imported food, to allow the cross-utilization of inspectors--
both from USDA and FDA--to provide grants for surveillance and 
protection, and to improve the surveillance of diseases affecting both 
animals and humans.

  I am very pleased, too, that this bill contains provisions I 
introduced in legislation, along with Senator Dodd and Congresswoman 
Slaughter from New York, to address the special needs of children.
  We know children have special vulnerabilities, and we also know 
biological and chemical agents can have a particularly bad and 
different effect on children because children are lower to the ground 
where we have gases that are dense and inert. We have other challenges 
in dealing with what happens to our children dealing with a 
bioterrorism attack. We have therefore established a national advisory 
commission on children and bioterrorism, and we will do much more to 
try to provide guidance on how best to protect our children.
  I also applaud the provision of $100 million to keep Plum Island, off 
the coast of New York, at its current biosecurity level and to 
modernize and improve the security of the facilities.
  Also, I think it is essential we are adding to our security at water 
systems and expanding the availability of potassium iodide for 
communities near nuclear powerplants, such as Indian Point near where I 
live.
  While we have taken such strong steps related to bioterrorism and 
children and food security and water security, I do have to express a 
disappointment that we were unable to include the codification of the 
pediatric rule that would require the testing of drugs that might be 
prescribed for our children. Senators Dodd and DeWine and I have 
introduced legislation to bring this about. Unfortunately, we were 
unable to attain support to have it included. But we will be taking 
steps, through a markup at the committee level and then with 
legislation, to try to ensure that the drug manufacturers to whom we 
have given access to an improved streamlined drug approval process--
which we all support--also will be assuring us that the drugs needed by 
our children are safe and properly labeled.
  This is a very good bill. There obviously are some features that 
should be included to make us stronger in the future, but I applaud my 
colleagues, and particularly those who shepherded it through the 
conference, for making us, today, safer than we would have been 
otherwise.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. GREGG. Will the Chair advise us as to the present status?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire has almost 11 
minutes remaining, and the Senator from Massachusetts has almost 10 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. GREGG. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank Senator Gregg and Senator Kennedy for 
pursuing this bill. I certainly support it. As part of the fight 
against terrorism, we must dedicate the resources to the growing threat 
of bioterrorism. This legislation enhances the capabilities of Federal, 
State, and local governments to coordinate emergency preparedness 
efforts, to stockpile vaccines and medical supplies, to modernize 
biosecurity facilities, and try to ensure the safety of America's 
health and food supply.
  I worked with my colleague, Senator Pat Roberts, to address the 
concerns about our food supply and vital agricultural economies. The 
agricultural bioterrorism provisions in this legislation will authorize 
the Department of Agriculture to strengthen its capacities to identify, 
prepare for, and respond to the bioterrorist threats to our farms, 
ranches, and food processing, packaging, and distribution facilities 
and systems.
  We have a clear priority to ensure the safety of our food and to 
maintain public confidence. To do so we must identify and quickly 
control the threat to our food supply, currently the world's safest, 
most abundant, and affordable.
  During the cold war, we knew the Soviet Union had bioweapons that 
included bioagents aimed at agriculture. Following the gulf war, we 
know our soldiers showed evidence of possible exposure to chemical and 
biological weapons. From the terrorist attacks on Japan's subway system 
with sarin gas to the recent anthrax attacks here in the United States, 
the public is now acutely aware of bioterrorist threats.
  This bill is critical, both for the results it will achieve and the 
reassurance it will provide.
  The Department of Agriculture will be expanded to enhance inspection 
capability, implement new information technology, and develop methods 
for rapid detection and identification of plants and animal disease.
  The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Veterinarian Services will also 
be authorized to establish cooperative agreements with State animal 
health commissions and private veterinarian practitioners to enhance 
their ability to respond to outbreaks of any animal disease.
  This bill directs the Department of Agriculture to establish a long-
term program of research to enhance biosecurity of U.S. agriculture.
  America's universities that have demonstrated expertise in animal and 
plant disease research in coordination with State cooperative extension 
programs will provide the resources and expertise that will prove 
invaluable in the war on agricultural bioterrorism.
  The front lines of this war on terrorism lie on our own shores, farms 
and fields, and the States where food is produced. However our States 
are vulnerable, they will meet the challenge, and they will help us in 
this war on bioterrorism because they will be able to detect the first 
evidence of an attack to protect our citizens, our economy, and our 
food supply.
  I urge my colleagues to support the bill before us today. I 
appreciate the hard work that went into making it come to the floor and 
making it the priority that it should be for our country.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.


                  MEDICARE PROVISIONS IN BIOTERRORISM

  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, some of the provisions in the bioterrorism 
bill have not received much attention. These provisions affect 
Medicare, Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program, or 
CHIP.
  What we have done here is to give the HHS Secretary the ability to 
waive certain requirements in the face of a bioterror event or other 
public health emergency.
  For example, the bill would give the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services the ability to pay providers for services rendered in 
good faith during an emergency, even if certain paperwork or other 
regulations are not followed.
  In short, the bill gives our federal health programs the flexibility 
they need to operate in times of emergency, while ensuring 
accountability if the waiver authority is ever used. The administration 
asked Congress for these provisions, and Senator Grassley and I both 
agreed that they are needed.
  I also want to add that the Medicare and Medicaid provisions in this 
legislation were hammered out together in a bipartisan and bicameral 
fashion. Although Senator Grassley and I were not conferees, our staffs 
worked extensively with the conference staffs to negotiate these 
provisions.
  In fact, all of the authorizing Committees, both sides of the aisle 
and both House and Senate, worked together on these provisions.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, allowing items within the jurisdiction 
of the Finance Committee to be added in conference is not something I 
do lightly. It is critical that we follow regular order, and that 
committees of jurisdiction hold hearings and examine proposals before 
the Senate acts. This is, however, an exceptional situation.
  In light of the current threats to our nation, we must make these 
changes to

[[Page S4781]]

make our Federal health care programs more flexible, and more 
responsive to patients, in times of crisis. In my view, this is 
important enough to make an exception to our general rule of asserting 
our committee's jurisdiction. Also urgent are two provisions that 
stabilize Medicare managed care plans, which many seniors have come to 
rely on.
  And as Senator Baucus mentioned, our staffs worked closely with the 
conferees' staffs to make sure that we were comfortable with the 
provisions that were included.
  Mr. BAUCUS. The Senator is right. And briefly, in addition to the 
waiver provisions that affect Medicare, Medicaid and CHIP, this 
legislation includes a provision that will suspend the Medicare+Choice 
``lock-in'' requirement for three years.
  Current law requires Medicare beneficiaries to remain in their 
managed care plan for the full year. HMOs and beneficiary advocacy 
groups have both urged Congress to suspend this requirement as a way to 
stabilize this program.
  While I appreciate the argument that a plan and a beneficiary should 
be required to make a full one-year commitment, I don't believe that 
this is the time to implement the lock-in requirement. Plans are 
pulling out of the Medicare program every year. Thousands of 
beneficiaries have lost the plans in their area. Because of the current 
instability in the program, it is my view that Congress should wait 
until the program is more stable before we implement the lock-in.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I agree, and believe that we have got to take other 
steps to ensure that seniors understand the choices they have even 
before the lock-in is in place. I have always believed that informed 
health care choice is the key to a successful Medicare+Choice system. 
That is why I fought hard in the 1997 Balanced Budget Act for the 
National Medicare Education Project, which required CMS--then called 
HCFA--to start a 1-800 number and to send out detailed plan comparison 
materials to every senior every year. I think this program has been a 
success, and I intend to push for additional funding for it this year. 
But Medicare education needs even more improvement, especially before 
seniors get locked-in to a specific plan for a whole year. So I think 
it is important that this bill delays the lock-in requirement. I would 
also like to point out that our doing so today is in sync with recent 
recommendations from the Advisory Panel on Medicare Education.
  Finally, the bill gives health plans an additional three months to 
assess their costs before making a decision to participate in the 
Medicare program. Because of exceptional circumstances with respect to 
timing, we needed to make this change to the so-called ``ACR filing 
date'' now--prior to the time the Finance Committee acts on Medicare 
legislation. As I have mentioned, I am not normally willing to make 
exceptions to Finance Committee jurisdiction, but the circumstances 
here justify such an exception in this case.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Let me summarize by saying that I agree with my good 
friend Senator Grassley, that every so often there are circumstances 
that warrant an exception to our jurisdictional concerns, and this is 
one of them.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I believe that bodes well for our future work together 
on Medicare legislation in the Finance Committee.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Yes, indeed. I look forward to working together in a 
bipartisan and bicameral fashion on all the other Medicare, Medicaid, 
and health issues that the Congress will be working on this summer and 
fall.
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to give strong support to H.R. 
3448, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act. The Nation is looking to Congress to provide the building 
blocks to prepare for and respond to bioterrorism. H.R. 3448 takes 
several good steps to coordinate and strengthen Federal programs and 
help states and communities prepare for bioterrorism and other public 
health crises. As an original cosponsor of the Senate companion bill, I 
am proud to support the final product. The work that the bill managers 
and their staff have done in preparing this important legislation is to 
be commended.
  H.R. 3448 provides $1.1 billion in funding for grants to state and 
local governments to prepare response plans, buy equipment, and train 
health care workers for bioterrorism and other public health 
emergencies, and an additional $520 million for community hospitals. 
The Act authorizes funding and establishes safety procedures for 
scientists to use pathogens for vaccine and disease research. H.R. 3448 
builds up many of the Nation's resources that have been weakened from 
years of neglect and also addresses several new concerns.
  Early detection of a biological threat is critical in minimizing the 
number of people exposed to an agent and the extent that the agent or 
disease will spread. New tools capable of detecting small quantities of 
infectious agents in food, water, air and other vectors are needed. For 
this reason, I introduced S. 1560, the Biological Agent-Environmental 
Detection Act of 2001. I am pleased to see provisions of my bill 
included in H.R. 3448, especially the authorization of funding to 
improve testing, verification, and calibrating of new detection and 
surveillance techniques and tools. Scientists and engineers in our 
universities and national labs are conducting exciting research on air 
and water monitoring and developing satellite-based remote sensing 
technologies to identify weather patterns that contribute to the spread 
of infectious disease and biological or chemical attacks. I am 
convinced that these men and women can develop robust, effective, and 
accurate detection methods.
  Creating a critical line of defense against bioterrorism must involve 
health care professionals. Through hearings and discussions with health 
care providers and bioterrorism experts, it is clear that our doctors 
and nurses are not trained to recognize or respond to bioterrorism. For 
this reason, Senator Rockefeller and I introduced S. 1561, 
Strengthening Bioterrorism Preparedness Through Expanded National 
Disaster Medical System Training Programs. I am pleased that H.R. 3448 
includes our proposal to use the existing emergency communication 
infrastructure, disaster training program, and community partnerships 
within the nation's 163 Veterans Affairs hospitals to train VA and 
Department of Defense staff and local health care providers in 
recognizing and treating victims of biological weapons.
  This is but one way in which the Department of Veterans Affairs 
serves the nation in bioterrorism preparedness and public health. The 
$133 million dedicated to VA will expand these efforts and is well 
deserved.
  Congress has not forgotten the role our local and community hospitals 
will play in such a crisis. We also are working to give our medical 
professionals, public health officials, and emergency managers the 
earliest possible warning of pending outbreaks. The problems we face 
with bioterrorism are not new, nor are they related solely to 
bioterrorism. Our hospitals lack the capacity to handle even a handful 
of extra patients during flu season, let alone hundreds of people 
seeking critical care during an intentional epidemic. Passing the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
is only the first step in making America safer. Now we can provide the 
hard working men and women in public service, academia, and private 
industry with the resources needed to continue protecting this country 
from bioterrorism.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I rise today to support the Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Response Act. This act represents a 
critically important turning point in the readiness of our public 
health system to respond to the challenge of bioterrorism. In many 
places in our Nation the public health infrastructure has been 
underfunded and understaffed. The anthrax attack has demonstrated that 
our system can be overwhelmed by a bioterrorist attack. This bill 
provides essential assistance to our network of local and state health 
departments, public health laboratories, hospitals and health care 
facilities so that they can protect all of us in the event of further 
bioterrorist attack, or of other infectious disease outbreaks.
  We in Minnesota have long been aware of the dangers of bioterrorism 
thanks to the efforts of Mike Osterholm, head of the Center for 
Infectious Disease Research and Policy

[[Page S4782]]

at the University of Minnesota. I am very glad that this bill is 
providing for the kind of bioterrorism preparedness our nation needs.
  This bill provides block grants to states to improve public health 
departments and to get the equipment they need, and to help local 
governments safeguard their communities from these threats. The bill 
also provides grants to hospitals and other health care facilities to 
improve their abilities to respond quickly and effectively to a 
bioterrorist attack. I am pleased that the authorization for our 
hospitals has been increased from $370 to $520 million. I am also glad 
this bill emphasizes getting funds to the local level. That is very 
important. In fact, I would have even gone further in setting aside 
funds specifically for localities. I am also glad that the antitrust 
exemption in the Senate bill has been dropped from the conference 
report.
  As Chair of the Subcommittee on Employment, Safety and Training, I am 
particularly glad that this bill recognizes the threat of bioterrorism 
in the workplace. Virtually all of the anthrax attacks involved places 
where people work, including media offices, the U.S. Postal Service and 
here in the Congress. I am especially happy that this bill includes 
language which I had suggested to direct the National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health to expand research on the health and 
safety of workers who are at risk for biological threats or attacks in 
the work place.
  Finally, I am particularly pleased that my provisions regarding 
mental health were included in this important bill. We know from the 
outstanding hearings on mental health and terrorism, chaired by Senator 
Kennedy in the HELP Committee, that the preparedness and response 
activities for the mental health consequences of bioterrorism are as 
important as all other public health initiatives this Congress can 
support. Recent press reports citing research on the psychological 
consequences of exposure to terrorist attacks, as well as the necessity 
of dealing with ongoing threats, have demonstrated clearly that mental 
health is an integral part of our ability to respond appropriately to 
bioterrorism attacks.
  I am particularly pleased that Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Response Act established mental health response 
preparedness as one of the primary goals in our national initiative The 
mental health provisions in the bill will support federal, state, and 
local efforts to enhance the preparedness of public health institutions 
to coordinate mental health services. The bill also establishes as one 
of the primary responsibilities of the federal Working Group on 
Bioterrorism and Other Public Health Emergencies to make 
recommendations regarding the preparedness of public health 
institutions and emergency service personnel to detect, diagnose, and 
respond appropriately with regard to mental health needs in the 
aftermath of a biological threat or attack.
  A special focus on children's mental health was established through a 
required National Advisory Committee on Children and Terrorism, whose 
responsibilities include making recommendations regarding the 
preparedness of the mental health care system to respond to 
bioterrorism as it relates to children. Similarly, a required Emergency 
Public Information and Communications Advisory Committee will include 
experts on behavioral psychology among its members and will make 
recommendations on appropriate ways to communicate public health 
information regarding bioterrorism. The bill also includes mental 
health training as one of the designated funding activities, 
specifically to enhance the training of health care professionals to 
recognize and treat the mental health consequences of bioterrorism or 
other public health emergencies. And finally, the bill authorizes 
funding for mental health counseling programs to be coordinated by the 
Department of Veterans Affairs to develop and maintain various 
strategies for providing mental health counseling and assistance to 
local and community emergency response providers, veterans, active duty 
personnel, and individuals seeking care at Department VA medical 
centers following a bioterrorist attack or other public health 
emergency. The VA program also includes funding for training and 
certification programs.
  We know one for thing for sure. It is a mistake to believe that 
bioterrorism events cannot have lasting impact on the mental health of 
the individuals who experience them. Let us not repeat the mistakes 
that were made in the aftermath of the Vietnam war, when the trauma 
experienced by veterans and their families was ignored or trivialized 
until well after the optimal time for treatment was past. We have 
learned from the outstanding research funded by the National Institute 
of Mental Health and the Department of Veterans Affairs regarding the 
severity of the trauma-related disorders and the effective ways in 
which it can be treated. We must ensure that all federal, state, and 
local public health efforts to respond to and prepare for bioterrorist 
attacks take advantage of this knowledge.
  I do not believe that mental health problems are a widespread or 
inevitable consequence of bioterrorist attacks. But as we heard from 
the experts at the HELP Committee hearing, we should not underestimate 
the severe impact that these events have on people's sense of identity 
and safety, and how the multiple losses and horrific experiences they 
go through has the potential to affect them for a long while. There 
have been many reports in the media of the heightened sense of anxiety 
and vulnerability throughout our country. These feelings are normal and 
I have confidence that most Americans will be able to deal with these 
crises. But I also firmly believe that the Federal, State, and local 
governments can play a major role in helping people to understand what 
has happened to them, and establish programs for mental health services 
for those who will need it. We in Congress are doing our part by the 
inclusion of these mental health initiatives within this bill.
  In closing, this bill represents an essential step forward in 
safeguarding both the physical and mental health of our nation in the 
event of further bioterrorist attack.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, last year, the weakness of our Nation's 
ability to respond to a bioterrorist attack was exposed. To properly 
prepare for the future, we must begin to think of our Nation's public 
health system as the front lines in our battle against terrorism. 
Unfortunately, our troops were inexperienced, our radar was out of 
date, and we were short on ammunition. Right now we don't have enough 
vaccines to protect every American. Public health officials were 
without the tools and training they need to detect an outbreak and 
rapidly respond.
  Prudence demanded action. That is why Senator Specter, Senator Byrd 
and I crafted and passed a $3.6 billion bioterrorism initiative to 
reverse this alarming trend. As a result of this effort, our Nation's 
defenses against bioterrorism has improved since September 11 and the 
anthrax attacks of last October, but much more still needs to be done.
  As chairman of the Labor-Health and Human Services Appropriations 
Subcommittee, I held several hearings with a broad variety of people, 
ranging from leaders of the Federal Government to first responders to 
our local public health workers.
  As a conferee for the bioterrorism bill, I'm proud of the bipartisan 
work we have been able to achieve on this plan to boost our Nation's 
bioterrorism prevention and preparedness. The initiatives included in 
this conference report will build on the Harkin-Specter bioterrorism 
plan that President Bush signed into law in January, and will 
aggressively ramp-up efforts to keep America the safest country in the 
world.
  I am especially supportive of the provisions in this conference 
report that I proposed in a seven-point plan I released following the 
anthrax attack last fall.
  Specifically, the measure will:
  Increase training for public health and medical officials: State and 
local officials, as well as doctors, nurses and other health 
professionals will be trained in diagnosis and treatment of 
bioterrorism exposure, as well as rapid communication to colleagues on 
case exposure and the identification of trends.
  Bolster vaccine stockpiles: Currently our stockpile of small pox 
vaccines could only vaccinate about 25 percent of Americans, and our 
anthrax vaccine

[[Page S4783]]

stockpiles are also vastly inadequate. This legislation will increase 
funding to increase supplies and improve systems of transport to make 
sure that the appropriate pharmaceuticals can quickly get where they 
are needed.
  Ensure that there are round-the-clock disease investigators in every 
state: A number of states have no full-time experts charged with 
identifying and dealing with infectious diseases. Federal support can 
be used to ensure that every single state has at least one professional 
in charge of detecting disease and notifying proper authorities.
  Increase hospital surge capacity: The conference report will increase 
funding for planning and staffing to meet possible high-volume cases of 
infectious disease exposure. Funds would be administered through an 
innovative grant program that provides support for wide-ranging 
initiatives that will improve state and local hospital preparedness for 
response to bioterrorism and other public health threats.

  Improve surveillance and information sharing capacity at all levels 
of government: The legislation will ensure that all local health 
departments have access to the Health Alert Network. Currently, health 
departments in some states don's have fax machines and Internet access. 
Funding will expand the Health Alert Network so that health 
professionals are able to quickly key in on outbreaks and share their 
information around the country and the world.
  Expand food safety inspections: Through this bill, every domestic and 
importer of processed foods must register with the Food and Drug 
Administration, FDA, farms, restaurants and nonprofit food 
establishments like soup kitchens are exempted. Also the FDA's 
authority is expanded to allow them to stop any food or product that 
may present a public health risk and allows the agency to ban importers 
who repeatedly violate food safety regulations. Lastly, the FDA is 
given authority to inspect food processing establishment's records 
related to food safety. Currently the FDA can only get such records 
through court action.
  Create and maintain a comprehensive database of the locations of 
biohazardous pathogens: Finally, this legislation will for the first 
time require that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and 
Agriculture closely regulate and register the possession, use and 
transfer of the most dangerous pathogens like anthrax and small pox. 
Security standards for these facilities will be established, and all 
people with access to the agents will be screened. Facilities with 
these pathogens will be inspected, and violation of these rules will be 
punishable by strict criminal and civil penalties.
  Again I am very pleased to support this conference report and I look 
forward to continuing to work in a strong bipartisan process with the 
President, Secretary Thompson and the rest of the administration to 
make sure adequate funding is provided for these critically important 
initatives.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, the Senate is going to pass landmark 
legislation today bolstering our Nation's efforts to prepare against 
future bioterrorist threats and attacks. As a member of the joint 
House-Senate bioterrorism conference committee, I am pleased to support 
this conference report.
  Eight months ago, five U.S. citizens died due to anthrax, buildings 
were shut down, and thousands of Americans were tested for possible 
exposure. Our country learned first hand about the need for improved 
knowledge about biological weapons and agents--how to detect them, what 
to do in the case of exposure, and the need for accelerated research 
and development of countermeasures to defend against such agents.
  The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 
Act provides for the development of vaccines and drugs to defend 
against biological agents or toxins, improvement of public health 
emergency response efforts, tightening of requirements for individuals 
who use and possess biological agents or toxins, enhancement of 
protections for our food supply and agricultural research facilities, 
and the development of emergency response plans and security upgrades 
for our Nation's water systems.
  I would like to particularly highlight provisions in the conference 
report to speed approval of vaccines and drugs developed as 
countermeasures against biological weapons, improve security at 
facilities where such countermeasures are researched and developed, and 
strengthen federal penalties for acts of sabotage against such 
facilities.
  These provisions I introduced as part of freestanding legislation 
last November, S. 1635, along with Senators Gregg and Frist. I believe 
that these provisions are at the heart of our preparedness for future 
bioterrorist threats and attacks.
  I am thankful to my fellow Senate and House conferees for working 
with me to include a proposal I offered to provide grants for 
proficiency testing of laboratory personnel in identifying biological 
agents and toxins. Laboratory personnel will be on the front lines of 
our detection efforts, and we must make sure they can identify 
biological toxins and agents.
  All States, including Arkansas, will benefit from grants to improve 
planning and State preparedness efforts, enhance laboratory capacity 
and educate and train health care personnel. I am also pleased with the 
inclusion of $5 million in grants for small community water systems in 
order to conduct vulnerability assessments, prepare emergency response 
plans, and make security upgrades.
  In summary, this is comprehensive legislation and it is needed 
legislation. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness 
and Response Act lays the foundation for significant changes in 
America's infrastructure, training, and response programs to protect 
our Nation's citizens against deadly weapons, particularly biological 
and chemical agents.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, today we will have the opportunity to 
act positively on one of the most important pieces of legislation that 
we will consider in this Congress--the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. I am pleased that 
we are able to vote today on this most vital piece of legislation. Many 
of our colleagues have worked very hard on this legislation but would 
like to take this opportunity at the outset of these comments to 
acknowledge the work of Senator Kennedy, and Senator Frist for 
originally introducing this bill in the Senate, as well as Congressman 
Tauzin and Congressman Dingell for their work in the House.
  From the events on September 11, and the anthrax incidents here in 
our Capitol and around the country, we know first hand that terrorist 
attacks on America continue to pose a real threat. We are not immune to 
the cowardly attempts by well-armed and well-financed groups who intend 
harm upon us, and we must continue to stand strong against those that 
resent our nation's unyielding commitment to preserve freedom 
throughout the world.
  Today, Congress is taking a step in the right direction. The Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 
solidifies the emergency measures taken last fall by Congress to 
safeguard the health of all Americans. The Act greatly enhances our 
ability to prevent and detect bioterrorist threats, and it gives us the 
resources we need in order to effectively care for our citizens in the 
event that another biological attack takes place on American soil.
  The act is a comprehensive, interdepartmental effort to ensure the 
safety of American families. This legislation will ensure proper 
communication across Federal agencies so that all of our available 
resources are put to their best use. As the cornerstone of our 
emergency response to public health threats, hospitals will be provided 
ample resources in order to ensure their preparedness in the event of a 
biological attack. In addition, we have greatly enhanced our ability to 
track labs and individuals who possess materials that could be used in 
bioweapons aimed at people or the food we consume, and there are strong 
measures taken to further protect the food supply throughout America.
  A primary focus of our efforts is to ensure a National Pharmaceutical 
Stockpile, and to increase production of vaccines for some of the most 
deadly diseases, including smallpox. There are also provisions for more 
timely FDA review of generic drugs, and it reauthorizes the 
Prescription Drug User

[[Page S4784]]

Fee Act, PDUFA, an important measure to ensure that newly developed 
drugs are made available to those who need them most in a safe and 
timely fashion.
  I am also pleased that this bill includes language requiring drinking 
water systems across the country to assess their vulnerability to 
terrorist attack and to develop emergency response plans to prepare for 
and respond to such attacks. We all hope there is no need for 
implementation of these plans, but information leads to preparation, 
and I am pleased to have a bill today that recognizes the crucial 
importance of assessing and addressing potential vulnerabilities.
  As chairman of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, I have 
worried about the lack of information within the Federal agencies about 
the security of our Nation's critical infrastructure and facilities. 
For instance, I am aware of one provision in the Clean Air Act which 
requires the Department of Justice to assess the vulnerabilities of 
chemical plants. This provision was enacted years before the tragic 
events of September 11th, but the assessment is not yet complete. And 
recently, in the wake of criticism that our government should have been 
more prepared for terrorist attacks, I read a chilling statement from a 
government official: ``People are saying we didn't connect the dots. 
It's awfully hard to connect the dots if people don't give you the 
dots.''
  I do not doubt that industry, communities, local and State 
governments and emergency responders are taking security measures 
seriously. But important provisions in this bill will enable our 
government to ``connect the dots,'' that is, to understand the safety 
of our Nation's water supply. The substantial funding in this bill will 
provide enhanced resources for completion of vulnerability assessments 
quickly, and in a thorough manner. And by requiring that these 
assessments be provided to the Environmental Protection Agency, we will 
have the ability to evaluate the security needs of our drinking water 
systems and to measure our national preparedness for potential threats 
against our water supply.
  In addition, we have addressed the concern that some information in 
these assessments may be sensitive in nature. Although we recognize 
that it is most often community knowledge and involvement that is most 
effective in addressing a community's needs, we also recognize that 
information in the wrong hands can endanger a community. This bill 
balances these competing concerns by exempting the content of the 
assessments from the Freedom of Information Act, by requiring 
implementation of protocols to secure and limit access to the documents 
at the EPA, and by imposition of criminal penalties upon persons 
designated by the EPA Administrator to have access to the documents in 
EPA's possession who knowingly or recklessly disclose those documents. 
It is important to note, however, that there is not a restriction on 
EPA's discussing the content of the assessments with persons who may 
benefit from information about the security of our nation's water 
supply, such as state and local officials, nor is there restriction 
intended by this bill upon a water system's voluntarily sharing 
information with other systems, emergency responders or communities. 
Our attempt to provide a safeguard against broad disclosure of 
sensitive information does not lead us to conclude that our citizens 
should not have the information they need to protect and inform 
themselves.
  Finally, I had hoped that this bill would encompass wastewater 
systems in addition to drinking water systems. I intend to pursue 
comparable legislation for wastewater systems in this legislative 
session.
  This legislation reflects a remarkable effort that drew from the 
jurisidictions of several Senate and House Committees including the 
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, the Energy and Commerce, 
Finance, Ways and Means, Agriculture, Judiciary and my own Environment 
and Public Works. The many Members from these Committees and the 
conferees are to be commended for their contributions.
  Once again I want to acknowledge the yeoman's work done by our staff. 
In particular I want to recognize HELP Committee staff including, David 
Nexon, Paul Kim, David Bowen and David Dorsey from Chairman Kennedy's 
office; Vince Ventimiglia, Steve Irizarry and Katy French of Ranking 
Member, Senator Gregg's office; and the staff of Senator Frist, 
including Dean Rosen, Helen Rhee and Shanna Christrup, and Doug Campos-
Outcalt. Credit also goes to Debra Barrett, Raissa Geary, Adam Gluck, 
Kate Hull and Rhonda Richards. Finally, I want to acknowledge my own 
staff, Sean Donohue, Eric Silva, Allison Taylor and Jo-Ellen Darcy who 
worked diligently to ensure that appropriate public health safeguards 
were part of this measure, including environmental provisions that will 
help provide for the safety of our public water systems.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President. I rise in strong support of passage of 
the conference report for H.R. 3448, the Public Health and Bioterrorism 
Response Act.
  This legislation will make our Nation better prepared for 
bioterrorist threats and other public health emergencies.
  That is why I am pleased that this bill includes funding to bolster 
the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, including enough smallpox 
vaccine to protect every American.
  We must ensure that there are sufficient vaccines, drugs, and medical 
supplies available to protect Americans against any potential 
biological attack. I believe this bill moves us one step closer to 
protecting every American from this threat.
  It is also crucial that we assist our States and local hospitals and 
health departments in beefing up their systems, including training 
personnel and first-responders on how to respond to a bioterrorism 
attacks.
  This legislation includes $1.6 billion for fiscal year 2003 to 
address these needs.
  I am particularly pleased that the conference report includes a 
provision which I sponsored along with Senator Judd Gregg, R-NH, 
establishing strict new controls for laboratories that handle anthrax, 
smallpox, and more than 30 other deadly pathogens.
  These provisions are the product of extensive negotiations with a 
number of other Senators including, Senator Frist, Kennedy, Harkin, and 
Durbin, as well as House Conferees, and the administration.
  The threat of biological attacks became front page news last fall, 
when deadly anthrax attacks killed five people, infected 23 people, 11 
with inhalation anthrax and 12 with cutaneous anthrax, and shut down a 
Senate office building for 3 months.
  The FBI has poured extraordinary resources into apprehending the 
perpetrator. Over the past 5 months, FBI agents have interviewed more 
than 5,000 people and offered a $2.5 million reward. Unfortunately, it 
has been unable to locate a single witness, fingerprint or a match to 
the handwriting found on the envelopes.
  We still do not know when or if the perpetrator will be found.
  It became clear during the investigation of the anthrax attacks that 
the regulations governing these dangerous substances were too lax.
  Our government did not keep track of who possesses these materials.
  No special registration was required to possess these agents.
  Nor were background checks conducted on the laboratory personnel who 
handled or had access to these agents.
  Under these security conditions, a rogue employee or outside 
terrorist group could easily gain access to some of the most dangerous 
pathogens on Earth.
  To close these loopholes, I introduced the Deadly Biological Agent 
Control Act last fall with Senator Jon Kyl, R-AZ, and a similar 
provision was approved as part of the fiscal year 2002 Department of 
Defense Appropriations bill.
  I am pleased that key portions of this legislation were included in 
the final comprehensive bioterrorism package.
  The conference report has the following key provisions: All labs that 
possess these dangerous agents would have to get registered with the 
Department of Health and Human Services or the Department of 
Agriculture, for animal pathogens.
  The registration process would include rigorous background screening 
by the Department of Justice of any laboratory employees intending to 
handle the agents.

[[Page S4785]]

  Anyone who possesses these agents without obtaining a registration 
will be subject to 5 years in Federal prison.
  The legislation also creates, for the first time, a national database 
of dangerous pathogens, so that the characterization, location and use 
of these agents can be tracked.
  Tighter controls of these agents are critical because they can be 
converted into weapons of mass destruction.
  In addition, to make sure that this list of dangerous agents is kept 
up-to-date, it must be reviewed a minimum of every two years.
  We need these strong measures because in the wrong hands, these 
biological agents can be converted into weapons of mass destruction.
  According to the calculation of some experts, biological weapons are 
pound for pound potentially more lethal even than thermonuclear 
weapons.
  For example, the World Health Organization estimates that 50 
kilograms of the virus that causes the plague, aerosolized over an 
urban city of 500,000, would incapacitate one fifth of the population 
and kill 55,000.
  A 1993 report by the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology 
Assessment estimated that between 130,000 and 3 million deaths could 
follow the aerosolized release of 100 kilograms of anthrax spores 
upwind of the Washington D.C. area, lethally matching or exceeding that 
of a hydrogen bomb.
  In sum, I believe it is critical that these laboratory security 
provisions were incorporated into this bioterrorism bill.
  Any comprehensive bioterrorism preparedness package would be 
incomplete without addressing laboratory security here in the United 
States.
  These controls are reasonable and necessary, given the extraordinary 
threat posed by biological and chemical weapons.
  Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to 
thank the members of the bioterrorism conference committee who have 
worked tirelessly over the last few months to craft this comprehensive 
response to our Nation's needs in bioterrorism. I rise today to make 
one point for the record in regards to this legislation. Following the 
September 11th attacks, Secretary Thompson, under the authority granted 
to him by Section 319 of the Public health Services Act, provided 
resources to rebuild and replenish our Nation's emergency health care 
providers who were directly affected by this terrible disaster. In sum, 
the Secretary awarded over $35 million in grants to hospitals, 
ambulance companies, and other first responders who responded or stood 
ready to respond to the health needs of those injured in the attacks on 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. These awards were made in 
recognition of the contributions that these providers made, regardless 
of their ownership. I commend the Secretary for this action.
  Disaster strikes without respect to hospital ownership. By exercising 
his discretion to award grants to all hospitals who responded, both 
private and public, Secretary Thompson recognized this important point 
and more importantly, fulfilled the statutory purpose of Section 319, 
providing continued access to necessary acute care, Nationally, there 
are 5,194 hospitals, and of those approximately 1,200 are for-profits. 
That is one out of every four hospitals. In many markets, for-profit 
hospitals--not the tax-exempts--serve as the safety net or sole-
community providers and that makes them 100 percent of the market in 
their communities. In my home State, approximately \1/3\ of the 
hospitals are for-profit. If a bio-terrorist attack were to ever happen 
in Louisiana, I can guarantee you that our investor-owned hospitals 
will play a critical role in the response. Those who are affected by a 
bio-terrorist attack will go to their local hospital for help; they 
will not check first to see how the hospital is being run.
  I am pleased that the conferees added language in this bill to 
strengthen the Secretary's authority to act as he did in this regard 
following September 11th. I hope that this administration and the 
administrations that follow will continue to recognize the important 
role that all of our hospitals play in the delivery of emergency health 
care.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I understand we have one more speaker on 
our side who is on the way to the floor. I guess there are about 5 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.
  I wish to comment on the efforts of our friend and colleague from New 
York, Senator Clinton, on the pediatric drug labeling rule.
  As Senator Clinton pointed out, this issue is of great importance to 
herself, Senator Dodd, and Senator DeWine. Senator Dodd, who is 
chairman of the Children's Caucus, Senator DeWine, and Senator Clinton 
have worked very effectively on the question of pediatric drugs, 
particularly on the recent reauthorization of pediatric drug 
exclusivity.
  I had hoped we would be able to secure the Pediatric Rule in this 
conference, but we were unable to do so. The research which would flow 
from this important rule is critical to children. That is why the FDA 
and the Administration took another look at their proposal to suspend 
the Rule. It was very wise of them to review that decision and to keep 
the Rule in place. But with the litigation ongoing, it is still being 
challenged. This is something we in the Senate will give focus and 
attention to in the very near future.
  I have spoken with Senator Dodd, Senator DeWine, and Senator Clinton. 
They know that we will address the Pediatric Rule in our committee in 
the near future. We will talk to our colleagues about the timing. But 
we will try to address it in the near future. We thank them for their 
continued interest.
  So my colleagues understand what is at stake, let me repeat: without 
the Rule, there will be less research conducted on the impact of many 
drugs on children, and some products will not be studied at all.
  Again, I give my colleagues the assurance that we will pursue this 
issue in the coming months. We can't afford to compromise children's 
health.
  Mr. President, during consideration of the bioterrorism legislation, 
there were a number of items which our colleagues raised which were 
included, a great majority of which were strengthened and which we were 
able to include in the conference report.

  I talked with Senator Carnahan about the importance of developing a 
Web site on bioterrorism so that accurate and good information would be 
available and accessible to people across the country. This has been 
included. It will provide important, accurate information to the public 
as a result of Senator Carnahan's legislation. We are certain this will 
be helpful to families, not only in her State but across the country.
  Senator Tim Johnson had some important proposals on agricultural 
bioterrorism. Those provisions were added to strengthen the food safety 
aspects of our legislation. We have included those, not least of which 
calls for the President's Council on Food Safety to develop in a timely 
but collaborative manner a national strategy for food security.
  Senator Wellstone had major proposals on enhancing the FDA's ability 
to protect the public health. We included many of those, particularly 
those strengthening oversight of drug safety and drug promotions.
  Senator Daschle was enormously interested in how we were going to 
protect America's farm families. We have many additional protections 
included in the legislation dealing with agroterrorism, such as mad cow 
disease, which are very important. His work with Senator Roberts led to 
a broad increase in resources and requirements for USDA.
  How much time remains on our side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Wyden). The Senator from Massachusetts has 
6 minutes 10 seconds. The Senator from New Hampshire has 6 minutes 50 
seconds.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, and I 
ask unanimous consent that the time be equally charged.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, for the information of the membership, we

[[Page S4786]]

understand Senator Collins will be coming in a few moments. After she 
speaks, we intend to yield back the remaining time and move to a vote. 
I anticipate we will have a vote on the conference report in probably 
about 10 minutes. We will ask for the yeas and nays. So Members should 
be alerted that we will proceed in that manner.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, in a moment, I will yield to Senator 
Collins. But let me, again, thank the chairman for the expert and 
professional way in which he handled this bill and moved it through the 
process. It is not the beginning; it is not the end; it is the middle 
of the process. But as a result of this bill, we will have put in place 
the mechanisms to produce the vaccines we need as a nation in order to 
protect ourselves from some of the most virulent biological agents with 
which we might be attacked--a very important step.
  As a result of this bill, we will begin the process of significantly 
upgrading all the public health capabilities across this Nation, 
whether it is in large States, small States, large cities, small 
cities. That is very critical because, as we learned so well in the 
instance of 9-11, the public health capability of dealing with a crisis 
is one of the core elements of the first responder, the first line of 
defense when it comes to a situation resulting from someone attacking 
our Nation, especially with a biological or chemical agent.
  So these two basic streams of effort, which are the core of this 
bill--the bill has a lot more in it, but that is the core of this 
bill--are going to make, I believe, a dramatic and significant 
difference in our capabilities as a nation to handle the threat which 
we, regrettably, confront now of someone using a biological or chemical 
agent against us as a nation.
  Mr. President, I yield up to 5 minutes, if she wishes it, if I have 
it, to the Senator from Maine.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized for 4 
minutes.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, first, I begin by thanking Senator 
Kennedy, Senator Judd Gregg, Senator Bill Frist, and all of those who 
have worked so hard to bring this important legislation to the floor.
  I am convinced that the bioterrorism bill to which we are about to 
give final approval will make a real difference in our Nation's ability 
to detect and, in the unfortunate event, respond to a bioterrorism 
attack.
  I am particularly pleased that the legislation includes food safety 
provisions which I have advocated for some time.
  In 1998, in my capacity as chairman of the Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, I conducted a 16-month investigation 
into the safety of imported food. What we found was truly frightening. 
We discovered that the FDA inspects fewer than 1 percent of all 
shipments of imported fruits and vegetables. And we discovered that the 
safety net for ensuring that imported food was, indeed, wholesome and 
safe was deeply flawed.
  We found that an unscrupulous shipper could very easily ship tainted 
food from one port to another without detection. If the system was that 
vulnerable to an unethical shipper, think what a determined terrorist 
could do.
  So I am convinced the provisions included in this bill will make a 
real difference in helping to ensure the safety of our food supply.
  I note that the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy 
Thompson, recently testified before the HELP Committee that one of his 
greatest concerns was the vulnerability of our food supply.
  I believe the provisions that are included in this bill will help to 
ensure that our food supply is safe from a terrorist attack.

  We have a long way to go in the war against terrorism, but this major 
bioterrorism legislation is an important step in securing the United 
States of America.
  Again, I commend the two leaders of our committee and all of those 
who have worked so hard to bring us to agreement on this important 
legislation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, finally, again, I thank my colleague, 
Senator Gregg, and Senator Frist, Senator Collins, and all of our 
Members for their cooperation and their help.
  I urge our colleagues to vote in favor of the conference report.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. They have not.
  Mr. KENNEDY. I yield the remainder of our time.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be.
  All time is yielded back.
  The question is on agreeing to the conference report. The clerk will 
call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Inouye) is 
necessarily absent.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. 
Helms) is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 98, nays 0, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 124 Leg.]

                                YEAS--98

     Akaka
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Cantwell
     Carnahan
     Carper
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     Dayton
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Helms
     Inouye
       
  The conference report was agreed to.
  Mr. REID. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. KENNEDY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________